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ISRAEL'S FIGHT
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WRONG THEN, WRONG NOW

From Cold War dove to retreater in chief

BY MATTHEW CONTINETTI

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

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An Officer and a Plagiarist

The sad thing about plagiarism, aside from the act itself, is that examples are always plentiful. Just a few weeks ago The Scrapbook took note of the serial larceny of antiwar polemicist Chris Hedges ("War Is a Force That Makes Us Plagiarize," June 23). Now, courtesy of the *New York Times*'s Jonathan Martin, we are apprised of shameless theft by a United States senator. The senator in question is Democrat John Walsh of Montana, who was appointed in February to succeed Max Baucus, now ambassador to China.

As Martin's *Times* story points out, "Democrats were thrilled" when the onetime adjutant general of the Montana National Guard, and Iraq war veteran, was named as Baucus's replacement, since Walsh "offered the Democratic Party something it frequently lacks: a seasoned military man." Seasoned or not, however, the thrill of Senator Walsh must be diminishing for Democrats.

Since his appointment, it has been learned that, as adjutant general, Walsh had been denied a routine promotion to brigadier general because (in the *Times*'s words) he had "[used] his role . . . to urge other guardsmen to join a private advocacy group . . . in which he was seeking a leadership role." Then it was discovered that he had lied, in his official congressional biography, about where he had gone to college.

And now this. In 2007, Walsh earned a master's degree at the Army War College, and, as the *Times* demonstrates in scrupulous detail,

Sen. John Walsh

a large portion of his 14-page "final paper"—roughly the equivalent of a thesis—is almost entirely lifted from the text of a 1998 essay by a Harvard political scientist and a 2002 paper produced by four scholars at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

As is almost invariably the case with plagiarism, Walsh is not disputing the evidence—or put another way, he admits his guilt—but is also offering an incredible excuse. A staffer was dispatched to tell the *Times* that the senator's thievery of others' words should "be viewed in the context of [his] long career," and that there were extenuating circumstances:

> Mr. Walsh had been going through a difficult period at the time he wrote the paper, noting that one of the members of his unit from Iraq had committed suicide in 2007, weeks before the assignment was due. . . . The aide said Mr. Walsh, who served in Iraq from November 2004 to November 2005, had "dealt with the experience of post-deployment," but said he had not sought treatment.

Readers will, perhaps, excuse The Scrapbook's revulsion at the invocation of a soldier's suicide to rationalize deliberately dishonest behavior. Readers may also be surprised to learn that production of a modest research paper in pursuit of professional advancement should have so easily stymied "a seasoned military man," driving him to deception. If Senator Walsh wants us to understand his actions in the context of his career, The Scrapbook would remind him that the words of a commissioned officer's oath should stop any plagiarist dead in his tracks.♦

The Progressive Racket

On July 16-19, the online progressive community held its annual "Netroots Nation" conference in Detroit. The irony of holding such an event in a desiccated husk of a formerly great metropolis undone by unionism and unfettered liberal governance was mostly lost on the crowd, and the gathering made no real news until it was over.

AP

Matthew Stoller, one of the founders of the OpenLeft website, which many credit with organizing Democratic activists to shove the party in its current leftward direction, posted a searching and anguished message to Facebook explaining his absence from this year's Netroots conference:

> I know people at Netroots Nation love Elizabeth Warren, but would be satisfied with Hillary Clinton. This is because Warren and Clinton, and Obama, and most political leaders at this point just basically have agreed to not argue about the big stuff. . . . Anyway, I feel very, very alone. . . . But professionally, it seems like there has been a total and utter abandonment of the idealism and optimism that got us started. The movement of which I thought I was a part is now just a mostly uninteresting trade show. Maybe I should have known it would always come down to that. But I don't really believe that it had to happen this way. That's what it means to be an optimist. We'll get another shot, eventually. I believe that. But right

now, I am not part of that throng, and it's very alienating.

Naturally, Eric Hoffer's old saw that "every great cause begins as a movement, becomes a business, and eventually degenerates into a racket" is as true as ever. And only the most delusional utopians among us, i.e., those who thought Barack Obama and progressive ideology were ever capable of hope and change, could be surprised at the current state of the Democratic party. After five years of catastrophic policy failures and an even bigger mess in the Middle East, the party is now perfectly willing to shrug off Hillary's packed itinerary of Goldman Sachs fundraisers and say, "Screw it, let's nominate another Clinton." Stoller's lamentations seem distinctly quaint.

Lest we make Stoller shed more tears into his summer gazpacho, The Scrapbook would like to point out just how much of a racket the progressive movement has in fact become. Last week *BuzzFeed* reported, "Two top veterans of President Obama's campaigns are asking political campaigners to pay $5,000 per person for the chance to learn their secrets and then work for five weeks in an unpaid campaign job somewhere in America." These are undoubtedly the same kind of jobs that campaigns normally bribe idealistic college kids to do with free pizza. Only this time you get to pay for the privilege of spending over a month licking envelopes and occasionally touching the hem of former Obama campaign staffers' garments. Surely that's worth $5,000.

Considering the Obama Labor Department has tried to stamp out unpaid internships and the Democratic party is currently demagoguing minimum wage increases in an extremely soft job market, this attempt by Obama campaign staffers to monetize their association with "The One" is pretty rich. *BuzzFeed* quoted a number of activists criticizing this supposed campaign training program as going against "progressive values." No doubt it's another data point for Stoller and others who think the progressive movement and the president it spawned have lost their way. But it turns out that it's really easy for a movement to lose its way when that movement is founded on the naïve belief that "progressive" is in any way a synonym for progress. ♦

Secret Disservice

Last week, while Israel, Gaza, Ukraine, Iraq, and Syria burned, and the immigration crisis intensified along the Texas-Mexico border, President Obama was hard at work for two days in Los Angeles raising funds for the Democratic party.

That's one problem with this picture—and indeed, it's a larger problem than The Scrapbook will deal with here. But the other problem—the virtual shutdown of Los Angeles and nearby Hollywood/Beverly Hills for Obama's motorcades—is one The Scrapbook would like to address. Especially since a brief video went viral last week showing a woman in labor being prevented from crossing the street to enter Cedars-Sinai Medical Center to give birth. The reason? The Secret Service directed that one of the city's main east-west thoroughfares, which passes in front of Cedars-Sinai, be cordoned off (for 30 minutes!) by Los Angeles police while Obama whizzed by to dine

with bundlers. For the Secret Service, it was just another day at the office, so to speak.

Yes, The Scrapbook is happy to stipulate that presidents are leaders of their respective political parties and, in a dangerous world, that high-ranking public officials require protection. But as we've noted before, the instinct of the modern Secret Service is not so much to protect the life of the president (and his family and colleagues) as to insulate him from the American public. As a consequence, when Obama or Joe Biden or Valerie Jarrett moves around Washington, large segments of the nation's capital are under police siege; and likewise when they're on the road, cities like New York or Los Angeles can be paralyzed.

Secret Service agents and LAPD officers are very good at obeying orders. But the occasional exercise of common sense should be a job requirement as well. It is not just cruel and inconsiderate to prevent a woman in labor from entering a hospital to give birth; it is foolish as well, for it raises public anger at security agencies and undermines support for public officials the police and Secret Service are "protecting."

Would it have been too much to allow the woman in question to cross the street and get the medical attention she desperately needed? Apparently so. ♦

Sentences We Didn't Finish

Vladimir Putin "has taken thugs, thieves, rapists, ex-cons and vandals and turned them into a paramilitary force. He has permitted ad hoc commanders of separatist groups to kill or chase off intellectuals, journalists and other moral authorities in the cities of . . . " (Bernard-Henri Lévy, *New York Times*, July 23). ♦

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Jeremiah Denton, 1924-2014

Jeremiah A. Denton Jr. had three careers in the course of his 89 years. He was a Navy pilot. He was a prisoner of war in North Vietnam for seven years and seven months. And he was a U.S. senator from Alabama.

He excelled in all three, but it was as leader of the POWs at the Hanoi Hilton that he should always be remembered. He spent four years in solitary confinement and was brutally beaten many times. Yet he defied his captors year after year and suffered as much as the POWs he led.

When he and the others were released in 1973, he was the first off the plane. He was smiling. He offered no complaints about a policy that led to their imprisonment. His statement was terse. "It was one of the most remarkable scenes in American history," said Alabama senator Jeff Sessions, who spoke at Denton's funeral and burial at Arlington National Cemetery last week.

Here's what Denton said 41 years and six months ago: "We are honored to have had the opportunity to serve our country under difficult circumstances. We are profoundly grateful to our commander in chief and to our nation for this day. God bless America."

I knew Denton through my wife's family, close friends of the Denton clan for more than a half-century. Like many others, I referred to him as "Admiral Denton," never "Senator Denton." His term in the Senate (1981-87), while important, was not what made him a great man. His actions as a POW did.

It was my father-in-law, Dr. Ralph Beatty, a physicist for the Center for Naval Analysis, who first met Denton when he was a young lieutenant with the Sixth Fleet staff in the Mediterranean in the 1950s. The two developed a strategy for deploying the fleet that revolutionized Navy practice. It was designed to prevent a single Soviet nuclear attack from wiping out a carrier battle group. And the two very different men—a scientist and a Navy flyer—became lifelong friends.

I met the Dentons shortly after my wedding in 1967. Jerry Denton wasn't there. His A-6 Intruder had been shot down as he led a bombing raid in 1965. He was in Hanoi.

What he did there, along with James Stockdale, John McCain, and others, still amazes me. He was a firm leader. He insisted the lines of authority be followed. The POWs communicated by tapping on the walls of their cells. When Air Force pilot Sam Johnson arrived at the prison, he got his orders from Denton. "I'll teach you to tap code," Denton said. "Yes-sir," replied Johnson, now 83 and a congressman from Texas. "I salute you," Johnson said at the end of his eulogy for Denton at the funeral. Then he saluted.

Jeremiah Denton arriving home in 1973

In 1966, Denton was interviewed by his captors for a propaganda film. What did he think of the American bombing campaign? "I don't know what is happening [in the war], but whatever the position of my government is, I believe in it . . . and I will as long as I live." As he spoke, Denton blinked "t-o-r-t-u-r-e" in Morse code, confirming suspicions American prisoners were being tortured. For his defiance, Denton was thrown into a concrete cell in a remote prison called Alcatraz.

Last week, his body was taken to his burial plot by a horse-drawn caisson. Navy jets did a flyover in his honor. The *Washington Post* ran a fine story (with four pictures) the next day, headlined "The defiant POW is free."

Eleven former POWs attended the services and I talked to four of them. What I learned was surprising, but it shouldn't have been. Studies found that nearly a third of Vietnam veterans have suffered from PTSD, a lingering psychological effect of war duty. But only a small fraction of POWs have.

What's the explanation? It's not just that extreme misery—the constant beatings, the isolation, the purposely broken bones—brought them together. The larger reason is strong and resourceful leadership, a chain of command in which every prisoner had a place. And one more thing: The POWs were singularly brave men, committed to their mission and their country. Long imprisonment and torture couldn't shatter that.

The honor given to Denton left me with a worry. The Korean War has been called the forgotten war. Now I fear the Vietnam war faces the same fate, remembered more for the photo of Jane Fonda sitting on the barrel of a North Vietnamese gun than for the courage of hundreds of POWs hidden from cameras. I think the leadership, honor, and unbroken spirit of our POWs transcends the war itself.

An epilogue: Republicans had encouraged another candidate when Denton decided to run for the Senate in 1980. He got the nomination, though some feared he couldn't win. Denton said God had told him to run, but didn't say he had to win. He won by 40,000 votes.

Fred Barnes

the weekly Standard

A Bad Deal

We are in an odd situation. President Barack Obama is trying to coerce and cajole Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, to compromise on his nuclear quest without using America's only possible trumps: more sanctions and a serious threat of force. These negotiations are unlikely to end well, unless one deems any deal better than the possibility of American preemptive strikes.

It's certainly possible that neither more sanctions nor the threat of preemptive attacks will now work with Khamenei, who has shepherded the nuclear-weapons program since he became supreme leader in 1989. He is a cleric of revolutionary faith. He loathes the United States. His religious identity, let alone the Islamic Republic's entire defensive strategy since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, is wound around the nuclear program. Kowtowing to America and Europe on anything, let alone the centerpiece of the revolution's defense, would surely be in his eyes an act of monumental cowardice.

It's possible the administration knows this, which is why President Obama has given ground on every single issue of importance in the nuclear talks. If a bad deal is better than no deal, then it's best not to provoke Khamenei's ire, which could torpedo everything. Fear of the supreme leader and his Islamic Revolutionary Guards, who oversee the regime's atomic aspirations, has fed a vaguely expressed belief among some senior administration officials that Western compromises help the cause of the "moderate" president Hassan Rouhani and his foreign minister, Muhammad-Javad Zarif. This sentiment is never explained, perhaps because Rouhani's own history in Iran's nuclear-weapons program—he and his former mentor Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani were the primary drivers of the program during its formative period in the 1990s—doesn't suggest that the man is antinuclear today. It is a delicious irony that so many folks who lambasted the Reagan administration's Iran-contra outreach to so-called moderates now applaud President Obama's outreach to the same men. Rouhani, if we recall, tried to extort as many Hawk missiles as possible for American hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s. It's a good guess that in the current negotiations his penchant for extortion and mendacity continues.

Let us see where the talks have taken us. Americans and Europeans have moved from insisting on a rollback of Iran's atomic program to recognizing almost all of Tehran's nuclear progress. The West has now recognized the clerical regime's "right" to uranium enrichment. It has bridled at accepting all of Tehran's currently spinning centrifuges (around 10,000). But Washington appears ready to accept several thousand operational machines, along with Iran's "right" to continue centrifuge research and development at the buried-in-the-mountain Fordow site, which President Obama once demanded be closed. The White House hasn't demanded that the Iranians fess up about their massive smuggling and engineering efforts behind the production of their ever-improving centrifuges; Obama appears satisfied with frequent inspections at acknowledged nuclear facilities—no need to challenge the Revolutionary Guards, who oversee all of the now-known-but-formerly-hidden sites. The Additional Protocol Plus, which allows for spot inspections of any suspicious facility belonging to a refractory signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty such as Iran, appears too provocative for the White House.

The West has also accepted the idea of a "sunset clause" on any restrictions on the clerical regime's nuclear infrastructure (Tehran has suggested 3 to 7 years; Washington would like at least 10), which means that after the stated period, Iran could legally develop an industrial-sized program with a nuclear-weapon breakout time dropping to a matter of days. President Obama is practicing a novel form of appeasement: Behave now and we promise to surrender later. Perhaps the White House believes that in a decade the Islamic Republic as we have known it will have collapsed.

The administration has also rigorously avoided treating as a major issue in the negotiations the profound concerns of the United Nations nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, about weaponization research. The Americans, though perhaps not the French, have apparently dropped the demand that Arak's plutonium-producing heavy-water facility be converted to a bomb-safe light-water reactor. The "compromise" advanced by the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi—a Ph.D. in nuclear physics from MIT who was probably once, and may still be, instrumental in the country's illicit trade in nuclear technologies—would leave Iran with a reactor still capable of producing bomb-grade plutonium. The Iranians would just agree to inject less fuel into the reactor—thereby making frequent inspections the only brake on Arak's weapons potential. And the White House has also dropped the idea of bringing Iran's intercontinental ballistic missile program into

these talks, even though there's not a single country that has ever developed ICBMs to carry conventional warheads. Iran's ballistic missile program is controlled by the Revolutionary Guards.

President Obama has gotten himself into a real pickle: He has essentially conceded Khamenei the bomb. The only thing really being discussed now in Vienna is timing. As long as the Iranians can engage in centrifuge research and development at Fordow and can maintain a sizable cascade of spinning centrifuges at Natanz, they can perfect centrifuges and cascades. Without an Additional Protocol Plus harassing them, they will be able to build smaller, hard-to-detect enrichment sites. With a deal, the White House surely knows that the European embargo of Iranian oil, which was a near-miracle given the politics within the European Union, is likely to end much sooner than American financial sanctions, which can be calibrated. Once the oil embargo falls, the odds that the Europeans will again have the will and consensus to raise it, even in response to massive cheating by the Iranians, are low. Without the embargo, extraterritorial American sanctions will be much more difficult to maintain, especially against European companies wanting to do business in Iran. Rouhani, who loves to opine about the need to play Europeans against Americans, may prove right: The Joint Plan of Action, signed by the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Iran in Geneva last November, was the beginning of the end of the sanctions arrayed against the nuclear program. Tehran in effect has won the economic tug of war with the West with all of its nuclear-weapons infrastructure intact.

If Iran were caught in gross violation of a nuclear deal, President Obama, assuming he were still in office, might bomb. But what if the Iranians go slow on Arak while gradually increasing the number of centrifuges? If the administration has accepted 19,000 installed centrifuges at Natanz, it's likely it will accept 38,000 centrifuges. The Iranians don't need to increase the enrichment rate of uranium—a 20 percent stockpile is irrelevant if they are increasing the number and quality of their centrifuges and don't care about rapidly manufacturing nuclear weapons right now. Diversion will become much easier, even at monitored sites, as centrifuge numbers go up; clandestine production will become a *fait accompli* if nuclear technicians can continue to improve enrichment efficiency and accordingly shrink the size of cascades.

So what is to be done? Khamenei could still reject any Western compromise that doesn't meet his demands. The supreme leader loves to stick it to the Americans. The Persian fable of the tortoise and the scorpion captures Khamenei's disposition to damn national interests for the survival of his more compelling religious ones. The scorpion can't resist striking the tortoise that has agreed to give it a ride across a river. The tortoise's neck is too close; the instinct to attack is too strong. Yet there is a limit to American and French acquiescence to Iranian demands. It's not clear exactly what that limit is, but it's a good guess that President Obama can't compromise much more on the number of centrifuges spinning or on a "sunset" clause. If Khamenei says no, then the president can try to revamp his coercive diplomacy.

But it's probably impossible for the president to credibly reassert the threat of force in these negotiations even if he wanted to. Given what's happened in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine, the only thing that would rebuild fear of Washington now would be a military operation of significant size. A preemptive strike against Iran's nuclear sites would do it. But barring gross stupidity on Khamenei's part, that's not happening.

Congress could try again to push more sanctions. There is, however, near zero chance of that before the new November deadline for the Joint Plan of Action. Even a staunch Iranian-skeptic and sanctions-backer like Democratic senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey got spooked when the administration and its left-wing allies led a warmongering charge against Democratic senators who wanted new sanctions to be triggered by a failure of the nuclear talks. That will unquestionably be the White House's game plan if Khamenei decides to let the administration surrender with some face. Nonetheless, Congress can and should harass the administration if it continues to go south in these nuclear talks. It might make a difference. And any agreement could well fall apart after it's signed: The Iranians may find even a sweetheart deal difficult to accept over time.

Republicans and Democrats have so far assiduously avoided the great debate: Are they willing to support preemptive military strikes against the Iranian regime's nuclear sites? This debate would have surely raged sooner had President Obama not neutralized much of the left by his assertion that he would not tolerate a nuclear Iran. Many on the left who have ardently backed nuclear negotiations would have been arguing that nuclear weapons in Khamenei's hands are less dangerous than American preemption. Both Democrats and Republicans have wanted to believe that sanctions might solve this conundrum, that economic warfare could be the answer to our post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan angst. But the modern Middle East hasn't been kind to those who see economics as the primary driver of men.

This debate may heat up come November. It depends on Khamenei. Can he accept victory slowly delivered? Just a few thousand centrifuges and just a few years separate him from a rather impressive triumph over the West. He recently enjoyed his seventy-fifth birthday. Old men can go either way. They can see a long way out; they can also be acutely impatient given their onrushing mortality. With Khamenei, it's best to bet on the scorpion: President Obama has become such a tempting target.

—Reuel Marc Gerecht

A New Disorder

Moments of clarity often come when you least expect them. In a speech to contributors last week in Seattle, Barack Obama made the case that his presidency has made America better. In most respects, it was precisely the kind of political pablum you'd expect from a president who seems more concerned with legacy-polishing than governing. He ticked off his accomplishments, a list that was equal parts premature celebration (deficit reduction), hyperbole (Obamacare), and borrowed glory (rising college attendance, a strong stock market, increased energy production).

Even if few in this fawning crowd were going to question him, circumstances required the president to acknowledge the growing tumult around the world. Despite all of this success, he conceded, there are some "big challenges overseas" that have some people anxious.

What are these big challenges and why are we facing them? It's worth quoting the entire passage:

> I am very proud that we have ended one war, and by the end of this year we will have ended both wars that I inherited before I came into office. (Applause.) But whether people see what's happening in Ukraine, and Russia's aggression towards its neighbors in the manner in which it's financing and arming separatists; to what's happened in Syria—the devastation that Assad has wrought on his own people; to the failure in Iraq for Sunni and Shia and Kurd to compromise—although we're trying to see if we can put together a government that actually can function; to ongoing terrorist threats; to what's happening in Israel and Gaza. Part of people's concern is just the sense that around the world the old order isn't holding and we're not quite yet to where we need to be in terms of a new order that's based on a different set of principles, that's based on a sense of common humanity, that's based on economies that work for all people.

These are remarkable words from an American president. They suggest that Obama either doesn't appreciate the causal relationship between his policies and the current crises—or doesn't care. He is proud that he has brought about the "end" of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but he seems not to understand that the unrest he goes on to describe is their direct result: *How* those wars ended shapes how others perceive the United States and its role in the world.

In Iraq, the president was willing to sacrifice the hard-won gains of U.S. military and diplomatic personnel in the pursuit of his overriding objective—getting out. The United States hadn't created a stable and peaceful Iraq when the president was sworn in on January 20, 2009. But we had largely defeated our enemies there, and even opponents of the war acknowledged the very real prospect of a relatively secure, democratic Iraq. We lost Iraq by choice.

Afghanistan might be worse. In the early days of the administration, the president and his team described the outcome of that war as crucial to U.S. national security. The goals of U.S. military and diplomatic efforts there—eliminating safe haven for al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and reversing the momentum of the Taliban—were essential to keeping Americans safe here at home. But Obama long ago made clear that he was more interested in ending the war than in winning it. In his December 1, 2009, speech at West Point, the president announced the troop surge and the withdrawal in the same breath. Today, U.S. troops are coming home, U.S. objectives remain unfulfilled, and President Obama dismissively refers to Afghanistan as just one of the wars he "inherited."

It's not just the wars. With remarkable consistency, Obama has demonstrated that he is unwilling to accept the responsibilities that come with being the world's only superpower. We said little as the Iranian regime put down a democratic revolution in 2009, for fear of accusations of "meddling." We watched as Assad began to kill his citizens by the thousand, calling plaintively for restraint. When the Russian military rolled into Crimea in an audacious land-grab, we announced our disapproval and pushed for sanctions that we knew—that everyone knew—would have little effect beyond allowing us to say we pushed for sanctions.

In Obama's telling, the chaos Americans see on their television screens every night—more than 150,000 slaughtered in Syria, a terrorist army taking over major cities in Iraq, dozens of rockets daily targeting citizens of Israel, nearly 300 innocent travelers dead after a surface-to-air missile downs a passenger plane, and continued Russian aggression—is just part of a natural evolution. In the old world order, the United States played a dominant role. In the new one, we will not. With a rhetorical shrug of his shoulders, Obama says that these things may be unpleasant, but better days are ahead—a new order based on a "different set of principles" with "economies that work for all people" and a "sense of common humanity."

These views are a radical departure from decades of bipartisan U.S. national security and foreign policy, and they can't be dismissed as just the careless ramblings of a president who has checked out. He's said much the same thing before. In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 2009, Obama declared: "In an era when our destiny is shared, power is no longer a zero-sum game. No one nation can or should try to dominate another nation. No world order that elevates one nation or group of people over another will succeed. No balance of power among nations will hold."

This is naïve and dangerous. There are serious consequences to the United States relinquishing power and influence. We're living them—and so are people in the rest of the world.

—Stephen F. Hayes

No Sword, No Justice

On Tuesday, President Obama visited the Dutch embassy in Washington to pay his respects to the victims of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, shot down over Ukraine by forces armed and backed by Vladimir Putin. Obama wrote in the embassy's condolence book, "We will not rest until we are certain that justice is done."

Then he rested.

Actually, that's not fair. Obama didn't rest. He flew off to the West Coast on a busy fundraising trip.

The sad fact is that justice will not be done with respect to Putin or his executioners. Justice won't be done in part because President Obama won't lift a finger to do it. Indeed, a couple of days after the president's edifying if passive formulation in the condolence book, Obama administration officials weren't even pretending they had much intention of doing anything significant. Perhaps that's what Obama meant when he promised Putin he'd have more "flexibility" after his reelection. Flexibility turns out to mean saying you won't rest until justice is done—and then doing nothing. It means presenting to the world what Leo Strauss wrote of Weimar Germany, "the sorry spectacle of justice without a sword or of justice unable to use the sword." Under the Obama administration, we are becoming Weimar America.

There is, on the other hand, one nation that is presenting to the world the bracing spectacle of justice able and willing to use the sword: Israel. Israel is fighting a war against Islamic terror. Naturally the administration isn't happy about this. As Obama explained to donors at a Democratic fundraiser in Seattle several hours after visiting the Dutch embassy, "Part of people's concern is just the sense that around the world, the old order isn't holding and we're not quite where we need to be in terms of a new order that's based on a different set of principles, that's based on a sense of common humanity."

Based presumably on that sense of "common humanity," Secretary of State John Kerry was, as Obama spoke, flying around the Middle East trying to "mediate" between Hamas and Israel. It's great to be on the side of "common humanity." It protects you from the charge that in practice you often seem to be on the side of the terrorists. Such a charge would be unfair. The Obama administration isn't on the side of the terrorists. It's just not on the side of those fighting against terror. It's in the middle, mediating between the forces of terror and the forces of civilization.

It's unfortunate that America is saddled with a Weimar-type administration. We've done it to ourselves. But surely we are not really a Weimar-type country. It's up to the Republican party to make this clear and save us from such a fate.

This is above all the task of the next Republican president. But it's also the task of Republicans in Congress—especially if the GOP wins control of the Senate this fall. A Republican Congress can stop the free fall in defense spending and military capability. A Republican Congress can make it clear that Congress does not accept an executive-branch-only agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran that allows that terror-sponsoring regime to retain nuclear weapons capabilities, and that a Republican president in 2017 would not be bound by such an agreement. A Republican Congress can stand with Israel in ways that range from defunding terror-friendly elements of the United Nations to countering pressure on Israel to take damaging steps for the sake of a nonexistent (for now) two-state "solution."

Above all, Republicans—even before November—can show they understand the world we live in. The Conservative governments of Stephen Harper in Canada and Tony Abbott in Australia seem to understand. Benjamin Netanyahu understands. What they understand was put well by Douglas Murray, writing in the London *Spectator*. Murray points out that Israel is

> a nation which currently has to do what people in countries like this one . . . used to have to do but seem to have forgotten about: it has to fight for its survival. Israel is surrounded by enemies, as we have been for much of our history. But today we like to think that enemies are a thing of the past. There are no enemies, just phobias we haven't been cured of yet.
>
> Today Israel is also distinguished by a deep sense of its values and ethics as well as a profound awareness of their source—things we also used to have. Deep questions of survival, the tragedy and triumph of the past, present and future remain the stuff of every Israeli house I have ever been to. . . .
>
> [I]t is Israel that remains the truly western country. It is Israel which takes its history seriously, thinks deeply about where it is going and what it exists for. It is Israel which takes western values seriously and fights for the survival of those values. . . . [I]t is Israel that is still truly a western country. Far more than many parts of western Europe now are.
>
> A gap may well be emerging. But not because Israel has drifted away from the West. Rather because today in much of the West, as we bask in the afterglow of our achievements—eager to enjoy our rights, but unwilling to defend them—it is the West that is, slowly but surely, drifting away from itself.

Israel is fighting for its safety and security. But in fighting terror, Israel also fights for the West. The example of Israel should be a reminder to all of us—but especially to the pro-Israel party, the Republican party—that it is not enough to hope for justice. We need to be ready to fight for justice. And the example of Israel should also remind Americans that we need not acquiesce in the downward drift of the West, a drift that President Obama seems to accept and even welcome, a drift that is as dangerous to America's future as it is unworthy of America's past.

—William Kristol

A photo Hamas doesn't want you to see: rockets ready for launch into Israel

Like a Broken Record

Human Rights Watch sings its same old discredited tune about Gaza. BY JOSHUA MURAVCHIK

Israel's Operation Protective Edge was only a week old when Human Rights Watch charged that "Israeli air attacks in Gaza investigated by Human Rights Watch have been targeting apparent civilian structures and killing civilians in violation of the laws of war." The report quoted Sarah Leah Whitson, the group's Middle East director: "Recent documented cases in Gaza sadly fit Israel's long record of unlawful airstrikes with high civilian casualties."

In reality, the "long record" compounded here was that of Human Rights Watch, which has waged a relentless campaign against the Jewish state. Its current accusations cannot be assessed amidst the fog of war any more than HRW itself can truly have "documented" or "investigated" Israel's targeting under these conditions. However, the credibility of HRW's accusations can be judged from its past record.

In 2006 the group charged Israel with "war crimes" on the grounds that "Israeli forces deliberately targeted civilians." The first of "the most serious Israeli abuses" instanced by HRW's director Kenneth Roth was the bombing of Srifa (or Sreifa) in South Lebanon. HRW claimed its personnel visited the village two weeks after it was hit and "saw no evidence that there had been Hezbollah military activity around the areas targeted by the IDF during or just prior to the attack: no spent ammunition, abandoned weapons or military equipment, trenches, or dead or wounded fighters." It quoted villagers insisting "there was no Hezbollah in the neighborhood." One even said, "Except for one person, who didn't even belong to Hezbollah, no one in that neighborhood knew how to handle weapons."

But the day after the bombing of Srifa, the Associated Press had reported, "In the village of Srifa . . . airstrikes flattened 15 houses after rockets were fired from the area." The *Guardian* had reported the same day, "Srifa . . . was a local beauty spot . . . but it is also in the Hizbullah heartland from which rockets have been fired into Israel." And the next month, with the fighting over, the *New York Times* reporter Hassan M. Fattah wrote from the scene: "A Sreifa official . . . estimated that up to two-thirds of the town's homes and buildings were demolished, leaving more than 43 people buried in the rubble. A majority of them were fighters belonging to Hezbollah and the allied Amal Party, residents said."

This stark and definitive contradiction apparently prompted no self-reflection because HRW acted in much the same manner during the Gaza war of 2008-09, the focus of the U.N.'s famous Goldstone Report issued late in 2009.

Among other outlandish charges, that report claimed that "the Israeli military bombed the [al-Bader flour] mill in a deliberate attempt to damage the civilian infrastructure of Gaza." Israel, it said, sought thereby to starve the Gazans. Israel published its investigation of this accusation and found that the mill had not been targeted and in fact no bomb had been dropped on it. It had, however, been damaged in the course of two-sided ground combat. HRW, which had earlier endorsed the charges, now rushed to counter Israel's explanation, claiming that "half" of a 500-pound Mk 82 bomb had been found on an upper floor of the mill a month after the damage occurred, proving it had been bombed.

But the Israeli report included a photo of the mill, dated the day after the incident, in which charring was visible outside the windows of the floor on which a fire had been ignited in battle. The aerial photo offered a crystal-clear view of the entire roof of

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the building, and it was undamaged: No bomb could have fallen through it. The Mk 82 is a "dumb bomb" and could not have entered otherwise. Its shell, however, could have been lugged into the building after the fact.

Ironically, while HRW's denunciations of Israel are often couched in demands that Israel investigate this or that allegation, it always then dismisses Israel's findings. In this case, it rejected Israel's report and simply ignored the incontrovertible evidence in the photo.

Surprisingly, however, Israel's account was corroborated by a department of the U.N. The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), an obscure office that operates satellites and provides mapping, was tasked with furnishing information in support of the Goldstone Commission's inquiries. UNITAR provided a photo matching those in Israel's report, and it accompanied them with the observation that the "damage signatures" on the mill suggested that "the majority of damage . . . was caused by intense IDF ground fire."

Perhaps because this contradicted the version put about by the Goldstone Commission as well as HRW, UNITAR's report has been removed from the U.N.'s website. Goldstone himself eventually renounced the report bearing his name, writing in 2011: "If I had known then what I know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different document." But HRW did not join him in reconsidering. On the contrary, Kenneth Roth rushed to print with an op-ed vowing: "the Goldstone report . . . will live on."

This shrill defiance betrays the passion Roth harbors about Israel and which is reflected in the staff he has assembled. Sarah Leah Whitson came to HRW from the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, a fervent Arab advocacy group. When the *New Republic*'s Ben Birnbaum interviewed her, he "noticed that a poster for *Paradise Now*, a movie that attempts to humanize Palestinian suicide bombers, hangs on her door." Whitson's deputy, Joe Stork, came from the Midde East Research and Information Project, which he cofounded, an outgrowth of the 1960s New Left devoted to extolling Palestinian terror groups as "liberation movements." *Middle East Report*, the journal Stork edited for 25 years before being hired by Human Rights Watch, went so far as to cheer the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre.

HRW, of course, denies any bias on Mideast issues. Roth maintains that it practices "strict neutrality on . . . political questions." Its touchstone, he says, is law.

But Roth doggedly refused to condemn former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's threats to wipe Israel off the map although there is no more fundamental piece of international human rights law than the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, which outlaws "direct and public incitement to genocide." When challenged on this, Roth argued that while "incitement" of genocide is illegal, the mere "advocacy" of it is not. How to distinguish one from the other? To be considered "incitement," he opined, an exhortation must be followed immediately or accompanied by the literal act of genocide. The Iranian statements, Roth said, "are not incitement to genocide [because] no one has acted on them." This tortured interpretation, however, cannot be squared with the very title of the convention, which speaks first of "prevention."

And despite his claim of "strict neutrality," HRW has gone out of its way to stake out a position on the central political issue of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. It has officially endorsed the Palestinian "right of return," which has little to do with rights and everything to do with Israel's existence. It refers not only to the thousands of aging Arab refugees of the 1948 war but also to millions of their descendants. It is, as everyone understands, a formula for abolishing Israel as a Jewish state, and to endorse it is implicitly to endorse the destruction of Israel.

Of course, that is exactly what Hamas is trying to accomplish. Aware that it is weaker, its strategy is to paralyze Israel's self-defense by mobilizing international pressure. Accordingly, its interior ministry recently sent a directive to social media users in Gaza, instructing them to "always add 'innocent civilian' or 'innocent citizen' in your description of those killed in Israeli attacks on Gaza" and to "avoid publishing pictures of rockets fired into Israel from [Gaza] city centers." In this manipulative strategy, it can count on willing accomplices like Human Rights Watch. ♦

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Police inspect damage to an Israeli home hit by a Hamas rocket, July 22.

Lamar Alexander in the Crosshairs

Will Tennessee's longtime incumbent go down?

BY MICHAEL WARREN

Lamar Alexander at the opening of his reelection headquarters in Memphis, May 30

Nashville

One name is ubiquitous at a July 22 rally for Republican Senate candidate Joe Carr, and it isn't Joe Carr's. Lamar Alexander, the Tennessee senator Carr hopes to defeat in the August 7 primary, practically greets you the moment you turn into the parking lot at the Millennium Maxwell House hotel. Signs and posters line the driveway and the hallway into the ballroom, reading in big letters: "Beat Lamar." The phrase also adorns stickers, buttons, even the nametags for those of us in the press covering the event.

The rally's special guest is focused like a laser on Alexander, too. Radio host Laura Ingraham, whose appearance has made this the biggest day yet in Joe Carr's Senate campaign, barely mentions Carr until halfway through her speech. Before that, she lays into Alexander for a solid 27 minutes, mocking the senator for a campaign ad last year that touted his Freedom to Fish Act allowing Tennesseans to fish below the state's federally administered dams. She feigns admiration for the senator's work on the law, saying it's put her in an angling mood.

"I am here in Tennessee to hook a big one," Ingraham declares, as the 700 or so people in the ballroom cheer and whoop and holler and leap to their feet.

Ingraham isn't exaggerating: The 74-year-old Alexander is a political institution in the Volunteer State. During his first successful run for governor in 1978, he walked more than 1,000 miles across the long state, from the northeast corner in the Appalachian Mountains to the banks of the Mississippi River in Memphis, wearing a red-and-black plaid shirt that's become as legendary as the man himself.

After serving two terms as governor and then as President George H.W. Bush's secretary of education, Alexander mounted two failed presidential campaigns before returning to office with a victorious Senate run in 2002. He was virtually unchallenged in his 2008 GOP primary and cruised to victory with 65 percent of the vote, winning every county in the state but one. To allies, he's a thoughtful conservative, but to opponents like Carr, he's a squishy moderate.

Alexander appears to have the strength necessary to win again in 2014, though he stresses, "I take nothing for granted." Nearly every Republican in Tennessee's congressional delegation has endorsed him, along with most statewide elected officials. Fred Thompson, Mike Huckabee, and Newt Gingrich are supporting Alexander, as are the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Republican Senatorial Committee. No serious Democratic candidate, meanwhile, even considered jumping in the race. And unlike past victims of GOP primary challengers, such as Dick Lugar, Alexander is frequently back home in Nashville. So why is Joe Carr, a 56-year-old three-term state representative, taking on Mr. Tennessee?

"Too much time is spent calculating whether or not you can win or lose before you determine whether or not it's worthwhile," Carr tells me, before the rally in Nashville. "We knew we were the underdog. We understand that. We also understand that for a lot of Republicans and conservatives, Senator Lamar Alexander has lost his way for a very long time."

If such a sentiment exists, some numbers might help explain it. Alexander's lifetime American Conservative Union rating is 76 out of 100, with a 60 rating for the 2013 legislative year. Heritage Action's scorecard gives Alexander a dismal 49 percent. But for Carr, Ingraham, and the rest of the "Beat Lamar" crowd, Alexander's worst betrayal is on immigration. In June 2013, he was one of 14 Republicans in the Senate to vote for the comprehensive immigration reform bill drafted by the bipartisan "Gang of 8." Alexander notes he cosponsored an amendment with fellow Tennessee Republican Bob Corker to

AP / THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL / WILLIAM DESHAZER

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beef up border security as part of the package. Border hawks like Jeff Sessions of Alabama argued the bill's enforcement measures were toothless, a stalking horse for amnesty for illegal immigrants inside the country. Alexander disagrees.

"I voted to end amnesty," he says. "By doing nothing, you perpetuate amnesty for 11 million people who are here illegally. I voted to double border security, end amnesty for those 11 million people, and create a legal immigration system."

Tennessee is a conservative state, but there was some indication its residents might have supported Alexander's vote. In a June 2013 poll sponsored by a pro-immigration-reform organization, 63 percent of respondents from Tennessee said they approved a description of the Gang of 8's proposed legislation.

Nevertheless, Carr says Alexander's vote for the reform bill is out of step with the views of most Tennessee voters and an example of how the senator "capitulated" to the Chamber of Commerce. "When both senators are promoting an alternative other than securing the border and the rule of law and advocating for the American worker, vis-à-vis amnesty, then it gives you a distorted picture about what Tennesseans really want," Carr says. On August 20, 2013, Carr formally entered the primary against Alexander, with the senator's immigration reform vote chief among his complaints.

Unfortunately for Carr's nascent Senate campaign, the immigration debate died down soon after. Conservative opposition to the Senate bill stalled passage of an immigration bill in the House. Meanwhile, as the 2014 primary season rolled along, Republican candidates backed by the Chamber of Commerce and other "establishment" groups were mostly winning. There was a growing body of evidence that it wasn't necessarily toxic for a Republican to have ties to the Gang of 8 bill or its principles on immigration.

Everything changed on June 10, when House majority leader Eric Cantor lost a stunning primary battle in Virginia against a local college professor named Dave Brat. Brat campaigned arguing that Cantor and the House GOP leadership wanted to pass comprehensive immigration reform similar to the Senate bill before the 2014 midterm elections. It was a message that prompted Laura Ingraham to campaign for Brat, even while several national Tea Party groups ignored the race.

Suddenly, the politics of immigration reform looked to be swinging in the direction of the enforcement hawks and economic populists. Just days after Cantor's defeat, one Capitol Hill Republican aide told me Carr was the "next Dave Brat." The growing crisis at the southern border, with tens of thousands of unaccompanied minors from Central America streaming into Texas from Mexico, further pushed illegal immigration into the forefront. A July 16 Gallup poll found a plurality of Americans thought the issue of immigration and illegal aliens was the most important problem facing the country, followed closely by dissatisfaction with elected officials. On July 22, Georgia Republican primary voters picked newcomer David Perdue over longtime congressman and Chamber-endorsed Jack Kingston in that state's Senate runoff. Perdue had closed the gap against Kingston in part by emphasizing his opponent's association with the pro-"amnesty" Chamber. It's a trend, some say, working in Joe Carr's favor.

"There's an economic populist movement afoot that's tired of electing the same people," says Ingraham. "One does get the feeling that the old way of establishment Republican politics is not bringing in anybody new to the party."

Carr senses a transformation, too, within the party and in Tennessee. "Lamar hasn't changed. I think the state has become more conservative," he says.

Or is that wishful thinking? Alexander, the big fish, reckons so. "I think Tennesseans don't just want a conservative senator who can make a speech," he says. "They want a conservative senator who knows how to govern." ♦

The Underground War on Israel

The tunnels of Hamas and Hezbollah.

BY LEE SMITH

During the first two weeks of the Gaza conflict, Hamas landed at least two significant punches. In firing missiles at Ben Gurion Airport, Hamas convinced the Federal Aviation Authority and European air carriers to temporarily suspend flights to Israel. The fact that relatively primitive rockets falling far short of their targets are nonetheless capable of at least briefly severing an advanced Western democracy with a leading tech economy from the rest of the world is a psychological blow. But perhaps the even greater concern for Israeli officials is the revelation of Hamas's extensive tunnel network.

Until Operation Protective Edge, it was generally assumed that Gaza's tunnel system was simply a feeding tube for a community of 1.8 million people. With both the Egyptian and Israeli borders closed, as well as Israel's naval blockade, goods entered Gaza mainly through the tunnels from Egypt. So did weapons, including missiles made or designed by Iran, which, as the last two weeks have shown, are capable of reaching any site in Israel. The tunnel

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economy flourished under former Egyptian president and Hamas sponsor Mohamed Morsi but has suffered under his successor, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who has won praise from Jerusalem for shutting down as many tunnels as he can find.

However, there is another system in Gaza as well, a network of attack tunnels that end not in Egypt but in Israel, where over the last two weeks Hamas commandos have attempted several terrorist operations.

"Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh said that we are not under siege, we are imposing a siege," says retired IDF officer Jonathan Halevi, now a senior researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. "What he meant was that [Hamas] can use tunnels as a strategic weapon. If you multiply tunnels, you can use them to send hundreds of fighters into Israel and create havoc, totally under cover. According to Hamas, the tunnels have changed the balance of power."

Israeli paratroopers enter a tunnel in the Gaza Strip, July 20, 2014.

Israeli officials have expressed amazement at the extent of the tunnel network. "Food, accommodations, storage, resupply," one astonished official told reporters last week. "Beneath Gaza," he explained, there's "another terror city." That is, Hamas's tunnel network is evidence of a military doctrine, both a countermeasure to Israel's clear air superiority and an offensive capability that threatens to take ground combat inside Israel itself, targeting villages, cities, and civilians as well as soldiers. Israel perhaps should not have been surprised to discover the size and seriousness of Hamas's tunnel network because they've seen something similar before, in the aftermath of the 2006 war with Hezbollah. And indeed it was Iran's long arm in Lebanon that helped build Hamas's tunnels.

"The spiritual father of Hamas's tunnel system is Imad Mughniyeh," says Shimon Shapira, a Hezbollah expert and senior research associate at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Mughniyeh, assassinated in 2008 in an operation believed to have been conducted by the Israelis, is credited with directing Hezbollah's 2006 war. He was the head of the organization's external operations unit and responsible for countless terrorist attacks. He also served as liaison to the top Iranian leadership as well as other Iranian allies and assets, including Hamas. "Mughniyeh sent instructors to Gaza and took Hamas members to Iran," Shapira explains.

While Hamas and Hezbollah's tunnel technology, equipment, and funding are mostly Iranian, the knowledge and the doctrine date back to the earliest days of the Cold War.

"The North Koreans are the leading tunnel experts in the world," says North Korea expert Bruce Bechtol. They learned as a matter of necessity. "The U.S. Air Force basically exhausted its target list after the first eight months of the Korean War," Bechtol explains. "All the North Korean cities were turned to rubble, so they got good at building large tunnels and bunkers, some of them 10 or 11 square miles. In effect, the North Koreans moved their cities underground for three years, with hundreds of thousands of people living down there."

"There is no better protection than the earth," says David Maxwell, associate director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University. But Pyongyang also has an offensive doctrine. "Defectors tell us that the North Koreans built 21 tunnels under the demilitarized zone, but only 4 have been discovered," says Maxwell, a retired U.S. Army colonel who served in South Korea. "Our concern is that the North Koreans would infiltrate, sending thousands of men through the tunnels in an hour, maybe dressed in South Korean uniforms. You can't imagine the kind of havoc that would wreak."

Just last week Hamas tried the same tactic, sending commando units disguised as IDF troops through two tunnels. For a short time, they fooled real Israeli soldiers in an observation post.

It's nothing new for the North Koreans to work with terrorist groups, as Bechtol explains. It started with the Polisario, the North African, and at one time Soviet-funded, terrorist group fighting the Moroccan government. "The North Koreans built them underground facilities, command and control, hospitals," says Bechtol. "All of it was supported by Soviets, but that changed with the end of the Cold War, when the North Koreans offered their services on a cash and carry basis only."

Their top customer is the Islamic Republic of Iran. The North Koreans, Bechtol says, have helped build some of the Iranians' underground nuclear weapons facilities, as well as Hezbollah's underground network. "They built it in 2003-04, coming into Lebanon disguised as houseboys serving the Iranians. Maybe nobody asked, hey, how come these houseboys are speaking Korean?"

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The significance of the tunnels became clear in the 2006 war, as Bechtol explains. "It lowered Hezbollah's casualty rate. The Israelis wondered why the air force was not inflicting more damage and it was because of those tunnels. It was the first time Hezbollah was ever truly protected."

Last week a U.S. federal judge ruled that North Korea and Iran were liable for providing support to Hezbollah during the 2006 war. According to U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth, North Korea and Iran assisted "in building a massive network of underground military installations, tunnels, bunkers, depots and storage facilities in southern Lebanon." Lamberth noted that one Hezbollah commander who received training in North Korea was Mustafa Badreddine, Mughniyeh's cousin. And as with North Korea, Hezbollah's heavily reinforced underground network has also given rise to an offensive doctrine—to invade northern Israel.

"Hassan Nasrallah says Hezbollah has a two-part operational plan," says Shimon Shapira. "One is rocket fire on Tel Aviv and two is conquest of the Galilee. I wondered what he meant by that—how is Hezbollah going to invade the Galilee, take hostages, capture villages, and overrun military installations? But we're learning from what is happening now. Nasrallah means Hezbollah is going to penetrate Israel through tunnels."

The difference between Hamas's underground network and Hezbollah's, explain experts, is the topography. It's easier to dig tunnels in the Gaza sand than in the rocky pastures and rich soil of the Galilee. The catch is that the latter are also harder to destroy since they are further fortified by nature.

Several Israeli journalists are reporting that "the fiasco of the tunnels," as Yossi Melman calls it, might have been avoided. Either military and security officials were aware of the extent of Hamas's network and didn't do enough about it, or they ran up against bureaucratic roadblocks. Whether the IDF needs to detail a specific unit to monitor and uproot the tunnels that cross into Israel on its southern and northern borders, one fact is plain: For decades Israel's traditional military doctrine has been to fight its enemies on the other side of the wire. However, its enemies' new North Korean-inspired doctrine is to go under the wire. If Israel doesn't deal with first Hamas's tunnels and then Hezbollah's, the next war it faces may well be inside Israel itself. ♦

Another Minnesota Miracle?

A Republican neophyte takes on Al Franken.

BY BARRY CASSELMAN

In 1978, Republicans in Minnesota, astonishingly, won all three statewide races: both Senate seats and the governorship. It became known by DFLers (Democrats here run as Democratic-Farmer-Laborites) as the "Minnesota massacre." Republicans preferred to call it their Minnesota miracle. This year they're looking for another miracle. One Senate seat is up, as is the governorship, and the DFL incumbents are widely expected to win. If an upset is possible, it might be in the Senate race.

Mike McFadden

Republican businessman Mike McFadden has not previously run for public office, but the 48-year-old investment banker has been successful in a rags-to-riches life that began in St. Paul. He has a picture-perfect large Catholic family, an exuberant personality, and years of coaching low-income kids at a school in Minneapolis to add to an outstanding record in business.

Although he attracted big-name Minnesota Republican support (including from former senators Rudy Boschwitz and Norm Coleman) in his quest to unseat Democrat Al Franken, McFadden had competition for the GOP nomination, most notably from state senator Julianne Ortman from suburban Minneapolis and county commissioner Chris Dahlberg from the northern Range area.

The McFadden team made an early decision not to seek endorsement at the state GOP convention in late May but to win the nomination in the August primary. Ortman soon emerged as the favorite to win endorsement as she aggressively attacked Franken on his first-term record and raised $1 million. The tone and aim of her campaign was directed to the most conservative wing of the Republican party, expected to have the most influence at the convention. Dahlberg had a few influential early backers and was the most conservative major candidate in the race, but he had limited campaign funds and was

AP / THE STAR TRIBUNE / GLEN STUBBE

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mostly unknown outside his district.

Ortman's energetic campaign, however, evidently did not persuade most conservatives at the convention. Instead, they went for Dahlberg. He led on the first and subsequent ballots, until almost the end. Surprisingly, McFadden was in second, although he had not committed to honoring the convention's choice for endorsement. Normally this would be fatal in Minnesota politics, but several weeks before the convention, McFadden began personally contacting delegates (although he still did not commit to honoring the convention's choice).

Late in the evening of the first day of the convention, after several ballots, Ortman was eliminated. The two finalists were called to the podium for five minutes of extemporaneous remarks. McFadden, who had been carefully scripted to this point in the campaign (and thus tended to come across as wooden and uninspiring), gave a short, passionate speech that many delegates later said changed their minds. The convention was then adjourned until the next morning.

The following day, with many delegates (presumably those who had supported now-eliminated candidates) having left Rochester to return home, almost 200 alternate delegates were seated, and after the next ballot it became clear that McFadden had the majority. Dahlberg then withdrew, and to the surprise of most political and media observers, first-time candidate McFadden had shattered the usually ironclad rule that candidates who do not pledge to honor the party endorsement don't win endorsement.

McFadden thus no longer faces serious competition in the August primary. Although he was expected to win the primary against a convention-endorsed opponent, he would then, with depleted resources and presumably hard feelings from the primary contest, have had to face a well-funded incumbent with only 12 weeks before Election Day.

Franken defeated Norm Coleman by the narrowest of margins in 2008 following a long and bitter recount. He was actually not sworn in until July 2009, and many Minnesotans still feel Coleman actually won the race, and that the final outcome was determined by the lawyers, and not the voters.

After taking office, Franken eschewed his well-known identity as a TV comedian and maintained a low-key and down-to-business approach, allowing the state's popular senior senator, Amy Klobuchar, to get most of the headlines. He consistently backed President Obama and Senate leader Harry Reid, including a vote for the unpopular Obamacare, which includes a harmful tax on medical device technology companies. Minnesota happens to be home to many of the largest such firms, and both Klobuchar and Franken have voiced their opposition to the tax, but to no avail: Reid has ignored their pleas.

Al Franken

Polls show that Klobuchar is the most popular statewide Minnesota elected official; DFL governor Mark Dayton runs second and Franken third. While maintaining their leads over any Republican opponents, both Dayton and Franken are now under 50 percent support in most polls.

In spite of his surprising success at the GOP convention, and his ability to match Franken in fundraising, McFadden remains an underdog. He is largely unknown to most voters and must face the formidable DFL get-out-the-vote operation, one of the best in the nation. Rudy Boschwitz argues, however, that McFadden "is a fast learner and incredibly hard worker." He points out that McFadden has "already campaigned in all of Minnesota's 87 counties." Although he has done well in early fundraising, McFadden almost certainly will have to at least partially self-fund to remain competitive. The Franken campaign will no doubt try to "Mitt Romney" McFadden as a rich banker, but McFadden's humble origins and Franken's own multimillionaire status might make this approach backfire. McFadden argues that his lack of political experience, but wealth of business experience, makes him the kind of "outsider" who can have an impact in the nation's capital.

With first-time GOP candidate Stewart Mills mounting a serious challenge to DFL incumbent Rep. Rick Nolan in the state's northeastern 8th Congressional District, and the likelihood of GOP gains in, even possible renewed control of, the state house of representatives, 2014 is taking shape as a potentially good year for Minnesota Republicans, although perhaps not as good as 1978. President Obama's popularity (he carried the state twice) has plummeted thanks in large part to Obamacare. Minnesota's high taxes (raised even higher by the Dayton administration) are causing many affluent individuals, small businesses, and corporations to leave the state. A recent incipient economic recovery in the largest cities has not reached the rest of the state.

Franken would likely be reelected if the vote were held now. He has solid support from the DFL establishment, and on paper has a formidable get-out-the-vote apparatus. On the other hand, his transition from comedian to political insider means he must defend some unpopular votes. As Norm Coleman puts it, "Franken is an integral part of the dysfunction and mess in Washington. Al is now the problem; Mike can offer himself as the solution."

Mike McFadden pulled off one small miracle at the GOP convention. If he can pull off the bigger one of winning back one of the state's Senate seats in November, he might help change control of the U.S. Senate back to the Republicans this fall. ♦

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Frozen in the Cold War

The roots of Obama's weakness abroad

By Matthew Continetti

In 1983, Barack Obama was a senior at Columbia University. He was not well known. He lived off-campus, had a few close friends, and spent a lot of time reading. He went to some meetings of the Black Students Association, but no one remembers seeing him there. He majored in political science, with a concentration in international relations, and classmates and professors say he was an attentive and intelligent student.

But he was not an active participant in student life. He was not a student radical. He did not go on a hunger strike. He did not storm any administration buildings. One friend, in an interview with biographer David Maraniss, likened Obama to the protagonist of Walker Percy's *The Moviegoer*: a passive observer.

As graduation approached, Obama took up his pen. Looking for work as a community organizer, he needed something to add to his thin résumé. He was interested in the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, which he was studying in a senior seminar on American diplomacy. "The class analyzed decision-making and the perils of 'groupthink,' the ways that disastrous policies, like the escalation of the Vietnam War, develop," writes biographer David Remnick.

The seminar had just eight students. In class, Obama had a tendency to relate U.S. foreign policy to his upbringing. "He talked about his father being from Kenya so much," Maraniss writes, "that at least one student assumed Obama himself was from Kenya." Obama's final paper for the seminar was on nuclear disarmament. He got an A.

In March 1983, Obama published an article in a student magazine called the *Sundial*. His piece, titled "Breaking the War Mentality," drew on the themes of the senior seminar. "Most students at Columbia do not have firsthand knowledge of war," Obama writes. Though "the most sensitive among us struggle to extrapolate experiences of war from our everyday experience," it is impossible to know the true costs of war from afar. "Bringing such experiences down into our hearts, and taking continual, tangible steps to prevent war, becomes a difficult task."

But the task is not impossible. There are goodhearted men and women, Obama writes, volunteers who, despite not knowing what war is really like, "foster awareness and practical action necessary to counter the growing threat of war." Far-left student groups such as Arms Race Alternatives (ARA) and Students Against Militarism (SAM), Obama says, "are throwing their weight into shifting America off the dead-end track."

Obama's sympathies are clear. "The article," Remnick says, "makes plain Obama's revulsion at what he saw as Cold War militarism and his positive feelings about the nuclear-freeze movement." Obama quotes reggae singer and activist Peter Tosh. He recounts a visit to a meeting of Students Against Militarism. "With its solid turnout and enthusiasm," he writes, "one might be persuaded that the manifestations of our better instincts can at least match the bad ones."

Obama's criticism of the antinuke activists is that their focus is too narrow. They aren't radical enough. "One is forced to wonder whether disarmament or arms control issues, severed from economic and political issues, might be another instance of focusing on the symptoms of a problem instead of the disease itself," he writes. What "the disease" is, Obama does not say.

DAVE MALAN

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In the end, though, Obama says the peace activists have noble motives and worthy aims. "What the members of the ARA and SAM try to do," he concludes, "is infuse what they have learned about the current situation, bring the words of that formidable roster on the face of Butler Library, names like Thoreau, Jefferson, and Whitman, to bear on the twisted logic of which we are today a part."

The essay not only reveals Obama's position on nuclear disarmament. It also offers a glimpse of the milieu in which a president came of age. Most of us form our political identities in young adulthood. Our attitudes, judgments, and preferences are shaped by political circumstances when we are 18 to 25 years old. Obama is no exception. As he reached maturity, the Cold War approached its climax. The most divisive issue in American politics was Ronald Reagan's foreign policy. The belief that Reagan was a warmonger was deeply held by many people on the left. Obama was one of them.

The trendy idea at the time was support for the "nuclear freeze." The production of intercontinental ballistic missiles would be halted. NATO wouldn't deploy missiles in Europe. Nuclear arsenals would be reduced. It was a utopian ambition: Advocates of the freeze proposed no verification system and flirted with unilateral disarmament. The security repercussions were irrelevant to these nuclear dreamers. "The freeze is not a plan," Charles Krauthammer wrote in the *New Republic* in the spring of 1982. "It is a sentiment." And it was widely shared.

Author Jonathan Schell published *The Fate of the Earth*, the bible of nuclear disarmament, also in 1982. The following March, Reagan delivered his famous "Evil Empire" speech, which horrified the left, just as the *Sundial* was publishing Obama's article. In June, one million people marched in New York City in support of the freeze. The fear-mongering reached its peak on November 20 when *The Day After*, a television movie that dramatized the aftermath of a nuclear war, aired on ABC. It is still the most-watched TV movie ever.

Few people remember either *The Day After* or the nuclear freeze campaign. But that does not mean they had no lasting effect. Indeed, when one examines President Obama's foreign policy in light of his article in the *Sundial*, one is struck by how he continues, to this day, to fight "the war mentality." How he continues to struggle against "the twisted logic" of the Cold War. How he continues to associate organization, negotiation, and moral suasion with "our better instincts." No matter the results.

The Cold War of the early 1980s is more than the backdrop to President Obama's dealings with Vladimir Putin. It is the backdrop to his dealings with the world. Obama is determined not to repeat what he sees as mistaken Cold War policies. He wants to move beyond the weapons and walls of his young adulthood to an era of friendship and peace. "You know, the Cold War's been over for 20 years," Obama told Mitt Romney during the 2012 presidential debates. "Our approach as the United States is not to see this as some Cold War chessboard in which we're in competition with Russia," he said earlier this year.

Tell that to Vladimir Putin. "There have been times where they slip back into Cold War thinking and Cold War mentality," Obama admitted to Jay Leno in 2013. Times? For Russia's president, the fall of the Soviet empire was "a major geopolitical disaster of the century." Putin has occupied Georgia, supported the Iranian nuclear program, propped up Bashar al-Assad, hosted Edward Snowden, sent Bear bombers to the Pacific Coast of the United States, annexed Crimea, financed, armed, trained, and directed Ukrainian insurgents, provided them the means to shoot down a passenger airliner, and organized a global campaign of anti-American propaganda. But one has the impression that President Obama is more interested in rejecting the "Cold War mentality" than he is in standing up to the Russian dictator. Indeed, he was against the "Cold War mentality" when the Cold War was going on.

Last March, in a speech to a group of European young people, Obama said, "This is not another Cold War that we're entering into." Ukraine, he said, "does not have easy answers or a military solution." Suggest as much—advocate the use of American airpower in Syria or Iraq, military aid to the Syrian rebels and the Ukrainian government, more defense spending, full-throated support for liberal democratic movements, crippling sanctions on Iran, and possible military strikes against its nuclear facilities—and the Obama administration and its allies dismiss your arguments as symptoms of the "war mentality." You are for another Vietnam, another Black Hawk Down, and another Iraq.

It's often thought that President Obama defines his foreign policy in opposition to President Bush's. Bush launched the Iraq war, and Obama ended it. Bush treated terrorists like enemy combatants, and Obama treats them—the ones he doesn't drone—like criminals. The ties between the United States and Russia frayed under Bush, so Obama proposes a "reset" with Russia. Bush was said to have neglected our allies in the Pacific, while Obama "pivots" to East Asia. Bush opened the prison in Guantánamo Bay, and Obama is trying to close it.

But that interpretation of Obama's foreign policy may be too narrow. Maybe Obama has defined himself not only against the foreign policy of George W. Bush, but also against the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan and other cold warriors. Maybe it is not the mentality of the Cold War in itself

that Obama opposes, but the mentality of Cold War hawks.

"For most of our history, our crises have come from using force when we shouldn't, not by failing to use force," Obama told journalist James Traub in 2007. "Since World War II," Obama said at West Point in June, "some of our most costly mistakes came not from our restraint but from our willingness to rush into military adventures without thinking through the consequences." Not since 9/11. "Since World War II."

When Obama studies postwar American history, he sees only the costs of action. He sees only Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq, meddling in Third World nations, and needlessly antagonizing great powers. What he misses are the costs of inaction: the consequences of not stopping Hitler earlier, of dithering as Yugoslavia came apart, of turning a blind eye to the slaughter in Rwanda, of treating al Qaeda as a band of criminals in the 1990s.

In his writings, rhetoric, initiatives, and personnel, Obama is also informed by and beholden to a mentality: the mentality of a Cold War dove.

It's easy to forget, but Obama devotes most of the chapter on foreign policy in *The Audacity of Hope*, his 2006 campaign book, to a survey of U.S. history. The chapter begins with a long description of growing up in Indonesia. Then Obama cites the most overworked quotations in public discourse: George Washington's warning, in his Farewell Address, against "entangling alliances" and John Quincy Adams's declaration, in his 1821 Independence Day speech, that the United States does not go abroad "in search of monsters to destroy." Manifest Destiny, American imperialism, World War I, the Fourteen Points, interwar isolationism, World War II, and the beginnings of the United Nations all have a place in Obama's story.

He spends most of his time on the Cold War. Obama's method is telling. He writes one sentence praising the cold warriors, and then devotes four pages to criticizing them. What Harry Truman, George Marshall, and Dean Acheson created in the aftermath of World War II is "a remarkable achievement," he says, "perhaps the Greatest Generation's greatest gift to us after the victory over fascism." But don't get carried away: America's Cold War foreign policy, he says, "had its flaws and contradictions; it could fall victim to the distortions of politics, the sins of hubris, the corrupting effects of fear."

Obama elaborates at length on these flaws and contradictions. Opposition to communism, Obama writes, led policymakers "to view nationalist movements, ethnic struggles, reform efforts, or left-leaning policies anywhere in the world" as "potential threats." America collaborated with horrible dictators. "For decades we would tolerate and even aid thieves like Mobutu, thugs like Noriega, so long as they opposed communism." U.S. intelligence agencies organized black operations and coups in Third World countries, removing "democratically elected rulers in countries like Iran—with seismic repercussions that haunt us to this day."

We spent too much money. "Over time, the 'iron triangle' of the Pentagon, defense contractors, and congressmen with large defense expenditures in their districts amassed great power in shaping U.S. foreign policy." The military was in command. Diplomats were shut out. Foreign policy became a partisan battleground. There was "not enough deliberation and domestic consensus building." Politicians attacked their opponents for being soft on communism. The missile gap, red baiting, Joe McCarthy—it's all here.

The further you go into Obama's history of the Cold War, the more liberal shibboleths you encounter. Obama is not studying anticommunism. He is engaging in anti-anticommunism. He is paraphrasing the critique of U.S. foreign policy leveled by Howard Zinn, Noam Chomsky, and Gore Vidal.

The further you go into Obama's history of the Cold War, the more liberal shibboleths you encounter. It occurs to you that Obama is not studying anticommunism. He is engaging in anti-anticommunism. The main subject of his criticism isn't the Communists, it's the hardliners who fought them. He is paraphrasing, in milder language, the critique of U.S. foreign policy leveled by Howard Zinn, Noam Chomsky, and Gore Vidal.

Why was America in Vietnam? "Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson would all find their judgment clouded by fear that they would be tagged as 'soft on communism.'" The clandestine tools of the intelligence community? They were turned on the American people. "The Cold War techniques of secrecy, snooping, and misinformation, used against foreign governments and foreign populations, became tools of domestic politics, a means to harass critics, build support for questionable policies, or cover up blunders." Sure, the Soviet Union and Red China had their problems. But Cold War America wasn't a paragon of virtue, either. "The very ideals that we had promised to export overseas were being betrayed at home."

Vietnam, Obama says, is where "all these trends came to a head." He spends a paragraph recapitulating the case against the war, lamenting how it turned foreign policy into

a debate between "caricatures, promoted by activists and political consultants." An older dove might have spent more time on Vietnam. But Obama, who was a teenager when Saigon fell, is more interested in the Cold War's finale.

"I personally came of age during the Reagan presidency," he says. And though Obama gives Ronald Reagan credit for championing freedom and humbling the Soviet Union, his attack on the fortieth president is passionate. "Like many Democrats in those days," he writes, "I bemoaned the effect of Reagan's policies toward the Third World: his administration's support for the apartheid regime of South Africa, the funding of El Salvador's death squads, the invasion of tiny, hapless Grenada."

The subject of nuclear weapons comes up. "The more I studied nuclear arms policy," he writes, "the more I found Star Wars to be ill-conceived; the chasm between Reagan's soaring rhetoric and the tawdry Iran-contra deal left me speechless."



Nuclear doom and trauma in 1982's 'The Day After'

Obama's indictment of Reagan for not living up to his idealism is revealing. It's a classic trope of Cold War doves: Critics of American foreign policy, from the Cold War to the war on terror, hold the United States to a standard it cannot possibly reach, while ignoring or excusing the crimes and faults of the Soviet Union, its successor states, rogue regimes, and other "nationalist movements, ethnic struggles, reform efforts, or left-leaning policies anywhere in the world."

You see this single-minded fixation on America throughout dovish literature. According to the doves, America is always active on the international stage, never reactive. America is always the cause of trouble, never the first responder to aggression and chaos. The threat the Soviet Union posed to international order and individual liberty is hardly ever mentioned. Obama notes Reagan's "invasion of tiny, hapless Grenada." But he ignores the causes of American intervention: a bloody Marxist coup, engineered by the USSR and Cuba, on a Caribbean island. He doesn't say that the rise of the People's Revolutionary Army did not justify war. He doesn't note that the brief U.S. intervention led to the restoration of constitutional government. He just dodges the argument altogether.

Something similar happens in his presidential speeches. Obama often refers to the fall of the Berlin Wall. What he does not talk about is the building of the wall: who built it, why, and at what cost in lives and misery. It's as though the wall appeared out of thin air. And only the indomitable human will to freedom—not a 50-year-long, costly global struggle led by the United States—brought it down.

Another trope of the Cold War doves is to impugn American involvement in the Third World. The double standard applies here as well. Support for anti-Communist dictators, aid to anti-Soviet guerrillas, and covert and direct intervention besmirched the United States, while Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the Kremlin's support for left-wing terrorism, Communist-engineered famines in Russia, China, and Ethiopia, Chinese repression of religious and ethnic minorities, the Khmer Rouge's slaughter, and the boat people are downplayed.

"Our record is mixed," Obama writes in *The Audacity of Hope*, "not just in Indonesia but across the globe." In his 2009 Cairo speech, marketed as "a new beginning" between the United States and "Muslims around the world," Obama said that tension between Islam and the West "has been fed by colonialism that denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims, and a Cold War in which Muslim-majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations." In both the Cairo speech and his 2013 address to the U.N. General Assembly, Obama attributed Iranian suspicion of America partly to our "role in overthrowing an Iranian government during the Cold War." To a Cold War dove, Islamic radicalism is not just an ideology. It's blowback.

Obama's foreign policy attempts to move on from the Cold War while repairing its excesses. Even as he looks to the future, the president cannot escape his own particular Cold War mentality. One of Obama's criticisms of the Bush administration in *The Audacity of Hope* is that it "resuscitated a brand of politics not seen since the end of the Cold War." He says military spending ought to be reduced, because "a defense budget and force structure built principally around the prospect of World War III makes little strategic sense." He says America will have to sway public opinion in the Muslim world, just as it promoted democracy during the Cold War.

Obama looks at nonproliferation through a Cold War lens. For him, nonproliferation doesn't mean the interdiction, prevention, and preemption of nuclear armament by

rogue regimes. It means negotiations with nuclear states to gradually reduce stockpiles.

In 2005, when Obama reached the U.S. Senate, he partnered with then-Indiana Republican senator Richard Lugar to secure Russia's nuclear ordnance. Under a program Lugar and Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn created in the 1990s, the United States gave money to former Soviet republics to help these weak governments safely maintain their aging and dilapidated warheads. "Although the program caused some consternation to those accustomed to Cold War thinking," Obama wrote in *The Audacity of Hope*, "it has proven to be one of the most important investments we could have made to protect ourselves from catastrophe."

In the summer of 2005, Obama and Lugar traveled to Russia and Ukraine to see how things were going. The senators ate a lunch of borscht and fish Jell-O in Saratov. They examined vials of anthrax and plague at a laboratory in Kiev. They were detained on an airport tarmac for three hours in Perm.

During the visit, while driving on Russian and Ukrainian streets, Obama caught glimpses of Western products and commercial franchises. Calvin Klein, Maserati, SUVs, iPods, and low-ride jeans—the sight of these brands "underscored the seemingly irreversible process of economic, if not political, integration between East and West."

Emphasis on "seemingly." In hindsight, Obama's own storytelling hints at the difficulty of joining Russia to the West. During one of the stops on the tour, when Obama visited a dank, unkempt laboratory, he asked about an odd poster hanging on a wall. The poster illustrated how to put bombs into children's toys.

"It was a relic of the Afghan war, we were told," Obama writes. The aging poster was "a testament, I thought, to the madness of men." It was "a record of how empires destroy themselves." Rereading this passage the other day, I couldn't help noticing where Obama's encounter with fallen empires took place: Donetsk.

As I write, Donetsk, Ukraine, is a battleground between the Ukrainian Army and pro-Russian separatists, who declared it an independent "People's Republic" in April. It is the central front in a conflict that exemplifies the consequences of Obama's Cold War mentality. For the separatists are puppets of the Kremlin, which has been at war with Ukraine since last February, when the Euromaidan movement forced pro-Russia president Viktor Yanukovych from power. Russia's proxy war has driven relations with the United States to a low not seen in decades. The chances of miscalculation and escalation are great.

How did we get here? When he became president, Barack Obama put into practice the ideas he had carried with him through college and into adulthood. Like many doves, he saw Russia, whether Soviet or oligarchic, as a paranoid and defensive power. To get Russia to cooperate, in this view, you have to demonstrate to the Kremlin that it has nothing to fear. You have to let Russia operate within its sphere of influence. You have to boost the Russian ego through bilateral diplomacy.

As president, Barack Obama put into practice the ideas he had carried with him through college and into adulthood. Like many doves, he saw Russia, whether Soviet or oligarchic, as a paranoid and defensive power. To get Russia to cooperate, in this view, you have to demonstrate to the Kremlin that it has nothing to fear.

You have to stop treating Russia as an adversary. "At the beginning of Obama's term," James Mann writes in *The Obamians*, a study of the president's foreign policy, deputy national security adviser Tom Donilon "said the administration's relationship with Russia 'shouldn't feel like 1974.'" If Donilon had been more specific, he would have said the relationship shouldn't feel as if Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were in charge of foreign policy. In fact, President Obama's handling of Russia has been more redolent of the Cold War than his immediate predecessor's. He has elevated the Kremlin to a status it no longer deserves.

First came the "reset." The policy assumed—just as one would expect a Cold War dove to assume—that tension between Washington and Moscow was the result of Washington's behavior, not Moscow's. The Russian occupation of Georgia was treated as a fait accompli. The centerpiece of the reset was the New START Treaty, a throwback to Cold War arms control. In exchange for Russian cooperation on New Start, for their help in Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria, the United States halted deployment of missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The cooperation was not forthcoming. But that did not change the Obama administration's approach. The president implemented other ideas of the Cold War left: defense cuts, reductions in America's nuclear arsenal, withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, easing of the Cuba embargo, refraining from interference in the fraudulent Iranian election of 2009. Obama promised Putin "more flexibility" on nukes after his reelection, despite Russia's

violations of the INF Treaty. In December 2012, when Obama signed the Magnitsky Act levying sanctions on Russians involved in human rights abuses, Putin retaliated by banning U.S. adoptions of Russian children. The White House protested, but took no action.

Conciliatory rhetoric and good-faith negotiations did not mollify Vladimir Putin. They emboldened him. When Edward Snowden compromised American national security, Putin offered him safe harbor. When Bashar al-Assad gassed his own people, Putin manipulated Obama into becoming, in effect, Assad's partner. As President Obama expressed his desire for "nation-building here at home," Putin beefed up defense spending.

By the time Putin annexed Crimea on March 21, 2014, all but the most diehard Obama supporters could see that the president's approach had failed. U.S.-Russia relations were tense not because of George W. Bush, not because of a "war mentality," but because Russia is ruled by an anti-Western ideologue who wants to recreate the Soviet empire under the nationalist banner of *Novorossiya*.

In recent days, Obama seems to have recognized that the major obstacle to global stability isn't the United States. The obstacle is Russia. He won't say so explicitly in public. But that is nonetheless the message of the sanctions Obama has imposed on Putin's inner circle, and of his reevaluation of current policy. "President Obama and his national security team are looking beyond the immediate conflict to forge a new long-term approach to Russia that applies an updated version of the Cold War strategy of containment," reports Peter Baker of the *New York Times*.

The irony is rich. Whether it is his desire for a world without nuclear weapons, the "reset," defense cuts, withdrawal, nonintervention, his choice of secretaries of defense and state who see the world in terms of their combat in Vietnam, or his habit of reminding the public of America's dirty hands, Barack Obama's foreign policy has been exactly what you would expect from an opponent of anti-Communist hardliners. He has brought to power a view of the world forged in the debates over the nuclear freeze and the Reagan Doctrine—a view shared by many on the left and on the noninterventionist right.

And yet Obama cannot escape the facts on the ground that have made Vladimir Putin's Russia, like the old Soviet Union, the world headquarters of illiberalism, of anti-Americanism, of international disorder. Nor can he escape the categories of thought and language he adopted as a senior at Columbia, when he assumed the mentality of a Cold War dove. His view of the world is frozen in time. ♦

Stop the Regulatory Madness

By Thomas J. Donohue
President and CEO
U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Last week the Dodd-Frank Act—a sweeping law intended to reform our financial regulatory system—turned four years old. But it's no milestone to celebrate. Dodd-Frank has become the poster child for all that's wrong with our regulatory system, which errs on the side of excess, overreach, complexity, and costliness.

Dodd-Frank layers 400 new rules on top of a regulatory framework that dates back to the 1930s. The rules are complicated, contradictory, and overlapping. There are 20 different agencies working to implement those rules, a number of them jockeying for jurisdiction and authority. And there's almost no coordination among them. Worst of all, the massive law has done little if anything to actually bring needed reform to the financial regulatory system.

Obamacare is another problem child. The law, which places the equivalent of one-sixth of our economy under bureaucratic control, has been a mess from the start. From legal challenges and overturned provisions to administrative problems and implementation snafus, we are reminded again and again how poorly conceived and badly executed Obamacare has been. And the law hasn't controlled costs—one of the primary reasons we needed reform in the first place.

Then there's EPA—a true overachiever when it comes to regulatory overreach. Last year the agency unveiled the first-ever greenhouse gas emissions caps for new power plants, effectively banning the construction of affordable and reliable coal plants. And earlier this year EPA proposed new regulations to limit carbon emissions at existing power plants. This complex set of mandates imposes a new regulatory framework on states that will transform how electricity is generated, distributed, transmitted, and used.

The latest EPA special is a radical proposal to expand the definition of "Waters of the U.S." under the Clean Water Act. The rule would subject farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, homebuilders, and local governments to new layers of rules and permitting and give regulators greater control over how landowners use their property.

No one is arguing that we shouldn't have any regulations. But in too many instances the government has gone too far. And if overregulation is allowed to stand, we'll continue to see the consequences. Already, the onslaught of rules is creating uncertainty, stifling hiring and investment, and undermining our recovery. It is upsetting the constitutional balance of powers and giving unelected bureaucrats unprecedented control over the lives and businesses of people across this nation.

We can stop the regulatory madness by replacing overreach and excess with commonsense and clarity and by truly balancing the costs and the benefits.

U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
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The Long War Against Hamas

Israel's Gaza dilemma

By Elliott Abrams

The Gaza war of 2014 will end in a cease-fire, just as the previous rounds between Israel and Hamas and the 2006 battle with Hezbollah ended. But the war will be won or lost less in the streets and tunnels of Gaza this summer than when the fighting is over. Israel must not only damage Hamas on those battlegrounds, but seal its own gains in the terms of the cease-fire, and ensure that the aftermath of the war weakens Hamas's hold on Gaza and its role in Palestinian politics.

This summer, Israel had no choice but to attack Hamas once the terrorist group decided to unleash rocket and missile fire at Israel's cities, a point that not only the United States but even our fickle European allies understood. The discovery—new to us in the West even if partially understood by Israeli intelligence agencies—of a vast attack tunnel system designed to enable Hamas to kidnap Israelis and to wreak havoc in Israeli communities near the Gaza border also justified the Israeli assault and meant that a ground attack was necessary.

When the combat ends, it will not immediately be clear who gained what. In 2006 most Israelis saw the Lebanon war as a failure. Hezbollah lost men and assets but remained (and remains now) in charge in much of Lebanon and possessing both a powerful terrorist force and serious conventional capabilities. But now, after eight years of calm along that border and after Hezbollah's Sheikh Nasrallah admitted that he would never have started the 2006 war had he known how fierce would be the Israeli response, what Israel achieved seems more like a victory.

One reason Israelis did not feel that they had won a victory in 2006 was the announcement of excessive war aims by Israel's then prime minister, Ehud Olmert. Olmert said repeatedly that Israel would not stop fighting until the underlying situation in Lebanon changed: What he called a "very effective and robust military international force" had to be introduced and Lebanon's army had to deploy throughout southern Lebanon. The United States also said there could be no return to the *status quo ante*, but we soon gave up on any goal larger than stopping the fighting. The gap between Israel's stated objectives and its actual achievements was clear, doomed Olmert politically, and converted what might have been seen as a considerable achievement into what for a long time was viewed as a defeat.

Israel's government has so far avoided those mistakes in this Gaza war. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that his goals are to gain "an extended period of calm and security" for the citizens of Israel and "to inflict serious damage" on Hamas. Severely damaging Hamas's missile stocks, killing Hamas fighters, and destroying its system of attack tunnels will clearly achieve the latter goal, and the former—extended calm—cannot be judged except with the passage of time. Netanyahu and his top advisers, including defense minister (and former IDF chief of staff) Moshe Yaalon and current IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz, have avoided saying they will destroy Hamas and eliminate the terrorist threat permanently. Those limited aims have been challenged by those who urge rooting out Hamas entirely through a longer ground war and then reoccupying and ruling Gaza, and Israel's unexpected combat death toll will inevitably persuade some that the whole war isn't worth the sacrifice unless a permanent change in the situation in Gaza is achieved. But Israel's government has not adopted these broader goals.

Hamas has stated its own war aims (perhaps a strategic error, but unavoidable when starting a war), and they are far more extensive than Israel's. Hamas rejected Egypt's early proposal for a "mere" cease-fire because it did not include the gains Hamas seeks in exchange for all the suffering it has caused the people of Gaza. Hamas has a long list, including freeing all the Hamas terrorists released from prison in exchange for Gilad Shalit but arrested again recently; opening the border crossings to Egypt and Israel; allowing a seaport and airport; expanding the

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Israeli tanks heading toward Israel's border with the Gaza Strip, July 18

offshore fishing zone; and easing conditions for permits to pray at the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

At bottom what Hamas wants is an end to the squeeze that was making it increasingly unpopular in Gaza and even threatening its rule there. While Israel has not over the last few years changed its conduct toward Gaza and Hamas, Egypt has. Cairo's military rulers see the Muslim Brotherhood at home and Hamas (a part of the Brotherhood) in Gaza as its enemies, and they have closed off the Gaza-Sinai border and shut the smuggling tunnels that provided Hamas with much of its revenue and Gazans with much of their economy. Hamas could not meet its own huge payroll in Gaza—43,000 people—nor could it give any hope that economic conditions would improve. Meanwhile, Hamas's oppressive rule alienated more and more Gazans. That's why Hamas took the risk in June of agreeing to join a technocratic or nonparty government under the Palestinian Authority, had the "ministers" in its government in Gaza resign their posts, and appeared ready for some role in Gaza for the PA (something it had prevented since its coup in Gaza in 2007). That ploy failed when the PA refused to take on the huge burden of all those additional salaries, and there was no change in the economic situation in Gaza. Hamas then turned to war as a way to shake things up.

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How has the war gone for Hamas? There's an unavoidable urge to make judgments now, but the real answer depends on what happens after the cease-fire. In choosing war Hamas imposed enormous hardship on a Gazan population that never voted for the 2007 coup, was already tired of Hamas rule, and may emerge with deeper resentment against the group. It's clear that Hamas lost many of its top fighters; physical assets such as arsenals, headquarters buildings, and training areas; most of the rockets it took years to accumulate; and most or all of the tunnels it took years to dig. If Israel can apply the technological genius that produced "Iron Dome" to the tunnels, perhaps Hamas's tunnels will prove to be a trick that can only be used once. Are there seismic sensors, or electromagnetic or thermal technology, that can be developed or applied to find new attack tunnels fast? Israel's various missile defense systems have largely defeated the threat from the air; if cutting-edge technology can blunt the threat from under the ground, Hamas will have sacrificed its tunnel system without ever getting the major attacks inside Israel for which it was planned.

On the other hand, Hamas proved that its rockets can reach half of Israel and managed (with the help of the American FAA) to block air traffic at Ben Gurion Airport as well as to kill several dozen Israeli soldiers. The balance between costs and benefits cannot be drawn today because it depends on where Hamas stands one or two years from now. Is its hold on Gaza stronger or weaker? Is it able to rebuild the attack tunnels and accumulate another 10,000 rockets? Can it plausibly tell Gazans that the hard sacrifices Hamas imposed in wartime led to a profound improvement in their economic situation? Put another way, before the war Hamas was growing stronger militarily but increasingly

weak politically. When the war ends it will have been weakened militarily—but only time will tell whether the outcome strengthens or weakens the organization politically and whether it can rebuild its military capacities.

Several Arab governments as well as many Israelis are now asking whether some change in the situation in Gaza could improve the humanitarian situation while weakening Hamas, making another round of conflict less likely or at least more distant.

Yuval Diskin, a former head of Israel's internal security agency, the Shin Bet, has outlined the kind of deal he and many Israelis would like to see. In exchange for removal of all longer-range rockets, the end of manufacturing weapons in Gaza, and the closing of all the tunnels (all of this under international supervision), the blockade of Gaza would be lifted. The border crossings would be open 24/7, Gaza could have a seaport and an expanded fishing zone in the Mediterranean, and there would be a big foreign aid program to rebuild the place. The Palestinian Authority would rule Gaza, with a coalition government in place and pledged to the old "Quartet Principles": recognition of Israel, respect for all previous agreements with Israel, and the abandonment of violence. A less extensive proposal along the same lines came from Israel's former national security adviser Gen. Giora Eiland, who also called for opening the passages and a seaport in exchange for disarmament: Hamas turns over its missiles, the tunnels are all destroyed, and there are zero attacks on Israel. Former IDF chief of staff and defense minister Shaul Mofaz has proposed demilitarizing Gaza, using what he calls a Syria-style process to remove all rockets, in return for a $50 billion rehabilitation and aid project. The basic idea has been endorsed by Netanyahu, Shimon Peres, and Labor party leader Isaac Herzog.

It is smart for Israel to make or support such offers, as it is for the United States: We should be sensitive to the suffering in Gaza and seek ways to help. Immiserating the people of Gaza is not an Israeli or American objective, and we should be open to all sensible ways of ameliorating the awful situation in which they live. We should draw up or applaud generous plans and leave it to Hamas to reject them or make them impossible by refusing to disarm. But those Israeli proposals will not, of course, work, nor will any proposals that require disarming Hamas as a precondition for aid to Gaza. Consider them instead a "teachable moment": These proposals are useful to demonstrate that Hamas is blocking progress.

The current crisis presents an opportunity to reinsert the PA into Gaza, which necessarily undermines Hamas rule and ought to be a U.S. and Israeli goal. Here we get to the broader issue of Israeli-Palestinian relations, so badly mishandled by the United States under the Obama administration.

In 2005, when Israel pulled out of Gaza, the United States negotiated an "Agreement on Movement and Access" between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Its purpose was "to promote peaceful economic development and improve the humanitarian situation on the ground." "The passages [in and out of Gaza] will operate continuously," it said, "construction of a seaport can commence," and there would be scheduled bus and truck convoys between Gaza and the West Bank so people and goods could move back and forth easily. There were elaborate details about inspections, customs duties, equipment, and the like. But the agreement was never implemented—and that was at a point when the Palestinian Authority ruled Gaza and PA-Israel relations and contacts were in reasonable shape, right after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. How likely is it that a similar, or even more generous, plan can really be implemented now?

The problem with all these wonderful proposals is that Hamas is not an NGO; it is a terrorist group. It exists to fight Israel and destroy it—unless one wishes to say that it exists to fight and kill the Jews more generally, which is the basic message of the Hamas charter. So it will not agree to disarm, and it will not stop trying to import and build weapons. How can this war end in a way that ameliorates conditions in Gaza, but without giving Hamas a political victory? Is it possible to imagine a plan that brings economic recovery for Gaza without political recovery for Hamas?

There are two elements here, the narrower one of the Gaza passages and the broader one of Palestinian politics and Israeli-Palestinian relations. On Gaza, there is no downside to negotiating, agreeing on, and then attempting to implement the various plans. Implementing them sensibly means tight Israeli and Egyptian border mechanisms to prevent Hamas from taking advantage of more open borders. It means that individuals seeking to move in and out of Gaza must identify themselves, so that terrorists can be stopped and arrested. It means careful inspection of cargo so that weapons can be stopped. Israel and Egypt should continue to insist that Hamas is to blame for problems and delays because it refuses to abandon the armed struggle—which it will. This is a point Israel, Egypt, and the United States should be making repeatedly. We now know for sure, to take a good example,

that Israel was right to restrict the amount of cement going into Gaza, because Hamas used the cement to build attack tunnels. Any Gaza border system has not only to ensure that what is called cement is actually cement, but must also identify the end user inside Gaza and ensure that 100 percent of the cement is used for a proper purpose. Detailed arrangements cannot be negotiated as part of a cease-fire but only after it, and then they will have to be implemented. This means that Hamas may claim victory because its war will have "broken the siege on Gaza," but Gazans will quickly find out that those claims are greatly exaggerated.

Meanwhile the only Palestinian entity that can have a role in all these activities aimed at "opening Gaza" is the PA. As in the 2005 access plan, PA officials will have to monitor the passages along with Israelis and Egyptians. The current crisis presents an opportunity to reinsert the PA into Gaza, which necessarily undermines Hamas rule and ought to be an American and Israeli goal. Here we get to the broader issue of Israeli-Palestinian relations, so badly mishandled by the United States under the Obama administration. If John Kerry will abandon his grandiose plans for a comprehensive peace, he can actually do something useful over the next two years: make it his goal to weaken Hamas in Gaza and return the PA to a governing role there. Kerry can tell himself that this actually fits within his overall objective of a peace agreement, because Hamas rule in Gaza is seen as one of the major stumbling blocks. No peace agreement is possible in the foreseeable future, but Kerry can be told that he is clearing away obstacles. In truth, one effect of this war is to persuade Israelis that giving up military control of the West Bank is unthinkable, because it would lead to barrages of missiles that would make Ben Gurion Airport unusable and make Jerusalem uninhabitable. So Kerry may as well switch his sights to a different and more realistic objective than an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.

Mourners at the funeral of an Israeli soldier, July 23

REUTERS / NIR ELIAS

Since the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations this year, Kerry and the United States have actually had no discernible policy at all. The Gaza war should be a reminder that there is a critical struggle under way among Palestinians, between Hamas and other Islamist terrorist groups on one side, and the largely secular PA and the Fatah party on the other. (And in the background, our friends in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are backing the PA, while Qatar and Turkey are backing Hamas.) In the 2006 elections, Hamas beat Fatah 44 to 41 percent. No elections are in sight today, but that contest continues. Depriving Hamas of its base in Gaza or at least weakening its hold there is an important goal, especially with PA president and Fatah/PLO chairman Mahmoud Abbas now 79 years old and a succession fight looming. Fatah remains the heart of the PLO and the PA—and remains a thoroughly corrupt and divided organization. There are no Mandelas or Havels waiting in the wings. But Fatah, and the PA and PLO, are not part of the Muslim Brotherhood, not committed to terrorism, not Islamist in orientation, and have engaged in negotiations and agreements with Israel for 20 years. They are not able to turn Palestine into Singapore or Switzerland, but they will not turn it into Somalia or Syria either.

One possible future for Palestinians is the Gaza model—to come increasingly under the domination of Hamas and other Islamist terrorist groups, which would then move into roles in the PA and PLO, making negotiations with Israel impossible not only on a peace agreement but even on day to day accommodations. That is a future of increasing conflict and of terrorism as official Palestinian policy. The end of the Gaza war presents an opportunity to weaken those forces, and that should be the American and Israeli goal now. We should put aside comprehensive peace plans and other dreams for a perfect future.

Right now the government of Egypt and that of Israel are aligned against Hamas and the Brotherhood, and tacitly most Arab governments are as well. We should be flexible about economic plans for Gaza and for the West Bank, and even flexible about Palestinian political coalitions, so long as they work toward weakening and defeating Islamist forces in Palestinian life. Cornered and desperate, Hamas took a chance in starting the war this summer. It has been eight years since Hamas won that election and seven since it seized Gaza. Our goal now should be to make 2014 the turning point, and make this war one from which Hamas never recovers. Hamas will claim victory this summer, but whether it actually gains from its murderous decisions or is permanently damaged by them will not be settled the day combat ends. That's when the IDF's current battle stops, but it's when the longer struggle against Hamas—Israel's and hopefully ours as well—begins again. ♦

Entitled to What?

Hillary Clinton's long march through the institutions

By Noemie Emery

Contrary no doubt to what she expected, Hillary Clinton has hit some serious snags in the rollout of her unannounced campaign for president. She has made Romneyesque comments about the size of her fortune, such as that she was "dead broke" when she bought her two mansions. When queried about events on her watch as secretary of state that proved embarrassing, she took responsibility without being accountable, projecting the impression that anyone who pressed further was crude. Most damning of all, what has emerged in plain sight from the first month of the publicity tour for her memoir *Hard Choices* is the extent of her sense of entitlement. She feels entitled to make $200,000 for a speech, to own two mega-houses in pricey neighborhoods, to be treated like royalty. She feels entitled to fawning coverage from reporters, especially female ones. Asked by the journalist John Harwood to respond to Jill Abramson's comment that "she expects you to be 100 percent in her corner," Clinton replied, "I think one of the points Jill was making is that I do sometimes expect perhaps more than I should." Now she feels entitled to go back to her old digs on Pennsylvania Avenue, not as first lady this time, but as the Big Dog herself. This is a lot, but she thinks she deserves it, and her story explains why she does.

As one of the first female stars to emerge from the best schools in the late 1960s, Hillary Rodham was a pet of a great many female professors, who assured her she was brilliant and could have it all. There was the pact that she made early on with her husband, a brilliantly gifted political salesman, to win and share power. There was the fact that from 1992 on she exerted an emotional hold over millions of professional and would-be professional women who thought her a leader, defender, and heroine, who formed an armed guard around her that reinforced her convictions. There was the Lewinsky scandal, which gave her an aura of martyrdom, cemented her hold on her feminist followers, and lifted her to a celebrity stardom few people will ever achieve.

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Coming along at the right time in history, the plain and outspoken Hillary Rodham—featured in *Life* as valedictorian at Wellesley, then a standout at Yale Law School—was someone on whom her teachers and mentors could hang their ambitions for the future they wanted to see. The Supreme Court, the White House would not be beyond her, and when she threw in her lot with the Arkansas charmer, they were convinced that she'd married beneath her and helped her pack for her trek into nowhere with nothing but grief in their hearts. "I worked hard as a woman to help her get the opportunities she was entitled to," said one mentor sadly. "I thought she was throwing that opportunity away."

She wasn't. She was joining forces with a man who would give her a shortcut to power unique to themselves: She would subsume her ambitions in his, get him elected, and they would share power, giving her clout of a sort rarely given a woman—plus the chance to succeed him when his term was done. Every office he held would become a joint venture, so much so that the pair were soon known as "Billary," and Bill would tell the *New York Times* when he won his first race for governor, "Our vote was a vindication of what my wife and I have done and what we hope to do for the state." By 1992, when Bill was elected president, Hillary held the same place in his life that Robert F. Kennedy had held in the life of his brother John 30 years before; Sally Bedell Smith would write in *For Love of Politics*, her dual biography of the Clintons, that Bill "showed his intention to expand his election victory . . . to encompass Hillary, as if she had been on the ticket, too." Thus he named her to head his task force on the reform of health care, planned as the highlight of his domestic agenda, a cabinet-equivalent post without the annoyance of a hearing in front of the Senate. At the same time, aides close to the couple speculated openly about her one day becoming president. "There are a great many people talking very seriously about her succeeding him," Smith quotes Clinton aide Betsey Wright saying. "Friends, Democrats, people out across the country think it is a very viable plan."

Hillary thought so, and so did a cohort of feminists who had been waiting for decades for her or one like her to surface in politics. They could barely contain their delight. *Good Housekeeping*, *Vogue*, *People*, *Parade*, and *Family Circle*

called her a role model. *Time* called her "an icon of American womanhood." Margaret Carlson wrote in *Time*, "Hillary Rodham Clinton will define for women that magical spot where the importance of the world of work and love and children and an inner life all come together. Like Ginger Rogers, she will do everything her partner does, only backward, and in high heels."

And so, critiques of Hillary were taken as attacks on all women, or attacks on strong women, or, in the case of some female journalists, as attacks upon women like them. At a meeting of the Democratic National Committee where her involvement in a questionable investment scheme was mentioned, signs appeared reading "Don't Pillory Hillary," and Blanche Wiesen Cook, a biographer of Eleanor Roosevelt, said that attacks on women who were powerful were a persistent element in our national life. The intensity and longevity of the Hillary cult were revealed in 2012, when she suffered a health scare that drove Tina Brown round the bend. "Losing Hillary has seemed . . . unbearable," the celebrity editor wrote on her website, giving her heroine magical powers. "She has become, literally, the ship of state. She stands for maturity, tenacity, and self-discipline. . . . [She is] a caring executive. . . . Her determination to defy fatigue and keep going beggars belief." Brown then ripped into varied "goaty Republican[s]," saving her best for bewhiskered John Bolton, a former ambassador to the United Nations, of whom she wrote in extremely high dudgeon, "Bolton is not fit to wipe her floor with his mustache."

I'll just ride your coattails, dear.

AP / DOUG MILLS

Not surprisingly, Hillary accepted this view of herself, believing not only that she was entitled to use the power her husband had given her, but that she was entitled to use it without opposition or scrutiny—because she was a pioneer who spoke for all women, and because she was the first lady, a post traditionally honored by both parties as above and apart from the fray. As Smith writes, she took it personally "that wives were subject to criticism," ignoring the fact that wives were not criticized when they played no political role—when they did little (Bess Truman and Mamie Eisenhower) or promoted the arts (Jacqueline Kennedy) or planted flowers and trees (Lady Bird Johnson) or encouraged reading (Barbara and Laura Bush). When Betty Ford was criticized for controversial statements, she did not whine; nor did Eleanor Roosevelt, a seasoned and tough political operative who understood that dealing a blow meant being willing to take one without complaining. Hillary behaved otherwise. While claiming Mrs. R. as a model, she never adopted her attitude. At an event to raise funds for a statue of Eleanor, Hillary spoke of "the conversations I've had in my head with Mrs. Roosevelt," in which she had asked her predecessor, "How did you put up with this? . . . How did you go on day to day . . . with the kind of attacks that would be hurled your way?"

Eleanor never responded, but it turned out not to matter: Down but not out after health care had cratered, Hillary Clinton got a new lease on life when Bill was impeached on charges related to his affair with an intern, and she, on a wave of support for the brave little woman, was swept into the Senate from the state of New York two years later, by a margin of more than 12 points. While her approval ratings had been in the 40s for much of her time as first lady, they were close to 70 by the summer of 1998: In the most bitter of ironies for the trailblazing feminist, she had been rejected while being a maker of policy, and embraced as victimized wife. "It gnawed at Hillary that her role as the silent, aggrieved wife earned her record approval ratings," Jeff Gerth and Don Van Natta report in their biography, *Her Way*. "She isn't thrilled at being forced to play the wronged little woman," a Clinton friend told the two writers. "You go with what works."

And so she did. Thirty-six years before, a traumatized Robert F. Kennedy had left Washington for New York and a new lease on life which included a plan for a return to the White House, and while having your husband cheat with an intern is not on the same plane as having your brother murdered in public, Hillary Clinton planned to do the same thing. But Bobby was murdered while running for president, and Hillary's plans would be thwarted, too. How could she have known her campaign would be blindsided by Barack Obama, running to be the first African-American president, whose historical drama would seem even greater? And, having taken the post of secretary of state when he offered, how could she have known, when she launched her second bid for president, that his (and her) foreign policy would happen to be collapsing upon them just as she began her campaign?

It was just days after the start of her meticulously planned book tour that the whole Middle East became an inferno, marking the collapse of the Obama "new beginning" that was supposed to transform the world. The jewel in her crown turned into her greatest embarrassment. Instead of touting her and Obama's triumphs in foreign

affairs, she had to gloss over their multiple failures—Benghazi, Syria, Iraq, Ukraine—distancing herself from the president's many misjudgments, but not enough to tick off his fans. At the same time, she began to display again the flaws she had shown six years earlier that had made her a troublesome candidate. She was older, much richer, and much more enclosed in the bubble. And it became apparent, once she began talking in interviews, that her gargantuan sense of entitlement might be her worst problem of all.

Hillary Clinton's sense of entitlement has three aspects—power, money, and a strong dose of vengeance—and each seems to go back a long way. Back in Arkansas, as the wife of a border state governor in the 1980s, she raged about Bill's modest salary ($32,000), her need to bring in additional income, and the lack of a pool at the governor's mansion. As a result, she became adept at seeking additional sources of revenue. As the governor's wife, she earned almost $65,000 a year sitting on boards of some of the state's biggest companies, accepted advice on a $1,000 investment that yielded a return of $100,000, and enjoyed favorable terms on the get-rich-quick Whitewater investment, which turned out quite badly. The culture of Arkansas was friendly to this, as Smith tells us, and "Bill and Hillary developed a sense of entitlement," since presents and favors were always forthcoming, and many expenses were picked up by "friends." (This continued down to 2001 when Bill Clinton left office and the couple set up a registry for furnishing their new mansions at an ultra-posh store in Omaha owned by Warren Buffett, where they listed among their many desires a Fabergé spoon for over $500 and a $980 Spode dish.) This did not conflict with Hillary's sense of her mission as a social reformer, but was reinforced by it: It was *because* she worked hard for such wonderful causes that she thought she deserved such luxury. Hillary, a White House aide told columnist Maureen Dowd, is like "an Episcopal bishop who deserves to live at the level of her wealthy parishioners, in return for devoting her life to God and good works."

Stumping for Hillarycare before it died, February 1994

But all politicians think they're doing good works, and few try to claim rewards in so lavish a fashion. The Roosevelts, Bushes, and Kennedys were rich, but they did not appear greedy, and none was raking in the bucks while running for office. The rule in politics is that you sacrifice while holding office, and rake bucks in later (see Dick Cheney and numerous others), but Bill Clinton's role as an ex-president and Hillary's as a celebrity ex-secretary of state has muddied this picture. What's seemly in a former statesman looks different in someone who's running for office; as NBC's Chuck Todd put it recently, "Ex-presidents make money like this, not candidates while they run." Suggestions that she tone it down some seem to have gone nowhere, and it didn't help when she announced that some of her speaking fees go to a charity—the Clinton Foundation—and that her daughter Chelsea, under an NBC contract, "earned" $600,000 a year.

Along with cash (and lots of it), Hillary feels entitled to power without accountability, disputing the right of others to grill her; or accepting responsibility in the abstract for some of her actions, while disowning it in the particular in her very next breath. Here she is in 1994 explaining why her health care reform bill fell flat: "I regret very much that the efforts on health care were badly misunderstood, taken out of context, and used politically against the administration," she said, deflecting her failure onto other people. "I take responsibility for that." And here she is this June on Benghazi. Diane Sawyer reeled off a list of the security failures at the U.S. installation before the September 11, 2012, terror attacks: "The mission was far short of standards: weak perimeter, incomplete fence, video surveillance needed repair." Was there anything Secretary Clinton might have done better? "I take responsibility," Clinton replied, "but I'm not making security decisions. I'm not equipped to sit and look at blueprints to determine where the blast walls need to be." In other words: As a strong woman, I am the big honcho, but don't ask me about blast walls or boy stuff like that.

Another Hillary ploy is to rule questions out of bounds by questioning the moral authority of the people who ask. Critics of her choices as first lady were described as opposing all strong women, and people who questioned her role in Benghazi were defaming our glorious dead. "I will not be part of a political slugfest on the backs of dead Americans," she declared in *Hard Choices*, implying it was unpatriotic even to mention the subject. "It is just plain wrong and . . . unworthy of our great country. Those who insist on politicizing the tragedy will have to do so without me." Asked if she would testify before the congressional committee called to investigate, she acted as if it were she who would judge the committee's behavior. "We'll see what they decide to do, how they conduct themselves," she told Sawyer, and on a different channel she told Cynthia McFadden, "Let's see

AP / MARK WILSON

if this is on the level or not." McFadden then asked if she would turn over her notes if the committee sought them. Said Clinton, "They can read it in the book."

All politicians want things all ways, and all have their egos, but Hillary's sense that she is owed something special seems unique. Does part of it come from the fact that she burst onto the national scene in the role of first lady, a ceremonial, semi-regal position? Is it that she was a politician with a constituency of one—having the king's ear, she needed no other? Is it the pact she and her husband made many years before, that Clinton & Co. would be a joint venture, that she would work to get Bill elected to high office and then would deserve her reward? Or does it go back to those long years in Arkansas, when she suffered and labored in a place that she didn't much like? "By the mid-1980s . . . there had been several adjustments in the partnership, most of them made by Hillary," wrote David Maraniss in his book about Bill Clinton, *First in His Class*. "Year by year in their joint political enterprise, she had taken on more tasks —some that her husband had asked her to do, some that she felt obliged to perform because it was clear to her that he did not want to do them or was not good at them. . . . She was her husband's public relations trouble shooter and legal problem-solver. . . . As public relations consultant, she would devote hours to courting . . . the managing editor of the *Arkansas Democrat*, in an occasionally effective effort to persuade him to go easier. . . . Some people sensed a growing resentment in Hillary that she had to take on so many private duties in the partnership when she was being asked, unfairly, she thought, to sacrifice material things."

Add this resentment to the feedback she had gotten from feminists—she was a genius who deserved only the best—and to the fact that among her duties was the suppression of "bimbo eruptions" brought on by the wandering eye of her husband, and you have the makings of a genuine grievance mentality, along with the insistence that payment had better come soon. Hillary would probably count those 20 or so years passed in the boondocks as part of her long service to causes and country, but a more objective eye might see them instead as careerist ambition, an investment in a political future that would turn out to pay very well. She may also have come to see her pact with Bill as part of a larger pact with the country, confirmed by his election and reelection. But voters who cast their ballots for Bill never knew of or voted for any such pact, and they may not feel bound by it. They may judge Hillary by her record in office, which nowadays is looking unimpressive, and not think her entitled at all. ♦

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Dylan Thomas (1946)

The Anti-Eliot

A centenary appraisal of Dylan Thomas. BY BEVIS HILLIER

The main link between 2014 and literature is, inevitably, the outbreak of the First World War and the war poets such as Wilfred Owen, Siegfried Sassoon, and Rupert Brooke. (Though a virtuoso technician, Brooke is nowadays held in less regard than the other two, as he depicted war as glorious, they as hideous.) But 1914 has another anniversary resonance in literature: It was the year the Welsh poet Dylan Thomas was born.

Bevis Hillier is the author of the three-volume authorized biography of Sir John Betjeman.

By one of those ironic quirks of fate, 1914 was also the birth-year of the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, whose often acidic letters were published last year. Trevor-Roper had a Great War association of his own: Though it is likely that he was gay, he married the eldest daughter of Sir Douglas Haig, one of the Great War generals satirized in the phrase "lions led by donkeys."

It is hard to imagine that Trevor-Roper—one of Nature's reactionaries—would have had much time for the poetry of his contemporary Dylan Thomas, which bubbled and burbled and gurgled over the traces, defying any kind of classicism or rule-book, with a modernism quite distinct from that of T. S. Eliot or W. H. Auden. (We know from Andrew Lycett's biography that Thomas was in a bad "state at a gathering for Lord David Cecil and Hugh Trevor-Roper, who recalled: 'He . . . overturned a full decanter of claret—good claret too—drenching the fastidious Lord David.'")

If I am right about Trevor-Roper's distaste for Thomas's poetry, he was not alone. My old Oxford tutor and friend A. J. P. Taylor (Trevor-Roper's greatest rival and foe in academe) wrote of Thomas's poetry that "it seemed to

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me sham, written to show those who admired it as fools." Admittedly, Taylor could be considered prejudiced in the matter: If he was not actually cuckolded by Thomas, his wife had a long flirtation with him, and Thomas sponged on both for money, drink, and property.

Taylor's opinion of Dylan Thomas's poetry was shared by Viscount Samuel—the English barrister-politician satirized in H.G. Wells's *The New Machiavelli* (1911)—as I discovered when writing my biography of John Betjeman. In 1952, Betjeman was awarded a prize by Foyle's Bookshop in London. It was presented to him at a "literary luncheon" at the Dorchester Hotel by Lord Samuel, who took the occasion to say how much he admired Betjeman's lucid verse as opposed to the mangled prosody of Dylan Thomas. To reinforce his point, Samuel read out some lines of Thomas, emphasizing what he took to be their nonsensical content by putting on a funny voice. These are the lines he read, from Thomas's collection *Twenty-Five Poems* (1936):

A grief ago,
She who was who I hold, the fats and flower,
Or, water-lammed, from the scythe-sided thorn,
Hell wind and sea,
A stem cementing, wrestled up the tower,
Rose maid and male,
Or, malted venus, through the paddler's bowl
Sailed up the sun . . .

Samuel said that he was "appalled to find the degree to which the vice of obscurity was afflicting English verse." It was, he thought, "self-conscious posturing." Stephen Spender, present at the lunch, bristled with indignation, glared at Samuel, and stalked out the door. The drama of this exit turned into farce when Spender bumbled by mistake into the Dorchester's kitchens, from which he emerged sweating, blinking, and "poppy-faced." He told a *Daily Mail* reporter that he was "furious" and "disgusted," adding, "I was a great admirer of Dylan Thomas, and was the first person to write to him about his poetry. It seems that if you are going to give £250 to a modern poet you have to denounce modern poetry. It is the price you have to pay."

I must admit I find it difficult to unravel much meaning from "A Grief Ago." But I still feel that, at his best, Thomas had the true poetic *ichor*—unlike Eliot, who was busy laying his dead hand on English poetry in the year Thomas was born. My own introduction to Thomas's work came in 1952 (the year before his death), when I was 12. My esteemed English master at Reigate Grammar School, Leslie Sherwood, gave me Thomas's poem "Fern Hill," which had been published only six years earlier in the collection *Deaths and Entrances*. I was entranced by the lyrical outpouring and have never lost my affection for it, even though John Bayley, in a characteristically perceptive essay on Thomas, explicitly excludes it from what he regards as Thomas's best work. It begins:

Now as I was young and easy under the apple boughs
About the lilting house and happy as the grass was green,
The night above the dingle starry,
Time let me hail and climb
Golden in the heydays of his eyes,
And honoured among wagons I was prince of the apple towns . . .

And it ends thus:

Time held me green and dying
Though I sang in my chains like the sea.

Certain one-syllable words recur over and over again in Thomas's poetry, almost like a mantra. They are simple words of power that could figure in a Norse saga or Anglo-Saxon poem: bare, beak, bell(s), blade, bird, blood, bone, breath, chains(s), claw, cloud, crotch, dark, dead, death, dome, dust, fire, flame, flesh, globe, grain(s), grief, hair, hawk, heart, hill(s), ice, king, light, love, moon, night, pain, rain, saint, sea, seed, shade, sing, skull, sky, snow, son(s), spit, star(s), stone, thief, tide, tree(s), wave(s), wind.

To write this, I have reread the whole canon of Thomas's poetry. At first, those power-words zoom into one's consciousness crisp and fresh; but as I read on, they began to have a numbing effect, not pleasurable. I recalled Evelyn Waugh's words in *Brideshead Revisited*:

> A blow, expected, repeated, falling on a bruise, with no smart or shock of surprise, only a dull . . . pain and the doubt whether another like it could be borne—that was how it felt . . .

I haven't actually totted up how often each of the power-words appears in Thomas's poetry, but I would guess that "bone" is the clear winner. Along with Thomas's obscurity, the thudding reiteration of the power-words would be part of the case against him. If making the case for him, one could point to many individual lines and couplets that are almost Shakespearean—among them:

The bones of men, the broken in their beds,
By midnight pulleys that unhouse their tomb.

The secret oils that drive the grass.

The hand that signed the paper felled a city . . .
A hand rules pity as a hand rules heaven;
Hands have no tears to flow.

Black-tongued and tipsy from salvation's bottle . . .

And what's the rub? Death's feather on the nerve?
Your mouth, my love, the thistle in the kiss?

The hero's head lies scraped of every legend . . .

O keep his bones away from that common cart . . .

And then there are sublime passages that are Dylan Thomas and could be no one else.

The force that through the green fuse drives the flower
Drives my green age; that blasts the roots of trees
Is my destroyer. . . .
The force that drives the water through the rocks
Drives my red blood; that dries the mouthing streams
Turns mine to wax. . . .

There was a saviour
Rarer than radium,
Commoner than water, crueller than truth . . .

Do not go gentle into that good night,
Old age should burn and rave at close of day;
Rage, rage against the dying of the light. . . .

And death shall have no dominion.
Dead men naked they shall be one
With the man in the wind and the west moon;
When their bones are picked clean and the clean bones gone,
They shall have stars at elbow and foot;
Though they go mad they shall be sane,
Though they sink through the sea they shall rise again;
Though lovers be lost love shall not;
And death shall have no dominion. . . .

If only all of Thomas's poems were on that level. Too often, they are little more than windy blather. As Bayley has written: "At its most disruptive, we feel there is simply no connection between the poem and what exegesis can suggest its meaning is, what it seems to be about." A polite way of saying that some of the poems are incomprehensible.

At times, one can't help wondering: How many pints of beer had Thomas drunk before he wrote this? He was a notorious drunk. The old joke about him runs: "He was a bard; but also—as he was excluded from so many pubs—he was *barred*."

When we call Thomas a "bard," we are, of course, referring to his Welshness, the Celtic lyricism in his blood. There are two reasons why that quality speaks to me. First, as with Thomas, Wales was the land of my fathers: My paternal grandmother was a Davies, a kinswoman of Lord Byron's great friend Scrope Berdmore Davies, to whom the poet dedicated "Parisinia." And second, in 1944, aged 4, I was evacuated to Glamorgan, South Wales, with my mother and baby sister when bombs began to fall too often on our hometown near London. I first went to school in Glamorgan. The older evacuee children had to learn Welsh, but I was thought too young for that.

I vividly remember one incident from those days. Our class teacher, Miss Penrose Davies, took us on a nature walk to learn about wildflowers, birdsong, and so on. As teacher's pet, I walked along beside her, but some of the other children sped on ahead. When we caught up with them, most of them were sitting on a five-barred gate and singing joyously, "Where have you been all the day, Billy boy, Billy boy?" It was a magical scene. They sang at the top of their voices, beautifully in tune. Recalling that moment, years later, I was reminded of Siegfried Sassoon's poem about soldiers in the Great War.

Everyone suddenly burst out singing;
And I was filled with such delight
As prisoned birds must find in freedom,
Winging wildly across the white
Orchards and dark-green fields;
on—on—and out of sight. . . .

Also in maturer years, I understood that English children would never have behaved like those Welsh ones, spontaneously and joyfully bursting into song. It is that quality of spontaneous, floodtide lyricism that is predominant in Thomas's poetry. There is in it something of incantation, so that it sounds good even when it does not mean a lot—especially when read by Thomas himself in his rich baritone, a voice rivaled only by that of his compatriot and fellow drinker Richard Burton, who so memorably narrated Thomas's Rabelaisian radio drama *Under Milk Wood* in 1954.

T.S. Eliot is the 20th-century poet to whom most scholars and critics today pay the greatest obeisance; it is nothing short of heresy to say about him what I am about to say. Eliot was a critic of formidable intellect, but what he desperately wanted to be seen as was a poet. And it seems to me that he lacked precisely the quality that Thomas had in superabundance: that instinctual, fountaining lyricism, the poetic *ichor* (defined in my *Chambers Dictionary* as "the ethereal juice in the veins of the gods").

Eliot was an outrageous plagiarist, notably (as was first pointed out by academic Robert Ian Scott in 1995) of the Kentucky poet Madison Cawein; Eliot even pinched the title of *The Waste Land* from him. (In 1996 I gave further examples of Eliot's borrowings from Cawein, who had conveniently died in the year of Dylan Thomas's birth.) Poor Cawein gets nil mention in most dictionaries of English literature, in which massive space is hogged by Eliot.

I think that Eliot, being the astute critic he was, may have come to a painful realization of his own limitations as a poet. In his play *The Confidential Clerk* (1954), written in plain prose masquerading as verse, he portrays the tycoon Sir Claude Mulhammer, a man who realized in the nick of time that he had no vocation for the art he most wanted to practice.

Yes, I did not want to be a financier. . . .
I wanted to be a potter. . . .
When I was a boy
I loved to shape things. I loved form and colour
And I loved the material that the potter handles.
. . . [But] I came to see
That I should never have become a first-rate potter.
I didn't have it in me. It's strange, isn't it,
That a man should have a consuming passion
To do something for which he lacks the capacity?
Could a man be said to have a vocation
To be a second-rate potter? . . .

Why did Eliot choose pottery as the art Sir Claude had wanted to excel in? Most people, in their fantasies, do not aspire to be humble potters. It's only a hunch, but I think he may have chosen thus because "pottery" and "poetry" are close in sound. Perhaps the fêted and garlanded Eliot was admitting, in a coded public confessional, that he, too, didn't have it in him—that he, in poetry, was a second-rater. What Sir Claude *does* shine in is connoisseurship of pottery—in Eliot's case, read "criticism of poetry."

Eliot was such a panjandrum in the period when Thomas was writing poetry that the younger poet may have taken from him the idea that it was acceptable, if not obligatory, for poetry to be obscure—though it has been pointed out that Thomas was probably mocking Eliot in "We Lying By

Seasand" (one of his best), in which, allegedly, Eliot is the "dry tide-master" who rules the tides of contemporary verse and is mocked for his sterility through the image of red rock.

Eliot versus Thomas is like Ingres versus Delacroix; Gladstone versus Disraeli; Sir Nikolaus Pevsner versus Sir John Betjeman: chill mastery confronts swashbuckling romanticism. (Writing in the 1930s and '40s, Thomas has much in common with British Romantic artists of the same period, such as John Piper and Graham Sutherland, who were inspired by William Blake and his disciples John Linnell, Samuel Palmer, and Edward Calvert.)

In a 1946 review of Thomas's *Deaths and Entrances* for the *Daily Herald*, Betjeman—whom Lord Samuel lauded as the antithesis of Thomas—wrote that "the Welsh poet, Dylan Thomas, is not only the best living Welsh poet, but is a great poet." That is, perhaps, going too far. As a discriminating verdict on Thomas the poet, I prefer what William Empson wrote: "There is . . . a lot of his poetry where I can feel it works and yet can't see why." ♦

B&A

The God Gene

The family that prays together . . . well, you know the rest. BY WILLIAM MCKENZIE

One of the realities of Christianity is that the church has always been forming and reforming. This evolutionary phenomenon goes back to the church's earliest days, when believers identified themselves in various ways, such as followers of Paul or Apollos or Cephas. The divisions were so evident that the apostle Paul urged the church in Corinth to remember that they were united in Christ! This organic aspect of religious belief remains real: Look at the forming and reforming of denominations over issues like same-sex marriage. It is easy to get discouraged over the squabbling when, perhaps, this is just an inherent reality within religious systems.

Vern L. Bengtson, professor emeritus of gerontology and sociology and research professor of social work at the University of Southern California, has spent much of the last four decades looking at religious systems. From 1970 through 2005, he conducted the Longitudinal Study of Generations, specifically examining how religious beliefs move from one generation to the next. Along with his research colleagues, Bengtson has tried to answer three fundamental questions, which he puts this way in *Families and Faith*:

> 1. To what extent are families able to pass on their religious faith to the next generation in today's rapidly changing society?
>
> 2. How has this changed over the past several decades, in the context of remarkable cultural, familial, and religious change in American society?
>
> 3. Why are some families able to achieve their goal of transmitting their faith to their children while others are not?

Bengtson's research certainly identifies some of the evolutionary aspects of religious systems. For example, we learn about families whose descendants shirk the values of previous generations. They do so by rejecting their family's faith altogether, becoming more zealous than their parents in their religiosity, or becoming prodigals who eventually return to the faith or something close to it.

The rebels essentially have too much religion in their upbringing; the zealots become far more intense in their adult years; and the prodigals wander home often because of a warm parent, families giving them latitude, and/or a strong religious foundation from the beginning. These are the types that react to the traditions of their families. And we probably all have seen them. But what is counterintuitive about Bengtson's findings is the degree to which families still pass on their religious beliefs (or lack of them) to the next generation. Many of us may find it surprising, given the common perception that Bengtson describes:

> In the eyes of many, families have lost a disturbing amount of their moral and religious influence, seemingly a consequence of parental divorce, excessive individualism, and a breakdown in traditional social structures.

The data he and his crew have unearthed challenge that view. They discovered their findings through looking at "linked lives," which are the social networks that include parents and even grandparents. Their research examines seven generations that span nearly 100 years. The first group of interviewees came from the World War I generation that was born as early as the 1890s. The last set belongs to the millennial generation, born in the 1980s.

Across that long arc, Bengtson and his fellow researchers found that the familial part of social networks remains critical in transmitting religious beliefs—or a lack of such. "Religious momentum across generations" remains a reality, Bengtson contends. Bengtson's study especially found "momentum" with Mormon, Jewish, and evangelical Protestant families. Each had a fairly steady transmission rate, as the sociologists call

Families and Faith
How Religion Is Passed Down Across Generations
by Vern L. Bengtson with Norella M. Putney and Susan Harris
Oxford, 288 pp., $29.95

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it, between 1970 and 2005. Here are a few key data points:

■ In 1970, 67 percent of Mormon parents had young adult children who shared their religion. By 2005, 85 percent did.

■ In 1970, 70 percent of evangelical parents had young adult children within the same tradition. By 2005, 62 percent did.

■ In 1970, 94 percent of Jewish parents had young adult children who shared their religion. By 2005, 82 percent did.

Obviously, Mormons did the best. But the slippage in evangelical and Jewish transmission rates was not very great, especially when compared with the drop-offs for mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics. The so-called parent-child similarity rates for mainliners dropped by 33 percentage points between 1970 and 2005, while they declined 41 percentage points for Catholics.

Interestingly, the parent-child similarity rates were also strong for the religiously unaffiliated—or the *nones* that we read so much about today. In 1970, 40 percent of parents with no religious affiliation had children within that same tradition. In 2005, 63 percent did. In short, the notion that the *nones* are a new category is not accurate: They are simply growing, which is a reality that religious leaders increasingly are coming to grasp.

Established institutions may never reach those who reject any sort of religiosity; but can they find common ground with those who consider themselves "spiritual but not religious"? That is one of the major challenges for today's houses of worship. Which gets us to the "how" part of the transmission process. Religious leaders and parents, especially, should delve into this part of the findings. In short, various factors come into play, but two especially stand out—or at least they should for those of us who profess a faith.

First, *parental warmth matters*. Parents who best transmit their beliefs are the unconditionally supportive ones who consistently model religious practices and don't force their beliefs on the next generation. Fathers, especially, are key, the researchers found. But talk about a tall order for those of us in the hurly-burly of raising children! My wife and I have active 11-year-old twins, and it's hard to pass that warmth test day-to-day. I am going to have to hang on to Bengtson's admonition to take the long view that religious beliefs often play out over time.

Second, *grandparents are a surprisingly important factor*. About 40 percent of grandparents and grandchildren share the same tradition. Some of this is due to grandparents stepping in to raise a child; some is due also to the longer lives many Americans now experience, allowing grandparents more time to be there for their grandchildren. Whatever the reason, this finding is reassuring: Grandparents can be a backstop.

Bengtson himself mirrors some of these findings. He was raised in a fundamentalist Christian family in the Midwest. Then he stepped away from it for many decades.

Serendipitously, he decided to attend an Easter service in California a few years ago. The music and beauty within the church overwhelmed him. Soon, he was rediscovering Christianity, although in a different form from that of his parents and grandparents.

My own religious "journey" started as a child in a Presbyterian church in Fort Worth and then included involvement with several evangelical groups and churches in high school and college. Finally, I rediscovered the Presbyterianism that my Scottish forebears passed on to my grandparents and my father. Mainline Protestants such as Presbyterians are down in numbers, but I love the services at my Dallas church, especially because I understand that somehow they connect me with a distant clan.

So, many of us still are evolving, like those in the early church. As Bengtson puts it, we experience continuity and change. Those two realities—faiths are transmitted but also evolve over time—matter beyond our own homes. Religion and families are two of the most stabilizing forces in society. For that reason alone, this book and Bengtson's findings are worth examining. The charts and data tend toward the academic at times, but the degree to which religious values are handed down suggests a greater cohesion within families than may sometimes be apparent. ♦

B&A

Promises to Keep

How the Romans (successfully) supplanted the Greeks.

BY **J. E. LENDON**

Taken at the Flood
The Roman Conquest of Greece
by Robin Waterfield
Oxford, 320 pp., $27.95

A mighty republic, having fought a considerable war to a victorious end, vindicated its plighted word by removing its arms from the realm where so many of its young men had fallen for the liberty of strangers. But then, compelled to regard fresh wars arising in that place—infestations of new enemies, friends trimming, and former allies turned repellent in its eyes—that power is seized by a weary disgust. Despite its preponderant strength, the great nation is unable to settle upon any policy of peace or war likely to put back into the slit belly of the country it had conquered and spared the serpentine slime of its unleashed entrails.

J. E. Lendon, professor of history at the University of Virginia, is the author of Song of Wrath: The Peloponnesian War Begins *and* Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity.

Such was the puzzlement, in 192 B.C., of the Republic of Rome. In 197 B.C., the Romans had bloodily freed southern Greece from the domination of the Macedonian dynast Philip V and tried to fashion a balance of power to keep the peace among the Greek states. And in 194 B.C., Rome had pulled all its soldiers back across the Adriatic to Italy, just as the Romans said they would when they announced that they were coming to Greece to free the Greeks from Philip. But Greek freedom devolved quickly into bedlam, and another powerful Greek-speaker, King Antiochus the Great of the Seleucid Empire (governed from what is now Syria), allied himself with one of Rome's former allies in Greece and marched in.

Now in confused frustration at the ingratitude of the Greeks, Rome settled upon war and invaded Greece again (192-188 B.C.), and then a third time, with more clarity of purpose, when Philip V's son Perseus began to gather what was, at least in Roman eyes, a new and dangerous potency in Macedon (171-168 B.C.). After his defeat, Rome put an end to the Macedonian monarchy, but a usurper arose in the vacuum, and the thwarted Romans had to invade Macedonia yet again (150-148 B.C.) before fighting one last time, with a kind of rueful brutality, to subdue southern Greece (146 B.C.). They sacked the ancient and beautiful city of Corinth, an act of vandalism similar to torching, at the same moment, the British Museum and the Metropolitan Museum of Art. But until 146 B.C., the Romans kept no permanent garrison in Greece, and even the troops then permanently settled in Macedonia looked primarily to the north to protect the Greeks and Macedonians from the fierce, crude peoples who swarmed in the Balkans. Rome did not make a territorial province out of southern Greece—with a Roman governor present every year to judge causes and collect taxes—until 27 B.C.

This tale of conquest, and disenchanted reconquest, is the story Robin Waterfield tells here. Waterfield has made himself into a living international treasure by his lean and lucid accounts of some of the most involved periods of ancient history (here, Rome's wars in Greece and Macedonia; in *Dividing the Spoils*, the wars of Alexander the Great's successors). The current story Waterfield tells clearly and enjoyably, with a deft selection of detail and not without anecdote: The reader meets characters such as the jolly pirate chieftain Dicaearchus, who would erect upon the beach of the land he had chosen to pillage lofty altars to his private gods, Impiety and Lawlessness.

But Waterfield has no less difficulty than a century of predecessors in explaining the crashing wave-and-retreat pattern of Roman involvement in the Greek peninsula. Why—and this has been one of the Great Questions of Roman history since the late 19th century—did the Romans who invaded Greece and Macedonia keep winning and then going home? The Romans were not, in their nature, a peaceable people; they fought a war, or a number of wars, almost every year, and they expected to do so. Nor had the Romans any absolute objection to seizing other men's territory and administering it themselves: As early as 241 B.C., they had made Sicily into their first province.

Even if cultural differences (e.g., the Roman expectation that freeing the Greeks would place them under so great a moral obligation that they would obey the Romans) explain the disappointment of Roman hopes for long-term peace after they liberated Greece from Philip V, the Romans were not so simple a folk as to blunder into that same cultural misunderstanding on several more occasions. If the Greeks were intended to remember the cruel might of the Romans and to obey out of fear (as Waterfield argues)—well, that worked no better. Such was Greek pride that they were willing to fight the Romans even when, as in the Achaean war of 146 B.C., they knew that there could be *no* possibility of victory.

But perhaps the circumstances of today can explain this mystery of yesterday. Our current president withdrew U.S. forces from Iraq partly because he said he would and partly because when the United States intervened in that region, it had denied before a doubting world that it intended to make Iraq into a dependency and pull forever on its udders for cheap oil. By the time the American withdrawal approached its end, the administration must have had qualms about the strategic wisdom of leaving. But the White House went on nevertheless to fulfill its own pledges and those of the administration before. Primarily, no doubt, it did so from distaste for the war; but also, it is nice to think, because the United States forswearing itself in so tremendous a matter might have terrible consequences in times to come.

'King Perseus before Aemilius Paullus' by Jean-François-Pierre Peyron (1802)

Similarly, every time the Romans of the second century B.C. invaded the Greek peninsula, they did so, as far as we know, under the pledge that they would leave the Greeks free (without, that is, the garrisons the Macedonians had employed to control central and southern Greece). And this they did, even if, as war succeeded war, "freedom" came with cruel provisos. After the war against Perseus of Macedon, the Romans emptied 70 enemy towns in Molossia (a petty kingdom to the west of Macedonia) and sent 150,000 Molossians to Rome as slaves. And even from the Achaean League—their longtime ally in southern Greece who helped too slowly and whose feelings towards Perseus, the Romans thought, were unduly warm—the victors carried 1,000 leading men to comfortable internment in Italy. (This was bad for them but good for us, because one of those internees was Polybius, who turned by necessity from politics to writing history and from whom, ultimately, we know most of this story.) But despite the annoyance with the Greeks these acts suggest, all of Rome's soldiers came home: Rome left no garrisons.

Once again, the Romans left Greece free, as they had promised.

In fact, the Roman promise of freedom and its regular fulfillment were inevitable. Only by promising not to leave garrisons could the Romans enjoy from their many Greek allies the practical support—troops, markets, information—they needed to be relatively confident that a war against Macedon or Antiochus would end in victory. Had Rome not pledged itself to Greek freedom, or had Rome reneged on its promise after its first or second invasion and left garrisons in Greece, or had it tried early on to reduce Greece or Macedonia to directly governed Roman provinces, proud and freedom-loving Greece would have closed up like an oyster. The Romans would have had few or no allies there, and they would have found the peninsula—its hundreds of fortified towns, overlooking its hundreds of arid valleys—as hard to take and control as the Macedonians (who made no secret of their ambition to rule) had found it during the two centuries before.

The Romans withdrew again and again from Greece because they had to make promises in order to succeed in Greece; and they had to keep those promises to succeed in the future. In fact, the Romans were, as Polybius tells us, unusual in the Mediterranean world for the rigor of their promise-keeping: It was one of the secrets of their success. For the Romans knew that keeping promises to allies, armed power, and the proven willingness to use that power were the three legs of the tripod of international credibility. And betraying one promise is noticed more widely than keeping a dozen, for those to whom promises are kept abide in quiet contentment but those betrayed from cowardice do not. Listen, now, to the cries of Poland and the Czech Republic, deprived of their missile defense shield by a White House flinching before Russia, or to the cries of Georgia and Ukraine, turned away from NATO. And so the blazing tripod of credibility tips and falls, dropping red-hot coals on the feet of the foolish, and only with long difficulty is it righted. ♦

B&A

Childhood's End

A story of guilt and innocence in Stalin's kingdom.

BY ANDREW NAGORSKI

One Night in Winter
by Simon Sebag Montefiore
Harper, 480 pp., $26.99

Simon Sebag Montefiore is best known for his monumental biography *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar* (2003), which offered a mesmerizing, richly detailed portrait of the Soviet tyrant's inner circle—and how he could alternately, even simultaneously, ooze charm and terror in his dealings with them. In that volume, he briefly mentions the murder-suicide of two teenage children of this super-elite, which led to the arrests of 26 schoolboys, including one of Stalin's nephews and two sons of Politburo stalwart Anastas Mikoyan. The children weren't released until they signed confessions that they had conspired to overthrow the regime.

'Thanks to dear Stalin for a happy childhood!' (1936)

HERITAGE IMAGES / GETTY IMAGES

In this novel, inspired by that incident, Montefiore explores how the parents and children might have handled this ordeal—and what may have prompted Stalin to pursue a case that, even in his perpetually paranoid frame of mind, he must have known to be bogus. With the leeway afforded by fiction, the author ventures into the minds of the participants to imagine how an initial act of schoolboy violence could trigger a chain of events that quickly engulfed the families of the most exalted of Stalin's willing executioners.

As in the real-life case, Montefiore starts with the apparent murder-suicide

Andrew Nagorski, a former Newsweek *bureau chief in Moscow and Berlin, is the author of* Hitlerland: American Eyewitnesses to the Nazi Rise to Power.

of two teenagers from what he calls Stalin Commune School 801, which caters to the children of the top Kremlin leadership. When a Jewish teacher opened their eyes to the wonders of Alexander Pushkin, several students had formed a group called the Fatal Romantics' Club, dressing up in theatrical costumes and staging impromptu scenes from the poet's work. It is during one of those reenactments that things go awry, leading to the deaths of two of the members. This is the Stalinist version of a Dead Poets Society, which necessitates a far more complex and chilling plot.

When "the organs"—as Soviet security services were known—start looking into the case, everyone in the group is imperiled. "Like a party of mountaineers, when one falls, all fall," the teenage main character Serafima Romashkina realizes. The parents, too, are in danger and may be the real targets of the quickly concocted conspiracy: Stalin liked nothing better than keeping his inner circle guessing about who he would dispatch next.

Historians, journalists, and others can easily stumble when they shift from nonfiction to fiction, and Montefiore's execution isn't always perfect. He faces the classic Russian-novel problem of juggling multiple characters and family relationships that can be difficult to keep straight, even with the help of a cast list at the beginning. His characters sound too colloquial at times, and his heroes—the free-thinking teacher and a school director who quietly supports him and takes other risks—can look almost *too* heroic.

Yet the language of Stalin's court was anything but elevated, as Montefiore knows from his extensive research, and much of the dialogue accurately captures its cringing, sycophantic tone. And while Stalin's reign of terror prompted millions to collaborate and cower in fear, there were brave souls who displayed extraordinary courage and moral fortitude. Hence, the great works of literature by the likes of Anna Akhmatova and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

For the most part, Montefiore nails the atmospherics. Asked by a new student why the Fatal Romantics' Club and its activities are so secret, Romashkina responds: "Don't you see? In our age of conspiracy, *everything* is conspiratorial. Even having a picnic or reading poetry." But most of all, Montefiore has constructed a story that all too convincingly conveys how the students, who are picked up one by one, are coerced into making confessions that both they and their interrogators know are false.

The most compelling parts of the story focus on the dilemma of the parents, who have to pretend they have full faith in "the organs"—and, of course, in Stalin, who revels in the mental torture he is inflicting on them. Tamara Satinova, the wife of a Politburo member, is allowed to visit her 6-year-old daughter at the Lubyanka prison, only to endure the agony of new separation as the girl doesn't want to let her go. Resisting the impulse "to hold on to her little girl," she feels compelled to pry herself loose from her "sobbing, shaking, struggling to breathe" child because the alternative of disobeying her jailers would be even worse.

Somewhat less convincing is the portrait of general rectitude, combined with a late-life love story, of Tamara's husband, who becomes one of the targets of the plot. This raises the question whether members of Stalin's court, who routinely approved mass murder, could exhibit genuinely warm emotions, especially within their families, and even romantic longings. Could they unwittingly share in the spirit of the Fatal Romantics' Club of their children?

Whether or not readers will accept this, Montefiore clearly believes so. He certainly understands the adage that truth is often stranger than fiction; but he makes a strong case here that fiction can illuminate such strangeness. By demonstrating how the most innocent members of very guilty families found themselves plunged into darkness, Montefiore has made a valuable addition to his already impressive body of work. ♦

B&A

Hoover at War

How the G-man beat the Germans at their own game.

BY DAVID AIKMAN

Ever since the death of J. Edgar Hoover in 1972, journalists and disparate authors have pored over his life in order to dissect its mysteries. There have been books about his (alleged) gay activities and darker allegations that he used his powers as director of the FBI for manipulative political purposes. Most Americans, however, recall Hoover as the federal tough guy who went toe-to-toe with organized crime and warned about the Communist threat to American freedoms during the Cold War.

Hoover's Secret War Against Axis Spies
FBI Counterespionage During World War II
by Raymond J. Batvinis
Kansas, 312 pp., $34.95

While these images of Hoover contain strong elements of truth, a side of his career that has not received much attention is his espionage and counterespionage duel with the Axis powers during World War II. *Hoover's Secret War Against Axis Spies* attempts to remedy that lacuna in our knowledge of J. Edgar Hoover.

David Aikman is the author, most recently, of The Mirage of Peace: Understanding the Never-Ending Conflict in the Middle East.

Even before the war, the FBI was tasked with counterespionage rather than foreign intelligence-gathering. As Raymond J. Batvinis shows, however, the FBI became an effective element not only in counterespionage but in operating a massive and successful disinformation campaign intended to deceive the Germans on the strategic goals of the Allies.

Despite America's experience with subversion in the aftermath of World War I—and an awareness of challenges to national security thanks to Soviet agents of influence in the 1930s—it wasn't until 1940 that Hoover set up, as an intelligence-gathering branch of the FBI, something called the Special Intelligence Service. Initially, agents posing as diplomatic couriers darted between Latin American capitals gathering intelligence and keeping an eye out for potential threats to the United States. Once we were fully involved in World War II, however, it became obvious that the country had to get up to speed on both intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence against Axis agents.

The British had a head start in turning German agents for the Abwehr (German military intelligence) into double agents. German agents who were fortunate enough to set foot on British soil without being arrested or shot on arrival were soon rounded up and faced with a choice: Cooperate as double agents or get executed as spies. This was known as "the double-cross" system.

Hoover was well aware of British success in turning German agents as well as the arcane arts of intercepting mail (e.g., reading documents in diplomatic pouches and then putting them back without any sign that they had been opened). But an early source of friction between British intelligence and Hoover's FBI was caused by the overambitious, and in some ways deceitful, activities of the British Security Coordination (BSC). Set up in London without very careful forethought, and led by an ambitious Canadian millionaire named William Stephenson, the BSC irritated Hoover and others by eavesdropping on the telephone conversations of American politicians and dissembling about key intelligence information picked up in America.

Hoover was furious, refused to have anything more to do with the BSC—and then had to start largely from scratch to rebuild trust with MI5 and MI6 officials in London. The rift, however, was healed when Hoover dispatched a cordial and diplomatic personal representative to London called Arthur Thurston and by diligent British efforts to repair the damage to the Anglo-American relationship caused by Stephenson's men.

J. Edgar Hoover (1940)

Before long, Hoover, through his able counterintelligence deputies in the United States and abroad, was busily recruiting Abwehr spies as double agents. The technique was more complicated than the British approach of "deal or get shot," and it benefited from the fact that many Abwehr agents had considerable animosity towards the Nazis and would offer their services to the FBI at the earliest opportunity. The resultant cache of Abwehr double agents proved invaluable in deceiving the Germans about Allied intelligence objectives and in learning what the Germans wanted to know about the United States. (One nugget of pure gold was the FBI's learning, early in the war, that the Germans wanted to know as much as possible about the American atomic program.)

One of the FBI double agents involved in this particular operation was code-named "the Peasant." Indeed, the agents had a string of exotic code names—"the Count from New York" and so on—often derived from their Abwehr code names. Part of the FBI deception involved sending radio messages to an electronic address in Hamburg that both simulated the actual Morse Code rhythms of the Abwehr agent and answered questions posed by the agent's control officer in Germany.

Sometimes the FBI had problems with Abwehr double agents running up gigantic expenses in order to deceive the Germans that they were maintaining official "cover." A Frenchman named Costes (who, before the war, had been a famous aviator) ran up huge bills at the Waldorf-Astoria posing as a refugee in order, ostensibly, to report for the Abwehr. His glamorous French wife—who didn't know her husband was a German agent, let alone an FBI double agent—planned to launch a singing career in New York and demanded payment for an accompanist. The FBI eventually settled the couple in a furnished apartment near the Waldorf at a cost to taxpayers (in today's dollars) of $55,000.

Was it worth it in terms of intelligence and counterintelligence? The author thinks that it was, pointing to a string of successful efforts to deceive the Abwehr—in particular, Operation Fortitude, which persuaded the Germans that the Allies would land in the Pas de Calais on D-Day rather than Normandy.

Hoover's Secret War offers fascinating details about FBI espionage and counterespionage operations during a deadly period in modern history. Its major weakness, however, is an abundance of disconnected detail and an absence of insight into J. Edgar Hoover's role in tactics and strategy. The author's explanation is that Hoover just wasn't very curious about life beyond the borders of the United States. His discipline, hard work, and professional integrity certainly produced impressive results; his thinking process in making those decisions is less clear. ♦

EVERETT COLLECTION / NEWSCOM

B&A

All Aboard

Snow, dystopia, trains, inequality. What's not to like?

BY JOHN PODHORETZ

I don't know what it says about the movies these days that the best one I've seen so far this summer is a completely insane thriller set on a train in perpetual motion around a post-apocalyptic earth on which the have-nots are packed like sardines in the caboose while the wealthy live in splendor in the front.

In one sense, *Snowpiercer* is indefensible. Science fiction, even satirical science fiction, needs to have its own rigorous internal logic, and *Snowpiercer* is almost defiantly illogical. For one thing, it begins 17 years after the earth has frozen over—apparently the world tried to cure global warming but turned the thermostat down too low—so surely whatever discrepancy there was in the fare between the front and the back of the train has long since been amortized.

For another, surely a train that keeps running by turning snow into gasoline can magically make a lot of other stuff too to improve the lives of its hoi polloi. And finally, if the world is made of snow, surely there would be enough water for the poor people to take a daily shower without costing the rich fascists in the front too much trouble.

The only way to excuse such lapses is if you come to the movie theater directly from having skipped a neighborhood effort to reenergize the Occupy Wall Street movement because you went to get your nails done, or from having made a third effort to get past page 11 of Thomas Piketty's book before closing the Kindle app and opening Temple Run 2 instead—and are therefore looking for something easier to get through about how mean and nasty economic and social inequality are.

Snowpiercer
Directed by Bong Joon-ho

So why do I also say *Snowpiercer* is the best movie I've seen this summer? Because it is a by-God *movie*—a seat-of-your-pants, nail-biting, over-the-top, exciting, funny, weird motion picture, with an emphasis on "motion." On screen, the train provides a near-perfect setting, combining the intimacy of a closed space of the sort you see on a theatrical stage with the illusion of constant movement and change on the outside. The director, a Korean named Bong Joon-ho, makes use of the contrast just about as well as anyone ever has.

There's a reason the slang term "movie" became the term of art to describe the narrative film; when you watch one, you are immobilized but the action around you is designed, metaphorically, to transport you without your ever having to leave your seat. It's the original and elemental magic of the motion picture, and it's still there more than a century after the form came into being. But directors and writers no longer think about *how* to make a movie move, or how to harness that particular magic to pull a viewer outside of himself and into a story. Bong Joon-ho really has done so here, though, and it will be extraordinarily exciting to see what he comes up with next.

I don't want to say much more about the movie because it really depends on the unfolding of a series of surprises as the train's hidden features and peculiarities begin to reveal themselves. You should be warned it's very violent, but it is also deliberately and satirically grotesque (especially in the person of Tilda Swinton, who hilariously embodies schoolmarm fascism in all its guises), and the grotesquerie serves to undercut the effect of the violence. But I will say that Chris Evans, best known for his soulful performances as Captain America in three (so far) Marvel films, is unrecognizable and absolutely great as the lead rebel from the back of the train.

Trains and films have gone well together since the first real plotted movie, *The Great Train Robbery*, was released in 1903. In 1938, Alfred Hitchcock made his most delightful film, *The Lady Vanishes*, about the disappearance of a woman from a train whom no one but a very nervous young woman seems to remember. Twenty years later, he used a phallic train ride as the metaphor for the seduction of Cary Grant by Eva Marie Saint in 1959's *North by Northwest*.

The great 1934 comedy *Twentieth Century* involves a washed-up theater producer who finds himself onboard the same train as the movie star he discovered—and makes hilarious improvisational use of the other passengers to talk her into appearing in his next show. Countless westerns featured bad guys duking it out with white hats on the tops of train cars. And you can't forget the great subway movies as well—*The Taking of Pelham One Two Three* (1974), *The Warriors* (1979).

But it's the sense of being trapped in a confined space that is either dangerous in itself (because the train might crash) or only a tin wall away from dangers untold (as in the barren world outside the Snowpiercer) that makes the train such an effective setting. Speaking of the former, there is another terrific film that came out earlier this year called *Last Passenger*, about six people on a commuter train from London that begins hurtling out of control. It's as understated as *Snowpiercer* is operatic, but like its flashier cousin, *Last Passenger* knows something all those $250 million blockbusters don't: Memorable moviemaking ultimately arises from conflicts between people, not fights between computer-generated images. ♦

John Podhoretz, editor of Commentary, *is* The Weekly Standard*'s movie critic.*

PARODY

"Even as Hillary Rodham Clinton looms as the overwhelming favorite for the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination, the party's base is stirring for a primary fight. . . . [F]ormer senator Gary Hart of Colorado said he intends to huddle with California Gov. Jerry Brown . . . to chat about the possibility of Brown running for the White House."

—Washington Post, *July 19, 2014*

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Democratic base hopeful for re-animated Stevenson

MCGOVERN, ABZUG COULD BE REVIVED, TOO

California's Brown: 'I'm not even dead'

BY ALLISON KLEIN



The grave of one-time Democratic standardbearer Adlai Stevenson, emptied of its contents by hopeful left-wing party activists.

Seeking to mount a challenge to frontrunner Hillary Clinton, the Democratic party's base has joined with a team of scientists to bring former Illinois governor and presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson back to life to champion the party's more liberal wing in the upcoming presidential primary.

"We just want to make sure our voices are heard," says Jarred Galbraith, a sociology professor at Wesleyan. "Looking around, there didn't seem to be a real alternative to Hillary. Someone suggested Jerry Brown, and I thought, well, why stop there? With technology and whatnot, anything could be possible."

While the science has yet to be figured out, activists remain confident that there is enough time to do so before the campaign begins in earnest. "I'm no scientist, but they could maybe do a Frankenstein thing, like with lightning, only more, you know, scientific," speculates Jerry Hirshfeld, a sociology professor at Bard. "Sure, there may be some kinks to sort out once he's alive again. Like explaining all the gay rights stuff and not using the words 'negro' and 'Indian,' but he'll pick it up pretty fast, I think."

While many on the left are excited by the prospect of a renewed Stevenson candidacy, some doubt that a newly re-animated Mr. Stevenson would be in touch with the issues they hold most dear. "Why are we trying to bring this guy back?" asks Jay McCauley, a sociology professor at Oberlin. "We need someone who will really take the fight to Hillary; we need a real liberal like McGovern."

Still others feel that the discussion about re-animation has revealed a subtle sexism in their party. "So now we need to bring men back from the dead to stop Hillary? It's ridiculous!" proclaims Jessica Green, a Barnard women's studies professor. "Nobody's even talked about bringing a woman back to life. There are so many great liberal women we could re-animate: Bella Abzug, Geraldine Ferraro, Dianne Fein-

ELEANOR CONTINUED ON A6

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