the weekly Standard

DID THE CIA'S NO. 2 LIE ABOUT BENGHAZI?
STEPHEN F. HAYES

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THE GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT

What happens when a political messiah fails?

BY JAMES W. CEASER

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Paying the Price

Readers may recall The Scrapbook taking note of a fawning, seven-page, profusely illustrated story in the *Washington Post* by Dan Zak (May 13, 2013) about three antiwar activists on trial in Tennessee for invading and vandalizing the nuclear weapons research facility at Oak Ridge. The heroes seemed to come from central casting—"a belligerent drifter, aging ex-nun, and grizzled house painter"—and their prosecution was inevitably depicted in the *Post* as a David-and-Goliath affair pitting three lovable humanitarians against the brute force of the military-industrial complex.

Well, The Scrapbook is pleased to report that the jury in the federal district court subsequently found the trio guilty, and last week, the trial judge, the Hon. Amul Thapar, handed out sentences ranging between 35 and 62 months in prison, and ordered the defendants to pay $53,000 in restitution for damaging the security system and vandalizing the site. The prison sentences were shorter than the prosecution had requested; but The Scrapbook, for its part, is content with the course of justice.

It should be said, at this juncture, that The Scrapbook (with some obvious exceptions) takes no particular pleasure in seeing people behind bars. And the judge, for his part, seemed to agonize between his duty to conscience and to federal sentencing guidelines, which, he explained, "do not distinguish saboteurs who truly mean harm from peace protesters who intend change. . . . If all that energy and passion," he lamented, "was devoted to changing the laws, perhaps real change would have occurred by today."

Here The Scrapbook must respectfully dissent. Obviously, in America, citizens are free to disagree with government policy, to write, to speak out, to demonstrate publicly. But the fact that "activists" regard their targets as evil, and their own motives as pure, does not excuse them from the law. The moral power of civil disobedience lies not in committing criminal acts and getting away with them, but in committing criminal acts and paying a price. When Dan Zak and the *Washington Post* glorify favored dissenters—proclaiming, in effect, that they are above the law—they destroy their moral authority. What begins as an act of conscience becomes gaming the system.

Nor do we share Judge Thapar's opinion that the so-called Prophets of Oak Ridge "intend change" without "truly [meaning] harm." On the contrary, certain critics of American policy—such as these defendants, other vandals of federal property, even Edward Snowden—do intend change but also mean harm. Indeed, in some cases, their motive is not persuasion but subversion, a deliberate attempt to weaken, undermine, and sabotage America. Once again, such people are entitled to their opinions, and the press is free to exalt them. But in the history of our liberal democratic society, especially in the years since Pearl Harbor, it takes a special obtuseness—especially in the media—to find tyranny in the burden of securing the common defense. ♦

North Korean Horror

The Scrapbook has taken a shot or two (or three, or four) at the United Nations in the past, but the organization still does good work from time to time. Last week was one of those times. The U.N.'s Human Rights Council released a deeply disturbing and extraordinarily important 400-page report on the human rights situation in North Korea.

The atrocities in North Korea have been chronicled in various places (books, conferences, documentaries) over the past several decades, but the new report, produced under the leadership of the Australian judge Michael Kirby and based primarily on refugee testimony, is perhaps the definitive account of the living hell that is life in North Korea—as well as the definitive indictment of the country's ghastly, murderous regime. As the report explains, the Kim dynasty is guilty of "crimes of extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, rape, and persecution."



To complement the report, one North Korean defector, Kim Kwang-il, who spent time as a prisoner in one of the country's horrific labor camps, hired an illustrator to draw the scenes he witnessed (and experienced) in the gulag. We've reproduced one here. As one defector explained, "Your hands are handcuffed behind your back. And then they hang you so you would not be able to stand or sit [for up to four days]. There are no people watching you. There is nobody. And you can't stand, you can't sleep. If you are hung like that for three

days, four days, you urinate, you defecate, you are totally dehydrated. . . . [This torture] was the most painful of all tortures. . . . [It] was so painful that I felt it was better to die." ♦

Self-Described Thugs

To hear the left tell it, the right is seething with hatred, ready to erupt into violence at any moment. Pro-lifers, gun owners, and Tea Partiers—a Venn diagram that encompasses more than half the country—are all sub rosa thugs. The media assist by reflexively blaming acts of political violence on conservatives, even when no such connection exists.

Last week provided a good reminder that one of the biggest sources of political violence in this country has long been and remains labor unions. The Justice Department filed racketeering and arson charges against the Ironworkers Local 401 in Philadelphia. "The defendants relied on a reputation for violence and sabotage, which had been built up in the community over many years, in order to force contractors to hire union members," notes the FBI press release. "It is alleged that the defendants created 'goon' squads, composed of union members and associates, to commit assaults, arsons, and destruction of property. One such squad referred to itself as the 'The Helpful Union Guys,' or THUGs." Among the extensive charges, perhaps the most appalling is that the union burned down a church under construction. The destroyed church happened to be a Quaker meeting house, a gathering place for a sect well-known for its pacifism. If irony were a crime, the U.S. attorney would have to add it to the list of charges.

This latest incident is part of a much broader problem of union violence in the City of Brotherly Love. The National Right to Work Committee estimates that Philadelphia has averaged 45 incidents of union violence a year for over 40 years. The media, of course, downplay the problem. Only "143 Philadelphia-based incidents of union violence [were] documented in news reports between 1975 and 2009, arrests were mentioned only 38 times, and only eight convictions were noted," according to a *National Review* investigation.



Philly union goons even boast of their violent reputation. "One person's harassment is another person's free-speech exercise," Pat Gillespie, business manager for the AFL-CIO-affiliated Building and Trades Council, told *National Review*. "Life is tough in Philadelphia, as it is in any urban area. Someone shot me from a car one time. People who tippy-toe around the edges of the city and then come in for a foray to try to do something against the standards that have been established get their feelings hurt when people call them a bastard, when people call them out for what they are. To say that we're more expressive than any other area—maybe we do it a little louder, but the point's the same. You have to protect what's yours and preserve the standards that have been established for our area."

What's disturbing is that when Gillespie equates union violence with expression, he has legal precedent on his side. Part of the reason you don't see more sweeping takedowns of violent unions is that the burden of proof for law enforcement is unreasonably high. In 1973 the Supreme Court ruled in *U.S.* v. *Enmons* that violence and property damage done for "legitimate union objectives" are exempt from the Hobbs Act—the 1946 law designed to

keep commerce from being disrupted by violence or threats.

A 2012 study published in the *Wall Street Journal* estimates that unions spent $4.4 billion on political activity between 2005 and 2011, nearly all of it going to Democrats. So long as Democrats are cashing union checks and support federal laws that sanction destruction and intimidation, they have no standing to sermonize about political violence. ♦

Don't Know Much About Art History

A couple of weeks ago, Ethan Epstein wrote in these pages about President Obama's "naked philistinism," exemplified in the cheap shot the president took at the study of art history in a speech in Wisconsin ("Philistine in Chief," Feb. 17). "A lot of young people no longer see the trades and skilled manufacturing as a viable career, but I promise you, folks can make a lot more, potentially, with skilled manufacturing or the trades than they might with an art history degree," Obama said—wrongly. (Art history majors earn more than most people in manufacturing and the trades.)

Understandably, art historians objected, and evidently sent him a lot of mail on the subject. So last week, the president sent a handwritten apology to one of them. "Let me apologize for my off-the-cuff remarks," Obama wrote to University of Texas professor Ann Collins Johns. "As it so happens, art history was one of my favorite subjects in high school, and it has helped me take in a great deal of joy in my life that I might otherwise have missed. . . . So please pass on my apology for the glib remark to the entire department."

Obama did persist in error, though, writing, "I was making a point about the jobs market, not the value of art history." (He seems not to have realized his "point" about the job market was also wrong.) But The Scrapbook is pleased the president apologized just the same. And at this point it's not exactly news when he says something wrongheaded about the job market. ♦

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Just the Facts, Ma'am

It was a day like any other. Oh, the weather was a little cool, I suppose. A thin band of clouds moved across the early sun, threatening an angry rain—but then again, maybe not. Light around the edges but dark in the center, like a calculating woman's smile, those morning clouds are hard to read, and the weather out here in the West often breaks its promises. All in all, the day seemed no more foreboding than usual when, at 6:26 A.M., the sheriff's phone rang. "Female caller in Sheps Canyon," the local newspaper would later report, "advising her neighbor's cows are out and she doesn't want them eating her garden."

I always read the police log in small-town newspapers—not just in my own town of Hot Springs, South Dakota, but in every small place I visit. Many tourists do, as well. Across America, it's a kind of standard comic turn, glancing at a community paper to chuckle at the insignificance of what counts as crime news. "Wednesday 4:39 P.M.: Deputy in Edgemont returning wallet that was stolen two years ago," an item notes. "Sunday 11:08 A.M: Caller entering a complaint of a Chihuahua on Evanston that has been a terror to the neighborhood," adds another. A terror to the neighborhood.

What big-city readers often miss, however, is how conscious the comedy usually is, how self-aware the irony is meant to be. Police-blotter reporting is one of the great journalistic forms, with a depth and range almost unparalleled by other writing opportunities that come a reporter's way. It's a miniature thing, admittedly, filled with strange conventions of abbreviated syntax and truncated grammar, but it's a real form, nonetheless, and Hemingway doubtless understood it.

Of course, like every genre, the small-town-newspaper crime log has better and worse practitioners. The most compelling I've ever read was from a tiny county seat in Nevada, the most boring from a good-sized community in Arizona. But the variation isn't large—for the form generally dictates its own composition. And like poetry, police-blotter reporting offers its writers the whole of the human comedy to draw upon.

What else could you want from a literary genre that gives you a chance to write sentences like this the other day in the *Hot Springs Star*: "Tuesday 6:43 A.M: Non-injury accident reported on S. 22nd Street; officer responded"—a small perfection dwelling in that laconic semicolon? Or "Monday 8:46 P.M.: Caller requesting advice on what to do with a rebellious teenager"?

JORI BOLTON

Often, flat is the best way to report an item: "Sunday 12:22 A.M: Fight reported outside Hat Creek Grill." Is there ever a Saturday night in which there isn't a fight reported outside a bar? There are towns even smaller than Hot Springs, here in Fall River County—towns that would hardly exist if the cowhands didn't need a place to raise a little riot on the weekends—and the sheriff's office has to cover them all.

But other times (if, for example, you want to poke fun at incompetent Easterners) you need more exposition: "Sunday 2:47 P.M.: Alarm company contacted dispatch regarding a burglar alarm on Slade St. Turns out was Slade St. in Fall River, MA, not Fall River County, SD."

Small tragedies are written in these items: "Saturday 10:11 A.M: Motorcycle accident with injury reported on Fall River Road." And hints of greater ones: "Wednesday 7:31 P.M.: Individual calling to report possible child abuse." Pieces of comic memoirs: "Saturday 11:33 P.M.: Report of individuals shooting off fireworks from the depot and then running and hiding in the bushes." And reminders that unsolved mysteries always lurk, just around the corner: "Tuesday 5:02 A.M: Resident of a downtown apartment reported suspicious persons pulled someone out of a residence."

"Monday 12:42 A.M: Sheriff out at the Igloo Bar; intoxicated caller reported drunken teenagers creating a problem." And "Wednesday 5:00 P.M.: Park Ranger arrested a subject on a Pennington County warrant." And "Sunday 1:49 P.M.: 911 call for Hot Springs Ambulance to a residence on Estates Rd." The real story—not the politicians, not the breaking headlines, not the national trends, not the international news, but the real story of life—is transcribed in police blotters and reported in small-town newspapers. "Monday 2:36 P.M.: Officer took a theft report for a lost wallet." "Thursday 12:26 A.M: Barking dog complaint received from the 1700 block of Canton." "Thursday 9:06 A.M: Officer out at a moving car vs. parked car accident on South 5th Street."

And this: "Tuesday 5:43 P.M.: 911 call from a female on Washington Ave., requesting officers because someone has messed with her TV and now it doesn't work." That's not a crime-log item. That's a novel, writ small.

Joseph Bottum

the weekly Standard

Obama Calls Retreat

Kiev is ablaze. Syria is a killing field. The Iranian mullahs aren't giving up their nuclear weapons capability, and other regimes in the Middle East are preparing to acquire their own. Al Qaeda is making gains and is probably stronger than ever. China and Russia throw their weight around, while our allies shudder and squabble.

Why is this happening? Because the United States is in retreat. What is the Obama administration's response to these events? Further retreat.

Having withdrawn from Iraq, and seeing it now fall apart, the administration is nonetheless determined to get out of Afghanistan. Its Russia "reset" is a joke, and its "pivot to Asia" an empty slogan. Secretary of State John Kerry huffed and puffed when Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons last year, and asserted it was a Munich moment. How right he was! Kerry came back brandishing a piece of paper, and Assad remains in power.

The B-team

Having failed to hold Assad accountable for the use of weapons of mass destruction, Kerry now says that global climate change may be the weapon of mass destruction we should most fear. Sure. Meanwhile, in the real world of real weapons, our military is being decimated in size as it is being enervated by political correctness. And on the matter of sheer competence in the execution of foreign policy, to say that we have a B-team in charge is an insult to B-teams everywhere.

We're tempted to produce at this point appropriate Winston Churchill warnings and statements from the 1930s. But the current situation is almost too pathetic to be worthy of Churchillian exhortation. We're dealing with no recent memory of the Great War, no Great Depression, no Hitler or Tojo or even a Mussolini. We don't need extraordinary heroism or exemplary statesmanship to deal with the second- and third-rate threats that we face. We require competent men taking serious measures.

But we don't have them. And of course second- and third-rate threats, if unchecked, can cause much death and destruction. Minor league gangs and small-time thugs can destroy a neighborhood if there's no police force. A small infection, if untreated and allowed to spread, can kill as surely as a cancer. Rome fell not to the majestic Hannibal but to groups of unimpressive barbarians. Chaos that results from weakness and dissolution can be as hard to remedy as defeat by formidable and well-organized foes. A panicked retreat can be hard to reverse even if the original opponent isn't that formidable. It's undoubtedly true that "Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds." But weeds can kill a garden too. And under President Obama, we've allowed the weeds to spread and multiply at an amazing rate.

All of which leads us—in this instance at least—to cite the Lincoln of 1838 rather than the Churchill of 1938: "If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of free men, we must live through all time, or die by suicide." Suicide isn't yet imminent. But we are on the cusp of accepting—even embracing?—a stance of shirking fearfulness and shrinking timidity. A nation of free men needs at times like this leaders who step forward to "sound forth the trumpet that shall never call retreat." Obama has a piccolo that only calls retreat.

—William Kristol

The Resistance

Texas attorney general Greg Abbott has a famous saying: "What I really do for fun is I go into the office [and] sue the Obama administration." Abbott's relentless struggle against an administration that routinely exceeds its authority and tramples on federalism made him the ringleader among the two dozen Republican state AGs. He's now running for governor.

So it's not surprising that Dan Branch, running to

NEWSCOM

succeed Abbott as Texas AG, is often asked if he would be as tough as Abbott in confronting the Obama administration. "My response is I'll have to be tougher," he says. And he goes on to name the federal agencies guilty of overreaching their constitutional bounds and increasingly encroaching on state power.

The key word is "overreach" by Washington. "Given the pattern of this administration, it is becoming synonymous with Obama," Branch says. And fighting overreach is not only a primary concern of Republican attorneys general, it's the most prominent issue facing Republican candidates in state AG races in the 2014 election.

"The administration has made it a huge issue," says Branch, an influential state legislator. "The state AG's role is to use all the tools in the toolbox to push back. The independent authority of the AG's office is the platform to do it."

Texas's Greg Abbott

Voters—at least Republican and conservative voters—understand the issue, says Adam Laxalt, an AG candidate in Nevada. "People here know exactly what federal overreach means. . . . I can use this office to fight to restore limits on our federal government and the proper balance our nation dearly needs right now." Laxalt is the grandson of former Nevada governor and later senator Paul Laxalt.

Other attorney general candidates pledge to resist the Obama administration vigorously. In Arkansas, David Sterling says: "The federal government is slowly creeping in on state authority and individual liberty, and my first priority as your attorney general will be to defend the Constitution and protect the liberty of all Arkansans."

And here's a quote from Mark Brnovich's campaign video in Arizona: "Arizonans deserve an attorney general who understands the federal and the state constitution, that makes sure that all of our rights and liberties are protected, and whether that's protecting us from federal encroachment, such as Obamacare, and making sure that the rule of law is upheld."

All this might be dismissed as campaign boilerplate—except for the political context. Until recently, AGs focused on consumer protection, crime, and child support payments. They tended to go their own way rather than unify. But that changed with the arrival of the Obama administration and its insistence on overreaching, especially with Obamacare.

It was 27 Republican AGs who challenged the health care law and won a partial victory—the Medicaid expansion was made voluntary for states, the commerce clause neutralized as a vehicle for federal expansion—in the Supreme Court. Abbott filed 30 lawsuits against the administration, 17 against the Environmental Protection Agency alone. AGs united to oppose the National Labor Relations Board's attempt to block Boeing from building 787s in South Carolina, a right-to-work state.

In 2010, a new class of assertive AGs was elected—Scott Pruitt in Oklahoma, Pam Bondi in Florida, Alan Wilson in South Carolina, Sam Olens in Georgia, Luther Strange in Alabama, Derek Schmidt in Kansas, among others. Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, another anti-overreach AG, was elected in 2012.

The result: Attorneys general have become the strongest Republican force in resisting the Obama administration, stronger than governors, state legislatures, and GOP members of Congress. Now Republican candidates this year want to join the AG crusade to stymie Obama's efforts to expand the federal government. They're committed to advancing federalism.

Texas is the most significant state because the AG's office there has the manpower (more than 700 lawyers) and the resources to lead the effort. Branch, a state representative, and two others—state senator Ken Paxton and Railroad Commission chairman Barry Smitherman—are seeking the Republican nomination in the March 4 primary. They agree that states are, as Paxton put it, "under assault from the federal government." They are all admirers of Abbott.

Given the outsized role of Texas, the next AG will be an important national figure. In this regard, Branch has impressive connections in Texas and across the country. He also has raised the most money. But all three have gotten more attention than down-ticket candidates usually receive. A major reason is the issue—overreach.

GOP attorneys general consider themselves the last line of defense against the Obama agenda. "It's us or no one," Georgia's Olens said last year.

But it doesn't have to be that way. Their success has two lessons for the rest of the Republican party. There is strength in unity and there's no substitute for boldness and tenacity in defense of limited government.

—Fred Barnes

NEWSCOM

The Other Kentucky Derby

Will Mitch McConnell prevail on a muddy track?

BY JOHN MCCORMACK



GARY LOCKE

Louisville

At the Bullitt County GOP's Lincoln-Reagan Day dinner on February 6, Kentucky state senator Paul Hornback rose to speak on behalf of U.S. Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell, who was away on business in Washington. McConnell is locked in a bitter primary fight, and it was up to Hornback to convince the party faithful to stick with Mitch.

John McCormack is a staff writer at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

"Senator McConnell is a solid conservative when it comes to protecting Kentucky families," Hornback told the crowd before proceeding to give some examples of McConnell's conservative accomplishments.

First, there was the 2004 tobacco buyout, which compensated farmers while ending a New Deal-era price-support program. "That brought $2.5 billion in the state of Kentucky," Hornback said. "We can't give him enough thanks for that."

"He saved us from a milk cliff," Hornback added, referring to the new $956 billion farm bill, without which, he said, milk could have spiked to $8 per gallon. Hornback pointed out that McConnell secured millions for research and infrastructure at Kentucky universities. And billions for Kentucky hospitals. And a national cancer research institute—right here in Kentucky—to boot.

"It takes influence to do those things. Those things don't just happen," Hornback said. "With Senator McConnell there, with his influence, with his tenure that he's got, he's got the ability to get these programs back here."

Bringing bucks back to Kentucky may play well with some voters, but that kind of self-dealing is the very reason investor Matt Bevin decided to challenge McConnell in the Republican primary. "You brag about the fact that you're burying our children and grandchildren in debt?" an incredulous Bevin said to me over coffee on February 7. "I'm not going to give you credit for that. I'm going to resent you for that."

The feeling is mutual. The Kentucky GOP Senate primary is shaping up to be the nastiest race in the country. Bevin, who grew up in New Hampshire and moved to Kentucky in the late 1990s to run a multibillion-dollar investment firm, was labeled a "traveling East Coast con man" by the McConnell campaign the day news of his candidacy was reported. On a phone call with donors, McConnell said that the Senate Conservatives Fund, a PAC that's funneled $1 million to Bevin, was run by "bullies" who deserve to be "punched in the nose."

Bevin's assessment of McConnell is just as harsh. He contends the Kentucky senator is "bought and sold" by corporate interests and even supports "wars for the benefit of large corporations in this country."

"They're thugs. They're bullies," Bevin said of McConnell and his associates. Bevin claims that McConnell's "messengers" threatened him, warning that his businesses might be audited and his reputation destroyed

if he challenged McConnell. "I was told that when they're done with me, the people who sit behind me in church will get up and move when I come in."

McConnell associates tried to use carrots as well as sticks, according to Bevin, to keep him out of the race. "You wanna run for Congress? You wanna be governor? You wanna be this? You wanna be that?" he said he was asked. "Anything—anything but this role. For this, I'm like the devil incarnate for this role."

Bevin wouldn't reveal who threatened him ("People. That's all I'll say."), "but the more of them there were, the more determined I was to break this cabal."

The rancor in the race suggests the stakes are high. The Senate Conservatives Fund has declared this the "most important Senate race" in the country. "The outcome of the Republican primary in Kentucky will determine the direction of the Republican Party for years to come," wrote SCF executive director Matt Hoskins, a protégé of former South Carolina senator Jim DeMint, in a January 28 fundraising email.

But a more plausible explanation is Sayre's law, named after a Columbia professor who believed academic disputes were so intense precisely because so little was at stake. When you look closely at the primary, Bevin and McConnell appear less like warriors fighting for the heart and soul of the Republican party than two of Professor Sayre's squabbling colleagues.

Consider their dispute over earmarks and spending. Bevin condemns McConnell for bankrupting the country, but when I asked him which of McConnell's projects in Kentucky were wasteful, he would name only one. "I was just in Owensboro the other day. There's like this big playground with cement palm trees and stuff," Bevin said. "It's lovely and it's nice and all, and I don't even know where that money came from, but [McConnell] apparently helped shake it from somewhere."

The Senate Conservatives Fund denounced the bill that ended the government shutdown in October for including a "Kentucky Kickback"—more than $2 billion in funding for a lock and dam project on the Ohio River. But Bevin told me he "absolutely" supports that "critical" project, though he thinks it was inappropriate to include it in the bill to end the shutdown. Bevin opposed the 2014 McConnell-backed farm bill, but supports the law's crop insurance program—the government's "most expensive farm program," according to the Heritage Foundation.

When it comes to entitlements, the biggest driver of the debt, Bevin said that Rep. Paul Ryan's plan to reform Medicare (which McConnell voted for) is simply a "step in the right direction"; he wouldn't say what more needs to be done. "We have to take a look at, basically develop actuarial tables, and risk pools, and statistical models that basically allow us to make sure that it's financially feasible."

Then there's the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program, which McConnell called one of the Senate's "finest moments" and Bevin denounced as a Wall Street bailout in one of his first ads attacking McConnell. On February 11, *Politico* reported that Bevin signed a 2008 letter to shareholders calling TARP a "positive" development—"don't call it a bailout," the letter read.

Bevin said his signature was a mere formality required by law, and the opinions expressed were not his, but those of a colleague who wrote and also signed the letter. According to securities law experts, if Bevin didn't hold the opinions expressed in the letter he signed, he was violating the law.

Even if Bevin were able to draw a clear contrast on these issues, there's still the problem that they're mostly old Bush-era grievances. During Obama's tenure, McConnell has been reviled by the left for working to obstruct the Democratic agenda at almost every turn. The current complaints against McConnell from the right rest mostly on the theory that his unwillingness to "hold the line" or "stand firm"—not the fact that Democrats control the Senate and White House—prevented conservative policy victories on the debt, taxes, and Obamacare.

In Bevin's telling, Republicans could have stopped the 2013 "fiscal cliff" tax hikes if they'd simply let all rates rise, as they were automatically scheduled to do by law, and then wait for Democrats and President Obama to give in to Republican demands. McConnell instead cut a deal with Vice President Joe Biden that permanently preserved the Bush income tax rates for individuals who earn $400,000 or less and repealed a part of Obamacare known as the CLASS Act.

The "stand firm" theory of legislative negotiation was tested in October, when the government shut down following a failed effort to defund Obamacare. According to Bevin, the problem was that the plan wasn't carried out flawlessly. He believes that President Obama and enough Democratic senators would have eventually caved if McConnell and his Republican colleagues had filibustered the bill to defund Obamacare until Senate Democrats agreed to vote for it. "By voting for cloture, you guaranteed there would never be a debate, there would never be a discussion," Bevin said. "McConnell doesn't really oppose Obamacare."

Bevin, an Iraq war opponent who voted for a third-party presidential candidate in 2004 (the Constitution party's Michael Peroutka), claims that McConnell also secretly supported U.S. military intervention in Syria last year, even though McConnell said he'd vote against it. "[H]e was for it because a lot of these special interests are people that pay good money to him to make sure that he's for everything that ever moves we're going to shoot at. I disagree. I'm a former military officer. I understand the purpose of our military, and it's not to engage in wars for the benefit of large corporations in this country."

Asked what should be done about the global resurgence of al Qaeda, Bevin said: "You cut them off financially, economically, you do everything you can diplomatically to marginalize them, to box them out, to ostracize

them, to keep them in a small space. To the extent they come out and they get on our soil and they want to cause trouble, smack them down." What about George W. Bush's contention that we need to defeat terrorists abroad before they reach the United States? "Bad idea," he said.

Lacking a clear line of attack and trailing McConnell by more than 20 points in the polls, Bevin faces an uphill path to victory in the May 20 primary. But it would be foolish to write him off just yet. Primary challengers have closed much bigger gaps in shorter periods of time. Polls show both McConnell and Bevin neck-and-neck with Democratic candidate Alison Lundergan Grimes in the general election, so there's a case to be made that Bevin, without McConnell's baggage as a five-term senator, would have a better shot at victory in November.

Bevin's argument against McConnell is weak, but the McConnell campaign's brief against Bevin is entirely character-based. They point to his contradictions on TARP and résumé-puffing on his LinkedIn page—Bevin listed the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under education, when he'd only attended an unaffiliated program held at an MIT conference center—as warnings that he's a huckster not ready for primetime.

The McConnell campaign hasn't attacked Bevin for taking extreme positions that would make him unelectable. Kentucky is the state, after all, where Republicans nominated Rand Paul in 2010 despite warnings that he was too extreme on fiscal issues and soft on national security. Paul won the general election by a comfortable margin. And over the past few years, McConnell has allied himself with Paul, hiring his campaign manager and speaking on the floor of the Senate in support of Paul's filibuster about President Obama's use of drones.

So don't expect McConnell to hit Bevin for sharing Paul's foreign-policy worldview. But you can expect many more bitter, personal attacks. Remember, it's Sayre's law. ♦

Back to Work

Conservatives and the unemployed.

BY IRWIN M. STELZER

Millions of Americans, glutted with benefits that until now have seemed likely to be renewed and renewed again, have suddenly become devoid of ambition, shed the work ethic, and taken to the couch and the TV remote. Or found a back pain or emotional problem that entitles them to the even higher benefits designed to ameliorate the plight of truly disabled workers.

Could she be on to something?

So runs the narrative that for too long has been the underpinning of conservative policies towards the unemployed, especially since the steady decline in the workforce participation rate. For many conservatives, "entitlement" is most frequently used as the adjective to precede "cuts." They are not entirely wrong, but there are entitlements, and then there are entitlements. There are those paid to the undeserving unemployed, who will always prefer benefits to work, just as there are benefits available to the undeserving rich, who are allowed to treat ordinary income as capital gains and deduct interest paid on mortgages on second homes.

Now, there is little doubt that there will always be some who prefer benefits to paychecks, and who will game any system in order to avoid the biblical injunction to earn their bread by the sweat of their brows or, in the updated version, at the risk of carpal tunnel syndrome. My advice to conservatives is "Live with it." Better that than to try to shape policy for the mass of the unemployed to thwart the relatively few work-shy for whom no available wage is high enough and no benefit our decent society is prepared to tolerate is too low.

The undeserving unemployed will always be with us no matter the incentives available to them to train and find work. But their existence should not prevent a generous attitude towards the deserving unemployed, sidelined by forces beyond their control: an education system that leaves them unprepared to cope with a 21st-century economy; globalization that has destroyed jobs in America for the unskilled; easy money policies that have funded a recovery that adds to the wealth of the asset-owning while creating relatively few new jobs. These are the Americans on whom conservatives should lavish their policy-making ingenuity by creating a two-pronged program to woo workforce dropouts back into the labor market: Make work pay, and make jobs available. The first requires increasing the gap between what we pay people not to work, aka benefits, and what they can earn by working; the second requires that jobs be available to those with a renewed incentive to take those jobs.

Anyone familiar with art auctions knows that sellers have a reservation price, one below which they will withdraw their object from the sale. The same is true of even the most

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ambitious rational worker. If the wage offered, minus transportation, clothing, meals, and other costs of accepting employment is not sufficiently above the value of benefits, the worker will quite rationally prefer his benefits. Yes, for some there is the psychic reward and pride that comes with a paycheck, but it is not sensible to build policy on the assumption that such considerations would prompt the great mass of workers to take a reduction in income in order to participate in the labor market. Most will quite reasonably compare the gap between the income on offer in the workplace and the income generated from the benefits programs available to them, the latter constituting their reservation price.

At Harvard's Kennedy School current and aspiring politicians, regulators, policymakers, and bureaucrats are taught that if they get the incentives right they will have done more to achieve their policy goals than regulatory oversight, auditing, and the other stuff of ever-growing government could accomplish. In the case of those who have dropped out of the workforce that would mean increasing income from work and, eventually but not until job-creating growth is restored, decreasing income from benefits.

Now, conservatives have always believed that benefits provide an incentive to stay home rather than look for work. But when it comes to increasing the value of work, for example by raising the minimum wage, conservatives' faith in incentives is sorely tested. Yes, *at some level* an increase in the statutory minimum should reduce employers' incentives to hire, and prompt them to seek labor-saving innovations, or raise prices for their products, thereby cutting into the demand for those products and for the workers that produce them. The CBO reckons that a move to the level Obama seeks would destroy 500,000 jobs. But it would also increase the incomes of more than 16.5 million workers. Factor in the inevitable unforeseen consequences and it is not at all clear that conservatives should automatically oppose an increase in the minimum wage. Surely a policy that increases both aggregate incomes and the gap between the value of work and the worker's reservation price is worth another look.

As is the idea of ameliorating the job-destroying effect of an increase in the minimum wage by outright grants to employers preparing to lay off workers as a consequence of the increase. By way of a thought experiment: The increase from $7.25 per hour to $10.10, a raise the CBO guesses might cause the loss of 500,000 jobs, would add a bit less than $5,000 per year to the pay of a 30-hour-per-week worker. To induce employers to pay that rather than to cashier 500,000 workers would cost about $2.2 billion per year for, say, two years. Worth it?

Possibly a fatally flawed thought. But the basic idea, that we have to think in terms of trade-offs and rise above knee-jerk reactions to proposals such as raising the minimum wage, is not—at least not if conservatives want once again to be the source of ideas that keep market capitalism the system of choice. And be comforted by the fact that in thinking about this you are once again following the lead of Adam Smith:

> Where wages are high . . . we shall always find the workmen more active, diligent, and expeditious, than where they are low. . . . No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. . . . That men in general should work better when they are ill fed than when they are well fed, when they are disheartened than when they are in good spirits, when they are frequently sick than when they are generally in good health, seems not very probable.

Of course, raising the minimum wage is not the only, and certainly not the most efficient way to increase the value of work. There is the Earned Income Tax Credit, which rebates employer and employee payroll taxes to low-wage workers, and which Eli Lehrer and Lori Sanders of the R Street Institute described in these pages ("Let's Move," February 10, 2014) as providing "virtually perfect incentives. . . . [I]t's also entirely portable . . . [but] remains quite modest." There is also a negative income tax. I leave it to others to devise ways to make work pay more, the funding to come from the savings in the benefits programs or from part two of a conservative back-to-work policy: accelerated growth.

Making work pay more amply than sitting on the couch now does is only part of the policy needed. There have to be jobs out there so that wages are available. For conservatives, now comes the hard part: We have to accept that both Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes have lessons we cannot ignore. Smith emphasized the key role of economic growth:

> It is not the actual greatness of national wealth, but its continual increase, which occasions a rise in the wages of labour. . . . Though the wealth of a country should be very great, yet if it has been long stationary, we must not expect to find the wages of labour very high in it.

We now reside in what for policy purposes we can consider a "long stationary" economy. We must concede that it is possible, not certain, but possible, that John Maynard Keynes was right when he said that in a recessed economy stimulation of demand would help that economy to start growing again. In order to make that concession we must first recognize that there is no theory of how our huge, complicated economy will respond to the pulling, or not, of this or that policy lever: For better or worse we are left with the sort of experimentation that characterized Roosevelt's mixture of successes and failures that, in the end, saved capitalism.

Second, we must ignore the vulgar, unnuanced Keynesians who conclude from their master that only government can implement a demand-expanding policy. There is more than one way to implement a demand stimulus than that chosen by progressives, unrelenting in their search for ways to expand the reach of government.

We would do well to consider the possibility, for instance, that in a period of low interest rates, it might make sense to undertake infrastructure projects with a high social payoff. Given that possibility, it just might be possible to couple increased incentives to look

for work with job-creating growth by—are you ready for this?—developing a better stimulus program. Look at it this way: If the Keynesians are wrong, and we follow their suggestions, we will waste some but not all of the money spent as described below. If they are right, and we don't follow their urgings, we will have wasted lives, and doomed millions of men and women to permanent separation from the labor market.

Stimulus spending need not be of the sort in which the government, in consultation with the trade unions, selects nonexistent shovel-ready projects. Or that ends up enriching the green entitlement-seekers who so generously support the Obama political machine. Instead, it should be possible to allocate available funds by devising a process in which companies bid for government funds by indicating just how large a portion of the capital required they are willing to fund from their own treasuries. The company willing to bear the largest portion of the project's capital and operating cost wins, and gets to share in the revenues from tolls, landing fees, or whatever income is generated by the infrastructure projects put out to bid. Such funds as the government ends up investing—"investing" is the right word in this connection, although not in the case of most government spending—will be repaid from the proceeds of user fees. The projects will thereby have to pass a market test—no bridges to nowhere, no airports in the hometown of some important congressman, no express trains that can't attract private capital because their costs so far exceed their market-determined benefits.

This is a rather sketchy outline of a way to avoid another abomination like the Obama stimulus. But a large subset of the economics profession specializes in devising bidding systems that maximize bang for a buck, and that could accommodate the maximization of private-sector participation and of market-oriented means of allocating available funds.

Finally, we might pursue what the late Alfred E. Kahn, the Cornell professor, called "sensible microeconomic policies" that produce "beneficent macroeconomic consequences." Vigorous enforcement of competition policies, even (especially) those that antagonize powerful incumbents; a no-nonsense policy towards innovation-reducing theft of intellectual property by China among others; removal of barriers to entry into trades such as hair and corpse dressing and the education business; regulation where competition is impossible or systemic risk is present, and deregulation in most other cases come to mind. As does support for projects that have benefits in excess of external costs, such as the Keystone pipeline.

None of this is to minimize the ideas bubbling up from conservative economists. Still, if we could get the incentives right and gradually and with ample notice lower the unemployed workers' reservation price while increasing the reward for work made more available by sensible fiscal policy, conservatives just might have a framework on which to erect a voter-friendly, humane, and effective attack on the decline in work-force participation and the stubbornly high level of long-term unemployment, especially among workers in their prime working years. Combine that with what *New York Times* conservative-in-residence Ross Douthat says is the case, that "reform conservatism suddenly has national politicians in its corner," and it might just be a tad early to reserve a place at Hillary Clinton's inaugural ball. ♦

The Collapse of Sanctions on Iran

The White House gets what it wants.

BY LEE SMITH

The economic news from Tehran is good—good, that is, if you are a state sponsor of terror moving toward a nuclear weapons program. If on the other hand you were hoping that sanctions might persuade the Iranians to cease and desist, the news is disastrous.

Since the Obama administration relaxed sanctions on Iran, oil sales are up 25 percent, from 1.06 million barrels per day to 1.32 million, and the White House reportedly has no intention of preventing the rise in sales and consequent swelling of Revolutionary Guard bank accounts. And that's not all. The leading economic indicators show an Iranian economy on the mend, thanks to the interim nuclear agreement struck in November. Inflation has decreased from 40 percent-plus to 20 percent and falling. The rial-to-dollar exchange rate is steadily recovering from the depths to which it had fallen in 2012. And where Iran's GDP fell 3 percent in 2012, the IMF now projects modest increases for 2014 and 2015.

In short, with the sanctions regime eroding, Iran's business climate has been transformed. What was once a foolish gamble is now a promising opportunity, and trade delegations are exploring investment options in Iran's petrochemical and automobile industries. The White House's early assessment that the regime was getting only $7 billion in sanctions relief was way off. The figure is far closer to those estimates of $20 billion that administration officials scoffed at.

What happened? Is it possible that the White House, with all the economic expertise at its disposal, simply miscalculated? Is the Obama administration just bad at math?

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No, it was intentional. Contrary to the administration's public stance, sanctions relief was never about rewarding the regime with relatively small sums of money in exchange for steep concessions on the nuclear program. The plan rather was to get Iranian president Hassan Rouhani lots of cash, the more the better. The White House's idea is that once Rouhani understands how much easier his life is with lots of money pouring into the economy, it will be in his interest to petition Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for more concessions on the nuclear file. The problem with the strategy is that it shows how badly the White House has misunderstood not only the regime's behavior, but also Rouhani's role and how sanctions affect it.

"The administration wanted to strengthen Rouhani's position vis-à-vis the hardliners," Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), says Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, whose work has been central in building the Iran sanctions regime. According to Dubowitz, the White House wanted to empower Rouhani while weakening figures like Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who use their proximity to Khamenei to argue against concessions. The administration assumes, says Dubowitz, that "the more Rouhani becomes 'addicted' to cash, the better he'll be able to make the case to Khamenei that they need to make more concessions. The White House's idea was to show Rouhani some leg."

They gave away much more than that. What was significant about sanctions relief was not merely the exact amount of money. Rather, it was that any relaxation of sanctions would give rise to an international lobby with a vital interest in making sure the White House never made good on its threats to reimpose stiff sanctions on the Tehran regime. And it's not just businesses wanting to trade with Iran that have a stake in sanctions relief, but also politicians. A European corporation doing business in Tehran means jobs back home. What politician would gladly turn his back on thousands of jobs or potential jobs to agree to observe the restoration of a sanctions regime that the Obama White House wasn't serious about in the first place?

Accordingly, businesses sensing a new climate have flocked to Tehran. "Administration officials said our estimate of $20 billion was exaggerated," says Dubowitz. "But they had to know about the secondary effects of sanctions relief. They were counting on it. It was key to their whole economic strategy of giving Iran's economy a lift to incentivize Rouhani to deliver more on the nuclear file. As Iran's economy continues its shift from a deep recession to a modest recovery, and Congress challenges administration officials on the impact of sanctions relief, administration officials may begin to change their tune and claim that this was their strategy all along."

Hassan Rouhani

John Kerry chastised a French business delegation for visiting Tehran, but other State Department officials saw it differently. "We hope people don't go to Tehran," said undersecretary of state for political affairs Wendy Sherman, the administration's lead Iran negotiator. "That is our preference. But those who go raise hopes that the Rouhani administration's going to have to deliver on."

The administration's strategy, says Dubowitz, "has nothing to do with rational economic models. Rather, it's a psychological profile of the regime based on its assessment of Rouhani as a pragmatist who was elected to secure sanctions relief and will be further strengthened if he can deliver."

But that's a misreading of Rouhani's position. The last thing he wants is more sanctions relief, says Iran specialist Ali Alfoneh. "Rouhani uses the sanctions regime, and the threat of new sanctions, as a stick in his fight with the IRGC and Khamenei. It may seem counterintuitive, but the fact is that sanctions relief and Obama's threat to veto additional sanctions are only likely to weaken Rouhani in Iran's political power structure."

To be sure, Rouhani was elected to win sanctions relief for a beleaguered Iranian economy—and perhaps more importantly for the Revolutionary Guards. "The IRGC was initially a beneficiary of the international sanctions regime," says Alfoneh, a senior fellow at FDD. Sanctions eliminated competition, especially in Iran's energy sector, and further concentrated economic power in the IRGC's hands. "However, as the sanctions regime continued," Alfoneh explains, "the IRGC suffered because of the overall deterioration of the Iranian economy and shrinking oil revenues." Contrary to the White House's understanding, sanctions relief not only enriches the IRGC but also weakens Rouhani.

Khamenei has long seen Rouhani as a useful asset in his dealings with the West. The Iranian president often boasts of his role in duping his American and European counterparts as lead negotiator when he held the regime's nuclear file from 2003-05. But that was after the U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq, and Khamenei was terrified the Bush administration might move on Iran next. Rouhani was the regime's happy face. When Khamenei saw that the Americans were tied down in Iraq, says Alfoneh, he got rid of Rouhani and moved back to hardball tactics.

The same is likely to happen here. Now that Western businessmen and politicians are pecking away at the sanctions regime, Rouhani has already served his purpose. Khamenei has a deal he's perfectly happy with. He's getting paid for doing nothing, and if the interim agreement is renewed after six months, as many anticipate, then it's just more money to spend on whatever he likes—backing Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, or building the bomb. What's peculiar is that the White House seems just as pleased with the agreement. ♦

Russia's Long Shadow

The view from Estonia.

BY JEFFREY GEDMIN

Tallinn

The modern name of Estonia's capital is thought to come from *Tallide-linn*, city of stables in the country's tongue, or *Taani-linn*, meaning Danish castle-town. The lovely old center, a medieval trading city, is splashed in summer with light and color, I'm told. Cafés bustle. In winter, though, Tallinn is bleak. I'm here in fog, sleet, and rain. The streets are mostly empty by early evening, as everyone seems to be hobbited away with warm fires and ice-cold vodka.

Estonia is a country of glaring contrasts. Try to size it up today and one is reminded of Boris Yeltsin's assessment of the Russian economy in the 1990s. Asked by a journalist about the state of play, the president answered, "Good." When pressed for more than a one-word response, Yeltsin replied, "Not good."

For this tiny country of 1.3 million, things are, from one perspective, excellent indeed. Since independence in 1991, Estonia has welcomed democracy and a market economy, become a member of NATO and the European Union, and adopted the euro. The country exudes modernity, consumerism, and freedom. There's wireless Internet nearly everywhere—parks, pubs, squares, beaches, forests—and nearly always free. When you walk through Tallinn Airport, you feel like you're in a trendy version of an Ikea store, with semi-inviting cafés, book alcoves, ready-to-use iPads. Joe Biden might say LaGuardia pales in comparison.

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Freedom House gives Estonia highest marks in democratic development, for both political rights and civil liberties. The country ranks higher than the United States in economic freedom in a Heritage Foundation index.

Who, me? Target Estonia?

So what's to worry?

The country struggles mightily with the weight of history and burden of having an exceptionally difficult neighbor. "What's the first thing that keeps you up at night?" a colleague and I asked a senior official. It turned out to be the same as the second and the third. A young journalist confirmed over drinks later with a laugh: "Of course, Russia remains foremost on everyone's mind." That's for good reason.

Estonia's ethnic Russian minority comprises nearly a quarter of its population (fellow Baltic nation Lithuania has 5.8 percent; Latvia, nearly 27 percent). As a result, Tallinn has to put up with constant Kremlin complaints—the charges nearly always unsubstantiated by international observers—that Russians in Estonia are treated poorly and subject to discrimination by the Estonian government. Russian president Vladimir Putin is believed to have a personal gripe with the country. Or so Estonian officials think, as we know from diplomatic cables, thanks to WikiLeaks. Putin's father, who fought with the Red Army during World War II, parachuted on a mission into Estonia, where locals, still angry over the Soviet occupation in 1940—a year before Germany invaded—handed him over to Nazi forces.

What's clear in any case is this: Moscow loves meddling, provoking, and slapping Estonia around. Three Estonian officials have been arrested as Russian spies in the last five years. Last year, the Estonian government accused Russia of intervening in mayoral elections in Tallinn. Edgar Savisaar of the pro-Russian, left-leaning Center party secured another term after the Kremlin, just two days before the election, had his rival Eerik-Niiles Kross placed on Interpol's wanted list for trumped-up sea piracy charges. Moscow had reason to dislike Kross, to be sure: He was a Cold War anti-Soviet agitator who later worked for Paul Bremer and the Provisional Coalition Authority in Iraq and advised the Georgian government after Russia's 2008 invasion.

Most famously, Estonia was subjected to a series of cyberattacks beginning in April 2007 that swamped the websites of banks, news outlets, government ministries, and parliament. The pro-Putin youth group in Russia, Nashy, took credit for the attacks, which coincided with a dispute between Tallinn and Moscow over the relocation of a Soviet-era grave marker known as the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn. Nashy is the Kremlin's Hitlerjugend, says one Estonian official. Putin is not Hitler. But it's not much fun having a little Mussolini as your neighbor.

Like the Italian fascist leader, Putin has a coherent and strategic foreign policy. Moscow failed in the 1990s to block NATO and EU accession for most of what once constituted Communist Europe (although Ukraine is still in play and leaning

sharply eastward at the moment). Putin will settle now for the Finlandization of Eastern Europe. That's Cold War-speak for how a large, powerful nation carefully erodes the sovereignty and independence of smaller states.

Part of the strategy, of course, is to use energy as a weapon. Russian energy giant Gazprom serves Kremlin foreign policy goals and can punish, or please, at any given moment. Putin employs trade, including import restrictions, to show pique and apply pressure, recently blocking milk from Lithuania and brandy and wine from Moldova. The Kremlin also knows how to work internal divisions. In Georgia, for example, this means aggravating relations between Abkhazia, Ossetia, and the central Georgian government. As a former KGB hand, Putin must adore every trick of the trade. Note the recent leak of that call between a senior State Department official and the U.S. ambassador in Kiev, designed to embarrass Americans with the EU and show Washington as a meddling force in Ukraine's internal affairs. Rich, that.

"Tight integration with our neighbors is our absolute priority," Putin told international Russia experts last fall at a conference in Novgorod. Russia had repeatedly warned Ukrainians to choose carefully. Russian customs began exhaustive checks of imports from Ukraine last year, creating long lines at the border. Kremlin economic adviser Sergei Glazyev said at the time this was Russia "preparing to introduce tougher customs administration in case Ukraine [made] the suicidal move of signing the EU association agreement."

Back to plucky Estonia. Some might have thought that NATO and EU membership settles everything. Courtesy WikiLeaks, we know that at least some U.S. officials have considered Estonia paranoid about Russia. It seems instead that recent events in Ukraine and Russian policy toward this small Baltic nation well might concentrate our minds on Kremlin strategy toward Eastern Europe—and on the sad fact that we don't seem to have one. ♦

Japan's 'Irish Question'

Is South Korea slipping away?

BY **DENNIS P. HALPIN**

In 1916 London faced a dilemma. The British were hoping to bring American reinforcements to assist them and their beleaguered French allies in the trenches of the First World War. Woodrow Wilson, however, seeking to become the first Democratic president to win reelection since before the Civil War, was campaigning under the slogan "He kept us out of war."



Wilson knew that every vote counted, and the sizable Irish-American community was demanding a deliverable to cement its support for Wilson in key swing states. That deliverable was named Éamon de Valera. Born in New York to a Cuban father and an Irish mother, de Valera had moved to Ireland at an early age following his father's death. Still, he was a U.S. citizen by birth. He became involved in Ireland's independence movement and was a leading figure in the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin. London regarded the wartime rebellion as treason but saw no option, given American pressure, except to spare de Valera's life, even while executing the other 15 Easter Rising leaders by firing squad.

Wilson's choice of votes over diplomacy is not much different than Virginia governor Terry McAuliffe's recent decision to side with his Korean constituents on the Tokyo-Korean-American clash over the labeling of the Sea of Japan in textbooks (Koreans call it the East Sea).

The strategic location of the Korean peninsula in close proximity to Japan is similar to Ireland's in relation to Great Britain. "Ireland is too great to be unconnected with us, and too near us to be dependent on a foreign state, and too little to be independent," observed C.T. Grenville in a letter to the Duke of Rutland in 1784. And as Prussian adviser Major Klemens Meckel told the Japanese military after the Meiji Restoration, Korea is "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan." Yet, despite this strategic importance, both former colonial powers allowed a hostile relationship to fester with their previously occupied people. As with the dysfunction between the British Empire and the Irish nation, which lasted for over 700 years, Tokyo's estrangement from its Korean neighbors has relied partially on a smug sense of cultural superiority, including a condescending attitude toward the alleged immaturity of the victimized people.

Tokyo seems today just as paralyzed as turn-of-the-century London in its inability to reach a constructive

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conclusion to its own version of the "Irish Question." For the United States, the danger is that the continuing dysfunction between its two key northeast Asian allies will allow South Korea to slowly slip away irretrievably into Beijing's orbit. The Japanese should ask themselves whether it's worth it to score points in territorial disputes over minuscule islands and historiographic disputes over Tokyo's World War II atrocities. Is defensiveness over the Imperial Army's sex slaves, the Korean Comfort Women, strategically wise if it results in a unified and hostile Korean peninsula tilting toward Communist China?



The recent condemnation by Shinzo Abe's administration of Korean independence figure Ahn Jung-geun, who assassinated Resident General of Korea Ito Hirobumi at a train station in Harbin in 1909, as a "terrorist" and "a convicted criminal" even has its Irish equivalent. And it involves, ironically, the family of Caroline Kennedy, the current U.S. ambassador to Tokyo.

In 1994, Ambassador Kennedy's aunt, Jean Kennedy Smith, then U.S. ambassador to Ireland, championed the issuance of a visa to Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, a suspected former IRA operative. British prime minister John Major was described as being "incandescent with rage" when President Bill Clinton heeded Ambassador Kennedy Smith's suggestion (joined later by her brother Senator Ted Kennedy) and granted Adams the visa. This British ire was compounded when Clinton warmly shook Adams's hand at a St. Patrick's Day reception on Capitol Hill in 1995. Major reportedly refused to take President Clinton's phone calls for a number of weeks. But President Clinton's diplomatic gamble paid off when his envoy George Mitchell successfully brokered the Good Friday Agreement, the culmination of the Northern Ireland peace process, in 1998. The issuance of the visa to Adams was seen, in retrospect, as a game changer, proving that even though it's a cliché, sometimes one nation's terrorist is another's patriot. The same applies to Ahn Jung-geun.

It is important to note that Éamon de Valera had his revenge on the British for the execution of his comrades-in-arms in 1916. When the Nazi blitzkrieg rolled over Western Europe two decades later, it was a democratic, but still bitter and divided, Ireland under then-president de Valera which maintained its neutrality, along with fascist Spain and Portugal. The handover of the Irish Treaty Ports from British naval to Irish control in 1938, on the eve of the Second World War, particularly infuriated Winston Churchill, a former First Lord of the Admiralty. Churchill took his old nemesis de Valera to task in a speech to Parliament, adding that "these ports are, in fact, the sentinel towers of the western approaches, by which the 45,000,000 people in this island so enormously depend on foreign food for their daily bread, and by which they can carry on their trade, which is equally important to their existence." Yet as the clouds of war approached, the Irish ports were closed to the British Navy. In a V-E Day radio broadcast in 1945, Churchill renewed his feud with de Valera by accusing his government of "frolicking with the Germans" during the war.

As the acrimony between Japan and South Korea continues to deepen, have Tokyo and Washington even contemplated the prospect of a de Valera-like declaration of neutrality? Could a disenchanted Seoul remain on the sidelines in an East China Sea crisis generated after a Japan-centered American pivot to Asia? Is the bitterness toward Tokyo by the South Korean people now at such a level that, like the Irish toward London in the 1930s, no government in Seoul would dare to lift a finger to help a neighboring democracy in crisis? Could Seoul conceivably even invoke the consultation wording contained in Article 2 of the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States to seek, as de Valera did with Britain, to deny access to ports and bases on the Korean peninsula—and even the use of the 28,500 U.S. forces stationed there—in a contingency involving a security threat to Japan?

Tokyo's own Irish Question, left unresolved, may turn out no better than did London's in 1939, when it was left without having Ireland to cover its back. ♦

The Great Disappointment of 2013

What happens when a political messiah fails?

By James W. Ceaser

Every student of American religious history has heard of the event known as "the Great Disappointment." In 1818 William Miller, a former naval captain turned lay Baptist preacher, developed a new method for calculating biblical chronology to arrive at the conclusion that the millennium would take place sometime between 1842 and 1844. Finally published in 1832, Miller's thesis quickly drew attention. A sect began to form, spreading from Miller's home region in Eastern New York to New England and beyond. Millerism was born. The time was drawing nigh, Miller preached, when a dreadful cataclysm would occur, to be followed by a wondrous splendor: "The heavens appear, the great white throne is in sight, amazement fills the universe with awe." Pressed by followers for an exact date—people wished to settle their affairs before going up to heaven—Miller, after some hesitation and a few unmet deadlines, settled on October 22, 1844. The fateful day came and then went without any visible sign of the Advent, leaving the Millerites disheartened and perplexed.

And what of the Great Disappointment of 2013? In the promiscuous blending of politics and culture that characterizes our age, the launch of the Obama campaign in 2007 marked the beginning of a politico-spiritual movement that promised a new beginning and a transformation of the nation. It was to be the "moment when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal . . . [when we] restored our image as the last, best hope on Earth." Faith in the leader knew no bounds. Obamaism spilled out from the college campuses and tony enclaves of Manhattan and San Francisco into the mass public to become first an American and then a worldwide phenomenon. The legion of believers included not only the youth in their T-shirts emblazoned with the silk-screen Obama image, but also many of the nation's most experienced political observers. By early 2009, the five wise persons from Oslo had come bearing the gift of the Nobel Peace Prize. No date was fixed for the fulfillment of all the hopes and promises—extensions were continually asked for under the excuse that "change would never be easy"—but enough time had transpired by the end of 2013 for people to sense that the deadline had come and gone. Like October 22, 1844, the appointed time passed with no visible sign of the advent of a new era.

How believers cope with the trauma of disappointment has long been a theme in the field of social psychology. Modern, positivist research on this topic began with the publication in 1956 of Leon Festinger's celebrated work *When Prophecy Fails*, in which Festinger and his colleagues first introduced the theory of "cognitive dissonance." This theory explores how people deal with the discomfort of confronting conflicting ideas and opposing sentiments ("dissonance"). The model holds that individuals will look for mechanisms to reduce dissonance, be it by avoiding contact with conflicting sources of information (as when readers of The Weekly Standard surf with their remotes past MSNBC) or by restructuring their worldview to reduce or eliminate clashing positions. Three general responses are possible: acceptance, denial, and deflection.

Accepters are those who conclude that they have succumbed to an error or perhaps been victims of a hoax. In the psychologists' jargon, they admit to "disconfirmation." Such recognition may come with powerful feelings of pain—a sense of emptiness, the despair of lost hope, or the embarrassment of having been "had" by a confidence man. It is poignant to read the reaction of one of the Millerites in the wake of the Great Disappointment: "Is there no God, no heaven, no golden home city, no paradise? Is all

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this but a cunningly devised fable?" Yet with acceptance, difficult as it may be, individuals eliminate dissonance and can at least hope to establish a new equilibrium. According to Festinger, who made Millerism one of his main case studies, acceptance turned out to be the Millerites' predominant, and likely the best, response. "In spite of their overwhelming commitments," Festinger writes, "Miller's followers gave up their beliefs and the movement quickly disintegrated. . . . By the late spring of 1845 it had virtually disappeared."

In the case of the Great Disappointment of 2013, at the elite level there appear to be at least a few individuals who have managed to reboot psychologically and go on to lead normal and productive lives. The most prominent is Robert Gibbs, Barack Obama's former press secretary, who is now pursuing his own business career. While he still supports Obama's political program, Gibbs has recently appeared on television admitting that "2013 was a lost year for the president," and that the people doubt that Obama's team is "remotely capable of solving those problems." He no longer frequents the White House. On the level of the mass public, poll data show a stunning loss of confidence in the leader, as more and more erstwhile followers have come to accept that "the change" was pure fiction. While there are signs of a mild and pervasive depression—nearly two-thirds of the public think the nation is on the wrong track—many seem to be adjusting to life after Obamaism.

Now available everywhere

Deniers are those who refuse to accept disconfirmation and go on believing. The explanation for deniability, a reaction that seems counterintuitive, is the pride of Festinger's study. By his account, some followers have invested so much in their adherence that they cannot eliminate the dissonance by adjusting to reality. They instead "effectively blind themselves to the facts" and band together, fortifying their beliefs by the support of others who agree. "If more and more people can be persuaded that the system of belief is correct, then clearly it must, after all, be correct." In brief, to quote another expert, they cling to religion.

Having used the Millerites to illustrate acceptance, Festinger turns to the followers of Sabbatai Zevi to explore deniability. Unknown to most, Zevi represents a remarkable case in religious history. The first half of the seventeenth century was a period of widespread belief among Jews that the Messiah would come—in 1648—and the world would be transformed. Zevi, a student of Kabbalah from Smyrna, proclaimed himself the One to his group of disciples. The appointed year came and went without visible change, but faith in Zevi did not waver. Based on recalculations, acolytes proposed later dates for the Messiah's arrival. Zevi's following continued to grow, attracting adherents throughout the whole world of Jewry. Pursuing his mission to go to the Holy Land, Zevi made his way toward Constantinople, where he was arrested by the Turkish authorities. The sultan sought to convert him to Islam, perhaps deploying the threat of death as an inducement. Zevi chose conversion over martyrdom. Yet even this supreme heresy did not entirely squelch the movement. Some followed Zevi into conversion (the Dönmeh), while secretly practicing their old Jewish rituals. Remnants of that group exist to this day.

Evidence of deniability inside of Obamaism is strong. Deniers can still be regularly encountered on college campuses and in many sections of the nation's capital. Even the revelation of Obama's famous deception about keeping your insurance—a moment worthy of Festingerian "disconfirmation" if ever there was one—was dismissed by HHS secretary Kathleen Sebelius on the grounds that it applied to just "5 percent of Americans," or about twice the population of New York City. The face of the deniers, shaven or unshaven, is Jay Carney, who gives every indication that he is already beginning to form a Dönmeh sect of his own. Of course, Carney has the excuse of being paid for his services, making his deniability plausible. Quite different and more admirable are those who deny with no ulterior motive, out of a pure and abiding faith, like the *New Yorker*'s editor, David Remnick.

Deflection is the most interesting of the responses to a crisis of disappointment. Dissonance, according to Festinger, can be reduced if not entirely limited by the mechanism of "inventing ingenious arguments," of which the "but for" line of reasoning has enjoyed the greatest success. Deflectors admit that the anticipated outcome did not actually occur, which is their concession to reality. But they go on to say that the failure was not the result of a falsehood or a hoax. The prophecy would have been fulfilled but for the existence of a countervailing force that canceled it out. The promise in a sense was kept, only its effects were nullified. Where deflection is ably executed, it can serve to strengthen belief among the faithful, who now conceive of themselves as saints in an implacable struggle with the sinners.

Among the remaining Obamaites, deflectors seem to outnumber deniers, though the overlap between the two groups makes measurement difficult. Deflection began

early on, when the movement was still growing, as a hedge against the possibility of failure. In the full flush of enthusiasm, deflectors began to caution that the great change might be thwarted by the racism of the American public. Deflection was later perfected by political scientists, who added the authority of supposedly neutral analysis. The failure of the advent, it is now said, has been the result of "polarization" and "dysfunctionality." Polarization is the label assigned to the fact that people strongly disagree today about political matters and have sorted themselves into different parties to express that disagreement. This condition has been artfully turned into a sinister cause, able to act on its own. The inadequacy of such an argument was recognized even by deflectors, who moved on to shore it up by the addition of the theme of dysfunctional government. This term sounds objective, only deflectors have successfully managed to define it as a condition brought on solely by the Republican party. Republicans who oppose the president and his party produce dysfunctionality; Democrats who pass a law fundamentally changing the health care system without reading it are functional. Dysfunctionality is treated as the great alien force; but for it, Obamaism would have succeeded. Here is a faith that can never die.

Social psychologists have concentrated their attention on the followers of false prophets and failed messiahs, not on the principals themselves. Applying to them the same logic of cognitive dissonance, these discredited leaders, having invested so much in their beliefs, should in all probability end up as deniers or deflectors. Such was the case with William Miller. Although he retired from active evangelizing after October 22, 1844, Miller continued to hold out for an imminent Advent and to urge patience among the dwindling number of the faithful. He also offered the excuse that previous biblical scholarship had led him astray, and that the bad results were the product of "forces over which I could have no control." Sabbatai Zevi's case is harder to judge, as his post-disappointment activities, like so much else about the career of this enigmatic figure, remain shrouded in mystery. Zevi's renunciation of his faith might have indicated acceptance that his messianic claims were delusional. Or, as some believe, he might have continued to preach underground his disruptive message, which might explain his banishment to Albania, a most unlikely place for a messiah to end his days on earth.

Barack Obama's reaction to the Great Disappointment of 2013 remains a matter of much speculation, fueled in part by comments he has made recently in interviews. As is so often the case with this protean figure, his position seems to depend less on the day than the time of day. Many observers thought they detected a weariness, bordering on an attitude of acceptance, in his "small ball" State of the Union address. A readjustment of this kind would indeed be remarkable since the essence of "political messianism" is a program of deep transformation led by a person of destiny. These characteristics were exactly what attracted followers to the original movement in 2008. Yet here was Obama in one of his interviews seeking to backtrack, sounding almost Burkean in likening his task as president to that of "a relay swimmer in a river [that] is history," and adding that "the things you start may not come to full fruition on your timetable." In another interview, he told Bill O'Reilly flat out, "I don't think we have to fundamentally transform the nation." Messiahs are normally made of sterner stuff. Before taking such comments at face value, however, it is worth recalling that they are of a piece with a longstanding Obama tactic used to dismiss adversaries' criticisms that he is too radical. The visionary language is dropped and the leader modestly professes to be just a country pragmatist. As he told David Remnick, repeating well-worn phrases, "I'm not a particularly ideological person, . . . I'm pretty pragmatic. . . . I am comfortable with complexity."

For the most part, however, Obama follows the predicted model of resolving dissonance by being a denier and deflector. He is still asking followers to have patience, going to the extreme of fighting Providence with executive orders, a tool unavailable to Miller or Zevi, that extend crucial deadlines. Obama appears at his most natural and sincere in the role of deflector-in-chief. All the great things, he suggests, would have happened but for sinister forces working against the change. Even today, he told Remnick, he is being resisted because some "don't like the idea of a black president." Looming larger for him are Rush Limbaugh and the scoffers at Fox News. Obama has described his opponents—the disbelievers—as being in the grip of "a fever," which is the source of the disease of dysfunctionality. For all of his self-analysis about his comfort with complexity, his preferred disposition appears to be Manichean.

Yet the time is quickly arriving when the thoughts and feelings of Barack Obama will matter little for American politics. As the full impact of the Great Disappointment sinks in—a process not yet completed—fascination with the leader of a dying sect is waning. To be sure, Obama remains president, pen in hand and phone in pocket, but Obamaism is now finished. The enthusiasm is gone. Many candidates for office from the former sect are aware of the messiah fatigue that is growing in their states and districts, and they have posted signs suggesting the leader proselytize elsewhere.

For political analysts, the post-disappointment



conferences are already underway. Their central task now is to figure out what traces the collapse has left and what the aftermath will be. The landscape is complicated. A part of the American populace was dubious from the start of the Obama awakening, viewing its religious overtones as a dangerous aberration from normal politics. Some were willing to brand it as such, while others, from charity or prudence, chose to await the signs of failure before speaking out. Now these doubters have become bolder. Yet they fall short of a numerical national majority, as the outcome of the last presidential election showed. For victory, Republicans will need to win the votes of some of those who were previously adherents of the faith. Deniers and deflectors will not switch, which means the future of American politics is in the hands of accepters. It is accepters, more than independents, who form the critical swing group. A part of this group is angry enough that it will vote to punish the Democratic party, but a larger portion likely feels only mild dismay or sensitivity, wishing for nothing more than to move on.

Political analysts usually gauge politics in terms of positions, ideology, and reactions to performance. They are generally right to do so since the most important opportunities for electoral change derive from situations in which the incumbent president or party is judged to have badly mismanaged affairs. Yet as much as people make their voting decisions by taking account of these hard realities, it would be an error to dismiss the importance of the more nebulous dimension of the nation's tenor or mood. Voters are often moved by vague inclinations, such as desire for normalcy, renewal, or stability. Moods are variable, even fickle, and what holds for one election cycle may be forgotten in the next.

Winning any particular election is a matter of a party finding the right fit between message, candidate, and mood. Republicans stand to be the natural beneficiaries of the Great Disappointment, but they paradoxically may be at greater risk than Democrats of mistaking the nation's mood. The GOP's champions are those whose judgments of Obamaism have been vindicated. Yet a celebration of vindication is unlikely to fit the temper of most accepters. The overriding sentiment in the post-disappointment period will be a yearning to be done with political messianism and to return politics to the political. Accessing this mood has nothing to do with disowning strong positions. It has everything to do with selecting a candidate in 2016 of steady disposition who has a track record of competently handling the public's affairs. Republicans would do well to listen to a genuine prophet, Isaiah: "Be calm, have no fear, and do not be fainthearted." ♦

The Benghazi Cover-up (cont.)

How the CIA's No. 2 misled Congress

By Stephen F. Hayes

Two leading Republicans on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence say that Michael Morell, then acting director of the Central Intelligence Agency, gave an account of his role on Benghazi that was often misleading and sometimes deliberately false.

"I went back and reviewed some of his testimony the other day and he's gotten himself in a real box," says Senator Saxby Chambliss, the highest-ranking Republican on the committee. "It's really strange. I've always thought Mike was a straight-up guy, gave us good briefings—factual, straightforward. I mean, this has really been strange the last few weeks—all this now being uncovered."

At issue is the role Morell, former deputy director of the CIA, played in producing the Obama administration's flawed talking points about the fatal attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012, and the misleading answers he gave lawmakers who investigated them.

The allegations of misconduct are serious. In the recent Senate Intelligence Committee report, six Republican members accuse Morell of lying in sworn testimony to Congress. Several Republican senators tell The Weekly Standard that Morell misled them in one-on-one or small-group meetings about the talking points. Morell—now counselor to Beacon Global Strategies, a consultancy close to Hillary Clinton—did not respond to a request for comment.

Three aspects of the controversy are drawing particular interest: (1) Morell's obfuscation of his central role in rewriting the talking points, (2) Morell's contention that the FBI rewrote the talking points, and (3) Morell's false claim that the talking points were provided to the White House merely as a heads-up and not for coordination.

WHO REVISED THE TALKING POINTS?

Within days of the Benghazi attacks, it was clear that major elements of the Obama administration's public story about the events were dubious. Within weeks, investigators on the Senate Intelligence Committee learned that the unclassified "talking points" provided by the CIA to members of Congress and top administration officials told a different story than the classified intelligence. "We were seeing the classified stuff and then we see the unclassified talking points," recalls one lawmaker with access to the intelligence. "It just didn't match up."

Among the changes: Early drafts referred to "al Qaeda" and "attacks," while later drafts did not. So lawmakers began to ask questions.

On November 15, 2012, four top intelligence officials appeared before the Senate committee to answer questions about Benghazi: Director of National Intelligence James Clapper; Matthew Olsen, head of the National Counterterrorism Center; Patrick Kennedy, under secretary of state for management; and Morell, acting director of the CIA.

Chambliss says he grilled the officials about changes made to the talking points. "I went down the line. I said: 'Okay, guys, did you change the talking points?' Every one of them said no."

The questioning might not have been that precise, according to sources familiar with the hearing, but much of the hearing was devoted to uncovering how the talking points had been put together and who had made the changes. Morell volunteered nothing.

Senator Richard Burr was more specific. The senator asked each witness if he knew who had been responsible for changing the word "attacks" to "demonstrations." Again, denials down the line. "I think that Mike answered what he felt he was asked," says Burr. "But there was clearly enough that he knew that he could have shortcut this process."

A similar process played out at a hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that same day. Clapper, as the top U.S. intelligence official, was asked if he knew who had revised the talking points. His answer: I don't. According to three officials in the room, the other intelligence officials also indicated that they didn't know who had made the changes, but their answers were nonverbal and thus do not appear in the transcript. Representative

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Peter King reported after the hearing that the officials had claimed not to know who had changed the language. The denials were widely reported.

"When U.S. intelligence officials testified behind closed doors two weeks ago, they were asked point blank whether they had altered the talking points on which U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice based her comments about the Benghazi attacks that have turned into a political firestorm," read a Reuters story on November 28. "Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, acting CIA Director Michael Morell and National Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen each said no, according to two congressional sources who spoke on condition of anonymity."

For two weeks, the official public position of the intelligence community was that no one knew who had made the changes. In private meetings with lawmakers, on Capitol Hill and at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, Morell denied that he had played any significant role in writing or revising the talking points.

Without any answers, members of the congressional oversight committees pressed the White House to turn over emails and other documents pertaining to the talking points. For months, the administration refused, citing the deliberative process inside the executive branch. But when the president decided to nominate John Brennan to run the CIA, Republicans in the Senate finally had some leverage. Several threatened to block Brennan's nomination unless the administration cooperated more fully on Benghazi. Eventually, the White House made available on a "read-only" basis nearly 100 pages of emails between top intelligence and Obama administration officials.

Those emails, which the White House gave reporters in May 2013, showed Morell had been a key player in rewriting the talking points. In fact, a September 15 email to Susan Rice described a secure video teleconference in which Morell told others on the call that he had rewritten the talking points and would be happy to revise them further in consultation with top advisers to President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton. The email reports: "Morell noted that these points were not good and he had taken a heavy editing hand to them. He noted that he would be happy to work with Jake Sullivan [State Department] and [Ben] Rhodes [White House] to develop appropriate talking points."

The messages contradicted claims from Jay Carney and other top administration officials that neither the White House nor the State Department had played any role in revising the substance of the talking points. Among others, top State Department officials expressed concern about the contents of the talking points and, in consultation with "building leadership," pushed for changes.

Carney was grilled on the contradictions at the White House press briefing on May 10, 2013, after The Weekly Standard and ABC News reported on the emails.

"On Benghazi, and with all due credit to my colleague on the right," a reporter asked Carney, "we have had emails showing that the State Department pushed back against talking-point language from the CIA and expressed concern about how some of the information would be used politically in Congress. You have said the White House only made a stylistic change here, but these were not stylistic changes. These were content changes. So again, what role did the White House play, not just in making but in directing changes that took place to these?"

Carney explained the process, downplaying the administration's role. Then he got specific. "The CIA—in this case, deputy director of the CIA—took that process and issued a set of talking points on that Saturday morning, and those talking points were disseminated."

Five days later, when the White House released the emails, the administration enlisted Morell to participate in two background press briefings. While the emails themselves showed robust and sometimes contentious exchanges between top officials, Morell told reporters that he had been responsible for most of the substantive changes.

That's quite a reversal. In November 2012, Morell had dodged responsibility during congressional hearings and misled lawmakers in private meetings. Then in May, the White House spokesman told the world that Mike Morell had been in charge of the process that produced the talking points, and Morell privately told reporters the same thing.

In June, Morell resigned. Soon he joined the consulting firm Beacon Global Strategies, cofounded by four men: Jeremy Bash, former chief of staff to Leon Panetta, who was secretary of defense during the Benghazi attacks; Michael Allen, former staff director of the House Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence, which helped investigate Benghazi; Andrew Shapiro, former assistant secretary of state for political and military affairs; and Philippe Reines, recently described by *New York* magazine as Hillary Clinton's "most visible spokesman and the guardian of her public persona."

Senator Chambliss notes that before leaving government, Morell "ultimately did own up to the fact that he made the changes. But," he adds, "if he'd have said that early on, it would have solved a lot of problems and answered a lot of questions."

THE FBI DID IT?

On November 27, 2012, Morell accompanied U.N. ambassador Susan Rice to Capitol Hill to meet with senators, including Republican critics of her role in selling the misleading Benghazi narrative to the country. At the time, Rice was considered a possible successor to Hillary Clinton as secretary of state, and the meetings were seen as an

attempt to mollify her critics. Morell had been named acting CIA director after the resignation of David Petraeus.

Senator Lindsey Graham met Morell and Rice along with Senator John McCain and Senator Kelly Ayotte. Graham says they were not told in advance that Morell would be joining Rice, and he remembers asking Rice why he was there. "She said: 'He will help you understand what was going on with the talking points,'" Graham recalls.

The first question of the meeting was simple: "Who changed the talking points?" Morell responded, telling the senators that the FBI had made the revisions. "He told us that the FBI made the changes because they were the ones on the ground talking to people, and they didn't want to jeopardize their investigation." Graham says Morell implied that the CIA didn't have enough information to have made the changes, telling the group that the FBI wouldn't share with the CIA information from their interviews with the survivors.

Graham was surprised. "It was the first time I'd heard anyone say the FBI," he says. And if the FBI wasn't sharing intelligence in real-time with the CIA, Graham recalls, it would mean we were back to pre-9/11-style stovepiping. So Graham called FBI leadership to ask why the bureau would have withheld such important information from the CIA. "They went apeshit," says Graham, and offered an unequivocal denial.

Here is the press release Graham, McCain, and Ayotte put out that afternoon:

> Around 10:00 this morning in a meeting requested by Ambassador Rice, accompanied by acting CIA Director Mike Morell, we asked Mr. Morell who changed the unclassified talking points to remove references to al-Qaeda. In response, Mr. Morell said the FBI removed the references and did so to prevent compromising an ongoing criminal investigation. We were surprised by this revelation and the reasoning behind it.
>
> However, at approximately 4:00 this afternoon, CIA officials contacted us and indicated that Acting Director Morell misspoke in our earlier meeting. The CIA now says that it deleted the al-Qaeda references, not the FBI. They were unable to give a reason as to why.

Graham doesn't think Morell misspoke. "He knew when he met with us that it wasn't the FBI who had changed the talking points. He lied."

Senator Richard Burr, who sits on the intelligence committee and is expected to become the top-ranking Republican after Chambliss retires, sees a simple explanation. "Morell tried to dump this on the FBI and got caught."

AWARENESS OR COORDINATION?

Perhaps the most serious charge against Morell comes in the "Additional Views" section of the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on Benghazi. The authors, six Republican senators who sit on that panel, report for the first time that in his testimony on November 15, 2012, Morell "emphatically stated" that the talking points were provided to the White House "for their awareness, not for their coordination."

That is not true, according to the 100 pages of emails between administration and intelligence officials released last May. In fact, in one of the emails that began the flurry of communication among top officials, a CIA spokesman tells a White House spokesman that the talking points are being provided to the White House "for coordination." That email, sent on September 14 from the chief of media relations at the CIA to the White House's National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor, reads: "You should be seeing some 'White Paper' talking points from us this afternoon for coordination." Ben Rhodes, a top foreign policy and national security adviser to President Obama, was copied on the email. So from the very beginning, top White House officials were involved in coordinating the discussion of what would go into the talking points, with heavy input from senior officials at the State Department and the intelligence community.

Was Morell unaware that the express purpose of circulating the talking points was White House coordination? That seems unlikely.

Later that day, September 14, the CIA public affairs office sent White House officials another draft of the talking points with instructions to "review the below and respond with your comments ASAP." An email later that evening from the same office noted: "everyone has submitted coordination comments."

In an email the following morning, Morell writes to officials working for the director of national intelligence seeking their approval of the talking points. "Everyone else has coordinated," he notes above a review of "tweaks" made by State Department and White House officials. Finally, according to a September 15 email from then-CIA director David Petraeus, the final decisions on the talking points were "[National Security Staff's] call, to be sure."

Given all of this, why would Morell emphatically claim two months later that the talking points, already the subject of public scrutiny, had been provided to the White House only for awareness and not "coordination"?

It's a good question. And a growing number of Republicans are determined to get an answer from him.

"Morell's explanations at the time didn't seem plausible," says Representative Devin Nunes, a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. "With these new revelations, Congress has an oversight responsibility to call him back to testify in order to get the full truth." ♦

A Slight Case of Bastardy

The curious and irregular conception of Obamacare

By Noemie Emery

A number of apologists for the Obama administration declare themselves vexed at the ongoing hostility to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (which isn't affordable, and from which many people are seeking protection), regarding resistance to its charms as a perverse and irrational gesture, uncalled for, eccentric, and strange. It's the law of the land, they tell us, passed fair and square by both houses of Congress, crowned as constitutional by the highest court of the country, and ratified by the people in Obama's reelection. They note that other historic reforms—Medicare, Social Security—had troubled beginnings and then were embraced by the nation, and that even the Civil Rights Act of 1964, preceded by outbreaks of terrible violence, was accepted quite quickly once passed.

The lies just keep on coming.

Not so with Obamacare, to which resistance over time has only grown stronger. "Current and former administration officials . . . have been surprised at how steadfast the opposition has remained," the *Washington Post* reported last summer, quoting MIT economist Jonathan Gruber saying, "It used to be you had a fight and it was over, and you moved on." But few have moved on, for reasons which are not all that hard to tease out: It's not working out, in fact it's a disaster; it's blowing holes in the federal budget; the win-to-lose balance is way out of kilter, as many more people are hurt than helped by it. Obamacare may collapse on its own for practical reasons, but there is a fourth strike against it that adds a dimension of weakness no comparable measure has faced: Much of the country believes it's a fraud, passed dishonestly, and not deserving of moral authority. In short, they find it nearly illegal, highly immoral, and possibly fattening. And their minds won't be changed.

There are written rules that make an act legal, and unwritten ones that make it legitimate, and it is the latter ones this act fails. Medicare, Social Security, and the Civil Rights Act had four things in common that made them iconic: They embodied a popular consensus that was strong if not universal; they were passed by large margins with bipartisan backing, which meant their appeal crossed many factions; they were transparent and easy to follow, so the country and Congress could make informed judgments; and they were passed by the usual order of legislative business. The Affordable Care Act, on the contrary, was passed with public opinion running strongly against it; it was passed by the minimum number of votes in the House, with no Republicans voting for it; it was passed through the Senate via a loophole, as it could not have passed through normal procedures; and it was so complex, convoluted, and incomprehensible that its contents were a mystery both to the voters and the members who passed it, and remained so until last October, three and a half years after it passed.

Medicare and Social Security were relatively simple transfers of money, paid for with taxes and given to those deemed eligible for them by virtue of circumstance, and the civil rights laws were even more simple: They gave back rights to black citizens that had been taken from them by prior government and citizen actions. Obamacare, on the other hand, was a huge, complex bill of more than 2,000 pages that aimed to remake a vast, complex health insurance system, and created large numbers of winners and losers, in ways that few understood. Much of this ignorance was created on purpose, with the full rollout suspended for years, presumably until after Obama had been reelected and the furor surrounding its passage had wound down.

"The White House systematically delayed enacting a

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series of rules on the environment, worker safety, and health care to prevent them from becoming points of contention before the 2012 election, according to documents and interviews with current and former administration officials," the *Washington Post* reported in December.

> Some . . . were instructed to hold off submitting proposals to the White House for up to a year to ensure that they would not be issued before the voters went to the polls. . . . [S]talled regulations included crucial elements of the Affordable Care Act. . . . The Obama administration has repeatedly said that any delays . . . were coincidental, and that such decisions were made without regard to politics. But seven current and former administration officials told the *Washington Post* that the delays were clearly political.

What the administration was trying to hide became clear as the first wave of cancellations rolled through the individual health insurance market last fall, and five to eight million American citizens were told that their existing policies had been canceled, and that any new ones they might get had much higher premiums, much higher deductibles, and a much narrower selection of doctors and hospitals from which to choose.

Democrats, besieged by angry constituents, began begging Obama to issue exemptions—at least until after the midterms had passed. At first, Obamacare partisans claimed that the old plans were "crappy," and that the government had done people a favor by making insurance companies drop them, but they soon gave up on this tack in the face of derision, and began to admit that forcing people to buy narrower plans for a whole lot more money had been part of the plan from the start. "Obamacare proponents who live in the real world might admit that they planned to cancel people's individual plans all along because kicking people off individual policies is at the heart of populating the health exchanges," wrote Charles Krauthammer. "The more honest Obamacare advocates are in effect admitting that to make this omelet you have to break 8 million eggs."

The lawmakers who passed Medicare, Social Security, and the Civil Rights Act had no need to suppress or to lie about their intentions. But with the Affordable Care Act, deception clearly was key. And along with the untruths of omission, there were also a number of sins of commission, like the 29 or so times Obama personally assured the public, "If you like your plan, you can keep it. If you like your doctor, you can keep your doctor," well past the time where he ought to have known that it was a great deal more likely that you could not. But if this had been admitted at the time, the bill would never have passed Congress—and Obama by now might be an ex-president, writing his next volume of memoirs back in Hawaii, safe from the effects of the dread polar vortex, not to mention the political vortex at home.

Thus, the new health care regime in all its particulars was never really debated by Congress and was not ratified by the 2012 election, as pains were taken to make sure its true features were obscured. And saying it passed Congress fair and square only seems truthful if "fair and square" serves to describe a massive defiance of public opinion, startling levels of bribes, threats, and buyoffs, and the use of dubious sleight-of-hand measures to cancel the power of public opinion in the face of inconvenient election results.

The table was set for the last development in September 2008, when the financial collapse just seven weeks before the election turned the electorate almost en masse against the party in power, and a close contest into a nationwide rout. Democrats won the House with a 76-seat majority; in the Senate they held the magic number of 60, just enough to override a filibuster by Republicans and enact pretty much whatever they wished. At once, their eyes lit on health care, almost an afterthought in the campaign, but which overnight became their preoccupation. There was no great clamor for a health care overhaul—80 percent of the country seemed pleased with their coverage—but that barely mattered. For 80-plus years, the liberal base had longed for this moment, and for two years at least had the chance to do what it wanted. Passing a health care bill became the priority. A chance such as this was a once in a lifetime development. Who knew when it might come again?

The problem was that this did not please the voters, and the moment the outlines of the bill emerged in April 2009, they made their annoyance quite clear. There were peaceful though populous protests by the Tea Party, which emerged in opposition to the stimulus and other loose-money projects, and adopted this cause as its own. Democrats from purple and red states were raked over coals in angry town halls during the late summer recess. Obama's numbers started to drop, sliding from the very high sixties into the middle, and then the low, fifties, and, as he slipped further, pressure on Democrats in the House and the Senate increased.

Whenever it could, the public went out of its way to express its displeasure: voting for Republican governors in Virginia and New Jersey, states won by Obama, a "go slow" sign which was wholly ignored by the president's party, as it plunged ahead, pushing the bill through the Senate the day before Christmas, after the last two reluctant red-state dissenters had been showered with millions of dollars in favors. This wasn't what voters wanted to find under the tree, but Democrats still had their 60 votes in the Senate, or would have again in January when Martha Coakley won the special election in Massachusetts to fill the seat of Edward M. Kennedy, who had died in August. Massachusetts would never send a non-Democrat to fill "the Kennedy seat," as David Gergen had put it. But then Massachusetts did.

The gubernatorial elections in November 2009 had been taken as proxies for health care reform, but the December special election in Massachusetts was the third kick of the mule, and by far the most telling. Symbolically, it was held for the seat of the Father of Health Care, and one of the bill's most conspicuous backers. The governors of two big states couldn't do much to stop health care reform, but a single vote in the Senate was critical. Newly elected Senator Scott Brown had run as the "41st vote" against Obamacare. There were many reasons for people in Virginia and New Jersey to vote for (or against) their new governors. There was only one reason for people in Massachusetts to be voting for Brown.

"Elections have consequences" is a prime rule in politics, but Democrats went out of their way to make sure that this one would be the exception, as their first move after the results in Massachusetts became evident was not to rework the bill to bring it in line with the will of the public, but to game the system to close off the need for a second vote in the Senate, the will of the public be damned.

Medicare, Social Security, and the Civil Rights Act all passed by huge and bipartisan margins, with public opinion strongly in favor. Health care reform passed by 7 votes in the House, losing the votes of 34 Democrats (and all the Republicans), with a strong tide of public opinion running against it. Had there been a Senator Coakley, Republicans would have groaned, but accepted the bill as having been passed by the regular order of business. As it was, they loathed it almost as much for the way it was passed as for what was in it, and never accepted its moral authority. A Gallup poll taken on March 30, 2010, found that 53 percent of Americans considered the way the bill passed an "abuse of power" by Democrats as against 40 percent who found it "appropriate," with 86 percent of Republicans and 58 percent of independents concurring in this negative judgment. Time has done nothing to soften these views.

Ultimately, acts of Congress gain their legitimacy in the way they win or reflect the will of the public, as expressed in the way they are passed. The Civil Rights Act, as Michael Barone reminds us, took place against a background of violence, but the careful and orderly way it was passed helped defuse opposition, and the much-feared resistance to it would never materialize. Full compliance, he notes, was not immediate, "[b]ut after Congress acted in such a deliberate fashion . . . white southerners largely acquiesced." No such deliberation was ever to be seen in the passage of the Affordable Care Act, and acquiescence eludes it, as does the conviction that it is legitimate. It isn't—and never will be. ♦



Memorial Church in Harvard Yard

The Learning Curve

What are the aims of education—and reform? BY JONATHAN MARKS

Courtney Munna must be one of America's most famous young debtors. A religious and women's studies graduate of New York University, she was working as a photography assistant when the *New York Times* discovered her. Munna was 26 and still $97,000 in debt for her bachelor of arts degree. She became a symbol for those who blame colleges and universities for luring students into deep debt for educations that do not prepare them to pay the loans back, much less succeed.

Glenn Harlan Reynolds, who teaches law at the University of Tennessee and blogs as Instapundit, refers to Munna in *The New School*. He thinks that people are now paying close attention to stories like hers and are on the lookout for alternatives to traditional education. And while those who make a living providing that kind of education "will do their best to marginalize and neutralize" new competition, change "is coming, and it is unlikely to be modest or gradual." Reynolds does more than take a swing at the education establishment, however: His arresting theme is the irrationality that pervades our thinking, especially as parents, about education—and not only at universities but also K through 12.

The New School
How the Information Age Will Save American Education from Itself
by Glenn Harlan Reynolds
Encounter, 112 pp., $21.50

Reynolds asks us to practice the "critical thinking" that is sometimes said to be the aim of education. His daughter, for example, "did most of her high school online." Her flexible schedule allowed her to gain valuable work experience on the side. Why don't more parents encourage their children to do what she did, or to attend a community college before transferring to a more expensive school, or to learn a trade?

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While there are good answers to such questions, one bad answer that probably plays a role in many cases is that the people in one's circle, or the next circle up, don't do such things. Indeed, Cortney Munna's mother regretfully told the *Times* that she let her daughter get into so much debt because "all I could see was college, and a good college and how proud I was of her." Reynolds quotes The Weekly Standard's Andrew Ferguson on how college "entangles our deepest yearnings, our vanities, our social ambitions and class insecurities, and most profoundly our love and hopes for our children." Such motives explain why, from the moment we purchase our first Baby Einstein video to when we make our campus visits, we are suckers for people and products that promise to improve our children.

Reynolds looks to channel the good intentions of parents, and other concerned citizens, into scrutiny of an educational system too many of us cannot imagine being any other way. We should ask why the highest-paid state official in most states is a college coach, or why a university system in the midst of a budget crisis would add to its roster of six-figure diversity administrators, or whether students should "leave school for the real world sooner," since "isolation from the adult world" promotes irresponsibility and because much of the knowledge schools now convey is already obsolete. Perhaps we should initiate a "broad based popular movement for higher education reform" and for the reform of education altogether.

The "new school" sought by such a movement would use new technology to make education more flexible, with online courses that can be completed on a student's own schedule. It would be more customized, with the help of adaptive learning technology, and would make education cheaper, because we can expect "information technology to drive costs and prices down" in some areas. It would also promote equality by separating good K-12 education from exclusive neighborhoods.

But to ensure that the movement is armed with questions rather than pitchforks, Reynolds should rein in his polemics. First, it would be difficult to come up with a less representative example than Cortney Munna. In 2012, the median debt among borrowers—a third or so don't borrow at all—was $12,800. Philosophy and religious studies degrees constitute about .007 percent of degrees awarded. Degrees in the combined areas of ethnic, cultural, gender, and group studies are about half of 1 percent of the total. A religion and women's studies major with $97,000 in debt was, for the *Times*, a lucky find. If we want to do the kind of clear thinking Reynolds wishes to encourage, we should retire Cortney Munna.

Second, Reynolds contrasts "traditional education," peopled by faculty and administrators who live "high on the hog," with nontraditional upstarts, creating a future that is "brighter for consumers." But American education is diverse, and not many of our students attend wealthy institutions. Community colleges alone account for over 40 percent of enrollments. As for the upstarts, some of them are at the heart of the debt problem. Private for-profit colleges, among the most eager embracers of online education, educate 10 percent of our students but account for 47 percent of loan defaults. According to the Department of Education's College Scorecard, University of Phoenix online students are considerably more likely to default on their loans than they are to graduate within six years.

Nonetheless, Reynolds does an important service. During his discussion of higher education reform, he reminds us to think "about what a college degree is really for." One might say, and I believe Reynolds would say, that the same goes for educational reform in general.

A hint of an answer is provided by Reynolds's daughter, who had "the discipline to sit down at a computer every day and do schoolwork with no one looking over her shoulder." The new school will aim to "give people self-teaching skills." Discipline is one virtue people capable of teaching themselves need. What other qualities of character and intellect do they need, and how can they be taught? While the possibilities afforded by new technology will shape the new school, the future will be shaped more decisively by our success or failure at answering those old-school questions. ♦

B&A

Visionary/Reactionary

The paradox of a Tar Heel editor-politician.

by Mark Tooley

Josephus Daniels was a North Carolina newspaper mogul, Democratic party kingmaker, Prohibitionist, progressive leader, ardent Methodist, equally ardent segregationist, friend to William Jennings Bryan, and counselor to Woodrow Wilson. He was an anti-imperialist who conquered and ruled parts of six nations, a pacifist who, as secretary of the Navy during World War I, shipped two million American soldiers to Europe, and the ambassador to Mexico during the Depression under Franklin D. Roosevelt—who had served as Daniels's assistant secretary of the Navy.

Josephus Daniels
His Life and Times
by Lee A. Craig
North Carolina, 592 pp., $35

Born during the Civil War, Daniels lived into the Cold War. During the 1890s, he acquired the Raleigh *News*

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& Observer, which his grandson ran into the 1990s. Part of the same generation as William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, Daniels transitioned his papers, like so many other publishers of that time, from strident partisanship to (aspired) impartiality. His merchant father was killed by Confederate fire while on a Union gunboat. Likely sensitive about the implications, Josephus Daniels was an ardent white Southerner, scarred by Reconstruction, who successfully toiled to politically suppress blacks and Republicans. His most shameful editorial crusade inspired a murderous race riot.

Daniels is chiefly recalled as FDR's boss at the Navy Department during the Wilson administration. Alternately portrayed as clueless and long-suffering (while a dashing, headstrong young Roosevelt did as he pleased), the ever-shrewd Daniels, Lee A. Craig persuasively argues, managed and mentored FDR, charmed by his charisma, prescient about his destiny—and, privately, occasionally, miffed by his insubordination.

Oddly, in a rare oversight, this biography omits what other histories sometimes highlight about FDR's relations with Daniels: that he may well have helped save Roosevelt's political career by quietly ending the employment at the Navy Department of FDR's likely lover, young Lucy Mercer, who had earlier worked as Eleanor Roosevelt's social secretary. It is more commonly remembered that Daniels nearly destroyed Roosevelt's career by mishandling the investigation of a homosexual ring at the Newport naval base, ordering undercover personnel to entrap targets. A congressional investigation, requiring FDR's testimony, left him justifiably anxious about his political future. Roosevelt survived, of course.

Whatever their earlier tensions, Daniels was a stalwart supporter of FDR in 1932, just as he had backed Woodrow Wilson in 1912. A grateful Roosevelt, who always referred to Daniels as "Boss," dispatched him to Mexico City as ambassador for eight years, where he successfully kept Mexico aligned with the United States as World War II approached. As a younger man, FDR had thought his onetime boss a "hillbilly," but he later recognized Daniels's political acumen. Daniels could easily have sought office himself, but he preferred kingmaking to the spotlight.

FDR (left), Josephus Daniels decorating Marine officers, ca. 1918

From a modest background, and forever devoted to his widowed mother, Daniels was a tireless entrepreneur who successfully displaced more socially prominent Carolina gentry as newspaper proprietor and Democratic boss. As husband, father, and churchman, he was impeccable in his personal morals: He robustly espoused Methodism, without bigotry, and he touted Prohibition, usually without undue interest in the private habits of others. He famously banned alcohol from naval ships.

Daniels was a lifelong Democrat who saw Yankee-backed Republican commercial interests as the intrinsic foe of agrarian North Carolina. Republican power in the South was only possible through black votes; in the 1890s, black and white Republicans gained power in North Carolina in alliance with "fusionist" populists. Daniels helped smash their alliance and power through skillful organization and race-baiting, ensuring the restoration of a white, Democratic hegemony in the state for the next 80 years. He thought most blacks could not be trusted with votes because manipulative Republicans would inevitably exploit them.

William Jennings Bryan was a natural enthusiasm for Daniels. But after Bryan suffered three national defeats, Daniels understood that the Great Commoner was no longer viable and helped to replace Bryan with Woodrow Wilson. Like Bryan, Daniels espoused a soft form of pacifism, which did not preclude his service as Navy chief under Wilson. Nor did it preclude his siding with Wilson against Secretary of State Bryan over the question of preparedness. Under Wilson, Daniels dispatched gunboats and Marines to Mexico, Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Cuba.

Although slow to embrace America's entrance into World War I, Daniels conveyed over two million soldiers to Europe within months of American entry. And the fact that there were no losses at sea from enemy fire is rightly considered one of the age's military logistical triumphs. Originally opposing a large Navy as a budget-buster and invitation to adventurism, Daniels eventually urged U.S. naval supremacy, persuading Wilson to prioritize the Pacific fleet. Less successfully, he urged upon Wilson a soft peace towards defeated Germany and, ever the realist, saw Wilson's defiance of the Senate over the League of Nations as folly.

Although most of his years were spent in the 20th century, Josephus

Daniels remained very much a creature of the 19th century. He always wore the loose three-piece suit and floppy bowtie of a post-Civil War small-town Southern merchant. His appearance and unaffected drawl invited underestimation by business and political foes throughout the decades. Although a visionary political and business pragmatist who pivoted away from principles in pursuit of larger victories, Daniels seems never to have envisioned the postracial, mostly suburban, middle-class New South that would escape the shadows of the Civil War, slavery, and racial strife. ♦

B&A

Bernini's Progress

In and out of favor, in and out of fashion.

BY ALGIS VALIUNAS

Facile cosa è farsi universale. (It is an easy thing to make oneself universal.) The statement in English has a blowhard's windy obscurity. It sounds as though it came from the facile mouth of an exceedingly minor Transcendentalist. Some things are best said in Italian, and by men who can back up such words.

The quotation is, in fact, from just such a man: Leonardo da Vinci, *un uomo universale* above perhaps all other aspirants to the honorific, a master whose genius extended in all directions. Only someone like Leonardo is entitled to the swank irony of declaring that such excellence comes easy.

A man can do all things if he will, Jacob Burckhardt quoted Leon Battista Alberti as saying, and he enshrined this sentiment as the sacred heart of the Italian Renaissance. But how many actually *did* such things—i.e., became what Burckhardt calls the all-sided men? Alberti, Leonardo, Michelangelo—and Gian Lorenzo Bernini (1598-1680).

Bernini, strictly speaking, came a bit late to be a true Renaissance man, but he was the last Italian *uomo universale*, achieving the very highest in sculpture and architecture and producing rich and remarkable work in painting, playwriting, and scenography. He was the supreme talent of the Italian Baroque. Without him, Rome would have been a far different city; without him, the Counter-Reformation would have lacked some of its most vital spiritual monuments.

Bernini
His Life and His Rome
by Franco Mormando
Chicago, 456 pp., $18

Gian Lorenzo Bernini, ca. 1623

Alberti, Leonardo, and, for most of his life, Michelangelo pursued worldly self-perfection and sought to make themselves the most impressive and renowned men in the known universe. Bernini, too, wanted to shine, but perhaps above all he wanted to serve: to serve the Roman Catholic church and to magnify the glory of the One True Faith. Of course, there was something more in it for him than a place among the ranks of the blessed; a man of worldly accomplishment wants his worth recognized in the coin of the realm, literally and figuratively. Bernini made a fortune, and he earned a lasting name. His vocation encompassed a tireless passion for artistic activity, consecration to a religious ideal, and ambition on a titanic scale.

Bernini lived a long time, and he worked all his life. In his 70s, he would still spend unstinting days at labor and would put off his assistants who begged him to spare himself: "Let me be, for I am in love."

In this excellent biography, Franco Mormando catches the full import of the artist's prodigious yearning.

> In Bernini's day, people would have unquestioningly accepted his obsessive creative drive not only as love but as yet another blessed case of divine furor. It was, in their eyes, his privileged share of the supernatural creative spark that God deigns to instill in a few chosen geniuses in each century. Similarly they would have applauded his incessant attempt to dazzle and amaze the world through his art—while outdoing his rivals—as a praiseworthy manifestation of the pursuit of worldly glory, honor, and immortality.

Mormando says straight-out that his book will skimp on the art itself—Howard Hibbard and Rudolf Wittkower have written superbly about it—and instead will concentrate on the man, who has never had a proper biography in English before. This is an eloquent portrait of a not-always-appealing character.

Bernini was the kind of man who wanted the best of both worlds, this one and the next. It is not often easy to satisfy such disparate desires, but Bernini was fortunate in crucial respects. To begin with, he was fortunate in that his father, Pietro, was an artist of some note who came to specialize in sculpture. When Gian Lorenzo was 8, Pope Paul V called

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Pietro from Naples to Rome in order to work on the Pauline chapel in Santa Maria Maggiore. With the upsurge of Protestantism, the Catholic church had a lot to prove, and one way of preserving the faith was to overawe the faithful and the dubious with artistic magnificence.

The church's need provided Gian Lorenzo's main chance. Youthful marvels of stonework caught the pope's eye; Bernini would later claim he'd produced these at the age of 8, or even 6, but more disinterested accounts place the sculptures several years later. At any rate, by the time Gian Lorenzo was about 12, he and his father had enjoyed a private audience with the pope, arranged by Paul V's aesthete nephew, Cardinal Scipione Borghese. The pope asked Gian Lorenzo to draw a head on the spot, and the boy tossed off a picture of Saint Paul. The winning command performance prompted the pontiff to hail the youth as the next Michelangelo.

Fountain of the Four Rivers

Henceforth, people on the street knew Gian Lorenzo by sight. Moreover, the Vatican opened its art collection to him, and he could not get enough of the masterworks there, particularly the classical sculpture, which he drew from morning till night for days on end.

Seriousness about his art came early and never left him. Perhaps when he was 15, or more likely when he was 18, he carved an innovative St. Lawrence being roasted to death on the gridiron. Writes Mormando:

> Among its many distinctions, it represents the first time that any sculptor, much less a teenage one, dared to depict in cold, colorless marble such a challenging, intricate scene involving the contrasting elements of fire, flesh, hair, wood, and metal, at the same time capturing the inexpressibly subtle emotional state of the martyr.

According to legend, it was not inexpressible subtlety the artist originally looked for, but expressive horror: Bernini was said to have burned his own thigh so that he could note in a mirror the agony on his face. *Se non è vero, è ben trovato.* (If it's not true, it's a good story.) Mormando points out, parenthetically, that St. Lawrence doesn't appear to be in agony, but approaches transcendent bliss.

By his early 20s, Bernini was already established as the leading sculptor in Rome, with such works as *Aeneas and Anchises*, *The Rape of Proserpina*, *Apollo and Daphne*, *David*, and portrait busts of Pope Paul V and Monsignor Pedro de Foix Montoya. Paul's successor, Gregory XV, honored Bernini in 1621 with the title of *Cavaliere*, or Knight, in the Order of the Cross of Christ. When Cardinal Maffeo Barberini, whom Paul had entrusted with the young Bernini's tutelage, became Pope Urban VII in 1623, he singled out his protégé as the man who was to make Rome resplendent, for the glory of God and the Barberini.

Civic appointments and distinctions were showered upon Bernini: He oversaw the papal art gallery and foundry, the fountains, the major aqueducts. Making St. Peter's Basilica the most luxurious church in Christendom became his principal occupation under Urban. He designed the spectacularly beautiful Baldacchino, the canopy over the main altar and St. Peter's tomb, set on 60-foot-tall spiral bronze columns. He supervised the decoration of the four immense piers undergirding the dome. He sculpted a monumental *St. Longinus*, the Roman centurion who pierced Christ's side with a spear and then realized, "Truly, he was the son of God." (The sinner, converted on the spot, stands with his arms extended virtually cruciform, his awe and his guilty suffering of a piece.) On the side, Bernini produced masterly portrait busts of Cardinal Scipione Borghese, Cardinal Richelieu of France, and King Charles I of England.

And this was not all Bernini did on the side. He began an affair, in 1636 or 1637, with Costanza Bonarelli, the wife of a sculptor colleague. Bernini's portrait bust of Costanza shows an inelegant but desirable woman. Mormando says that she looks "full of vitality and self-possession." To me, she looks frightened, and she certainly had reason to be: She was sleeping with Bernini's brother, Luigi, and when Bernini found out, he chased Luigi around town trying to kill him. He also ordered a servant to slash Costanza's face. Tumultuous scandal ensued. The servant was exiled; Bernini was initially fined. But Urban wound up giving him a free pass: The writ of exoneration hailed Bernini as "an exceptional human being, a sublime genius, born by directive of Divine Providence, in order to bring illumination to this century for the glory of Rome." Bernini *did* change his ways afterward, marrying and becoming

IMAGES: NEWSCOM

a devoted husband and the father of 11 children. He also took to practicing his faith with exceptional fervor.

With the accession of Innocent X in 1644, Bernini fell out of papal favor for a spell. It was mostly family politics: Innocent's Pamphilj clan envied the wealth and power of the Barberini, while the former's Spanish sympathies clashed with the latter's French leanings. The new pope did not entirely cut Bernini out of the action: He retained his position as architect of St. Peter's and was commissioned by Innocent to finish decorating its still-mostly-empty nave and side chapels.

Nevertheless, the architect Francesco Borromini and the sculptor Alessandro Algardi started to impinge on Bernini's territory. And when cracks began to appear in the façade of St. Peter's Benediction Loggia, Borromini led the public cry that Bernini's botched job on the still-unfinished bell towers was to blame. Innocent insisted that the bell towers come down, and Bernini's politic courting and outright bribery of Innocent's influential sister-in-law Donna Olimpia (the pope's former lover) failed to keep his work from being demolished.

Throughout this disgrace, and amid sudden family deaths and successive births, Bernini preserved his equanimity and kept on working hard. For the rest of his life, he attended Mass daily and received Communion twice a week.

Sometimes living right pays off, especially if you can come through with the goods. The Pamphilj family had an elegant residence on the Piazza Navona, and Innocent was having a family church, Sant'Agnese in Agone, built there. A fountain was needed to complete the effect, and competitors lined up with their designs. Bernini, on the outs with Innocent, secretly prepared a model, aware that if Innocent knew that it was his it wouldn't stand a chance. According to Mormando, Olimpia arranged for the pope to see the unattributed silver model after a family dinner, and the pontiff did backflips: He praised the design for half-an-hour, declared that only Bernini could have done it—and that whatever he had against a man of such gifts must be forgotten. The *Fontana dei Quattro Fiume*, Fountain of the Four Rivers—with heroic figures representing the Nile, the Plate, the Ganges, and the Danube, and an obelisk standing in the middle—was finished in 1651 and remains a prime Roman landmark.



The Ecstasy of Saint Teresa

Works done during the papacy of Innocent's successor, Alexander VII, were more satisfactory to the artist. The colonnade of St. Peter's Square, according to Bernini, embodies the church, "with maternally open arms, [receiving] Catholics to confirm them in their faith, heretics to reunite them with the Church, and infidels to illuminate them into the true faith." The *Cathedra Petri*, the Chair of St. Peter, in the apse of the Vatican Basilica, is a wonder of scenic design and iconography in the service of a towering righteousness. For the Jesuits, Bernini built the Church of St. Andrea al Quirinale.

Under trying political circumstances for the pope, who had run afoul of the superior and overweening power of France's Louis XIV, Bernini was put on loan to Louis in 1665. As architect, he was to prepare designs for the new Louvre; as sculptor, he was to do the king's portrait in marble. At the latter he succeeded better than at the former: His Louvre designs displeased everyone but himself, while his flamboyant portrait bust hit the mark of regal vanity. "In this kind of head one must bring out the qualities of the hero as well as make a good likeness," Bernini explained.

His return to Rome came as a relief, but Bernini's old age would be full of trials. The commission from the new pope, Clement IX, an old Bernini friend, for his tomb monument in Santa Maggiore encountered exorbitant cost overruns, and Romans smelled corruption. In 1670, Bernini was sacked. Then things got worse: His equestrian statue for St. Peter's, *The Vision of Constantine*, was received with indifference, and his brother Luigi, ever the reprobate, raped a young man as they stood in the vicinity of *Constantine*. The statutory punishment was burning at the stake, but Bernini begged the pope for a pardon and got Sweden's Queen Christina, who revered him, to intercede as well. As part of the price for his brother's pardon and return from exile, Bernini agreed to do a large marble statue for free. He was 77 when he carved the brilliant *Death of the Blessed Ludovica Albertoni*. It was his last major work. In 1680, Bernini died after a stroke.

Bernini could perform all manner of wonders in stone, but his supreme—and daring—artistry was with faces. He did not spare even his most important patrons: The 1623 bust of Paul V portrays a man concerned with the affairs of this world, and this world alone. The cannonball head and triple chin lapped in froufrou bespeak luxury, gluttony, and

pride. Of the pope's infamous nephew, Cardinal Scipione Borghese, there was no reputation for rectitude to undermine. The Venetian ambassador described him as "utterly given over to pleasures and pastimes," including sport that went so far as the murder by his servants of a beautiful young man who had left the cardinal's bed after a quarrel. In Bernini's 1632 bust, the cardinal has dissolution written all over his corpulent mug.

But while Bernini rendered the moral rot of the hearts of men—and so beautifully, and so carefully, that they did not appear to mind—he also honored spiritual beauty where he found it. His bust of Monsignor Pedro de Foix Montoya (1621-22) represents noble happiness within severe discipline. Montoya's visage radiates ascetic contentment. In the *David* (1623-24), Bernini turns his skill to divinely appointed heroism in the throes of action. His young athlete twists and strains ferociously to ready his sling for a mighty heave. The violent torsion of Bernini's figure could not be more different from the beauty in repose of Michelangelo's David: Michelangelo shows heroism that has been won and perfected; Bernini shows heroism proving itself. In Michelangelo's version, physical magnificence is an object of aesthetic rapture; in Bernini's, it is a model for martial valor.

But Bernini's most renowned sculpture, the one he called his most beautiful, is *Saint Teresa in Ecstasy* (1645-52), in the Cornaro Chapel of Santa Maria della Vittoria, a small Carmelite church. Against a stunningly elaborate *mise en scène*, an angel prepares to plunge a golden spear into the heart of the saint, who, as evidenced by her convulsed features, has plainly been transfixed. In the saint's autobiography, she describes the mystical ravishing:

> When he pulled [the spear] out, I felt he took [my entrails] with it, and left me utterly consumed by the great love of God. The pain was so severe that it made me utter several moans. The sweetness caused by this intense pain is so extreme that one cannot possibly wish it to cease, nor is one's soul then content with anything but God. This is not a physical, but a spiritual pain, though the body has some share in it—even a considerable share.

Bernini's Teresa looks to be melting away. The shape of her body is lost, enfolded in liquid drapery; only her face, one hand, and one bare foot are visible. Teresa's expression is famously, and notoriously, orgasmic. Writes Mormando: "The statue titillates our senses as it provokes our wonder, if not our shock, about this blatant melding of the spiritual and sexual, within a Catholic church in the city of the popes during supposedly morally vigilant times of the Counter-Reformation." ♦

B&A

Literary Man of War

John Keegan: an appreciation.

BY EDWIN M. YODER JR.

It is unlikely that any debut in the field of military history will rival that of John Keegan's masterpiece *The Face of Battle* (1976) nearly four decades ago. It was not his first book, or even his first good one. But it was, and remains, definitively brilliant and original.

John Keegan (1934-2012) would have turned 80 this year, and though he is gone, his books live on—none more permanently than *The Face of Battle*, as inventive and influential today as it was on first reading. And its continuing celebrity is the more remarkable, given the author's assertion that he, of all writers, was least qualified to write it.

"I have not been in a battle," he writes in his opening sentence, "not near one nor heard one from afar, nor seen the aftermath." That admission is as rare as it is pertinent, since most historians in most eras—Thucydides being the ancient exception, Winston Churchill the modern one—never heard a shot fired (or saw a sword raised) in anger. Keegan did not lack professional credentials: He was a lecturer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and a defense correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph*. So why make an issue of his lack of combat experience?

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

BOSTON GLOBE / GETTY IMAGES

John Keegan

Here is one considered theory, with some personal resonance: Keegan and his contemporaries on both sides of the Atlantic experienced a certain chronological deprivation. As we (he and I were born in the same year) came to historical consciousness in the 1940s, the greatest of wars was raging afar. We were too young to fight in it and would be too old for service when the Vietnam misadventure came along. Many of us served in peacetime reserves, and a few went to Korea; but that brief and bloody conflict doesn't alter the

'Battle of Waterloo' by William Sadler II (ca. 1830)

rule. We were prone to share a powerful curiosity about a missing experience, and John Keegan was determined to come as close as study and eloquence could bring him to the explication of what was once deemed, in Western society, one of the great rites of passage.

Those who passed from boyhood to youth in the 1940s will respond with a sense of shared familiarity to his memories of Taunton in the West Country, whither his father, a school inspector, moved the family. The young Keegan viewed Hitler as a deluded amateur who had foolishly challenged the might of the mightiest of modern empires.

> I knew, with an unshakable moral and intellectual certainty that Britain could not lose. . . . If only, I used to muse, I could get [Hitler] to myself for a moment or two . . . open his eyes, he'd have to see that there was no point in going on.

For him, there was a physical deficit as well. In childhood, he suffered from a rare form of tuberculosis that left him with a limping gait; and perhaps that accounts for a compensatory interest in mountaineering. "Mountains," he writes, "like battlefields, are places inherently dangerous to inhabit . . . and numbers of climbers are killed on every major range every year."

Keegan, in fact, had much in common with that other great writer on battle who never witnessed one: Stephen Crane. There may be another clue in a little book that many were reading during Keegan's years at Oxford: Isaiah Berlin's reflection on Tolstoy's view of history, entitled *The Hedgehog and the Fox*. According to Berlin's typology, the hedgehog (who "knows one big thing") and the fox ("who knows many things") stand for fundamentally different views of the past and of war. John Keegan was a fox among foxes, at ease with variety and paradox in human experience.

But it is as a skeptic of traditional battle narratives that Keegan made his lasting mark. Stately, heroic, orderly, sometimes even bloodless, accounts of war aroused his doubts. War, he argued, is disorderly and sometimes—as he writes in his portrait of the Duke of Wellington in *The Mask of Command* (1987)—"anti-heroic." What eyewitnesses believe they have seen is often implausible, given the exhausting marches, the fear, hunger, exposure, and fatigue—and yes, the disease, drunkenness, desertion, and straggling rates that often as not precede and accompany battle. J. G. Randall said much the same in his famous essay on the "blundering generation" of American Civil War origins. But none before Keegan carried it to the utmost conclusion.

Three of Keegan's books—I would include *Six Armies in Normandy* (1982) along with *The Face of Battle* and *The Mask of Command*—reinforce his idea that battle is often other than as reported. Tanks, for instance, "should be thought of not so much as weapons but as theatrical devices, dei ex machina, by the maneuvering of which a general is enabled to manipulate the emotions" of foes. Battle itself is "essentially a moral conflict [requiring] a mutual and sustained act of will . . . and if it is to result in a decision, the moral collapse of one of [the sides]." It is "necessarily a social and psychological study," though obviously it is much else.

The Face of Battle permanently changed the way historians think and write about war. If the casual reader reads only one of Keegan's books, it should be this one. He addresses three memorable English battles—Agincourt (1415), Waterloo (1815), and the Somme (1916)—and the essential thesis is the transition from "edged" weapons that permitted hand-to-hand fighting and heroic styles of command through to the erraticisms of musketry in Napoleonic warfare that still allowed commanders to lead from the front of formations to the deadly rifled and

machine-gun fire of World War I, which raised the human cost exponentially and moved command miles from the front, leading to the "impersonalization" of battle that, as of Keegan's time of writing, heralded its end.

I write here on the limited authority of having reread Keegan's three classics on battle and a modest personal acquaintance. He was a man of erudition and charm, master of all he chose to survey. But even a master nods. He once wrote that, in April 1865, "Jefferson Davis . . . lost all hope of heroic epitaph when he cravenly fled from Richmond . . . at the appearance of Grant's army." Even an amateur student of the Confederacy's last act rubs his eyes at this. There is (as I wrote at the time) no evidence that Davis's departure from Richmond, however hurried, was "craven." On the advice of General Lee, whose front was collapsing, the Rebel president was trying to preserve a semblance of authority; and the immediate need was a retreat southward. Grant's army had been at Richmond's doorstep for months.

Such slips were few, and Keegan invariably greeted a friendly correction with receptivity and kindness. I last saw him at a small Washington dinner party a few days after the revelation of the so-called Hitler diaries. I had filed a skeptical column that went pretty far out on a limb and was eager to hear an expert's view. Given Keegan's encyclopedic knowledge of the Hitler era, the modesty with which he considered the issue of authenticity offered a good lesson for a rash journalist.

That evening he signed my copy of *Six Armies in Normandy*, "Ed, in friendship." I think he meant it; and I treasure that autograph still. ♦

B&A

The Netflix Effect

'The line between politics and entertainment has become more *distinct.'* **BY ELI LEHRER**

Last fall, during an earnings conference call, Netflix CEO Reed Hastings made an announcement that landed him on the front page of every newspaper business section: His company had surpassed HBO to become America's biggest pay-TV service. Today, about 30 million Netflix accounts exist, serving about a quarter of America. Netflix's first round of original series won critical plaudits and were the first purely video-on-demand television series to win Emmy awards. The concept of "binge watching" became popular largely because of Netflix. Because it offers a rich library of old and new TV shows for a modest sum per month, the service has even helped grow the number of "cord cutters," who watch "television" only through the Internet.

All this, of course, is well documented and much discussed. What has gotten far less attention is the fact that Netflix's rise to become America's most influential TV service is a rejoinder to scolds on both sides of the political spectrum who have claimed that new media will fuse politics and entertainment. In fact, Netflix's rise—and its combination of unconcern and cluelessness about the world of politics—shows just the opposite. No matter how many people might call *Network* (1976) prophetic, or think that last year's bizarre *Anchorman 2* was an accurate representation of the news business, or decry the rise of "tabloid TV" and "infotainment," there's little evidence that politics and entertainment have fused in recent years. Over the past century, in fact, the line between politics and entertainment has become *more* distinct.

Famous orators of the past—the temperance crusader John Gough, Frederick Douglass, William Jennings Bryan—always knew how to bring a strong dose of the theatrical to their presentations and drew larger audiences than the theatrical performances of their time. Three-hour speeches, unthinkable today, were a lot more exciting than the farm and assembly-line labor common in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Before the national release of films began in the 1920s, almost no American outside of the world of politics (broadly construed) could claim national celebrity. As late as the 1980s, the Big Three network news anchors were among the biggest celebrities in the country. Today, if you're under 55, it's unlikely you could even name all three of their modern successors.

If Netflix is the future, then, there's considerable evidence that news and entertainment will become more distinct. Netflix has no news division, and its on-demand format makes it unsuitable for even the modest "public affairs" programming that appears on HBO (*Real Time with Bill Maher*, et al.). While it recently produced and released a reasonably sympathetic look at Mitt Romney—a return to the documentary production it started and abandoned in the last decade—this isn't a sign that the company is somehow trying to correct the left-leaning slant of most documentary filmmakers. While there is certainly streaming material besides the Romney documentary that flatters conservatives (Andrew Breitbart's *Occupy Unmasked*), at least as much will please liberals (Michael Moore's *The Big One*) and lunatics (*Dark Legacy*, which describes how George H.W. Bush killed John F. Kennedy).

Of course, no video-on-demand service controlled by user choice could ever be effective in delivering news, since it's based on what's going on at any given moment and demands a "pushed" format that's best delivered as a web page or 24-hour news chan-

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nel. As the cost of getting on the web, or starting a cable channel, has plummeted, such services have proliferated. The news universe that results may well be more fragmented, opinionated, and angry, and since people can easily watch and read only things that flatter them, this may be more comforting. But that still doesn't make it entertainment.

Which is why it's interesting that Netflix's first series all have political elements: *House of Cards*, starring Kevin Spacey, offers a cynical view of Washington politics; *Orange Is the New Black* is a "dramedy" about life in a women's prison, based on a nonfiction book full of public policy arguments; *Hemlock Grove*, a thriller/supernatural series, deals with the political machinations of small-town life. *House of Cards* and *Orange Is the New Black* rank among the smartest, best-written, best-produced shows around. *Hemlock Grove* is better-than-average TV.

All three, however, show a certain cluelessness about the political issues they address. *Hemlock Grove* is the most forgivable in its portrayal of politics. At heart, it's a small-town gothic in the spirit of *True Blood*'s early seasons and *Twin Peaks*, and it takes dramatic license in converting things that would be national news stories (the brutal murder that opens the first episode, for example) into purely local events. Dozens of other shows do this, and it's easy enough to overlook.

The other two series can't get the same pass. Piper Kerman's memoir, which serves as the basis for *Orange Is the New Black*, is an interesting (if sometimes shrill) screed against mass incarceration based on the Smith-graduate-turned-drug-money-courier's year in federal prison. While she doesn't claim that our prisons are full of innocent people, she makes a solid political case that the long-term incarceration of nonviolent, or even less-violent, offenders can't be good for society. The Netflix version centers on one Piper Chapman (Taylor Schilling), but depicts the same minimum-security prison as a violent place full of people who deserve to be isolated from society. In other words, for the purposes of good TV, the producers contradict the central political message of the book. Since Piper Kerman herself has promoted the show, she must recognize the contradiction.

If *Orange Is the New Black* simply contradicts the political message of its source, however, *House of Cards*, a far more overtly political show, largely ignores real life altogether. On one hand, its production shows that some people with experience in Washington know what they're doing: Designers perfectly match the visitors' badges used in the Capitol building and the stickers in taxicab windows, even the look of the Georgetown and Adams Morgan flats occupied by recent college graduates. (All the more impressive, really, since most filming takes place in Baltimore.)

But the political doings at the heart of *House of Cards*, the second season of which premiered in February, betray an ignorance of political reality. In the first season, several episodes turned on a national teachers' strike that caused all public schools in America to close because teachers disliked a bill moving through Congress. This is, of course, plainly impossible: Only a third of public-school teachers in America belong to a union, no single union controls all organized teachers, many states ban teacher strikes, and since the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act nearly 70 years ago, unions haven't been allowed to engage in political strikes at all.

Ignorance of the world of politics doesn't end there. A major plot thread has South Carolina congressman Francis Underwood (Kevin Spacey) getting himself heavily involved in a Pennsylvania gubernatorial campaign. (In the real world, it's rare that members of Congress involve themselves in local races in their *own* states.) In other episodes, editors at a big metropolitan daily give front-page placement to a story based on an unattributed tip, written by a reporter who won't disclose her sources to her own editors, and the House of Representatives holds a floor roll-call vote on a bill involving a single river's watershed. While all these things could happen in theory—and may have occurred at some point in the past—they almost certainly wouldn't take place today. The people behind *House of Cards* presumably know better, but prefer a good drama to any grounding in political reality.

Caveat emptor. Anyone who wants to learn about American politics from what's marketed as pure entertainment programming is almost certain to emerge clueless. And people aren't relying on Netflix for their news anyway. If Netflix is the future, entertainment and politics will continue to grow apart. ♦

Kevin Spacey, Robin Wright in 'House of Cards'

NEWSCOM

Swiss fighters grounded during hijacking as outside office hours

Agence France-Presse (AFP) – February 17, 2014

GENEVA — No Swiss fighter jets were scrambled Monday when an Ethiopian Airlines co-pilot hijacked his own plane and forced it to land in Geneva, because it happened outside business hours, the Swiss airforce said.

When the co-pilot on flight ET-702 from Addis Ababa to Rome locked himself in the cockpit while the pilot went to the bathroom and announced a hijacking, Italian and French fighter jets were scrambled to escort the plane through their respective airspaces.

But although the co-pilot-turned-hijacker quickly announced he wanted to land the plane in Switzerland, where he later said he aimed to seek asylum, Switzerland's fleet of F-18s and F-5 Tigers remained on the ground, Swiss airforce spokesman Laurent Savary told AFP.

This, he explained, was because the Swiss airforce is only available during office hours. These are reported to be from 8am until noon, then 1:30 to 5pm.

"Switzerland cannot intervene because its airbases are closed at night and on the weekend," he said, adding: "It's a question of budget and staffing...."

the weekly Standard
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