the weekly
Standard

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THE HERETIC

Thomas Nagel—professor, philosopher, apostate

BY ANDREW FERGUSON

WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM

Contents

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COVER BY C.F. PAYNE

The Carcass of Caracas

The Scrapbook took note last week of plans in Venezuela to embalm the late strongman Hugo Chávez and put his corpse on permanent public display. This would have placed a comparatively tinhorn character in some fast historical company—Lenin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Kim Il Sung—and made his resting place a must-see on the Macabre Tourism trail (The Carcass of Caracas, Peasant Under Glass, and so on).

But, alas! The Scrapbook must report that it probably won't happen. It seems that, according to his (interim) successor President Nicolás Maduro, "Russian and German scientists have arrived to embalm Chávez, and they tell us it's very difficult because the process should have started earlier. . . . Maybe we can't do it." Which means that Chávez may soon be buried in the usual way, as he seems to have wished, in his provincial hometown of Sabaneta. And which also means that the scenes of celebrity mourning we had anticipated—Harry Belafonte throwing himself across the glass sarcophagus, Joe Kennedy in deep reverence, Oliver Stone prostrate at the foot of the monument—may never happen.

In the meantime, this subject has put The Scrapbook in an inquisitive mood. Just exactly who, or what, are the "Russian and German scientists" who have been called in to postpone Hugo Chávez's decomposition? This sounds like a task not for "Russian and German scientists" but for somebody like Mr. Joyboy, the chief embalmer at Whispering Glades in Evelyn Waugh's *The Loved One*, or the creator of the animatronic Abraham Lincoln at Disneyland.

For while The Scrapbook enjoys a postmortem joke as much as anyone—here is proof, at last, that Chávez really was rotten!—there is good reason why cadavers aren't usually on indefinite display. It is widely assumed, for example, that the corpse of Lenin in Moscow's Red Square is about as much "Lenin" as his wax representation at Madame Tussaud in London. Or consider "Mao" on his catafalque in Beijing. Sure, it looks like the Great Helmsman, more or less; but given the inexorable process of decay, and the imperfect science (if that's the word for it) of mummification, you have to wonder just how much genuine Mao is to be seen in the so-called Mao-soleum—and how much is wax, sawdust, and high-fructose corn syrup.

Indeed, from The Scrapbook's perspective, what's interesting here is not so much the objects on exhibit as the instinct to preserve tyrants under glass. It is true that the remains of saints and martyrs are sometimes seen, largely as objects of veneration for the faithful. But what is the purpose of preserving, say, Ho Chi Minh's dead body? For veneration—or to instill fear? It cannot be entirely coincidental that the characters on such public display—Ho, Lenin, Mao, Kim—are villains, not heroes, of history. The cult of personality that nourished them in life is embodied, and sustained, in death.

In that sense, it is entirely fitting that "Russian and German scientists" should be engaged in concocting some suitable representation of Hugo Chávez for public consumption. This sort of civic preservation is largely practiced under regimes, in which most humans would not choose to live. Or maybe Chávez will get lucky, and like the corpses of Stalin and Eva Perón, his personal contribution to the taxidermist's art will be seen for awhile, but then happily disappear. ♦

Papacy Idiocy

Among its many splendors, a papal conclave affords a refreshingly unguarded window into the media's parochial view of the larger world.

This time around the pre-conclave press saw a series of pieces suggesting that two American cardinals were seriously being considered as papable. (With all due respect to Cardinals Dolan and O'Malley, they had only a slightly better chance of being elected pope than The Scrapbook did.) Then there was the line of thinking that sees the church as just another political organization in need of diversity training, typified by a *Washington Post* piece headlined, "Has the time come for a pope of color?"

> When Catholicism's cardinals meet in the Sistine Chapel to select a new pope, they will be surrounded by an explosion of divine artistic images in one of the most famous places on Earth to seek the face of God.
>
> And pretty much all they will see when they look on the walls and ceilings are white faces—of Jesus, Mary, God, Adam, Eve, angels, prophets. That will also largely be true when they lower their eyes and look at one another. . . .
>
> After centuries and centuries of white European popes, a developing-world pope could further alter the modern concept of Christianity, and by extension the modern concept and geopolitical tilt of power.
>
> In conversations, comparisons to Barack Obama's election as the United States' first black president readily arise.

After Francis's election there was more of the inanity of treating a conclave as a party convention. The *New York Times* reported that in his native Argentina Francis was viewed suspiciously because of his "hardline conservative views on a range of issues, including gay rights and artistic expression." The *Times* then

dutifully procured quotes from the Argentine Federation of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transsexuals and a "conceptual artist." It wasn't clear from the *Times*'s reporting if either of these critics was actually Catholic, but kudos to them for finding two Argentinians who weren't ecstatic about their new pope. Who says investigative reporting is dead?

The media's obsession with the Catholic church's stance on gay marriage was on display all week. Of the 14 stories the *Times* ran about Francis, 5 mentioned gay rights. The *Washington Post* brought up the subject in 4 of the 13 pieces it ran on the new pope. Other major papers had similar ratios. It's not clear why the secular press cares so much about whether the Catholic church permits same-sex marriage—what's it to them? But boy, do they care.

Of course, it wasn't just the major media that covered themselves in provincialism last week. The *New Republic* kicked off its coverage with a piece by an honest-to-goodness professional Catholic journalist: *National Catholic Reporter* columnist Michael Sean Winters. Mere hours before Francis was elected, Winters wrote a piece explaining why "White Smoke Is Good News for Cardinal Scola," in which he went on to handicap the conclave and explain how the chances for several cardinals would grow or diminish as the conclave wore on. Funnily enough, Winters did not even mention Bergoglio's name.

After Bergoglio was announced, Winters wrote another piece defending the new pope by insisting that, whatever his shortcomings, at least Bergoglio had never been a "neo-con capitalist" or followed the "neo-con American Catholics." It wasn't quite clear what Winters meant by this—in no sense of the term, traditional or post-9/11, does "neoconservatism" really exist within the Catholic hierarchy. And as far as free-marketeering goes, even the church's supposed "hardliners"—such as Popes John Paul II and Benedict—have always been deeply critical of what they saw as the inherent moral limits of capitalism. And for that matter, "neo-con capitalist" doesn't even make sense outside the church: Actual neoconservatives have never been a prize breed of running-dog capitalist. (Winters may want to consult Irving Kristol's canonical text, "Two Cheers for Capitalism.") In the end, Winters's defense of Francis makes sense only if "neo-con" is shorthand for "something I do not like."

Like the secular journalists writing about Pope Francis, Winters seemed less interested in telling readers about Pope Francis than in telling them about himself.

Comparing the election of a pope to the election of Barack Obama; defending the pope from being a "neo-con"; attacking him for being hostile to gay marriage—it's all of a piece. It's a way for reporters to make sure that even in the context of "reporting" on religious news, their readers understand whose side they're really on. ♦



A Headline that Will Live in Infamy

Good news for a change from Phnom Penh: Ieng Sary, brother-in-law of and cofounder with Pol Pot of Cambodia's murderous Khmer Rouge movement, died last week. Or perhaps it wasn't really good news. His heart (who knew he had one?) gave out before the Cambodian-U.N. tribunal had a chance to finish its proceedings and convict him of mass

New York Times

IE WEEK IN REVIEW

Section 4

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Communist Rule Is at Least Uncertain; Napalm Is Not

Indochina Without Americans: For Most, a Better Life

By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG

murder. As the AP account of his death, at 87, noted, the Khmer Rouge regime, which he served as foreign minister in its four year reign from 1975 to 1979, caused "the deaths of an estimated 1.7 million people from starvation, disease, overwork and execution."

Ieng Sary's death would be a fitting occasion for the *New York Times* to append a correction to Sydney Schanberg's April 13, 1975, dispatch from Phnom Penh, "Indochina Without Americans: For Most, a Better Life." For "the ordinary people of Indochina," Schanberg wrote, "it is difficult to imagine how their lives could be anything but better with the Americans gone. . . . This is not to say that the Communist-backed governments . . . can be expected to be benevolent."

He went on to predict that life under the Khmer Rouge might be "hard and inflexible." Nonetheless, he concluded, "it will be nice when Americans get out of the killing business in Indochina."

The Scrapbook suggests, for the correction, that the word "Communists" be swapped in wherever the word "Americans" appeared in Schanberg's infamous forecast. ♦

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Mister Early Riser

My wife Cynthia occasionally interviews our kids, jotting down their answers in little journals. She asks questions like, What was your favorite part of our trip? What was your favorite meal?

This started before our children were even saying much. When our firstborn, Maddy, was not even one, Cynthia wrote down her favorite food, milk, and recorded her favorite song, which was "You Got the Belly, I Got the Rub," a goofball number I had invented on the fly during bath time. Apparently, my daughter didn't mind that it made less sense with every line: "You got the belly, I got the rub. You got the bathwater, I got the tub. You got the appetite, I got the grub."

I had forgotten about the song, and can only quote the lyrics because Cynthia wrote them down and read them aloud a few nights ago in a terrifically cute recital as we celebrated Maddy's tenth birthday. After some more saccharine lines, including "You got the mama bear, I got the cub," Cyn and I made a little show about, awwww, how much we love-love-love each other and our whole wonderful family—smoochy, smoochy—until the kids rolled their eyes and said what happens to be, currently, their favorite word of disapproval, which they actually caw like a crow: "Awkward! Awkward!"

The next morning, I woke up early to do some reading and then roused the kids for breakfast. As usual, we were running late. As usual, there was a fight, over what I can't remember. A needed piece of clothing that was sitting in a pile of dirty laundry. Whether or not the kids were to buy lunch at school or take sandwiches. The clock ticked dangerously closer to 8:00 A.M., but somehow we got out the door, all three kids and I. Only two are in school, but the third likes to come for the walk.

On the sidewalk, Maddy, irritated at our general slowness, sprints ahead. Her brother Ben asks if I will carry his backpack, and because it's about half the size he is, I always say yes. He hands me the bag, then runs after his sister. The youngest reaches for me and says, "Uppy, uppy," but I say no, explaining that he insisted on coming, so he has to carry himself.

DAVE CLEGG

The temperature is just above freezing. I begin jogging so we don't fall entirely behind. Halfway down the block, I look around. The low-slanting light of winter is flooding the rooftops, an almost powdery kind of light, washing over us, washing over the neighborhood, washing over the whole world, perfect and innocent and beautiful. And I think this, right now, is what I don't want to forget.

Hustling the youngest one along, we catch up to the other two at the corner where the crossing guard is standing and the familiar faces of our fellow stragglers line up. It's always the same people who are running late, and it's always the same people who have arrived just two minutes earlier and are returning childless from the school entrance as we race past them. On the rare occasion they see me walking back earlier, they check their watches and shake their heads, as if to say, "Look who decided to get out of bed, Mister Early Riser." But not today.

The crossing guard blows her whistle and throws her fluorescent-gloved hands in the air to halt the cars that race down Commonwealth Avenue; if drivers get impatient, she gives them her death stare; if their cars roll even a little bit while children are crossing, she yells at them. A newspaper did a story on how much crossing guards make, suggesting it was a cushy gig. But I don't think this woman is overpaid.

We walk the last block, always passing the same two middle-school girls and lately a band of seven or so boys a few years older than my own. I know one of the boys. He wants to be a writer when he grows up, but he doesn't seem comfortable saying hi with his friends there.

I look at my son's crazy red hair as I hand him his backpack and think, not for the first time, we've got to teach this kid to use a brush. My daughter's already up the steps, a wave goodbye flung in the air like nothing. The boy lets me give him a squeeze and say, "See you, buddy."

I start to walk back with the littlest one saying "uppy" again. I say no again, and think, well, yeah, it's a minor thing but this routine is one of my favorite parts of being a parent.

David Skinner

the weekly Standard

'The GOP of Old'

"The GOP of old has grown stale and moss-covered," Kentucky senator Rand Paul said Thursday to the Conservative Political Action Conference. "I don't think we need to name any names here, do we?" he added coyly.

The names he had in mind were of course those of John McCain and Lindsey Graham. Those spokesmen for "the GOP of old" had the bad form to call out Rand Paul after he took to the Senate floor to speculate glibly about American presidents and American military and intelligence officers calling in unprovoked domestic drone strikes against innocent Americans. McCain and Graham, advocates of what Paul calls an "aggressive" foreign policy—i.e., the foreign policy of the Republican party for the last 70 years—also challenged Paul's general foreign policy prescription.



What does Dr. Paul prescribe? In an interview last week, Paul appealed to the wisdom of Vice President Joe Biden. In the 2012 vice presidential debate, Paul said, Biden had a good response to Paul Ryan on Afghanistan: "We're coming home." And, Paul continued, "I think that's what people want. I think that's what people are ready for, that we're coming home." And why does Paul think the American people are now ready for this McGovernite message? "War weariness."

Are the American people war weary? Yes, to some degree. Could there be a worse prescription for American foreign policy than giving in to popular war weariness? No.

It was (well-deserved) war weariness after World War II that led to a precipitous drawdown in Europe that in turn helped make possible Stalin's subjugation of Eastern Europe. It was understandable war weariness after Vietnam that produced the shameful abandonment of Vietnam and Cambodia and the subsequent disastrous weakness of the Carter administration. It was (somewhat inexplicable) war weariness after the Cold War that led to a conviction in the 1990s, as Haley Barbour put it just last week, trying to accommodate the Paulistas, that "We're not the policeman of the world."

And thus we had the failure to finish the job in Iraq in 1991, the retreat under fire from Somalia in late 1993, inaction in Rwanda in 1994, years of dithering before confronting Milosevic in the Balkans, passivity in the face of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, and weak responses to al Qaeda's attacks on U.S. embassies in 1998 and the USS *Cole* in 2000. That decade of not policing the world ended with 9/11.

Now we're weary again. And there are many politicians all too willing to seek power and popularity by encouraging weariness rather than point out its perils. Foremost among those politicians is our current president. It's hard to blame the American people for some degree of war weariness when their president downplays threats and is eager to shirk international responsibilities. The rot of war weariness begins at the top. One can't, for example, be surprised at the ebbing support of the American public for the war in Afghanistan years after the president stopped trying to mobilize their support, stopped heralding the successes of the troops he'd sent there, and stopped explaining the importance of their mission.

That task of Republicans is to confront Obama on his irresponsibility, not compete with him. The task of a serious opposition party is to rally the nation to its responsibilities and long-term interests. The task of GOP political leaders is to educate the public about the dangers of the world and to inspire people to rise above their weariness. The

NEWSCOM

task of American conservatives is not to let an understandable Obama-weariness turn into weariness in fighting the nation's enemies or in supporting our troops in the field.

It fell to a freshman congressman, speaking at CPAC on the same day as Rand Paul, to tell some hard truths. "I know there is war weariness among the American people, just like there is war weariness among conservatives, and in this audience, no doubt," said Tom Cotton from Yell County, Arkansas. "It's no surprise, though, that the American people are war weary when their commander in chief is the weariest of them all."

But, Cotton reminded his audience, "We're fighting . . . a war against radical Islam and jihad." He continued, "Our president often says 10 years of war are ending. Wars are not movies. They do not end. They are won or they are lost. The quickest way to end a war is to lose it." And Cotton pointed out the obvious: "We have the manpower to win the war. We have the matériel to win the war. The question is, do we have the most essential element to combat power? Do we have the will to win the war? Our enemies certainly have that will. They question now whether we do."

Cotton is 35 years old. He's not stale or moss-covered. A combat veteran, he understands real war weariness. But he also understands it needs to be resisted and overcome. Above all, he understands, as did the GOP of old, the GOP of Nixon, Reagan, and Bush, that while we may not be interested in war, our enemies remain interested in us.

And so, Cotton concluded his remarks, "We as conservatives must have the will to win."

—William Kristol

Plan B for Obamacare

'With Obamacare entrenched, Democrats feel free to gripe," read the headline in *Politico*. And gripe is the word. Senator Maria Cantwell of Washington gripes that the administration won't subsidize Americans "just above the poverty level." Senator Bill Nelson of Florida gripes that the administration "negotiated away" funding for insurance co-ops. Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland gripes that Obamacare doesn't address the national crisis in pediatric dentistry.

Some Democrats are doing more than gripe, though. They are trying to change the law. *Politico* says that senators Amy Klobuchar and Al Franken of Minnesota, Bob Casey of Pennsylvania, and Joe Donnelly of Indiana have joined forces with Republicans to sponsor the repeal of Obamacare's medical device tax. In the House, 24 Democrats have cosponsored a similar bill. And 10 House Democrats have joined another Republican bill that would repeal Obamacare's Independent Payment Advisory Board.

This comes after 76 Democratic representatives and 41 Democratic senators voted in 2011 to repeal Obamacare's onerous 1099 reporting requirements (a repeal President Obama signed into law). And after 172 Democratic representatives and all but three Democratic senators, as part of January's deal to avert the fiscal cliff, voted to repeal Obamacare's long-term insurance program, the so-called CLASS Act. Invented by Ted Kennedy, the CLASS Act was an unworkable and costly Ponzi scheme. Which, come to think of it, is a pretty fair description of Obamacare. Just don't expect the law as a whole to suffer the same fate—at least as long as Obama is president.

Obama and Pelosi: We've found out what's in Obamacare, alas.

NEWSCOM

Still, Democrats are becoming disillusioned at the law's failure to achieve its ideal of quality health care for every American that doesn't add to the deficit, reduces medical spending, and promises employees the right to stay on the company plan. And so they're trying to clean up the mess they've made.

For decades, critics of the American health care system have identified two major flaws in its design. First, there is the problem of universality. Not everyone has health insurance. This creates a "free rider" issue: Americans without health insurance end up in emergency rooms, and the rest of us pick up the tab. It also offends our sense of equity and compassion.

Second, there is the problem of affordability. The amount of money America spends on health insurance far exceeds the amount spent by other postindustrial nations. Americans pay through their noses for health care. One 2009 study, by President Obama's Council of

Economic Advisers, suggested that increases in employer health premiums have crowded out wage growth, leaving us poorer. Meanwhile, government spending on Medicare and Medicaid is behind our exploding long-term debt.

The Affordable Care Act was sold as a way to solve both problems. What it really does, though, is extend, sloppily and expensively, a right to health insurance to all. It's a law that deals with the universality problem, not the spending problem. The cost-cutting measures it does contain are mainly experiments that will take years to evaluate. Yes, the rate of growth in health care costs has remained stable for the last three years. But that is more likely the result of the recession, and of experiments in private networks, which began before Obamacare. Most of Obamacare has yet to take effect. The problem of rising health costs remains.

And liberals are noticing. In January, David Goldhill, a Democratic business executive, published a book-length treatment of American health care that concludes, "Nothing in the [Affordable Care Act] changes the fundamental incentives that have so warped our health care system." In late February, CNN pundit and Democratic strategist Donna Brazile tweeted: "Just got off the phone with my health care provider asking them to explain why my premium jumped up. No good answer!" Later that month, journalist Steven Brill published an article in *Time* magazine investigating the high price of health care and criticizing the Affordable Care Act.

Expect the grumbling to become more pronounced as the administration struggles to implement Obamacare. The 2014 deadline for the individual mandate and state- and federal-based health insurance exchanges is looming, and there is no guarantee the government will meet it. We may be better off if it doesn't. What might happen, for instance, if universal coverage is not achieved despite the mandate? What might happen if employers slough employees off to the exchanges? If costs rise as demand increases? Imagine what Donna Brazile will be tweeting then.

Unless conservatives and Republicans offer their own solutions to the twin problems of universality and affordability—solutions that begin a long process of introducing real price discovery and consumer choice into health care—liberals and Democrats will use Obamacare's flaws as the basis for additional government intervention. They will double down on the flawed insurance model. Their inability to realize unrealizable ideals through politics will provoke . . . well, more politics. Liberal griping will give way to liberal law-making. You've been warned.

—Matthew Continetti

Stand with the Falklands

The American position on the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic should be obvious.

The Falklands, discovered by Britons in the late 17th century and named for the First Lord of the Admiralty of the day, have been under British sovereignty since 1765. Settlers, descendants of whom still live and work on the islands, began arriving in the 1830s, and there has been a resident British administration ever since. The Falkland Islands are not a colony of the United Kingdom but an "overseas territory," roughly comparable to the status of Guam or the Virgin Islands as U.S. territories.

The Falklands: 99.8 percent say this is a herd of sheep, not un rebaño de ovejas.

In the meantime, Great Britain may be accurately described as America's closest ally, certainly in the past century. We two are the world's oldest free-market democracies, bound by ties of language, culture, blood, and common law, and have stood side by side in two world wars, in Korea, in the Cold War, and in the war against terror. The second-largest military contingent in Afghanistan, after our own, is British.

Last week, on their own initiative, residents of the Falkland Islands conducted a free, open referendum and voted overwhelmingly (99.8 percent) to retain their status as a British overseas territory. In the meantime, the United States remains the world's foremost advocate for democracy, taking up rhetorical and military arms in support of the right of people—in Asia, in the Middle East, in the old Soviet empire, in Africa and Latin America—to "self-determination," to choose freely for themselves how they wish to be governed.

All of which suggests that the American position on the Falklands should be obvious. Except that it isn't. When asked last week if the State Department had any comment on the referendum, or took into account the stated wishes of the people who live on the Falkland Islands, spokesman Victoria Nuland repeated the department's position that there are "competing claims" to the Falklands, about which the United States of America has no opinion.

This refers, of course, to the fact that Argentina lays claim to the Falkland Islands as well—although as a legal and historical matter, the Argentine claim is essentially nonexistent. It is true that the Falklands are 315 miles off the Argentine coast—that is to say, more than three times the distance of Cuba from the United States—but that puts the Falklands well within the realm of international waters, and gives Argentina no more "right" to the islands than, say, nearby Chile or Uruguay.

The Argentine claim to the Falklands is largely an invention of the Perón dictatorship, which, in its dying phases in the mid-1950s, was always searching for nationalist causes to promote. The pattern has reliably repeated itself in subsequent years. When the military junta that ruled Argentina during its "dirty war" in the 1970s was close to collapse, the generals not only seized on the Falklands as a self-preserving device but invaded the islands in 1982, subjecting the residents to terror and privation until a British expeditionary force reclaimed the Falklands two months later. The current Argentine president, Cristina Kirchner, is beset by corruption and political scandals, as well as a collapsing economy, and has used the Falklands to rally her fellow Perónists.

Which raises an interesting question: What is the United States trying to accomplish? By pointedly ignoring the wishes of the Falkland Islanders, the Obama administration and the State Department insult our British allies, serve the interests of a historically unstable Latin American regime, and violate our principles.

A member of the Falklands Legislative Assembly, visiting Washington last week, said after the referendum that "it is time that other nations around the world who respect human rights and democracy, and who are not afraid to stand up for justice and freedom, lend us their support." Indeed, it is past time.

—Philip Terzian

NEWSCOM

New World Pope

An Argentinian Jesuit in the Vatican.

BY JOSEPH BOTTUM

Jorge Mario Bergoglio at his first Mass as Pope Francis in the Sistine Chapel

NEWSCOM

There was much talk during the recent conclave in Rome, as there usually is at such times, about the Catholic church as a medieval institution. Occasionally that took the mild form of newspaper Sunday-supplement pieces brightly describing the voting process in the Sistine Chapel. More often it combined a sneer at the past with an attack on the present.

In the face of a wild, almost hysterical national rejoicing—Argentinians flooding the churches to weep in joy, parading through the streets to cheer in a way not seen since Poland went mad in the wake of John Paul II's election 35 years ago—Argentina's president Cristina Kirchner could not avoid issuing a statement of congratulations when her old enemy Jorge Bergoglio, cardinal of Buenos Aires, was elected Pope Francis by the Roman conclave on March 13. But her earlier denunciation of the man as the residue of "medieval times and the Inquisition" reflects her better-documented view. The Middle Ages are the Dark Ages, and the Enlightenment has left those terrible, benighted times behind, except for the strange anomaly of the Catholic church, and, well, *Ecclesia delenda est*. "Men will never be free," as Diderot put the famous Enlightenment adage, "until the last king is strangled with the entrails of the last priest."

The funny thing is that, in its forms and ceremonies, the Vatican is far more Renaissance than medieval. In its placement in the world, the church is more reflective of the era of the Counter-Reformation than any medieval arrangement. In its supra-national organization, the faith is probably most influenced by the post-Napoleonic settlement in Europe.

To visit Rome, in truth, is to be overwhelmed by the kaleidoscope of history: flashes of the past presenting themselves anew and demanding attention, slices of time come alive again to influence the world. Yes, the medieval is there, but so is the Renaissance. And so is the Prisoner in the Vatican in the days of Italian unification. And so is the Second World War. And so is the looming presence of John Paul II. And underneath it all is something far older: a belief in the moment when the Roman Empire put to death Jesus Christ, and he rose from the dead.

The Catholic church is not one of the last surviving medieval institutions in the world. Even in the Middle Ages, it was old, for the church is the world's only surviving *ancient* institution—born in a world shaped by Alexander's conquests, deriving from a time of Roman rule. And we will never understand it, never grasp its fundamentally countercultural nature, unless we recognize that fact. In every age, somewhere in the church, there flashes into the present moment a religious claim—a divine revelation, say its believers—from the ancient world.

And that, perhaps, is the best way to understand the strange and interesting character of Jorge Bergoglio, the Argentinian just elected pope. He is an advocate of the poor who has consistently opposed the Argentinian government's ostensible programs for the poor. A social activist who rejects most social reform. A churchman who refused many of the elaborate trappings of his office while promoting the power of the church. A populist who denies almost every request for an interview. A leftist who denounces the state power and cultural changes demanded by the left. A reactionary who despises the accumulation of wealth and the libertarian freedoms praised by the right. No attempt to

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impose liberal and conservative definitions on him will succeed. Pope Francis simply won't fit in those categories, mostly because the ancient religious insights of Christianity—taken, as he takes them, in their undiluted form—cannot find an easy place in the modern world.

All of which makes him quite possibly a saint, in the mode of his namesake, Francis of Assisi. The question, of course, is whether the church can survive a saint like that. Francis of Assisi would have made a horrendous pope; he proved an awful manager of even his own order, as far as that goes, his administrative legacy a drag on the Franciscans until Saint Bonaventure finally regularized them. From Saint Crispin the shoemaker to Saint Louis the king, the Catholic understanding has always been that nearly any human profession can be turned to God's service. That has never meant, however, that one form of sanctity is appropriate for every sort of job, and the kind of saintliness for which most commentators are praising Pope Francis is not, on its face, the kind the church may need in a pope.



A vendor's figurine

But, then, the first comments from New York's Cardinal Dolan and others suggest he may have been chosen pope precisely for his personal sanctity. There are certainly odd elements in his election. Why would the conclave choose a 76-year-old man to replace a pope retiring on the grounds of age? Why would they select someone whose hidden life has left him so little known to the world, despite his managing of a large South American diocese? Initial news reports made much of the fact that Bergoglio was, by all accounts, the second-leading candidate in the conclave that elected Cardinal Ratzinger as Pope Benedict XVI in 2005—but, as papal biographer George Weigel has repeatedly explained, Bergoglio's candidacy was not a serious one at the time. He was an apparent conservative briefly backed by liberal cardinals in an effort to split the vote coalescing behind Ratzinger.

Then, too, he is a Jesuit, the first Jesuit pope, in fact—a member of a society that frowns on high church offices for its priests. Of course, he is also something of an outlier in the Society of Jesus, not just in his having been a metropolitan archbishop but also in his theology. In the days of Bergoglio's young priesthood, South America's Jesuits were almost entirely persuaded by Communist-tinged liberation theology, and Bergoglio remains far more in the world of traditional and socially conservative ethics.

Finally, Bergoglio is from the Third World, the first non-European pope in 1,200 years. And yet, with his Italian heritage and study in Frankfurt, to say nothing of his role in the Synod of Bishops, he is something of a *safe* Third World choice. South America holds the largest collection of Catholics in the world, but the church is weaker there than it appears, and Pope Francis will help shore up South American Catholicism. Still, the church's most dynamic presence at the moment is in Africa, while its largest growth is taking place in Asia, and a pope chosen from those continents might have had a greater immediate impact.

It would be wrong to say that Francis was elected to serve as an interim pope. He's too active for that, too holy, too smart, and too involved. But he's also much older than most observers predicted the new pope would be, and he represents, in a way, the limits of what the cardinals were willing to accept.

Think of it this way: The ghost of John Paul II still haunts the church, and the good and the bad elements of his papacy still influence the cardinals' decisions. They wanted someone who has John Paul's kind of symbolic value, who shines above the age. They also wanted someone to dig in as an administrator and address the massive problems in the curia that John Paul swept into the wings in the grand drama that was his papacy.

That combination may not be possible for anyone. Certainly it was not the strength of the intellectual Benedict XVI, whose great legacy lies in his writing. Will it be the strength of Pope Francis? By choosing a non-European, by reaching out to the world and refusing to elevate someone from the Vatican bureaucracy—by being moved by personal sanctity, for that matter—the conclave went as far as it could in the line of John Paul II.

But by seeking out a quiet bishop, known to them for his skillful and courageous handling of accusations against priests and his willingness both to work with and work against national governments, the conclave also went as far as it could in the line of Pius XII's sheer Vatican competence. And in selecting a 76-year-old, they also hedged their bets, understanding that the new papacy will not last as long as John Paul II's reign of 26 years. Bergoglio may not have been chosen as an interim pope, but it would not be wrong to describe his election as having been for a compromise pope—and such compromises rarely work out well.

Still, having been elected as a compromise does not mean Francis will reign as one. He has that core of the thing—not medieval, not modern, but ancient—and it will not be confined to any age's apparent limits. This may well be a papacy full of surprises, particularly in the evangelizing Francis undertakes and the changes he makes in the curia.

But, then, little could be as surprising as the sudden appearance of this holy man on the world stage. Asked for a toast at dinner after his election, he is reported to have raised his glass to the cardinals and said, "I hope God forgives you all." If he has the strength to go with his humility, Pope Francis could well prove to be what the church needs as it moves through the coming years. ♦

ABOVE AND OPPOSITE: NEWSCOM

Booze Blues

The politics of liquor stores in Pennsylvania.

BY FRED BARNES

Gettysburg

The legacy of Gifford Pinchot rests heavily on the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Pinchot is known nationally as a great conservationist. In Pennsylvania, however, he's remembered as a great Prohibitionist. Pinchot was governor when Prohibition ended in 1933 and he regretted its demise. He vowed to "discourage the purchase of alcoholic beverages by making it as inconvenient and expensive as possible." His success is felt to this day.

Tom Corbett

To buy beer in Pennsylvania, you can go to a licensed beer store and purchase a case, but only a case. At bars and restaurants, you can buy a six-pack or a single beer—that's all. As for wine and what's referred to as "spirits," there are special state-run stores where those can be purchased, but nowhere else. The wholesale distribution of beer, wine, and liquor is tightly controlled by the state too.

After 80 years, Governor Tom Corbett wants to throw out Pinchot's handiwork, privatize the antiquated system, and emasculate the powerful Liquor Control Board. "We're trying to get into the 20th century," he says. "Selling liquor isn't a core function of government." But getting rid of it is another thing entirely.

The 63-year-old Corbett is following bravely in the footsteps of his Republican predecessors, Richard Thornburgh and Tom Ridge. Both governors failed at privatization. "Hopefully, the third time's a charm," he says. That's hardly a confident battle cry.

The argument over privatization is all on his side. The public favors it. Sixty-one percent said so in a January poll commissioned by the Commonwealth Foundation, a Pennsylvania think tank. By selling liquor licenses, the state would raise $1 billion, money Corbett would earmark for education. And up to $80 million would be gained in revenue that's now lost when "people vote with their cars" and leave the state to buy liquor, he insists.

Better still, Corbett makes a practical case for privatization. When he appeared with local officials in Gettysburg recently, a large banner touting "Consumer Choice" and "Consumer Convenience" dominated the background. The TV cameras couldn't miss it. His watchwords are "choice" and "convenience."

Winning the booze battle is a high priority for Corbett. Yet that would be dwarfed by what he's already achieved and few governors can match. Rather than merely slow the growth in spending, he's reduced spending, period. Under Corbett, the budget fell from $28.3 billion in 2011 to $27.1 billion in 2012, then increased slightly to $27.6 billion this year. His proposed budget for 2014 is $28.4 billion, or roughly at the 2011 level.

Corbett also wiped out a $4.2 billion shortfall left by Ed Rendell, his Democratic predecessor. "If Rendell was the free-spending parent who let his teenage daughter stay out all night, Corbett is the penny-pinching dad who makes his kids eat their vegetables and insists they get home by 11," according to Robert J. Vickers, the political writer for the *Harrisburg Patriot-News*.

Accolades for Corbett have been minimal. He was one of just four governors to get an "A" last year in the Cato Institute's "report card" on fiscal policy. That's about it. In Pennsylvania, "the story hasn't been told," says Mike Turzai, the Republican majority leader in the Pennsylvania House. For this, Corbett has himself and his staff to blame.

His poll numbers have tanked. His job approval sank to 33 percent in a Public Policy Polling survey in early March. For reelection, he trailed every potential Democratic opponent. He ran even in matchups with Democrats in a Quinnipiac survey, but his approval was stuck at 39 percent.

A victory or two in getting his agenda—liquor privatization, pension reform, transportation—ratified by the legislature would help. At least his advisers think so. For now he's concentrating on liquor privatization.

There's an ideological reason why Corbett wants Pennsylvania out of the liquor business. He's a serious conservative. He favors limited government and free markets. As state attorney general in 2010, he agreed to join the lawsuit against Obamacare on the day the health care law was approved by Congress. His reasoning was simple. "Congress can tell you what you can't buy. Congress can't tell you what you have to buy."

The lawsuit failed in the Supreme Court, but his opposition to Obamacare hasn't slackened. He declined to establish a state exchange for obtaining health insurance and has so far refused to take federal money to expand Medicaid. "The door [on expansion] is closed," he told me. "It's not locked."

He's fought Obamacare on his own. He doesn't need the legislature. It's controlled by Republicans—27-23 in the Senate, 109-93 in the House—but is neither reliably conservative nor chummy with Corbett. He was elected governor on the strength of his prosecution, as AG, of legislative corruption. It led to more than two dozen convictions or guilty pleas

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(more Democrats than Republicans).

His ties to the legislature suffered. And his political skills need improvement. "He hasn't shown a capacity to wheel and deal," says Vickers. To get liquor privatization, he may have to.

The Liquor Control Board has nearly 6,000 unionized employees, and unions are a powerful force in Pennsylvania with considerable experience in combat with Republican governors. Corbett can't count on united GOP support. "All the Democrats are owned [by the unions], and they rent enough conservatives," says Matthew Brouillette, president of the Commonwealth Foundation. Corbett was already blocked when he clumsily sought to privatize the state lottery (170 employees).

He also has a lingering Penn State problem. In the PPP poll, 58 percent disapproved of "how Tom Corbett has handled the Penn State situation over the last few years." Twenty-five percent approved. He was on the university's board of trustees when football coach Joe Paterno was fired—an unpopular move. And his Democratic successor as attorney general, Kathleen Kane, is probing whether, as AG, he slowed the investigation of child molester Jerry Sandusky, Paterno's assistant, to keep the case from hurting his campaign for governor. There's no evidence he did.

In a press release promoting its poll, PPP labeled Corbett "a massive underdog for a second term." In truth, he has an even chance of reelection. His possible Democratic opponents are mostly unknown statewide. Congresswoman Allyson Schwartz, who's all but certain to run, is an ardent liberal. Outside the Philadelphia area, "I don't know what her selling point is," says Ray Zaborney, a Republican consultant and ally of Corbett.

The Corbett reelection campaign, much like Rendell's, is expected to begin this spring, a year and a half before the election. Money won't be a problem. At the end of 2012, Corbett had $3.5 million in the bank, easily enough for him to begin telling his story on TV. "Tom has been able to do what Washington hasn't been able to do," Zaborney says—that is, cut spending. "He's very committed to a balanced budget and not raising taxes."

At 35 percent, his deserves-to-be-reelected number is low. But Rendell's was 38 percent in April 2006 and he won handily in November. The electorate in the 2014 midterm is certain to be more Republican and conservative than in 2012. And history is on Corbett's side. Since Milton Shapp in 1974, every governor who has sought reelection has won a second term.

Though President Obama won there 52-47 percent last year, Pennsylvania is not a blue state. The congressional delegation is 13-5 Republican. Corbett isn't the only conservative to have won statewide. Rick Santorum won two Senate races. Pat Toomey won a Senate seat in 2010.

Corbett doesn't hide his conservatism. Brouillette of the Commonwealth Foundation says Corbett "is probably the most conservative governor Pennsylvania has ever had." I asked the governor if indeed he is. "Probably," he said. ♦

Cash for Doctors

Revisited.

BY TONY MECIA

With Obamacare poised to kick in to high gear next year, Dr. Brian Forrest routinely hears skeptics ask if the new laws and regulations will stifle his innovative primary care practice outside Raleigh, N.C.

THE WEEKLY STANDARD has been checking in with Forrest since our May 24, 2010, cover story, "Cash for Doctors," detailed how physicians were developing novel approaches to avoid the coming avalanche of new regulations and insurance mandates. Forrest's practice, Access Healthcare, charges patients $39 a month, plus $20 per office visit, and offers a menu of additional low-cost services and tests. He doesn't accept insurance, because he says it's too much of a hassle and drives up his costs.

At the time, Forrest's approach seemed to be paying off, but there were still plenty of questions about how the Affordable Care Act would affect his practice and those of other doctors seeking to steer clear of insurance bureaucracies and government decrees.

Now, though, Forrest and other doctors with similar business models say Obamacare is looking like a boon to their businesses, as people begin to realize what's coming.

"I wasn't in favor of the Affordable Care Act, but the effect is actually going to be very beneficial for our model," he says. "People want to escape the train before it derails. There are a lot of doctors who don't want to be trapped in the traditional system when it takes effect, and there are a lot of patients who don't want to be trapped there, either."

He says people ask him all the time whether Obamacare's requirement that everyone have health insurance will siphon away patients. On the contrary, he replies. Roughly half of his patients have insurance, but they find it cheaper or easier to go to him than to deal with insurance deductibles and co-payments. As for his uninsured patients, he's not sure they're going anywhere, either.

A notice in the Raleigh office of Dr. Brian Forrest

"Anybody who thinks there will not be uninsured patients just because a law says there can't be uninsured patients is not being realistic," he says. The Congressional Budget Office last year estimated that 30 million Americans will lack insurance in 2016, even after the mandate takes effect.

In the three years since we first talked with Forrest, he has been busy. In addition to seeing patients, he has consulted with doctors who want to set up similar practices. He's reached agreements with specialists and an online drugstore to offer price breaks to his patients. He's spoken at conferences and is helping compile a directory of practices with similar business models, known as "direct primary care" or "direct payment." (The latest list is available through his website, www.accesshealthcaredirect.com.) He has given interviews to *Forbes* and National Public Radio and trade publications. And he has started to work with companies and insurers who are looking for cost-effective ways to deliver care amid all the upheaval in the industry.

Direct pay practices account for only a small fraction of all doctors' offices, and they seem to be most common in primary care. Forrest says the model also works for outpatient specialists, such as rheumatologists and neurologists. (He dreams of opening a flat-rate hospital that charges $500 a day—including surgery, room, and board—but acknowledges that's at least a decade away.)

But the direct-payment model is gaining traction. A report last year by the consulting firm Accenture predicted that as many as one in three independent primary-care practices will eventually adopt subscription-based care models, "and this trend will increase 100 percent annually for three years." The report did not estimate the number of such practices, but included examples from all over the country: from Leesburg, Va., to Portland, Ore., to San Francisco. It said doctors have been experimenting with different approaches and pricing structures, from bare-bones practices charging $60 a year to "concierge" plans that, according to Forrest, offer round-the-clock "presidential medical care in your residence, jet or yacht." Those plans can cost a princely $30,000 annually.

Dr. Erika Bliss, who helped start Qliance Medical Group in the Seattle area in 2007, says patients are more open to exploring alternatives than ever before. "The idea was slow to

TOM WOLFF

Tony Mecia is a freelance business writer in Charlotte, N.C.

catch on, but with the recession and health care reform, there is a general public understanding about making changes," says Bliss, the company's chief executive. "People are a lot more open to innovative models of care delivery than they were a few years ago."

Qliance runs four offices in the Seattle area and charges a flat fee between $54 and $94 per month, depending on the patient's age, in exchange for unlimited doctor visits.

One of the fastest-growing parts of Qliance's business, Bliss says, is contracting with corporations that pay Qliance to allow their employees to visit Qliance doctors at no charge. While the companies still offer traditional insurance, they find that encouraging their workers to visit Qliance helps keep their overall costs down and their workforce healthy, Bliss says.

The companies come from a variety of industries, including retail, manufacturing, trucking, and technology. Labor unions have even signed up their members. Some of the best-known corporations that have partnered with Qliance are Expedia, Inc., the online travel company, and Brown & Haley, makers of Almond Roca candy. In January, Qliance opened a clinic inside Expedia's headquarters.

As it grows, Qliance is mulling whether to offer its services, in conjunction with a traditional insurance carrier, on Obamacare's health insurance exchanges, which will start enrolling patients this fall. Bliss would also like to see tax rules clarified to make patient fees eligible for reimbursement under health savings accounts (HSAs).

Bliss, Forrest, and others are starting to combine their efforts, with a goal of flexing a little more lobbying muscle and sharing information, just as any other trade association would. Even with Obamacare, they say, their business model seems poised for explosive growth.

Says Bliss: "Sometimes we as a society have to recognize that we need to transform the system from the bottom up." ♦

The Unions vs. Obamacare

Disenchantment sets in.

BY MARK HEMINGWAY

'I heard [Obama] say, 'If you like your health plan, you can keep it,'" John Wilhelm, chairman of Unite Here Health, representing 260,000 union workers, recently told the *Wall Street Journal*. "If I'm wrong, and the president does not intend to keep his word, I would have severe second thoughts about the law." Besides Wilhelm, some of the nation's largest union bosses have taken to publicly criticizing the Affordable Care Act.

Of course, keeping your health care plan, like many Obamacare promises, has turned out to be demonstrably untrue. According to the Congressional Budget Office, about 7 million Americans stand to lose insurance coverage through the law by 2022. But unlike most private-sector workers expected to lose their current health coverage, union workers were a powerful Democratic constituency granted specific exemptions from Obamacare. Labor leaders are just now realizing that those protections are fleeting, and Obamacare regulations and cost increases will fall on the politically connected and unconnected alike.

The Obama administration has thus far issued waivers from Obamacare's onerous requirements to unions representing 543,812 workers. By contrast, the administration has issued waivers for only 69,813 nonunion workers. While these waivers are a significant benefit, they accrue to a small fraction of the nation's 14 million union workers. Further, many of the waivers have been granted on an annual basis, and no waiver has been granted for longer than two-and-a-half years. Eventually even union health plans are going to have to comply with Obamacare regulations.

Unions also secured a five-year delay in the imposition of the law's 40 percent excise tax on high-premium health care plans, known as the "Cadillac tax." The tax would hit insurance plans in which annual premiums exceed $10,200 for individuals or $27,500 for family coverage. This hefty tax is designed to both drive down premiums and help fund the law. However, the fact that unions often secure more generous and expensive benefit packages than those found in the nonunion workforce is one of organized labor's biggest selling points. Unions weren't going to go along with this tax without a fight, and they eventually cut a deal with Democrats shortly before the passage of Obamacare.

Initially, unions were supposed to be exempt from the Cadillac tax until 2018, while expensive plans for nonunion workers would be taxed starting this year. Exempting just unions from the tax would cost an extra $60 billion during Obamacare's first few years of implementation. But rather than appear to do an expensive favor for just one key special interest, Democrats delayed the tax for everyone until 2018.

The problem for unions is that 2018 isn't that far off. Five years may seem like a lot of time to lobby for another exemption, but union members have to agree to employment contracts years in advance. The Cadillac tax has already become a collective bargaining sticking point. This is especially true for public-sector employees, who typically have much pricier health care plans than nonunion workers. Public-sector unions may be the last sector of the workforce where it is

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common for employees to not have to contribute anything towards their health care, and the Cadillac tax will make it much more difficult for taxpayers to continue footing the bill.

This is poised to wreak havoc at the state level. In Pennsylvania, teachers in 168 of the state's 500 school districts are working without contracts, and by the fall a majority of districts could be without contracts. Most of the negotiations in the state reportedly hinge on reining in health care benefits, rather than salaries. "District negotiators fear if unions do not make concessions now, an excise tax called for in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, signed into law by President Barack Obama in 2010, could cost districts thousands starting in 2018," reported the Scranton *Times-Tribune* earlier this month.

The other problem is Obamacare's sticker shock. In the runup to the law's passage, the White House was dismissive toward anyone who claimed the law's morass of new rules would raise insurance premiums. Now no one really denies this is happening. Even though the Cadillac tax's $10,200 and $27,500 premium thresholds were seen as defining exorbitant insurance plans, plans that don't offer lavish benefits are becoming expensive enough to be subject to the tax.

In Massachusetts, which has the highest average health care costs of any state thanks to the Bay State's own misguided experiment expanding health care coverage, over half the state's employees will be subject to the tax, according to a report by the Pioneer Institute. The report goes on to highlight that the tax is particularly punishing for middle-income public employees in Massachusetts. From 2018 to 2028, a police officer on a typical family plan will be subject to an extra $53,907 in new taxes. A teacher on an individual plan will owe an extra $20,807. Even granting that the problem is acute in Massachusetts, it's safe to assume the Cadillac tax is going to cause turmoil across the country between public employees who have become accustomed to gold-plated health packages and taxpayers who are increasingly unable to pay for them.

Obamacare presents some additional challenges for those union members who aren't public employees.

Is this where the unions will end up?

EPA / MICHAEL REYNOLDS

Many employers of low-wage workers have expressed concern that they may have to drop existing health coverage, as Obamacare has outlawed the salient features of many cheaper insurance options. Offending plans had benefit caps and other drawbacks but were often the only affordable option for low-wage workers.

Owners of chain restaurants were particularly vocal about this problem, and in some cases subject to public opprobrium from Obama supporters for expressing concern that they might have to cut jobs or drop insurance as a result of the law. Now unions are expressing the same fears for the same reasons. Yet again, unions want a special dispensation for their own low-wage workers. The AFL-CIO, Teamsters, Unite Here Health, and other powerful unions are lobbying to let low-wage union workers remain on their existing insurance plans, while also collecting an Obamacare subsidy that is supposed to go only to low-wage workers without employer coverage.

The Obama administration hasn't ruled the idea out. "These matters are the subject of pending regulations," a Treasury spokesman told the *Wall Street Journal*. Aside from the question of cost, it would seem difficult for the administration to justify allowing only union workers to collect a subsidy on top of an existing insurance plan. If union workers lost their employer insurance coverage, they could take comfort in the fact Obamacare has a surprisingly expansive definition of who's poor enough to qualify for government assistance to pay for health care. A family of four making up to $92,200 a year would qualify for a subsidy, and the subsidies are proportionally larger for those with lower incomes.

Beyond the specifics, what union leaders are really saying is that they have no confidence Obamacare will live up to its central promise—that the government can provide millions of uninsured Americans with health care coverage that both is affordable and meets their needs.

Surely organized labor must realize that Obamacare has only begun to be implemented. If the Democrats' most ardent constituency and most prolific fundraisers are already having second thoughts about Obamacare—fearful that besides being expensive and unworkable, the law will make unions less attractive to workers and undermine collective bargaining—the law may be less secure than its apologists assume. ♦

Round Two

Another constitutional challenge to Obamacare.

BY TERRY EASTLAND

At issue in the Supreme Court's most important case last year was the constitutionality of the "individual mandate" in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, aka Obamacare. The mandate, which takes effect in 2014, requires most Americans without health insurance to buy a policy providing a minimum level of coverage as defined by the government or else make to the Internal Revenue Service a "shared responsibility payment," which the law describes as a "penalty." For individuals lacking the minimum essential coverage, the penalty when fully phased in will be 2.5 percent of income per year. For families it will be $695 per uninsured family member per year or 2.5 percent of income, whichever is higher, up to a maximum of $2,085.

In *National Federation of Independent Business* v. *Sebelius*, in the pivotal opinion in the case, Chief Justice John Roberts said that the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to "regulate commerce" but not to compel it. Because the latter is what the mandate aims to do, he continued, it can't be supported as an exercise of the Commerce Clause. However, adopting a "saving construction" of the law, he read the mandate as imposing not a penalty but a tax on those without insurance. And because it was "just a tax hike," as he called it, the mandate was permissible, a legitimate exercise of Congress's enumerated power "to lay and collect Taxes."

Roberts summed up the law this way: "The Federal Government does not have the power to order people to buy health insurance. . . . [It] does have the power to impose a tax on those without health insurance."

Not surprisingly, given its continuing unpopularity, the individual mandate is being taken again to court. Matt Sissel, who runs an art studio and gallery in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, objects to the government's effort, as he puts it, to conscript him into a health care program. He would pay his own health care expenses out of pocket. Sissel was among the many parties that challenged, on the basis mainly of the Commerce Clause, the constitutionality of the mandate in the group of cases that resulted in *NFIB*. Since that case was handed down, Sissel has declined to end his objection to Obamacare and is now advancing another constitutional argument against it.

In *NFIB*, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that "any tax must . . . comply with the other requirements in the Constitution." Roberts found that the tax for not having health insurance complies with certain constitutional requirements. But he didn't address whether it satisfies Article I, Section 7, Clause 1, which provides: "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." The clause is known as the Origination Clause, and Sissel's new claim is that if the individual mandate is to be read as an exercise of the congressional power to lay taxes, then it is unconstitutional, since it is a "bill for raising revenue" that originated in the Senate and not, as it should have, in the House of Representatives.

The government says, to the contrary, that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) originated in the House and is not "a bill for raising revenue." And because it is not such a bill, its enactment, the government says, would have been consistent with the clause even if, for the sake of argument, it had originated in the Senate.

The Origination Clause is one of those parts of the Constitution that define the structure of the government and how it is to operate. And it originated, you could say, in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 with those Framers who wanted to ensure that the "power over the purse" lay with the legislative body closer to the people. Thus, as Case Western Reserve University law school professor Erik Jensen writes in the *Heritage Guide to the Constitution*, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts proposed a clause that would have required all money bills to originate in the House and given the Senate no power to amend. With proponents of national power opposing an origination clause in any form—James Wilson of Pennsylvania said that "if both branches were to say yes or no, it was of little consequence which should say yes or no first"—the clause that was finally agreed upon, Jensen says, was "closer to Wilson's vision than to Gerry's," requiring that only bills for raising revenue originate in the House, and giving the Senate the amendment power.

Over the years that power has been understood to be so broad, Jensen writes, as to permit the Senate to strike and "replace the entire text of a bill that technically originates in the House." That's what happened in the case of the ACA. H.R. 3590 modified a number of tax-credit, tax-penalty, and estimate-tax provisions of the Internal Revenue code. Sent to the Senate, the bill became something else, its entire text deleted and replaced with provisions that ultimately became the ACA.

Sissel isn't challenging the "strike-and-replace" procedure—also known as "gut-and-amend"—in a general sense, but rather, as his lawyers put it, "the constitutionality of a bill for raising revenue which originated in the

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Senate through the use of that device."

Here, then, is the key issue in Sissel's case: whether or not the mandate is a bill for raising revenue. That was also the critical question in the Court's most recent Origination Clause case, *United States* v. *Munoz-Flores*, decided in 1990. Under review was a special assessments statute that imposed mandatory monetary penalties on those convicted of federal misdemeanor crimes and which appeared to originate in the Senate. The Court recognized precedents dating back more than a century that distinguished between bills that establish federal programs and raise revenue to support them, and bills that raise revenue to fund ordinary government expenses and obligations. The Court located the special assessments statute in the first group. Thus, it was not a bill for raising revenue, and its origins in the Senate posed no constitutional problems.

The Supreme Court has decided eight Origination Clause cases, including *Munoz-Flores*. And it has never found an act of Congress in violation of the clause. Sissel would like his case to be the first in which the Court declares a law unconstitutional on account of its origination. Yet it's hard to see how Sissel's case makes its way up to the High Court. The federal appeals court in Washington, with Judge Laurence Silberman writing, already has said that the purpose of the mandate isn't to raise revenue but to bring about universal coverage. Still, if the appeals court were to review the case and find the ACA unconstitutional, that would create a circumstance in which the Supreme Court almost certainly would take the case.

Lawsuits often have an impact beyond the courtroom, and Sissel's case may serve to stimulate interest in the structural Constitution and one of its less well-known elements. The case also merits a cautionary note. In *Munoz-Flores*, Justice Antonin Scalia, concurring in the judgment, nonetheless worried about the "uncertainty" and "instability" that would result if every statute could be challenged in the federal courts as improperly enacted. We are not there, fortunately. Not yet.♦

Partners in Terror?

Iran, al Qaeda, and the secret bin Laden files.

BY THOMAS JOSCELYN

The arrest earlier this month of Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, Osama bin Laden's son-in-law and former spokesman, has sparked renewed interest in an old question: What is the extent of the relationship between the Iranian regime and al Qaeda?

Along with a cadre of other senior al Qaeda operatives, Abu Ghaith was sheltered inside Iran for almost the entire post-9/11 period. The U.S. government has never quite known what to make of this fact. The Iranians have repeatedly supported al Qaeda henchmen even while holding some others under house arrest. This seemingly contradictory policy has baffled counterterrorism officials, who are, in any event, not keen to connect too many of these dots because of the possible policy ramifications for the war on terror the administration would prefer to be over.

Since Abu Ghaith's arrival in New York City, where he is to be tried for conspiring to kill Americans, journalists have attempted to grapple with the Iran-al Qaeda nexus. Their published accounts are a mix of fact and speculation. But the press has missed an important storyline. The Obama administration has refused to release the best evidence for evaluating the relationship: Osama bin Laden's complete archive.

THE WEEKLY STANDARD previously reported that hundreds of thousands of documents and files were recovered during the raid that killed bin Laden in May 2011. The Obama administration has released just 17 of them. A year after the raid, West Point's Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) published this paltry set online.

The documents released were chosen by White House officials to push their preferred spin: Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda is on the verge of extinction. Many documents that contradict this politicized narrative remain behind a classified wall.

Al Qaeda operatives do discuss their relationship with Iran in some of the 17 documents the CTC received. But those records provide only a narrow window into complex, decades-long ties. The administration-approved set highlights tensions between bin Laden's terrorists and Iran's functionaries. But other documents, according to several U.S. officials with direct knowledge of bin Laden's files, show extensive collusion. The administration did not give those documents to the CTC and has not released them to the public.

The White House's selective release of bin Laden's documents has distorted the public discourse. Consider the effect it had on Joby Warrick's article in the *Washington Post* last week, "Iran, al-Qaeda relationship is showing cracks, U.S. officials and analysts say." Warrick did a far better job than most journalists in reporting on the Iran-al Qaeda axis. He offered a balanced view of the relationship, juxtaposing evidence that cut both ways. Unlike many reporters, Warrick did not shy away from evidence of ongoing collusion.

Warrick noted that the documents released to the CTC demonstrate al Qaeda's "wariness" in dealing with Iran. "The Iranians are not to be trusted," bin Laden wrote in one email. "It is possible that they may plant chips," he warned, to track al Qaeda's terrorists. Those documents also reveal that al Qaeda kidnapped an Iranian official, and then used this official as leverage with the regime. Some have cited these documents as evidence that the entire relationship is hostile.

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What Warrick and *Washington Post* readers don't know is that the CTC selection presents Iran-al Qaeda relations in the worst possible light. It is true that there have been, to use the CTC's description, "antagonistic" episodes between the two. It is true that bin Laden did not fully trust Iran. Then again, al Qaeda's CEO likely trusted few people wholeheartedly—he may have had his own mentor killed. None of this conflict stopped bin Laden from seeking or receiving the Iranians' assistance.

"We believe that Iran continues to allow al Qaeda to operate a network that moves al Qaeda money and fighters through Iran to support al Qaeda activities in South Asia," Warrick quoted David S. Cohen, the Treasury Department's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, as saying.

The Treasury and State Departments have led the way in shedding light on the Iran-al Qaeda partnership. Since President Obama was first sworn in, these departments have designated numerous al Qaeda terrorists who operate on Iranian soil. Several U.S. officials contacted by The Weekly Standard say that Osama bin Laden's documents, along with other evidence, played an important role in these designations, which highlight the Iranian regime's support of al Qaeda.

In July 2011, for instance, the Treasury Department reported that al Qaeda's Iran-based terrorists operate "under an agreement between al Qaeda and the Iranian government." This agreement was part of a formerly "secret deal."

In December 2011, the State Department announced a $10 million reward for the terrorist who leads al Qaeda's Iran-based network, Yasin al-Suri, making him one of the U.S. government's most-wanted men. A Treasury Department official noted at the time that the Iran-sanctioned network "serves as the core pipeline for al Qaeda to funnel operatives and facilitators from the Middle East to Afghanistan and Pakistan."

In February 2012, the Treasury Department found that Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) "has facilitated the movement of al Qaeda operatives in Iran and provided them with documents, identification cards, and passports." The MOIS has also "provided money and weapons to al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) . . . and negotiated prisoner releases of AQI operatives."

In October 2012, the Treasury Department designated additional al Qaeda operatives who work inside Iran. Treasury's Cohen explained that the designation "builds on our action from July 2011" and "further exposes al Qaeda's critically important Iran-based funding and facilitation network." Cohen added: "We will continue targeting this crucial source of al Qaeda's funding and support, as well as highlight Iran's ongoing complicity in this network's operation."

Some folks didn't get the memo.

President Obama's national security team did not release to the CTC the documents used as evidence in support of these designations. The files showing cooperation between Iran and al Qaeda would have undoubtedly undermined the narrative being pushed by John Brennan, then President Obama's senior counterterrorism adviser and now CIA director. Brennan, who announced the release of the documents by the CTC, has been eager to proclaim al Qaeda's demise. But if al Qaeda is working with the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism—and it is—that argument becomes much more difficult to make.

That some Treasury officials continued doggedly to pursue the Iran-al Qaeda relationship, even as other administration brass pushed a disingenuous narrative to the public through the CTC, is an honorable testament to their hard work.

According to Warrick's account, there is evidence that Abu Ghaith, the formerly fire-breathing al Qaeda spokesman, was finally expelled from Iran earlier this year. Some were quick to cite Abu Ghaith's putative expulsion as evidence that the relationship between the Iranian regime and al Qaeda is beginning to fray. But the two have always had significant points of disagreement.

Today, the fight in Syria complicates their partnership, as they support opposing sides. Al Qaeda's al-Nusra Front, the most deadly Syrian insurgency group, is battling Bashar al-Assad's Iran-backed forces. Ironically, as Cohen noted to Warrick, al Qaeda's Iran-based network is supporting the al-Nusra Front even as Iran's mullahs desperately seek to keep Assad in power. Such incongruity is not uncommon in the terrorist underworld.

The war in Syria may very well take Iran-al Qaeda relations in a new direction. But one of the enduring characteristics of this alliance is that it has survived despite especially contentious differences of opinion. Iran colluded with al Qaeda before 9/11, even though bin Laden's network was sheltered by the Taliban, then the Iranians' bitter foe. The Iranian regime also continued to allow al Qaeda to operate a network on its soil even as Al Qaeda in Iraq mercilessly targeted Iraqi Shiites.

The only way to judge the true extent of Iran's sponsorship of al Qaeda is to examine every bin Laden document, not just the ones some administration officials found useful. Perhaps Joby Warrick and the *Washington Post* will join us in calling for the release of all of bin Laden's files dealing with Iran. ♦

Supercuts

The Senate barbershop gets a trim.

BY RYAN LOVELACE

The barbershop of the U.S. Senate has run deficits of approximately $350,000 a year for each of the last 15 years. So Senate sergeant at arms Terry Gainer has decided to try out a new model, one that has looked rather unfashionable during the Obama era: privatization.

Gainer has tried to trim Senate Hair Care Services for the past few years. Now the political climate troubling everyone else on Capitol Hill is allowing him to move faster than he anticipated towards privatizing it completely.

"I've accelerated my goal to get there through leveraging sequestration," Gainer explains. "The only real way we're going to change this thing around without pricing ourselves out of the market is by reducing the number of fulltime employees."

The sequestration's required spending cuts provide convenient cover. Gainer is offering early retirement to all eligible employees, hoping to replace them with independent contractors. Four employees have already accepted the offer, and they plan to retire in the next 60 days. Gainer likens these "buyouts" to those that corporations often make. He has no timeline for complete privatization, but is determined to see it through.

If previous efforts to end taxpayer funding of the Senate barbershop are any guide, it will take much longer than one might expect. According to a report from the Office of the Sergeant at Arms, Senator Paul Douglas (D-Ill.) spoke out against the federally funded barbershop back in 1951, suggesting that taxpayers need not pick up the tab for their legislators' haircuts. Arizona senator Carl Hayden quickly rejected Douglas's efforts, gaining support by arguing that the barbershop was an important institution passed down from the great statesmen who came before them.

A Senate barbershop that provides government-subsidized cuts, shaves, and shines is a tradition that predates the Civil War. Over the years, its legend has grown. The barbershop was thought to be more private than the cloakrooms: a place that sometimes shaped the course of human events. In 1937, the debate about President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Judiciary Reorganization Bill—the effort to pack the Supreme Court with justices favorable to the New Deal—may have forever shifted after one encounter there. According to the report from the sergeant at arms's office,

> Republican Senator Styles Bridges, an opponent of the bill, visited the barbershop to receive a shave. The barber placed a warm towel over Bridges' face to soften his whiskers. A few minutes later, Democratic Senator Henry Ashurst, one of the bill's defenders, bustled into the shop in search of Senator Prentiss Brown, who had remained undecided during the debate. Ashurst mistook the shrouded Bridges for Brown and, hoping to sway him, bent down close to his ear and began to whisper secrets about White House policy related to the bill. Bridges lay completely still, absorbing the information, and Ashurst left the shop deceived about Bridges' identity. The bill suffered a 70-20 defeat in the Senate.

Rick Santorum's proposal suffered an even greater defeat when he took on the barbershop in 1997. Senators and barbers alike were quick to object. "If you start to privatize," intoned Arlen Specter, Santorum's fellow Republican senator from Pennsylvania, "[y]ou put a lot of people out of a job, and you have a lot of disruptions." Specter and his colleagues were also concerned about finding a barbershop that would cater to lawmakers' irregular timetables. "I don't know when you could get a haircut with our schedule around here. You can slip in and out of the barbershop in 20 minutes. If you have to go downtown, it will take an hour and a half," Specter complained. Like Douglas's effort before him, Santorum's plan failed to survive a Rules Committee vote, but then-sergeant at arms Greg Casey decided to consolidate the Senate barbershop and beauty parlor anyway.

Santorum lamented the hopelessness of his attempt to battle the barbers' influence among his comrades: "When your barber has you in the chair, and he says, 'You're not going to cut my job, are you?' what are you going to say?"

Gainer has taken away the burden of persuading senators to agree. He points to the House of Representatives' success in contracting out its barbershop's services. House Republicans successfully privatized their taxpayer-subsidized barbershop in 1995, when they passed a resolution from then-speaker Newt Gingrich's privatization task force. The operation had been losing $50,000 annually, according to *Roll Call*.

Senate Hair Care Services has cost taxpayers about $5.25 million over 15 years. They foot the bill of more than $40,000 for the shoeshine attendant last fiscal year. Six barbers took in more than $40,000 each, including nearly $80,000 for the head barber.

Gainer, who is entering his seventh year as sergeant at arms, accepts the blame, saying "shame on me" for not moving to privatize it sooner. But he adds, "I've tried to be more of a humanitarian than some people would like, and not just wallop everyone's heads off at once."

As press and politicians continue to play Chicken Little over sequestration, it's comforting to know that at least someone in the Senate recognizes that the institution could use a trim. ♦

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The Heretic

Who is Thomas Nagel and why are so many of his fellow academics condemning him?

By Andrew Ferguson

Last fall, a few days before Halloween and about a month after the publication of *Mind and Cosmos*, the controversial new book by the philosopher Thomas Nagel, several of the world's leading philosophers gathered with a group of cutting-edge scientists in the conference room of a charming inn in the Berkshires. They faced one another around a big table set with pitchers of iced water and trays of hard candies wrapped in cellophane and talked and talked, as public intellectuals do. PowerPoint was often brought into play.

Thomas Nagel

The title of the "interdisciplinary workshop" was "Moving Naturalism Forward." For those of us who like to kill time sitting around pondering the nature of reality—personhood, God, moral judgment, free will, what have you—this was the Concert for Bangladesh. The biologist Richard Dawkins was there, author of *The Blind Watchmaker*, *The Selfish Gene*, and other bestselling books of popular science, and so was Daniel Dennett, a philosopher at Tufts and author of *Consciousness Explained* and *Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life*. So were the authors of *Why Evolution is True*, *The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World*, *Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized*, and *The Atheist's Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions*—all of them books that to one degree or another bring to a larger audience the world as scientists have discovered it to be.

Contemporary philosophers have a name for the way you and I see the world, a world filled with other people, with colors and sounds, sights and sensations, things that are good and things that are bad and things that are very good indeed: ourselves, who are able, more or less, to make our own way through life, by our own lights. Philosophers call this common view the "manifest image." Daniel Dennett pointed out at the conference that modern science, at least since the revelations of Darwin, has been piling up proof that the manifest image is not really accurate in any scientific sense. Rather science—this vast interlocking combine of genetics, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, particle physics—tells us that the components of the manifest image are illusory.

Color, for instance: That azalea outside the window may look red to you, but in reality it has no color at all. The red comes from certain properties of the azalea that absorb some kinds of light and reflect other kinds of light, which are then received by the eye and transformed in our brains into a subjective experience of red. And sounds, too: Complex vibrations in the air are soundless in reality, but our ears are able to turn the vibrations into a car alarm or a cat's meow or, worse, the voice of Mariah Carey. These capacities of the human organism are evolutionary adaptations. Everything about human beings, by definition, is an evolutionary adaptation. Our sense that the colors and sounds exist "out there" and not merely in our brain is a convenient illusion that long ago increased the survival chances of our species. Powered by Darwin, modern science proceeds, in Dennett's phrase, as a "universal corrosive," destroying illusions all the way up and all the way down, dismantling our feelings of freedom and separate selfhood, our morals and beliefs, a mother's love and a patient's prayer: All in reality are just "molecules in motion."

The most famous, most succinct, and most pitiless summary of the manifest image's fraudulence was written nearly 20 years ago by the geneticist Francis Crick: "'You,' your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of

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nerve cells and their associated molecules. Who you are is nothing but a pack of neurons."

This view is the "naturalism" that the workshoppers in the Berkshires were trying to move forward. Naturalism is also called "materialism," the view that only matter exists; or "reductionism," the view that all life, from tables to daydreams, is ultimately reducible to pure physics; or "determinism," the view that every phenomenon, including our own actions, is determined by a preexisting cause, which was itself determined by another cause, and so on back to the Big Bang. The naturalistic project has been greatly aided by neo-Darwinism, the application of Darwin's theory of natural selection to human behavior, including areas of life once assumed to be nonmaterial: emotions and thoughts and habits and perceptions. At the workshop the philosophers and scientists each added his own gloss to neo-Darwinian reductive naturalism or materialistic neo-Darwinian reductionism or naturalistic materialism or reductive determinism. They were unanimous in their solid certainty that materialism—as we'll call it here, to limit the number of isms—is the all-purpose explanation for life as we know it.

Powered by Darwin, modern science proceeds, in Dennett's phrase, as a 'universal corrosive,' destroying illusions, dismantling our feelings of freedom and selfhood, our morals and beliefs, a mother's love and a patient's prayer: All in reality are just 'molecules in motion.'

One notable division did arise among the participants, however. Some of the biologists thought the materialist view of the world should be taught and explained to the wider public in its true, high-octane, Crickian form. Then common, nonintellectual people might see that a purely random universe without purpose or free will or spiritual life of any kind isn't as bad as some superstitious people—*religious* people—have led them to believe.

Daniel Dennett took a different view. While it is true that materialism tells us a human being is nothing more than a "moist robot"—a phrase Dennett took from a Dilbert comic—we run a risk when we let this cat, or robot, out of the bag. If we repeatedly tell folks that their sense of free will or belief in objective morality is essentially an illusion, such knowledge has the potential to undermine civilization itself, Dennett believes. Civil order requires the general acceptance of personal responsibility, which is closely linked to the notion of free will. Better, said Dennett, if the public were told that "for general purposes" the self and free will and objective morality do indeed exist—that colors and sounds exist, too—"just not in the way they think." They "exist in a special way," which is to say, ultimately, not at all.

On this point the discussion grew testy at times. I was reminded of the debate among British censors over the publication of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* half a century ago. "Fine for you or me," one prosecutor is said to have remarked, "but is this the sort of thing you would leave lying about for your wife or servant to read?"

There was little else to disturb the materialists in their Berkshire contentment. Surveys have shown that vast majorities of philosophers and scientists call themselves naturalists or materialists. Nearly all popular science books, not only those written by the workshoppers, conclude that materialism offers the true picture of reality. The workshoppers seemed vexed, however, knowing that not everyone in their intellectual class had yet tumbled to the truth of neo-Darwinism. A video of the workshop shows Dennett complaining that a few—but only a few!—contemporary philosophers have stubbornly refused to incorporate the naturalistic conclusions of science into their philosophizing, continuing to play around with outmoded ideas like morality and sometimes even the soul.

"I am just appalled to see how, in spite of what I think is the progress we've made in the last 25 years, there's this sort of retrograde gang," he said, dropping his hands on the table. "They're going back to old-fashioned armchair philosophy with relish and eagerness. It's sickening. And they lure in other people. And their work isn't worth anything—it's cute and it's clever and it's not worth a damn."

There was an air of amused exasperation. "Will you name names?" one of the participants prodded, joking.

"No names!" Dennett said.

The philosopher Alex Rosenberg, author of *The Atheist's Guide*, leaned forward, unamused.

"And then there's some work that is neither cute nor clever," he said. "And it's by Tom Nagel."

There it was! Tom Nagel, whose *Mind and Cosmos* was already causing a derangement among philosophers in England and America.

Dennett sighed at the mention of the name, more in sorrow than in anger. His disgust seemed to drain from him, replaced by resignation. He looked at the table.

"Yes," said Dennett, "there is that."

Around the table, with the PowerPoint humming, they all seemed to heave a sad sigh—a deep, workshop sigh.

Tom, oh Tom . . . How did we lose Tom . . .

Thomas Nagel may be the most famous philosopher in the United States—a bit like being the best power forward in the Lullaby League, but still. His paper "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" was recognized as a classic when it was published in 1974. Today it is a staple of undergraduate philosophy classes. His books range with a light touch over ethics and politics and the philosophy of mind. His papers are admired not only for their philosophical provocations but also for their rare (among modern philosophers) simplicity and stylistic clarity, bordering sometimes on literary grace.

Nagel occupies an endowed chair at NYU as a University Professor, a rare and exalted position that frees him to teach whatever course he wants. Before coming to NYU he taught at Princeton for 15 years. He dabbles in the higher journalism, contributing articles frequently to the *New York Review of Books* and now and then to the *New Republic*. A confirmed atheist, he lacks what he calls the *sensus divinitatis* that leads some people to embrace the numinous. But he does possess a finely tuned *sensus socialistis*; his most notable excursion into politics was a book-length plea for the confiscation of wealth and its radical redistribution—a view that places him safely in the narrow strip of respectable political opinion among successful American academics.

For all this and more, Thomas Nagel is a prominent and heretofore respected member of the country's intellectual elite. And such men are not supposed to write books with subtitles like the one he tacked onto *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False*.

Imagine if your local archbishop climbed into the pulpit and started reading from the *Collected Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*. "What has gotten into Thomas Nagel?" demanded the evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker, on Twitter. (Yes, even Steven Pinker tweets.) Pinker inserted a link to a negative review of Nagel's book, which he said "exposed the shoddy reasoning of a once-great thinker." At the point where science, philosophy, and public discussion intersect—a dangerous intersection these days—it is simply taken for granted that by attacking naturalism Thomas Nagel has rendered himself an embarrassment to his colleagues and a traitor to his class.

The *Guardian* awarded *Mind and Cosmos* its prize for the Most Despised Science Book of 2012. The reviews were numerous and overwhelmingly negative; one of the kindest, in the British magazine *Prospect*, carried the defensive headline "Thomas Nagel is not crazy." (Really, he's not!) Most other reviewers weren't so sure about that. Almost before the ink was dry on Nagel's book the UC Berkeley economist and prominent blogger Brad DeLong could be found gathering the straw and wood for the ritual burning. DeLong is a great believer in neo-Darwinism. He has coined the popular term "jumped-up monkeys" to describe our species. (*Monkeys* because we're descended from primates; *jumped-up* because evolution has customized us with the ability to reason and the big brains that go with it.)

DeLong was particularly offended by Nagel's conviction that reason allows us to "grasp objective reality." A good materialist doesn't believe in objective reality, certainly not in the traditional sense. "Thomas Nagel is not smarter than we are," he wrote, responding to a reviewer who praised Nagel's intelligence. "In fact, he seems to me to be distinctly dumber than anybody who is running even an eight-bit virtual David Hume on his wetware." (What he means is, anybody who's read the work of David Hume, the father of modern materialism.) DeLong's readers gathered to jeer as the faggots were placed around the stake.

"Thomas Nagel is of absolutely no importance on this subject," wrote one. "He's a self-contradictory idiot," opined another. Some made simple appeals to authority and left it at that: "Haven't these guys ever heard of Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett?" The hearts of still others were broken at seeing a man of Nagel's eminence sink so low. "It is sad that Nagel, whom my friends and I thought back in the 1960's could leap over tall buildings with a single bound, has tripped over the Bible and fallen on his face. Very sad."

Nagel doesn't mention the Bible in his new book—or in any of his books, from what I can tell—but among materialists the mere association of a thinking person with the Bible is an insult meant to wound, as Bertie Wooster would say. Directed at Nagel, a self-declared atheist, it is more revealing of the accuser than the accused. The hysterical insults were accompanied by an insistence that the book was so bad it shouldn't upset anyone.

"Evolutionists," one reviewer huffily wrote, "will feel they've been ravaged by a sheep." Many reviewers attacked the book on cultural as well as philosophical or scientific grounds, wondering aloud how a distinguished house like Oxford University Press could allow such a book to be published. The *Philosophers' Magazine* described it with the curious word "irresponsible." How so? In *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, the British philosopher John Dupré explained. *Mind and Cosmos*, he wrote, "will certainly lend comfort (and sell a lot of copies) to the religious enemies of Darwinism." Simon Blackburn of Cambridge University made the same point: "I regret the appearance of this book. It will only bring comfort to creationists and fans of 'intelligent design.'"

But what about fans of apostasy? You don't have to be a biblical fundamentalist or a young-earth creationist or an intelligent design enthusiast—I'm none of the above, for what it's worth—to find *Mind and*

Cosmos exhilarating. "For a long time I have found the materialist account of how we and our fellow organisms came to exist hard to believe," Nagel writes. "It is prima facie highly implausible that life as we know it is the result of a sequence of physical accidents together with the mechanism of natural selection." The prima facie impression, reinforced by common sense, should carry more weight than the clerisy gives it. "I would like to defend the untutored reaction of incredulity to the reductionist neo-Darwinian account of the origin and evolution of life."

The incredulity is not simply a matter of scientific ignorance, as the materialists would have it. It arises from something more fundamental and intimate. The neo-Darwinian materialist account offers a picture of the world that is unrecognizable to us—a world without color or sound, and also a world without free will or consciousness or good and evil or selves or, when it comes to that, selflessness. "It flies in the face of common sense," he says. Materialism is an explanation for a world we don't live in.

Among materialists the mere association of a thinking person with the Bible is an insult meant to wound, as Bertie Wooster would say.



Nagel's tone is measured and tentative, but there's no disguising the book's renegade quality. There are flashes of exasperation and dismissive impatience. What's exhilarating is that the source of Nagel's exasperation is, so to speak, his own tribe: the "secular theoretical establishment and the contemporary enlightened culture which it dominates." The establishment today, he says, is devoted beyond all reason to a "dominant scientific naturalism, heavily dependent on Darwinian explanations of practically everything, and armed to the teeth against attacks from religion." I'm sure Nagel would recoil at the phrase, but *Mind and Cosmos* is a work of philosophical populism, defending our everyday understanding from the highly implausible worldview of a secular clerisy. His working assumption is, in today's intellectual climate, radical: If the materialist, neo-Darwinian orthodoxy contradicts common sense, then this is a mark against the orthodoxy, not against common sense. When a chain of reasoning leads us to deny the obvious, we should double-check the chain of reasoning before we give up on the obvious.

Nagel follows the materialist chain of reasoning all the way into the cul de sac where it inevitably winds up. Nagel's touchier critics have accused him of launching an assault on science, when really it is an assault on the nonscientific uses to which materialism has been put. Though he does praise intelligent design advocates for having the nerve to annoy the secular establishment, he's no creationist himself. He has no doubt that "we are products of the long history of the universe since the big bang, descended from bacteria through millions of years of natural selection." And he assumes that the self and the body go together. "So far as we can tell," he writes, "our mental lives, including our subjective experiences, and those of other creatures are strongly connected with and probably strictly dependent on physical events in our brains and on the physical interaction of our bodies with the rest of the physical world." To believe otherwise is to believe, as the materialists derisively say, in "spooky stuff." (Along with *jumped-up monkeys* and *moist robots* and countless other much-too-cute phrases, the use of *spooky stuff* proves that our popular science writers have spent a lot of time watching *Scooby-Doo*.) Nagel doesn't believe in spooky stuff.

Materialism, then, is fine as far as it goes. It just doesn't go as far as materialists want it to. It is a premise of science, not a finding. Scientists do their work by assuming that every phenomenon can be reduced to a material, mechanistic cause and by excluding any possibility of nonmaterial explanations. And the materialist assumption works really, really well—in detecting and quantifying things that have a material or mechanistic explanation. Materialism has allowed us to predict and control what happens in nature with astonishing success. The jaw-dropping edifice of modern science, from space probes to nanosurgery, is the result.

But the success has gone to the materialists' heads. From a fruitful method, materialism becomes an axiom: If science can't quantify something, it doesn't exist, and so the subjective, unquantifiable, immaterial "manifest image" of our mental life is proved to be an illusion.

Here materialism bumps up against itself. Nagel insists that we know some things to exist even if materialism omits or ignores or is oblivious to them. Reductive materialism doesn't account for the "brute facts" of existence—it doesn't explain, for example, why the world exists at all, or how life arose from nonlife. Closer to home, it doesn't plausibly explain the fundamental beliefs we rely on as we go about our everyday business: the truth of our subjective experience, our ability to reason, our

capacity to recognize that some acts are virtuous and others aren't. These failures, Nagel says, aren't just temporary gaps in our knowledge, waiting to be filled in by new discoveries in science. On its own terms, materialism *cannot* account for brute facts. Brute facts are irreducible, and materialism, which operates by breaking things down to their physical components, stands useless before them. "There is little or no possibility," he writes, "that these facts depend on nothing but the laws of physics."

In a dazzling six-part tour de force rebutting Nagel's critics, the philosopher Edward Feser provided a good analogy to describe the basic materialist error—the attempt to stretch materialism from a working assumption into a comprehensive explanation of the world. Feser suggests a parody of materialist reasoning: "1. Metal detectors have had far greater success in finding coins and other metallic objects in more places than any other method has. 2. Therefore we have good reason to think that metal detectors can reveal to us everything that can be revealed" about metallic objects.

But of course a metal detector only detects the metallic content of an object; it tells us nothing about its color, size, weight, or shape. In the same way, Feser writes, the methods of "mechanistic science are as successful as they are in predicting and controlling natural phenomena *precisely because* they focus on only those aspects of nature *susceptible* to prediction and control."

A materialist who lived his life according to his professed convictions—understanding himself to have no moral agency, seeing his friends and enemies and family as genetically determined robots—wouldn't just be a materialist: He'd be a psychopath.

Meanwhile, they ignore everything else. But this is a fatal weakness for a theory that aspires to be a comprehensive picture of the world. With magnetic resonance imaging, science can tell us which parts of my brain light up when, for example, I glimpse my daughter's face in a crowd; the bouncing neurons can be observed and measured. Science cannot quantify or describe the feelings I experience when I see my daughter. Yet the feelings are no less real than the neurons.

The point sounds more sentimental than it is. My bouncing neurons and my feelings of love and obligation are unquestionably bound together. But the difference between the neurons and the feelings, the material and the mental, is a qualitative difference, a difference in kind. And of the two, reductive materialism can capture only one.

"The world is an astonishing place," Nagel writes. "That it has produced you, and me, and the rest of us is the most astonishing thing about it." Materialists are in the business of banishing astonishment; they want to demystify the world and human beings along with it, to show that everything we see as a mystery is reducible to components that aren't mysterious at all. And they cling to this ambition even in cases where doing so is obviously fruitless. Neo-Darwinism insists that every phenomenon, every species, every trait of every species, is the consequence of random chance, as natural selection requires. And yet, Nagel says, "certain things are so remarkable that they have to be explained as non-accidental *if we are to pretend to a real understanding of the world*." (The italics are mine.)

Among these remarkable, nonaccidental things are many of the features of the manifest image. Consciousness itself, for example: You can't explain consciousness in evolutionary terms, Nagel says, without undermining the explanation itself. Evolution easily accounts for rudimentary kinds of awareness. Hundreds of thousands of years ago on the African savannah, where the earliest humans evolved the unique characteristics of our species, the ability to sense danger or to read signals from a potential mate would clearly help an organism survive.

So far, so good. But the human brain can do much more than this. It can perform calculus, hypothesize metaphysics, compose music—even develop a theory of evolution. None of these higher capacities has any evident survival value, certainly not hundreds of thousands of years ago when the chief aim of mental life was to avoid getting eaten. Could our brain have developed and sustained such nonadaptive abilities by the trial and error of natural selection, as neo-Darwinism insists? It's possible, but the odds, Nagel says, are "vanishingly small." If Nagel is right, the materialist is in a pickle. The conscious brain that is able to come up with neo-Darwinism as a universal explanation simultaneously makes neo-Darwinism, as a universal explanation, exceedingly unlikely.

A similar argument holds for our other cognitive capacities. "The evolution story leaves the authority of reason in a much weaker position," he writes. Neo-Darwinism tells us that we have the power of reason because reason was adaptive; it must have helped us survive, back in the day. Yet reason often conflicts with our intuition or our emotion—capacities that must also have been adaptive and essential for survival. Why should we "privilege" one capacity over another when reason and intuition conflict? On its own terms, the scheme of neo-Darwinism gives us no standard by which we should choose one adaptive capacity over the other. And yet neo-Darwinists insist we embrace neo-Darwinism because it conforms

to our reason, even though it runs against our intuition. Their defense of reason is unreasonable.

So too our moral sense. We all of us have confidence, to one degree or another, that "our moral judgments are objectively valid"—that is, while our individual judgments might be right or wrong, *what makes them right or wrong is real*, not simply fantasy or opinion. Two and two really do make four. Why is this confidence inherent in our species? How was it adaptive? Neo-Darwinian materialists tell us that morality evolved as a survival mechanism (like everything else): We developed an instinct for behavior that would help us survive, and we called this behavior good as a means of reinforcing it. We did the reverse for behavior that would hurt our chances for survival: We called it bad. Neither type of behavior was good or bad in reality; such moral judgments are just useful tricks human beings have learned to play on ourselves.

Yet Nagel points out that our moral sense, even at the most basic level, developed a complexity far beyond anything needed for survival, even on the savannah—even in Manhattan. We are, as Nagel writes, "beings capable of thinking successfully about good and bad, right and wrong, and discovering moral and evaluative truths that do not depend on [our] own beliefs." And we behave accordingly, or try to. The odds that such a multilayered but nonadaptive capacity should become a characteristic of the species through natural selection are, again, implausibly long.

Nagel's reliance on "common sense" has roused in his critics a special contempt. One scientist, writing in the *Huffington Post*, calls it Nagel's "argument from ignorance." In the *Nation*, the philosophers Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg could only shake their heads at the once-great philosopher's retrogression from sophisticated thinking to common sense.

"This style of argument," they write, "does not, alas, have a promising history." Once upon a time, after all, our common-sense intuitions told us the sun traveled across the sky over a flat earth. Materialistic science has since taught us otherwise.

Not all intuitions are of the same kind, though. It is one thing for me to be mistaken in my intuition about the shape of the planet; it's another thing to be mistaken about whether I exist, or whether truth and falsehood exist independently of my say-so, or whether my "self" has some degree of control over my actions. Indeed, a person couldn't correct his mistaken intuitions unless these intuitions were correct—unless he was a rational self capable of distinguishing the true from the false and choosing one over the other. And it is the materialist attack on those intuitions—"common sense"—that Nagel finds absurd.

Leiter and Weisberg, like most of his other critics, were also agog that Nagel has the nerve to pronounce on matters that they consider purely scientific, far beyond his professional range. A philosopher doubting a scientist is a rare sight nowadays. With the general decline of the humanities and the success of the physical sciences, the relationship of scientists to philosophers of science has been reversed. As recently as the middle of the last century, philosophers like Bertrand Russell and A.J. Ayer might feel free to explain to scientists the philosophical implications of what they were doing. Today the power is all on the side of the scientists: One false move and it's *back to your sandbox, philosophy boy*.

And so some philosophers have retreated into the same sort of hyperspecialization that has rendered scientists from different subdisciplines practically incapable of communicating with each other. Now these philosophers, practicing what they call "experimental philosophy," can pride themselves on being just as incomprehensible as scientists. Other philosophers, like Dennett, have turned their field into a handmaiden of science: meekly and gratefully accepting whatever findings the scientists come up with—from brain scans to the Higgs boson—which they then use to demonstrate the superiority of hardheaded science to the airy musings of old-fashioned "armchair philosophy."

In this sense too Nagel is a throwback, daring not only to interpret science but to contradict scientists. He admits it's "strange" when he relies "on a philosophical claim to refute a scientific theory supported by empirical evidence." But he knows that when it comes to cosmology, scientists are just as likely to make an error of philosophy as philosophers are to make an error of science. And Nagel is accused of making large errors indeed. According to Leiter and Weisberg and the others, he is ignorant of how science is actually done these days.

Nagel, say Leiter and Weisberg, overestimates the importance of materialism, even as a scientific method. He's attacking a straw man. He writes as though "reductive materialism really were driving the scientific community." In truth, they say, most scientists reject theoretical reductionism. Fifty years ago, many philosophers and scientists might have believed that all the sciences were ultimately reducible to physics, but modern science doesn't work that way. Psychologists, for example, aren't trying to reduce psychology to biology; and biologists don't want to boil biology down to chemistry; and chemists don't want to reduce chemistry to physics. Indeed, an evolutionary biologist—even one who's a good materialist—won't refer to physics at all in the course of his work!

And this point is true, as Nagel himself writes in his book: Theoretical materialism, he says, "is not a necessary condition of the practice of any of those sciences." Researchers can believe in materialism or not, as they wish,

and still make scientific progress. (This is another reason why it's unconvincing to cite scientific progress as evidence for the truth of materialism.) But the critics' point is also disingenuous. If materialism is true as an explanation of everything—and they insist it is—then psychological facts, for example, *must* be reducible to biology, and then down to chemistry, and finally down to physics. If they weren't reducible in this way, they would (ta-da!) be irreducible. And any fact that's irreducible would, by definition, be uncaused and undetermined; meaning it wouldn't be material. It might even be spooky stuff.

On this point Leiter and Weisberg were gently chided by the prominent biologist Jerry Coyne, who was also a workshopper in the Berkshires. He was delighted by their roasting of Nagel in the *Nation*, but he accused them of going wobbly on materialism—of shying away from the hard conclusions that reductive materialism demands. It's not surprising that scientists in various disciplines aren't actively trying to reduce all science to physics; that would be a theoretical problem that is only solvable in the distant future. However: "The view that all sciences are *in principle* reducible to the laws of physics," he wrote, "must be true unless you're religious." Either we're molecules in motion or we're not.

You can sympathize with Leiter and Weisberg for fudging on materialism. As a philosophy of everything it is an undeniable drag. As a way of life it would be even worse. Fortunately, materialism is never translated into life as it's lived. As colleagues and friends, husbands and mothers, wives and fathers, sons and daughters, materialists never put their money where their mouth is. Nobody thinks his daughter is just molecules in motion and nothing but; nobody thinks the Holocaust was evil, but only in a relative, provisional sense. A materialist who lived his life according to his professed convictions—understanding himself to have no moral agency at all, seeing his friends and enemies and family as genetically determined robots—wouldn't just be a materialist: He'd be a psychopath. Say what you will about Leiter and Weisberg and the workshoppers in the Berkshires. From what I can tell, none of them is a psychopath. Not even close.

Applied beyond its own usefulness as a scientific methodology, materialism is, as Nagel suggests, self-evidently absurd. *Mind and Cosmos* can be read as an extended paraphrase of Orwell's famous insult: "One has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that: no ordinary man could be such a fool." Materialism can only be taken seriously as a philosophy through a heroic feat of cognitive dissonance; pretending, in our abstract, intellectual life, that values like truth and goodness have no objective content even as, in our private life, we try to learn what's really true and behave in a way we know to be good. Nagel has sealed his ostracism from the intelligentsia by idly speculating why his fellow intellectuals would undertake such a feat.

"The priority given to evolutionary naturalism in the face of its implausible conclusions," he writes, "is due, I think, to the secular consensus that this is the only form of external understanding of ourselves that provides an alternative to theism."

In a recent review in the *New York Review of Books* of *Where the Conflict Really Lies*, by the Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga, Nagel told how instinctively he recoils from theism, and how hungry he is for a reasonable alternative. "If I ever found myself flooded with the conviction that what the Nicene Creed says is true," he wrote, "the most likely explanation would be that I was losing my mind, not that I was being granted the gift of faith." He admits that he finds the evident failure of materialism as a worldview alarming—precisely because the alternative is, for a secular intellectual, unthinkable. He calls this intellectual tic "fear of religion."

"I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear," he wrote not long ago in an essay called "Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion." "I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that."

Nagel believes this "cosmic authority problem" is widely shared among intellectuals, and I believe him. It accounts for the stubbornness with which they cling to materialism—and for the hostility that greets an intellectual who starts to wander off from the herd. Materialism must be true because it "liberates us from religion." The positive mission Nagel undertakes in *Mind and Cosmos* is to outline, cautiously, a possible Third Way between theism and materialism, given that the first is unacceptable—emotionally, if not intellectually—and the second is untenable. Perhaps matter itself has a bias toward producing conscious creatures. Nature in that case would be "teleological"—not random, not fully subject to chance, but tending toward a particular end. Our mental life would be accounted for—phew!—without reference to God.

I don't think Nagel succeeds in finding his Third Way, and I doubt he or his successors ever will, but then I have biases of my own. There's no doubting the honesty and intellectual courage—the free thinking and ennobling good faith—that shine through his attempt. ♦

Among the Evangélicos

For Republicans reaching out to immigrant groups, a glimmer of hope: Protestant Hispanics are genuine swing voters.

By Michael Warren

Marietta, Ga.

The 2004 presidential election was the Republican party's high-water mark with Hispanic voters. George W. Bush received between 40 and 44 percent of the Hispanic vote that year. Bush lost Hispanic Catholics to John Kerry, but he overwhelmingly won Hispanic evangelicals, 69 percent to Kerry's 29 percent.

In 2008, the numbers changed dramatically. Barack Obama secured the votes of 74 percent of Hispanics, while John McCain won a paltry 22 percent, despite having been the GOP's spokesman for comprehensive immigration reform. Sixty percent of Hispanic evangelicals supported Obama, and just 36 percent McCain. Four years later, Obama's support among Hispanics dipped slightly, to 71 percent, but Mitt Romney received only 27 percent. An October 2012 Pew poll found that while 73 percent of Hispanic Catholics supported Obama, just 50 percent of Hispanic evangelicals did so, with 39 percent supporting Romney. Republicans have no reason to be happy about that small uptick, since their net loss with Hispanic evangelical voters over eight years was an abysmal 30 points.

Pentecostal worship in Spanish at Tucson's New Life congregation

The truth is that in 2004, Bush won the popular vote by a little more than 3 million votes, which is nearly equal to his 40 percent share of the 7.6 million Hispanics who voted in 2004. Bush's popular vote victory, the only one by a Republican since 1988, was due in no small part to his support from Hispanic evangelicals (about 15 percent of all Hispanics). They are the quintessential swing-voter group. If Republicans hope to gain a foothold with Hispanic voters—and start winning presidential elections again—they might want to begin by visiting Iglesia Misionera, a Spanish-language evangelical church in metro Atlanta.

As the first Sunday morning service ends, the doors of the church fly open and congregants spill out into the parking lot. It's as if the tiny brick building has been generating a giant ball of evangelizing energy, which it has just released into the world in one celebratory burst. The crowd is overwhelmingly Hispanic (with a sprinkling of Anglo and black faces). People are shaking hands, embracing each other, offering blessings in Spanish and English. I'm greeted several times in Spanish with a hearty handshake and a smile. I have to wait several minutes before I can make it inside for the next service.

Inside the sanctuary, flags hang high on the walls: Argentina, Guatemala, Puerto Rico, Colombia, Cuba, Brazil. There's also a large American flag prominently displayed behind the lectern. The members of this congregation were born or have roots in about 16 countries outside the United States, most of them in Central and South America. There's one flag I don't recognize, with three horizontal stripes (blue, red, blue) and the white silhouette of a Buddhist temple in the middle.

"We have a family from Cambodia," Pastor Arturo Venzor explains. "A lady married to a Mexican man. He doesn't speak Cambodian. She doesn't speak Spanish."

Don't let the flags fool you into thinking this is some sort of pan-national, United Nations-approved, hippy-dippy "spirituality" center. Iglesia Misionera is associated with the Assemblies of God, the largest federation of Pentecostal churches in the world. There's not much talk about social justice or finding your inner peace. Here, God is numero uno. The focus is on fostering an individual's relationship

AP / ARIZONA DAILY STAR / CHRIS RICHARDS

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with Christ. Venzor and his ministers want to shepherd their flock toward a godly life. "Basically what we're trying to do is to help, first of all, their spiritual life," he says. "Guide them to know the Lord, Jesus Christ."

But material charity is also an important part of the church's mission. Iglesia Misionera is generous with its benevolence fund, usually using it to help families pay bills or afford groceries in tough times. The congregation wants the church to give those in need a hand up, not a handout. "Once you help someone, the news goes," Venzor says. "People we don't even know, people that you don't know if they are really in need, come, and I said, 'I'm sorry, we cannot help you.'" The church is small (fewer than 500 members), so its funds for charity are limited.

On issues like abortion and gay marriage, the church takes an orthodox stand. "Most of the people that I know here at church, we have the same thinking about what the Bible says," Venzor says. "So, because Assemblies of God believes homosexuality and lesbianism is against God's law, everybody has the idea that that's sinful." He doesn't preach the politics of these positions, but Venzor says he will often talk about the sacredness of life and the sanctity of biblical marriage as the pillars of a strong Christian family.

Some academic observers find Hispanic Protestants to be more 'civically engaged' than Hispanic Catholics because their churches' high participation rates 'cultivate skills that can be transferred to civic life.'

Family is the axis around which Iglesia Misionera spins. On the wall in the hallway outside the sanctuary is a portrait of Venzor with his own family, his wife of 30 years and their five children. Families here range from empty-nester couples to newlyweds. There are plenty of nuclear families, though it's common to see mothers with children in tow, their husbands at home or absent entirely. "Most women come by themselves, asking for prayers that their husbands can come with them," Venzor says. "I'm glad most of their husbands don't prohibit them from coming to church."

Venzor says most of the congregants at Iglesia Misionera either are U.S.-born or have green cards, but there are definitely "undocumented" immigrants who worship there, too.

"We don't check, we don't ask, even though we know for a fact, you know," he says. "They know the risk being here."

On the busy highway in front of the church, a police car sits in the center turn lane, ready to direct traffic before and after services. For a time, illegal immigrants were at heightened risk here in Cobb County. In 2006, the county commission approved a request from the sheriff to join a federal program to crack down on immigrants working and residing here illegally. Venzor remembers police stopping members of his church for driving without licenses, which led to deportation when the offender was an illegal immigrant. He can think of several men who were deported, along with two or three entire families who had to return to their home countries. Venzor talks about the struggle his church faces, wanting to open its doors wide but still uphold the law and have good relationships with the community and local government officials. Police officers, he says, often stop by to ask for prayers.

In the sanctuary, I find a seat on the right side, and an usher hands me a radio device and headphones. There's a Puerto Rican kid sitting in the balcony with a microphone, who'll translate the sermon into English for the benefit of the few members who don't speak Spanish. Apart from the translator, church officials stick to Spanish in the sanctuary.

"Buenos días," members greet me before the service begins. "Bienvenidos."

"Hello," I respond. Most often, they smile and reply in English.

"Welcome."

There are some adult members who are bilingual, but several are recent arrivals and speak primarily Spanish. Their children, born or raised in the United States, often know English better than they know their parents' Spanish. One church member, Felix Mercado, says he worries about the youth drifting away from God, as he says he did as a young man after moving to the United States from Puerto Rico. Mercado says he rediscovered his faith later in life, but "kids today" are becoming "Americanized." For the older crowd here, Americanization translates into a loss in faith. The language and cultural gaps are evident when eight young teenage boys sit in the pew in front of mine, chatting before (and during) the service in English. One of the ushers comes by several times to hush them—in English.

Sunday morning service begins with four long, rocking worship songs. A black female cantor belts out lyrics in Spanish, which are projected onto screens on either side of the stage. Behind her, an amplified band jams, the bass shaking the building. Members dance and sing, raising their hands in the air and shouting "*¡Aleluya!*" By the end of the medley, there aren't a lot of dry eyes, with men and women alike availing themselves of the boxes of tissues found throughout the church. Members then spend a good 10 minutes shaking hands and hugging and saying hello. Some walk up and down every aisle, stretching across pews to greet everyone.

Throughout Pastor Venzor's 30-minute sermon, spontaneous amens and alleluias echo off the sanctuary walls. Near the end of the service, members lay hands on the unsaved, praying loudly and speaking in tongues. Venzor calls the Spanish style of worship "expressive."

"If they want to dance, they dance," he says. "Raise their hands, shout, whatever. We don't say, 'Don't do that.'" Emotional expression is characteristic of Hispanic Christianity, across denominations, and it is a defining feature of Christian renewalism, a movement within evangelicalism. Renewalism emphasizes the daily intercession of the Holy Spirit in the lives of men, and the movement has gained a foothold among Hispanic Christians. In fact, 90 percent of Hispanic converts to evangelical Christianity say they made the commitment out of a "desire for a more direct, personal experience of God."

Worship at Iglesia Misionera is an all-week, immersive experience. If devout members aren't at work or in school, they're likely here. There's Bible study on Monday night, youth services on Tuesday night, a Wednesday night service, and a family service on Friday. "Thursday, everybody's here, even though we don't have service," Venzor says. "Everybody's practicing or doing something."

A Spanish-language Easter service at the Primitive Christian Church, New York

AP / TINA FINEBERG

There's reason to believe that Hispanic immigrants who spend their time at churches like Iglesia Misionera are learning more than spiritual lessons—they're learning how to be good Americans. Edwin Hernández, the director of the Center for the Study of Latino Religion at the University of Notre Dame, has researched how Hispanic churches in America help their members build social capital—the stuff that makes an individual function well in civil society. Hernández cites fellow academics Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, who found that Hispanic Protestants were more "civically engaged" than Hispanic Catholics because the "small, close-knit structure of most Protestant Latino communities encourages participation from a comparatively large share of its members in the kinds of activities that cultivate skills that can be transferred to civic life."

One metric helpful for understanding "civic engagement" is volunteerism. A 2007 study coauthored by Hernández shows that religiously active Hispanics are more likely than religiously inactive Hispanics to volunteer, and they do so primarily with church or faith-based groups. Also, Hispanic Protestants are more likely to volunteer than Hispanic Catholics, particularly at church or with religious groups. Hernández also found that those Hispanics who volunteer at church are more likely to volunteer in schools, tutoring programs, neighborhood groups, business organizations, community groups, and ethnic groups, even accounting for the fact that people in general who volunteer in one setting are more likely to volunteer elsewhere.

"Churches are a critical venue in which civic engagement is fostered among [Hispanics]," Hernández writes. "Our analysis indicates that the reason those who attend church regularly appear more likely to volunteer in their communities is because they are engaged as volunteers in their churches."

Another Americanizing aspect of the evangelical church is the opportunities it offers for leadership. In contrast with traditional Catholicism, evangelicalism eschews hierarchy and distributes leadership roles across congregations. Anyone with a little commitment to the church can become a minister of some kind, leading the music department or teaching a Bible study or working with youth. Leadership requires learning basic civic skills: how to speak in front of an audience, execute a group mission, manage a budget, deal and negotiate with others.

Iglesia Misionera's senior pastor exemplifies this. Born in Monterrey, Mexico, about 140 miles southwest of Laredo, Arturo Venzor moved to Houston as a teenager in 1978. In Mexico, his family was culturally Catholic, but he says they seldom went to church. Once in Texas, Venzor and his parents began attending a nondenominational church. In 1980, he moved to Dallas, where he met his wife, who is American-born of Mexican descent. They married in 1983, the year he says he "came to know the Lord," and in a few years, he moved his young family to Georgia. The Venzors were among the first members of Iglesia Misionera; they began meeting in the first pastor's living room in 1987. An active member over the years, Arturo eventually joined the full-time ministry. He was ordained in 2008, and an abrupt retirement the following year elevated him to the position of pastor. It was a two-decade spiritual journey, but along the way, he discovered American civic institutions.

"When I came here, this was my first time knowing

about Assemblies of God," Venzor says. "I didn't know that you had to fill out an application for membership. I didn't know about tithes. I was used to giving my tithes, but nobody knew except me. When I came here, they said, 'You need to fill out an application and become a member so we can keep a record of your tithes. Fill out an envelope, that way we keep a record in case you want to be a deacon or something, so that we know you are helping with everything.'"

Evangelical churches instill in their members a strong sense of personal responsibility. Tied with a strict adherence to tithing is a culture of thriftiness. Be responsible with your money, give to the church, and let God take care of the rest, the idea goes. Hispanic immigrants to the United States suddenly find themselves with considerably more money and more freedom than in their home countries. Many are young men, separated from their wives and families so they can earn money to send back home. The evangelical church provides immigrants a moral anchor, teaching them self-care and assimilating these new Americans into a culture of citizenship.

All told, there are about 7.8 million Hispanic evangelical Protestants in the United States. They are more likely to be U.S.-born, more likely to speak English, more educated, and wealthier than their Catholic counterparts.

There are about 52 million Hispanics living in the United States, and while the large majority of them—more than 67 percent—are Catholic, nearly 20 percent are Protestant. More specifically, 15 percent of Hispanics identify themselves as born-again or evangelical Protestants, and more than half of Hispanic Protestants describe themselves as charismatics or Pentecostals—catchall terms for those who practice renewalist Christianity. Only about 20 percent of non-Hispanic Protestants identify themselves this way. Even among Hispanic Catholics, 54 percent describe themselves as charismatics, while just about 10 percent of non-Hispanic Catholics do.

All told, there are about 7.8 million Hispanic evangelical Protestants in the United States. They are more likely to be U.S.-born, more likely to speak English, more educated, and wealthier than their Catholic counterparts. They also attend church more often, are more likely to say that their religious beliefs are very important to their politics, and are more likely to vote Republican than Hispanic Catholics.

Most Hispanic evangelicals in the United States have Mexican roots, which isn't surprising since most Hispanics in the United States have Mexican roots. But while 63 percent of Hispanics traced their origins to Mexico in 2007, only 50 percent of Hispanic evangelicals did. Just 12 percent of Mexican Americans are evangelical Protestants. Among Hispanic evangelicals, those with origins in Central American countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama have relatively high representation, making up 14 percent of the evangelical population but 9 percent of the total Hispanic population. Twenty-two percent of Central Americans in the United States are evangelicals.

Puerto Ricans make up a particularly outsized proportion of evangelicals: While only 9 percent of the total Hispanic population, they are 16 percent of the evangelical population, and 27 percent of Puerto Ricans on the mainland are evangelicals. Evangelicalism, particularly Pentecostalism, has a rich history in Puerto Rico, beginning with Juan L. Lugo's mission to Puerto Rico on behalf of the Assemblies of God in 1916. Lugo established the Pentecostal Church of God of Puerto Rico in 1921, which split from the Assemblies of God in 1956. In 1929, Lugo traveled to New York to start the first Pentecostal church for the city's nascent Puerto Rican community. In addition to Lugo's Pentecostal Churches of God, both the Assemblies of God and the Iglesia Defensores de la Fe, founded by Juan Francisco Rodríguez Rivera in 1934, flourish today in Puerto Rico, as do other evangelical churches.

Samuel Rodriguez is one of those Puerto Rican evangelicals. The president of the National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference and the senior pastor at New Season Christian Worship Center near Sacramento, Rodriguez is considered a leader in the Hispanic evangelical movement. "The way that I phrase it is this," he says. "A Hispanic Christian is what you get when you take Billy Graham and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., put them in a blender, and put salsa on top."

It may be crude, but it's not exactly inaccurate. There are elements of both the white and black Protestant churches in Hispanic evangelicalism. Rodriguez defines the movement as having two communities, vertical and horizontal, that "reconcile" the Christian visions put forth by Graham and King. These dual identities have political and social implications as well.

The vertical community, he says, links God, the church, the family, and the individual. As Rodriguez tells it, this is the element that places importance on the universal truths taught by Christ that unite the church: the sanctity of life, the primacy of the transcendent over the material, the need for personal salvation.

Like the members of Iglesia Misionera, Hispanic evangelicals are generally pro-life and espouse traditional

family values, though as the country as a whole becomes more accepting of gay marriage, so do Hispanic evangelicals. In a 2006 Pew poll, for example, 86 percent of Hispanic evangelicals opposed gay marriage. This made them more conservative than Hispanic Catholics (52 percent opposed), non-Hispanic evangelicals (67 percent opposed), and the general public (56 percent opposed). And opinions on same-sex marriage have continued to change since then. In a more recent poll, from October 2012, 66 percent of Hispanic evangelicals said they were opposed to gay marriage, still far more than Hispanic Catholics (31 percent) and the general public (44 percent) but less than white evangelicals (76 percent).

On abortion, too, Hispanic evangelicals are conservative. In a 2005 poll, 77 percent said abortion should be illegal, more than Hispanic Catholics (54 percent) and non-Hispanic evangelicals (61 percent). And in a 2012 study of Hispanic congregations in the Chicago area, 64 percent of evangelicals and 71 percent of Pentecostals (treated as separate groups) said abortion is "never acceptable," while an additional 34 percent and 27 percent, respectively, said abortion is acceptable "only under certain extreme circumstances." Evangelicals and Pentecostals were significantly more conservative on the issue than Hispanics overall, 59 percent of whom said abortion is never acceptable and 39 percent of whom said it is acceptable only in extreme circumstances. It's problematic to compare a 2007 national poll of Hispanic evangelicals with a more localized poll in 2012, but the point is this: On abortion and gay marriage, evangelicals continue to be the most conservative subgroup among Hispanics.

President Barack Obama is introduced by Rev. Luis Cortes Jr. at a Hispanic evangelical event in Washington, D.C., in 2009.

Rodriguez says the awakening of the Christian right during and since the era of Ronald Reagan has spoken to Hispanic evangelicals as well. They hear Republicans talking about life and traditional marriage and say, "That's us."

Except when they don't. Enter Rodriguez's horizontal community within Hispanic evangelicalism: the relationships among people, following Christ's call to charity and love of neighbor. That may help explain, Rodriguez says, how Hispanic evangelicals have more liberal views on economics and the role of government. In 2007, 70 percent of Hispanic evangelicals said they favor government-guaranteed health insurance, indistinguishable from all Hispanics and higher than non-Hispanic evangelicals. Hispanic evangelicals are more likely than their non-Hispanic counterparts to say "poor people have hard lives due to lack of government services" (57 percent to 42 percent), although they are less likely to have that view than Hispanics overall (64 percent).

Two 2011 studies showed a particularly stark gulf between Hispanic evangelicals and white evangelicals on the issue of the size of government. While a majority of white evangelicals (71 percent to 20 percent) say they prefer a "smaller government providing fewer services" to a "bigger government providing more services," Hispanic evangelicals flip those numbers: Seventy-six percent prefer a bigger government, with only 20 percent preferring a smaller government. On that question, Hispanic evangelicals are more in line with Hispanics in general, who overwhelmingly prefer bigger government.

As for party preference, the 2007 Pew poll found 37 percent of evangelical Hispanics identify themselves as Republicans and 32 percent as Democrats. This was the only faith group among Hispanics that preferred the GOP. Going beneath the topline numbers, country of origin also plays a large role in party identification among evangelicals. Fifty-two percent of Puerto Rican evangelicals identify as Democrats and only 18 percent as Republicans, while 19 percent are independents. Among all Hispanics, Puerto Ricans are one of the most Democratic groups (48 percent), trailing only Dominicans (50 percent) in their preference for the Democratic party. Puerto Ricans are also concentrated in the liberal northeastern states of New York and New Jersey, which suggests Puerto Rican affinity for the Democrats may have a regional ingredient. Puerto Ricans are also concentrated in South Florida, where the prominence of the heavily Republican Cuban-American establishment may influence their political affiliation, regardless of religious tradition.

On the other hand, 47 percent of Mexican evangelicals are Republicans, and only 24 percent are Democrats, with 19 percent identifying as independents, even though only 14 percent of Mexican Catholics and 19 percent of Mexicans in general are Republicans. South American evangelicals, taken as a whole, are split, with 38 percent supporting the GOP, 33 percent supporting the Democrats, and 24 percent identifying as independents.

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Immigration complicates this simple picture. Twenty-five percent of Hispanic eligible voters are naturalized citizens, born in other countries. The remaining three-quarters are the children or grandchildren of immigrants, and many have family or friends who are recent immigrants. While Hispanic evangelicals are more likely to be U.S.-born than Hispanic Catholics (46 percent versus 32 percent), they are not as likely to be U.S.-born as mainline Protestants of Hispanic background (65 percent). The Hispanic evangelical population is made up mostly of immigrants, some in the United States legally and many here illegally.

In his church, Venzor says there are both Republicans and Democrats, so he doesn't like to talk about politics from the pulpit. But he knows his members discussed Mitt Romney's much-ridiculed advice during the campaign that illegal immigrants should "self-deport," as well as Barack Obama's failed promises to address immigration reform in his first term. Venzor says they don't care which party solves the problems of a byzantine immigration system as long as Washington comes up with a solution that helps a community that is straddling the line of legality. In 2007, according to Pew, Hispanic evangelicals were nearly split on which party could "do a better job of dealing with immigration," with 36 percent choosing the Republicans and 38 percent choosing the Democrats. Evangelicals gave higher marks to the GOP on the issue than any other group; just 22 percent of Hispanics overall preferred Republicans to deal with immigration and 49 percent preferred the Democrats. Around one-fifth of Hispanics, including about that many evangelicals, said they believed neither party could find a solution.

Since the GOP's drubbing in the 2012 presidential contest, Republicans have wondered if a more conciliatory platform on immigration could help them recapture the Hispanic votes they lost after 2004. The hardline image the GOP has cultivated, wittingly or not, hasn't helped move Hispanics into the Republican column. But even if Republicans acquiesce to some kind of comprehensive immigration reform, the party will still have to deal with the reality that its more libertarian elements are unappealing to evangelicals, the Hispanic group with the most natural affinity for the GOP.

That's no reason for Republicans to despair. Somewhere in the party's long tradition, there are principles and policies that can attract a group that values family, community, and the church. A party that can win Hispanic evangelicals might be one that can combine pro-family tax policies, pro-growth economic policies, traditionalism on social issues, and a realistic immigration policy. And a little salsa on top couldn't hurt. ♦



Noam Chomsky releases doves, Cabramatta High School, near Sydney, Australia (2011).

Forbidden City

The left-wing stranglehold on academia. BY MARK BAUERLEIN

Neil Gross is a sociologist at the University of British Columbia who previously held posts at the University of Southern California and Harvard, has a doctorate from the University of Wisconsin, and received undergraduate training at Berkeley. He edits *Sociological Theory* and has written a book on the liberal philosopher Richard Rorty.

He has all the markers of an academic on the left, and Gross confesses in his introduction to this study of faculty politics that he has "very liberal social attitudes" and that his views on the economy and law are center-left. Nevertheless, he registers clearly the overwhelming ideological slant of higher education. Reviewing survey and voter registration data, he concludes that "the professoriate either contains the highest proportion of liberals of any occupation in the United States for the period 1996-2010 or is right behind another famously liberal occupational group, authors and journalists."

Why Are Professors Liberal and Why Do Conservatives Care?
by Neil Gross
Harvard, 400 pp., $35

It's a galling situation for people on the right, and the response by people on the left only makes it worse. If the underrepresented group were a favored one, liberal observers would invoke disparate-impact theory, which holds that any situation that is demographically disproportionate signifies bias at work and needs public intervention. But in this case, the excluded group is conservatives, which makes the imbalance the conservatives' own fault.

In interviews of professors conducted by Gross and his colleagues, the most common explanation for the dearth of conservatives on the faculty

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Mark Bauerlein, professor of English at Emory University, is the author, most recently, of The Dumbest Generation: How the Digital Age Stupefies Young Americans and Jeopardizes Our Future.

was that conservatives lack the "open-mindedness" necessary for academic work (41 percent of interviewees stated this), while the second most popular reason was that conservatives care too much about making money to become academics (30 percent noted this). Prejudice or greed, take your pick—but don't overlook the self-congratulation in each judgment ("*we* are here because we're broad-minded and we care more about people than about dollars").

We've heard this before, both the charge and the defenses. Gross recounts the same debate as it occurred in the 1950s, citing William F. Buckley's and Russell Kirk's columns in *National Review*, and a few liberal adversaries such as Richard Hofstadter, who anticipated nearly exactly the exchanges between David Horowitz and the National Association of Scholars (NAS) on the right and the Modern Language Association (MLA) and Association of American University Presses (AAUP) on the left. That liberal bias on campus has been such a longstanding issue in American life and has undergone so little change in spite of bestselling books such as *The Closing of the American Mind*, columns in national periodicals, and cable television denunciations indicates to Gross that the customary explanations are shortsighted and misleading.

Hence the purpose of this book: to examine standard rationales for an occupation that pledges diversity and tolerance but has ended up so dominated by the left half of the ideological spectrum. Gross combines existing data with his own Politics of the American Professoriate project, which queried 1,416 professors in different disciplines and types of institutions for, among other things, their political self-conception. The results provide an empirical base on which he evaluates theories about the conservative mindset, discrimination in hiring, indoctrination in the classroom, and just how liberal the faculty really are.

One interviewee tells Gross that academe isn't liberal at all. Most are Democrats, yes, but "the Democratic Party is quite conservative," he insists. Many economists, engineers, and business profs are right-wing, too, and "I bet that if you check out [academic] administrators a lot of them are voting Republican." It's a common reply, Gross notes; but survey research puts the faculty at half Democrat (51 percent), one-third independent (who lean Democrat by more than two to one), and only 14 percent Republican.

Other myths Gross refutes: Liberal professors claim to enter academia out of egalitarian motives while conservatives favor the competitive, hierarchical world of business. In academia, liberals can produce a more just and equal society, a goal that turns conservatives away. Gross replies that, while academics profess to dislike hierarchy, academia itself is altogether hierarchical, with set "power differentials between professors of different ranks . . . and with equally well-established status hierarchies among professors in different types of institutions."

An English major who reveres Great Books needs only one occasion of a teaching assistant ridiculing him for a dead-white-male fixation to decide, 'I don't need this.'

Defenders of academia claim that while professors are liberal, few of them bring their politics into the classroom in a heavy-handed way. Gross challenges that assertion by examining courses offered during the fall 2011 semester at his alma mater, the University of Wisconsin department of sociology. While some appeared neutral—"Marriage and the Family," "Criminology"—others had an obviously leftist perspective: "Feminism and Sociological Theory," "Intercultural Dialogues," "Environmental Stewardship and Social Justice," "Class, State, and Ideology: An Introduction to Marxist Sociology." The same themes and angles prevail in anthropology, history, literature, communications, education, geography, and "in nearly all programs in ethnic studies, women's and gender studies, cultural studies, and social work."

Another liberal theory holds that conservatives attack academia out of "status anxiety," that is, the feeling on the part of a heretofore-dominant group that its power is fading. Here, we have white male Protestants upset that women and minorities and secular visions have taken over. But in his work, Gross found that, for example, "more than two-thirds of evangelicals think that colleges *do* welcome the faithful," and so "there would appear to be no widespread perception among them that higher education per se represents a threat to Christian values or their way of life." Gross also had an assistant comb through the interviews to check whether "any interviewees expressed—even in a veiled fashion—frustration with their life situation or a sense that contemporary society was leaving them in the dust. None did."

Yet another account of the campaign against academia asserts that its spokesmen serve as tools for the power elite, getting paid to issue broadsides against professors who expose the underhanded dealings of capitalists and corporations. But when Gross investigates those leading figures, he uncovers a different account. Buckley didn't begin his academic critique as a mouthpiece hired by wealthy conservatives, but as an undergraduate at Yale appalled at the stigmatization taking place in his courses. Stephen Balch started the NAS not at the behest of a benefactor, but because he realized that his colleagues at John Jay College were fostering radical proletarianism in students. These tales, Gross says, gainsay the idea that conservative critics are "ideological mercenaries in the employ of the power elite."

Why is academia liberal, then? Gross's data indicate that it isn't because liberals and conservatives

have different values or mental habits, or that liberals discriminate against right-leaning graduate students and job candidates. Rather, it is because academia has a reputation for liberalism, and conservative undergraduates decide on their own not to continue in the field.

The key moment, Gross maintains, is the decision whether or not to go to graduate school. Young conservatives may not know all that much about academia at the faculty level, but popular stereotypes and a few off-putting experiences in class can sufficiently discourage them from pursuing academia as a site for success. A freshman orientation session that divides white males from everyone else, incessant talk about diversity, multiculturalist reading assignments, and so on may not bother them that much (and they can always find safe spaces such as College Republicans), but such things do convince young conservatives that staying on campus as a career move is foolish. An English major who reveres Great Books needs only one occasion of a teaching assistant ridiculing him for a dead-white-male fixation to decide, "I don't need this."

Gross's thesis sounds plausible, and the data support it. It leaves conservative critics with a disarming irony, though: The more critics expose liberal indoctrination and intolerance, the more they reinforce the image of academia that makes young conservatives shun it. As Gross puts it, "Decades of antiprofessorial rhetoric have made academia seem an even less desirable home for young conservatives than it would otherwise be." When Bill O'Reilly and John Stossel discussed affirmative action for conservative professors, as they did this past December, did they believe that it would inspire more 22-year-olds on the right to apply for graduate study in Princeton's English department, which tells prospective students that "we offer a wide range of theoretical specializations in fields such as feminist theory, gender studies, psychoanalysis, Marxism, New Historicism, environmental studies, political and social theory, and cultural studies"? ♦

B&A

Scholar-Gentleman

'Well done, Wheeler-Bennett,' as historian and sage.

BY ANDREW ROBERTS

"Tonight my country stands alone," the British historian and diplomat John Wheeler-Bennett told the American people in a radio broadcast on the night of June 17, 1940, the day that France capitulated to Hitler. He continued:

> Alone before the embattled might of totalitarian Europe, Nazi Germany rooted in hatred and cruelty and perversion, and Fascist Italy standing forth at last in her true colors, wearing a suit of tarnished blackmail and with the bar-sinister upon her shield. Tonight for the first time in many years, your country sees an unfriendly power established on the far shores of the Atlantic. France, immortal and glorious France, has fallen at our side.

As well as being Britain's finest hour, that speech to the Institute for Public Affairs of Charlottesville, Virginia, was to be Wheeler-Bennett's, too. Speaking off the cuff—with a minimum of preparation, since the news of the fall of France had been received only hours earlier and Wheeler-Bennett had to take the place of the British ambassador, Lord Lothian, who was dealing with the unfolding emergency from the British embassy in Washington—he went on to liken Britain's situation to John Milton's defense of free speech during the English Civil War, which describes a nation "not degenerated or drooping to a final decay, but casting off the old and wrinkled skin of corruption, to outlive these pangs and wax young again, entering into the truth of prosperous virtue, destined to become great and honorable in these later ages."

Of all the many tributes Wheeler-Bennett was to receive for his inspiring speech, the one which he said gave him "the greatest pleasure and gratification" was from Lord Lothian himself, who confined his praise to: "Well done, Wheeler-Bennett."

As this well-researched and well-written book makes clear, that night in June 1940 was only one of a series of very many times when John Wheeler-Bennett happened to be the right man in the right place at the right time. A debonair, charming, and decent man, Wheeler-Bennett was one of those fortunate historians who, like Lord Macaulay and Winston Churchill and precious few others, actually made history as well as writing it.

Born in 1902, the son of a successful English businessman and his Virginian wife, Wheeler-Bennett suffered from asthma, a stammer, and a facial tic after his prep school was bombed by a Zeppelin airship in the Great War. Bullied at his minor public school, he became "a sceptic and a rebel" and, in 1920, he traveled around the world. It was felt that his constitution—he was later also to suffer from insomnia, fainting fits, jaundice, mastoids, pneumonia, nervous exhaustion, and a weak heart—was not strong enough for him to undergo the rigors of Christ Church, Oxford. However, his world tour engendered a love of

Witness to History
The Life of John Wheeler-Bennett
by Victoria Schofield
Yale, 360 pp., $50

Andrew Roberts is the author, most recently, of The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War.

travel, but also a belief that the League of Nations, for which he began working full-time when he returned, might abolish war, a naïveté that he later admitted was a "youthful illusion."

Wheeler-Bennett discovered his lifelong love of observing politics while watching the 103 ballots be cast in the 1924 Democratic convention in New York. "One danced on the St. Regis roof garden and always had the address of a reliable bootlegger and a respectable speakeasy," he recalled of the city he loved. He soon became one of the greatest exponents of the value of close Anglo-American amity and, in the course of some 30 books, the founder of what has become the international relations school of history writing.

Charming, well-off, handsome, and intelligent, Wheeler-Bennett smoked cigars, drank brandy, was a member of Brooks's, Pratt's, and the Beefsteak clubs in London, and made friends easily—especially interesting ones in high places. Blanche "Baffy" Dugdale, Ian Fleming, Harold Nicolson, Lewis Namier, Ralph Richardson, the Duke of Windsor's best man "Fruity" Metcalfe, H. A. L. Fisher, Robert Bruce Lockhart, Robert Vansittart, Averell Harriman, Dorothy Thompson, Adam von Trott zu Solz, Lord Lloyd, Isaiah Berlin, King Fuad of Egypt, Chiang Kai-shek, and Anthony Eden waft in and out of these pages, testaments to Wheeler-Bennett's talent as an indefatigable networker.

Editing the newsletter of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (at Chatham House in London) brought him into contact with Emilio Aguinaldo in the Philippines. After taking a house on Lüneburg Heath in the early 1930s while researching his magnum opus, the biography of Paul von Hindenburg, he befriended Chancellor Heinrich Brüning of the Weimar Republic and spotted the dangers posed by the Nazis early on. This also brought him into contact with Field Marshal Hindenburg, General Erich Ludendorff, and the ex-kaiser Wilhelm II, whose illegitimate son he was reputed (without any truth) to have been.

Wheeler-Bennett also got to know Franz von Papen, who, when Wheeler-Bennett warned him in 1933 about Adolf Hitler's ambitions, replied: "Nothing to worry about, my dear fellow; we can always outvote them in cabinet." After seeing the smoldering ruin of the burnt Reichstag, helping Brüning escape from Germany in May 1934, and having some acquaintances killed in the Night of the Long Knives two months later, Wheeler-Bennett was persuaded to quit Germany and to warn Chatham House that, in his own meetings with the new führer, "What struck one was Hitler's utter lack of humanity or humour. He gave the impression of a self-invented, self-inspired robot." He concluded that although the Nazis would probably not last in power for more than four years, "it behooved the Continent to look to its armaments and defenses."

Sir John Wheeler-Bennett (1958)

MARK GERSON / NATIONAL PORTRAIT GALLERY, LONDON

During his next set of travels, he met Pope Pius XI (who he thought spoke many languages badly), Benito Mussolini (whose heart he pronounced to be "of a lighter shade of black"), and Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, who was shortly afterwards assassinated by Austrian Nazis. In the Soviet Union in 1935, he met the Czech playwright Karl Radek shortly before Radek's murder by the NKVD; later on, he met Leon Trotsky only weeks before his assassination in Mexico in 1940, and Jan Masaryk before his probable murder by Communists in Prague in 1948. It seems as though the Grim Reaper was never far behind a request for an interview from John Wheeler-Bennett.

Editing the anti-Nazi magazine *Review of Reviews* in the late 1930s earned Wheeler-Bennett a much-coveted place on the SS "Black List" of Britons to be executed upon capture. But it was after being turned down for enlistment in 1940—aged 38, due to heart murmurs—that Wheeler-Bennett made his greatest contribution to history. He became a gifted propagandist for American intervention in the war, operating out of the 44th floor of the RCA Building at 30 Rockefeller Center. He debated isolationists like Charles Lindbergh, coordinated the activities of pro-interventionist Hollywood producers such as Alexander Korda and Sam Goldwyn, organized ticker-tape parades down Broadway for British servicemen, instigated undercover operations masterminded by Wild Bill Donovan of the OSS and William Stephenson (code-named Intrepid), encouraged the anti-Nazi resistance within Germany, and met Winston Churchill at Downing Street during the Blitz, all while working for any number of political intelligence departments of the British secret state.

After D-Day, he moved into the Hôtel de Crillon in Paris to continue his war work, and after the war he attended the Nuremberg Trials with Rebecca West. He edited German foreign policy documents for publication in the late forties, and was given a room at Buckingham Palace by the queen, where he could write the official life of George VI, for which he received a knighthood.

His happy marriage, at age 42, to the American Ruth Harrison Risher,

curtailed his habit of smoking cigars at breakfast but was otherwise a delight to him, and she proved a superb chatelaine of their beautiful Tudor home, Garsington Manor in Oxfordshire.

Dying in 1975, John Wheeler-Bennett can be said to have led the perfect English historian's life, full of friendship, decency, patriotism, scholarship, and gently ironic wit, as exemplified by his superb autobiography, *Knaves, Fools and Heroes*. And at that supreme crisis moment of his nation's history, on the day that the battle of France was lost and Americans turned on their wireless sets to discover what the British would do next, his resolute tones and mastery of the English tongue left them in absolutely no doubt. ♦

B&A

The Secret Society

Hawthorne as chronicler of the American unconscious.

BY MICAH MATTIX

Nathaniel Hawthorne is an enigma.

In the heady days of Amos Bronson Alcott's progressive schooling experiment, Margaret Fuller's proto-feminist *Memoirs*, and Ralph Waldo Emerson's call to self-reliance, Hawthorne wrote short stories and "romances" peopled with characters plagued by original sin. The independent, sexual women of *The Scarlet Letter* and *The Blithedale Romance* end life either alone or dead, and characters who show Emersonian self-reliance, such as Aylmer in "The Birth-Mark" or Robin in "My Kinsman, Major Molineux," become monsters. In a three-part lecture on "The Times," Emerson argued that while the conservative defends "the actual state of things, good and bad … the project of innovation is the best possible state of things." But for Hawthorne, those who pursue such a project ruin both themselves and society.

Hawthorne's belief in original sin might suggest a man of a particular religious conviction, but he seems to have differed little from his fellow Unitarian New Englanders with regard to his views on God. That there was a divine being who providentially ruled the world, Hawthorne had little doubt. What he did doubt was that Jesus Christ was God incarnate, whose suffering had redeemed that world. For Hawthorne, we must suffer for our own sins, like Reuben in "Roger Malvin's Burial," with redemption being no sure thing.

Hawthorne's Habitations
A Literary Life
by Robert Milder
Oxford, 336 pp., $39.95

Why would a man who rejected those aspects of orthodox Christian belief that seem irrational—the trinity, the virgin birth, the divinity of Christ—hold on to the idea of original sin? Philip Rahv expressed in a 1941 essay what has become the standard take: Hawthorne continued to believe in sin because of an unconscious attachment to the vestiges of a "moribund religious tradition." He was, in Rahv's words, "unable to free himself from the perception of human destiny in terms of sin and redemption, sacrilege and consecration."

In this new biography of the American romancer, Robert Milder reminds us that, unlike so many of his contemporaries, Hawthorne was not just unable, but "unwilling" to reject the idea that we have an innate and universal disposition towards evil. "Sin," Milder writes, "was his conduit to experiential meaning, to cosmic order, to God's Providence, and to the immortality of the soul. Without the reality of sin, there was no transcendent dimension to human affairs, only the anarchic play of desire and circumstance."

Paying particular attention to Hawthorne's conception of sin, *Hawthorne's Habitations* examines his work in the context of the four central places of his life: Salem, where Hawthorne was born and spent much of his early life, including 10 years following his graduation from Bowdoin College in 1825; Concord, where he lived with his young wife, Sophia Peabody, at Emerson's grandfather's "Old Manse" from 1842 to 1845; Liverpool, England, where he served as consul; and Rome, where he lived for a year with his wife and family.

As Milder progresses, he encounters two Hawthornes: There is the "naturalist" of his journals and notebooks and the "idealist" in his stories and novels. In his journals, Milder writes, Hawthorne viewed experiences as "secular, material, finite, and shaped by social and psychological forces apart from anything supernatural." But in his fiction, we have the Hawthorne of "Young Goodman Brown"—in which the main character goes into the woods one night to meet with the devil—and of the poisonous "Rappaccini's Daughter." Milder suggest that Hawthorne's romances served as "a refuge against the threefold horrors of naturalism: the horror of universal meaninglessness; the horror of death and oblivion; and the horror of enthrallment of bodily drives, particularly the sexual." But as Milder's own analysis proves, it was more than a mere refuge. Hawthorne's creative work was an extended argument against naturalism and progressivism and their respective rejections of the reality of evil. This is the thrust of almost all of his work.

So how did Hawthorne become convinced of the reality of evil? In a word, experience. In his notebooks,

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Demi Moore as Hester Prynne in 'The Scarlet Letter' (1995)

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Milder writes, Hawthorne often referred to his room in Salem as his "dismal and squalid chamber." Editing his notebooks after his death, Hawthorne's wife struck the word "squalid" from the passage—perhaps because, as Milder suggests, the term still had carried the secondary meanings of "impure, morally polluted, [or] morally shameful." Herman Melville told Hawthorne's son, Julian, that he was convinced that there was a "secret" in Hawthorne's life which "had never been revealed, and which accounted for the gloomy passages in his books." Critics have wondered about Hawthorne's relationship to his beautiful, dark-haired sister, Ebe.

Milder dismisses suggestions of incest, "because a man of Hawthorne's character would never have gotten over it"—which, if not the most convincing of reasons, is still probably right. Yet some sort of sexual sin, whether in thought or action, seems to have taken place in Salem, given Hawthorne's preoccupation with sexuality and his attitude towards the city, particularly after college. Salem would prove to be the beginning of another idea that is central in Hawthorne's work, an idea that Milder associates with Hawthorne's first three years of marriage in Concord. It is that of love, particularly the love of a chaste woman, as the spiritual antidote to self-gratification.

Like the virtuous and innocent women of Hawthorne's tales, Sophia Peabody was not a sensual woman. She was often sick—suffering frequently from debilitating headaches—and somewhat homely, but she was also his "heavenly Dove," as Hawthorne puts it in an early letter, whom he sheltered. She, in turn, offered an innocence that allowed him to grasp "a far deeper sense of beauty." Hawthorne wrote to Sophia in 1839: "I have really thought sometimes that God gave you to me to be the salvation of my soul."

Milder claims that, for Hawthorne, love is the "cure" for man's selfishness, and that "love has its source, center, and limit in conventional marriage." This is particularly evident in Hawthorne's often-ignored *Blithedale Romance*. Based on Hawthorne's own experience at Brook Farm, *Blithedale* follows a community of progressives who, eschewing traditional family roles, attempt to create a perfect society. The problem? The members of the utopian experiment are unable to divorce themselves "from Pride"; and with no familial love to correct the errors of selfishness, the experiment ends in failure and tragedy. It is only at the conclusion of the story that the narrator, seeing the love of a family in town, comes to understand that true self-sacrificial love can only be nourished in families, in which the pleasures of sex cannot (or, at least, ought not) be divorced from the pain of childbirth and the responsibilities of parenthood.

Milder concludes this biography with a brief look at Hawthorne's time in England and Italy. While Hawthorne had come to think of earthiness as sinful, England challenged this idea. Hawthorne could (and often did) express disdain for the English lower class, but he also found something attractive in "the beef-and-ale solidity of the English character," as Milder puts it. And if England challenged Hawthorne's identification of purity and goodness with ethereality, Italy challenged his secular asceticism.

> Catholicism in Italy awakened Hawthorne to precisely those elements in Christianity that Anglo-American Puritanism had suppressed. Against

the physical barrenness of New England's churches and what he considered the spiritual barrenness of Old England, Hawthorne found the Italian churches warm and replete—brilliant to the eye but filled, too, with Stowe's "softening poetries and tender draperies."

While the beauty of Catholicism didn't bring Hawthorne to a crisis of faith—he was, at that point in his life, too set in his ways to consider any real change—he nevertheless wrote that "perhaps it would be a good time to suggest and institute" some changes to American Protestantism, such as the rise of "a new Apostle to convert it into something positive."

Milder's life of Hawthorne really is "a literary life": The focus throughout is on the sources of Hawthorne's literary preoccupations, not on the why and wherefore of the man himself. "There were not more than two or three persons in the world," Julian Hawthorne would write of his father, "to whom he could disclose himself freely." It is because of this that Hawthorne will remain a mystery. Yet, thanks to Milder's careful handling of Hawthorne's notebooks and fiction, the outline of his face is almost visible through the otherwise dark and impenetrable veil of time and personal reserve. ♦

B&A

France's de Gaulle

Or de Gaulle's France. Are the two interchangeable?

BY ROGER KAPLAN

In downtown Algiers, on June 4, 1958, Charles de Gaulle expressed himself clearly, as usual. The conventional wisdom has it that he was "ambiguous," even "duplicitous." But what he said was that the page had to be turned in Algeria: Political and civil institutions had to be reformed; there could not be two classes of citizens. He said it clearly. He said there must be educational and career opportunities for all.

Algeria, formally, was administratively and politically part of France, divided into three "departments." In practice, it was treated like a colony in which just under a million European settlers (about a quarter of whom were of French background) had a distinctly better deal than the 10 million *indigènes* (as non-Europeans were called), a large majority of whom were Muslim (with some Jews and Christians). The *indigènes* were divided about equally between Arabs and Berbers, with both groups subdivided along tribal, sectional, and clan lines.

In the Shadow of the General
Modern France and the Myth of De Gaulle
by Sudhir Hazareesingh
Oxford, 256 pp., $29.95

It was a complicated country, but by no means incomprehensible; Tocqueville had grasped the essence of the situation when he visited during the early stages of the military conquest in the 1830s and '40s. Tocqueville, with a ruthlessness that shocks us who are used to his acute but approving analyses of the balancing acts and politics-is-always-local features of American democracy, said that the colonial enterprise was a lousy idea, but if you must do it, you either repress without pity or you assimilate systematically.

He actually favored the latter but thought the French would not like that, for all manner of reasons of racial and religious snobbery. Moreover, he said, if you export a system of rigidly centralized administration, which was already proving to be a failure in France, you could be sure it would fail in Algeria. Tocqueville predicted that it would all end badly.

It was certainly going badly in the 1950s. De Gaulle took advantage of a movement by army officers in Algeria who were frustrated by the inability of the government to end what was commonly called the Algerian War (official statements referred only to "acts of terrorism" and "measures to maintain order"). De Gaulle did not overthrow the Fourth Republic, notwithstanding his decadelong opposition to its constitution; but he did accept the invitation of the parliamentarians to form a government. Admittedly, there was something of an offer-you-can't-refuse quality to those dramatic May days, but de Gaulle was a stickler for legality and constitutional continuity. He considered it his duty to become the last president of the council (prime minister) of what he referred to as "*le régime des partis*."

After announcing that a new constitution would be drafted and submitted to the nation for approval, the 68-year-old general traveled to Algeria and made that famous—or notorious—speech, leading with a line whose meaning Frenchmen of a certain age—as well as historians—still debate: "*Je vous ai compris*" ("I understand you").

He did not say *what* he understood—and why should he? He understood that they were upset and insecure and wanted order to be restored in the context of an Algeria associated with France. Everyone knew that the audience—mainly composed of Algerians of European extraction who were opposed to the independence demands of an insurrectionary movement called the National Liberation Front (FLN)—desired the maintenance of a French-controlled Algeria.

De Gaulle continued, in this characteristically short and pointed speech:

I know what has been going on here. I know what you are trying to do. I see that you are on the road

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> to renovation and fraternity. And that is why I am here, because you understand that we must begin at the beginning, which means that from this day, in Algeria, there can be only one class of Frenchman, with the same rights and duties.

He referred to the dignity and civil and political rights and opportunities that had to be granted to "those who previously did not have them," making it clear that he considered the whole segregationist structure of governance in Algeria a thing of the past. He used words that were essential to his political thinking: *ensemble*, *fraternité*, *France*. He did not say that French Algeria, with all that implied at that time, was viable or worth defending. But many chose to hear him say exactly that.

The willful misunderstanding of de Gaulle's important statements by the French—or, more precisely, by various French constituencies at different times—was one of the characteristics of his political life. Was it his fault, or theirs? De Gaulle was devoted to the idea of a constitutional, representative government supported by a strong republican state; his whole life proves this. But he was partial to a plebiscitary style that he believed necessary to maintain the bond between citizens and executive. He inspired passionate loyalty and support as well as intense opposition, even hatred. Quite a few of his strongest supporters felt, in time, that he had betrayed France's higher interests.

This is the Gaullian paradox: The most important historical figure in 20th-century France was, throughout his career, the most controversial. However, according to Sudhir Hazareesingh, after de Gaulle retired from public life, and soon thereafter died, a consensus took hold in France that the whole country really was Gaullist. The thesis advanced by this book is that Charles de Gaulle, quite apart from the policies he promoted, was and remains the incarnation of the national genius, somewhat like Vercingetorix, Joan of Arc, or (as de Gaulle himself said in jest) Tintin, the Belgian comic book reporter and champion of justice with whom millions in France identified for decades.

KATHERINE MESSENGER

In the Shadow of the General is a study of how the Gaullists, the general foremost among them, quite deliberately and assiduously built the legend of a Gaullist France in such a thorough way that it became an integral part of French political—one can almost say cultural—reality. True, the only "Gaullist" in last year's presidential election, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, won less than 2 percent of the first-round vote, largely because "Gaullism" as a political movement ended with de Gaulle. But the hatred that de Gaulle inspired among leftists who mistook him for a military dictator, and among certain rightists attached to the dream of French Algeria, gradually was replaced by a consensus that he had left France in better shape than he had found it—and no more need be said.

As Hazareesingh sees it, the key to his project was to insist on a kind of secular cult of the great national efforts of the century, the great moments of what de Gaulle himself called (as he did on that June day in Algiers) "*redressement*" and "*renouveau*"—rebuilding and renewal. The third "r" here would be *résistance*; a fourth would be *rayonnement* (influence). There were also *grandeur* and *gloire*—and indeed, there is a whole industry devoted to the study of de Gaulle's rhetoric. This would, in itself, be evidence of the Gaullists' success, and, while acknowledging this, Hazareesingh subtly and gently (for he does not hide his admiration for his subject) notes that it may also be a sign that Gaullism has run its course. (He notes, for example, that recent commemorations of the "Appeal of June 18" have required a cumbersome explanation, suggesting that the French, or at least those under 50, do not know what happened in their country during May-June 1940.)

Notwithstanding the meanspirited nature of the recent presidential campaign, Hazareesingh believes that France owes to de Gaulle a vast deal of appeasement, or pacification—that is to say that de Gaulle was the agent and, in the collective memory of France, the personification of the reconciliation of contrary impulses in French political history. Republicans and royalists, bourgeois and proletarians, Roman Catholics and secularists, colonialists and liberals, these and many other opposites in French political life eventually rediscovered a center in the institutions, the economic growth, and the political culture that

developed in the half-century following World War II. De Gaulle was the man who best understood how to calm France's historical passions.

Which, of course, is the irony of the story. For if de Gaulle—a man of the right who fought the political right all his life; a devout Catholic who, more than anyone in his time, fought for the sanctity of the values and institutions of the secular Republic; a social Christian and statist who never gave an inch to what he viewed as the totalitarian tendencies of the left—aimed to calm things down by calling off the ancient civil wars of French history, he was also a man of romance and passion, whose life was described as a medieval *geste*, and who wrote of France as a country of fairytale legend. And yet, he also called the French a bunch of slippers-wearers.

'Je vous ai compris,' Algiers, June 4, 1958

So the question is whether, in reconciling opposites, he overlooked his own contradictory goals of creating stable institutions while playing an epic role in the affairs of nations.

François Mitterrand was the most overtly and concretely hostile to de Gaulle among the Fifth Republic presidents, and it is fitting that he was also the one who most relished and took advantage of the regal aspects of the presidential office. De Gaulle himself, though in favor of a strong executive, had no taste for luxury. He did not believe in expense accounts. While in office, he paid the utility bills of the residential quarters at the Élysée Palace, a home he would have readily traded for the barracks at the École Militaire. "At my age," he said upon returning to power in 1958, "would I want to embark on a new career as a dictator?"

At moments of crisis, however, de Gaulle wore the uniform of the brigadier general he had been during the epic of Free France—and that he remained for the rest of his life. When, in 1961, desperate and despairing soldiers rebelled against his Algeria policy (which, by then, accepted the principles of majority rule and independence), he went, once again, before the nation—and the enlisted men in Algeria, to whom he had with foresight distributed transistor radios—and was terse, as usual, with a strong lede: *Un pouvoir insurrectionnel s'est établi en Algérie par un pronunciamiento militaire . . .*

He denounced the coup as a foursome of retired generals. (Actually, its leader, General Maurice Challe, was the officer most responsible for defeating the FLN on the ground.) De Gaulle also announced the application of Article 16—having been approved, he took care to remind listeners, by parliament, in keeping with the constitution—giving him full power to deal with the crisis. He did so by ordering French soldiers to disobey any orders emanating from the junta. With only the First Foreign Legion joining the mutiny, and the popular pro-French Algeria generals Jacques Massu and Marcel Bigeard gone from the theater (though it is unlikely they would have opposed his orders), the coup collapsed, only to degenerate into the appalling irredentism of the OAS and its terrorist campaign.

This broadcast was more immediately and directly effective than the June 18 Appeal of 21 years before, and Hazareesingh is right to underscore the work Gaullists put into turning such "gestures" into historically iconic moments. He is right, too, to stress the symbolic value that Gaullists recognized in such deeds, however insignificant they may have seemed at the time.

The French eventually turned de Gaulle into a representative figure of their recent history. He was that, of course; but he was also at his best in opposition, and therefore in controversy. Today, few observers seem terribly interested in questioning his foreign policy choices: Did he help the Soviet Union maintain its grip on Central and Eastern Europe? Did he encourage the North Vietnamese victory in Indochina? Was his Africa policy in practice a form of neocolonialism that contributed to the continent's failure in the half-century that followed decolonization—or was it the best that could be done?

These kinds of questions will eventually become the normal stuff of France's understanding of its own history. Hazareesingh is surely correct that, for this to happen, a "certain idea" of Charles de Gaulle, a certain serenity about his role in French history, needs to be achieved. ♦

TIME & LIFE PICTURES / GETTY IMAGES

B&A

Under the Rainbow

A charming 20th-century fairy tale gets the crass treatment. **BY JOHN PODHORETZ**

I've spent worse hours at the movies than the ones I spent watching *Oz the Great and Powerful*, which purports to tell the story of how the Wizard gained his dominion over the Emerald City. It has a great title sequence, there are a few good lines, and there's an absolutely magical conceit involving a broken China doll that, once repaired, turns into an enchantingly bossy 10-year-old. My kids, 8 and 6, liked it fine, weren't bored, sat without fidgeting. The film made $80 million its first weekend because of children like them and parents like me, and it is likely to be a worldwide hit. But it's still indefensible, and a complete *shondeh*, as my grandmother would have said.

The plot features a womanizing carnival magician named Oscar (Oz for short) who flees a jealous husband in a hot-air balloon. The balloon carries him to a magical land that bears his name. He's told by a pretty witch (Mila Kunis) that his arrival was foretold in a prophecy: A great wizard would arrive from the sky to save the kingdom. She and her sister (Rachel Weisz) are in a battle with a wicked witch (Michelle Williams) and need his help to win. Oz knows he's not a wizard, but goes along with it, hoping to secure the riches of the Emerald City for himself, until (of course) he ultimately decides to stand and fight for justice.

As the foregoing indicates, there's nothing especially involving here. The director, Sam Raimi, who has made terrifically energetic tiny movies (*The Evil Dead*) as well as huge ones (*Spider-Man 2*), can't find a decent pace. Moreover, despite spending $200 million, mostly on effects, the land of Oz looks more like papier-mâché and matte paintings than the 1939 version. And Raimi's Oz is bizarrely underpopulated. While there are 50 percent more witches than Judy Garland had to face (three instead of two), there are only about 11 munchkins and 5 other residents of the Emerald City. Since there's a lot of talk about how the people of Oz deserve to be free, there should probably have been a few more of them.

Oz the Great and Powerful
Directed by Sam Raimi

James Franco

But the true calamity here is the casting of James Franco as the Wizard. To use the word "terrible" to describe Franco's performance would be an injustice to Czar Ivan. Franco is spectacularly, shockingly inauthentic, unable to convey even a semblance of a recognizable emotion. He comes across like the star of a sixth-grade play who is doing his best at all times not to roll his eyes so that his friends will know he's embarrassed to be up there onstage. I've had little use for Franco before this movie, and found him appalling as an Oscars host a couple years ago; but I was unprepared for how obnoxiously unsuitable he would prove to be here. Raimi's original idea was to have Robert Downey Jr. play the Wizard, and that would have been perfect: Downey specializes in finding the soulfulness that lurks inside the fast-talking phony. Franco barely exists in two dimensions. He can't even talk fast.

So Franco is bad and the movie is mediocre; why, then, is *Oz the Great and Powerful* a disgrace? Because Raimi and his team of screenwriters have made something literal out of the 20th century's foremost fairy tale. They treat Oz as though it were the planet from *Avatar* rather than the metaphorical manifestation of a child's unconscious, and thus they betray the story's core meaning and turn it into a lifeless action-adventure.

There's nothing sacrosanct about *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz*; L. Frank Baum's 1900 novel and its many sequels have been the source material for more movies and television shows than most people remember. They were and are all forgettable, save for the 1939 musical that is (according to the Library of Congress) the most-watched film ever made. But the bad ones didn't make anyone angry, and this one is making people angry. Indeed, when Gregory Maguire released his novelistic prequel *Wicked* in 1995, it sold well; and the novel has since been turned into a wildly successful Broadway musical that will, at some point toward the end of this decade, become the most profitable stage presentation in history. *Wicked* is a politically correct revisionist fairy tale about power and powerlessness and the misuse of history. But it's still a *fairy* tale, and that is what's most important.

If Raimi and company had found an inspired new approach to Oz, its resonances with the great movie-musical and with Baum's stories would have been amusing and touching rather than annoying and infuriating. When Franco first arrives in Oz, his balloon's basket lands in water and travels quickly down a river and then over waterfalls while he yells, "Yeeeooww." My 8-year-old turned to me and said, "In 10 years they're going to make this a ride at Disney World."

That's what *Oz the Great and Powerful* is, in the end: a theme-park ride in which your seat never moves. ♦

DISNEY

John Podhoretz, editor of Commentary, *is* The Weekly Standard*'s movie critic.*

THE AMERICAN COMBOVER ASSOCIATION

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News Release
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For Immediate Release

Senator Levin is 2013 MacArthur Medalist

The Board of Trustees of the American Combover Association is pleased to announce that it will present its annual MacArthur Medal to retiring Senator Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan, who has served in the U.S. Senate since 1979 and is currently chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Named for General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), the medal is awarded annually to a distinguished American in public life whose combover has not only contributed to his professional success but has attracted wide attention and admiration as well, leading to broader public understanding and acceptance of men who choose to comb those remaining strands of hair across the expanse of their bald pates.

"Our friend Senator Levin is famous, I might even say notorious, in the nation's capital not only for the length and audaciousness of his combover," says ACA Chairman and CEO Ernest J. Flywheel in announcing this year's MacArthur medalist, "but also for his unusually low part, which practically begins at the level of the left ear. He has made the Armed Services Committee a 'combover-friendly' environment in the U.S. Capitol, where references to 'the Dome' don't necessarily mean the building."

Mr. Flywheel also said that Senator Levin, who will receive the medal at a ceremony in Washington next month, becomes the fourth U.S. Senator to win the coveted award, following the late Senators Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan (1950) and James Eastland of Mississippi (1966), and Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota (2004).



MacArthur Vandenberg Eastland Dorgan

In other ACA news, nominations are being accepted for next year's Proxmire-Thurmond-Biden Award, which recognizes the Senate's best hair transplant and is widely