



the weekly
Standard

MAY 16, 2011

\$4.95

**A GREAT
VICTORY
IN A LONG WAR**

**The death of bin Laden
and what lies ahead**

**THOMAS DONNELLY
REUEL MARC GERECHT
STEPHEN F. HAYES & THOMAS JOSCELYN
FREDERICK W. KAGAN & KIMBERLY KAGAN
WILLIAM KRISTOL
BENJAMIN RUNKLE**

here's what we did today:



added over
\$1 billion to
the economy.



employed
nearly 3 million
Americans.



generated
2,500,000
kilowatts.



heated
57 million
U.S. homes.



delivered
over 150,000
packages.



gave thousands
of kids cleaner
rides to school.



powered
29 million home
computers.



melted tons
of recycled
glass.



roasted
millions of
coffee beans.




made the U.S.
less dependent
on foreign energy.

 AMERICA'S
NATURAL GAS
**smarter
power
today.**

All in a day's work for a cleaner domestic energy.

anga.us



Explore 3 Millennia of Genius

Perhaps more so than in any other discipline, philosophy is best understood as a “great conversation” held across hundreds of years. All philosophers—and we are all philosophers or their followers—have the same eternal questions: What is the nature of the world? What can we know about it? How should we govern ourselves and each other?

Professor Daniel N. Robinson focuses on the Long Debate about the nature of self and self identity, the authority of experience and the authority of science, and the right form of life. On what philosophical precepts does the rule of law depend? On what basis, philosophically, did we ever come to regard ourselves as outside the order of nature? These lectures take you into the exciting world of ideas and return to abiding issues confronted by each new age and thinker. They are more than a collection of the thoughts of various geniuses; they link their concerns across centuries, making their debates a part of our own.

Offer expires 05/26/11

1-800-832-2412

WWW.THEGREATCOURSES.COM/8WKS

The Great Ideas of Philosophy, 2nd Edition

Taught by Professor Daniel N. Robinson
OXFORD UNIVERSITY

LECTURE TITLES

1. From the Upanishads to Homer
2. Philosophy—Did the Greeks Invent It?
3. Pythagoras and the Divinity of Number
4. What Is There?
5. The Greek Tragedians on Man's Fate
6. Herodotus and the Lamp of History
7. Socrates on the Examined Life
8. Plato's Search For Truth
9. Can Virtue Be Taught?
10. Plato's *Republic*—Man Writ Large
11. Hippocrates and the Science of Life
12. Aristotle on the Knowable
13. Aristotle on Friendship
14. Aristotle on the Perfect Life
15. Rome, the Stoics, and the Rule of Law
16. The Stoic Bridge to Christianity
17. Roman Law—Making a City of the Once-Wide World
18. The Light Within—Augustine on Human Nature
19. Islam
20. Secular Knowledge—The Idea of University
21. The Reappearance of Experimental Science
22. Scholasticism and the Theory of Natural Law
23. The Renaissance—Was There One?
24. Let Us Burn the Witches to Save Them
25. Francis Bacon and the Authority of Experience
26. Descartes and the Authority of Reason
27. Newton—The Saint of Science
28. Hobbes and the Social Machine
29. Locke's Newtonian Science of the Mind
30. No matter? The Challenge of Materialism
31. Hume and the Pursuit of Happiness
32. Thomas Reid and the Scottish School
33. France and the Philosophes
34. *The Federalist Papers* and the Great Experiment
35. What is Enlightenment? Kant on Freedom
36. Moral Science and the Natural World
37. Phenology—A Science of the Mind
38. The Idea of Freedom
39. The Hegelians and History
40. The Aesthetic Movement—Genius
41. Nietzsche at the Twilight
42. The Liberal Tradition—J. S. Mill
43. Darwin and Nature's "Purposes"
44. Marxism—Dead But Not Forgotten
45. The Freudian World
46. The Radical William James
47. William James's Pragmatism
48. Wittgenstein and the Discursive Turn
49. Alan Turing in the Forest of Wisdom
50. Four Theories of the Good Life
51. Ontology—What There "Really" Is
52. Philosophy of Science—The Last Word?
53. Philosophy of Psychology and Related Confusions
54. Philosophy of Mind, If There Is One
55. What makes a Problem "Moral"?
56. Medicine and the Value of Life
57. On the Nature of Law
58. Justice and Just Wars
59. Aesthetics—Beauty Without Observers
60. God—Really?

The Great Ideas of Philosophy, 2nd Edition
Course no. 4200 | 60 lectures (30 minutes/lecture)

SAVE UP TO \$475

DVD ~~\$624.95~~ NOW \$149.95
+\$20 Shipping, Processing, and Lifetime Satisfaction Guarantee
CD ~~\$449.95~~ NOW \$99.95
+\$15 Shipping, Processing, and Lifetime Satisfaction Guarantee
Priority Code: 51851

Designed to meet the demand for lifelong learning, The Great Courses is a highly popular series of audio and video lectures led by top professors and experts. Each of our more than 300 courses is an intellectually engaging experience that will change how you think about the world. Since 1990, over 9 million courses have been sold.

Competition is everything.

*Competition is the steady hand at our back, pushing us to faster,
better, smarter, simpler, lighter, thinner, cooler.*

Competition is the fraternal twin of innovation.

*And innovation led us to offer America's first 4G phone,
first unlimited 4G plan, first all-digital voice network,
first nationwide 3G network,
and first 4G network from a national carrier.*

All of which, somewhat ironically, led our competition to follow.

*Competition is American.
Competition plays fair.*

Competition keeps us all from returning to a Ma Bell-like, sorry-but-you-have-no-choice past.

Competition is the father of rapid progress and better value.

*Competition inspires us to think about the future,
which inspires us to think about the world,
which inspires us to think about the planet,
which inspired us to become
the greenest company among wireless carriers.*

*Competition has many friends,
but its very best is the consumer.*

Competition has many believers, and we are among them.

*Competition brings out our best,
and gives it to you.*



All. Together. Now.™

Contents

May 16, 2011 • Volume 16, Number 33



- 2 The Scrapbook *The president's assistant, giving interrogators their due, & more*
- 5 Casual *Irwin M. Stelzer, wedding watcher*
- 6 Editorials
Justice **BY WILLIAM KRISTOL**
You Get What You Pay For **BY THOMAS DONNELLY**

Articles

- 8 Whither Jihad? **BY REUEL MARC GERECHT**
Islamic militancy preceded Osama bin Laden. Unfortunately, it will probably outlast him, too.
- 12 Target Neutralized **BY BENJAMIN RUNKLE**
The mixed history of strategic manhunts
- 14 Governing Kentucky **BY JOHN DAVID DYCHE**
The Bluegrass State's other horse race
- 16 Triumph of the Conservatives **BY FRED BARNES**
Are they now the natural governing party of Canada?
- 18 Egypt's Other Extremists **BY PAUL MARSHALL**
While the Muslim Brotherhood gets all the ink, the Salafists go on a rampage

Features

- 22 Bin Laden Is Dead . . . **BY FREDERICK W. KAGAN & KIMBERLY KAGAN**
But al Qaeda isn't
- 25 Reasonable Suspicion **BY STEPHEN F. HAYES & THOMAS JOSCELYN**
What did Pakistan's military and intelligence agents know about bin Laden's whereabouts?

Books & Arts

- 30 Who's on First? **BY JAMES M. BANNER JR.**
The year Delaware made history
- 33 The Opposing Self **BY ALEC SOLOMITA**
When social pressures stand in the way of black success
- 34 Divine Intervention **BY FRANCIS J. BECKWITH**
What religion means to politics, and vice versa
- 36 Canadian Contra **BY KELLY JANE TORRANCE**
Making the case against mindless tinkering
- 37 Oh, the Humanities! **BY MARK BAUERLEIN**
They have seen the enemy, and it isn't who you think
- 39 How Is John Galt? **BY JOHN PODHORETZ**
America's favorite drugstore polemic goes Hollywood
- 40 Parody *Atheists in a foxhole*



The Ultimate Assistant to the President

In the midst of the Osama bin Laden news last week occurred one of those quiet cultural transitions that catch THE SCRAPBOOK's attention. We are speaking of the death, in Stamford, Connecticut, of 91-year-old Hubert J. Schlafly Jr.

Mr. Schlafly, who so far as THE SCRAPBOOK is aware was not closely related to Phyllis Schlafly of Eagle Forum fame, was the onetime "director of television research" at 20th Century Fox. One day, in the late 1940s, he received a request from the vice president for radio and television at Fox, Irving Kahn. Kahn had been talking to a Broadway actor named Fred Barton, who told him that he had an idea for a mechanical device that could help him remember his lines. Could Hub Schlafly build the contraption conceived by Fred Barton?

"I said it was a piece of cake," Schlafly told the *Stamford Advocate* a few years ago. He attached a motorized scroll inside a suitcase shell, printed half-inch letters on the scroll, and set the device beside some television cameras. The teleprompter was born.

Schlafly, Kahn, and Barton must have instantly realized they'd hit the jackpot, for all three quit their jobs and founded the TelePrompTer Corp., which revolutionized not only television production—it was first used on

a soap opera in 1950—but also politics as well. Former President Herbert Hoover was the first prominent politician to use a teleprompter, in a speech at the 1952 Republican national convention, and Lyndon Johnson was the



The president, with teleprompter

first president to use a teleprompter routinely in public appearances.

Since then, of course, presidents, game show hosts, news readers, and just about anybody who regularly speaks into television cameras has come to rely on Schlafly's device. In its early days, there was a certain stigma attached to teleprompter dependence, and some presidents used them more than others; but the stigma has long since vanished. Indeed, so ubiquitous has it become that, in 1994, when Bill Clinton real-

ized that his teleprompter contained the wrong speech during an address to Congress, he was obliged to improvise for several minutes. When it was revealed that Clinton had winged it on national television, he was widely congratulated for not melting down.

Which makes the case of President Obama even more intriguing. Among the president's many magical qualities, of course, is his reported high intelligence and golden tongue. He is admired, especially in journalistic circles, for his oratory and lawyer's gift of gab. But Obama is also unusually dependent on teleprompters—the apparatus can be seen just about anywhere he speaks, even to children—and when he is obliged to say a few words in public without a teleprompter, he is surprisingly in-

articulate. The smooth, teleprompted operator suddenly sounds tongue-tied, confused, even a little panicky.

Which proves, in THE SCRAPBOOK's estimation, one of two things—maybe both: that the influence of the teleprompter on American politics has been nearly as profound as the invention of aerosol hairspray; and that Barack Obama is not quite as miraculous as he—and E.J. Dionne and Maureen Dowd and Jonathan Alter and all the other camp-followers—seem to believe. ♦

Giving Interrogators Their Due

On Sunday, May 1, a team of Navy SEALs raided Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan and killed him. Over the next several days, we learned about the intelligence that made the assault possible. It started, according to senior intelligence officials, with the *nom de guerre* of bin Laden's courier and housemate—Ahmed al-

Kuwaiti. That crucial piece of information was the first step on the long, difficult path to bin Laden. Without it, according to a U.S. intelligence official THE SCRAPBOOK's colleague Stephen F. Hayes spoke with last week, Osama bin Laden would be alive today. The intel came from captured al Qaeda terrorists who had been subject to the enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) employed by the CIA during George W. Bush's presidency.

But if you get your news only from the *New York Times*, the self-styled newspaper of record, you would have read on Wednesday that information from enhanced interrogations played only a "small role at most" in finding bin Laden.

The *Times* is heavily invested in this storyline, having claimed repeatedly over the years that such interrogations are ineffective. Never mind that the CIA's own declassified assessment

AP / GERALD HERBERT

of the interrogations demonstrates the opposite: Some 70 percent of what the U.S. intelligence community knows about al Qaeda came from detainees subject to enhanced interrogation, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad willingly gave “terrorist tutorials” to his interrogators after he was broken.


The *Times* reporters knew better. Scott Shane, whose coverage of national security would fit comfortably in the pages of the *Nation*, was one of those reporters. The other was Charlie Savage, author most recently of *Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy*.

The authors pitted Bush administration officials against “human rights advocates” and former intelligence officials. They quoted Glenn Carle, a former CIA operative. Carle did not speak directly to the piece of intelligence that set the CIA on the trail to bin Laden, but he did share his opinion that coercive techniques “didn’t provide useful, meaningful, trustworthy information.” Such procedures, he added, were “un-American.” The next day, Carle continued his campaign against enhanced interrogation on a conference call conducted by the left-wing think tank Center for American Progress.

If Carle was not in a position to talk specifically about the intelligence that led to bin Laden, others were. In 2007, former CIA director Mike Hayden told analysts and operatives at the agency to refocus their search for bin Laden on his courier network. In a radio interview on the afternoon before the *Times* piece ran, Hayden said that there is a “straight line” between the intelligence produced by interrogators and bin Laden’s death.

But it was the comments of current CIA director Leon Panetta that were particularly newsworthy. In an interview with NBC’s Brian Williams that aired the night before the *Times* piece ran, Panetta confirmed that intelligence obtained through enhanced interrogations helped the agency find bin Laden.

Williams asked Panetta about “the sourcing on the intel that ultimately led to this successful attack” and whether “it was as a result of wa-



terboarding that we learned what we needed to learn to go after bin Laden.”

Panetta said: “You know, Brian, in the intelligence business you work from a lot of sources of information and that was true here. We had a multiple source—a multiple series of sources that provided information with regards to the situation. Clearly some of it came from detainees and the interrogation, but we also had information from other sources as well.”

Williams pressed: “Turned around the other way, are you denying that waterboarding was, in part, among the tactics used to extract the intelligence that led to this successful mission?”

Panetta was clear: “No. I think some of the detainees clearly were, you know, they used these enhanced interrogation techniques against some

of these detainees. But I’m also saying that, you know, the debate about whether we would have gotten the same information through other approaches I think is always going to be an open question.”

To some extent, then, Barack Obama owes his singular national security achievement to interrogation practices that he condemned for years and finally banned as president. And the confirmation of that deeply ironic point comes from the two most recent heads of the CIA—including the man that Obama selected for the job and has now chosen to run the Pentagon.

The *Times*, however, did not find this news fit to print. They ignored it.

A third source with deep knowledge of the intelligence also contradicted the paper’s analysis. Jose Rodriguez, who

ran the CIA's counterterrorism center from 2002 to 2005, said that the intelligence extracted from two high-level al Qaeda operatives after EITs was "the lead information" that made the operation possible. Rodriguez told *Time* magazine: "Information provided by KSM and Abu Faraj al Libbi about bin Laden's courier was the lead information that eventually led to the location of [bin Laden's] compound and the operation that led to his death."

Readers of the *New York Times* do not know this. The paper neglected to mention the assessments of Rodriguez, Hayden, and, most astonishingly, Leon Panetta. Perhaps that helps explain why weekday circulation is down nearly 9 percent since last year. ♦

Don't Drive, He Said

Throughout the Obama presidency there's been a steady stream of stories about radical policy proposals from various quarters of the administration. As a general rule, these stories are so crazy it's scarcely believable they're even contemplating the cockamamie ideas. Remember when the EPA was considering a ban on traditional lead ammunition? Or the Obama administration's feints at putting serious curbs on sport fishing? Such proposals have a tendency to be quickly squashed, but they are a rather revealing window into the mentality of the Obama administration's worker bees.

Well, here's the latest what-on-God's-green-earth-are-they-thinking story: A proposal is afoot to tax people based on how much they drive. Curiously, the administration is trying the neat trick of saying it doesn't necessarily support the proposal even as it floats the plan.

"This is not an administration proposal," White House spokeswoman Jennifer Psaki told the *Hill*. "This is not a bill supported by the administration. This was an early working draft proposal that was never formally circulated within the administration, does not take into account the advice of the president's senior advisers, economic team, or cabinet officials, and does not represent the views of the president." ♦

Not supported by the president? Well, it has been a whole month since the president told citizens at a town hall in Pennsylvania struggling with gas prices to buy new cars. This is a president who can't bring himself even to pretend to feel your pain.

It's also curious that this is happening now in light of contemporary transportation trends. We used to decry "white flight" to the suburbs, but in recent years the opposite has been happening. Wealthy transplants have been driving up property values in revitalized city centers, causing many to seek affordable housing elsewhere.

Just last week, the *Los Angeles Times* had an editorial celebrating the fact that growth in the "Inland Empire" outside of L.A.—driven mostly by minorities and urban poor—had slowed. Apparently, this growth was responsible for Southern California's "dependence on cars, its sprawl and the lack of regional planning."

Naturally, the *Times* editorial board's concern over a "lack of regional planning" devolves into predictable whining about not building pie-in-the-sky public transportation projects. Apparently, the fact that millions can't afford to live in the city but can afford cars is a problem that needs to be rectified. (The car tax proposal is one possible solution to this vexing conundrum.) *Reason* writer Tim Cavanaugh, a former *Times* editorial board member, has called this editorial out for what it is: "Purse-lipped snobbery wrapped up in a disguise of liberal concern."

There's an election next year, so don't expect the president to push a driving tax. But deep down, just know that his administration is probably seriously considering any number of ridiculous ideas to stop the angry phone calls from Al Gore and force Americans onto those impractical high speed rail lines Obama's so intent on building. We might call taxing car drivers by the mile "purse-lipped snobbery wrapped up in a disguise of liberal concern," but to Obama it's simply "catering to the base." ♦

the weekly
Standard
www.weeklystandard.com

William Kristol, *Editor*
Fred Barnes, *Executive Editor*
Richard Starr, *Deputy Editor*
Claudia Anderson, *Managing Editor*
Christopher Caldwell, Andrew Ferguson,
Victorino Matus, Lee Smith, *Senior Editors*
Philip Terzian, *Literary Editor*
Stephen F. Hayes, Matt Labash,
Jonathan V. Last, *Senior Writers*
Matthew Continetti, *Opinion Editor*
Jay Cost, John McCormack, *Staff Writers*
Mark Hemingway, *Online Editor*
Daniel Halper, Emily Schultheis,
Deputy Online Editors
Kari Barbic, Kelly Jane Torrance,
Assistant Editors
Michael Warren, *Editorial Assistant*
Philip Chalk, *Design Director*
Barbara Kytte, *Design Assistant*
Carolyn Wimmer, *Executive Assistant*
Max Boot, Joseph Bottum, Tucker Carlson,
Noemie Emery, Joseph Epstein, David Frum,
David Gelernter, Reuel Marc Gerech,
Michael Goldfarb, Mary Katharine Ham,
Brit Hume, Frederick W. Kagan, Robert Kagan,
Charles Krauthammer, Tod Lindberg,
Robert Messenger, P.J. O'Rourke,
John Podhoretz, Irwin M. Stelzer,
Contributing Editors
Terry Eastland, *Publisher*
Nicholas H.B. Swezey, *Advertising Director*
Catherine Lowe, *Digital Business Director*
Richard Trocchia, *Fulfillment Manager*
T. Barry Davis, *Senior Advertising Manager*
Kathy Schaffhauser, *Finance Director*
Nik Nelson, *Marketing Assistant*
Taybor Cook, *Office Manager*
Andrew Kaumeier, *Staff Assistant*
Advertising inquiries:
202-293-4900

The Weekly Standard (ISSN 1083-3013), a division of Clarity Media Group, is published weekly (except the first week in January, third week in April, second week in July, and fourth week in August) at 1150 17th St., NW, Suite 505, Washington D.C. 20036. Periodicals postage paid at Washington, DC, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to The Weekly Standard, P.O. Box 421203, Palm Coast, FL 32142-1203. For subscription customer service in the United States, call 1-800-274-7293. For new subscription orders, please call 1-800-283-2014. Subscribers: Please send new subscription orders and changes of address to The Weekly Standard, P.O. Box 421203, Palm Coast, FL 32142-1203. Please include your latest magazine mailing label. Allow 3 to 5 weeks for arrival of first copy and address changes. Canadian/foreign orders require additional postage and must be paid in full prior to commencement of service. Canadian/foreign subscribers may call 1-850-682-7644 for subscription inquiries. American Express, Visa/MasterCard payments accepted. Cover price, \$4.95. Back issues, \$4.95 (includes postage and handling). Send letters to the editor to The Weekly Standard, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Suite 505, Washington, DC 20036-4617. For a copy of The Weekly Standard Privacy Policy, visit www.weeklystandard.com or write to Customer Service, The Weekly Standard, 1150 17th St., NW, Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20036. Copyright 2009, Clarity Media Group. All rights reserved. No material in The Weekly Standard may be reprinted without permission of the copyright owner. The Weekly Standard is a registered trademark of Clarity Media Group.



There'll Always Be an England

Because we spend a lot of time in Britain, my wife, Cita, and I were especially interested in the reaction of American friends to the royal wedding. Some enjoyed the spectacle; many thought it rather nice that this beautiful commoner fit the glass slipper; many thought the whole process a silly anachronism—“twits in sashes,” one commentator joked. They are all right, but they miss the real importance of the event.

For the royal family, the wedding marked an end to what the British would call a rough patch. The emotionally obtuse Prince of Wales failed to convince his young wife, Diana, that men in his position traditionally had mistresses and that, as one Tory grandee told me, “she should take the diamonds and be quiet.” Then there was Diana’s manipulation of the media. Knowing that her picture on the front page was worth a boost in circulation of 50,000, she tried to induce editor friends of ours to play up the brutal treatment she had received from a royal family that offered no support to a teenager way over her head in both the family’s businesses, being royal and being loved. Finally, the Queen’s inability to comprehend the depth of the emotions unleashed by Diana’s death at 36 in a car crash almost brought down the House of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, renamed Windsor when World War I became something of an issue.

I arrived in London the morning after Diana’s death, and I, too, was amazed at the floral outpourings and the tears from a tough-looking plumber. Were it not for Tony Blair, who finally persuaded the Queen to put a quiver in the royal upper lip and dispatched his media-savvy team to the palace, Kate Middleton might have married Bill the helicopter pilot, instead of becoming

the Duchess of Cambridge, consort of Prince William.

But there was something even more important than the second kiss and the staged plain-clothes departure from the palace by the royal newlyweds. Britain has endured a wave of immigration that has strained its social fabric. New documents reveal that Blair and his then-chancellor of the exchequer, Gordon Brown, secretly opened the door to a wave of immigration almost ten times the level they inherited. Blair was infatu-



ated with multiculturalism, Brown with the prospect of cheap labor that would keep wages and prices down while he went on a spending binge. Both knew their Labour party constituents would hate this: It is, after all, *their* schools that were inundated with non-English-speaking kids, *their* hospitals overloaded with new immigrants, *their* neighborhoods that saw strange new costumes and smelled unfamiliar cooking, *their* jobs that were threatened. So the decision to open the gates was kept a deep, dark secret until some Blair aides recently leaked the truth.

The result is a Britain with more unassimilated immigrants than it can comfortably absorb, and a strain on its welfare, education, health, and hous-

ing systems. When Cita visited the northern town of Bradford recently, she was the only woman in a shopping center not in a burka. When we stroll down Oxford Street, we see as many shoppers wearing headscarves, veils, and the like (and often pushing prams) as we see women in jeans. Now 62 and ever tone-deaf, Prince Charles, should he outlive his 85-year-old mother, wants his title changed from Defender of the Faith—Anglicanism—to Defender of Faith.

Never mind the positive contributions many immigrants have made to the economic and cultural life of Britain: That’s for the metropolitan elites to savor. Those contributions are less relevant to the middle class, which bears the social costs of the immigration of millions with no interest in assimilation, some of them violently hostile to Western values.

Which is where the wedding comes in. It was quintessentially British, a reaffirmation of the country’s unity under the crown, a comfort to those who are feeling like strangers in a strange land. The service was a reaffirmation of the Christian nature of the country, welcome even to the more than 90 percent who do not attend church but who fear the Islamization of their nation, where *sharia* law already reigns in parts of the country. Watching the wedding crowd from the balcony of our London flat, we saw not a burka.

Most important, the wedding promised that Britain’s future will at least in broad outline resemble the past. Princes William and Harry—the heir and the spare, as they are known—retain some of the magic that Walter Bagehot noted was essential to any monarchy. Yet they’re also working stiff—very rich ones, wallowing in unearned wealth and titles bestowed by a doting grandmother, but working stiff all the same. Better still, the line of work they have chosen is military service to their country.

IRWIN M. STELZER



Justice

Here's what we posted on our website shortly after President Obama finished speaking Sunday night, May 1:

Congratulations to all those, from the president on down, who are responsible for the achievement of tracking down and killing Osama bin Laden. The wheels of justice may sometimes turn slowly, but turn they do—with the help of the United States armed forces and intelligence personnel. Justice has been done.

This remains the key point, one that deserves reiteration before getting to all the (necessary) analysis about the consequences and implications of bin Laden's death: Justice has been done. It has been done by the exercise of American military power. Sunday night, to put it in terms bin Laden would have understood, Justice rode a strong horse. Or, to change metaphors, there's a reason Justice is traditionally portrayed in the West as carrying a sword. Justice needs to be able and willing to use the sword. Nor is it an accident that the seal of the United States depicts a bald eagle carrying thirteen arrows as well as an olive branch. American liberal democracy rightly inclines toward the olive branch. But, confident in its principles, well-constituted for energetic (and limited) government, our democracy is also capable of wielding power effectively against our enemies and the enemies of civilization. The British prime minister

William Gladstone once said, "The resources of civilization are not yet exhausted." By finding and killing Osama bin Laden, the United States showed that the resources of civilization are alive and well.

They are alive and well because President Obama did not choose in this instance to "lead from behind"—a term Noemie Emery correctly characterizes as "a paradox and punch line, not a doctrine." Obama led, and he acted, and he acted decisively. And is it too obvious to point out that this admirable and effective act was not particularly "progressive"? The action against bin Laden was militaristic, unilateral, and secretive. It was non-U.N.-approved, non-NATO-consultative, non-Miranda-compliant, and non-politically correct (though we must say that we're sympathetic to the complaints of American Indians about giving bin Laden the code name Geronimo, who was in many ways a noble and impressive figure, and a part of the American story).

The act's protagonists were non-gender-diverse, pre-Don't-Ask-Don't-Tell-reform, and had undergone a notably nonprogressive training. Attorney General Eric Holder and his merry band of lawyers who are proud to have defended al Qaeda terrorists seem not to have been in the loop (the Justice Department is not represented in the now-famous photo of the gathering in the Situation Room, for instance). Indeed, the operation was based on information developed by intelligence professionals of the kind Eric Holder wants

REUTERS / TOBY MELVILLE

to prosecute, and planned and carried out by servicemen unaccompanied by a JAG.

Will the president draw the conclusion that the cause of justice and our national interest—and, one might add, his own political interests—is well served when he leaves behind his progressive prejudices, and embraces unapologetic and energetic American leadership? Or will he decide that this was just a one-off event, and return to progressively leading from behind, both at home and abroad? We hope for the former, and fear the likelihood of the latter.

—William Kristol

You Get What You Pay For

The killing of Osama bin Laden says a lot about the United States at war. It occurred almost a decade after 9/11, contradicting the notion that a democracy can't fight a long war. It demonstrates that our presence in Afghanistan, without which the raid would have been impossible, is our main point of leverage on Pakistan. It reveals that even a reluctant commander in chief can summon the strength of will and nerve to order the assassination of a terrible enemy.

The mission says a lot about our government's ability to carry out its most fundamental task: providing for our security. Al Qaeda has had some successes since September 11, 2001, but nothing remotely on the scale of that terrible day. Our law enforcement, domestic intelligence agencies, and even the Department of Homeland Security have been more successful than anyone would have guessed.

Our foreign intelligence efforts have been transformed. By the end of the Cold War, the CIA's ability to conduct covert operations was a shambles. East bloc spies had penetrated its innermost circles. Our technical intelligence capabilities were unmatched—but those were focused on Soviet missiles and the Red Army. Now, if press reports are accurate, the agency can run an undetected safe house while scouting the bin Laden compound for months.

Most of all, though, last week's mission was a snapshot of a superb military. The nearly flawless raid stands in stark contrast to the Desert One tragedy of 1980. But the leadership distinction between Jimmy Carter and Barack Obama isn't so great as some would have us believe. Carter's decision to go ahead with Operation Eagle Claw was as bold as any Obama had to make. And the nature of a large-scale hostage rescue attempt meant greater risk.

The big difference between 1980 and 2011 is that President Obama is blessed with an infinitely more capable set of military tools. Today's force stands at the end of a 30-year

trail of investment in recruiting, retaining, and training the best people and providing them with world-class equipment. The fighting in our long war against global terrorism has been varied and exhausting, but the force has been sharpened to the cutting-edge. The SEALs who killed bin Laden were prepared to succeed.

In Desert One, the "chances for success were very slender indeed," recalled mission leader Col. Charles Beckwith. As Beckwith wrote in *Delta Force*, such a complicated operation "revealed that at this time the Armed Forces of the United States had neither the present resources nor the present capabilities to pull it off. Training was needed to accomplish unique and demanding tasks." Operation Eagle Claw was undertaken at the nadir of the post-Vietnam years. The fledgling all-volunteer force was weak. Service leadership was dispirited. The generation of weapons that marked the Reagan build up was largely still on the drawing board. Training was little removed from the low-budget "shake and bake" approach created during World War II.

The irony, of course, is that Barack Obama—the commander in chief who owes his newfound martial reputation to a military built and maintained by his predecessors of both parties—is leading the charge to cut defense spending. His most recent proposal to eliminate \$400 billion from future Pentagon budgets essentially doubles the cuts from his first two years in office. The long-term result will be a smaller, less-well-equipped, and less-well-trained force. If President Obama continues to employ the force at current rates, it will be more rapidly run down.

Congress, which has the constitutional obligation to provide for the armed forces, may well slash defense even more deeply than the administration would like. Senate Democrats are preparing a set of budget proposals, based upon the recommendation of the Bowles-Simpson commission on "fiscal reform," to gut defense. Defense secretary Robert Gates described these spending levels as "catastrophic" for the force.

Meanwhile, the Republican party is in danger of losing its deserved reputation for being strong on defense. President Obama's "bin Laden bounce" in the polls will fade. But if his 2012 opponent is the nominee of a quasi-isolationist, green-eyeshade GOP, Obama will be able to claim he's the most assertive candidate for commander in chief.

Luckily, Republicans can begin to reclaim their national security credentials by sticking to the defense numbers proposed in Rep. Paul Ryan's budget. Of course, until four weeks ago, these were also the Obama administration's defense numbers. They've gone from being a political floor for Pentagon spending to a ceiling. And the final irony? The president's boldness in launching the bin Laden raid is one of the best arguments against his proposed defense cuts.

On May 1, an important mission was accomplished with astonishing success. Now we must prepare for the missions to come.

—Thomas Donnelly

Whither Jihad?

Islamic militancy preceded Osama bin Laden. Unfortunately, it will probably outlast him, too.

BY REUEL MARC GERECHT



Will Osama bin Laden's demise advance the evanescence of jihadism in the Islamic world? Probably, but not by much. Islamic extremism

Reuel Marc Gerecht is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a contributing editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, and the author of The Wave: Man, God, and the Ballot Box in the Middle East (Hoover Institution Press).

was intellectually in full bloom long before bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan to aid the mujahedeen against the Red Army.

Bin Ladenism—its leitmotif is a preference for attacking the “far enemy,” the United States, to weaken the “near enemy,” the despised Westernized autocrats of the Middle East—is essentially the same religious doctrine of rebellion propagated by the Egyptian revolutionary Sayyid

Qutb (d. 1966) and the Iranian revolutionary Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989). Although bin Laden took suicide bombing to new heights, death-wish holy warriors have a long history in Islam, among Shiites and Sunnis. What really made bin Laden special was his success in striking the continental United States. The Iranian-backed Shiite bombers in Lebanon who took out the U.S. embassy, French paratroopers, and American Marines in 1983 never launched a bombing run in America; the Palestine Liberation Organization, the mothership of media-savvy Islamic terrorism, eagerly killed Americans abroad, but they never dared to bomb Washington and New York City.

Bin Laden gained eminence among holy warriors because he dared to do what others only dreamed of. The Egyptian blind sheikh, Omar Abdel Rahman, who spearheaded the attempt to fell the World Trade Center in 1993, and who became a spiritual mentor to bin Laden, didn't obtain the same jihadist status as the Saudi because he failed. Even more than the Palestinian suicide bombers of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, bin Laden made suicide attacks sexy among Sunni Muslims.

Intellectually, however, the Saudi contributed nothing to the jihadist cause; for a “nonstate” actor—a designation that was always more myth than fact, given the assistance bin Laden and his jihadists received from the high and mighty in Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Iran—he organized well. His lyrical Arabic, his good looks (he was once a holy-warrior celebrity in Saudi women's magazines), his rejection of an easy life in favor of a religious calling (in Arabia's corpulent world, bin Laden was a tall, lithe prince with guts), the legend of his fight against the Soviets, and his no doubt sincere wish to defend mother Arabia from Saddam Hussein without the demeaning assistance of infidel America—all gave bin Laden charisma among many Muslims. And charisma matters.

DAVE GLEGG

But modern Sunni jihadism has never really revolved around individuals. Sunni Islam is emphatically communitarian. It reacts poorly to cults of personality. Although messianic figures have appeared, they aren't nearly as frequent as in Shiism, whose foundation myth revolves around the divine authority that sprang from the union of Ali, the Prophet Muhammad's cousin, and Fatima, the prophet's daughter. Sayyid Qutb, a vastly more important force behind modern jihadism than bin Laden, remains relevant because his critique of Islamic society since the West gained military preeminence over Islam is so trenchant.

Compared with Qutb, bin Laden is a gadfly. Bin Laden was so scary because men like Qutb and the equally impressive journalist-turned-philosopher Abul Ala Maududi, the great self-taught theologian of the Indian subcontinent, had prepared the ground: Militancy was not a rivulet within Islam but a wide river.

Bin Laden played on the moral collapse within Islamic civilization, brought on chiefly by Islam's calamities in the 19th and 20th centuries. Intellectually and militarily, Muslim empires couldn't hold their own against the West. When an Islamic identity was reborn, it was in an age of global extremism—the catastrophic aftermath of World War I, when fascism, national socialism, and communism were rampant. Later, the growth of jihadism as an ideology was poorly checked by the dying ideologies of the Middle East's calcifying police states, which had done so much to validate the critiques of Qutb and his kind.

And traditional ethics, the bulwark of decency, had also been transformed: The urban cosmopolitan mores of the Ottoman Empire and the British Raj had ceded considerable ground to Saudi Arabia's puritanical Wahhabi faith and its subcontinent equivalent, the Deobandi school. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's most famous line, which has become the anthem of modern fundamentalists far and

wide—*Al-Islam hua Al-Hal*, “Islam has all the answers”—would have made little sense to a devout Ottoman gentleman or his equivalent in British India at the end of the 19th century. He would've been confused, since the complexity of who he was and what he believed could not possibly have been reduced to so radical a statement.

By the 1960s and 1970s, this phrase had gained telegraphic power among many Muslims because all of their other identities and associations had been so badly mauled by modernity. *Al-Islam hua Al-Hal* can mean any-

The excesses of al Qaeda and allied Islamic groups have created unease and even disgust among Muslims. The Great Arab Revolt is altering how Arabs see themselves. It's still much too early to know where this awakening is going, but it's not too early to see how the turbulence that started in Tunisia has discombobulated the holy-warrior set.

thing, and in the hands of militants it started to mean an ever-expanding conception of sanctified killing.

What started out as the targeted assassination of detested local officials became, with the rise of the PLO, the killing of Israeli civilians and Jews in general. From the Iranian revolution to 9/11, it's not an exaggeration to say that Islamic militants developed an ethical universe that allowed them to attack almost anything foreign (non-Muslim) without much fear of condemnation in the Middle East.

This has obviously changed. The excesses of al Qaeda and allied Islamic groups in spilling blood in Muslim lands since 9/11—especially in Iraq—have created considerable unease and sometimes even

fire-and-brimstone disgust among Muslims. The Great Arab Revolt is altering how Arabs see themselves. It's still much too early to know where this awakening is going—whether it will lead to democracy or back to dictatorship—but it's not too early to see how the turbulence that started in Tunisia has discombobulated the holy-warrior set. Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri fell silent when these popular pro-democracy eruptions started. Both Iran's ruling elite and al Qaeda finally described the Arab Revolt, surreally, as an Islamic movement that mirrored their most cherished principles.

It's possible that a democratic Arab society could be fertile ground for Islamic militancy. Pakistan is an utterly broken society that has a hybrid political system allowing some democracy and a lot of (pretty religious) military autocracy. That scenario is certainly possible in the Arab world, especially in Egypt, where the country's social and economic problems are only a bit larger than the military's conception of itself as the backbone of the state. Pakistan has been an astonishing incubator of lethal militancy. A vibrant Hindu India has, of course, been next door, always offering an invidious comparison. With Egypt, a dynamic Jewish state is nearby to provoke feelings of inferiority and outrage.

Yet holy warriors, both Sunni and Shiite, probably offer the best guide to how this is going to shake out. Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic's supreme leader, lives in fear of representative government. He and the leadership of the Revolutionary Guards see democracy as the end of their world. Democracy might not make the United States and Iran allies, but it would surely end the unofficial war Tehran has waged against the United States since 1979. It's difficult to imagine any of the terrorist apparatus that the Islamic Republic has set up surviving a free parliament, which would likely restore diplomatic relations with the United States. The pro-democracy

Green Movement has made it crystal clear that it wants no part of the anti-American fundamentalist *mission civilisatrice* that has defined so much of the Islamic Republic's actions under religious dictatorship.

The Arab world is definitely trickier, since the autocracies in the region have often been supported, or at least not opposed, by the United States. But democratic Arab states would surely have great debates about the Holy Law and women, two core issues for Islamic militants, and about whether parliament or God's law is supreme. A freer press in the Arab world is bound to push further the questions that even the not-so-free press—think the Arabic TV channels al-Jazeera and Al Arabiya—have already started to address about when jihad is lawful and who morally can be slain. These discussions may seem hopelessly crude and retrograde to Western audiences, but they are important steps in the creation of healthier, less violent mores.

And it is difficult to imagine a functioning Muslim democracy, with an elected parliament overseeing government, running clandestine networks of jihadists. Beyond the fact that in any democracy there would be Muslims who sincerely and strenuously objected to jihadism, a simple concern for self-defense would militate against it: Would an Egyptian parliament really want the United States or Israel to bomb its military bases because Egypt was aiding Palestinian suicide bombers? Compared with what we've had under dictatorships, where suicide bombers against Jews have usually been called "martyrs" in the state-controlled media, a functioning democracy would increase the voice of those Muslims who have moral qualms about killing infidels, even Israelis. Democracy might not end the appeal of holy war, but it would surely diminish that appeal among the mainstream. It would likely constrict the river into a rivulet.

But holy war will probably continue to have traction where autocracy flourishes. Saudi Arabia, which has strenuously tried to diminish the appeal of jihadism on the home front by enlisting the Wahhabi establishment to say how bad terrorism is, at least when aimed at Saudis, may well remain the big incubator of Islamic terrorism in the Sunni world, for the simple reason that the Saudi state perpetuates an unbridgeable contradiction. The Wahhabi creed is virulently intolerant of non-Muslims and Muslims who don't practice with the requisite rigor. It's no accident that so many of al Qaeda's foot soldiers have come out of Saudi Arabia—the distance between the official creed and the ethos of those who become holy warriors, or admire them enough to support them financially, isn't great. If much of the Arab world starts going democratic, the Saudis may become even more generous to Islamists who take a dim view of representative government. Saudi Arabia



**We gave it the best hwy
gas mileage in its class.***

*2011 Explorer. EPA-estimated 25 highway mpg, V6 FWD. Class is Three-Row Large Utilities, Non-Hybrid.

could well become a robust Wahhabi police state that tortures internally the same people it supports externally. If bin Ladenism has a future in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia will likely remain its friendliest terrain.

Iran, too, will probably remain a bastion for those who want to wage war against the United States. As long as Khamenei rules, anti-American Sunni militants will have a friend. A large number of al Qaeda warriors, including members of bin Laden's family, fled Afghanistan for Iran after 9/11. It's not clear where they all are now, but we can be fairly certain that they are not under house arrest. It's a decent guess that if al Qaeda can rise again as a centralized organization, Iran will be helping the cause.

And then there's Pakistan, the adopted home of al Qaeda, which is de facto no longer an Arab organization. Much of al Qaeda's ideology has been absorbed by several Pakistani holy warrior groups, most

prominently the umbrella for most fervent Pakistani Pashtuns, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and the Hindu-loathing Lashkar-e-Taiba.

With the war in Afghanistan, where the Pakistani Taliban are ethnically and spiritually joined with their Afghan brethren, the conflict in Kashmir, and the crisis of identity among Pakistanis themselves (who really are they as a people?), Islamic militancy in Central Asia has found fertile soil. Pakistani democracy offers some countervailing hope, but it is fragile and anemic—especially when compared with the Pakistani military, which has been deeply impregnated with Islamist ideology since the rule of General Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988).

The bloodshed caused by the war since 9/11 between the army and Islamic militants who've gone too far in their zeal has certainly hurt the Islamist cause. But Pakistan hasn't yet experienced the revulsion that we've seen in the Arab world

for jihadists. The military and the civilian elite remain conflicted about who is a good Islamic militant and who is a bad one.

Bin Laden may be dead, but in Pakistan hope springs eternal. Mainstream Islamic thought in the country still provides considerable sustenance to the spiritual descendants of al-Maududi. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same is true in Saudi Arabia. And in besieged Iran, where the regime is philosophically at war with the most educated members of its own society, any Sunni holy warrior who hates Iran's enemies is likely to be viewed increasingly as a friend.

Although some American liberals and conservatives would now like to declare the global war on Islamic terrorism over, a little bit of patience is in order. We don't get to declare the war over. Only Muslims do. And among them, we still don't have the necessary quorum. For far too many, jihadism still has a certain redemptive appeal. ♦



Because you just might go where there isn't any gas.



Drive one.

Target Neutralized

The mixed history of strategic manhunts.

BY BENJAMIN RUNKLE

Before Osama bin Laden's body was even cold—or wet, depending upon how quickly it was committed to the Arabian Sea—the debate over the significance of his demise at the hands of U.S. Navy SEALs was underway. Some suggest he will prove irreplaceable to al Qaeda, a uniquely inspiring leader and fundraiser without whom the terrorist organization will succumb to centripetal forces. Others argue that because he had been in hiding for so long—ever since fleeing Afghanistan in late 2001—bin Laden had become operationally and strategically irrelevant, and that “Al Qaeda Central” had been eclipsed by dangerous franchises like Anwar al-Awlaki's Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

History can shed some light on this discussion. When President George W. Bush declared he wanted bin Laden “dead or alive” in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, it was not the first time the United States had targeted an individual. Long before Washington offered \$25 million for information on bin Laden's whereabouts, the House of Representatives in May 1886 offered a reward of \$25,000 for information leading to the capture or killing of Geronimo. In fact, the United States has deployed forces abroad to kill or

capture one man to achieve a strategic objective almost a dozen times. Taken together, these campaigns show that there are three likely outcomes for a strategic manhunt.

- *The target escapes, but we achieve our strategic objective.* In 1916, 10,000 U.S. troops under General John J. Pershing invaded Mexico in pursuit of Pancho



Geronimo, Che Guevara, Osama bin Laden

Villa, who had launched a deadly cross-border raid on Columbus, New Mexico. Although the “Punitive Expedition” failed to apprehend Villa, he was forced into hiding, and his operational capacity was degraded enough that cross-border incursions from Mexico were never again a significant threat to the United States.

Similarly, from 1927 to 1933, U.S. Marines pursued the Nicaraguan insurgent leader Augusto Sandino. Although Sandino was never captured, the U.S. presence led to the establishment of a stable, pro-American government.

- *We capture or kill the target, but fail to achieve our broader objectives.* In 1901 an American expedition led by Frederick Funston captured Filipino insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo. Fighting continued for nearly a decade, however, and the most brutal phase of the counterinsurgency campaign

occurred *after* Aguinaldo swore a loyalty oath to the United States.

In the same way, U.S. intelligence assets and Delta Force assisted Colombian police in tracking and eventually killing drug lord Pablo Escobar, yet the nexus of cocaine trafficking from Colombia merely shifted from Medellín to Cali.

And U.S. forces captured Saddam Hussein and killed Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, but neither success marked the turning point in defeating the Iraqi insurgency.

- *We capture or kill the target, and achieve our strategic objective.* In 1886, Geronimo surrendered to U.S. forces at Skeleton Canyon, marking the effective end of the Apache Wars which had once led General William Tecumseh Sherman to propose abandoning the Arizona Territory altogether.

In 1967, the capture and execution of Che Guevara by U.S.-trained (and clandestinely advised) Bolivian Army rangers ended the hemispheric threat of Cuban-exported Communist revolution.

And in 1989, the invasion of Panama and arrest of Manuel Noriega allowed that country to make a successful transition to democracy.

Thus, in the majority of cases, the success or failure in apprehending the targeted individual does not correlate with success or failure in achieving the broader strategic objective. An obvious exception is the failure to snare Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid and that country's descent into its present Hobbesian nightmare. In retrospect, U.S. interests would probably have been better served by elevating Aidid to strongman than hunting him.

The reason for the disparity between the outcome of a manhunt and the achievement of our objective is simple: Pursuing an individual and forcing him to go to ground renders him strategically ineffective and creates space for other actors to step to

Benjamin Runkle is a former official of the National Security Council and the author of Wanted Dead or Alive: Manhunts from Geronimo to Bin Laden (forthcoming August 2 from Palgrave Macmillan).

BRADLEY PRIZES

CONGRATULATIONS TO THE 2011 BRADLEY PRIZE RECIPIENTS

The Bradley Prizes will be presented on May 11th at the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, DC.

The Bradley Prizes recognize outstanding achievements that are consistent with the Foundation's mission statement. Founded in 1985, The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation is devoted to strengthening American democratic capitalism and the institutions, principles and values that sustain and nurture it. Its programs support limited, competent government; a dynamic marketplace for economic, cultural activity; and a vigorous defense, at home and abroad, of American ideas and institutions. Learn more at www.bradleyfdn.org.




JEB BUSH

- Former Governor of Florida
- Chairman, Foundation for Excellence in Education
- President, Jeb Bush and Associates



RICHARD A. EPSTEIN

- Professor of Law, New York University
- Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Chicago
- Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution



HARVEY C. MANSFIELD

- Professor of Government, Harvard University
- Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
- National Humanities Medal Recipient



ALLAN H. MELTZER

- Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University
- Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
- Author, *A History of the Federal Reserve*

the fore. From a strategic standpoint, the successful targeting of an individual is usually less important than the successful targeting of the network that either supports him or will carry on the struggle in his absence.

This explains the strategic success of the Geronimo campaign, the Che manhunt, and Operation Just Cause in Panama. In August 1886 the United States cruelly exiled all Chiricahua and White Springs Apaches, denying Geronimo potential sanctuary and recruits and leading him to surrender. The operation that captured Che Guevara was part of the Bolivian Army's broader counterinsurgency campaign. And, recognizing the difficulty of targeting a dictator who specialized in counterintelligence, U.S. planners intentionally sought to neutralize key units of the Panamanian Defense Forces to render Noriega a general without an army once he evaded the initial snatch operation.

Which category will best describe bin Laden? The ultimate strategic significance of bin Laden's killing depends on several questions about al Qaeda, the answers to which will become apparent only with time.

Was bin Laden strategically irrelevant by the time of the SEALs' raid, or will the computers seized from the Abbottabad compound show that he still exerted operational control over al Qaeda and its affiliates? Will another charismatic leader emerge to unify the al Qaeda franchises that have grown up over the past decade? Are these groups more dangerous as a decentralized network, or will the lack of a common strategy undermine their effectiveness? Is "bin Ladenism" an ideology gone viral that cannot be suppressed, or will the Arab Spring blunt its violent appeal?

Bin Laden's death at the hands of U.S. forces was an important moment for American morale in the broader struggle against al Qaeda and its affiliates, and it represents a triumph of justice over evil. Whether it turns out to be a strategically significant turning point depends in part on choices the United States makes as it continues to prosecute the war. ♦

Governing Kentucky

The Bluegrass State's other horse race.

BY JOHN DAVID DYCHE

Louisville

Kentucky is one of just four states electing governors this year, and the race—pitting Democratic incumbent Steve Beshear against a Republican nominee to be chosen in a primary on May 17—will be colorful and could be close.

Sometimes called a purple state, Kentucky may be better described as politically confused. There are three registered Democrats for every two registered Republicans, but Republicans have held both U.S. Senate seats since 1998, occupy four of the state's six congressional seats, and have enjoyed a majority in the state senate since 1999. Yet the GOP has elected just one governor since 1967, and he served only a single, controversial term.

The silver-maned Beshear, 66, has been in state politics seemingly forever. A preacher's son from tiny Dawson Springs in western Kentucky, Beshear served in the state house of representatives from 1974 until being elected attorney general in 1979. He climbed the commonwealth's political ladder as high as lieutenant governor before losing the Democratic gubernatorial primary in 1987. Beshear landed in one of the state's largest law firms, settled on a farm outside Lexington, and took to the life of the Bluegrass equine elite as if born to it.

He returned to politics in 1996 to challenge Mitch McConnell, the man who was on his way to transforming Kentucky into a bona fide two-party state and becoming Senate Republican leader. That campaign is best remembered for McConnell's ridicule

of Beshear's membership in an exclusive hunt club. McConnell supporters, including a character dressed in full red riding regalia, shouted "Tally ho!" during Beshear's public appearances.

McConnell soundly beat Beshear even as Bill Clinton was carrying Kentucky for the second time (and no Democratic presidential candidate has carried it since). The defeat seemed the political end for Beshear, who returned to his comfortable private life until 2007. Having long coveted the governorship, Beshear jumped into a crowded field of Democratic contenders eager to take on Republican Ernie Fletcher, who was embroiled in turmoil over political hiring and weakened by myriad minor embarrassments.

Beshear barely avoided a runoff primary, but went on to best Fletcher easily in the fall. He promptly failed at his one and only campaign promise of bringing some form of expanded gambling to Kentucky to help both the beleaguered horse industry and strapped state coffers. Beshear's three years as governor have been little more than a series of forced budget-cutting measures and claims of credit for the ideas and initiatives of others.

Kentucky drew national attention last year as Rand Paul, the personification of the Tea Party, won the GOP Senate primary over McConnell's preferred candidate. Paul went on to trounce Democratic dream candidate Attorney General Jack Conway in the general election. This surprising libertarian triumph in a culturally conservative state that has long suckled on federal largesse set the tone for the gubernatorial campaign now underway.

Recent public polling puts state Senate president David Williams of Burkesville well ahead of two Louisvillians, businessman Phil Moffett

John David Dyché is the author of Republican Leader: A Political Biography of Senator Mitch McConnell and writes a political column for the Louisville Courier-Journal.

and county clerk Bobbie Holsclaw, for the Republican nomination. Williams has been the state's second-most powerful politician since Republicans captured the state Senate via party switches in 1999. His encyclopedic knowledge of state government, pugnacious style, and serial parliamentary triumphs have made Williams the favorite bogeyman of Kentucky's reflexively liberal mainstream media.

Williams, 57, won a state house seat in 1984 and moved to the state senate two years later. He was among the few Republicans who supported a controversial 1990 education law funded by a tax increase. In 1992 Williams was his party's sacrificial lamb against then-U.S. Senate majority whip Wendell Ford, the ultimate expression of the faction-ridden Democratic politics that dominated the commonwealth from the Civil War to the McConnell era.

Seeking to offset his negative public persona as "the Bully from Burkesville," Williams convinced state

agriculture commissioner and University of Kentucky basketball folk-hero Richie Farmer to be his running mate. Farmer hails from Clay County, deep in eastern Kentucky coal country, and was a schoolboy legend before becoming part of the 1992 U.K. squad nicknamed The Unforgettables. A last-second shot by Duke's still-reviled Christian Laettner deprived them of a trip to the Final Four, but Farmer's number now hangs from the Rupp Arena rafters to honor his role in restoring the program's prominence after NCAA probation.

To say that being a basketball star is helpful in Kentucky politics is like saying Secretariat was a nice horse. The taciturn Farmer, who only recently abandoned a Haldeman-worthy crew cut and still sports a formidable Freddie Mercury-style mustache, is a proven vote-getter. Unfortunately for all concerned, however, Farmer's wife has just filed for divorce, and hostile reporters are ramping up critical stories questioning his conduct

and management in his current office.

Moffett, a political novice, had hoped to reprise the role of Rand Paul as Tea Party phenomenon. But Williams saw it coming, allowed not a sliver of light to pass between Paul and him during the former's Senate crusade, and has defended his right flank effectively. Lacking name recognition, Moffett's Internet "money-bombs" have been duds.

Holsclaw, a popular local politician in the state's largest city, could have been a contender for a lesser position like secretary of state. Her meager fundraising—only \$12,648 on hand in the most recent reports—suggests that the governorship is out of her league. One blogger derisively refers to Holsclaw as "Paula Deen," playing on the candidate's considerable resemblance to the culinary celebrity.

Mistaken identity may be Holsclaw's best hope, but some think the extremely low turnout predicted for the primary makes anything possible. The last two GOP primaries

NATIONAL NURSES WEEK MAY 6 – MAY 12



Celebrating National Nurses Week

Our Nurses: A Shining Light at Home

During National Nurses Week, we thank nurses everywhere for making a difference in so many lives.

888-4-BAYADA | www.bayada.com

BAYADA
NURSES
Home Care Specialists

averaged 18.5 percent participation, and 15 percent of the state's registered Republicans reside in Holsclaw's home county. McConnell, who was chastened by his ineffective endorsement of Paul's opponent last year and now has his hands full in Washington, has prudently returned to his preferred posture of primary neutrality.

Although Beshear has no primary, he is already spending some of his nearly \$5 million campaign war chest on advertising. His running mate this time around is Jerry Abramson, who finally appears on a statewide ballot after serving five terms as Louisville mayor. Abramson's principal purpose may be fundraising, but the verbose urban Jewish liberal may play poorly in rural Kentucky. He left multiple messes from his final mayoral term, but the same media that are putting a full-court press on Farmer will probably give Abramson a pass.

Having apparently abandoned expanded gambling, which admitted casino patron Williams blocks on policy rather than moral grounds, Beshear touts his management of state finances through tough times and some economic development successes. Williams says the state is "adrift," and in the recently completed legislative session offered a bold platform featuring immigration, neighborhood schools, state pensions, and tax reform. The two locked horns over how to fill a Medicaid shortfall, with Williams trying to turn his abrasiveness into an asset à la Chris Christie in New Jersey.

Williams wants Kentucky to participate in the movement for fiscal sanity that Republican reformers (and many reformed Republicans) are carrying to Washington and state capitals around the country. Beshear is the poster boy for business as usual, but will be favored over any GOP nominee. If that person is anyone other than Williams, the campaign will be over before it begins. If it is Williams, however, Kentucky could treat the nation to an entertaining and quite spirited political horse race come autumn. ♦

Triumph of the Conservatives

Are they now the natural governing party of Canada? **BY FRED BARNES**



Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper, powerhouse

Who's the most powerful conservative leader in the Americas, north and south? That may sound like a trick question, but it's not. The answer is Stephen Harper, the Canadian prime minister who triumphed last week in an election that all but destroyed two opposition parties, the Liberals and the Bloc Québécois (BQ).

Harper, prime minister since 2006, has been called an "elected dictator"—and that was when he headed a minority government with limited power. Now he has a majority (167 of 308 seats in the House of Commons). In Canada's parliamentary system, this means Harper and the Conservative party control both the legislative and executive branches.

For decades, the Liberal party has

considered itself Canada's "natural governing party." The election erased this conceit. First, the Liberals lost their status as the official opposition, a role that will now be played by the New Democratic party (NDP). Moreover, Liberal leader, former Harvard professor Michael Ignatieff, lost his seat in parliament and quickly resigned his leadership post.

Replacing Liberals as the default ruling party has been a goal of Harper's. In the election his party took a huge step in reaching beyond its base in western Canada, making significant inroads in Toronto and Vancouver, scoring big gains among Indian and Chinese immigrants, and crushing Liberals in some maritime provinces. The only mandate Harper sought was reelection, for himself and his party, and the defeat of a potential leftist coalition of Liberals, the NDP, and the BQ. Winning a majority

Fred Barnes is executive editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

NEWS.COM

was an unexpected bonus. If Conservatives haven't achieved a natural majority, they're getting closer.

Relations with the United States were not a major issue in the campaign. There was no U.S.-bashing, even from the left-of-center NDP and Green party. But dealing with the Obama administration is a top item on Harper's agenda.

Since he became Conservative party leader in 2004, Harper, 52, "has practiced [former Conservative Prime Minister] Brian Mulroney's golden rule for the conduct of relations with the U.S.—we can disagree without being disagreeable," wrote Colin Robertson, vice president of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. "Now he needs to follow the second Mulroney dictum—Canada's influence in the world is measured by the extent to which we are perceived as having real influence in Washington."

Harper has succeeded in building a solid relationship with President Obama. He never criticizes the administration, at least publicly. Now he needs Obama's cooperation on two issues.

When Harper visited the White House in February, he and Obama announced the Declaration on a Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, an idea first broached, post-9/11, by President Bush. It would require a new agreement to ease travel restrictions between the United States and Canada, but is yet to be implemented. Also, economic regulations need to be harmonized.

The second issue is a proposed pipeline, the Keystone XL, to carry oil from northern Alberta to the Gulf Coast of Texas. The United States imports twice as much oil from Canada as it does from Saudi Arabia and Mexico combined, and the Keystone XL pipeline would allow us to rely even more on Canada, a friendly and nearby ally.

The problem, however, is that some environmentalists claim this is "dirty oil," which contributes far more than other oil to global

warming. It's not true, but the argument has support in the Obama administration's outpost of environmental extremism, the Environmental Protection Agency.

Because the pipeline would cross the Canadian-U.S. border, it must be approved by the State Department. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seems willing to sign off, but the president also needs to be on board. Harper delivered a personal appeal to Obama at their February meeting and made the case for the pipeline at their joint press conference. The president was silent on the mat-

One immediate result of the election is the demise of the Liberal party, the party of Pierre Trudeau, Lester Pearson, and Jean Chrétien. It hadn't fallen to third-party status since the 19th century. The Bloc Québécois was massacred at home, in Quebec, by the New Democratic party, which won 58 of the province's 75 seats, the BQ only 4.

ter. Rejection of the pipeline would be a devastating blow to Harper, his party, and Canada.

The trick for Harper is to get and then keep Obama's attention. Since Canada is not a problem for the United States, it rarely penetrates the White House's radar. For instance, the election occurred a day after the killing of Osama bin Laden and got minimal coverage from the American media.

What seems to hold the interest of American policymakers is Canada's single-payer health care system—even though it barely produced a ripple in the campaign. Health care in Canada is handled chiefly by the provinces, which have considerably more authority than American states. The federal government's

main role is to transfer money to the provinces, which are required to abide by the rules of the Canada Health Act. It bars free-market reforms such as cost sharing and extra billing.

Nonetheless, private clinics have sprung up, particularly in quasi-socialist Quebec. "The provincial and federal governments have been afraid to shut down the illegal clinics because they realize there would be a huge outcry from patients," says Sally Pipes, a native of Canada who runs the Pacific Research Institute in San Francisco.

Harper will have a chance in 2014 to ease the health care rules when the transfer act is renegotiated. "There's an opportunity, but Harper has not publicly stated if his government will loosen the strings for the transfers," says Niels Veldhuis of the Fraser Institute in Vancouver. If he does, "reforms might include everything from insurance experimentation and parallel private systems to the use of health savings accounts." Any major reforms would be enormously controversial as well as politically risky.

A more immediate result of the election is the demise of the Liberal party, the party of Pierre Trudeau, Lester Pearson, and Jean Chrétien. It hadn't fallen to third-party status since the 19th century. BQ was massacred at home, in Quebec, by the NDP, which won 58 of the province's 75 seats, the BQ only 4. The BQ's role in the national parliament has always been conflicted, given its aim for the province to secede from Canada and become a sovereign nation.

For Harper, the NDP is the ideal opposition. It's leftwing but also flaky. Many of its Quebec seats were won by placeholders or college students. One NDP candidate spent part of the campaign in Las Vegas and won anyway. With 102 seats, the NDP might seem formidable. It's not. With their majority, Conservatives won't need NDP votes.

For Harper and Conservatives, it doesn't get any better than last week's election. ♦

Egypt's Other Extremists

While the Muslim Brotherhood gets all the ink, the Salafists go on a rampage. **BY PAUL MARSHALL**



Protesters in Qena gather to oppose the seating of a Christian governor, April 22

Judging the likely trajectory of post-Mubarak Egypt requires assessing the depth of public support for Islamism, and usually this has meant assessing the strength and intentions of the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Brotherhood remains central, however, the country is also facing a frequently violent upsurge of Salafist versions of Islam.

The groups can overlap, but the Brotherhood tends to stress an Islamic state and political organization, and its members have no prescribed mode of dress, apart from modesty: In this sense they are a modern movement. The Salafists are

Paul Marshall is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Religious Freedom and coauthor, with Nina Shea, of the forthcoming Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are Choking Freedom Worldwide.

often distinguishable by full beards for men and full face covering for women, and they stress emulating the piety and practice of the first three generations of Muslims (*Salaf* means “predecessor” or “forefather”).

Strongly influenced by Wahhabi teachings, the Salafists have tended to follow local sheikhs rather than have a countrywide organization, and under Mubarak they were usually quiescent or else inclined to a violent extremism that led to rapid and severe repression by the regime's efficient security apparatus. But many Salafists are now trying to take advantage of the widespread chaos in Egypt in order to impose their repressive version of Islam on their neighbors and ultimately on the country.

One Salafist target is Egypt's Christians, the Copts, the largest non-Muslim minority in the Middle East. On March 20, in Qena, Salafists,

including an off-duty policeman, accused a Copt named Ayman Mitri of renting an apartment to a prostitute, cut off one of his ears, mutilated his other ear, and slashed his neck. The attackers then informed the police that they had carried out the punishment required by Islamic law. As was usual under Mubarak, the police refrained from pressing charges and called for a “reconciliation” meeting between the religious communities.

Also as under Mubarak, the authorities' refusal to punish attacks on Christians has led to more attacks. On March 23, Salafists surrounded St. George's church in Beni Ahmad and successfully demanded that a church expansion approved by the government be stopped. On March 27, they blockaded St. Mary's church in Giza, saying it did not have a permit. After yet another “reconciliation” meeting between Copts and Muslims, services at the church were forbidden until it acquired a new permit.

On March 28, Salafists attacked a liquor store in Kasr El-Bassil owned by a Copt, destroyed other stores, and demanded that coffee shops be closed. One villager was killed and eight others injured. On April 5, hundreds occupied St. John the Beloved church in Kamadeer, stopping repairs after heavy rain, and told Copts that they were not allowed to pray there any more. After yet another “reconciliation,” Copts were told to build a church 200 meters away, one without a dome, cross, bell, or any other external feature marking it as a church.


Beginning on April 15, over 10,000 demonstrators, mostly Salafists, protested in the southern province of Qena against the appointment of a new governor, Emad Mikhail, who is a Christian (the previous governor, Magdy Ayoub, was also Christian). Protesters blocked main roads, stopped buses to separate men and women passengers, and disrupted the main rail route in Upper Egypt for eight days. There were threats to bar Mikhail from the province and even to kill him.

Some protesters were concerned

NEWS.COM

**“The left
made me do it!
I swear!”**

—ANDREW BREITBART



**“ONE OF THE CONSERVATIVE
MOVEMENT’S MOST
FEROCIOUS FIGHTERS.**

Brash, funny, fiery, and irreverent, Breitbart and his Big sites put liberals on the defensive—where they belong.”

—RUSH LIMBAUGH

**“A MANUAL AND CALL TO ACTION
FOR AWAKENED PATRIOTS**

who are too intelligent to believe the leftist media lies and distortions. Breitbart reminds us why we must fight for our country’s future by staying true to core values and never retreating.”

—SARAH PALIN

www.hachettebookgroup.com

gco

**GRAND CENTRAL
PUBLISHING**

Hachette Book Group

STEVEN LIPPMAN

Available in hardcover, as an audiobook, in a Large Print Edition, and as an eBook

simply that the new governor, like so many others appointed throughout the country in recent years, had no experience and was being rewarded for previous service to the regime. But Salafist concerns soon dominated, with one speaker complaining, “A Copt won’t implement Islamic law,” and demonstrators chanting, “We will never be ruled by a Christian governor” and “Mikhail is an infidel pig.”

There were also declarations that Qena was an “Islamic Emirate.” Tensions ran so high that local Christians stayed inside and couldn’t celebrate Palm Sunday. The armed forces refused to intervene, and, although Egypt’s cabinet initially rejected calls for the governor’s resignation, on April 25, Prime Minister Essam Sheraf surrendered and said he would “freeze” the appointment for three months.

Salafists are also attacking other Muslims. On March 30, one killed a Muslim colleague for not praying at the requisite time. They also target Sufi mosques and shrines, because Salafists regard veneration of saints as heretical. Since Mubarak stepped down, dozens of shrines on the outskirts of Cairo have been burned or have simply disappeared, and there have been attacks throughout Alexandria and in Beheira and Monufiya. In turn, leaders of Sufi orders have threatened to attack those destroying shrines, especially the shrines belonging to the prophet’s family. Sheikh Gaber Kasem al-Kholy, the highest-ranking Sufi in Alexandria, declared in early April, “I don’t underestimate people’s fears concerning Salafists. Of course, Coptic Christians are a main target for those extremists, but we need to speak out about the suffering of the Sufi people.”

Egypt’s small Shiite community is another target. Shiite leader Mohamed al-Derini has denounced the attacks, and some Shiites believe that the Saudis also bear responsibility for the violence. During the demonstrations in Qena, some demonstrators waved Saudi flags. It is also rumored that the Saudis fund the Salafists, and this, coming on top of the Saudis’ support

for Mubarak and their condemnations of Shiites, Sufis, and shrines, has increased tensions. On April 9, Shiites protested at the Saudi embassy in Cairo and waved banners denouncing Saudi *fatwas* that condemn Shiites and permit the demolition of shrines, as well as the kingdom’s rejection of calls to prosecute ousted Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. One banner

read: “You defended Mubarak, pushed Salafis to sow sedition, and pressed for not trying the tyrant.”

Some Salafists joined the demonstrations in Tahrir Square, and others have said they will enter politics—in many cases by supporting the Brotherhood. Often the two groups have been opposed to one another, with the Salafists accusing the Brotherhood

Exploring



Oil and natural gas polymers are vital to solar panels and wind turbines

Most Americans know oil and natural gas heat our homes and get us where we need to go. What many may not know is just how vital they are to the viability of renewable energy sources.

Oil and natural gas polymers are essential to the manufacture of components for solar panels and wind turbines. And since we can’t always rely on the wind and sun, natural gas provides a clean, efficient source of always-available, on-demand electricity

*The Economic Impacts of the Oil and Natural Gas Industry on the U.S. Economy, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, September 2009 (Sponsored by API)

of compromise, but in the March 19 constitutional referendum, Salafi clerics urged their followers to support the Brotherhood in campaigning for a “yes” vote.

Perhaps thinking that these more extreme Islamist currents make it appear relatively moderate, the Brotherhood condemned the killing of Osama bin Laden. Already before that,

it had become more outspoken about its own desire for an Islamic state.

On April 14, at a forum in Cairo, the Brotherhood’s deputy supreme guide, Mahmoud Ezzat, said his group wanted to establish an Islamic state when they achieved sufficient support through their Freedom and Justice party. At the same forum, another Brotherhood leader, Saad al-Husseiny,

stated that they aimed to apply Islamic law and establish Islamic rule. On April 22, a senior spokesman, Sobhi Saleh, said the Brotherhood wished to apply “Islamic legislation.”

There is some ambiguity in these remarks, and, after an outcry from other parties, one leading Brotherhood figure, Hamdi Hassan, said the statements were nothing new and that reaction had been inflamed by inaccurate press reports. Ezzat filed a complaint with the attorney general, accusing the media of twisting his remarks.

These newer statements about Islam and law by senior leaders of the Brotherhood have alarmed democracy activists and many others. In response, the Coptic Orthodox Church suspended its dialogue with the Brotherhood and dropped its plans to invite the group’s leaders to attend Easter celebrations. The state-run daily *Rose Al-Youssef*, meanwhile, under the headline “A state of terror follows Salafi threats,” reported Salafists’ warnings that they will attack women who do not wear the full face covering called the *niqab*, while schools have had high absence rates and have sometimes closed because of fears of sectarian violence. The combination of these Islamist currents poses a growing threat to a free Egypt.

On April 28, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom for the first time recommended to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that Egypt be labeled a “Country of Particular Concern (CPC).” This designation refers, as commission chair Leonard Leo noted, to “the world’s worst religious freedom violators and human rights abusers.” He added,

Severe religious freedom violations engaged in or tolerated by the government [of Egypt] have increased dramatically since the release of last year’s report, with violence, including murder, escalating against Coptic Christians and other religious minorities. Since President Mubarak’s resignation from office in February, such violence continues unabated without the government’s bringing the perpetrators to justice. ♦

for renewables



to back up renewables.

The U.S. oil and natural gas industry supports more than 9.2 million American jobs and contributes more than \$1 trillion each year to the U.S. economy.* And by providing vital feedstocks to make a wide range of products, from health care to agriculture to electronics, oil and natural gas contribute in ways most of us haven’t even imagined.

THE *people* OF AMERICA'S
OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY

EnergyTomorrow.org

© 2011 American Petroleum Institute (API)

Bin Laden Is Dead . . .

But al Qaeda isn't. We should build on our success in Abbottabad by redoubling our efforts to defeat his movement.

**BY FREDERICK W. KAGAN
& KIMBERLY KAGAN**

Osama bin Laden's killing was a great moment for America and for decent people around the world. But allowing the euphoria of that moment to drive us to irresponsible decisions in South Asia would be devastating to America's interests and security. Al Qaeda has not yet been dismantled or defeated.

Osama bin Laden's death has no implications for the number of American or international forces in Afghanistan, for their mission, or for the timeline for their reduction. George W. Bush sent forces into Afghanistan not to kill bin Laden, but to oust al Qaeda from its safe haven there, defeat that organization, and create political conditions that would preclude its return to Afghanistan. Barack Obama reaffirmed that mission in his December 2009 speech setting out the current strategy. He chose a counterinsurgency approach because a return of the Taliban regime to Afghanistan would allow al Qaeda to reestablish safe havens there, whether drawing on the historical friendliness between the two or the inability of the Taliban to prevent their return to the country. Furthermore, the protracted, virulent insurgency creates opportunities for al Qaeda-linked Pakistani proxies such as the Haqqani network to invigorate international terrorist groups and use them in the fight in Afghanistan. President Obama has been pursuing the right strategy, and the forces the United States and its international partners have committed to executing it are—just barely—adequate to achieve it.

The outcome of the war in Afghanistan hangs in the balance. American forces and their allies made dramatic gains last year, clearing the Taliban out of safe havens throughout southern Afghanistan, their heartland. Eastern Afghanistan, where al Qaeda-linked groups have a stronger presence, has

also seen considerable progress. Contrary to some media reporting, neither al Qaeda nor Lashkar-e-Taiba has established safe havens in the wake of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from isolated river valleys in Kunar Province. In fact, a series of offensive operations in the valleys and the province has inflicted great harm on elements of those organizations. Kunar's capital, Asadabad, is a growing and increasingly thriving town, as we saw on a recent visit. And Afghan Army troops have remained in some of the outposts from which U.S. forces withdrew, demonstrating their determination to control their own territory.

Although al Qaeda has not reestablished sanctuaries in Afghanistan, it has not been for lack of trying. U.S. forces only recently killed a senior Afghan al Qaeda official in Kunar, and there is ample evidence that al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba, among other Islamist groups, would welcome the opportunity to set themselves up in a lawless Afghanistan once again. The need to help Afghans establish a state that can prevent the reemergence of terrorist sanctuaries remains after bin Laden's death, and the current strategy, adequately resourced, is the only way to achieve that goal. Calling for accelerating the withdrawal is tantamount to declaring that Afghanistan has become irrelevant with bin Laden's death and that succeeding there is no longer important for America's security.

Consequently, there is a great deal of fighting ahead. Continued military engagements are needed to make precarious improvements enduring and handle other challenges. The enemy will work hard this year to retake its lost sanctuaries in the south, to conduct spectacular attacks in Kabul and elsewhere, and to strengthen its remaining safe havens in the east. Our forces will try to hold and expand security gains in the south and make progress in the east, but conditions are not set for any major reductions in those forces.

If there is cause for cautious optimism in Afghanistan, there are ample grounds for pessimism on the other fronts in the struggle with militant Islamism. Bin Laden's presence in Pakistan has once again concentrated the minds of Americans on the fact that Pakistan's leadership

Frederick W. Kagan is a contributing editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and director of its Critical Threats Project. Kimberly Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War.

has yet to come to consensus about the need to combat and defeat militant Islamist groups within Pakistan's borders. Nor has the United States developed any real strategy for addressing this challenge. We can hardly expand the campaign of targeted strikes further, particularly after the recent raid deep into Pakistani territory. And the drone campaign will not defeat the virulent terrorist groups it is attacking. Overreacting to suspicions of Pakistani complicity in bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad by suspending all aid or military ties or by taking other drastic actions would make it much harder, not easier, to operate against the terrorists who threaten us.

On the contrary, withdrawing forces from Afghanistan and cutting all aid to Pakistan would merely reinforce two of the most prevalent conspiracy theories in South Asia—that the United States will always abandon those who rely on it, and that we were only there to get bin Laden anyway. We should, instead, build on the symbolic victory of killing bin Laden by following through with the president's strategy to dismantle and defeat the militant Islamist groups supported as proxies by some in the Pakistani security apparatus. Only by defeating those proxies can we reasonably hope to compel Pakistan to reevaluate its security interests and develop a policy to oppose and suppress all militant Islamists operating within its borders.

But al Qaeda has not confined itself to its sanctuaries in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda thrives in political weakness and has been in the process of expanding around the globe. The core al Qaeda group of which bin Laden was the head (often referred to as Al Qaeda Central) has long had at best only a tenuous control over the operations of its dispersed franchises. That control rested partly on resources Al Qaeda Central directed, partly on the value of its recognition of a particular group as worthy of the al Qaeda brand, but largely on the symbolic importance of the charismatic bin Laden. Bin Laden's likely successor, Egyptian doctor Ayman al-Zawahiri, is far less charismatic. His accession to the leadership role could prompt a competition between Al Qaeda Central and its franchises over which group really is at the center of the movement. Such competitions, unfortunately, unfold in the form of spectacular attacks, particularly those conducted on the territory of Western states.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), in Yemen, is the most active and perhaps the most dangerous al Qaeda

franchise in the world. The Arab Spring has reached Yemen with a vengeance—massive protests have led to the defection of elements of the Yemeni military, with the result that armed forces are concentrating for potential civil war in and around the capital and elsewhere in the country. Attempts to broker a negotiated departure for Yemen's hated president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, have broken down. It is far from clear that any such agreement would keep the peace there for very long in any case. Already Saleh has brought back to his capital some of the elite, U.S.-trained Special Forces units supposedly dedicated to the fight against AQAP. As the work of Katherine Zimmerman at AEP's Critical Threats Project has shown, almost any likely scenario going forward will give AQAP more freedom to train, plan, stage, and conduct attacks from increasingly lawless tribal areas in which it has considerable local support. The combination of Yemen's slide toward state failure and bin Laden's death could create a tremendous opportunity for AQAP. His

death may also lead to an increase in AQAP's efforts to conduct spectacular attacks against the United States and the West.

Another al Qaeda affiliate already has control over large portions of a state: Al Shabab is the de facto government of much of southern Somalia outside of Mogadishu. It has not been formally recognized as an al Qaeda

franchise, but its ties with AQAP are long and deep, and its ideology closely mirrors al Qaeda's. Shabab is kept from controlling all of southern and central Somalia only by the presence of peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi, who have been barely able to hold parts of the capital. Shabab is unlikely to suffer at all from bin Laden's death, but it may see a chance—or feel the need—to expand the reach of its strikes in sympathetic retaliation.

Al Qaeda in Iraq, fortunately, remains relatively ineffective, despite efforts to revive itself as American forces withdraw. But the continued presence even of American military trainers in Iraq after the end of this year remains in doubt, and it is not clear that the Iraqi military on its own will be able to maintain the necessary degree of pressure on that al Qaeda franchise. If the complete withdrawal of American forces now underway leads to the explosion of ethnic conflict between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, as some analysts fear, Al Qaeda in Iraq could find fertile ground to reestablish itself, undoing the progress we have made since 2006.

A protracted stalemate in Libya could also set conditions



A NATO oil tanker, destroyed by the Taliban in Pakistan, May 1

for al Qaeda groups to pose again as the only reliable allies of eastern fighters feeling abandoned by the United States and the West. Although the current Libyan resistance leadership is not penetrated by al Qaeda or supportive of that organization or its ideology, eastern Libya is the area that has produced the most al Qaeda fighters in that country and that has the conditions most conducive to the injection of al Qaeda's ideas and leaders.

More remote scenarios could see the rise of al Qaeda franchises or fellow travelers in Egypt, elsewhere in North Africa, the Levant, or Equatorial Africa, but there is no need to belabor the point. The struggle with al Qaeda, to say nothing of the larger struggle against militant Islamism generally, is far from over. Clear and present dangers are, in fact, emerging. It can be tempting to argue that these threats merely show the wisdom of withdrawing from Afghanistan, which is not now a center of al Qaeda activity, to focus on more pressing problems elsewhere. We must resist that temptation. Our struggle against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will not be helped by our giving its affiliates and allies free rein in Afghanistan and returning Taliban leader Mullah Omar, whom all al Qaeda affiliates recognize as "the leader of the faithful," to a position of power.

Success in Afghanistan and Iraq remains vital. American withdrawal from either commitment will be taken throughout the Islamist community as a sign of weakness and indecision. But success in those two theaters is not enough. This moment in the war with militant Islamism is the time to take stock of our global strategy and to develop coherent approaches to the dangers already visible on the horizon. No one wants to invade Yemen, Somalia, Libya, or any other country. But the strategies we have been relying on in Libya and Yemen are failing, and we have never had a strategy for Somalia. The United States must seek every possible way of averting the dangers of stalemate, state collapse, and the triumph of al Qaeda groups, preferably without deploying more of our own forces.

It may be that, in the end, America simply cannot be secure if terrorist groups with international ambitions have uncontested control over sanctuaries and resources. But the U.S. government has never yet focused its attention fully on these challenges, let alone focused resources on them. It is past time to do so. Those sincerely concerned with America's security should be demanding that kind of commitment and should reject utterly the notion that bin Laden's death will allow us to declare "mission accomplished" and withdraw from the Middle East, and the world. ♦

We Can't Leave Education Reform Behind

By Thomas J. Donohue

President and CEO
U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Few laws have been more hotly debated in the last decade than the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, better known as No Child Left Behind (NCLB). Nearly 10 years since its passage, we have an excellent opportunity to reauthorize and strengthen it.

By measuring academic performance—and publicizing the results—NCLB has held schools accountable to students, parents, and taxpayers. The law has dramatically enhanced public school choice by expanding charter schools. Today, 1.5 million children attend nearly 5,000 charter schools in 40 states, three times more schools and students than in 2000. No Child Left Behind also set high standards, establishing real deadlines and real consequences if those deadlines are not met.

But even its most ardent supporters would acknowledge that the law can be improved. And given the current state of

our K–12 education system—where only one-third of high school students graduate on time (50% for minorities) and 40% of those who make it to college require remedial courses—we must seize every opportunity for additional reform.

We believe that NCLB can be strengthened in four fundamental ways. First, under the law, states should establish a grading system, such as A–F, for school performance to provide the public with clear and meaningful information. The grading system would classify all schools in the state based on the actual performance of their students on state assessments, the academic growth of students over time, and the progress in closing achievement gaps between student groups. States must then target assistance and interventions to schools in each grading category.

Second, parents and students—especially those in low-performing schools—must have more choices. Education funds should "follow the child" to wherever parents believe that their children can receive a better

education, including free tutoring, public school choice, charter schools, online learning, and private school choice.

Third, the law should support the identification, development, and retention of effective teachers and principals who produce real gains in student achievement. Teacher tenure policies that reward longevity over performance ought to be overhauled, and federal law should not inhibit state and local efforts to make changes to tenure policies.

Fourth, the law should eliminate ineffective programs and provide states more flexibility with regard to resources with which to meet their achievement targets.

The Chamber stands ready to work with the administration and both parties in Congress to get a new law passed. There can be no retreat from our national commitment to the success of every child.



U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Comment at
www.chamberpost.com.

Reasonable Suspicion

What did Pakistan's military and intelligence agents know about Osama bin Laden's whereabouts, and when did they know it?

BY STEPHEN F. HAYES
& THOMAS JOSCELYN

In May 2010, in the aftermath of the attempted bombing of Times Square by a jihadist with ties to the Pakistani Taliban, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave an interview to *60 Minutes* and made a startling claim about the government in Pakistan. “I’m not saying that they’re at the highest levels, but I believe that somewhere in this government are people who know where Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda is, where Mullah Omar and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban is, and we expect more cooperation to help us bring to justice, capture or kill, those who attacked us on 9/11.”

Why would Clinton say this? Did the U.S. government have intelligence—an inside source, communications intercepts—that Pakistani officials knew where bin Laden was hiding? Or was America’s top diplomat just engaging in idle speculation about a nation often described as a key ally in the war on terror?

One hint: She had made similar comments before.

A year later, two days after a team of Navy SEALs had killed bin Laden at his compound in Abbottabad, CIA director Leon Panetta was even more blunt. In an interview with *Time* magazine’s Massimo Calabresi, Panetta explained why the United States went in on its own: “It was decided that any effort to work with the Pakistanis could jeopardize the mission. They might alert the targets.”

That is a stunning statement. If Clinton would not accuse officials at the “highest levels” of the Pakistani government of al Qaeda sympathies, Panetta did. The CIA director does not deal with anyone other than officials at the highest levels of partner governments. So Panetta wouldn’t withhold information simply out of concern that there are al Qaeda sympathizers or agents seeded among the midlevel ranks of Pakistan’s military and ISI intelligence agency. He was concerned that the leaders of these institutions might alert the targets.

*Stephen F. Hayes is a senior writer at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.
Thomas Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation
for Defense of Democracies.*

It was a reasonable concern for two reasons: the surprising location of bin Laden’s compound and the long history of support for jihadists from within the Pakistani security apparatus.

In August 2010, the U.S. intelligence community tracked Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, a courier known to be very close to bin Laden, to a large compound in Abbottabad, just 40 miles from Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital city. The one-acre property immediately stood out. It was eight times larger than most of the surrounding lots, and it was contained by high walls topped with barbed wire—some rising to more than 15 feet. There were no obvious telephone or cable lines. From a nearby safe house, the CIA monitored the activities of the residents. Among other oddities, they burned their garbage rather than put it out for collection. A seven-foot wall on the third floor was high enough to allow a tall man to get some fresh air without being seen by his neighbors. But even after the intelligence community concluded that bin Laden was probably living there—a 60-80 percent likelihood, the CIA estimated—the location raised doubts.

Abbottabad is home to the Kakul Military Academy, often described as Pakistan’s West Point. As a result, many military officials retire there, to be close to their friends from the army. It frequently hosts high-ranking military officers and visiting foreign dignitaries. A week before the U.S. assault on bin Laden’s compound, the head of Pakistan’s military, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, spoke at a ceremony on the grounds of the academy. In February 2010, General David Petraeus paid a visit to Kakul.

So as CIA analysts learned everything they could about the property, one question kept coming up: Is it possible that the world’s most wanted man is hiding in the shadows of one of Pakistan’s best-known military garrisons without the knowledge of that country’s top officials? They looked—and listened—for signs that official Pakistan was helping those ensconced in the compound. They did not find any.

Still, as Panetta’s comment suggests, the absence of that evidence did not allay suspicions that high-ranking Pakistani officials were aware of bin Laden’s presence. And no wonder.

Bin Laden’s links to Pakistan dated to the 1980s, when

he was a liaison between Saudi intelligence, Pakistani intelligence, and the so-called Arab Afghans who traveled from the Middle East to fight the Soviets. While the war against the Soviets was fought in Afghanistan, the Arab Afghan network bin Laden led was based in Pakistan.

Al Qaeda was headquartered for several years in Sudan in the 1990s, during which time bin Laden refashioned the Arab Afghan network into an international terrorist network. But after the Sudanese government expelled the terror master, al Qaeda relocated to Afghanistan, almost certainly with the help of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence—the ISI.

According to the 9/11 Commission: “It is unlikely that bin Laden could have returned to Afghanistan had Pakistan disapproved. The Pakistani military intelligence service probably had advance knowledge of his coming, and its officers may have facilitated his travel.” During his time away from South Asia, bin Laden had “maintained guesthouses and training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” But he would have needed to broker a deal with the new power inside Afghanistan, Mullah Omar, in order to resettle there.

The ISI made that happen. “Pakistani intelligence officers reportedly introduced bin Laden to Taliban leaders in Kandahar, their main base of power, to aid his reassertion of control over camps near Khowst, out of an apparent hope that he would now expand the camps and make them available for training [Pakistan-backed] Kashmiri militants,” reported the 9/11 Commission.

The value of Pakistan's assistance to bin Laden at this time cannot be overestimated. After being expelled from Sudan, the 9/11 Commission found, bin Laden “was in his weakest position since his early days in the war against the Soviet Union.” He was desperate for a new ally who would host his network and allow him to rebuild. Mullah Omar's Taliban, an ISI proxy, gave him just that.

Newly ensconced in Afghanistan, bin Laden rebuilt al Qaeda quickly and within just a few years showed off his group's deadly capabilities. On August 7, 1998, al Qaeda launched simultaneous suicide truck bomb attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It was al Qaeda's most successful operation prior to 9/11, killing hundreds. In the wake of the attacks, President Clinton authorized missile strikes against a suspicious factory in Sudan and bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan.

From a tactical perspective, the strikes mostly failed. A few dozen al Qaeda trainees and operatives were killed, but bin Laden escaped. Several Clinton administration officials and intelligence officers thought they knew why. “Officials in Washington speculated that one or another Pakistani official might have sent a warning to the Taliban or bin Laden.” Adding to their suspicions was the

fact that several Pakistani military intelligence officials were among the dead at one of bin Laden's camps.

In early 1999, Clinton officials were still exploring ways to get bin Laden. The main obstacle, they feared, was Pakistan. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger “suggested sending one U-2 flight” over Afghanistan in an effort to locate bin Laden. The spy plane would have to fly over Pakistani airspace; Clinton's chief counterterrorism adviser, Richard Clarke, objected on the grounds that Pakistani intelligence “is in bed with” bin Laden and would warn him. “Armed with that knowledge, old wily Usama will likely boogie to Baghdad,” Clarke warned. (Clinton administration officials had received multiple intelligence reports saying that Saddam Hussein wanted bin Laden in Baghdad at the time.)

The 9/11 attacks ushered in a new era of American-Pakistani cooperation against al Qaeda. But the alliance was not a natural one—nor did it come about easily. Pakistan had built Mullah Omar's Taliban to wage a proxy war in Afghanistan. After al Qaeda executed the most devastating terrorist attack in history, Omar refused to disavow al Qaeda's leader. Pakistan's ally in Afghanistan was now one of America's chief enemies.

The deployment of American-led forces to the region and rapid overthrow of the Taliban undoubtedly influenced Pakistani behavior. In his memoir, former President Pervez Musharraf says that Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage threatened to bomb Pakistan “back to the Stone Age” if Musharraf's regime did not cooperate. (Armitage denies he made such a threat, but the tough U.S. position vis-à-vis Pakistan is not in question.)

So deep were the ties between Islamabad and the Taliban that Musharraf was initially undecided about abandoning his erstwhile ally. Musharraf claims that he “war-gamed the United States as an adversary” and concluded, in a “dispassionate, military-style analysis,” that the costs of defying Washington outweighed the benefits.

Musharraf's account may be a self-serving fiction intended to prop up his image as an independent-minded leader who only had Pakistan's interests at heart. Even so, it is telling that he would express his misgivings about allying with the United States in such a way. “The ultimate question that confronted me was whether it was in our national interest to destroy ourselves for the Taliban,” Musharraf writes. “Were they worth committing suicide over? The answer was a resounding no.”

In reality, however, the answer to Musharraf's question was not so straightforward. Whether motivated by an American threat or the billions of dollars it received in U.S. aid, Pakistan did offer vital assistance in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda members

were captured in late 2001 as they attempted to flee Afghanistan's Tora Bora mountains for the unsettled areas of northern Pakistan. Many of them were transferred to American custody and detained at Guantánamo Bay.

Pakistan also helped American counterterrorism officials hunt down important al Qaeda operatives who were plotting more attacks on U.S. soil from their hideouts in Pakistan's cities. Senior al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah, 9/11 point man Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) are the most noteworthy captures from 2002 and 2003. And the counterterrorism cooperation continued in the years that followed. In 2005, for example, Pakistani authorities captured Abu Faraj al Libi, KSM's replacement as al Qaeda's external operations chief. Press reports indicate that the CIA's interrogations of KSM and al Libi played a role in identifying the courier who ultimately led a Navy SEAL team to bin Laden's door.

Even while providing crucial assistance in the fight against al Qaeda, Pakistan kept the Taliban alive. Mullah Omar relocated to Quetta, and his Pakistani protection became so obvious that his new leadership council came to be called the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST). Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an old ISI client from the days of jihad against the Soviets, reestablished his base of operations in northern Pakistan. The same is true for the father and son team of Jalaluddin and Siraj Haqqani, who were also longtime clients of the ISI.

These three organizations—the QST, Gulbuddin's Hezb-i-Islami, and the Haqqani network—are the principal insurgency groups in Afghanistan today. The Pakistani military-intelligence establishment has actively aided and abetted them. These three groups have something else in common: They are closely allied with Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. Siraj Haqqani, who now leads his father's network, sits on al Qaeda's elite Shura council and may have a say in who replaces bin Laden as al Qaeda's top man. Hekmatyar was one of bin Laden's friends from the 1980s. To this day, al Qaeda fights alongside these ISI-backed organizations against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan.

In 2008, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Nash, an American commander who advised the Afghan border police, told the *Army Times* that the ISI “flew repeated helicopter missions into Afghanistan to resupply the Taliban during a fierce battle in June 2007.” A copy of a presentation authored by Nash reads: “ISI involved in direct support to many enemy operations. . . . Classification prevents further

discussion of this point.” The ISI support included “training, funding, [and] logistics” to the Taliban and allied insurgency groups.

In July 2008, the ISI was caught red-handed aiding U.S. enemies when the Haqqani network bombed the Indian embassy in Kabul. The Indian defense attaché and more than 50 others were killed. The following month the *New York Times* reported that American officials had confronted the Pakistanis with evidence of their complicity, including “intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack.” Remarkably, the *Times* also reported that the ISI was warning Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists about U.S. drone attacks: “American officials also said there was new information showing that members of the Pakistani intelligence service were increasingly providing militants with details about the

American campaign against them, in some cases allowing militants to avoid American missile strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas.”

That collaboration continues. In late April, Obama dispatched his top military officer to Islamabad in an effort to repair the rapidly deteriorating relationship between the United States and Pakistan. In a series of high-level meetings, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sought to renew the military

and intelligence partnerships between the two countries. In his public remarks, Mullen had praise for the civilian government and the efforts of Pakistan's security services to help in the battle against jihadists. “Throughout the visit, the admiral emphasized the long-term U.S. commitment to supporting Pakistan in its fight against violent extremists,” read a statement issued by the U.S. embassy.

But in an interview with one of Pakistan's most widely read newspapers, the *Dawn*, Mullen offered an assessment that contrasted dramatically with the happy talk. “It's fairly well known that ISI has a long-standing relationship with the Haqqani network,” he said. “Haqqani is supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners. And I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesn't happen. So that's at the core—it's not the only thing—but that's at the core that I think is the most difficult part of the relationship.”

Recently leaked files produced at Guantánamo provide more examples of Pakistan's duplicity. One leaked Gitmo file contains a “list of terrorist and terrorist support entities” associated with al Qaeda and the Taliban. The U.S. officials who authored the document wrote: “Through associations

Even while providing crucial assistance in the fight against al Qaeda, Pakistan kept the Taliban alive. Mullah Omar relocated to Quetta, and his Pakistani protection there was obvious.

with these groups and organizations, a detainee may have provided support to al Qaeda or the Taliban, or engaged in hostilities against U.S. or Coalition forces.” Even though Pakistan helped capture many of the detainees who have been held at Guantánamo, Pakistan’s ISI intelligence agency is included on the list.

Another leaked Gitmo file contains a striking example of Pakistan’s dual loyalties in the war on terror. The file notes that in January 2003, “Three Pakistani military officers provided . . . training . . . in explosives, bomb-making, and assassination techniques” to a group of Taliban commanders. “This training was conducted in preparation for a planned spring campaign to assassinate Westerners.” A few months later, members of this same Taliban group kidnapped and killed an International Red Cross worker in Afghanistan.

The Afghan insurgency groups are not the only Pakistan-backed terrorist organizations to maintain close ties to al Qaeda. After news of bin Laden’s death was made public, Lashkar-e-Taiba’s founder, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, put out a statement through his spokesman. “Osama bin Laden was a great person who awakened the Muslim world,” Saeed was quoted by Reuters as saying. “Osama bin Laden has rendered great sacrifices for Islam and Muslims, and these will always be remembered.”

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) was founded in the 1990s with assistance from both the ISI and bin Laden to fight Indian forces in Kashmir. It has since evolved into an organization with an international reach. The U.S. government has put considerable pressure on the Pakistani government to crack down on the LeT—to no avail. The LeT operates openly in Pakistan, sometimes under an assumed name. The LeT’s most notorious attack came in November 2008, when well-trained gunmen laid siege to Mumbai. More than 160 people were killed, with hundreds more wounded.

The operation showed the degree to which al Qaeda’s ideology had been adopted by Pakistan’s indigenous terrorist groups. After the attack, Indian officials released transcripts of intercepted telephone calls between the Mumbai attackers and individuals connected to the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment. Indian and American authorities both linked a Pakistani-American named David Headley to the attack. Headley, formerly known as Daood Sayed Gilani, was convinced by the LeT to change his name so that his international travels would avoid scrutiny. He performed surveillance on the LeT’s targets in Mumbai and reportedly confessed to the ISI’s involvement in the assault.

The FBI concluded that Headley had reported to a former Pakistani military officer named Ilyas Kashmiri. As the operational commander of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), another Pakistani-based terrorist group with

historical ties to the ISI, Kashmiri developed close ties to al Qaeda. In 2010, the U.S. Treasury Department designated Kashmiri as a terrorist, saying in a statement that he “is responsible for creating a cadre of militants to act on behalf of HUJI and al Qaeda.”

The reality is that al Qaeda has developed close ties to virtually all of the Pakistani terrorist organizations that have been used as proxies by the ISI. These same organizations provide a deep bench for al Qaeda to use when replacing fallen leaders. Another of these organizations is Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). Like the LeT, JeM was created with assistance from the ISI to wage jihad against India in Kashmir but has evolved into an international jihadist organization. JeM terrorist Rashid Rauf, for example, became a top operational leader within al Qaeda. Rauf has been tied to al Qaeda’s 2006 plot against U.K.-based airliners, among other attacks.

The jihadist violence unleashed by the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment has engulfed Pakistan itself. Suicide bombings have become commonplace. And this violence has been directed at the very organs of the Pakistani state that helped cause it. The Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), an organization that is strongly affiliated with al Qaeda, has targeted ISI and military targets. Led by Hakimullah Mehsud, an ally of bin Laden, the TTP was also responsible for the failed attack on Times Square in May 2010.

In interviews since Osama bin Laden was killed, officials from across the U.S. government have refused to accuse their Pakistani counterparts of complicity in the hiding of the al Qaeda mastermind. But suspicions run deep.

“My best assessment is that their behavior is such that they are surprised by what we found,” says a senior administration official. “But I am not in a position to give them a clean bill of health at this point.”

“I can say with high confidence that those at the top of the Pakistani military and its intelligence service did not know where bin Laden was hiding,” says one official with direct knowledge of the intelligence.

Others warn that such assessments must be parsed literally. The handful of individuals at the very top of those institutions are provisionally beyond suspicion, in other words. But how do we know? No one currently serving would say. One strong possibility: The U.S. government was monitoring their reactions in real time, listening as the assault on bin Laden’s compound went down.

We will soon know more. Document exploitation teams are analyzing the surprising amount of information taken from bin Laden’s compound during the raid. Among their chief objectives: determining what role, if any, top Pakistani government officials played in harboring the fugitive Osama bin Laden over the last decade of his life. ♦



Save 64% on the **Family Value Combo**



Plus, 3 Free Gifts
to every shipping address in your order.



FREE
6-piece
Cutlery Set
FREE
Cutting Board

6 FREE
Omaha Steaks
Burgers



Family Value Combo 45069XHZ

- 2 (5 oz.) Filet Mignons
- 2 (5 oz.) Top Sirloins
- 4 (4 oz. approx.) Boneless Chicken Breasts
- 4 (4 oz.) Omaha Steaks Burgers
- 4 (3 oz.) Gourmet Franks
- 4 (5¾ oz.) Stuffed Baked Potatoes

Save
\$89⁰¹

Reg. ~~\$139⁰⁰~~ | **Now Only \$49⁹⁹**

Limit of 2 packages. Free Gifts included per shipment.
Offer expires 4/15/11. Standard shipping and handling
will be applied per address.

To order: www.OmahaSteaks.com/steaks56
or call 1-888-409-1719



Aaron Burr, Thomas Jefferson

Who's on First?

The year Delaware made history. BY JAMES M. BANNER JR.

On my shelves stand six studies of the presidential election of 1800, two more than James Roger Sharp cites in this most recent and substantial of them. There may be more. Why so many? The election was, as Sharp writes, “one of the two great political and constitutional crises in our nation’s history” and, because of its cast of leading characters (Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Aaron

James M. Banner Jr. is a cofounder of the National History Center and, most recently, the editor, with John R. Gillis, of Becoming Historians, a set of memoirs by 11 historians.

The Deadlocked Election of 1800
Jefferson, Burr, and the Union in the Balance
 by James Roger Sharp
 Kansas, 239 pp., \$34.95

Burr, and many others who fill the roster of the nation’s founders), among the most memorable. In addition, the election set the course of American development long afterwards, and we debate public affairs today in terms never entirely free of those of that era.

But other reasons lie behind the endless flow of these studies, of which Sharp’s ought to be the capstone. One is the relentless pulse of the publishing industry and the apparent need of so many publishers to have their own

series of individual works on each presidential election and each president. Another is the inability of historians (as well as of their readers) to break free of the American measurement of historical time—a calendar cemented in our minds around quadrennial presidential elections. Not that, in our fixation on presidential terms, we’re different from peoples who measure their lives by monarchies (the Edwardian Era, for instance) or dynasties (say, the Ming). But try as historians occasionally do to calibrate American history by such major developments as changes in capitalism (industrial and technological growth, say), or the spread of democracy (women’s and African Americans’

ARCHIVE PHOTOS / GETTY IMAGES; SUPERSTOCK / GETTY IMAGES

rights are examples), they—all of us, really—succumb to the regularities of our politics and mark the nation's days in presidential terms. And so there appear many books, probably too many, like this one.

Because of its particular qualities—comprehensiveness, balance, and readability above all—Sharp's work ought to be the last, at least for awhile, about the election of 1800 (actually, the two elections of 1800 and 1801, which is what Sharp's story is all about). There's little more to be said, and new evidence is unlikely to be found. Yet even if this isn't the last word, a reader can be confident that it's now the best.

The double election of 1800-01 compels our attention for two reasons: It was distinctive, and it was epochal. It was one of the only two presidential elections in American history to be resolved by the House of Representatives, the second being the election of 1824. (Two others, for different reasons, were resolved by different means, the election of 1876 by a special commission, the election of 2000 by the Supreme Court.) The election also marked the opening of a new stage in the nation's history, a stage, one can argue, that has never closed.

The troubles of 1800 and 1801 arose from an Electoral College tie—not, as one might expect, between the opposing presidential candidates, incumbent Adams and vice president Jefferson, but between Jefferson and his running mate, Aaron Burr. The Constitution's framers hadn't provided for the rapid emergence of political parties in the 1790s. So the young frame of government didn't yet require (as it soon would by the 12th Amendment) that electors distinguish between presidential and vice presidential candidates when they cast their electoral votes. More pertinently, Jefferson and Burr's young Democratic-Republican party had failed to arrange for even a single elector to withhold his electoral vote from Burr, the presumptive vice presidential candidate, and so Jefferson and Burr had received the same number of electoral votes. Under the terms of the Constitution, the electoral tie between the two men had to be resolved by the

House of Representatives. The difficulty lay in the fact that the House was in Federalist hands and would remain so until the newly elected 7th Congress met in December 1801 (another quirk in the Constitution, one not to be remedied until 1934). As a result, the Federalist-controlled 6th Congress would have to select the new president from the two candidates of the opposition Democratic-Republican party. And the decision had to be reached in time for Inauguration Day on March 4, 1801.

Yet the fact that the Federalists constituted the majority in the House in the 6th Congress did not alone create the deadlock that eventuated in 36 tense House ballots being necessary to make Jefferson president. Rather, the cause of the problem was the constitutional requirement that such deadlock-resolving votes be taken in the House by states, not by individual congressmen, and that a majority of states decide the outcome. Had votes been tallied by individual congressmen, Jefferson would easily and quickly have won election. Instead, only eight of the necessary nine state delegations (out of 16 voting) were firmly in Republican hands. An additional state was needed to put Jefferson in office. Here's where the Federalists could make mischief, and mischief they purposefully made.

Sharp tells this complex story with great clarity. He's particularly good at describing how many Federalists saw in the tied electoral vote the chance to defy popular sentiment in Jefferson's favor; how Burr first repelled, then dangled with, and finally rejected the lure of some kind of Federalist conditional support for his election to the presidency; and how, to resolve the electoral crisis in Jefferson's favor on the 36th ballot, some kind of understandings were probably reached (although Sharp isn't as convinced on this point as I am) between self-appointed representatives of Jefferson and a few Federalists—understandings that Jefferson would not make wholesale removals of Federalists holding federal office, and would not try to dismantle elements of the nation's financial system. It's a story filled with natural drama and events carrying huge

historical weight. No one who reads this book will ever think otherwise.

It would have been easy enough for Sharp to isolate the election from its surroundings. Fortunately, a noted scholar of the critical earlier decade of the 1790s, he is a contextualist *par excellence*. He points out, for example, that only recently had the federal government moved south from Philadelphia and thus exposed its officeholders for the first time to the raw, unrefined community that the federal capital then was and long remained. Coming on top of the sulphurous political rancor of the preceding decade—rancor no less permeating than today's—the government's move to the banks of the Potomac seems to have formed a permanent part of Americans' political DNA, to say nothing of the general bad mood into which it cast members of Congress. Starting then, with good enough reason to belittle the place of their service, officeholders began to attack the government in which they had agreed to serve. Those who now believe that their detestation of "Washington" is a sentiment they've come to out of native genius might remind themselves that it's a stale charge when it isn't disingenuous.

The capital's mood was in no way lightened by the recent slave uprising in nearby Richmond. Gabriel's Rebellion had been put down easily enough, but the unappealing federal city gained nothing in reputation or ease for being surrounded by states filled with restive slaves. Add to that the perplexity and division caused in Federalist ranks by Hamilton's no-holds-barred attack on the Federalist candidate Adams, and it should come as no surprise that many contemporaries were predicting the disintegration of the union, an end to constitutional government, and the use of arms to enforce Jefferson's election. Today we can see the sour feelings in the capital as a passing moment in the history of American representative government. But as Sharp is at pains to emphasize, government under the Constitution of 1787 was only 13 years old. No one could be confident

that it would survive. All hung on the outcome of the House vote.

In only two respects does this otherwise fine work offer less than it might have. The first concerns Delaware's Federalist congressman James A. Bayard, who deserves to be brought into the limelight more fully than Sharp does. As Sharp indicates clearly enough, Bayard, his state's sole congressman, was key to resolving the deadlock in the House of Representatives by breaking with his Federalist colleagues and, in withholding Delaware's vote, allowing Jefferson to be elected by the requisite majority of states voting. While it has never been entirely clear why Bayard did so, many have since thought that he convinced himself (or was misled by others to think) that Jefferson, wanting as much as anyone else to end the electoral deadlock, had sent signals that he would not overturn some key Federalist policies. But evidence also exists that Bayard, an attorney and formerly a close House associate of John Marshall before Marshall went to the Supreme Court as chief justice, was a firm constitutionalist as well as a moderate Federalist. After he'd broken the deadlock in the House, he explained that he'd acted out of "imperious necessity" so as "not to hazard the Constitution." Bayard's claim can surely be taken to be self-serving; but might it not also reveal the man's true grit and a new kind of commitment—one to the Constitution, above all?

Whatever Bayard's true motives, it turns out that he was willing to risk his future electoral chances in Delaware (and to allow the election of a man whom he strongly disliked) in order to resolve the constitutional paralysis. And so Bayard deserves more admiration for his statesmanship than Sharp and most other historians give him. He was key to ending a crisis that was directly threatening the young constitutional regime of 1787. Even had armed forces not been marshaled to enforce Jefferson's election in the event of the government's paralysis lasting beyond Inauguration Day, it remained possible that calls would have gone out for another constitutional con-

vention, the Federalists' worst fear. Had another convention met, the Constitution of 1787 would no doubt have been jettisoned in favor of a different form of government, and the United States would have begun its early political life in the pattern of other nations: one constitution after another. (Remember that the Constitution of 1787 was already the second of two, the Articles of Confederation having been the first.) That it did not can be credited in significant measure to James Bayard.

Along these lines, then, a second line of argument—or at least of speculation—opens before us. What, if any, were the constitutional consequences of the solution to the deadlock of 1801? The preserved record offers little help. But Sharp might have posed the question—one that, it should be said, no other historian has posed, either: Might not John Marshall have discerned in the election's outcome, and Bayard's act, something that has eluded historians? Not until Bayard's switch in 1801 was the Constitution of 1787 vindicated in all its initial authority; not until the election of Marshall's cousin and fellow Virginian, Jefferson (whom Marshall roundly disliked; he was disliked by Jefferson in return), can it be said that the Constitution had been put to the test and, in the nick of time, been found up to the task.

What did Marshall make of this fact? We don't know. Yet we can see now that his friend Bayard had made of the still-young Constitution a rock on which to build. He had established a new rule: that in a contest between parochial politics and the Constitution, the Constitution must win. In a way not available before, the Constitution was now open to interpretation in the confidence that it, rather than parties or individual political figures, had gained the highest standing in American governance. Bayard had opened a new phase of American constitutionalism. The lesson could not have been lost on Marshall, who soon delivered the Supreme Court's path-breaking opinion in the *Marbury* case that gathered for the Court the authority to declare acts of Congress uncon-

stitutional. And it would not be lost, in subsequent years, on Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln.

In a very direct sense, then, the survival of the Constitution was one result of the election of 1800. No less consequentially, as Sharp emphasizes, the election ushered into office a Jeffersonian regime that determined the course of American government, the nature of American culture, the fate of African Americans, and the geographic reach of national authority for the next 60 years of American history—and in some respects, for all time. Small-government market capitalism thereafter became the ideological norm against which much of American public policy would be measured well into the 20th century. With the help of the three-fifths clause, the South gained a chokehold on the presidency and Congress until Lincoln's election took the nation into a new era for all time. Slavery was given six more decades to strengthen itself in the Old South and in the states carved out of the Old Southwest and across the Mississippi in the Louisiana Territory. The purchase of that vast terrain in 1803 at a stroke doubled the size of the young nation, greatly enlarged its agricultural might, expanded the areas into which slavery would advance, and set the final stage for the nation's eventual spread from eastern to western sea. And with ideological sustenance from Jefferson and his followers, white manhood suffrage became nearly universal by 1840. In short, the election of 1800, by creating the first long-lived alignment of political forces in America's history, laid the groundwork for the nation's emergence as a slaveholding, agrarian, male-democratic, continental colossus.

Both Jefferson and his enemies realized as much. The Squire of Monticello famously termed his election the "revolution of 1800." A Federalist opponent, calling it "a great moral revolution," agreed. But that revolution was no sure thing. Only by a series of fortuitous events and circumstances, as Sharp so well explains, did a few American officeholders step up to the brink of disaster—and then draw back from it in a way that preserved the constitutional government's integrity for 60 more years. ♦

The Opposing Self

When social pressures stand in the way of black success.

BY ALEC SOLOMITA

Ron Christie's book begins with a jolt.

The lawyer, political pundit, and former aide to President George W. Bush tells a story of his younger self, an eager, starstruck—and African-American—junior legislative assistant working for a Republican congressman from Florida, Craig T. James, who served on the House Veterans Affairs Committee. At the committee's first hearing, the 22-year-old Christie was impressed to see Representative Maxine Waters (D-Calif.), a woman whose work and status (if not politics) he admired. Waters, he soon learned, was as impressed by him—but not as favorably.

After the hearing, she summoned Christie to her office: "I want to know why you're working for a Republican. Are you confused?"

"No ma'am, I'm not confused. I work with Congressman James because I share his values. I am a Republican."

"You are a sellout to your race! White people work for Republicans! Not African Americans! You're nothing but an Uncle Tom!"

Christie reports that he was stunned by the tirade. But it was not the last time he would find himself facing a liberal's fusillade of abuse. Indeed, he seems to have made a career of refuting such small-minded, hostile accusations. He has gallantly endured the gently expressed incredulity of Janet Langhart Cohen, who interviewed Christie about his book and wondered aloud how a black man could possibly be a Republican. And he has repeatedly appeared on MSNBC's vituperative *Ed Show*, attempt-

Alec Solomita is a writer living in Somerville, Massachusetts.

Acting White
The Curious History of a Racial Slur
by Ron Christie
Thomas Dunne, 304 pp., \$25.99



Booker T. Washington

ing, civilly, to counter the self-righteous, perpetually outraged harangues of the host and like-minded guests.

What Christie is accused of, by blacks and liberal whites alike, is "acting white." That is, abandoning his heritage, selling out. He shares this distinction with other admirable cultural warriors, individuals as various as Condoleezza Rice, Juan Williams, Shelby Steele, John McWhorter, Randall Kennedy, Thomas Sowell, and Walter Williams. And make no mistake, they *are* various: Their nuanced views cover a wide spectrum. Their only commonality is an independence of mind that incites the wrath of an enervated, bitter, and self-pitying black leadership addicted to the glory days of the civil rights movement and, some of them, to the Black Panther party and its offshoots.

Christie's thesis has become familiar

in recent decades, particularly after Bill Cosby's keynote speech at the NAACP's celebration of the 50th anniversary of *Brown v. Board of Education*, in which Cosby advised the black community to look into its own soul: "We cannot blame white people. . . . We've got to take the neighborhood back." Christie expands the argument. A strong and destructive *internal* attitude impedes black accomplishment. And this attitude is encapsulated, Christie says, in the high-school taunt "acting white," aimed by black students at peers who pay attention in class and do their homework. When "hard work, diligent study, and eloquent communication skills" become cause for derision and abuse, the result is a powerful deterrent to success. It is a phenomenon based on a misguided notion of group loyalty. Its strength resides in a fear of ostracism.

Acting White takes a historical approach, sketching out the contours of not just the term itself but the operating concept as well, the origins of which he discerns in the antebellum South. He relies heavily on Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1852), where the attitudes of whites toward blacks run a gamut of viciousness: from benign superiority to amusement to sadism, fear, and loathing—all serving the purpose of unthinkable exploitation. Christie points to whites' fear of black literacy: "Blacks were legally denied the opportunity to become literate in several southern states. Alabama, Georgia, and Virginia joined . . . other states in enacting statutes that prescribed fines, flogging, and imprisonment for those who taught African Americans how to read and write."

How blacks perceived literacy becomes the focus of Christie's attention. The slave George Harris in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* says, "I know more about business than [the master] does. . . . I can read better than he can; I can write a better hand." But Harris's stance was not, according to Christie, prevalent among blacks in the slaveholding South:

Apparently, the notion that blacks would apply themselves to become literate and educated . . . was a foreign concept to someone of Uncle Tom's mindset. . . . This subservient . . . ideol-

ogy about education—then and now—holds that African Americans seeking to emancipate their minds from the chains of illiteracy act as do whites.

Although *Acting White* suffers occasionally from awkward prose and unnecessary repetition, Christie proves a competent guide through some complicated history. He shows, for example, that despite Booker T. Washington's promotion of "hard work and economic self-reliance for blacks," he blinked when it came to true equality, supporting industrial over academic education for blacks and assuring whites that they need not fear social assimilation. Interestingly, Washington and his rival W.E.B. Du Bois traded similar charges of kowtowing to white attitudes. "Acting White" seems to be an equal opportunity slur.

Discord in the early 20th century between Du Bois and the leader of the nascent Back to Africa movement, Marcus Garvey, makes earlier disagreements sound mild. Distrustful of education and opposed to assimilation, Garvey attacked the Harvard-educated Du Bois at first vigorously, and then viciously: Du Bois, Garvey wrote in 1923, "likes to dance with white people, and dine with them, and sometimes sleep with them, because from his way of seeing things all black is ugly, and all that is white is beautiful." Garvey's accusations would seem quaint, perhaps, if they were not as current as today's headlines. Christie quotes a 2007 item from CNN.com: "The Rev. Jesse Jackson criticized Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama . . . accusing the Illinois senator of 'acting like he's white' according to a South Carolina newspaper." And about a year later, Ralph Nader chimed in, saying that Obama tries to "talk white."

This comprehensive history of the dangerous and self-defeating notion that pursuing an education, speaking well, dressing well, and working in a profession equals "selling out" is both sobering and encouraging. And the failure of many black leaders to relinquish the comforting myth that all of their community's woes can be laid at the feet of "institutional racism" is causing young African Americans enormous harm. ♦

BCA

Divine Intervention

What religion means to politics, and vice versa.

BY FRANCIS J. BECKWITH

Although virtually all Americans would agree that the idea of the separation of church and state is a good thing, what exactly it means is a hotly contested question.

For some, it means that the government and religious bodies are autonomous entities that ought not to exert power over each other in the areas over which each has appropriate authority. Others extend the idea of separation to include not only institutional limits but also a severance between the government's lawmaking powers and religiously informed policy proposals. So, for example, a law that prohibits embryo-destruction research would violate the separation of church and state, since such a law is informed by a sanctity-of-life ethic derived from a particular theological tradition. Thus, the only legitimate policy on this matter that the state may enact is one whose advocates are not motivated by their religious beliefs.

Notice that the latter understanding of separationism is not concerned with the actual content of the religious citizen's policy proposal, whether or not he or she has offered a cogent argument that is rationally defensible. Rather, this form of separationism amounts to a metaphysical exclusionary rule that *a priori* bars as illegitimate a cluster of policy proposals without regard for the quality of the cases offered for any of them. Their secular contraries are not

subjected to this philosophical apartheid, even though they offer answers to the same questions and rely on beliefs no less contested than their so-called religious counterparts.

Consider, again, embryo-destruction research. One side claims that the embryonic human being is a full-fledged member of the human community, identical to its postnatal self, and thus possesses the same moral worth and intrinsic dignity throughout its existence. The other side denies this, arguing that embryonic

human beings lack some characteristic or property that would make them moral persons and thus subject to the usual prohibitions against homicide. Although the religious citizen is motivated by what his theological tradition teaches, that tradition is itself a consequence of an extended argument over time, no different in character from its secular counterpart. For the secularist's position is shaped by certain inherited beliefs acquired during his academic and cultural formation that are central to his intellectual tradition. These beliefs in metaphysics (nominalism), epistemology (scientism), and religion (subjectivism) are, like the believer's beliefs, the result of an extended argument over time.

In *Good and Bad Ways to Think About Religion and Politics*, Robert Benne provides a clear and compelling brief for just this sort of religious citizen (and the ecclesial community to which this citizen belongs). And he does so with great care and insight. Director of the Center for Religion and Society at Roanoke College, Benne focuses on American

**Good and Bad Ways
to Think About
Religion and Politics**
by Robert Benne
Eerdmans, 128 pp., \$14

Francis J. Beckwith, professor of philosophy and church-state studies at Baylor, is the author, most recently, of Politics for Christians: Statecraft as Soulcraft.

politics and Christian participation in it. Although he does mention a few non-Christian groups, his purpose is to offer Christians and their detractors a way of thinking about religion and politics that addresses some of the concerns that many believers and unbelievers have expressed over the past three decades since the ascendancy of the Religious Right.

After the short introduction, in chapters two and three Benne distinguishes two sorts of positions on the relationship between religion and politics—separationism and fusionism—both of which he argues Christians ought to reject. As for the first, there are at least two varieties. One sort—championed by writers as diverse as Richard Dawkins and Damon Linker—views the participation of religious citizens in the formation of policy as deleterious to democratic liberalism, if the policies these citizens propose have their genesis in their religious beliefs. Benne convincingly rebuts this claim by showing that to actualize this separationist prescription would, in effect, limit religious liberty in ways inconsistent with the promise of the American Founding. (This is why John Rawls’s “political liberalism”—the liberation theology of the secular class—is a project subversive to liberal democracy, since it privileges what it claims it does not privilege, understandings of reason, liberty, self-governance, and philosophical anthropology that are intrinsically hostile to the principles of the American Founding. And it does so on the basis of rather flimsy arguments.)

In fact, contends Benne, the separation of church and state, so famously penned by President Jefferson in his Letter to the Danbury Baptists, was a call for separating the state from the institutional church and not sequestering religion from politics. Contemporary separationists, moreover, are notoriously selective when they lament the mixing of religion and politics. For they rarely if ever decry the political activism of liberal Christians in mainline denominations who almost always walk lockstep with the left wing of the Democratic party.

The other sort of separationist is usually a devout Christian who believes that his church’s (or its members’) involvement in politics will corrupt its character and thus undermine or make more difficult its duty to save and nurture souls. Benne sees this as a legitimate concern, and one that he returns to several times. Nevertheless, he argues that because Christianity teaches that God is sovereign over all creation, including political and social institutions, and because the Gospel requires us to love our neighbors and to will their good, we cannot capriciously exclude the political realm without undermining our belief that Christianity is a knowledge tradition that properly informs us about the good, the true, and the beautiful in every facet of human existence.

Fusionists, according to Benne, see such a direct connection between their political beliefs and partisan affiliations and the teachings of their faith that they often think, either intentionally or unintentionally, that there is a straight line from the latter to the former. Globally, some Christians fuse ethnic solidarity and patriotism with their theological traditions in unhealthy ways, fomenting the sorts of violence we have seen in places like Bosnia and Northern Ireland. Domestically, fusionism is more issue-oriented. So, for example, Paul Tillich wrote, “Socialism is the only possible economic system from the Christian point of view.” And today some left-leaning Christians support same-sex marriage and abortion rights on precisely the same grounds.

On the political right, groups like the Christian Coalition issue policy pronouncements that range from opposing abortion (which is much more defensible as *the* Christian point of view) to supporting the war in Iraq (which is much more tenuous as *the* Christian position). Moreover, when one equates the platform of either of the two major political parties with one’s theological beliefs, this leaves one with virtually no room for making distinctions between posi-

tions that seem to be close to obvious entailments of one’s Christian beliefs (e.g., male-female marriage, pro-life on abortion) and positions over which Christians of goodwill may disagree (e.g., whether a particular war is just, the size and scope of the welfare state, school-sponsored prayer in public schools).

Benne proposes an alternative to separationism and fusionism: critical engagement. In making his case he offers a theoretical justification and suggests some practical applications as well. Concerning the former, he takes the central claims of Christianity—about the nature of God, creation, salvation, and man—and, from them, derives several politically relevant principles. He then explains how those principles may be applied given the historical, political, national, and social situations in which an ecclesial community and its members may find themselves. So, for example, a Christian who has good reason to believe that the unborn from conception is a moral person, and is thus her neighbor, may have a difficult time placing that belief in our laws if she lives in a society in which most of its citizens cannot “see” the unborn’s personhood. In that case, the Christian may opt for more modest attempts at shaping policy that provide a means to teach her compatriots about the sanctity of human life. So, she and her church may support a partial-birth abortion ban, since it requires that their compatriots confront this gruesome procedure and what it does to a being that seems obviously to be one of us.

In terms of practical application, Benne suggests several ways by which Christian churches may, indirectly or directly, as well as intentionally and unintentionally, involve themselves in politics and public affairs. And although this is a small book, it is packed with real insight. Benne wisely navigates between several extremes while always mindful that, though the Christian is a citizen of two kingdoms, it is in only one of them that he can find the eternal source of all that could possibly be good and true in the other. ♦

Canadian Contra

Making the case against mindless tinkering.

BY KELLY JANE TORRANCE

Canada's Conservative party won a clear majority in last week's federal election. So the Canadian constitution is safe, for now.

Virtually every Canadian election in modern times has had electoral reform as part of the debate. And this one—especially as it was the country's fourth election in seven years—wasn't any different. Jack Layton, head of the New Democrats, the left-wing party now official opposition for the first time in its history, promised to abolish the Senate if he assumed power, calling it a tool of political patronage. Prime Minister Stephen Harper showed no inclination to stand athwart history: He wouldn't make changes that would require renegotiating the constitution—a thorny prospect in a country as regionalized as Canada—but he did promise reform, perhaps allowing provinces to hold senatorial elections. (Alberta already does, but it would take constitutional change to remove the prime minister's power of appointment.)

The debate over electoral reform can be difficult to follow, especially for those not fortunate enough to have grown up under parliamentary government. But if you want to understand that system, and the constant calls to change it, you can do no better than John Pepall's knife-edged treatise, *Against Reform*. Pepall might be Canada's most curmudgeonly commentator. His all-encompassing title really is genuinely all-encompassing: He is against not just some suggestions for political reform, but *all* of them. Moreover, he is almost always convincing.

Kelly Jane Torrance, a native of Edmonton, Alberta, is an assistant editor at THE WEEKLY STANDARD and movie critic of the Washington Examiner.

He begins with a simple—but important—observation: “We have forgotten how and why our political institutions came to be. Behind Canada's experience with our existing political institutions lie centuries of political evolution in Britain.” Pepall doesn't mention Friedrich Hayek, but the Austrian economist's insights into how social and political institutions evolve through trial and error into a spontaneous order apply here. The Westminster model of parliamentary government has been honed over generations; it's not an *au courant* system created by a few bureaucrats.

As Pepall says, “We are distracted by the spectacle of American politics.” Fixed elections, for example, lead to a cycle that begins years before the actual voting day, with dozens of possible candidates making their way into the news. Canadian politics looks (like much of the rest of the country) staid in comparison. But it seems a fair question: “Why should we not know when the next election will be?” There are plenty of reasons. Floating election dates have their advantages—not the least of which is avoiding America's overlong, expensive election cycle.

Pepall has an even better one: “Americans are stuck with their politicians for however long their terms may be.” When a Canadian government misbehaves, it is subject to a nonconfidence vote. (The Conservatives lost such a vote, which led to this election, only 30 months after the last one. The Liberals sorely miscalculated.) Pepall asks supporters of fixed dates a good question: Why would champions of democracy object to an election? Consider how this might have affected one of the most controversial pieces of legislation passed in the recent history of the United States.

Instead of holding a proxy election on Obamacare in Massachusetts—which didn't stop the administration from passing it—Americans could have had a national election to vote on it more directly.

Pepall examines each call for reform, and finds it wanting. His approach is analytic, his conclusions full of common sense. More surprising, he manages to make the details of parliamentary wrangling entertaining.

Typical free votes in the House of Commons have been on issues like abortion or capital punishment, which are supposed to touch politicians' generally obscure consciences. Such free votes have in any event been just for show. No free vote has ever frustrated the wishes of the government.

So much for the push for less party discipline.

Underlying his arguments is an emphasis on “strong government,” a phrase that may be anathema to many Americans but is about structure not content. A government must be able to get things done, and it cannot do so when parties dissolve into factions that make it impossible to form a stable government. Proportional representation gives every interest “an incentive to break off and form its own party.” You might like what the Green party promises, but even in Canada the Green party has no chance of forming a government—and that, in the end, is the essential function of a parliamentary system. The Greens aren't even interested in developing the comprehensive platform needed to be in the running. They have no desire for mass appeal.

Pepall isn't wholly conclusive. As a teenager I worked with the fledgling Reform party, which campaigned for a Triple-E Senate—equal, elected, and effective. (“Equal” meant that each province would have the same number of senators, as in the American system.) Layton is right; the Senate is a conglomerate of cronyism. But as leaders of every party promise reform, *Against Reform* is sorely needed. John Pepall is a masterful guide through the thicket, and a wry one, too. As he notes, echoing Yeats, “Some advocates of reform are full of passionate intensity.” ♦

Oh, the Humanities!

They have seen the enemy, and it isn't who you think.

BY MARK BAUERLEIN

This past month, as applicants to selective colleges received letters of acceptance, how many parents sat down with their 18-year-old, cast a stern regard, and said, “Okay, you’re on your own soon, but we want you to major in English”? Not many, of course. At the current price of tuition, they want a nice job waiting for Junior right after graduation. Whaddya gonna do with a literature degree?

As a result, while the student population has grown every year, English and foreign languages have slipped. They used to be the center of the liberal arts, but now they collect less than 5 percent of bachelor’s degrees. From 2005 to 2008, graduate programs produced two-and-one-half times as many Ph.D.s as there were tenure-track jobs available (roughly 600 openings from 1,500 doctorates each year). In 2009, after the financial crisis, posts advertised in the Modern Language Association Job List fell to 97 in foreign languages and 165 in English for the entire country. One year later, SUNY-Albany decided to terminate majors in French, Russian, Italian, Classics, and Theater, while news of similar cuts spilled out of LSU, the University of Maine, the University of Nevada-Reno, and other campuses.

To many, this spells the death of the

Mark Bauerlein, professor of English at Emory, is the author, most recently, of The Dumbest Generation: How the Digital Age Stupefies Young Americans and Jeopardizes Our Future (Or, Don't Trust Anyone Under 30).

humanities, fields unable to withstand job-hunting students and bean-counting administrators. When professors congregate and broach the downgrading, the customary villains pop up: The corporate mentality of university leaders, stupid Republican legislators who slash funding, right-wing gadflies such as David Horowitz who demonize professors as rabid leftists. At the same time,



John Churchill of Phi Beta Kappa

they salute themselves for having lifted the field past the days of Dead-White-Male-only authors and raising needed attention to matters of race, sexuality, gender, class, and imperialism. Some of them attribute the loss of support to risky stances they’ve taken against patriotism, faith, capitalism, etc. They’ve spoken truth to power, and power is fighting back.

Something altogether different happened recently at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. At the end of March, 200 scholars, administrators, and advocates gathered for the Symposium on the Future of the Humanities, a day-long colloquy framed from the start as a defensive summit. SAIS and the Coun-

cil of Independent Colleges cosponsored the event, with CIC president Richard Ekman and SAIS scholar Azar (*Reading Lolita in Tehran*) Nafisi serving as hosts. Their invitation letter acknowledged the poor prospects, a “long period of marginalization of the liberal arts,” and they clearly intended the meeting to have a motivating impact. Four panels would address Big Issues—“Why the Humanities?” “The Humanities, the Individual, and Society”—and everyone in the room would agree on the first premise that the humanities are crucial to an intelligent, virtuous society.

As the proceedings began, I sat down in front and expected the same things I’d seen before at such meetings. I waited for panelists to trash George W. Bush, Rush Limbaugh, the reign of “accountability,” American anti-intellectualism—and it never happened. Surely remarks about the rasping incivility of the right would surface—but not this time, it turned out. Nor did anybody solicit more adversarial critique from literature professors, pledge to disabuse students of middle-class notions, or urge that we insert more pop culture and works by women and persons of color into the curriculum to make it more relevant and less elitist.

Instead, the mood was sober and moderate, and the arguments traditional. Speakers and attendees had a no-nonsense, no-cheerleading air about them—perhaps because so many of them occupy posts that bring them into contact with nonhumanities figures. A tenured English professor can go for years without having a consequential talk with an outsider, the like-minded habitat fostering extreme views and a collective self-regard. The people at the symposium—college presidents, foundation personnel, organization leaders—have to face politicians, journalists, donors, and parents all the time. For them, cutting-edge, transgressive, political definitions of the humanities don’t work, and if their statements don’t appeal to funders

and officials, they lose their jobs.

The former chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts, Dana Gioia, spoke on an afternoon panel, with Reagan's NEA chairman, Frank Hodson, in the audience sitting not far from the current Humanities Endowment chairman, Jim Leach. Leaders of Phi Beta Kappa, the Guggenheim Foundation, the Luce Foundation, the Federation of State Humanities Councils, Columbia University Press, the Association of American Colleges and Universities, and various scholarly associations were there, along with high officers from Kenyon College, George Washington, NYU, MIT, Notre Dame, Harvard, and several smaller independent colleges. Each group has relations with outside powers such as state governors; and when, for instance, the National Governors Association calls their campuses "an often hidebound system" (as it did recently in a 46-page report), they know they can't get indignant or self-important.

In the proceedings, then, several warned against mounting the moral high ground too readily. Matthew Santirocco, dean at NYU, opened the second session not by "preaching to the converted," as he said, but by wondering: "To what extent are the humanities themselves also responsible for the current situation?" Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain of the University of Chicago observed that humanists often "overstate" their case, sliding into Polonius-like assertions that boil down to "the reader of great works of literature will not become a murderer" and "the aficionado of Mozart will not be cruel and unfeeling." Recall, however, that famous "lover of opera" Adolf Hitler, whose first destination in occupied Paris was the opera house; those camp commanders who kept musician inmates alive to play classical pieces while others marched into the gas chambers; and those poets and filmmakers who were fascists and Communists. Steven Knapp, president of George Washington, outlined a lingering tension between the things academics say about cultural objects and the way people admire those objects.

"What matters to the public is Shakespeare," he observed, "not 'the logic of theatrical representation.' What matters

is the story of America, not 'the ideological structure of American essentialism.'" He went so far as to chide the high-cachet schools of deconstruction, Marxism, feminism, and anticolonialism because they "took a critical turn against culturally prestigious objects." Knapp left the implication unstated: Humanities professors disrespected great works, so naturally the public turned around and disrespected *them*.

Nobody demanded that the public change, either, and little resentment or griping popped up. Gioia noted a bipartisan consensus in Washington to cut arts and humanities funding (don't blame Republicans alone) and urged the audience to create a "workable public consensus" to reverse it. In one question-and-answer session, Jeffrey Brown of *PBS NewsHour* wondered about the "neglect or inability or lack of desire . . . to speak directly to the public in a public language."

"The writing that emerges from many departments of liberal arts," Elshtain noted, "is deeply unintelligible and arcane," leaving a gap between academics and the public that translates into less public support.

This isn't to say that the humanities don't have outside adversaries. They do. But the one singled out in my conversations with participants between panels was not political or reactionary or conspiratorial: It was practical. Hodson summarized it neatly: "The most potent threat is that [the humanities] are not viewed as useful to jobs." John Churchill of Phi Beta Kappa termed it "the cry of the practical . . . that which will be immediately useful." Ekman underscored the narrow expectation: "You can't expect to find a one-to-one correspondence in the short term between studying a work of 18th-century English literature and acquiring a job skill." In her talk, Kenyon president S. Georgia Nugent found the approach symptomatic of a general drift toward quantification in the world, while Princeton philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah regretted the threat to "works of the past" in a utilitarian, scientific culture, adding, "I don't think that our civilization is so

degraded that we have to defend giving attention to what is excellent."

Against the trend, speakers and attendees voiced nothing radical or subversive about the humanities, but pressed traditional justifications which Cardinal Newman and Matthew Arnold would endorse. Appiah charged the humanities with identifying the most excellent and refined creations amidst the vulgar swirl of contemporary society. Edward Hirsch of the Guggenheim Foundation praised the humanities for, *contra* postmodernism, maintaining "the concept of the human" and helping people "transcend the local." Neil Rudenstine, ex-president of Harvard, contrasted "real thought, real concentrating," which the humanities foster, to the "connectivity" and inability "to be alone" that characterize the lives of the young. The citations favored by panelists came not from multiculturalist writers and edgy theorists but from figures of High Culture: Cicero, Hobbes, Dostoyevsky, Wallace Stevens.

At day's end, the symposium hadn't secured a \$10 million pledge for literary study, crafted a handbook for humanities lobbyists, or brought any politicians or CEOs into the discussion. It did, however, pinpoint the best attitude toward revival: respect for tradition and consideration of the public. The fashions and theories that have so exhilarated the professorate in the past simply disappeared.

For some 40 years, literature professors have toyed with the humanities in principle and practice, and they have dismembered its prior achievements, sometimes brilliantly but usually shortsightedly. The game could continue as long as the money kept coming. (The arguments of Allan Bloom, Roger Kimball, and others made no inroads on the orthodox humanities "critiques" at all.) The budget, though, has wounded it—fatally. The economics of the university have raised the stakes to actual survival, making provocative and radical positions look irresponsible. A new sobriety and realism have set in, and if more meetings repeat the tenor and content of the SAIS/CIC event, the humanities might regain some prestige and climb back to their proper, essential place in higher education. ♦



How Is John Galt?

America's favorite drugstore polemic goes Hollywood.

BY JOHN PODHORETZ

There was some excitement on the right earlier this spring as the movie version of Ayn Rand's *Atlas Shrugged*—or rather, the movie version of the first third of Rand's behemoth novel-cum-lecture from 1957—approached its release. The film, made on a modest budget by a first-time director and no-name cast and paid for by a passionate Libertarian businessman, wasn't sold to them as a gripping yarn or a crackerjack dystopian thriller. Rather, it was marketed almost exclusively as a cultural watermark.

You weren't supposed to buy a ticket to *Atlas Shrugged* because you wanted an evening's entertainment. You should buy a ticket to send a message—a message to Hollywood about making entertainments palatable to conservatives, to liberals about their dogmatic refusal to accept the power and popularity of Rand's anti-statist ideas, and to Washington politicians who have allowed the government to balloon in size over the past decade.

The marketing team for *Atlas Shrugged* had the idea that it could turn the movie into a Tea Party version of *Fahrenheit 9/11*, the Michael Moore screed that caught the wave of anti-Bush hysteria in 2004 and went on to gross an unimaginable \$222 million against a budget of \$6 million—by leagues the most successful nonfiction film ever made. In one of the most brilliant promotional gam-

bits ever devised, Moore managed to turn the purchase of a ducat to *Fahrenheit 9/11* into a substitute ballot, a cultural vote against George W. Bush.

But that wasn't the only reason for its success. *Fahrenheit 9/11* was, to some extent, a perfectly realized piece of work. It both reflected and epitomized the attitude of its audience toward George W. Bush with its depiction of its villain as a moron Machiavel—and with its sniggering humor congratulated its viewers on their utter superiority to the buffoons who bought Bush's bilge. It's a hateful piece of work, but undeniably effective.

You can't say the same of *Atlas Shrugged*, to put it mildly. Whatever one might think of Ayn Rand as a philosopher, she had a propulsive sense of story, and her book is an amazing mash-up of dystopian science fiction, conspiracy mystery, and political thriller. It is also unquestionable that Hollywood's refusal thus far to bring *Atlas Shrugged* to the big or small screen has long been a mark of its cultural blindness. The book has sold over 7 million copies since its publication and continues to sell more than 100,000 copies a year. If any piece of fiction published over the past half-century in America could be said to have proved itself as a mass-culture favorite, *Atlas Shrugged* can.

The movie could never have been a mass-culture favorite. Indeed, its box-office receipts tapered off significantly after the first weekend once people got a real sense of it and discovered that it was not actually

an adaptation of *Atlas Shrugged* but rather something like the pilot for an unmade *Atlas Shrugged* miniseries. Since it covers only the first third of the novel—in which Rand sets up her characters and her plot but doesn't show you where it's all going—the movie version is all wind-up and no delivery. If you know the novel, it is unsatisfying. If you don't know the novel, you will leave the theater baffled and angry.

It doesn't even get to the crux of Rand's conceit: the existence of a libertarian utopia to which all the great men of society are exiling themselves to live as free men rather than surrender the fruits of their labors to a statist tyranny. We see the men disappearing, but we don't know where. And just as we're about to find out, it ends.

The miracle of this modest venture—which was put into production so that its producer could retain the rights to the property—is that it is at all watchable. And the reason for it has nothing to do with Rand's political or social message. Director Paul Johansson and screenwriters John Agliadoro and Brian Patrick O'Toole did one very interesting thing: They figured out how to set the movie in the present, or near present, while effectively retaining the book's mid-century spirit through the use of old-fashioned settings, clothing, and slightly formal dialogue.

This approach turns *Atlas Shrugged* into a strangely fascinating update of those stilted but glamorous 1950s/60s movies about rich people you can see on Turner Classic Movies—those adaptations of big, sodden novels of Rand's day like *Youngblood Hawke* and *Parrish* and *Written on the Wind*. And in so doing, the filmmakers have revealed a core truth about Ayn Rand without meaning to: Rand may have fancied herself a visionary truth-teller, but in the end, her masterpiece is really just the greatest drugstore paperback of all time. And the only quality that makes this new *Atlas Shrugged* worthwhile is its odd invocation of those kinds of junky but irresistible books and the junky but irresistible movies made from them. ♦



John Podhoretz, editor of Commentary, is THE WEEKLY STANDARD's movie critic.

“Strange as it sounds, groups representing atheists and secular humanists are pushing for the appointment of one of their own to the chaplaincy, hoping to give voice to what they say is a large—and largely underground—population of nonbelievers in the military.”

—New York Times, April 27

PARODY

New York Times

MAY 22, 2011

ONE DOLLAR CHEAP

A Shepherd of Their Own

Nonbelieving Troops Embrace Atheist Chaplain

By PETER BAKER AND
JEFF ZELENY

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN — With members of his flock gathered before him in the morning chill, Lt. Col. Murray O’Hair, USA, opened his text, cleared his throat, and began to read:

“A reading from the Tenth Chapter of ‘The God Delusion’ by Richard Dawkins, subsection four, page 420: ‘I am thrilled to be alive at a time when humanity is pushing against the limits of understanding. Even better, we may eventually discover that there are no limits.’”

“You know, guys, they say that there are no atheists in the foxhole. But I am here to tell you that not only are there atheists in the foxhole, there are atheists right next to you in the foxhole. And they believe—as I believe, and as the Blessed Dawkins teaches us—that there may well be no limits to what you guys can do to fulfill your mission here as part of the International Security Assistance Force.

“You guys are paratroopers; you know what I’m talking about. When you jump out of that plane—sure, maybe you’re tempted for a second to say a prayer



GETTY IMAGES

Lt. Col. Murray O’Hair, USA, atheist/secular humanist chaplain, speaks to members of the 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, in Kandahar.

before you pull the ripcord. But when you look past the clouds—I mean really beyond the clouds—do you see Saint Peter standing at the pearly gates, or a bunch of angels waiting at a bus

stop? Of course not! You see what every secular humanist sees when he beholds the infinite reaches of outer

Continued on Page A11

the weekly
Standard

MAY 16, 2011