the weekly Standard

JULY 9, 2007 $3.95

RUDY AT REGENT
MATTHEW CONTINETTI

BLOOMBERG ON POVERTY
HEATHER MAC DONALD

"We are beyond a surge of forces, and we are now into a surge of operations."

Lieutenant General Ray Odierno
Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq

PROGRESS IN IRAQ, QUAGMIRE IN D.C.

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How the West *Really* Lost God

A new look at secularization

What secularization theory assumes is that religious belief comes ontologically first for people and that it goes on to determine or shape other things they do—including such elemental personal decisions as whether they marry and have children. Implied here is a striking, albeit widely assumed, view of how one social phenenomenon powers another: that religious believers are more likely to produce families because religious belief somehow comes first. . . . What has not been explained, but rather assumed throughout that chain of argument, is why the causal relationship between belief and practice should always run that way instead of the other, at least some of the time. . . . In brief, it is not only possible but highly plausible that many Western European Christians did not just stop having children and families because they became secular. At least some of the time, the record suggests, they also became secular because they stopped having children and families.

—Mary Eberstadt

Terrorism, the Military, and the Courts

What kind of process is due detainees?

This essay . . . is for those who live in that gulf between the centers of gravity of elite and mass opinion—those not content to give the president a free hand in a messy, unending quasi-war but also suspicious that courts can and should supervise detentions and interrogations and doubtful that such operations are, in any event, easily subjected to absolute moral rules. This is uncomfortable territory, for the slope is indeed as slippery as slopes get—and slippery, I should say, on a hill with two distinct bottoms. At one lies a government capable of torture with impunity, the very essence of tyranny. At the other lies a government incapacitated from expeditiously taking those steps necessary to protect the public from catastrophic attack. . . . In reality, however, this is the intellectual and practical territory in which wars have been won with liberty preserved.

—Benjamin Wittes

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Contents

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Articles

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Features

Books & Arts

the weekly Standard

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BPA INTERNATIONAL

Cruising für ein Bruising

Needless to say, The Scrapbook is devoted to the First Amendment, and our heritage of freedom of speech. And while we might not always agree with what people are saying, we will defend to the death, etc., etc.


Reuters / Paul Hanna

All right, now that we've said all that, The Scrapbook is emboldened to express its disappointment at the decision of the German government to allow Tom Cruise to film scenes for his new movie at German military installations. (They had tentatively refused permission, but changed their mind.) The movie, entitled *Valkyrie*, is about the July 20, 1944, plot against Hitler by anti-Nazi German officers. Cruise is playing Col. Claus von Stauffenberg, the wounded aristocrat who planted a bomb-laden briefcase under the briefing table at Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia. As nearly everybody knows, Stauffenberg left the headquarters to catch a plane for the capital, and the bomb went off; but Hitler was injured, not killed—and Stauffenberg was executed later that evening in Berlin.

As it happens, the Germans had no quarrel with the movie itself but with Tom Cruise, and not because of his strange ideas about psychiatry or last year's bouncing episode on Oprah's sofa. No, it's because (in the words of a Defense Ministry spokesman with the delightfully Teutonic name Harald Kammerbauer) "Tom Cruise . . . has publicly professed to being a member of the Scientology cult."

Well! Tom Cruise has not just "publicly professed" to being a member of the Scientology cult; he publicly revels in his devotion to the Scientology cult. And here we must explain that while Germany is a liberal democracy, like ours, German law—for historic reasons we need not detail here—takes a dim view of the public expression of certain sentiments (admiration for the Führer, Holocaust denial, etc.), as well as sinister cults dressed in the guise of religion (the Church of Scientology, etc.).

So while we, as good Americans, may not share the German attitude toward limitations on speech, we appreciate the reasoning behind such limitations.

And while we're on the subject, here is The Scrapbook's official view of the matter, as it now stands. Frankly, we don't much care if Tom Cruise (and other Hollywood illuminati such as John Travolta, Priscilla Presley, etc.) are Scientologists or not; we enjoy a good laugh as much as the next moviegoer. What offends us is the idea of a buffoon like Cruise playing a tragic hero of modern history. What's next? Steven Seagal as Dietrich Bonhoeffer? Jenny McCarthy as Anne Frank? *Gott in Himmel!* ♦

Gray Lady Gospel

The Scrapbook will yield to no one in defending the *New York Times*'s right to reveal its antireligious biases. The latest revelation is the *Times*'s June 26, 2007, editorial attacking "John Roberts's new conservative majority" for its five-to-four decision in *Hein* v. *Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.*:

> Moreover, the professed devotion to the First Amendment did not extend to allowing taxpayers to challenge White House aid to faith-based organizations as a violation of church-state separation. The controlling opinion . . . permits the White House to escape accountability when it improperly spends tax money for religious purposes.

The Hein named in the suit is Jay Hein, who directs the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI). The suit was waged by a tax-exempt Wisconsin group for self-described atheists, agnostics, and "freethinkers." The Court ruled that they had no legal standing to sue.

Contrary to the *Times*'s assertion, the OFBCI has not given a penny in "aid to faith-based organizations" or spent any "tax money for religious purposes." Rather, both at conferences on federal grant-making and on its website, it has instructed religious nonprofit organizations that federal law strictly forbids using tax dollars to proselytize or for other sectarian purposes.

For decades, national religious megacharities have received federal grants. The effort to broaden federal outreach to urban and other grassroots religious groups that supply social services dates back to the Clinton years.

Journalistically speaking, the *Times*'s fact-free preaching against faith-based organizations is a sin. ♦

The Horror! The Horror!

We were recently reminded of Andrew Ferguson's essay in these pages, "Puritans in Hollywood" (May 21,

Scrapbook

(Classic Steiner, reprinted from our issue of May 12, 1997)

2007), when we came across the *Washington Post*'s FamilyFilmgoer review of *Hostel Part II*. (If you recall, Ferguson reported on the possible R ratings for films that feature smoking: "*Now, Voyager*, the 1942 movie in which Paul Henreid lights two Camels and passes one to Bette Davis, would today earn an NC-17, along with the revulsion of the motion picture community.")

Revulsion would also be the appropriate reaction to *Hostel Part II*. According to the FamilyFilmgoer, "three American students . . . are lured to a 'spa' in Slovakia and become prey for the killing 'factory.'" Still not sure if you want to take your child to see this movie? Thankfully the FamilyFilmgoer lists some of the gruesome activities taking place: "Bloodletting done with saws, blades, axes, dogs; film shows entrails, severed heads, headless corpses; a boy is shot dead; sexualized killing. . . . " But wait, it gets a lot worse: "strong profanity; drug use; drinking; smoking."

Although the squeamish may want to close their eyes during those scenes of dismemberment, the very sight of actors smoking cigarettes on screen may have the audience heading for the exits. ♦

Hugh Newton 1930-2007

A few years ago The Scrapbook referred to Hugh Newton, longtime public relations counsel at the Heritage Foundation, as a "PR king" in Washington. Indeed, he was; but he was more than that. As a tireless and cheerful advocate for conservative ideas during four decades—and a friend and drinking companion of McGovern Democrats, neoconservatives, Cold War liberals, and Rockefeller Republicans alike—Hugh was a unique and invigorating presence among the politico-journalistic set, and a genuine happy warrior. He will be missed. ♦

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The Weekly Standard has a full-time position available for a staff assistant. This is a clerical position working with the editors. Duties will include answering phones and emails, updating our website, research, and record-keeping. Candidates should address a cover letter and résumé to *hr@weeklystandard.com*. ♦

Casual

Offers I Could Refuse

A pessimist is a man who doesn't check his mail. I, an optimist, approach my mailbox each morning light of heart and with hope in my step. I also click on my email twelve or fifteen times a day. What, exactly, am I looking for? In a word: offers. I check mail and email in anticipation of offers that will bring me unexpected gold, opportunities to increase my small fame, and exaggerated praise.

Since I do not get all that many offers, those that I do get have the added element of sweet surprise. I think of people for whom offers must flood in with such regularity that an offerless day might result in depression. I imagine Toni Morrison's secretary having to inform her, with real trepidation, that the current day's mail brought offers of only two honorary degrees and not a single speaking engagement above $20,000.

The past few weeks have brought me a small number of offers, all of which I found I could refuse. The first was to speak to someone on the BBC about the American reaction to the visit of Queen Elizabeth. I rather like the Queen, despite her simple résumé. In the movie *The Queen*, I pulled for her and against the multitudes supposedly so deeply touched by the death of the sad, air-headed Princess Diana. But the fact was that I hadn't a single thing to say about her visit to the United States. Watching her on television at Jamestown and at the White House and being put through the paces and pains of tourism and empty goodwill diplomacy, my only thought was: "It is good not to be Queen." I turned down the BBC, neglecting to inquire if any fee was involved.

"I'm a longtime fan of yours," writes the editor of a new business magazine, "and wonder whether I could overpay you to contribute something to us." That word *overpay* jumped out at me. I replied instanter. Overpay by how much? I wanted to know. Alas, the editor didn't reveal exactly what grand sum he had in mind, leaving me to fantasize high numbers. (Four dollars a word, perhaps five?) I was to get back to him with an idea for an article.

Darren Gygi

I soon did: the utter uselessness of the MBA degree, except as part of the general networking racket. The idea was found unacceptable. I was to return with another. I probably won't, and if I did, my guess is that it, too, wouldn't be what is wanted.

Years ago I had a similar offer from the now defunct *Talk* magazine, one of whose young editors asked me to write a piece on a vastly overrated figure in American life. I suggested Arthur Miller. "Terrific," said the editor, who soon returned to report that his betters rejected the idea. I next suggested that great false wise man, Walter Cronkite. "Perfect," said the editor, who returned to report that this, too, didn't go down well with the higher-ups. We finally settled on Harold Bloom. I wrote the piece, was paid for it, but the magazine went out of business before it ran, leaving me to wonder if this wasn't an offer I should have refused.

The president of a small liberal arts college wrote to ask if I would deliver a talk to the school's alumni about Robert Hutchins and the Great Books Movement. I said that I would, but reported that I charge a fee of $5,000. "It is an appalling sum," I added, "and far from worth it, I realize, having heard a number of these Joseph Epstein talks myself." When, after a decent interval, he wrote back to say that the trustees felt unable to approve my fee, I replied by instructing him to congratulate his trustees for "having demonstrated considerable fiscal responsibility." And I meant it.

Finally, I was invited to participate in a local university's Summer Writers' Conference by teaching a two-and-a-half hour workshop on writing short stories or anything else I might like to gas away upon. No fee mentioned. Restraining myself, I didn't reply that Kingsley Amis used to say that everything that had gone wrong with life since World War II could be summed up in the word *workshop*. I answered instead that I was pleased to have been invited but that my dance card was filled for the summer, with not even a mazurka or a flamenco open.

Recounting these offers, I feel like the man in the joke who claims to be losing money every day of the week and is able to stay in business only by closing on Sundays. These offers, however little came of them, nonetheless delight me: nice to be thought of, even by strangers. So don't hesitate, please, to make me an offer, especially one I can refuse.

Joseph Epstein



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THE EVANGELICAL CLIMATE INITIATIVE

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the weekly Standard

Richard Lugar, Meet David Kilcullen

Indiana senator Richard Lugar is, if he may say so himself, a thoughtful fellow. Not, to be fair, that he *quite* says so himself. In his speech on the floor of the Senate last Monday night, he simply chose to point out that unnamed others had been engaged in "sloganeering rhetoric and political opportunism" and had failed to appreciate "the complexities at the core of our situation." He, by contrast, chose to offer "a thoughtful revision of our Iraq policy," "a thoughtful Plan B" for Iraq.

Except it's not thoughtful. Students of American politics should read Lugar's 50-minute speech as a case study in pseudo-thoughtfulness, full of cheek-puffing and chin-pulling. It fails to deal seriously with the real strategic choices the United States faces in the war we're fighting. Lugar acknowledges that the security strategy is working and probably could achieve its goals. Yet in the same breath he accepts as a given "the short period framed by our own domestic political debate." Why? Who "framed" that time period? Who drives our "domestic political debate"? Don't senators have any influence on this? Can't they try to shape, or reshape, the political debate—especially if it threatens the success of a major U.S. military effort? Apparently that would be too much to ask.

Lugar acknowledges the strategy is working, yet he accepts as a given 'the short period framed by our own political debate.' Why? Don't senators have any influence on this? Can't they try to reshape the debate?

Lugar also fails to explain how the partial withdrawal and redeployment of U.S. troops that he recommends, along with various diplomatic initiatives, would actually achieve the fundamental goals he identifies—preventing horrendous violence in Iraq, denying victory to al Qaeda and/or Iran, and avoiding great damage to U.S. credibility. The speech is hollow at its center, and unserious to the core.

Contrast Lugar's speech with an assessment of the situation in Iraq posted the very next day on the Small Wars Journal website (*smallwarsjournal.com*). David Kilcullen, a former Australian military officer, is one of the world's leading experts on counterinsurgency warfare. A sharp critic of the previous U.S. strategy in Iraq, he was asked by General Petraeus to serve as an adviser during the development and early execution of the new strategy. Now finishing up his tour of duty, Kilcullen offered "personal views" of "what's happening, right now." It's worth reproducing much of Kilcullen's report, "Understanding Current Operations in Iraq":

> On June 15th we kicked off a major series of division-sized operations in Baghdad and the surrounding provinces. As General Odierno said, we have finished the build-up phase and are now beginning the actual "surge of operations." I have often said that we need to give this time. That is still true. But this is the end of the beginning: we are now starting to put things onto a viable long-term footing.
>
> These operations are qualitatively different from what we have done before. Our concept is to knock over several insurgent safe havens simultaneously, in order to prevent terrorists relocating their infrastructure from one to another, and to create an operational synergy between what we're doing in Baghdad and what's happening outside. Unlike on previous occasions, we don't plan to leave these areas once they're secured. These ops will run over months, and the key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them. The really decisive activity will be police work, registration of the population and counterintelligence in these areas, to comb out the insurgent sleeper cells and political cells that

have "gone quiet" as we moved in, but which will try to survive through the op and emerge later. This will take operational patience, and it will be intelligence-led, and Iraqi government-led. It will probably not make the news (the really important stuff rarely does) but it will be the truly decisive action.

When we speak of "clearing" an enemy safe haven, we are not talking about destroying the enemy in it; we are talking about rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation. If we don't get every enemy cell in the initial operation, that's OK. The point of the operations is to lift the pall of fear from population groups that have been intimidated and exploited by terrorists to date, then win them over and work with them in partnership to clean out the cells that remain—as has happened in Al Anbar Province and can happen elsewhere in Iraq as well.

The "terrain" we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa'ida, Shi'a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on. . . . [B]ecause [the enemy] needs the population to act in certain ways in order to survive, we can asphyxiate him by cutting him off from the people. And he can't just "go quiet" to avoid that threat. He has either to come out of the woodwork, fight us and be destroyed, or stay quiet and accept permanent marginalization from his former population base. That puts him on the horns of a lethal dilemma (which warms my heart, quite frankly, after the cynical obscenities these gang members have inflicted on the innocent Iraqi non-combatant population). That's the intent here. . . . Of course, we still go after all the terrorist and extremist leaders we can target and find, and life has become increasingly "nasty, brutish, and short" for this crowd. But we realize that this is just a shaping activity in support of the main effort, which is securing the Iraqi people from the terrorists, extremist militias, and insurgents who need them to survive.

The enemy can't just 'go quiet.' He has either to come out of the woodwork, fight us, and be destroyed, or stay quiet and accept permanent marginalization from his former population base. That puts him on the horns of a lethal dilemma.

Is there a strategic risk involved in this series of operations?

Absolutely. Nothing in war is risk-free. We have chosen to accept and manage this risk, primarily because a low-risk option simply will not get us the operational effects that the strategic situation demands. We have to play the hand we have been dealt as intelligently as possible, so we're doing what has to be done. . . .

Personally, I think we are doing reasonably well and casualties have been lower so far than I feared. Every single loss is a tragedy. But so far, thank God, the loss rate has not been too terrible: casualties are up in absolute terms, but down as a proportion of troops deployed (in the fourth quarter of 2006 we had about 100,000 troops in country and casualties averaged 90 deaths a month; now we have almost 160,000 troops in country but deaths are under 120 per month, much less than a proportionate increase, which would have been around 150 a month). And last year we patrolled rarely, mainly in vehicles, and got hit almost every time we went out. Now we patrol all the time, on foot, by day and night with Iraqi units normally present as partners, and the chances of getting hit are much lower on each patrol. We are finally coming out of the "defensive crouch" with which we used to approach the environment, and it is starting to pay off.

It will be a long, hard summer, with much pain and loss to come, and things could still go either way. But the population-centric approach is the beginning of a process that aims to put the overall campaign onto a sustainable long-term footing. The politics of the matter then can be decisive, provided the Iraqis use the time we have bought for them to reach the essential accommodation.

All this may change. These are long-term operations: the enemy will adapt and we'll have to adjust what we're doing over time. Baq'ubah, Arab Jabour and the western operations are progressing well, and additional security measures in place in Baghdad have successfully tamped down some of the spill-over of violence from other places. The relatively muted response (so far) to the second Samarra bombing is evidence of this. Time will tell, though.

Now this is the voice of a serious and thoughtful man, working with other serious and thoughtful men to change the situation in Iraq. The appropriate response of a serious and thoughtful political leadership in Washington would be to give Petraeus, Odierno, and the troops at least a fighting chance to implement the surge—and to succeed.

But too many of our politicians are not serious. As retired General Jack Keane told the *New York Sun* last week, "The tragedy of these efforts is we are on the cusp of potentially being successful in the next year in a way that we have failed in the three-plus preceding years, but because of this political pressure, it looks like we intend to pull out the rug from underneath that potential success." I would only qualify Keane's statement in this way: Such a frivolous and thoughtless betrayal of our fighting men would be too contemptible to be called tragedy.

—William Kristol

Things Fall Apart

Why the center didn't hold on immigration.

BY FRED BARNES

The what-ifs in the sudden death of immigration reform are intriguing. What if Senate majority leader Harry Reid hadn't pulled the immigration bill from the floor when it was close to passage in early June? What if Republican senators Lindsey Graham of South Carolina and Jon Kyl of Arizona had come up earlier with their enforcement-toughening amendment that would have prompted, for the first time, a sweeping crackdown on those 3 to 4 million foreigners who have overstayed their visas? What if Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky had twisted arms to get more Republican votes for the bill?

Fascinating what-ifs all, but mostly irrelevant. Immigration reform was defeated by a conservative revolt that spread to the wider public. Senate opponents, gloating over their success in killing the bill, were essentially correct in insisting the American people had rejected immigration reform. By the time the key vote came last week, the bill's core supporters—President Bush, Kyl, Graham, Democratic senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts, and the business community—had already lost the argument over immigration.

Fred Barnes is executive editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

The issue touched off a national debate that gripped middle-class America, much as President Clinton's health care initiative did in 1993 and 1994. In both cases, the more people heard—not all of it true—the less they liked the legislation. Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg found that a majority of Republicans and independents opposed the immigration bill. Democrats were split evenly.

Worse for Democrats, the poll suggested the reelection of some Democratic members of Congress might be jeopardized if they backed immigration reform. "Demagogic attacks are not ineffective," Greenberg found. "In terms of the battleground districts, immigration attacks are more likely to play a key role in Democratic rural and exurban districts where opposition towards immigration is stronger and Democrats hold a smaller advantage."

So Democrats in Washington, with the exception of Kennedy and senators Dianne Feinstein of California and Ken Salazar of Colorado, were not enthusiastic about the bill. Reid was lukewarm at best. And all five Democrats running for reelection in red states in 2008—Max Baucus of Montana, Tom Harkin of Iowa, Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, and Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia—voted to kill the bill.

The excuses some senators used to explain their "no" votes and mask their political motives were laughably lame. Harkin said he feared some workers could have been denied jobs "because of errors in a government database." Republican Pete Domenici of New Mexico told the *New York Times* that the supposed secrecy in which the bill was drafted created confusion and "caused it to flop." Actually the bipartisan drafting sessions were widely reported and attended by more than a dozen senators. Domenici is up for reelection next year.

Republican Sam Brownback of Kansas switched his vote during the roll call from yes to no. "The country's not ready," he told the *Washington Times* in justifying his reversal. "I thought we were, but just concluded the country's not ready." Brownback voted for a more liberal immigration bill last year. This year he's seeking the Republican presidential nomination.

Susan Collins rarely splits with her Maine colleague Olympia Snowe, but on immigration she did. She said the bill didn't strike the right balance. "People were troubled by the proposed solution for the 12 million people here illegally," she said. Collins is running for reelection next year. Snowe isn't.

While opposition to the bill may aid individual senators, it clearly undercuts Republican efforts to capture the Hispanic vote. Hispanics paid close attention to the Senate deliberations, and while Democrats—Reid especially—bear some of the responsibility for the bill's downfall, Republicans bear more. After all, the leading Republican foes claimed credit for the bill's demise.

Hispanics are the fastest-growing

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voting bloc in the country, and they are basically swing voters. According to exit polls, they voted 44 percent for Bush in 2004 but only 29 percent for Republican congressional candidates in 2006. As a result of Republicans' role in killing the immigration bill, "I believe we're reinforcing everything" that brought us to 29 percent, said Graham, one of the bill's architects. He's right about that.

For Democrats, the failure of immigration reform is a twofer. Democrats are likely now to begin to solidify their hold on the Hispanic vote. And their House members in rural and conservative districts have been spared a risky vote in favor of immigration reform.

Of the what-ifs, one is worth considering. That was Reid's rash decision on June 7 to pull the bill off the Senate floor rather than give Republican leaders a day or so to put together a limited number of amendments and proceed to final passage. At the time, the bill was hurtling toward passage. Opponents were despondent. Both McConnell and Kyl believe it would have passed within a few days had Reid not been so impatient. But we'll never know.

The pause before Reid brought the bill back to the Senate floor last week proved fatal. My guess was that the opposition had peaked. It hadn't. Instead, resistance to the bill became an earsplitting national phenomenon during the interim rather than mere conservative noisemaking.

McConnell had theorized that a divided Washington—Republican White House, Democratic Congress—provided the best chance for bipartisan agreement on big issues like Social Security and immigration. But preliminary talks on reforming Social Security have gone nowhere and the attempt to overhaul America's broken immigration system has failed.

Too bad. The bill was a compromise that, in my view, had far more in it that conservatives should have cheered than booed. And Kyl and Graham and a few other Republican senators were courageous in negotiating the bill and fighting for its passage. They didn't flinch. But in politics you only get credit for success. And that they didn't achieve.♦

Exit Blair...

Enter Gordon Brown.

BY GERARD BAKER

It takes skill to turn one of the most predictable and anticipated events in political history into a virtual showstopper. It takes something approaching political genius to pull off that feat when you are almost universally regarded as dour, unexciting, and having all the charisma of a mildewed raincoat.

But that is essentially what Gordon Brown managed to do last week as he assumed at last the mantle of leader of the British Labour party and prime minister of the United Kingdom.

Brown has been the next prime minister for more than a decade. He was already the heir apparent to Tony Blair when Labour swept to power in 1997. But like an ambitious dauphin whose monarch refuses to die, Brown was forced to wait and wait and anxiously and impatiently wait. And the longer he waited, the less appealing he seemed. Brown is a kind of British version of Hillary Clinton—the experienced, intellectually gifted frontrunner who has vanquished all challengers by creating an aura of inevitability about his succession, but who manages to engender no real affection or enthusiasm among the voters.

When Brown finally effected a clumsy coup last September that forced Blair to announce he would quit within the year, it only added to the sense that his was going to be a Pyrrhic, and shortlived, victory. The Conservative party, moribund for the last 10 years after dominating British politics for the previous 20, has been showing real signs of life in the last year under its new charismatic, if slightly vacuous, leader David Cameron, who could not disguise the relish with which he looked forward to the contest with Brown.

But in the course of a frantic few days last week, Brown managed to sprinkle a little pixie dust onto his lugubrious and largely uncelebrated accession. First, a few days before the handover, he orchestrated a bizarre piece of political theater, letting it be known that he had invited Lord Paddy Ashdown of the third-party Liberal Democrats (known to non-British readers as an energetic peace envoy in the Balkans and elsewhere) to join his cabinet. Given that Labour has a large enough majority in the House of Commons on its own, this was a purely political move. As well as wrongfooting the Liberal Democrats, who have the capacity to inflict real damage on Labour in the next election, the move had the startling effect of making Brown look magnanimous, reaching out to political opponents, willing to work in a bipartisan way on the nation's future.

Since the new prime minister has long had a reputation, even among his admirers, as a control freak—reluctant to share power with anyone inside his own party, let alone outside it—this was quite a change. And even though the Liberal Democrats noisily declined the offer, the image of a different, more collegial Brown lingered, improbably, in the haze.

Then, the day before he was due to take office, Brown engineered one of those pieces of pure Westminster political theater in which a hitherto utterly unknown member of parliament suddenly becomes a cause célèbre and the object of equal amounts of adulation and loathing. We are talking, of course, about a good old-fashioned political defection of a backbencher from one party to the other—in this case, Quentin Davies, an obscure Conservative MP who

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crossed the floor to join Labour.

This too made Brown look inclusive and statesmanlike, and his seething Tory opponents look bickering and factionalized. So much for Cameron's flair and élan; he had been taught a lesson in political pyrotechnics by his colorless opponent.

Then the new prime minister, the second most familiar figure in British politics, co-genitor of the Blair-Brown New Labour revolution these last ten years, suddenly cast himself as the agent of change. In his inaugural remarks on the threshold of No. 10 Downing Street last week, Brown used the word "change" eight times in a two-minute speech.

So the transition has gone quite well for Brown. But can he possibly keep it up? In fact, the Brown accession—as smoothly as it has gone so far—is a long way short of completion.

What the new prime minister is attempting to pull off is one of the most familiar but rarely successfully executed maneuvers in democratic politics, and one that could have big lessons for this country's Republican party.

Like the Conservative John Major, who replaced Margaret Thatcher, like Nicolas Sarkozy, the French conservative who replaced Jacques Chirac as French president this May, Brown is trying to demonstrate that the public's hunger for change can be met without ditching the governing party, but merely by changing its leader. If Brown can persuade the public that change in the leadership of the ruling party is sufficient change, then he could yet achieve a famous victory at a general election in a year or two. (For Republicans, the lesson might just be the same.)

The most obvious—and from Washington's point of view the most alarming—move would be a radical shift from the unpopular foreign policy of Tony Blair. Cut yourself off from George Bush; pull British troops out of Iraq; strike a new tone in the Middle East, Brown is being urged by some of his advisers.

The new prime minister doesn't seem quite ready to do that. What he appears to be doing is insisting on his pro-American credentials, while giving subtle hints that he will move in a somewhat different direction than the one chosen by Blair and gently distancing himself from the Bush administration.

In his cabinet appointments announced last week, he signaled a distinctly less pro-American and pro-Israeli line. David Miliband, who is the new foreign secretary, was a critic of Israel's war against Lebanon last year; John Denham, an undistinguished

Reuters / Nigel Rodds

minister, returns to government, having quit Tony Blair's government over the Iraq war. And most eyebrow-raising, Mark Malloch Brown, who was Kofi Annan's deputy at the United Nations, and a fervent basher of American conservatives and President Bush in particular, has been given a special ministerial role for Africa.

But it is well enough known by now that the new prime minister is an enthusiastic pro-American. As chancellor of the exchequer, he has come to appreciate more than ever the advantages of the capitalist American model. An avid student of American history and politics, Brown sometimes seems to be consciously modeling himself on great Americans. In his acceptance speech to the special Labour conference that chose him (unopposed) as leader last week, he quoted Abraham Lincoln, promising to appeal to the "better angels" of our nature. And he recently published the book *Courage*, a series of eight profiles of his personal heroes. If it turns out Brown's father bought him the election that secured him the Labour leadership, the American analogy would be complete.

Of course this might all be an elaborate smokescreen of rhetoric and image behind which he can execute a radical change in U.K. policy away from Washington, but I doubt it. Brown has no interest in getting into fights with the United States. He knows the Iraq war is unpopular in America too and that the course of events there could change sharply in the next few months.

Brown has been careful to cultivate good connections with members of the Bush administration, even with the president himself. He also knows that President Bush, toxic in British politics, won't be around for more than a year and a half, and he thinks he can have a warm relationship with his successor, whether that be Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, Fred Thompson, or Rudolph Giuliani.

That does not mean Brown will not change aspects of foreign policy. He will regurgitate the left-wing bromide that winning the war on terror means winning the battle for hearts and minds, rather than fighting hot wars. But he will be unstinting in pursuit of terrorists at home and abroad, and plans a major—and most welcome—effort to replace Britain's invidious multicultural sludge with the harder substance of patriotism and national identity.

But if his foreign policy is not going to change much, what remains if Brown is to be the changemaker?

Another way of posing this question, Brown's friends believe, is to ask what was it, other than Iraq, that people really didn't like about Tony Blair? The answer, they think, has much to do with style. There was always something a bit too slick about Blair, a bit too much charisma that allowed him to ride roughshod over the views of his colleagues. Brown intends to make a virtue of his very seriousness, his staid, stolid approach to government. This will also help him contend with

the challenge from David Cameron, the Conservative leader, whom Labourites regard as a bit of a Blair himself. In addition, there will be changes of personnel. Announcing his cabinet, Brown emphasized he wanted a government "of all the talents." New faces at the Treasury and the Foreign Office will give the Labour government a much needed jolt of energy.

Will this be enough? Brown can't really change much of the substance of Labour over the last ten years because he, as well as Blair, has been so influential over it. The hope is that voters will be persuaded by the change of style and tone. The evidence, however, suggests that they want a change of direction as well. Tony Blair had led Britain falteringly in the direction of greater choice in the provision of public services in the last few years, to tackle the bloated growth of the state. Brown, if anything, seems wary of pushing further in that direction, more inclined to slow the already glacial pace in the opening up of the public sector.

This is not the lesson to be learned either from Major's initial success in replacing Thatcher, or in Sarkozy's sharp turn in succeeding Chirac. Both represented a change of style, certainly, but both also represented radical change in direction.

There's another recent precedent of a party that changed its head, bestowing the leadership on a successor anointed long in advance, a successor who had been closely identified with the policies of the government all along.

In 2003 Paul Martin became prime minister of Canada, after nearly a decade as finance minister and heir apparent to Jean Chrétien. But by the time he got the top job, voters wanted real change, not just a change in the leader. Unable to deliver on that demand, within three years he was out of office, rejected by the voters.

Gordon Brown got off to a good start last week. But, unless he can persuade the British that his changes are about more than names, faces, and appearances, the unhappy Canadian precedent looks more relevant than those other, more successful transitions. ♦

Rudy at Regent

Giuliani gets a standing ovation at Pat Robertson's university. BY MATTHEW CONTINETTI

It was June 26, and Rudy Giuliani was surprised. This was his first visit to Regent University in Virginia Beach, Virginia, the headquarters of televangelist and onetime GOP presidential candidate Pat Robertson's media and education efforts. The Regent campus was much larger than Giuliani had expected.

The former New York City mayor was at Regent to participate in the school's executive leadership speaking series. For the pro-choice Giuliani, the speech at Regent demonstrated his willingness to campaign anywhere, including before religious conservatives, for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination. Robertson, the host of the *700 Club*, introduced Giuliani to the paying audience of more than 600 people. The two embraced. "I'm not going to give a political speech," Giuliani said. The crowd laughed. Instead Giuliani delivered his speech on leadership.

Giuliani likes lists. In addition to his "12 Commitments to the American People," a set of policy goals he outlined a few weeks ago, the mayor has "Six Principles of Leadership": knowing what you believe, optimism, courage, relentless preparation, teamwork, and communication. At Regent, Giuliani discussed each. Then he brought up his presidential campaign. "Don't expect that you'll agree with me on everything, because that would be unrealistic," Giuliani said. "But if you agree with me on enough things, and you think I have the ability to lead, then maybe I'm the person you'd support."

He wasn't finished. "That's the way I've kind of been approaching this campaign," Giuliani went on. "It's not about one issue. It's about many issues. If it is about one issue, there is one issue that dominates our present; it's not an issue of our making. And that's why I call it the terrorists' war on us. The one issue that dominates is the fact that Islamic terrorists are fighting to kill us. They've succeeded in doing it, and they want to do it again. . . . If this is a one-issue election, it's about remaining on offense against terrorists." Giuliani received a standing ovation.

Then he took questions from the audience. Giuliani's first interlocutor asked how the mayor incorporates his Judeo-Christian beliefs into his governing style. Other questions dealt with immigration and the war on terror. The social issues hardly came up. That wasn't the case when Giuliani spoke to the press afterwards, however. The first question came from a correspondent for the lefty online magazine *Salon*. It was about abortion.

And so it goes. The press still hasn't figured out Giuliani, who continues to lead in the Real Clear Politics average of national GOP presidential polls and in polls taken in many primary states. The press and large parts of the political establishment assume that Giuliani's pro-choice position and support for stem cell research and gay rights disqualify him for the Republican nomination. According to this line of thinking, most GOP voters are still unaware of his positions on these issues, and when they find out, they'll go elsewhere.

The reality is more complicated. Religious and social conservatives greet Giuliani warmly when he appears before them. "In my opinion, it was a smash appearance and people were very high on Rudy and what he had to say," Robertson said in a televised interview after the Regent speech. "He

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did a great job." Giuliani's May 11 speech at Houston Baptist College, in which he straightforwardly declared himself pro-choice, received a standing ovation—a fact the *Washington Post* left unmentioned. When Giuliani takes questions from conservative audiences, abortion rarely comes up. A campaign spokesman estimates that only one out of every 15 questions posed to Hizzoner deals with a social issue.

Still, Giuliani wants to appeal to social issues voters. He's supported social conservatives in the past, campaigning in 2006 for Sen. Rick Santorum and former Christian Coalition executive director Ralph Reed (both lost). He does not want to antagonize the so-called values voters. He's pledged to reduce the number of abortions and appoint strict constructionists to the bench, and says he won't attempt to change the GOP's pro-life platform.

There are three prongs to Giuliani's social conservative strategy. The first is to stress the war on terror, including the war in Iraq. Support for the war on terror is something Giuliani shares with social conservatives. That's why he often says that the Democrats are "in denial" about the terrorist threat. It's why keeping America "on offense" against jihadism is his first commitment.



AP / Steve Holber

Second, Giuliani emphasizes his viability in a general election. Last week's Gallup poll found that Giuliani, at 57 percent, had the highest favorability rating of any candidate in either party. On the stump, Giuliani says he's the only GOP candidate who could put states like California, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey in the Republican column. He stresses the differences between Republicans and Democrats and lambastes Hillary Clinton, suggesting what a Democratic president might do. "Giuliani's support is a function of people who are terror stricken by the concept of President Hillary Clinton," says Richard Land, president of the Southern Baptist Convention's Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission. Land doesn't endorse candidates, but has said he would not vote for Giuliani.

The third prong in Giuliani's strategy is what you might call "divide and conquer." Social conservatives may be the single largest group in the Republican coalition, but they do not constitute a majority. Last week GOP pollster Tony Fabrizio released a study of the Republican electorate. He says the party is composed of seven groups: Dennis Miller Republicans, Government-Knows-Best Republicans, Moralists, Bush Hawks, Fortress America Republicans, Heartland Republicans, and Free Marketers. For now, Giuliani leads among all groups. He draws his strongest support from Free Marketers, Heartland Republicans, and Government-Knows-Best Republicans.

And here's where things get interesting. One third of Moralists told Fabrizio they'd look past a candidate's position on abortion if they agreed with him on other issues. And a sizable chunk of Moralists say they will base their vote next year on a candidate's leadership qualities. So, to win the Republican nomination, Giuliani doesn't need the support of all the Moralists. He just needs enough support from them that, when combined with his leads among other GOP voting blocs, he beats the competition. The way to get this support is to find issues on which Giuliani and the Moralists align, says Fabrizio. Examples besides the war on terror include the fight against pornography, anti-drug campaigns, school uniforms, even opposition to racial preferences. (Giuliani was the first GOP presidential candidate to release a statement praising the Supreme Court's end-of-term race preferences decision.) At the moment, all the other Republican candidates are competing for the Moralist vote, slicing it a dozen different ways. Giuliani pulls just enough to remain in the lead. Divide and conquer.

Two things imperil this strategy. First, Giuliani's campaign organization still has some serious flaws. For example, after his address at Regent, Giuliani traveled to Rockville, Maryland, for a speech to the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Washington. The mayor arrived an hour late—and was missing his speech. "So I'm going to do it all from my head," he said. The audience laughed and the speech went well, but it was an embarrassment nonetheless. To fix these flaws, Giuliani has introduced CompStat—his government accountability program—to parts of his own campaign.

The greater threat to Giuliani is the emergence of a GOP candidate who is able to unify all groups in the Republican coalition. This hasn't happened yet, but we're still a long way away from the Iowa caucuses. "Once a social conservative becomes a viable candidate," predicts Richard Land, "you are going to see social conservatives deserting Giuliani in droves." That candidate's name? "Fred Thompson." ♦

Orderly Humiliation

The moderates think they've found a 'responsible' way out of Iraq. BY TOM DONNELLY

Operation Phantom Thunder, the first real effect of the Iraq troop surge of the past six months, is improving the battlefield situation in Baghdad and the surrounding towns. But in Washington, those who believe the war is already lost—call it the Clinton-Lugar axis—are mounting a surge of their own. Ground won in Iraq becomes ground lost at home.

The most notable defeat last week in Washington was the speech given by Richard Lugar, the senior statesman and senator from Indiana and voice of moderate Republicanism. On Monday, Lugar announced that he had concluded that the surge was irrelevant: "The prospects that the current surge strategy will succeed . . . are very limited within the period framed by our own domestic political debate." And while President Bush may want to hang tough, "the resulting contentiousness with Congress would make cooperation on national security issues nearly impossible." That is, Bush's commitment to victory is disrupting Lugar's desire to restore bipartisanship.

Lugar allowed that the surge might well improve things in Iraq. Indeed he allowed that they already have: "I do not doubt the assessments of military commanders that there has been progress in security." But he doesn't even want to hear General David Petraeus's report in September. "Persisting indefinitely with the surge strategy will delay policy adjustments that have a better chance of protecting our vital interests over the long term." Lugar's interests include "more regular contact with Syria and Iran with less drama and rhetoric" and addressing "the two elephants in the room," the Arab-Israeli conflict and our need for oil. This sounds an awful lot like James Baker, Lee Hamilton, and the Iraq Study Group.

AP / SSgt Antonieta Ricco

It also sounds like a speech given by Senator Hillary Clinton last week at the coming-out party for a new Washington think tank, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). This group—if the rather awkward name summons echoes of the Project for a New American Century, well, it's supposed to—has brought together a powerful collection of veterans of the Clinton administration. Without doubt, CNAS will provide the intellectual muscle behind the 2008 Clinton campaign. And it is these New Clintonistas who are also breathing new life into the otherwise moribund ISG recommendations.

Indeed, coincident with its "inaugural" conference at the Willard Hotel, CNAS released an extended Iraq report—"Phased Transition: A Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq"—that might as well have served as the script for both Lugar and Clinton. But if its authors, James Miller and Shawn Brimley, are fresh figures, their ideas are pretty stale. To begin with, the report styles itself as "build[ing] explicitly on ISG recommendations." CNAS wants to put more effort into the so-called New Diplomatic Initiative and other attempts to turn the problem of Iraq over to others in the region, including Iran and Syria—which of course are a big part of the problem.

If the overall policy approach is recycled Baker-Hamilton, the military strategy is recycled Rumsfeld-Casey. Indeed, an agonizingly "phased" transition, beginning immediately but continuing until December 2012—a cynic would say just in time for President Clinton to get out of Iraq entirely before her reelection campaign—constitutes the core of the CNAS report. Of course, the surge stops now; even though the report concedes "it is too soon to declare the 'surge' a success or failure" and admits the prospect of a post-withdrawal "genocide," it's not too soon to give up. After all, the continued erosion of domestic political will is "inevitable."

But, in a revealing twist, CNAS sees this also as an "opportunity" to revive the transition-and-train policy envisioned by General George Casey shortly before he was relieved of command in Iraq. To be fair, the report's authors have thought the training part of the program through in great detail, offering several different models of advisory teams for the Iraqi police and interior ministry as well as the army. But the underlying strategy is "Iraqis-stand-up-so-we-can-stand-down," the old, failed approach of 2003 through 2006.

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The new wrinkle in the CNAS report is that it pretends to be an alternative to something worse, a precipitous withdrawal. In this regard it is as much an attack on the Democrats to Hillary's left—certainly John Edwards, but less directly Barack Obama. Thus the report elaborates "Three No's" for a post-surge posture: no al Qaeda safe havens, no regional war, no genocide. The idea is to create and maintain "an internal balance of power among Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds that reduces the chances of mass violence." But how an American withdrawal will increase our leverage with Iraqi factions, let alone with an almost-nuclear Iran and other regional powers, is mystifying.

This is the final fantasy of Lugar-Clinton and the Washington establishment: that withdrawal in the face of multiple and highly motivated enemies can be neatly calibrated—extended through 2012 in the CNAS concept. And it is in this respect, too, that the view from Washington is badly out of touch with the view from Baghdad. Petraeus, his troops, and their Iraqi counterparts know they're in a war—a blood-soaked "act of force to compel the enemy to do our will," as a famous Prussian once put it. Indeed, the methods of al Qaeda, driven by religious zeal, come as close to embodying the Clausewitzian notions of "absolute war" and "maximum use of force" as can be found in the modern world.

The image of senatorial probity, Lugar ultimately sounds more like an investor rebalancing his portfolio, selling Iraq and buying Israel-Palestine, than a man thinking about strategy in war. Likewise, the CNAS report is written in the "risk-management" rhetoric of Pentagon planners. There's a complex flow chart that explains their "responsible way forward" transition plan; it includes a little box detailing the possibility of a "contested withdrawal"—that is, what might well happen if, as in the final withdrawal from Saigon, all hell breaks loose. But when you're sure that the "way out" is the only "responsible way forward," defeat is simply an "unfortunate contingency." ♦

Roberts Rules

The Supreme Court term ends with a 5-4 decision against racial preferences. BY TERRY EASTLAND

The Supreme Court, in its very last decision of the term, limited the ability of public school districts to use race in determining which schools students may attend. The Court reviewed student assignment plans from Seattle and Louisville. The 5-to-4 decision in the consolidated case generated no fewer than five opinions totaling 185 pages.

To say the justices were sharply divided in *Parents Involved in Community Schools* v. *Seattle School District No.1, et al.* would be an understatement. Justice Stephen Breyer spoke for himself and justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg in a 77-page dissent disputing key points in the plurality opinion made up of those parts of Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion that weren't joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy. The dissent also took issue with the majority opinion, made up of those parts of Roberts's opinion that were joined by Kennedy, as well as Justice Clarence Thomas's concurrence. Roberts, Kennedy, and Thomas each responded, leaving no doubt about their differences with Breyer.

The big issue dividing the Court was the question of which justices were really being, as Roberts put it, "faithful to the heritage of *Brown*." *Brown*, of course, is *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, the landmark 1954 case in which the Court struck down public school segregation. According to a count by the *New York Times*, the five opinions in *Parents Involved in Community Schools* referred to *Brown* no fewer than 90 times.

The Seattle pupil assignment plan allowed ninth graders to choose from among any of the district's high schools. When too many chose the same school, tiebreakers were used. The second tiebreaker was race. The school district classified every student as either "white" or "nonwhite." If a student's race served, in the school district's words, "to bring the school into balance"—racial balance being defined as the system's overall white/nonwhite composition—then that student got in over someone whose race didn't further this end.

In Louisville, the district classified elementary school students as "black" or "other" and used race to decide transfers. Here, too, the district sought to maintain a certain racial balance in each school, and if your race contributed to an "imbalance," then you couldn't enroll there.

Considering the Court's equal protection precedents, it was hard to see how either use of race could have survived judicial review. The Court has made clear that government programs that classify individuals on the basis of race, and burden or benefit them accordingly, are subject to "strict scrutiny." This means such programs must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling" state interest. It doesn't matter what the motive behind a program is. Whether the motive is "benign," as supporters characterized the Seattle and Louisville programs, or "invidious"—as was the case in, for example, the original school desegregation cases—under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, every racial classification is subject to strict scrutiny.

In his majority opinion, Roberts pointed out that the case law recognizes two state interests as "compel-

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EPA / Corbis / Matthew Cavanaugh

The Roberts Court, May 2006

ling." One is remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination. The other is, within the context of higher education, producing student body diversity encompassing not just race but also other factors. The Court affirmed the diversity interest in the 2003 *Grutter* case, which upheld race preferences in admissions.

The problem for both Seattle and Louisville was that neither school district could advance a remedial interest or a diversity interest consistent with *Grutter*. As Roberts wrote, race, as it is considered in the two plans, "is not simply one factor weighed with others in reaching a decision, as in *Grutter*; it is *the* factor." Also, as Roberts emphasized, both plans were directed "only to racial balance," which was tied to each district's racial demographics and which "this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate."

Of obvious concern to Roberts was the work of the courts of appeals in deciding the legality of race-based assignment plans in primary and secondary schools similar to those in Seattle and Louisville. Before *Grutter*, wrote Roberts, the courts struck down such plans.

But after *Grutter*, some appellate courts had "largely disregarded" the Court's own limitations on its holding in *Grutter*—notably its definition of a broad-based diversity and its focus on the unique context of higher education—and extended the meaning of that case to uphold such plans. "The present cases are not governed by *Grutter*," wrote Roberts, clearly intending to send a message to the lower courts.

Justice Kennedy, as is sometimes the case, was a puzzle. He agreed with Roberts in his analysis of how the lower courts wrongly extended *Grutter*. Yet in his separate opinion he also maintained that diversity, "depending on its meaning and definition," could indeed be a compelling interest that a school board might pursue.

So there are potentially five votes—the Breyer foursome plus Kennedy—for some kind of diversity interest in the primary and secondary education context. And clearly Kennedy, notwithstanding his sharp critique of what he rightly called the "crude" use of race by the Seattle and Louisville districts, is open to using race as "one factor" among others in placing students in schools.

What all the justices noticed was the slight impact of the Seattle and Louisville plans. They produced only small changes in the racial makeup of the districts' schools. The dissenters see the majority opinion as not slight at all, however. In their view, it is not only a death knell to other school district attempts to promote racial integration, but also

a tacit overruling of *Grutter* and, even more ominously, a step toward a majority holding in behalf of the "colorblind Constitution," which they believe would bring an end to hundreds of race-conscious federal and state laws.

"Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens" is what Justice John Paul Harlan famously declared in his solitary dissent in *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*, the 1896 case that sustained a Louisiana law mandating racial segregation aboard passenger trains. Decades later, when *Brown* was decided in 1954—and for at least a decade thereafter—the ruling was widely seen as a victory for Harlan's notion of a "colorblind Constitution." Said the *New York Times* approvingly in the wake of *Brown*: "The words [Justice Harlan] used in his lonely dissent" have effectively become "a part of the law of the land." Compare that with the Gray Lady's editorials now denouncing the majority holding in *Parents Involved in Community Schools*.

The opinions in *Parents Involved in Community Schools* suggest that the Court is soon going to be debating, more intensively than anyone might have expected, the meaning of Harlan's famous dissent in *Plessy*, as well as the meaning of *Brown*, and of the "colorblind Constitution." As always, the question of the Court's composition will affect this debate and the decisions that come from the Court. Given that a vacancy occurs on average every two years, the next president likely will have the opportunity to influence the Court's direction. That is why the debate among the justices in *Parents Involved in Community Schools* deserves to be taken to the campaign trail, and deserves to be discussed in terms of the kind of new justices who ought to be sitting—whether the next justice should be someone like Roberts or Thomas, say, or someone like Breyer. Kennedy, it is safe to assume, is not the sort of justice any candidate, of either party, is likely to suggest as a model. ♦

Learning for Dollars

Bloomberg's fanciful antipoverty program.

BY HEATHER MAC DONALD

New York mayor Michael Bloomberg announced his latest change of political party two weeks ago and cast himself as an innovative anti-politician. "Any successful elected executive knows that real results are more important than partisan battles," he said via press release, "and that good ideas should take precedence over rigid adherence to any particular political ideology." Such results-oriented executives, the implication was clear, are precisely what presidential voters are hungering for.

Mayor Bloomberg

Corbis / David Brabyn

By now, there are few political appeals more conventional than the claim that one is unconventional and above party. But this time, the newly minted independent mayor (who had just lightly dispensed with his temporary and self-serving "Republican" identity) *had* rolled out a "new" solution to an old problem—poverty—the day before. Anyone interested in seeing what Bloomberg's rhetoric of "innovative," nonpartisan problem-solving means in practice will find his new poverty plan illuminating. It combines a clever technocratic veneer with a profound ignorance of civil society. If this at present privately funded pilot were ever duplicated widely, it could prove to be one of the most destructive welfare policies ever devised.

Bloomberg plans to pay low-income parents in six New York neighborhoods to behave responsibly toward their children, and their children to take advantage of school. Starting in September 2007, 2,550 parents enrolled in the "Opportunity NYC conditional cash transfer" pilot will get $25 for reviewing their child's test scores, and another $25 for discussing those scores with a teacher. Merely attending a parent-teacher conference earns $25. Obtaining a library card nets $50; taking one's child to the dentist or to a doctor-recommended (and taxpayer-subsidized) medical exam, $100. Students will receive monthly bounties for school attendance; improvement on standardized tests yields about $300; completing 11 high-school credits is priced at $600 a year. In a separate pilot, 9,000 fourth- and seventh-grade students will receive up to $100 simply for tak-

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ing required math and English tests; answering all questions correctly garners up to $500.

Funding for the $53 million pilot is to come from foundations such as Rockefeller and George Soros's Open Society Institute, as well as from Mayor Bloomberg himself. But if after two years the project architects are satisfied with the results, the mayor envisages extending the incentives city-wide and paying for them with hundreds of millions of tax dollars.

Give the Bloomberg policymakers credit for one thing: The cash-for-responsibility plan violates the greatest taboo in the poverty industry. It implicitly recognizes that the long-term poor are held back more by their own behavior than by social inequities. Talk to any inner-city teacher and you will hear how difficult it is to get parents involved in their child's education, or students to bother with homework. Countless schemes for tutoring and job training sit on the shelves unused because the "clients" never show up. Free medical advice is wasted because patients don't return for follow-up visits, if they bother following the doctor's instructions at all. After the urban riots of the 1960s, political scientist Edward Banfield observed that the central trait separating the poor from the prosperous is future orientation. His insight has never been improved upon. The middle and upper classes defer gratification and invest effort in self-improvement, Banfield wrote in *The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of our Urban Crisis*; were the underclass to do so, they would not long stay in the bottom economic tier.

In unveiling his "conditional cash transfer" scheme on June 18, Bloomberg predictably eschewed Banfield's bracing honesty. The poor fail to "plan for the future," the mayor said, because they are "so focused on surviving." The idea that the residents of Brooklyn and Central Harlem are engaged in a "struggle," as Bloomberg put it, against starvation and depredation is a fantasy. Many teens who will be enrolled in "Opportunity NYC" likely wear the latest sneakers and carry pagers and cell phones. Their problem is motivation, not the unforgiving demands of a subsistence economy. Nevertheless, Bloomberg should be congratulated for implicitly acknowledging the behavior issue, however misleading the rhetoric in which he couches it.

But the cure in this case will be worse than the disease. Introducing cash rewards for conduct that is simply part of what it means to be a conscientious parent or student is no way to inculcate a more functional value system. Creating the expectation of immediate cash for behavior that provides a long-term payoff, such as studying in school, will further shorten the poor's time horizon, rather than lengthen it. Civil society requires individuals to undertake countless actions in the private

sphere out of a sense of duty and propriety. The state cannot possibly devise a payment schedule complex enough to capture those actions, nor should it try.

Liberal supporters of the Bloomberg payment plan claim that conservatives should love it—after all, it involves money, doesn't it? And we all know that the only thing conservatives care about is money and the market. But the market is made up of entities and individuals involved in discretionary, profit-seeking transactions. There should be nothing discretionary about encouraging your child's education or providing him with medical care (especially when that care is free). These behaviors are moral obligations, not economic exchanges. Nor are the "conditional cash transfers" comparable to tax incentives for corporate investment, for the same reason: Tax breaks, rightly or wrongly, aim to influence optional spending.

"But the program works in Mexico," say its defenders. Leaving aside whether Mexican poverty policy cries out for emulation, Mexican peasants *are* facing a "struggle" for subsistence, unlike America's inner-city poor. A *campesina*'s decision to take her child to the doctor may in fact jeopardize her livelihood, making the $200 offset, for example, which the Bloomberg administration intends to pay parents simply for taking their child to an annual medical check-up, a significant cushion against risk. New York is a different universe. The Bloomberg plan will pay parents $40 a month merely for maintaining taxpayer subsidized health insurance—the barrier to doing which is apathy and inertia, not a Dickensian struggle for survival.

Should the Bloomberg payment experiment go large-scale, as its architects hope, it will create a bizarre caste system, in which one part of society bribes the other to behave in ways that the paying class regards as basic to responsible human life. So far, the Bloomberg administration has not articulated any principle for distinguishing who is in that paying class, and who in the payee class, other than a crude income test. The program will enroll families at or below 130 percent of the federal poverty level. How will the administration explain to parents at 140 percent of the federal poverty line that their children should attend school simply because it is in their long-term self-interest, when their neighbors are getting paid for the same behavior?

EPA / Corbis / Justin Lane

Nor has City Hall said what its end game is. Once the payments are institutionalized, it will be difficult to dislodge the expectations that they create. Welfare advocates are already arguing that the bounties are not large enough. Expect a constant push from the poverty industry to raise the price of good behavior, to broaden the payee class, and to compensate a greater range of conduct—making sure that one's child has had breakfast or takes his books to school would seem to be as worthy of being remunerated as downloading a child's test scores. And once word gets around classrooms that some students are taking home $500 for doing well on tests, good luck persuading other students that they should study for the love of learning or the prospect of a better future.

Throughout his mayoralty, Bloomberg has pursued conventional liberal solutions to poverty, going on an affordable-housing building spree, for example, and seeking to water down the work requirements in welfare reform. His latest endeavor at least breaks with that conventional wisdom by correctly diagnosing the behavioral roots of entrenched poverty. Its remedy is blind, however, to the moral basis of civil society. If Bloomberg really wants to earn the title of independent, he should promote marriage as a way of reducing poverty. Now *that* would be a radical idea. ♦

Sarkozy Starts Strong

And the opposition splits—literally.

BY MICHEL GURFINKIEL

Hyperpresident—that's what France's leading conservative newspaper, *Le Figaro*, called Nicolas Sarkozy two weeks ago. Around the same time, the liberal satirical weekly *Le Canard enchaîné* ran a cartoon featuring a pedalling machine under the president's desk. Caption: "He is even producing energy for the Elysée Palace." Left, right, and center, the sentiment was near universal: Sarkozy means business. He is a doer, and he does things so cleverly that he succeeds.

The new French president's most remarkable achievement so far has been to restore momentum to European affairs. Two years ago, two of the European Union's founding nations, France and the Netherlands, voted down a draft constitution for Europe that would have transformed the present confederation into a federal superstate. The defeat left the EU in total disarray. Some members, like Spain and Italy, had already ratified the constitution and felt betrayed. Some, like the United Kingdom, felt justified in their own skittishness about anything more elaborate than a European free trade zone. The rest started to wonder whether the Union had not reached the point of overstretch. The fact that two more countries—Romania and Bulgaria ("Northern and Southern Ruritania," as a French humorist had it)—joined in the meantime was no real comfort.

Neither was the euro's steady gain against the dollar, hardly helpful in terms of world trade. And other ominous developments loomed: Putin's Russia ratcheted up its bullying of the EU, both its energy delivery blackmail and its posturing over missile defense. A Franco-German crisis at Airbus ended in the sacking of the French CEO, Noël Forgeard, the nomination of a German, Gustav Humbert, to replace him, and the transfer to Hamburg of key operations hitherto located in Toulouse, the avionics capital of southern France.

Numerous plans for reviving the EU had been broached in various quarters. Sarkozy seized on a few of these and combined them in a characteristically smooth package, which he proceeded to sell.

The concept he put forward was a "smaller, leaner treaty." This meant stripping the proposed constitution of everything grandly "constitutional" and concentrating on practical reforms, like the creation of an elected EU presidency to replace the present rotation (the presidency changes hands every six months, and every nation, large or small, gets a turn—clearly unworkable with 27 member countries), or the elimination of the requirement of unanimity for decisions on certain vital matters like security and immigration.

Sarkozy knew he would win the support of German chancellor Angela Merkel, who had supported similar proposals. In addition, the "small treaty" was to be discussed at the European Council (or conference of heads of state or government) to be held in Germany by late June, at the end of Germany's EU presidency. Merkel would look sympathetically on a French initiative that could provide an accomplishment to crown her presidency.

One by one, the other European partners were approached and seduced, including the leaders of the smaller nations that, under Sarkozy's plan, would receive less representation in Brussels than under the defeated draft constitution: Portugal, Spain, and even the redoubtable Poland, currently run by the hypernationalist Kaczynski twins. As for Britain, Sarkozy adroitly exploited the changing of the guard there: Tony Blair could not possibly leave office on a sour note, any more than Gordon Brown could assume it with a declaration of war on the continent. In short order, the "small treaty" was approved. The only puzzle was how such a modest, reasonable compromise could have eluded the EU for so long.

Sarkozy has used similar methods in domestic affairs: simple, no-nonsense proposals, and a lot of face-to-face discussion with all the major players, allowing for adjustments or amendments. Before he left for the European summit, Sarkozy made sure to consult with Ségolène Royal, his Socialist opponent for the presidency last May, and François Hollande, the leader of the Socialist party. Both were invited to the Elysée Palace and given red-carpet treatment. This was a complete break with the Fifth Republic tradition, according to which foreign affairs is the president's *domaine réservé* (private domain), not to be shared with the cabinet or even the prime minister—and certainly not with the leaders of the opposition. Just days after being elected, Sarkozy had insisted on meeting in person with union leaders before honing new industrial legislation—again, something no president had ever done. The outgoing president, Jacques Chirac, for instance, always handled such issues by hiding behind his prime minister (Alain Juppé, Jean-Claude Raffarin, or Dominique de Villepin), who, in turn, usually made sure legislation had been safely passed before engaging in consultations, especially if a bill were likely to spark protest or unrest.

Another feature of Sarkozy's approach is to bring into the cabinet,

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and thus coopt, as many people from the left or at least the liberal persuasion as possible. He made Bernard Kouchner, the famous founder of *Médecins sans frontières* and a former Socialist minister of public health, his foreign minister. Then he named Martin Hirsch, chairman of the left-wing Catholic charity Emmaus, high commissioner for "active solidarity" (emergency help for the poor and homeless). Eric Besson, a former Socialist party secretary for economic affairs, had publicly switched to Sarkozy even before the presidential election; he was rewarded with a junior position in the cabinet. Jean-Marie Bockel, a Socialist senator from Alsace, switched sides in June, and is now in charge of relations with the French-speaking world.

Equally impressive are the president's inroads in the neo-French—that is, immigrant—community. Rachida Dati, a woman in her forties of Moroccan and Algerian descent and an observant, if moderate, Muslim (she fasts during Ramadan), is now minister of justice. Rama Yade, a Senegalese-born civil servant, is deputy foreign minister for human rights. And Fadela Amara, born in an immigrant ghetto to a traditional Kabyle (Berber-speaking) family, who founded the women's rights group *Ni Putes Ni Soumises* (Neither Whores Nor Submissives)—Sarkozy has made her his minister for urban affairs.

At first, it was widely assumed that Sarkozy's openness was purely tactical. He knew he had defeated Royal in the presidential election by about six percentage points, and presumably he feared he might not win a working majority in the National Assembly in the elections in June: a well-founded concern, as it turned out, since the right took 314 seats out of 577, an absolute majority, but short of the 400 or 450 seats most pollsters had predicted. In retrospect, though, there is something transparently spontaneous and genial in his behavior. The man everybody loved to hate before and during the campaign—not just the left, but the Chirac crowd as well—is now eager to be friends with everyone, all the more so at a time when his Socialist opponents are riven with animosities.

Throughout the recent presidential and legislative campaigns, the French wondered what exactly was the relationship between the Socialist candidate, Ségolène Royal, and her common law husband, François Hollande, the leader of the Socialist party. Royal and Hollande had lived together for more than 25 years and have four children. The fact that they were not legally married was, by Gallic standards, of little consequence. What was notable was that they didn't seem to speak much to each other, and were obviously running separate campaigns, with separate agendas. At times, it even seemed that Hollande resented his companion's candidacy and was surreptitiously undermining it. The most telling incident, in this respect, was his slip of the tongue at the first mass rally of the campaign. As party leader, he had to show enthusiasm for the party's candidate, and he did, except that in his very last sentence, he said that he believed in a complete "Socialist defeat . . . er . . . victory!"


Nicolas Sarkozy

AFP / Getty Images / Jacques Collet

What once was rumor is now established fact, thanks to *La femme fatale*, by Raphaëlle Bacqué and Ariane Chemin, published between the presidential and legislative elections. Terse and ungossipy (relatively little name dropping, for instance), it asserts that Hollande had left Royal a few years ago for another woman, and that Royal, seeking revenge, had worked hard to become a political leader in her own right. When the book appeared, the couple sued both authors for breach of privacy, an offense that, under French law, includes exposure of intimate matters such as adultery.

Then Royal changed course. On June 17, at precisely 9 P.M., the moment the polls closed in the legislative elections, she publicly acknowledged being separated from Hollande, thus essentially validating Bacqué and Chemin's book. And she made clear she would make a bid for the party's leadership, if necessary against her former companion.

The French were thrilled: Soap opera and politics were meeting at a level not seen since the fall of the monarchy. The media feeding frenzy drowned out even the election returns. And the story goes on. Last weekend, the Socialist old guard—affectionately known as "the elephants"—circled the wagons around Hollande and started to isolate Royal within the party. Royal, however, who won 47 percent of the vote, thinks she has what amounts to a popular mandate. She will fight back. This is very bad news for the left, which may collapse in the process—and very good news for the amiable Sarkozy. ♦

Tax Cuts for Kids

A pro-family agenda for 2008.

BY CESAR CONDA & ROBERT STEIN

Tax reform has been the Holy Grail of conservative economists since the early 1990s. But after years of conservative ascendance in Washington, the tax code remains a mess.

Two major problems plague the flat tax, the retail sales tax, and other "big bang" tax reforms. First, utopianism. Ending the mortgage interest deduction might make perfect sense on a blackboard. But putting at risk the most valuable asset many taxpayers have is the equivalent of policymaking suicide.

Second, many free market economists treat families as an afterthought. As far as they are concerned, the tax code should be "neutral" about raising children. In effect, they say the U.S. government should be indifferent to whether the people that created it exist in the future. What these experts fail to recognize is that Social Security and Medicare have created a huge fiscal bias against raising children, "crowding out" the traditional motive to raise children to protect against old-age poverty, a bias that would exist even in a mandatory saving program.

We suggest a different approach to tax reform, one that achieves the major conservative policy goals of a simple, flatter, and fairer tax—and can be enacted with broad bipartisan support. The proposal would simplify the tax code—no more itemizing, no more alternative minimum tax—cut marginal tax rates on capital investment and high-income labor (the activities most sensitive to marginal rates), reduce the tax burden on the middle class and below, treat married couples as equal partners, and offset the anti-parent bias in Social Security and Medicare.

Rather than re-creating the tax code from scratch or imposing new taxes, we would make the following changes to the existing code.

First, remove impediments to capital investment. Cut the corporate tax rate to 32 percent and make cash dividends fully deductible at the corporate level (taxable as regular income for individuals). Reduce the corporate tax rate—currently the second highest in the industrialized world—to encourage equity financing of new investment, raising worker wages, and improving the competitiveness of U.S. firms.

Additionally, let firms expense 25 percent of plant and equipment in the year of purchase. Replace the separate tax structure for capital gains with a 100 percent exclusion for gains up to $5,000 and a 50 percent exclusion for long-term gains above that level. Eliminate the tax on inheritances.

Next, scrap the individual alternative minimum tax and every itemized deduction except two: mortgage interest and charitable donations. Make these two deductions available to all taxpayers, not just itemizers. Reduce the limit on the principal amount on which interest is to be deducted, but only to keep the total amount of mortgage interest deductions the same as under current law. Similarly, for the charitable deduction, adjust minimums, maximums, and verification standards to keep the amount the same as under current law.

After deductions, individuals face only two income tax brackets: 15 percent and 32 percent. Make the 15 percent bracket twice as wide for married couples as singles to acknowledge that husbands and wives share their incomes. Then apply credits based on family size to reduce taxes owed.

Replace the standard deduction and personal exemption for each filer with a nonrefundable credit of $2,000. (Married couples get up to $4,000; singles up to $2,000.) Replace the personal exemption for children, child credit, child care credit, and adoption credit by a new $4,000 credit per child that offsets both income taxes *and* payroll taxes. (Citizenship requirements would apply, and those taking the earned income credit could not take the child credit too.) Dependents not covered by the $4,000 credit get $500 instead. Given the generosity in the child credit, eliminate the "head-of-household" filing status and treat them as singles. Index the 15 percent brackets and filer credit for inflation; index the child credit for wages, like the Social Security tax base.

These changes would make a huge

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difference. The typical married couple with two children would get a tax cut of more than $5,000 per year.

Additionally, the plan promotes better health care by converting the employer deduction into a worker deduction with a cap, empowering consumers to purchase affordable health insurance.

The common arguments against a $4,000 child credit do not withstand scrutiny:

The child credit is a large transfer payment. Although it's called a "credit," it is not a lump-sum payment. It works like a deduction applicable against both income and payroll taxes. Taxpayers only get the full credit if they have enough earnings and taxes to offset.

Nonparents already pay for schools. When nonparents complain about having to pay school-related taxes, they are saying, in effect, that they were entitled to a free K-12 education without ever having to pay for one.

The proposal takes too many people off the tax rolls each year, increasing the public's appetite for more government spending. Workers move across income classes over time, which is why static tax distribution tables are often misleading. Given this dynamism, we should not be concerned with some workers falling off the tax rolls in a particular year, based on where they are in their life cycle. Parents will pay higher taxes when their kids grow up and parents with more after-tax income are *less* likely to demand government services.

For years, supply-siders and progressives have talked past each other. Our proposal lets both sides get their way. By using generous family-related credits and a reduced top marginal rate that kicks in at lower income levels, the tax code would become substantially more progressive. The rich would pay more but, with a lower top marginal tax rate, have better incentives to work harder and invest more. The middle class and those below would pay less and have their tax burden shifted away from the years when they need it the most, when they are raising children. ♦

Endangered Salman

From London to Cairo, free speech is under assault. BY PAUL MARSHALL

AFP / Getty Images / Aamir Quereshi

Protest in Islamabad, June 22

On June 16, Queen Elizabeth announced in the annual birthday honors list that author Salman Rushdie, previously accused of "insulting Islam," would be knighted. At the same time, five Egyptian Muslims, also accused of "insulting Islam," languished in the jails and interrogation rooms of Egyptian State Security.

The Queen's announcement caused violent protests in many countries and renewed death threats, and received extensive media coverage. The imprisonment elicited little protest or coverage. Both events teach important lessons, but the latter is politically more significant.

The reaction to the protests over the knighthood reveals an erosion of confidence in the West. Back in 1989, when Iran's supreme leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, issued his *fatwa* declaring that all Muslims had a duty to kill Rushdie, the writer was defended and feted. Politicians vied to appear with him and shake his hand. When I passed through Amsterdam airport, the bookstores had every possible display space filled with copies of Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*. Free people declared that freedom of speech would not be surrendered in the face

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of threat and violence.

This time around, there were sporadic articles in Rushdie's defense, but no governments or politicians rushed to his side offering outspoken support. Many more now seem to regard him as a bit of an embarrassment, someone who makes unnecessary trouble, just like the writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali, those Danish cartoonists, and maybe the pope. Why do these people persist in provoking Muslims? There is a palpable loss of nerve in the defense of freedom.

Equally worrying is that the way the "insulting Islam" story has been framed—freedom of speech versus insulting a religion—misses the crucial political question: Can there be open debate about Islam, especially among Muslims? This is revealed starkly by recent events in Egypt.

In May and June, Egyptian State Security arrested Amr Tharwat, Ahmed Dahmash, Abdelhamid Mohamed Abdelrahman, Ayman Mohamed Abdelrahman, and Abdelatif Sayed, who are all members of the "Quranist" network. On June 21, they were charged with "insulting Islam."

These Quranists promote a reformist view based entirely on the Koran (*www.ahl-alquran.com*) and are committed to religious freedom and an open society. They oppose a penalty of death for apostasy since the Koran nowhere mentions it. Amr Tharwat had coordinated the monitoring of Egypt's June Shura Council elections on behalf of the pro-democracy Ibn Khaldun Center, headed by prominent Egyptian democracy activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Former Jemaah Islamiya member Tawfik Hamid told me that it was Quranists who gave him the space to develop critical thinking and so helped wean him away from jihadism.

State Security has now also leveled charges against Quranist founder Ahmed Subhy Mansour, who formerly taught Islamic history at Cairo's Al-Azhar University, the major center of Sunni learning. He was fired because of his views and imprisoned in 1987. Subsequently he found asylum in the United States and lives in Virginia. Also charged is Dr. Othman Mohamed Ali, who lives in Canada.

These arrests are part of the Egyptian government's double game in which it imprisons members of the Muslim Brotherhood when the latter appear to become too powerful, while simultaneously trying to appear Islamic itself and blunt the Brotherhood's appeal by cracking down on religious reformers, who are very often also democracy activists. A similar strategy was followed in the February 22 arrest of blogger Abdel Kareem Nabil, who was sentenced to four years in prison—one year for insulting President Hosni Mubarak, and three for "insulting Islam."

The Quranists' plight, mirrored in countless other cases in the Muslim world, shows that in defending those accused of "insulting Islam," there is far more at stake than a right to offend. Islamists and authoritarian governments now routinely use such accusations to repress political dissidents, writers, journalists, and, perhaps politically most important, religious reformers.

Such laws and threats are not a marginal religious quirk afflicting only cartoonists, converts, and controversial authors. They are a fundamental barrier to open religious discussion and dissent, and so too to democracy and free societies, within the Muslim world. Hence, removing legal bans on "insulting Islam" is an indispensable first step in creating the necessary space for debate that could lead to other reforms.

If, in the name of false toleration and religious sensitivity, free nations fail to firmly condemn and resist these totalitarian strictures, we will not only silence ourselves, but also abet the isolation and destruction of our greatest need and resource in combating radical Islam—courageous moderate Muslims. ♦

You deserve a factual look at . . .

"One Land for Two Peoples"

Is it a solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict or a recipe for disaster?

For decades, the declared thrust of the Palestinians has been their desire of having their own state – in Judea/Samaria (the "West Bank") and in the Gaza Strip. Now, a new idea has taken hold and is propagated in national media: a binational state, encompassing those territories and "Israel proper." The slogan is "One Land for Two Peoples."

What are the facts?

Review of history: The Arabs have launched four major wars against Israel, at the end of which Israel remained in possession of all the lands west of the Jordan River, the undivided city of Jerusalem, the vast Sinai, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip. In what was in all likelihood a major act of folly, but in order to attain peace with Egypt, Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt. But the peace with Egypt is the coldest imaginable.

Thus, having been unable to defeat Israel in war and unable to wear it down by their "intifadas," the Arabs had to think up something new in order to destroy Israel. And they did indeed come up with something. According to the late and unlamented Yasser Arafat, the most important weapon of the Arabs is the "Arab womb," the motto being: "If we can't defeat them in war, let's outbreed them." And that is exactly what would happen if there ever were a "binational" state. There can be little doubt that, within a generation or less, the Arabs would have outbred their Jewish fellow citizens and would have become the majority in the country. They would thus have accomplished what they were unable to attain by any other means, namely the destruction of the Jewish state.

> "The Palestinians, just as the over one million Arabs now living in Israel with full rights as citizens, could be part of Israel, with full autonomy and with their own internal governance…"

Artificial countries: With the exception of Egypt, all the countries of the Middle East are artificial creations. After World War I, England and France carved up the Ottoman Empire, with England retaining what are now Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and Iraq, and France being in possession of what are now Syria and Lebanon.

In 1917, the Balfour Declaration, proclaimed by the British mandatory power, established all of Palestine – east and west of the Jordan River – as the reconstituted homeland for the Jewish people. This was ratified by the 52 countries of the League of Nations. Insistence that these are Arab lands and that the Jews are "occupiers" is a notion that is farily new. But it has been repeated so often and for so long that most of the world has come to believe it. But it has no basis in fact at all. It is a myth.

If Israel were ever to consent to the creation of a binational state, how would it work out? To get the answer, one only needs to go next door to Lebanon. In order to provide a safe haven for the Maronite Christians, the French carved out the artificial state of Lebanon. Within just one generation, the population ratio had begun to change in favor of the Muslims. Strife broke out, which ultimately culminated in a bloody civil war that lasted for close to ten years and in which scores of thousands died. Can anybody really believe that, given the mortal hatred of the Muslims against the Jews, things would be any different in Israel/Palestine? Of course not! A bloody civil war would be the inevitable result.

Created as a Jewish state: Israel was created as a Jewish state by the will of the nations of the world and by the brain and brawn of the Jewish people. There is no reason why the Israelis would turn their country over to those who are their declared mortal enemies. Do the Turks plan to establish a binational state with the Kurds (or do the Iranians or Iraqis, for that matter)? Do the Spaniards consider a binational state with the Basques? Do the Chinese propose the formation of a binational state with the Tibetans? Of course not. Why, therefore, should Israel even consider sharing its country with those whose never-changing agenda is its destruction? Why should Israel, one of the most advanced countries in the world in virtually every field of endeavor, make itself hostage to those who live in backwardness and ignorance and who are guided by religious fanaticism? Israel was founded to be the Jewish homeland and it will never acquiesce to its own destruction by allowing itself to become a binational state.

A binational state is a non-starter and, realistically, a Palestinian state in any portion of Judea/Samaria and Gaza (even in the unlikely case that the Israelis were ever willing to concede it) would not be viable. What then is the possible solution to this enduring problem? The Palestinians, just as the over one million Arabs now living in Israel with full rights as citizens, could be part of Israel, with full autonomy and with their own internal governance (something that the Kurds would give anything to attain). If they were unhappy with that solution they would be at liberty to migrate to any of the over twenty Arab countries that, one would hope, would welcome them with open arms.

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The New Strategy in Iraq

General Petraeus learns from past U.S. mistakes

By Frederick W. Kagan & Kimberly Kagan

The new strategy for Iraq has entered its second phase. Now that all of the additional combat forces have arrived in theater, Generals David Petraeus and Ray Odierno have begun Operation Phantom Thunder, a vast and complex effort to disrupt al Qaeda and Shiite militia bases all around Baghdad in advance of the major clear-and-hold operations that will follow. The deployment of forces and preparations for this operation have gone better than expected, and Phantom Thunder is so far proceeding very well. All aspects of the current strategy have been built upon the lessons of previous successful and unsuccessful Coalition efforts to establish security in Iraq, and there is every reason to be optimistic about its outcome.

The first phase of the new strategy unfolded over five months—between the president's announcement of the "surge" on January 10 and the arrival of the last of the five additional Army brigades and Marine elements in early June (though critical enablers for those combat forces have only just arrived). As the new units entered Iraq, commanders began pushing forces already in the theater forward from their operating bases into outposts in key neighborhoods of Baghdad and elsewhere. The purpose of these movements was to establish positions within those key neighborhoods and to develop intelligence about the enemy and relationships of trust with the local communities.

Also during this first phase, additional Iraqi security forces were deployed to Baghdad in accordance with a plan developed jointly by the U.S. and Iraqi military commands. All of the requested units were provided. The Iraqi military has just completed its second rotation of units into Baghdad; as before, all of the designated units arrived, and they were generally closer to being fully manned than in the first rotation.

The new U.S. troops have increased the available combat power in Iraq by about 40 percent, from 15 brigades to the equivalent of 21 brigades. Generals Petraeus and Odierno allocated only two of the additional Army brigades to the capital. The other three Army brigades and the equivalent of a Marine regiment they deployed in the surrounding areas, known as the "Baghdad belt." There, under the guise of Operation Phantom Thunder, they are now working to disrupt the car-bomb and suicide-bomb networks that have been supporting al Qaeda's countersurge since January.

But this second phase is designed primarily to support the clearing and holding operations in Baghdad itself, which will continue for many months. It is those operations that are meant to bring lasting security to Iraq's capital and thus create the space for political progress.

The United States has not undertaken a multiphased operation on such a large scale since the invasion, so it is unsurprising that many commentators are confused about how to report and evaluate what is going on. Indeed, the current effort differs profoundly from anything U.S. forces have tried before in Iraq. As Coalition forces begin the attempt to establish sustainable security in Baghdad and its environs, it is worth reviewing past major combat operations in Iraq, since their clear lessons have informed planning for the current, much larger campaign.

FALLUJA, 2004

The U.S. Marines fought two big battles in Falluja, the easternmost major city in Anbar province not far from Baghdad, in the spring and fall of 2004. The enemy was a dense network of al Qaeda fighters and Sunni Arab insurgents who had prepared defensive

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positions throughout the city and had considerable support from the local population. The initial assault was ordered on short notice after the kidnapping and execution of several American contractors, whose bodies were prominently displayed from a bridge.

The Marines were not given adequate time to prepare for the attack. They could not establish forward outposts in the city, develop adequate intelligence about the enemy, or gain the trust of the population. The American command did not fully prepare the Iraqi government for the intensity of the battle or the controversy it was bound to generate. As a result, the Marines' initial assaults resulted in heavy casualties and collateral damage. The Iraqi government was shaken, and the Marines were ordered to abandon the effort and rely instead on local forces to restore order in the city. Lacking troops, training, and support, the local allies were quickly either turned or slaughtered, and al Qaeda and the insurgents strengthened their hold on Falluja and Anbar generally.

WEEKLY STANDARD MAPS BY PHILIP CHALK

The second Marine attack, in the fall, was much more successful. The local units were reinforced and given time to develop a much clearer intelligence picture, as well as to obtain local allies, although those were still few and unreliable. The much better-planned attack cleared the city, although with considerable collateral damage resulting largely from the sophistication of the defenses the enemy had been able to establish during the pause between the two attacks.

The Marines were not allowed to follow up on their success in Falluja, however. No effort was made to clear and hold Ramadi or the Upper Euphrates Valley for more than a year. In the meantime, the area between Falluja and Baghdad, including the Abu Ghraib neighborhood on the western outskirts of the capital, was left largely devoid of American forces and remained a major Sunni Arab insurgent and al Qaeda base. Nevertheless, Falluja was fairly stable for many months after the Marine attack, only slowly sinking back into chaos and enemy control.

NAJAF AND SADR CITY, 2004

The summer of 2004 also saw the only major combat between Coalition forces and Moktada al-Sadr's Mahdi army, or Jaysh al-Mahdi. This took place in the Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala and the Baghdad neighborhood of Sadr City. The Sadrist uprising followed close on the heels of the first Battle of Falluja, and it seemed briefly that the Coalition might be defeated simultaneously by Sunni insurgents and Shia militias across Iraq. But U.S. forces rapidly regained control of the situation in Sadr City, where Major General Chiarelli's 1st Cavalry Division restored order. Fighting in Najaf was greatly complicated by the fact that the Sadrists took up positions in and near the Imam Ali Mosque, one of Shia Islam's most sacred sites. Skillful Coalition military operations dislodged the Sadrists from those positions without significant damage to the shrine, and killed many Sadrist fighters in the process.

The battles of Sadr City and Najaf continue to influence the situation in Iraq today. Sadr appears to have learned from these battles that his militia cannot stand up to American forces in pitched battles. He has avoided situations that might lead to such fights, preferring hit-and-run attacks, the use of IEDs (and now EFPs, explosively formed projectiles), and death-squad attacks on Sunni Arabs after the bombing of the Samarra Mosque in February 2006. The successes in Najaf and Sadr City were fleeting in another respect, however. U.S. forces left both areas quickly, and the Sadrist militias retook control of them within months. The Sadrists remain largely in control of Najaf and were long uncontested in Sadr City, although recent events have greatly complicated their situation there.

TAL AFAR AND THE UPPER EUPHRATES, 2005

After the uprisings of 2004, the United States focused its efforts on moving the political process forward in Iraq and on training the Iraqi army and

National Police. It was widely expected in the government and especially in the military leadership that political progress would translate directly into improved security. It was also believed that the onus for conducting what military operations were necessary should fall on the nascent Iraqi military to the maximum extent possible.

Nevertheless, the Coalition command understood that only U.S. forces could provide the short-term security necessary for elections. The command requested and received significant reinforcements to this end in late 2005. The most dramatic battle before the elections came in September 2005, when Colonel H.R. McMaster's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment cleared Tal Afar, a city in Nineveh Province between Mosul and the Syrian border.

Tal Afar was a stronghold of the Sunni Arab insurgency and al Qaeda on the road from Syria into the heart of Iraq. As in Falluja, the enemy had prepared sophisticated defensive positions and terrorized the local population into providing support. McMaster had a number of advantages over the Marines in Falluja, however. He had a larger number of trained and reasonably reliable Iraqi soldiers, the first fruits of a new effort to build an Iraqi army capable of conducting counterinsurgency efforts. He was also able to establish outposts in and around the city, develop a sophisticated intelligence picture, and shape the situation to his advantage before beginning the major clearing operation. The result was a marked success. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment isolated the city with a berm to control access and then cleared it house-to-house in conjunction with the Iraqi army. Some insurgent cells fought back determinedly, but the Coalition forces cleared the city without destroying it, and gained the support of the population in the process.

Tal Afar had been cleared twice before September 2005, and both times had immediately fallen back into the hands of the insurgents. Although U.S. forces in the area were again reduced sharply after this operation, the situation did not deteriorate rapidly or completely. Promised reconstruction aid from the Iraqi central government arrived in Nineveh only a few months ago, and tensions rose in the city in 2006, in part because the Iraqi government replaced several key provincial leaders with Shia extremists. Nevertheless, Tal Afar has not been retaken by the insurgents, and a spectacular suicide truck bomb in March 2007 did not trigger a renewal of sectarian strife. A few days of tit-for-tat sectarian killings followed, but the local government and Iraqi police and army units with very little Coalition support managed to bring the situation under control and stop the killing.

Nineveh Province today is held by 18,000 Iraqi army soldiers, 20,000 Iraqi police, and a small number of Americans. Al Qaeda and Sunni insurgent cells operate in the province, particularly in Mosul, but have not been able to take it over or establish uncontested safe havens. Operations in 2005, although inadequately followed up and sustained, created a lasting change in a critical province of northern Iraq.

RAMADI, 2006

Early in 2006, the U.S. military command withdrew the additional forces introduced to support the elections, and thereafter resisted all suggestions of a more active posture or a larger American presence. In 2006 the focus was on training the Iraqi military and transitioning responsibility for security to the Iraqis. It was hoped that the results of the 2005 elections would lead to the political progress that was seen as the key to reducing violence, and Generals John Abizaid and George Casey believed that an active American presence was an irritant that caused more trouble than it cured. They also feared that American forces conducting counterinsurgency operations would allow the Iraqi forces to lie back and become dependent on the Coalition. The overall U.S. posture in the first half of 2006, therefore, remained largely defensive and reactive, and the military command aimed to reduce the number of American forces in Iraq as rapidly as possible.

In the meantime, the situation was deteriorating dramatically. Al Qaeda terrorists destroyed the Golden Dome of the al-Askariya Mosque in Samarra (a Shiite shrine in the predominantly Sunni Arab province of Salahuddin), and a wave of sectarian violence swept Iraq. Within days more than 30 mosques had been bombed, and death squads began executing civilians across the country in large numbers in tit-for-tat sectarian murders.

The failure to follow up either on the successes in Falluja in 2004 or on the beginnings of clearing operations in the Upper Euphrates in 2005 allowed Anbar Province to sink deeper into the control of Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda terrorists. As late as August 2006, the Marine intelligence officer for the province declared that it was irretrievably lost to the enemy.

Nevertheless, the Marines and Army units in Anbar began a series of quiet efforts to regain control that ultimately led to spectacular and unexpected success. They began to engage local leaders in talks, particularly after al Qaeda committed a series of assassinations and other atrocities against tribal leaders and local civilians as part of an effort to enforce their extreme and distorted vision of Islamic law. U.S. forces under the command of Colonel Sean MacFarland also began a quiet effort to apply the clearing principles honed through operations in Falluja, Sadr City, and Tal Afar to Ramadi. There were never enough forces to undertake such operations rapidly or decisively, and suc-

cess never appeared likely, at least to outside observers, who focused excessively on the force ratios.

But the effort was successful beyond all expectations. The tribal leaders in Anbar came together to negotiate an accord that ultimately produced the Anbar Awakening, an association of Anbar tribes dedicated to fighting al Qaeda. Recruiting for the Iraqi Security Forces in Anbar increased from virtually zero through 2006 to more than 14,000 by mid-2007. As the 2007 surge forces augmented U.S. troops in Anbar and began to change the political dynamic in Iraq, efforts to clear Ramadi and bring overall violence in the province under control also peaked. As *New York Times* reporter John Burns noted after a recent visit to Ramadi, Anbar's capital has "gone from being the most dangerous place in Iraq, with the help of the tribal sheikhs, to being one of the least dangerous places." And the Anbar Awakening movement has spread to Sunni tribes in neighboring areas. Parallel organizations have developed in Babil, Salahuddin, and Diyala provinces, and even in Baghdad. As the new strategy of 2007 took hold, U.S. forces found that they could even negotiate and work with some of their most determined former foes in the Sunni Arab insurgency—groups like the Baathist 1920s Brigades that once focused on killing Americans and now are increasingly working with Americans to kill al Qaeda fighters. Coalition operations in Anbar, which looked hopeless for years, have accomplished extraordinary successes that are deepening and spreading.



BAGHDAD, 2006

The worsening sectarian violence after the al-Askariya Mosque bombing led General Casey to conduct two operations aimed at restoring stability in Baghdad. Dubbed Operations Together Forward I and II, they involved surges of fewer than 10,000 additional U.S. troops and a relatively small number of Iraqis into the capital to conduct clearing operations. Inadequate planning and preparation for the movement of the Iraqi battalions into Baghdad led to the refusal of many of those units to show up. The plans, moreover, relied on Iraqi forces to hold cleared neighborhoods on their own, while U.S. forces moved on to other troubled areas.

These operations failed. Six months of intense sectarian conflict had led many members of the mostly Shiite Iraqi police into death squads. They were not and could not be effective bulwarks on their own against sectarian violence of which they were a part. The fact that most Iraqi army formations did not show up reduced the force ratios necessary to clear neighborhoods and deprived the Iraqi command, which was poorly organized, of resources vital to holding areas that U.S. forces cleared. The very small increase in American combat power (two additional brigades in Baghdad, but no overall increase in the American force levels in the theater) was inadequate to gain control of the situation. Sectarian killings dropped during the first two weeks of the second, and larger, operation, but then rapidly rose above pre-operation levels and continued to rise for the rest of the year. By November, Operation Together Forward II had mostly ground to a halt, having made no lasting improvement in the situation.

LESSONS OF THE PAST

A number of clear lessons drawn from these operations have informed the current strategy. First, political progress by itself will not reduce the violence. From May 2003 through mid-2006, the Bush administration and the military command focused on political progress as the key. The transfer of sovereignty in mid-2004, the election of a Transitional National Assembly in January 2005, the approval of a new constitution by referendum in October 2005, and the election

of a fresh National Assembly in December 2005 were all expected to subdue violence by creating an inclusive and balanced government. Throughout this period, American armed forces tried to stay in the background, keeping their "footprint" minimal and pushing the nascent Iraqi Security Forces into the lead. Violence steadily increased. Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda terrorists dug into cities that U.S. forces left open, and Shia militias took control of abandoned Shia lands.

When local American commanders took the initiative to clear insurgent hotbeds, they were generally successful. These operations produced measurable improvements in important areas that decayed only slowly, despite the absence of follow-up or adequate continued presence. U.S. forces honed their skills in such operations, allowing them finally to clear insurgent-held cities without destroying them or excessively alienating the local population. Political progress and political solutions are essential to ultimate success in counterinsurgency, but they must often be complemented by major military operations sustained over a long time.

Second, all American efforts to establish local security in Iraq have been hindered by the paucity of U.S. troops there, yet some have succeeded even so. Colonel McMaster could muster nearly one Coalition soldier (American or Iraqi) for every 45 people in Tal Afar, which helps explain the speed and success of the clearing in that city. But General Chiarelli restored order in Sadr City in 2004 with fewer than one soldier per 100 inhabitants, and the Marines and Army units in Anbar cleared Ramadi slowly with similarly poor ratios. More soldiers and Marines, to say nothing of more trained and reliable Iraqi troops, would have made every operation proceed more rapidly and smoothly, but the evidence suggests that critical clearing operations can succeed even at these lower ratios. There are now well over 350,000 Coalition forces, including Iraqis, in the country, whose population is around 25 million—an overall ratio significantly better than what sufficed to restore order in Sadr City and Ramadi.

Third, rapid reductions in Coalition forces after clearing operations undermined the success of almost all past operations. In Sadr City and Najaf, the withdrawal led to the complete if quiet restoration of the militias that had been driven out. In Falluja and Tal Afar, rapid reductions in Coalition forces led to slow deterioration, although not to previous levels of insurgent and terrorist predominance. Turning control of cleared areas over to Iraqi forces prematurely—as in Falluja after the first battle and in Baghdad after Operations Together Forward—generally led to rapid failure. The Coalition must plan to maintain a significant presence in direct and indirect support of Iraqi forces after clearing operations are complete in order to sustain success. The model is Ramadi, where Coalition forces have remained in strength even as the situation has improved, helping to deepen the positive trends underway there. The capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces have improved steadily, but it is highly unlikely that Coalition forces can leave areas as soon as they have been cleared without seeing security deteriorate.

Fourth, every successful operation was preceded by commanders' taking the time to develop a good intelligence picture of the situation. To do this, they moved forces into the area and made contact with the local population. Advance forces help shape the environment by occupying bases from which subsequent operations can proceed and by establishing relationships with local leaders that will be exploited in subsequent phases. This also helps commanders and planners refine their estimates of the forces required in the clearing operation. Especially operations on a large scale, involving the physical movement of many forces, require significant preparation.

Fifth, Coalition casualties generally increase at the start of major clearing operations, when Coalition troops move into areas previously held by the enemy, especially where the enemy has prepared sophisticated defensive positions. As the enemy realizes that a major attack is underway, he often launches counterattacks, in an attempt to blunt the offensive and/or weaken the will of leaders in Baghdad and Washington. Depending on the scale of operations and the resilience of the enemy defenses, this period of increased violence can last for days or weeks. As clearing proceeds to its conclusion, however, violence generally drops and Coalition casualties begin to fall. This pattern has occurred in almost every successful clearing operation, including Sadr City, Najaf, the second Battle of Falluja, Tal Afar, and Ramadi. Higher force ratios combined with solid preparation can reduce the intensity and duration of this spike in violence and casualties, but cannot eliminate it.

OPERATION PHANTOM THUNDER IN CONTEXT

The new strategy for securing Baghdad was designed with all these lessons in mind, as well as lessons from other successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operations elsewhere. So far, the campaign has the hallmarks of past successful operations; and it has a number of promising new elements. One of these new elements is Operation Phantom Thunder itself.

Many advocates of the new strategy—and many critics—bemoaned the staggered arrival over five months

of the additional combat forces, which delayed the start of major clearing operations and seemed to threaten a ragged and uneven launch. But Generals Petraeus and Odierno put the time to good use. They immediately began to push U.S. forces that were already in Iraq off of their forward operating bases and into the neighborhoods to be cleared. In some areas that were sufficiently stable to begin with, the mere movement of forces into permanent positions in the neighborhoods had the effect of a rapid clearing operation, even though the aim was only to gather intelligence and set the conditions for the clearing to follow.

More important, previous clearing operations in Iraq were not part of a coherent plan to establish security in a wide area, but rather reactions to violence in particular places. Thus, U.S. commanders made no extensive efforts to contain the accelerants to violence—vehicle-bomb factories, insurgent safe houses, training grounds, smuggling routes, and weapons caches—located outside the cities being cleared. By contrast, the current strategy aims to establish security across greater Baghdad, and Petraeus and Odierno have added a phase between the preparation phase and the major clearing. This is Operation Phantom Thunder, which aims to disrupt enemy networks for many miles beyond the capital, as far away as Baquba and Falluja. What's more, Phantom Thunder is striking the enemy in almost all of its major bases at once—something Coalition forces have never before attempted in Iraq.



Al Qaeda's operations in Baghdad—its bombings, kidnappings, resupply activities, movement of foreign fighters, and financing—depend on its ability to move people and goods around the rural outskirts of the capital as well as in the city. Petraeus and Odierno, therefore, are conducting simultaneous operations in many places in the Baghdad belt: Falluja and Baquba, Mahmudiya, Arab Jabour, Salman Pak, the southern shores of Lake Tharthar, Karma, Tarmiya, and so on. By attacking all of these bases at once, Coalition forces will gravely complicate the enemy's movement from place to place, as well as his ability to establish new bases and safe havens. At the same time, U.S. and Iraqi forces have already disrupted al Qaeda's major bases and are working to prevent the enemy from taking refuge in the city. U.S. forces are also aggressively targeting Shia death-squad leaders and helping Iraqi forces operating against Shia militias.

Still ahead, of course, is the challenge of completing the clearing and holding of a city of 6 million. The establishment of security, moreover, is a precondition for further political progress, not a guarantee of it. The enemy may find a way to disrupt the current operations, or to derail or defeat the subsequent clear-and-hold operations. It is possible that Iraqi Security Forces will prove unable to develop the numbers and capabilities required to maintain security once it has been established. And unpredictable disasters can always drive a well-designed strategy off course.

But there is every reason to believe at this stage that the current operation and its likely successor will dramatically reduce the level of violence in Baghdad, and do so in a way that will prove sustainable. That accomplishment in itself will be a major contribution to American security, in that it will entail a major defeat for al Qaeda and its allies, now surging in response to our stepped-up operations. And it will create an unprecedented situation in postwar Iraq: one in which Iraq's elected government can meet and discuss policies in relative security in a capital returning to normal; in which Sunni and Shia can afford to compromise without fear of an imminent sectarian explosion; and in which Iraqi forces can become increasingly responsible for maintaining the security that they have helped to establish. The current strategy is on track to produce that outcome—which is why it deserves to be given every chance to succeed. ♦

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The Hollywood Ten, minus three, 1950

Modern Mythology

How Stalinists became martyrs BY STEPHEN SCHWARTZ

Who in the world was John Henry Faulk? I grew up in the 1950s, a "red-diaper baby" born to parents intoxicated with pro-Soviet progressivism, and especially with the radio success of the Stalino-folk ensemble The Weavers. But I lived on the West Coast and never understood why the national press, every once in a while, spent so much time on Faulk, an apparent radio celebrity whose performances I never heard.

As explained in this generally excellent book, Faulk was a Texas-twanging, East Coast-based humorist who opposed U.S. policies abroad after the Second World War, considered Soviet aggression a myth, and tangled with "the blacklist," i.e., the attempt to prevent arrant Muscovite propaganda from being aired on radio, screen, and television. Broadway was never affected by this dread phenomenon, which many observers concluded was grayer than black even in movies.

A Shadow of Red
Communism and the Blacklist in Radio and Television
by David Everitt
Ivan R. Dee, 414 pp., $27.50

People under suspicion as Stalinists were often denied some work, but few were truly excluded from the airwaves and either the small or large screen. The talent and appeal of John Henry Faulk, such as they may have been, are obscure, to say the least, but his "case" is a central element of this book.

Faulk is not alone on history's dust heap. Everybody knows the name of the outstanding director Elia Kazan, whose reputation is still brutally assaulted, even in death, by recusant leftists because he fully declared and admitted his past Communist associations. But while "the Hollywood 10" provide a widely recognized metonym for the struggle over Stalinism in the movie business, few individuals can name any of them. They were not movie stars; they comprised middle-ranking screenwriters, directors, and producers who appeared as obstreperously defiant witnesses before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, refusing to answer any questions about their Communist advocacy, which was no secret on the Hollywood labor scene, and they were briefly jailed for contempt of Congress.

The most famous of the Ten was, in reality, the eleventh witness at the session, the German playwright Bertolt Brecht. He was punctiliously cooperative with the committee, managed adroitly to evade their questioning, was not charged with anything, and immediately fled for the other side of

Stephen Schwartz is the author of a forthcoming study of Sufism, to be published by Doubleday.

the Iron Curtain. This was understandable, since he had been a Soviet secret police agent. But few people recall his involvement in the Hollywood controversy. Cold War history is fading out of popular consciousness, and today it resembles nothing so much as expertise in dinosaurs or rare diseases.

Was the public investigation of Stalinists and Sovietophiles in Hollywood, radio, and television justified? A citation in *A Shadow of Red* summarizes the debate in a manner difficult to surpass. The anti-Communist liberal Murray Kempton pointed out, in 1952, the basic claim of the anti-blacklist crowd: "That a man who signed a letter praising the Soviet Union after the Moscow trials has no reason to apologize." Kempton did not agree with that item of liberal piety. Of course, it is unfortunate that one should typically have to explain, today, that the Soviet show trials of 1936-38 constituted an immense homicidal purge of the country's political, military, and cultural elite by Joseph Stalin. It is even more regrettable that some conservatives have taken to condemning the victims of the purges as evil commies no better than Stalin himself. But that is another story. The point is that Stalin was a mass murderer as bad or worse, in some cases, than Hitler, and that to deny the Soviet internal massacres and what they demonstrated about the regime—in 1938 or now—was and remains as bad as denying the Holocaust of the Jews.

In his 1952 comment, however, Kempton pointed out the other obnoxious aspect of anti-blacklist hysteria: the belief that the Stalinists removed from mass entertainment were "the flower of humanity and radio artistry." This brings up, once more, "the Faulk effect." Most of those who lost work because of their Stalinist associations were minor figures who left almost no legacy of artistic excellence. Complaints about the rank Stalinist propaganda purveyed before World War II by Pete Seeger and other members of The Weavers brought about the loss of their radio and record-industry income, but little of their output before or after the war was memorable enough to be performed today.

The claim that the Stalinists were the best radio had to offer echoes a form of special pleading well-established in the politicized historiography of movies, wherein leftist academics argue that the campaign against Communist screenwriters and a few Red actors crippled American film art beyond measure. In reality, of course, the 1950s, with or without the Soviet aficionados, was a golden age of the American motion picture.

Movies have durability; we watch them over and over. The true addict has seen his or her favorites—works like 1954's *On the Waterfront*, the next year's *Kiss Me Deadly*, and Orson Welles's *Touch of Evil* (1958)—dozens of times, as have most directors and screenwriters. (The first two are implicitly anti-Communist, and undeniably great. The third hardly constitutes the prettification of American law enforcement.) But radio and television shows are disposable. Many of us remember their names, but who listens to old radio entertainment? Words without images are most often lost in the air. Classic TV fare from the 1950s can seldom be seen, mainly because of the physical degradation of video stock. In addition, radio and television styles go out of date much more quickly than films.

For those reasons alone this volume has an evanescent feeling. Aside from *I Love Lucy*, which passed through a transitory crisis when it was discovered that Lucille Ball had registered as a Communist voter in the 1930s, TV shows like *Danger*, an early hit, or the broadcasting idol Edward R. Murrow's *You Are There*, have sunk without trace.

Nevertheless, David Everitt has done a service to Cold War historians by thoroughly documenting one of the most controversial anti-Communist efforts of the 1950s: the publication of a hard-edged newsletter aimed at communism in broadcasting, titled *Counterattack*, accompanied by a handbook of named suspects, *Red Channels*. These were further supplemented by the tireless activism of a former naval intelligence officer, Vincent Hartnett, and an organization called Aware, Inc.

Counterattack had been launched by American Business Consultants, Inc., established in 1947 by three former FBI agents, and financed and otherwise supported by a small conservative business group; but Hartnett became the outstanding figure in the undertaking. I remember my parents pronouncing his name in a tone of horror.

The anti-Communists experienced various contretemps with Communists and pro-Communists, through the 1940s and '50s. The episode that has retained the greatest presence in America's collective memory is the multi-act showdown between Edward R. Murrow and Sen. Joseph McCarthy, which is widely credited with ending McCarthy's career.

The Murrow performance was reenacted in the limp *Good Night and Good Luck* (2005), directed by a current left hero, George Clooney, but (as pointed out by Everitt) Murrow's own associations and sympathies were less than pristine. Murrow is described in *A Shadow of Red* as inflamed by the suicide of his friend Lawrence Duggan, a known Soviet spy at a high level in the State Department, and whose depredations in the service of Stalin were anything but trivial. For Murrow to take on McCarthy in vengeance for the death of Duggan puts a somewhat different construction on the events portrayed in George Clooney's project.

But we must, finally, return to John Henry Faulk, who brought Vincent Hartnett down by a legal suit. The litigation grew out of a confrontation inside the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA), the powerful broadcasting union, between the anti-Communist forces and the self-styled "progressives," the anti-anti-Communists. Faulk's biggest résumé item was a CBS radio feature, *The John Henry Faulk Show*. He had been barred from employment in 1955 as an executive for Texas radio stations owned by Lady Bird Johnson. Faulk was convinced, and strident in his opinion, that anti-Communists were all "fascists" who would "kill the coun-

try." He mounted a challenge to the anti-Communists from inside AFTRA, and was supported by news personalities such as the late Charles Collingwood and the TV variety-show host Garry Moore, also now dead.

The nullity of Faulk, at the height of his career, puzzled even Hartnett, since the Texan seemed to have leaped out of nowhere to prominence inside AFTRA. The anti-Communists denounced Faulk in a perfunctory manner, listing his endorsement of various Soviet-controlled enterprises. (Remarkably, Faulk never denied, disclaimed, apologized for, or denounced any of them, quibbling only with the fairness of their exposure and consequences for his career.) But Faulk, supported by Murrow and represented by the well-known trial attorney Louis Nizer, sued Hartnett and his organization for libel. Faulk was then fired by CBS. The suit consumed some six years, and ended in 1962 with a judgment of a half-million dollars in Faulk's favor.

This and other sympathetic accounts of anti-Communism are good evidence that America's leftist intelligentsia will not forever impose its mythologies in the academy, in which the travails of a few minor entertainment figures who lost work are balanced with the ordeals of Stalin's purge victims. Modern academics teach that Stalinism and McCarthyism were the same. They were not, and Kempton had it right: Anyone who supported the worst crimes of Moscow and refused to account for such actions got what they deserved, and some of them deserved quite a bit more.

One last empirical observation. While writing this I asked a number of educated people who were adults in the 1950s why John Henry Faulk was significant. All of them said he was a symbol of opposition to anticommunism. None could explain what he did to entertain people, or why that was important. Nevertheless, the anti-Communists seem to have won the battle of historical memory in America. All that remains is to watch the collapse of the academic edifice about the so-called blacklist and its putative evils. ♦

Book of Memories

The charmed life of a modern Hungarian writer.

BY PAUL HOLLANDER

George Konrád may well be the only Hungarian writer whose books have been translated into every major European language and favorably reviewed in major Western publications. He has also been the president of the International PEN club and the German Academy of Arts in Berlin. He has received numerous prestigious literary prizes and awards and has been a frequent traveler on European and North American lecture circuits.

A Guest in My Own Country
A Hungarian Life
by George Konrád
Other Press, 352 pp., $15.95

It has been an unusual career for a man writing in a difficult language spoken by barely more than 10 million people in a small country with a complicated and largely depressing history that remains largely unknown to American readers. As this volume also testifies, he has had an unusual career and, arguably, a charmed life, the turns of which have been just as unpredictable as the unraveling of Communist systems in Eastern Europe that greatly influenced his life and literary prospects.

In Communist Hungary he was a dissident intellectual, expelled from (and readmitted to) the university, fired from jobs, his writings banned, barred from foreign travel for years, and briefly jailed. But as the Kadar regime became more permissive he was allowed to publish his first book in Hungary and go abroad for extended periods. He was also allowed to publish abroad and receive royalties to live on. The authorities would not have minded if he had stayed abroad and made clear that he was free to emigrate. But he wanted to be a Hungarian writer in Hungary, notwithstanding the dim prospects of becoming one, or at any rate a published one. He declined opportunities for departing, notably after the 1956 Revolution, when many of his friends (including this writer) left. He explains:

> I had no desire to look for clever ways out. I wanted a normal, simple life: the same stairways, the same cafes, things as they had been. Even if hundreds of thousands were leaving, millions stayed. . . . My books were here and the sky and the balcony overlooking the hills of Buda across the water. . . . From age forty to fifty five I was a nonperson in my country. . . . My response to the prohibition against working and publishing? An unchecked, internal, authorial freedom. I distributed my work in samizdat.

He admitted: "I was not cut out for steady jobs in the East or West. . . . I was thrilled to be released from it all. . . . I was a pipe-smoking rocking-chair adventurer." Although a dissident he was not an activist: "Too lazy and inept to handle the organization that went with oppositional activities, I did not get much involved, especially since political activism started early in the morning."

Because of the difficulties of a literary career in Hungary, he was for long periods of time a social worker and, later, urban sociologist. Both of these occupations provided stimula-

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tion and raw material for two of his books, *The Case Worker* and *The City Builder*. The former, his first and arguably best book, was published in Hungary in 1969 and in the United States in 1974 and earned a well-deserved rave on the front page of the *New York Times Book Review.* It was a highly original, at once poetic and realistic rendering of his experiences of Hungarian social pathologies, as well as a moving meditation on human bonds, frailties, deprivations, and the relationship between the social and the personal realm. Other novels and numerous collections of shorter writings followed.

A Guest In My Own Country incorporates two autobiographical volumes published in Hungary in 2002 and 2003. His *Kerti Mulatsag* (*Feast in the Garden,* 1989), as well as numerous volumes of shorter writings, are also replete with autobiographical information and reflection. Konrád has had a consuming and enduring interest in his own past but managed to avoid the self-indulgent thrust of the self-aggrandizing memoirs published in alarming quantities in America. A substantial part of this volume consists of nostalgic evocations of an idyllic pre-Nazi childhood in a small provincial city (where his father owned a hardware store) and affectionate portraits of his parents, sister, and two very close cousins, as well as a large number of nieces, nephews, aunts, uncles, and grandparents.

The title captures Konrád's relationship to Hungary and things Hungarian. He wanted to stay in Hungary to become a Hungarian writer and he succeeded, probably beyond his wildest expectations. But he is also Jewish and his Jewish consciousness, or sense of identity, has been a counterweight to the Hungarian one. It seems that over the years the pressures of this Jewish identity have increased, finding expression in this volume and others. The process of aging—its growing preoccupation with the past, including a search for roots and closure of unresolved problems of identity—is likely to be the major factor. A Jewish Hungarian of his age cannot contemplate his life without recalling the Jewish persecution and the narrow escape from being killed.

The second likely reason for this concern is the rise, or more open expression, of anti-Semitism in post-Communist Hungary. Konrád apparently felt compelled to confront it by publicly emphasizing his Jewish identity.

While many have written about experiences of Nazism, and a few about both the experience of Nazism and life under Communist repression, Konrád's recollections and reflections have a distinctive quality. A unique blend of detachment and attachment, fatalism and purposefulness, as well as seriousness and playfulness permeate these pages. Konrád writes in a matter-of-fact style, yet eloquently, without apparent moral indignation about the politically induced childhood traumas and the less-than-life-threatening injustices and deprivations under communism.

He also radiates an unusual, authentic capacity for empathy and curiosity that must have served him well as a social worker. Thus, he notes that inhabitants of some poor neighborhoods in Budapest "developed a kind of raw, barroom variety of existentialism . . . subject to the same insoluble questions and same loneliness and consternation affecting those of us who are relatively well educated."

Unlike many socially conscious, politically engaged intellectuals, he is immune to self-righteousness and his sense of identity does not seem to require the display of championing the underdog. Social critics in Communist police states, even in the less repressive ones, did not hold tenured professorships and could not count on being treated as campus celebrities and media stars. Virtue was truly its own reward.

Konrád also manages to be non-judgmental without becoming a moral relativist. This unusual accomplishment is likely to be rooted in his belief that "moral philosophy must be built on human frailty, and our acceptance of it." Something of a bohemian-Buddhist, he writes:

> I would put off decisions, letting myself be swept into marriages (and jobs) and entrusting the progress of my life to happenstance. . . . I made a raw kind of peace with it all and with the somnolent passing of time and things. I shrugged my shoulders. "Everything is fine with me. You're all fine just as you are."

He also cheerfully confesses to "remember[ing] things that had not happened to me"—an admission I can second, having been linked on these pages to some of the incidents and events described. I have known Konrád since age 15, when we sat next to each other in the Gymnasium (academic high school) in Budapest. I believe that I possess and have read every book he has written both in Hungarian and English.

I must note that much of this translation leaves a lot to be desired, especially when compared with the others I am familiar with—let alone to Konrád's writing in his native language. These defects are all the more puzzling since the book was supposed to benefit from the attention of an editor listed alongside the translator.

I was moved to pick up the original in my possession and compare the two texts, and grew dismayed at the liberties and missteps taken by the translator. The text is liberally sprinkled with major and minor mistranslations, factual errors, poor grammar, fruitless efforts to find English equivalents of Hungarian words or expressions. "Took a powder" is offered as a substitute for a Hungarian expression conveying rapid departure; "a bell jar of silence"—used more than once—is another failed attempt to capture the Hungarian locution. "Look around" in Hungarian becomes "*suss* out"—whatever that means; "determined" (*elszant*) morphs into "obsessed." Konrád, an excellent, original stylist, is poorly served by the translator; his gifts and understated wisdom come across nonetheless. ♦

Stink for England

The assault on the senses in early modern Britain.

BY DAVID AIKMAN

'The Enraged Musician' (1741) by William Hogarth

Corbis

"Ugly," "Itchy," "Mouldy," "Noisy," "Grotty." The plain old Anglo-Saxon adjectives of distaste that comprise the author's chapter headings make it clear what this book is about before you really embark on the text. In fact, it's not for the faint of heart: Vomiting, flatulence, turds, carbuncles, even dead babies discarded on rubbish heaps float, as it were, in front of your eyes as Emily Cockayne, a lecturer at Britain's Open University, takes you on a tour of all the filth and discomfort of early modern England.

Hubbub
Filth, Noise, and Stench in England, 1600-1770
by Emily Cockayne
Yale, 352 pp., $35

David Aikman, senior fellow at the Trinity Forum, is writer-in-residence at Patrick Henry College.

You are conducted through English towns in all their Hogarthian squalor—and there are many Hogarth drawings to illustrate the text, often with a commentary on their content that approaches the forensic in detail—that pre-industrial, pre-Wesleyan England could produce. Why pre-Wesleyan? Because England changed quite drastically in social mores in the period after 1770, Cockayne's cut-off point in narrative, at least in part because revivalist preachers were persuading the English by the thousands to change their lifestyle. Gin alcoholism, the scourge of British cities in the late 18th century, vanished, street crime was markedly reduced, and "cleanliness is next to Godliness" eventually became the watchword of the Victorian bourgeoisie. (Wesley, of course, did not invent this phrase; in 1605 Francis Bacon had pronounced that "cleanness of body was ever deemed to proceed from a due reverence to God.")

But in the days before "every Englishman's home [became] his castle," and sophisticated Europeans were amazed at how prim, even prudish, the mid-Victorian English appeared to be, life in the growing metropolises of England could be exceedingly uncomfortable for the fastidious. Cockayne calls upon a broad variety of novelists, poets, diarists, and essayists for the raw material of her insight into the discomforts of life in the period she is looking at. Since her sources, for the most part, wrote complainingly and in revulsion at their experiences in the daily squalor of life, they may be suspected of an exaggeration at times. But when no less an authority on London life than Samuel Pepys records with disgust that his neighbor's sewage has seeped into his own basement, you know that this event is not a fluke.

Indeed, it wasn't. What to do with personal waste was a constant problem of life in England's towns before the widespread introduction of the flush toilet in the 19th century and the construction of modern sewage pipelines. "Houses of easement," also known as "jakes," "boghouses," or "privies," were almost never watertight, so that waste filtered out into the street, nearby streams, "kennels" (the premodern open drainage water courses built into urban streets) and even neighbors' basements. The rank stench must have been horrifying, and there were court cases of citizen complaint at the worst offenses. Sometimes dead babies were discovered abandoned in houses of easement.

If the most basic personal hygiene was marginal, so was personal cleanliness. Ordinary citizens in premodern England almost never fully immersed themselves in water, and the personal stench of others was a hazard in all social settings. Fops drenched themselves in scent to cover the worst of body odors, but most people took it for granted that they would encounter

people of rank personal odor or, at the very least, bad breath. John Cleland's Fanny Hill, a prostitute, in a passage from the novel cited by Cockayne, was offended by the extreme ugliness of her first client, whose breath also was "like a jakes." The common practice of wearing wigs, which only began to decline in the second half of the 18th century, was another way that dirt and odors were gathered. Wigs became dirty, greasy, and matted, and required pounds of pomatum powder to cover their odor.

There was no refrigeration, either, except the opportunity for the very wealthy to maintain ice-cellars, so food began to spoil almost as soon as it was exposed to fresh air. The only way to preserve meat was to season it with spices and salt. In Cockayne's chapter entitled "Mouldy," a French visitor reports that London's fresh produce was always likely to be impregnated with coal-smoke pollutants. Street fruit sellers would often try to make their produce more attractive by spitting on it and polishing it with a dirty sleeve. Often fresh, or at least recently introduced, produce would be advertised by street criers, who would draw attention to their wares as loudly as their voices permitted.

"Noisy," in fact, is another chapter heading. England's city streets were a constant cacophony of street hawkers, hammers banging metal, and the squealing of pigs, who often rutted wild through the waste and offal in the street. A Hogarth illustration in the book, "The Enraged Musician," depicts a violinist attempting to practice while looking out of an open window on an alleyway filled with sources of noise that must have made his heart sink: a bawling baby, cawing cat, chirping parrot, piper playing his pipe, barking dog, and the screeching of a knife-sharpener's wheel.

In one use of animals that will strike the 21st-century sensibility as particularly cruel, cats were sometimes used as parts of a musical instrument, their bodies held in place in a piano-like contraption and their cries—elicited by a spike being driven through their tails—tuned to a certain required pitch. Traffic through the city streets was another source of noise, with draft animals often neighing or hooting. Then there were nightly revelers (often students in university towns) whose alcoholic forays were every bit as binge-like as they are supposed to be on college campuses today. In some cities, there were ordinances against beating wives after 9:00 P.M.: It interrupted the sleep of other citizens.

This volume is a useful corrective to unrealistic modern suppositions about urban life in jolly old England as a frolicsome idyll of handsome beaux and Jane Austen heroines. Many of the inhabitants of its pages are curmudgeonly grouches, and even some of their complaints will strike modern readers as unrealistic outrage at—well, life itself in the 18th century. Cockayne dwells almost lovingly on some of the more grotesque uglinesses of daily life in that era, and the reader is left wondering if the main purpose of the book isn't a tad voyeuristic. Perhaps it would have been useful to narrate a little of the processes by which urban life was, indeed, made more pleasant in urban England after her chronological cutoff date of 1770. But at bottom—so to speak—*Hubbub* is revelatory and as amusing as its author, who is described on her agent's website as living "with her busy husband and noisy daughter in an ugly house in Nottinghamshire." ♦

Quaker Nation?

The Society of Friends and American society.

BY RYAN T. ANDERSON

Everything you think you know about them is probably wrong. They don't live in Pennsylvania or ride horse-and-buggies (that's the Amish). They didn't compose "Simple Gifts" (the Shakers). They don't all wear black suites and broad-brimmed hats (the guy on the oatmeal box).

How the Quakers Invented America
by David Yount
Rowman & Littlefield,
176 pp., $19.95

If you haven't guessed, I'm talking about the Quakers. And in *How the Quakers Invented America*, veteran journalist David Yount presents the much-overlooked and misunderstood Religious Society of Friends (as they're formally known) to an America that doesn't realize how much it owes them. A "convinced" Friend (the term used for "convert") with three theology degrees and nine books to his name, Yount brings to the project the usual advantages and drawbacks of being both a practitioner and a scholar of his subject.

Sandwiched between opening and concluding chapters that attempt to show the Quaker influence on America are 10 well-crafted chapters explaining the basics of Quakerism. In 17th century England—a hundred years after the reforms of Calvin and Luther—George Fox sought a more radical reform, doing away with "steeple-houses," clergy, sacraments, hymns, creeds, sermons, and idolization of scripture. Fox preached that because "there is that of God in everyone" (the standard Quaker tenet) everyone has equal access to God—no ministers required. Quakers look to the "Inner Light" (their term for the Holy Spirit) for inspiration, which is paramount: "Scripture and creed were subordinate to the inspiration of the Spirit." This wasn't done to undermine Christian-

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Brooklyn Museum / Corbis

'The Peaceable Kingdom' (ca. 1840) by Edward Hicks

ity; Fox tells us it was precisely "to turn people from darkness to light that they might receive Christ Jesus."

They were called "Quakers" because when Friends encountered God they would literally quake with a "feeling of release from sin and the power of God to forgive it." For at the center of Fox's Quakerism was the truth that "one must first repent in order to live in the new era dominated by God's spirit." Then one can focus on the "testimonies" of simplicity, equality, integrity, community, and peace. Simple living, truthful speaking, and plain dressing became Quaker hallmarks. Their "Meeting for Worship," held on the "First Day" (Sunday) consists of sitting silently on plain wooden benches in a plain room for an hour. Those moved by the Spirit to share their inspiration stand, speak, and sit back down.

The emphasis on silence and expectant listening is to focus on living in the light of eternity "through immersion in the present moment." And Yount's exposition on Quaker spiritual practices that make eternal life present now is one of the most appealing parts of the book, especially in our fast-paced, media-driven culture.

Yet the title argument is the book's least developed and least convincing. Rather than a sustained presentation of the way Quakers affected American life, Yount merely catalogues Quaker values and asserts they are also American values. Yes, the Quaker-drafted Rhode Island constitution was an influence on the Bill of Rights. And yes, the Liberty Bell was originally named the Great Quaker Bell. But some of Yount's examples are merely amusing. He submits that "all Americans prefer casual clothing" because of the Quakers who, by the way, also invented "the idea of marriage." Meanwhile, Yount overlooks distinctively Quaker ideals that never quite received patents: The prohibition of alcohol and general hostility toward holidays, sports, and theater.

Yount insists that Quakers "contributed more than any other group to the founding ideals that sustain our national life." While it's true that Thomas Paine was a birthright Quaker (but didn't practice as an adult) and that Susan B. Anthony was a Friend for life, have Quakers really contributed more than Puritans, Presbyterians and Episcopalians, or Locke and Rousseau, or Madison, Hamilton and Jay or, for that matter, Jefferson (who derided the Quakers as "Protestant Jesuits")? Thirteen of America's original 29 senators were Episcopalians; only one was a Quaker.

Yount's historical-theological arguments for Quakerism also seem shaky. Since he writes for both Quakers and non-Quakers—religious skeptics and enthusiasts—the book tends more toward apologetics than academics. When he asserts that "George Fox restored primitive Christianity . . . to the simple faith and practice of Jesus' own companions," Yount simply repeats a long-discredited romanticized notion of "primitive" Christianity. Would Justin Martyr, who wrote in the second century that Christian worship was a liturgy of readings, a sermon, and a sacrament (the Eucharist), recognize Fox's version as more authentic?

Yount claims that Fox's genius consisted in focusing on the Spirit by ignoring the theological disputes that

hindered true Christianity. Yet one could argue that this was Fox's great mistake. As Yount himself notes, heresies focus on a real truth "but they stretch that truth to redefine Christian faith by oversimplifying it." Isn't this exactly what Fox did? This becomes apparent as Yount explains Quaker spirituality and the Inner Light, for he quotes no less than 10 Roman Catholic and Anglican thinkers—from Dante and Anselm to Teresa of Avila and C.S. Lewis. In fact, he quotes more Catholics than Quakers! (This also leads one to wonder if the Quaker influences he claims "invented" America aren't simply part of the common heritage of traditional Christianity.) Rather than restoring "primitive Christianity," it seems George Fox isolated the contemplative strand of Christianity and set it up as the whole.

But for much of the book Yount writes about a Quakerism that doesn't actually exist. He describes a scripturally rich, Christ-centered community of Friends whom we'll know—as Yount repeatedly reminds readers—"by their fruits." But what are the fruits of modern Quakerism? Early Friends were known as "Friends of Truth." What is the truth that Quakers proclaim today? Early Friends quaked at the experience of release from sin; how many modern Quakers even use the word "sin," and who would Quakers say released them from it? For all Yount's emphasis on Jesus and the Bible I couldn't help but notice that the booklet "Faith and Practice," just put out by the Quaker school I attended for 12 years, fails to use the words "Jesus" or "Bible" at all. This is all too symptomatic of modern Quakers—even those Friends self-consciously trying to reassert their Quaker identity.

Yount describes a largely nonexistent Quakerism because he mistakes his ideal image of Quakerism for reality. It's understandable. Yount is a theologically serious Christian; in fact, he's a Catholic who became a convinced Quaker late in life and says he has "rejected none of that legacy." It's unclear how Yount reconciles Catholic belief in sacraments, priests, and dogma with Quaker belief that they get in the way. But it's readily clear that many Quakers, unlike Yount, have been drawn to Quakerism precisely because they *reject* the Christian legacy. And though he mentions them, he pays them scant attention.

The problem, as even Yount admits, is that when Quakers talk about God, "God himself may have trouble recognizing himself," for "whenever two or three Quakers" are gathered, "there may be five different opinions." Except, of course, when it comes to politics. Though there are always outliers, most Friends are committed liberals. The "permanent agenda" of the Friends Committee on National Legislation "seeks the peaceful prevention of deadly conflicts, extension of civil rights to all Americans, protection of the environment, and redistribution of taxes to meet pressing human needs." Emphases on peace and the environment would be expected from Fox's Quakers, but one has to wonder why a "permanent agenda" with only four goals includes redistributive taxation and what can only be understood as a veiled appeal for gay marriage. Who are the Americans, exactly, who lack civil rights?

Yount closes his book by saying that "Friends' spirituality increasingly resonates with Americans of all faiths and none." Even granting his (unsubstantiated) demographic point, Yount should tread lightly, for most Americans would find Quakerism attractive for reasons very different from his own. The appeal of being "spiritual but not religious"—where "religious," from the Latin *religare*, means *binding* oneself to common life, morals, and beliefs--is attractive to Americans. Believe and act as you wish with God's blessing, even his inspiration.

In the end, I'm not convinced that the Quakers invented America. Given my experience, it seems that America has reinvented the Quakers. ♦

So Long, Tony

Even 'the greatest soap opera ever' must come to an end. **BY JAMES BOWMAN**

The final scene of the final episode of the long-running HBO hit *The Sopranos* inspired thousands of fans to go to the Internet's sounding boards to complain about the choice of the series's creator, David Chase, to end it with an inconclusive blackout. For several minutes previously, he had led audience expectations up the garden path to a hecatomb of slaughter in a suburban diner before pulling the plug at what ought to have been the climactic moment. What made it worse was that Tony Soprano (James Gandolfini) and his family were left having dinner together, all of them happy—and happy with each other—for perhaps the first time in the eight years and seven seasons of the show's run. This was obviously the perfect dramatic moment for the mass execution that Chase's camera had seemed to be setting us up for.

Yet I think he had several good reasons for depriving us of it. Had, for a start, the complainers forgotten how many times he has similarly teased them before? *The Sopranos* is nothing if not mock heroic, and the mock heroic's characteristic mode is bathos. We expect high drama, if not heroism, and we get farce. In the final episode, alone, there were several examples. We were invited to revel in the macabre comedy of the death of Tony's gang-

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land rival Phil Leotardo (Frank Vincent), his head run over by his own SUV and producing a sickening crunch as it disturbed the even ride of his grandchildren, strapped into their car seats above. In another SUV—an inherently comic vehicle—Anthony Jr. (Robert Iler) was seen engaging in sexual activities with a girlfriend while parked on a lonely country road. We could feel the subtextual undertow of the teen slasher movies, in which the couple would be doomed just by being there, as well as the anticipation as smoke begins seeping into the cab of the vehicle through its air vents. Aha! Here must be the answer to the question posed implicitly in the penultimate episode when Tony told his wife Carmela (Edie Falco), "They never touch the family."

James Gandolfini, Steven Van Zandt

Everett Collection

Does such gangland chivalry still apply, or are we now living in a more brutal world?

We never find out here any more than we do in the disputed ending. It's all a false alarm. The smoke comes from A.J.'s having parked the SUV on a pile of dead leaves, which its overheated catalytic converter has then set fire to. As the kids scramble out of the car and down the hill, they watch as it catches fire and explodes, the very image of Mafia murders by car bombs in *The Godfather* and other films. Except that it's not a Mafia murder but a bathetic suburban accident caused by heedless affluence.

"I'm depressed," moans A.J. when his parents scold him for his carelessness. "I'm supposed to worry about catalytic converters?" That's *The Sopranos* in a nutshell: The heroic turning into a mockery of itself—usually with the help of therapeutic psychobabble—at (almost) every turn, while still attempting to cling to its heroic dignity.

The Sopranos is also soap opera—perhaps the greatest soap opera ever. Way back in season one, in 1999, Chase and his team had penned a hilarious exchange between the gangster and aspiring screenwriter, Christopher Moltisanti (Michael Imperioli), and his fellow gang member, popularly known as Paulie Walnuts (Tony Sirico), in which Christopher tries to explain to Paulie what a character's "arc" is.

"Like, everybody starts out somewheres, then they do somethin', or somethin' gets done to them that changes their life," he says. "You see the arc? He starts down here," holding his hand in front of his face, "and he ends up here," moving his hand upward. "Where's *my* arc, Paulie?"

It takes Paulie to point out to him the difference between art—which he calls "make-believe"—and life.

"Hey, I got no arc, either. I was born, grew up, spent a few years in the Army, few more in the can—and here I am, a half a wise guy. So what?"

Of course, what Christopher is looking for is art's *meaning* in his life. But life is more like soap opera than art. It tends to flatten out those arcs of meaning because its characters have to keep coming back and doing the same things over and over again, week after week, season after season. They start out here and end up—nowhere, just as the series itself does. It was the genius of David Chase from the start to redeem soap opera for serious art, as *Hamlet* redeemed the popular revenge tragedy of the Elizabethans, and in a similar way. As Journey put it in the song, "Don't Stop Believing," that Tony plays on the diner's jukebox during the final sequence:

Some will win, some will lose
Some were born to sing the blues
Oh, the movie never ends
It goes on and on and on and on

Actually, the movie *does* end, as Christopher was aware. It's life—and soap opera—that goes on and on and on and on, which is why we love it. Now it can go on and on even when it's off. What more perfect ending than to leave them all in the diner, their mouths stuffed with the best onion rings in the state of New Jersey, with such an obvious artifice that we can't help being reassured? As always, the danger and the drama dissolve into bathos and absurdity before they can produce anything so uncongenial to our post-heroic world as meaning.

And yet I think there *was* a resolution, or arc, though perhaps an inadvertent one, that was no less emphatically inscribed for being (so far) unnoticed. It came with A.J.'s announcement that he intended to join the Army. This was a stunning reversal of form for that whiny youth, who had spent the last several weeks battling depression after a break-up

with a fiancée, attempting suicide (not very persuasively), and moaning about all the suffering in the world. Now his decision presented his parents with the choice they had been avoiding for eight years. Are they still part of the old honor culture of their Sicilian forebears, or have they definitively entered the contemporary world of consumerist America, a world of feelings, individualism, and therapy?

Faced with the unavoidable choice at last, they did not hesitate. Rather than allow A.J. to become "cannon fodder" in Iraq, as Tony puts it, they are prepared to bribe him with a new BMW and a busy-work job on a trashy movie even worse than *Cleaver*, the sole creative product of the long search for an "arc" of his now-deceased cousin, Christopher—a movie that Tony so hated that he ultimately killed Christopher. A.J. happily takes the bribe.

Tony has, of course, been ambivalent about the mob's honor culture from the beginning. That's the point of his visits to his shrink, Dr. Melfi (Lorraine Bracco). His killing of Phil also removed what the series has presented to us as the only unambiguous representative of the old, unforgiving macho standards left in gangland: The man who had ordered the torture and murder of Vito Spatafore (Joseph Gannascoli) out of disgust for his homosexuality, and who had lost all respect for his former boss, Johnny "Sack" Sacramoni (Vincent Curatola), because he wept as the feds dragged him away from his daughter's wedding. The only reason that peace is restored and Tony prevails is that Phil's own men have come to see him as dangerously extreme—a throwback. The real farewell to the old world comes with Tony's visit to his senile uncle Junior (Dominic Chianese) in the nursing home: "You and my dad, you two used to run North Jersey," says Tony with a tear in his eye.

"We did?" says the uncomprehending *capo*. "That's nice."

But it's all over now. Tony's was the only ending possible for an American hero for more than half-a-century. Like the last of the cowboys riding into the sunset, he must not die but just fade away. And for the same reason: His world is past. There were heroes in it, we admit; men who were larger than life. We can't let them go without a pang of regret. But we want them gone. Them and all they stood for.

Tony Soprano was such a hero. He wasn't a good man, but he was a free man—free not by constitutional arrangement but as the heroes of old were free: because they had mastered other men by the strength of their arms and the keenness of their wit. Blowing him away would, paradoxically, have brought him and that world back. It would have acknowledged that the heroic lives on at a time when so many of us—like Tony and Carmela contemplating A.J. in uniform—want it and its terrifying demands on us gone more than ever.

So let him disappear while he's happy in his choice of the comfortable, unheroic age that has made his heritage—and, to a disturbing extent, that of his country and his country's wars—obsolete. ♦

Reverend Mike

American health care is sick, and Cuba is the cure.

BY JOHN PODHORETZ

You may think me mad when I say that the closest historical parallel to Michael Moore is William Jennings Bryan. After all, Moore is a mere filmmaker—his latest pseudodocumentary is *Sicko*, a call for universal health insurance—while Bryan was thrice a candidate for the presidency and served as secretary of state. Moore is unquestionably a man of the left. Bryan—defender of Jim Crow laws, ardent Prohibitionist, fundamentalist Christian, opponent of Darwinian theory—is generally considered a man of the right.

Sicko
Directed by Michael Moore

But both stand as important cultural figures in the years just before and after the turn of a century—Bryan the 20th, Moore the 21st. Bryan was the most popular orator of his day at a time when speeches were one of the few forms of popular entertainment. Moore is the most financially successful nonfiction filmmaker alive; his *Fahrenheit 9/11* earned a staggering $225 million, double the amount grossed by its nearest nonfiction competitor.

Bryan's specialty was the "Chautauqua"—a stem-winding address in the manner of an evangelist's sermon delivered in a tent to a rapt audience on a topic in the news. Moore's movies are the Chautauquas of our time, addressing topics of current interest in a highly entertaining style that makes their author's didactic intent go down like a spoonful of sugar. Moore movies are comic and sentimental and yet full of moral outrage, exactly in the Chautauqua tradition. They do not attempt arguments in any sense of the word. Rather, they are complete expressions of a worldview, and how you respond to them depends on whether you came into the theater accepting the worldview to begin with.

Moore, like Bryan, surveys the American scene before him in disgusted wonder. Bryan believed the simple, hard-working American was being ground into dust by "business interests"—heartless, faceless, machine-like interests that controlled America for

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Lev Nisnevitch

their own selfish purposes. Those business interests, he thought, manipulated the system by proposing policies—free trade and a strong dollar backed by gold, especially—that were heartlessly destroying the lives of their more modest countrymen. Moore believes faceless corporations, relentlessly pursuing profit, are today's destroyers.

"You shall not crucify mankind on a cross of gold," Bryan famously said, finding the problem behind all of America's ills in its tight monetary policy. In *Sicko*, Moore offers a cradle-to-grave peroration about today's cross of gold: debt. A cycle of indebtedness turns Americans into obedient cattle. The system saddles you with debt through college, so that you will take a job and not make waves, because you are so worried about losing the job you need to pay off your debt, not to mention needing the health care benefits provided by that job. But your health care benefits don't cover all your expenses anyway, so you go into more debt, and your kids go into debt to go to college, and the whole oppressive rigmarole begins again.

Bryan was a populist, perhaps the most storied populist in American history. He was seeking to protect the defenseless folk of America's small towns from the depredations of America's cities: "The miners who go 1,000 feet into the earth or climb 2,000 feet upon the cliffs and bring forth from their hiding places the precious metals to be poured in the channels of trade are as much businessmen as the few financial magnates who, in a back room, corner the money of the world."

Moore is the most successful populist of the present moment, and that means something a bit different. His audience isn't the workingman or the small-towner. Though he began his filmmaking career running after the chairman of General Motors to ask about plant closings, he has consigned his defender-of-the-poor posture to the ash-heap of history. *Sicko* is pointedly aimed not at the almost 50 million Americans who don't have health insurance but, rather, at the 250 million Americans who do. Moore wants universal health care run by the government.

Usually, calls for this radical solution to America's health care ills are laden with appeals to the conscience of those who have coverage about the nightmarish lives of those who don't. Cleverly—and Moore is nothing if not clever—Moore is trying to convince people with health care coverage that they might even be worse off than people without. At least the uninsured don't believe they are covered, only to discover their insurance company won't pay for treatments it considers experimental. The sad tales on display here, and they are undeniably sad and infuriating, involve not only the failure of people to get proper treatment but also the profound disappointment they felt at being turned down by their insurer.

Fortunately, Moore proposes a cure for the disappointment with a sweet, uncomplicated message. We can have it all: great medical care with no bills, administered by loving institutions, and practiced by happy doctors. That's the way it is in Canada, Britain, France, and even Cuba, according to Moore. And we won't even have to pay for it, the way we do now.

Who pays? Moore doesn't say, exactly, but the logic is clear: *They* do. The rich people. Tax them. Take from them. After all, why should they have it?

A movie review is not the appropriate place for a substantive discussion of Moore's sugarcoated vision of government-run health care, or to offer a critique of his macroeconomics. Moore's own case is not substantive, but almost entirely anecdotal—and for every anecdote he summons up, someone, somewhere, has a counter-anecdote that disproves his case. He does a masterful job of crafting his Chautauqua for the new millennium, but there's something ultimately unsatisfying about it. Not unconvincing (though it is unconvincing), but unsatisfying.

The great emotional appeal of populism is not that it promises a better tomorrow, as Moore (evoking his past as a materialist socialist) does in *Sicko*. It's almost exactly the opposite. Populism is powerful because it is a lament *against* change, an expression of grief at the rapidity with which old ways are being trampled by the rush toward the new. Bryan sought the material betterment of the poor through the redistribution of income, but he did not believe it would bring heaven on earth. Salvation would come only through God's grace.

And there is the difference between the populism of the last *fin-de-siècle* and the populism of this *fin-de-siècle*. In the end, Michael Moore is less William Jennings Bryan than he is Reverend Ike, the Harlem preacher who sat on a throne in a converted movie palace and ran memorable ads in the New York subways in the 1970s proclaiming: "If you want 'pie-in-the-sky when you die' then Rev. Ike is not your man. If you want your pie now, with ice cream on top, then see and hear Rev. Ike."

Reverend Ike is still there, but his ads are long gone. William Jennings Bryan has been dead for 82 years, but we are still reckoning with his legacy. It's probably a safe bet that Michael Moore will follow Rev. Ike's path to obscurity rather than Bryan's path to an admittedly problematic immortality. ♦

". . . These are some of the particulars of the last will and testament of Brooke Astor, New York's doyenne of philanthropy and high society who turned 105 in March. . . . The will, which Mrs. Astor signed on Jan. 30, 2002, reflects her love of New York City, her own particular brand of charity and even her devotion to people and her joie de vivre."
—New York Times, *June 24, 2007*

whole and in fee simple. If, however, my dear friend and confidant Mr. Larry should predecease me, I direct that the amount specified be divided evenly among his surviving colleagues, Mr. Anthony, Mr. Vincent, and the other one, provided they are still employed by the salon within six months of my death. (My drivers will know the location.)

ITEM NUMBER 91

I give and bequeath the sum of $100,000.00 to the lovely Hispanic woman who always opened the door for me at the Foundation offices and asked if I wanted a glass of water. Friends always told me that her oldest son, whose name is also not known to me, closely resembled my late husband, Vincent; in which case I direct that the son (or his heirs) be invited to select one necktie and one pair of cufflinks from my late husband's wardrobe.

ITEM NUMBER 92

I give and bequeath the sum of $10,000,000.00 to the nice Armenian man with the goatee at the New York Public Library, who always said such flattering things to me and held several wonderful dinners in my honor. I remember telling him afterwards that I would not forget his people in my will, and he told me that it would be more efficient for distribution and tax purposes if the sum were left to him personally instead of to the library. My son, Anthony, has advised me to follow that advice.

ITEM NUMBER 93

People always complain that they have such trouble finding good help these days. That was never a problem for me! Accordingly, I direct that the delightful man who counted my sterling flatware every Monday morning, and kept it so perfectly polished all those years, be rewarded for his devotion and hard work with a bequest of $75,000.00, as well as his choice of two place settings, although I notice a lot of pieces seem to be missing. I had no idea my guests were such kleptomaniacs!

ITEM NUMBER 94

I give and bequeath the sum of $250,000.00 to Frederick Law Olmsted, the very talented gentleman who seems to have laid out Central Park, or so Tom Hoving told me. I have so much enjoyed the view from my snuggery window; and my late husband,Vincent, loved to drive me through the park in his Packard on the way to the Union League. If, however, Mr. Olmsted should predecease me, I direct that the