the weekly
Standard

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Europe's Terror 'Strategy'

CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL
reports from Zapatero's Spain

GERARD ALEXANDER
on the EU's shortsightedness

Nothing New about Outsourcing

Outsourcing—the subject of intense controversy this election year—is blamed for the loss of jobs in the United States, but outsourcing should be nothing new to Americans. **The founding and development of America is the result of English outsourcing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.**

James I was crowned king of England in 1603. At that time his fledgling nation of some 4.2 million people was beginning to compete with its more populous, wealthy, and powerful Spanish and French rivals. A century later, England was able to challenge France and Spain for control of the New World. By 1764, England had defeated both France and Spain in North America and controlled the Atlantic Coast inland to the Appalachian Mountains. A century later, England had become the world's dominant commercial and military power. Its rise from precarious island nation to global giant followed its outsourcing of people and production to America.

By 1682, with the founding of Pennsylvania, England controlled twelve colonies along the Atlantic Coast and others in Canada and the Caribbean. The outsourcing of free and indentured migrants who made up the first generation and subsequent waves of settlers, increased from 350 in 1610 to more than a quarter million in 1700, passing two million in 1770. The military contributions of the colonists helped England eliminate the threats from France and Spain in North America.

English outsourcing of several economic activities was productive for both the colonies and the mother country. The Crown forbade the growing of tobacco in England, granting a monopoly to Virginia planters that provided the means of livelihood in the most populous colony as well as substantial customs revenue for the English government. The colonists supplied furs, foodstuffs, and iron to English consumers and manufacturers. In the late seventeenth century, England granted bounties for white pine trees that produced masts and bowsprits for English vessels, freeing England from dependence on unreliable Baltic countries. Payments were also granted for pitch, tar, potash, rice, indigo, and silk, which generated jobs and income in many of the colonies. English capital helped underwrite the expansion of agriculture and other productive colonial activities. English insurance underwrote shipping ventures. Royal Navy protection of American shipping stimulated a large shipbuilding industry in New England, such that a third of all English-owned vessels were eventually built in the colonies.

In turn, colonial America provided a market for a steadily growing, broad range of English manufactured goods, helping to alleviate unemployment in England and contributing to England's overseas earnings. Colonial purchases of English products grew in importance throughout the eighteenth century. Upon the conclusion of the French and Indian War in 1763, England viewed the American colonies more as markets for its goods than as sources of supply for its consumers. Although the two countries ultimately split over the issue of taxation, outsourcing was clearly beneficial for both peoples.

—Alvin Rabushka

Alvin Rabushka is the David and Joan Traitel Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and is currently writing a book on the history of taxation in colonial America.

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Contents

May 10, 2004 • Volume 9, Number 33

2 Scrapbook . . . . . *Douglas Brinkley, teen voting, and more.*

4 Casual . . . . . *Terry Eastland, proud Texan.*

6 Correspondence . . . . . *On Iraq, firefighting, etc.*

9 Editorial . . . . . *Bush's Missing Issue*

Articles

10 Cheney vs. Kerry *The national security debate is joined.* . . . . . **BY STEPHEN F. HAYES**

13 Europe's Non-Strategy *The E.U. isn't taking terror seriously.* . . . . . **BY GERARD ALEXANDER**

15 A Corrupted Punditry *Paul Krugman, political propagandist* . . . . . **BY KEVIN HASSETT**

17 Melodrama in Manila *Movie stars don't always make good presidents.* . . . . . **BY GREG SHERIDAN**

19 Vouchers Without Competition *Conservatives' favorite education reform won't deliver.* . . . . . **BY FREDERICK M. HESS**

Cover: James Bennett

Features

21 Zapatero's Spain

Spain's problem with terrorism: It does not want to defend itself. . . . . . **BY CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL**

25 The Politics of Bioethics

Playing defense isn't enough. . . . . . **BY ERIC COHEN & WILLIAM KRISTOL**

Books & Arts

31 Quixotic Adventures *Cervantes and the coming of modern times.* . . . . . **BY ALGIS VALIUNAS**

34 Indian Fighter *The American life and times of George Bent.* . . . . . **BY BILL CROKE**

36 Blaming the Jews *Do we face a new anti-Semitism, or the return of the old anti-Semitism?* . . . **BY WERNER J. DANNHAUSER**

39 THE STANDARD READER . . . . . *Briefly Noted: Sabin Willett's* Present Value *and Peter T. King's* Vale of Tears.

40 Parody . . . . . *The presidential race gets hairy.*

the weekly Standard

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Profiles in Sycophancy

Hats off to *Boston Globe* columnist Alex Beam for his devastating April 29 takedown of celebrity historian Douglas Brinkley, unofficial Director of Biography for John Kerry's presidential campaign. There's no point summarizing the thing. Here's Beam himself:

What kind of historian is Douglas Brinkley anyway?

These days Brinkley is acting a lot less like a historian and a lot more like a PR flack for John Kerry, the subject of Brinkley's flattering bestseller *Tour of Duty: John Kerry and the Vietnam War*. Brinkley proclaims his independence from the Kerry campaign—"This is my book, not his," he writes in *Tour*—but he's become a major player in the Kerry agitprop machine. . . .

In *Tour of Duty*, Brinkley makes much of how Kerry shared all his Vietnam records, and of the extra research the author brought to the book. And yet, just a few months after publication, here are three examples of lazy puffery in Brinkley's tome.

Brinkley told the *Atlantic* magazine, which excerpted a portion of the book, that he interviewed "every single one" of John Kerry's crewmates on the so-called swift boats that Kerry captained in Vietnam. But in fact he did not interview crew member Steven Gardner, and—surprise!—Gardner turned out to be the only one of Kerry's crewmates who disliked his former commander. "I would have talked to Gardner, but I couldn't find him," Brinkley says now.

It gets worse. After the Kerry campaign learned that the *Globe* had interviewed Gardner for its [own] Kerry biography, Brinkley called Gardner. The presidential historian . . . warned Gardner of a "firestorm" if the vet went public with his doubts about Kerry, and then hacked out an article attacking the former gunner's mate on *Time* magazine's website! . . .

Despite his claim to have reviewed Kerry's Navy records, Brinkley didn't interview Lieutenant Commander Grant Hibbard, the commanding officer who likened the wound for which Kerry was awarded his first Purple Heart to a scrape from a fingernail. . . . In his role as aggrieved Kerry factotum, Brinkley ginned up a quick article for *Salon* magazine condemning Hibbard as a "blowhard" and dumping on the *Globe* for reporting Hibbard's comments. . . .

Predictably, Brinkley toes the current Kerry party line on the controversial medal-throwing incident of April 1971, reporting that Kerry threw his ribbons, and other servicemen's medals, away during an antiwar demonstration. But the historian seems blissfully unaware that the party line has changed several times since Kerry threw away, or did not throw away, his medals—or his ribbons, and other people's medals.

"His explanation seemed fairly logical," is how Brinkley justifies printing the latest version of this much discussed event. Isn't it relevant, I asked, that Kerry has answered questioners differently about this incident over the years? Brinkley: "His answers are a different story."

Brinkley and publisher William Morrow plan to release a revised edition of *Tour of Duty* in two weeks. "I started realizing, 'I've got to fix this,' 'I've got to fix that,'" Brinkley says. "Nobody believed we would get to this point where every aspect of the book is being dissected."

Call me old-fashioned, but I can remember a time when historians wrote books that didn't have to be revised after sitting on the shelf for just four months. ♦

Britney Spears for President

When The Scrapbook was 14 years old, its school-cafeteria political debates were of classical simplicity: Betty or Veronica? Stridex Triple Action pads or Oxy-10? But kids today wear trucker hats and get nose jobs and have text-messaging cell phones and, like, y'know, adolescent life is more complicated these days, okay? And adolescent politics are more complicated, too. That's why it's high time teenagers were allowed to vote.

Or so says the burgeoning youth suffrage movement, which is popping up everywhere from Maine to Hawaii. Californians, for example, are now being urged to adopt a new amendment to the state constitution that would lower the voting age to 14. "Training Wheels for Citizenship," the plan is called, as opposed to the more obvious analogy, "training bras for boob-heads."

It used to be that organizations like the National Youth Rights Association were content to protest age-bias atrocities like midnight curfews and movie ratings systems. But no more: NYRA now wants ballot access for the prelearner's-permit set so that American politics might finally be forced to confront the full spectrum of youth-relevant issues, issues like . . . well, we're not exactly sure. Here's a suggestion, though: First thing the new teenie-voters should do is lobby Congress to ban embarrassing research—like that study last year by the National Conference of State Legislatures, the one where it turned out that 80 percent know where the cartoon Simpson family "lives," but fewer than half can say which party their own state's governor belongs to. They could've flipped a coin and done better than that.

"Terminally dumb" is what Curtis Gans of the Commitee for the Study of the American Electorate calls NYRA's kiddie-franchise idea. Predictably, NYRA is really angry with mean Mr. Gans and has challenged him to a pub-

lic debate, "any time, any place"—except during school hours Monday through Friday, and not until after 4 o'clock on Wednesdays, when they have band practice.

Meantime, while they're setting that up, THE SCRAPBOOK feels obliged to warn its readers that the California amendment proposal contemplates granting 16- and 17-year-olds a vote worth only half as much as a regular grownup's and, worse, 14- and 15-year-olds would only get a quarter of a vote apiece. Holy smokes! Haven't these people ever heard of Fort Sumter?

Actually no, they probably haven't. ♦

Air America Is a Big, Fat Failure

Schadenfreude alert: All is still not well at Air America Radio network, the left's just-launched answer to conservative talk radio. A major billing dispute in its third week of existence got the Al Franken-led 24-hour radio station thrown off the air in Chicago and Los Angeles. Then, at the end of Air America's first month, came news—already!—of a bigtime management shakeup.

In the earlier billing dispute, Air America—according to its erstwhile partner, a company called MultiCultural Radio Broadcasting—wrote "a bounced check" to cover airtime and facilities leases in both cities. A lawsuit soon developed. Air America employees were reportedly locked out of their offices.

But they did not allow themselves to be silenced . . . well, silently. Air America remained on the air in such major metropolises as Burlington, Vt., as well as on the Internet. In fact, visitors to the Air America website were treated to a press release explaining the network's argument with MultiCultural Radio Broadcasting in the station's inimitable style of well-reasoned commentary.

The folks at Air America are not like those right-wing troglodytes. They're highly intelligent and cosmopolitan ladies and gentlemen of the liberal persuasion. So when they found themselves in such a contretemps, they knew what to do: use their press release to make extended fun of MultiCultural Radio president Arthur Liu's last name ("Liu-ser," "Liu-cifer," etc.).

Additional press releases were then issued, counterattack quotes were hoisted onto the barricades, and everyone from Franken on down claimed that Air America was doing just fine, even growing, thank you very much.

Except that now the network's CEO and director of programming are stepping down. CEO Mark Walsh, a former AOL executive and Democratic operative, departs just weeks after telling the *New York Times Magazine* that the "timing . . . is just right for a progressive media business aimed at an audience that's underserved." Director of programming David Logan will soon be replaced by Lizz Winstead, an on-air personality whose management experience seems limited to having been a producer for the *Daily Show*.

As Michael Harrison of *Talkers* magazine tells the *Washington Post*: "Chaos is not a good sign." ♦

Casual

In the Black Bean Soup

If you haven't seen *The Alamo*, I recommend it. I know the movie is vulnerable to criticism on historical grounds, but that doesn't bother me much. Being a native Texan, I like just about anything that stimulates thinking about Texas history, and *The Alamo*, directed by John Lee Hancock, did that for me.

I realize I've just disclosed my interest in Texas history. Texans, in case you haven't noticed, tend to have that interest. It's one of the things that make us insufferable, I'm told. But there's a reason for it. The state requires—or at least it did back when I was in school—lots and lots and lots of Texas history. If we learn nothing else, we learn that.

In my case, I get all the more interested in Texas history since I have some forebears who were part of it. Watching *The Alamo* brought to mind one of them, a fellow named William Mosby Eastland.

Eastland was born in Kentucky in 1806 and lived in Tennessee before moving his family to south Texas. A volunteer in the Texas army, he wasn't at the Alamo, which fell on March 6, 1836. But six weeks later he was at San Jacinto, the battle that avenged the Alamo and gave Texas its freedom.

San Jacinto, which Hancock was smart to include in his movie, is a great story. After taking the Alamo, president of Mexico and commander in chief Antonio López de Santa Anna moved his troops east, towards Galveston Bay. General Sam Houston and his Texas army were in the area, and he chose a prairie near Buffalo Bayou to engage the Mexicans.

In a surprise attack taking but 18 minutes, the Texans routed the enemy, killing 630 Mexican soldiers and capturing 730 while suffering only 8 casualties. One prisoner was Santa Anna, who, as Hancock shows, had disguised himself as a common soldier. The Texans figured out who he was when one of his men messed up by calling him "el presidente." El presidente agreed to give up Texas in exchange for his life.

I sometimes think that Eastland, deeply upset by what had happened at the Alamo, had some words with the captured Santa Anna. As history would have it, Eastland later found himself a prisoner of the Mexican army, and an order by none other than Santa Anna led to his death.

Right after San Jacinto, Eastland joined the Texas Rangers. He fought the Comanches, saw his wife die, found a new one, acquired much acreage, and was elected to local office. In those years, Texas was a republic, and Mexico its biggest national security threat. After Mexico invaded Texas for a second time in 1842, Houston, now president of Texas, ordered a militia to pursue a retreating Mexican army and—restraining his often dovish instincts—to invade Mexico if there was "a prospect of success."

Eastland was a captain in this pursuing army of 800 men, which reached Laredo without encountering the enemy. The commanding officer ordered a retreat, but about 300 men, including Eastland, refused to obey. You could say they were hawks, ready to wage offensive war, and they picked a new leader, who made the fateful decision to cross the Rio Grande. A force of 261 men reached the town of Mier, where they met an enemy larger than they'd figured. Outnumbered ten to one, the Texans suffered only 30 casualties while killing 600 Mexicans and wounding 200 more.

But they were hungry and low on powder, and a wily Mexican general tricked them into surrendering. Force-marched towards Mexico City, the Texans managed to escape at Saledo after killing their guards. Most of them—176 in all, including Eastland—were soon recaptured.

Old el presidente was now dictator of Mexico. He didn't like the news about Saledo, and he ordered a mass execution. But the local authorities refused to carry out the decree, and it was modified so that only every tenth man would be executed. The Mexicans filled an earthen jar with 176 beans, 17 of which were black, symbolizing death. Officers drew first, and Eastland was the only officer to draw a black bean. Along with the 16 others who drew black beans, he was shot at dusk on March 25, 1843.

I know little more about William Mosby Eastland, except that he had things in commendable perspective as he faced death. He told one of the survivors: "For my country I have offered all my earthly aspiration and for it I now lay down my life. I never have feared death nor do I now. For my unjustifiable execution I wish no revenge, but die in full confidence of the Christian faith."

Decades later the state of Texas named a county after Eastland. It is 118 miles northwest of Crawford, where George W. Bush has his Texas home. Surely he has passed through it a time or two. I wonder whether he knows about the county's namesake, and the story of those fatal black beans.

Terry Eastland

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We Few, We Happy Few

While I agree with Robert Kagan and William Kristol that the pacification of Iraq will require more troops ("Too Few Troops," April 26), in my judgment they will be necessary, but not sufficient, to achieve our war aims. What matters is not how many troops we place in Iraq. What matters is whether we are prepared to use them to achieve victory.

Consider Vietnam. American deployments there began with just a few thousand advisers, then escalated upward to several thousand advisers, and then to over half a million troops. And still the United States lost. It is clear, then, that merely increasing numbers will not guarantee victory.

The war in Iraq will be won or lost like any other. And the side whose will to win is greater will win it. Indeed, something magical happens when one side in a conflict suffers catastrophic losses without being able to inflict proportional casualties on its tormentor: It gives up. A victor nation must impose its will on the vanquished. It is unfortunate, but necessary, that we understand the way to do this is by inflicting so many casualties that the loser accepts defeat.

James H. Fink
Lincoln, MA

I am in full agreement with Robert Kagan and William Kristol's "Too Few Troops."

As a U.S. Navy veteran, I am appalled by both the civilian leadership at the Pentagon and the uniform leadership's blatant disregard for the safety of our soldiers in Iraq.

It is clear to anyone willing to look honestly at the situation that we need more troops on the ground in Iraq. I have supported this war from the beginning, but I am angry that our soldiers are being sacrificed needlessly because of incompetent leadership in the Pentagon.

I know how the military works. Donald Rumsfeld has repeatedly said that if the commanders on the ground request more troops, they will get them. And yet I wonder: What would happen to the careers of those commanders if they asked for the additional troops we need so desperately?

Wayne Howard Johnson
Ham Lake, MN

No Substitute

Larry Miller's article "Win Now" (April 26) struck a chord with me. That's probably because I am writing this letter three days shy of graduating from the Army's Field Artillery Officers' Basic Course.

September 11, the war to liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban and al Qaeda, and the initial invasion of Iraq all took place while I was still a cadet, although my brother, also in the Army,

fought in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Once I am done with my training, I will be headed not to the Sunni Triangle, but to South Korea.

Yet I know my turn will eventually come. Which is why I hope the president follows Larry Miller's advice: Win now. Which is why I also hope that we see the recent uprisings in Falluja and Najaf as the opportunity they are. Our enemy has exposed himself and come out into the daylight. The correct course of action is to crush him violently—not to push him back underground with as little force as possible.

The terrorists, Baathists, and Sunni insurgents in Falluja, as well as Moktada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, have provided the United States with an opportunity to launch an all-out assault on our enemies. The fact that the insurgency is growing a spine gives us a chance to break that spine. Negotiation is counterproductive.

Douglas Matthew Weber
Fort Sill, OK

Catholic School

Joseph Bottum's "John Kerry, in the Catholic Tradition" (April 26) teases out some of the paradoxes facing Catholics who plan to vote in this year's presidential contest. But it should be said that the Catholic bishops now planning punitive measures against pro-choice Catholic politicians benefit from a widespread misunderstanding about the nature of the abortion debate.

The basic question before the country is not whether one favors or opposes abortion as a matter of abstract morality or personal behavior. Rather, the issue is whether one believes the existing federal law should be changed, either by individual states following a Supreme Court opinion overturning *Roe* v. *Wade*, or by constitutional amendment, to make abortion once again a criminal offense.

A Catholic politician, even one opposed to abortion in the great majority of circumstances, might well decide to leave ill enough alone on this subject as far as the secular law is concerned.

Peter M.Connolly
Washington, DC

Firestarter

As a career, non-union, suburban, and conservative fire officer, I agree with Eli Lehrer's observations on the changing fire service, but not his analysis of it ("Do We Need More Firefighters?" April 12/April 19). The fire service is truly in the midst of an identity crisis, but for a multitude of reasons—not just a dramatic decrease in fires. Indeed, the anxiety stems from the public's rising expectations that departments fulfill an unclear mandate.

For over 100 years, the primary tasks for a fire department have been the

extinguishment of fires and the management of associated life hazards. However, over the past 20 years, technological advancements, as well as changes in our society, have forced fire departments to begin retooling their programs. While Lehrer is correct that the number of actual fires is down significantly, that does not mean there are fewer requests for the fire department to provide public services. Indeed, these days the majority of requests are, by far, requests for medical care. In addition to such requests, fire departments now run citywide call centers, bicycle safety programs, and baby-sitting advice programs. They administer flu shots, investigate unknown noises, manage hazardous substances and wildland pests . . . all *in addition to* well-known services like urban search and rescue and hometown emergency preparedness.

It's not that the fire service isn't organized. It's that the fire service has apparently become this country's foremost problem-solving organization. Fire department dispatch centers now receive calls for noisy furnaces when no repairmen are available, transportation to emergency rooms when personal physicians can't take an appointment, and help in moving invalids from cars to homes to beds.

What makes this a true crisis, however, is that the public expects the same high-quality level of service to be maintained for firefighting—as well as all of the other new services fire departments now provide—without any additional funding. High-quality service requires time, training, equipment, and manpower. And where those resources used to be confined to firefighting, they're now being rapidly and thinly spread over a variety of functions. We should be grateful that the majority of the population will never have the need for the fire department. But it's the new and demanding requests for resources that have strained most fire department budgets and many municipal budgets as well.

Too often the fire service seems a necessary evil to municipal leaders and citizens. This is because it's one of the few municipal departments that produce little or no revenue. But, from the fire service's perspective, it can't always reconcile increased requests for service with the body politic's unwillingness to provide funds and resources. And yet the department is still expected to provide the highest level of service. While many local governments can make similar claims, reductions in fire service quality are more frequently obvious and therefore highly criticized. All of which equals a tight line to walk for firefighters.

These days one can see easily a fire service that is pulled in constantly changing directions, held to an unclear standard, and receiving limited funds. People in the fire service take pride in their line of work and want to do their best no matter how complex the job gets. Which means that, if the firefighter's union is endorsing John Kerry, it's not because he will feed the union federal dollars. It's that the fire service is grasping to find anyone who's willing to help support its new, and increasingly vague, mission.

CHRIS TRUTY
Wheaton, IL

Democracy Gap

WHILE I GENERALLY APPLAUD President Bush's efforts to liberate Iraq, it gives me pause to read articles like Stephen Schwartz's "Falluja's Friends" (April 26). Schwartz's article raises an important question: whether or not democracy can take root in a culture swathed in the more virulent strains of Islam. There is nothing in the shadows of Wahhabism to suggest that it can participate in democratic politics. All peoples may yearn for freedom, as President Bush is right to point out again and again. But not every culture can provide it.

THOMAS M. BEATTIE
Mt. Vernon, VA

Flashback

FRED BARNES'S "Uncovering Saddam's Crimes" (April 26) left no doubt in my mind that the former Iraqi dictator is guilty of crimes against humanity.

So it's unfortunate that, before and during what Barnes calls "the most famous" period of Saddam's mass murders (1986-1988), the United States maintained an (albeit uneasy) alliance with the Iraqi government. The United States stopped supporting Saddam only when we no longer saw it in our self-interest: specifically, after he invaded Kuwait in 1990 and threatened Saudi Arabia's oil fields.

Saddam's mass graves are a painful reminder of why many doubt the sincerity of our government's rhetoric about promoting human rights and democracy abroad.

BOB PALMER
Chicago, IL

Sock It Toomey

HERE'S ONE FACTOR left out in Stephen F. Hayes's excellent rundown on the primary battle between Senator Arlen Specter and Congressman Pat Toomey: electability ("A Challenger Haunts Specter," April 26). Toomey's movement conservatism would've faced an uphill battle in tightly-divided Pennsylvania. The fact is that if Republicans want to be the national governing party, then they need moderates like Arlen Specter.

MIKE LIEDTKA
Yardley, PA

Errata

THE GURKHA REBELLION mentioned in David Tell's editorial, "The 9/11 Commission Looks Backward" (April 26), took place in 1814, not in 1914.

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Fannie Mae works with partners like Liberty Bank and Trust, a community bank based in New Orleans, to make the dream of homeownership a reality. "Fannie Mae has allowed us to help more customers with the biggest purchase of their lives. They offered technology that allowed us to be more efficient so we can handle more capacity with fewer resources," states Greg St. Etienne, COO. Liberty Bank's vision is to find better ways to serve the New Orleans community and help people help themselves. "Because of Fannie Mae, we're able to offer more competitive products and better rates," St. Etienne notes. "Fannie Mae levels the playing field and allows us to compete with larger lenders." Creating technology that cuts out costs and allows financial institutions of all sizes to compete means more people can achieve their dream of owning a home. Because as the American Dream grows, so do we.™

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the weekly Standard

Bush's Missing Issue

The Bush campaign has performed well since John Kerry wrapped up the Democratic presidential nomination on March 2. But not nearly well enough. The Bush TV ads have been crisp and clever and have put Kerry on the defensive. Speeches by the president and the vice president and a host of Republican officeholders have added to Kerry's distress. But there's a giant hole in the Bush campaign. Social and cultural issues, important to so many Americans who don't call themselves Republicans, have been all but ignored.

These issues—especially gay marriage—may cause discomfort when raised among elites inside the Washington-New York-Los Angeles axis. Country club Republicans may wince when social issues are broached. Everyone else in America, however, talks easily and without embarrassment about gay marriage and abortion and public indecency. And they often decide how to vote on the basis of these issues—ones where a large majority of Americans agree wholeheartedly with Bush and not with John Kerry.

Here's one issue: gay marriage. Bush seems to think it's political slumming to mention it. But promising to preserve traditional marriage is not a descent into bigotry and intolerance. Nor is it a cynical bow to Bush's base, which is already solid on the issue and knows the president supports a constitutional amendment barring gay marriage. All he needs to do is reaffirm in his speeches that, if reelected, he will work to preserve marriage. He can also point out that he's not attacking anyone, either, but merely defending an age-old institution from attack.

Why say that? Because it's both true and politically helpful. An improved situation in Iraq and a growing economy won't guarantee Bush's reelection. Most voters have made up their minds on those issues. But Democrats and swing voters are deeply split on gay marriage. It's an issue on which Bush may be able to crack open the Democratic base and attract a majority of independents. But first these voters need to know Bush's position and that he's serious about it.

For now, they don't. His standard speech concentrates on taxes, Iraq, and terrorism. Sure, Bush has endorsed a constitutional amendment protecting traditional marriage, but he rarely alludes to it, and thus tens of millions of voters don't know his position contrasts sharply with Kerry's. If he tells them, Bush will find he has a receptive audience. Pollsters know this. Bush's top political advisers know this. Democratic strategists know this, which is why Kerry also never talks about gay marriage.

Prime turf for the issue is Ohio, a state Bush won in 2000 and cannot afford to lose this year. Ohio's economy is troubled, and Midwestern states have never been overly enthusiastic about foreign wars—bad news for the president's chances. But marriage is a powerful issue in the state. In the presidential primary last winter, an exit poll found a majority of *Democrats* oppose gay marriage. More recently, a private poll discovered that when swing voters in Ohio were told of Bush's and Kerry's positions on gay marriage, 43 percent said they'd be inclined to vote for Bush, and 26 percent for Kerry (who opposes a constitutional amendment). Among undecided voters, 51 percent said they'd side with Bush, 8 percent with Kerry —an astonishing six-to-one advantage for Bush.

In Minnesota, which Bush lost narrowly in 2000, Democrats fear he'll win this year if a gay marriage referendum gets on the ballot in November. The house of representatives has authorized a referendum on a state constitutional amendment preserving traditional marriage, but Democrats are blocking it in the senate, which they control by two votes. They're concerned turnout would spike with a referendum and that many casual voters, including Democrats, would vote for the amendment and also for Bush. The president spoke in Minnesota last week without mentioning marriage.

Gay marriage is a strong issue among Latinos, who normally vote 65 percent to 35 percent Democratic. That's what they did in 2000, when Bush lost the popular vote. But they are more opposed to gay marriage and legalized abortion than Anglos. They know Bush is pro-life and Kerry pro-abortion, but there's no evidence they know the difference between the candidates on marriage.

Bush may think he's being high-minded by not citing gay marriage and other social and cultural issues. But he's not, and the longer he waits to talk about them, the more he risks looking desperate or cynical when he finally does. These are legitimate issues, fully worthy of discussion in a presidential contest. The sooner the better.

—Fred Barnes, for the Editors

Cheney vs. Kerry

The national security debate is joined.

BY STEPHEN F. HAYES

Fulton, Missouri

As JOHN KERRY was getting pummeled last week for his inconsistent answers on ribbons, medals, or whatever the things are called today—in the process turning a one-day story into a one-week story—the Bush campaign continued its precise assault on his national security record in the Senate. The centerpiece of that attack was an address here April 26 by Vice President Dick Cheney.

In the back-and-forth of a close campaign, Cheney's speech was an important contribution to the debate. It generated news coverage for three days and helped ensure that Kerry spent much of the week playing defense.

But the speech—delivered six months before the election, on what will surely be the campaign's most important issue—was more than a news-cycle win. Campaign and administration sources say it is a blueprint for how the Bush-Cheney campaign will use national security in its effort to win reelection and trap John Kerry in a box of his own making.

Cheney's argument last week—delivered in a gymnasium at Westminster College, the site of Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech—was substantively much the same as one he made in a March address at the Ronald Reagan library in California. George W. Bush, like Reagan and Churchill before him, is a bold statesman leading his nation in an existential fight against evil. Churchill, said Cheney, provides a model for "the kind of leadership required to defend freedom in our time."



AP/Wide World Photos / James A. Finley

Cheney urged continuing Bush policies on national security. He devoted the first half of his speech to the nature of the threat and the administration's aggressive response to it. On September 11, he said, "we awakened to dangers even more lethal—the possibility that terrorists could gain chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons from outlaw regimes and turn those weapons against the United States. We came to understand that for all the destruction and grief we saw that day, September 11 gave only the merest glimpse of the threat that international terrorism poses to this and other nations."

The Bush administration, Cheney continued, is "taking the fight directly to the enemy." President Bush is "calm and deliberate, comfortable with responsibility, consistent in his objectives, and resolute in his actions. These times have tested the character of our nation, and they have tested the character of our nation's leader." It won't surprise anyone to learn that Cheney thinks his boss passed the test.

The second half of the speech was a deconstruction of Kerry's congressional record on national security, which, Cheney said, "raises some important questions." Using Kerry's own words, the vice president painted the Massachusetts senator as a vacillating politician whose uncertainty makes him unfit to lead in difficult times.

Why does Kerry now praise the international effort in the first Gulf War as a "strong coalition," when at the time he dismissed the participants as "shadow battlefield allies who barely carry a burden"? Why did Kerry advocate tough action against Saddam Hussein under President Clinton, with or without allies, but want President Bush to seek additional U.N. approval? Why did Kerry vote in favor of the Patriot Act only to denounce it later?

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Cheney says that all of this, coupled with Kerry's "deeply irresponsible" proposed cuts to defense and intelligence, raises "serious doubts" about his "understanding of the broader struggle against terror."

The Bush campaign's two-part argument on national security has Kerry in a tough spot. The first part: *George W. Bush's policies have made America safer.* And the second: *John Kerry is a weak, unsteady leader who does not know how to fight terrorists*. Because he initially supported so many post-9/11 Bush administration policies, especially the war in Iraq, Kerry will have a tough time challenging the first contention without confirming the second.

I asked Ken Mehlman about all of this last week. He's the campaign manager for Bush's reelection effort and has been on the job since August 2003. A Harvard-trained lawyer and longtime deputy to Karl Rove, the 37-year-old Mehlman has a reputation as one of the capital's brightest political thinkers.

His eighth floor office in the nondescript Arlington, Virginia, building that houses the Bush-Cheney campaign offers a fantastic view of the Washington Monument and the Capitol. Mehlman speaks at perhaps twice the volume of a normal conversation, making his denunciations of Kerry seem even more forceful.

"Senator Kerry's biggest problem is that on the critical questions on the war on terror, he's been wrong," says Mehlman. "Kerry's argument that fighting terrorism is primarily a law enforcement and intelligence function reflects his pre-9/11 worldview. I think his fundamental problem is that at a time when Americans recognize a very serious threat, Senator Kerry has not. And what's damaging is that's consistent with his voting record. What's most problematic for a candidate is when a wrong position is consistent with his overall record."

Mehlman, like Cheney, emphasizes the similarities between the war on terror and the Cold War. He makes this point several times, in rapid succession, his voice rising with each accusation.

"At the height of the Cold War, Senator Kerry also failed to see the nature of the real threat we faced." And then: "If you look back on the 19 years of Senator Kerry's career, when America faced two very large, existential threats, he made the wrong judgment about the nature of those threats and therefore had the wrong policy conclusions." And again: "At the height of the Cold War and at the height of the war on terror, he said we need to cut our defense and cut our intelligence. I think that's his fundamental problem."

The politics are simple. The Cold War united the Republican base for more than 40 years. Whatever their differences on *Roe* v. *Wade* or prayer in schools, social conservatives and economic conservatives shared a belief in the importance of confronting communism. The Bush campaign hopes the war on terror will have the same effect today. And polls indicate solid Republican support for the war in Iraq, specifically, as well as for the broader campaign. "We have Reagan-era levels of support among our base," says Mehlman.

Kerry failed to explain why it would be desirable to turn over Iraq to an organization that was complicit in Saddam-era corruption.

Democrats, by contrast, are divided, particularly on the question of Iraq. Kerry faces the difficult task of appealing to both the large swath of Democratic voters passionately opposed to that war—the voters Howard Dean energized in his primary run and those potentially available to antiwar candidate Ralph Nader—and more moderate Democrats. That conundrum hit him squarely at a rally last Wednesday in Toledo, when a woman in the audience accused the Bush administration of murdering Iraqi children and waging the war in Iraq "for the oil and for Cheney, for his business over there." The crowd applauded, and Kerry gingerly sidestepped at least one of the accusations, saying he couldn't support her claim that the war was for oil. "I understand where you are coming from, ma'am," he responded. "I really sympathize with the anger you feel. I'll tell you this: If you'll trust me with the presidency of the United States, I will pursue a policy that I know can get our troops down in number, reduced, out of Iraq."

So Kerry muddles on. In his own speech at Westminster College on Friday, Kerry finally laid out his plan for Iraq. He vowed to internationalize the force, specifically calling on France, Germany, and Russia to participate, and proposed the appointment of a U.N. high commissioner on Iraq. The tone of the speech was good, but it was short on specifics; Kerry did not tell the audience how exactly he would win the support of those nations that opposed the war, other than to alert them to the fact that a successful Iraq was in their "self-interest." And he failed to explain why it would be desirable to turn over all of Iraq to an organization that—as the unfolding Oil-for-Food scandal suggests—was complicit in Saddam-era corruption. These details matter. And it's hard to imagine a union member from Toledo, Ohio, or a schoolteacher from Fulton, Missouri, getting too excited about further involvement with the U.N.

It's probably not smart to draw broad conclusions based on audience responses to one line in a speech. Kerry, after all, got plenty of applause at Westminster. But Cheney got a standing ovation and whoops of delight from the heavily Republican crowd with this dig at Kerry's faith in the United Nations: "The United States will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country." ♦

Europe's Non-Strategy

The E.U. isn't taking terror seriously.

BY GERARD ALEXANDER

IN THE WAKE of the March 11 Madrid train bombing, Romano Prodi, president of the European Commission, said, "It is clear that force alone cannot win the fight against terrorism." Prodi was hardly the first continental leader to implicitly criticize U.S. policy as short-sighted and to suggest that there are clear and compelling alternatives to America's strategy in the war on terror.

Soon after 9/11 itself, French prime minister Lionel Jospin traced terrorist acts to "tension, frustration, and radicalism," which in turn "are linked to inequality," which would have to be addressed. In 2002, France's foreign minister famously termed U.S. policy toward terrorism "simplistic" precisely because it did not look to "root causes, the situations, poverty, injustice." Norway's prime minister, Kjell Bondevik, insists that "fighting terrorism should be about more than using your military and freezing finances," and convened two international conferences on the root causes of terrorism in 2003. And after Madrid, German chancellor Gerhard Schröder said that "terrorism cannot be fought only with arms and police. We must also combat the roots of terrorism."

This view isn't restricted to the other side of the Atlantic. John Kerry said in January 2003 that President Bush "has a plan for waging war [on terror] but no plan for winning the peace" over the long haul. "We need more than a one-dimensional war on terror," he went on, requiring us to "recognize the conditions that are breeding this virulent new form of anti-American terrorism."

There are only two things wrong with this line of criticism. The United States *is* mounting a long-term strategy against terrorism. And Europe *isn't* offering any alternative.

American conservatives may not be famous for their "root causes" explanations of terrorism, any more than of crime. But in several major speeches that echo neoconservative thinking on the subject, President Bush has articulated what amounts to a root-causes theory of terrorism. "As long as the Middle East remains a place of tyranny and despair and anger," he says, "it will continue to produce men and movements that threaten the safety of America and our friends," because dictatorships incubate "stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export." And his administration has begun to implement a strategy based on this theory. It has outlined a far-reaching "greater Middle East initiative" aimed at offering incentives for political reform and democratization in the region. More pointedly, the United States invaded Iraq in no small part to create a new democracy which the administration thinks might catalyze liberalization throughout the Middle East.

The United States doesn't exactly have the strongest track record when it comes to transformational policies in the Middle East. And there are grounds to be skeptical of the "tyranny" theory of the origins of anti-Western extremism. But it cannot be denied that this administration is trying something bold and serious, something expensive and risky, to solve the terrorism problem from the roots up. Britain, Poland, and several other European countries have of course joined in the Iraq initiative.

By comparison, what are European critics offering as an alternative? All European countries have mounted assertive intelligence-gathering and law enforcement policies against terrorists and plotters in their midst. And several have military forces in Afghanistan. But both those measures are parts of the bombs-and-bullets strategy they insist is not enough. So what major initiative have they—say, the governments of France, Germany, Belgium, and Scandinavia—launched to address what *they* consider terrorism's root causes, whether alone, jointly, or through the European Union? No such initiative is anywhere in sight.

Is it too early to expect more? It's only a little over a month since Islamist terrorists attacked a major E.U. capital, killing 191 people and wounding 1,500. But Europeans have had two and a half years since al Qaeda put terrorism on everyone's agenda. Moreover, they have had major domestic terrorist problems for decades, unlike the United States. So there has been ample time to formulate what French president Jacques Chirac has called for: a "European plan against terrorism." And Europe has the means. The E.U. countries have a total GDP of around $8 trillion, and they stand at the crossroads of both international diplomacy and the global economy.

What are the leading candidates for a European "root causes" initiative? Sweden's Social Democratic Olof Palme Center declares that "world poverty, exclusion, and class divisions" are key root causes of extremism. As is well known, the link between poverty and terrorism is suspiciously difficult to establish. But let's assume many Europeans believe that poverty is generating a major threat to the security of the West. Several E.U. governments famously give foreign aid at higher rates than the United States, especially the Scandi-

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navians. But they have been giving at these rates for decades, the same decades in which anti-Western extremism was growing. In answer to post-9/11 calls for changes in policy, these leaders might have launched—or at least proposed—a major shift in which countries receive their aid or in how they monitor its effectiveness. Or they could have proposed to dramatically increase the amount of aid—the recipients of the Marshall Plan now "giving back" to the international community. But they haven't done any of these things. For example, European official development assistance levels and practices generally remain steady.

Other Europeans argue that global economic inequality is a source of resentment. If so, France, Germany, and other E.U. countries could try to revise the rules of the global economic game to promote growth in developing countries. They might have started by opening their own markets to textiles and especially agricultural products from developing countries. But instead they've chosen to maintain import barriers and extensive subsidies to their own producers. By depressing the prices of goods made in Europe, these measures decrease incomes in the developing world, at levels almost certainly outweighing the value of Europe's foreign aid. If anything, Europe (and especially France) has been playing a regressive role on agriculture in world trade talks in recent years.

Other European commentators highlight political root causes, such as the lack of political and human rights in many developing countries. Decades of experience suggest that mild pressure on developing countries to reform has little effect. So have these Europeans outlined a transformational strategy aimed at political reform in, say, the Middle East? So far they haven't. Indeed, nothing has attracted their criticism as much as America's pursuit of a democracy-seeking transformational agenda in the region.

Finally, Jacques Chirac and former French prime minister Alain Juppé are among many who trace Islamist anger to "conflicts," often a code word for the Arab-Israeli conflict. The evidence for this thesis, too, is not persuasive, to say the least. But have Europeans launched a major initiative aimed at resolving or even substantially mitigating this dispute? Here is the one candidate on this list on which Europe's leaders have expended effort and (some) treasure trying to encourage progress and increase their leverage over events, mostly by funding Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority with over $100 million a year. This has not solved the problem (and may well have made it worse), but it's a rare attempt to follow through, however partially, on one root-causes theory of terrorism.

So where have continental European leaders been focusing the bulk of their counterterrorism efforts? Since 9/11, and again since "3/11" in Madrid, they have dramatically intensified surveillance, gathered intelligence, revealed wide-ranging plots and recruiting networks, and made a pleasing number of arrests of known and suspected terrorists in their midst. Pleasing, but not satisfying, because arresting on-site conspirators deals only with the tail end of an enemy's overall assault. Dick Cheney points out that such a law-enforcement strategy "leaves the network behind the attacks virtually untouched," able to continue recruiting, training, and dispatching new teams of bombers whenever it wishes. This is the furthest thing from a root-causes strategy.

The result is that there is a real difference between European and American strategies in the war on terror, but not the one you might think. It's not that Europeans are thinking long-term while the United States is thinking short-term, or even that their theories of root causes are distinct (though they are). The real difference is that only the United States has translated a theory of root causes into a strategy and started to implement it.

What might explain this? One disturbing possibility is that the real long-term strategy of many Europeans might be to lie low while the United States takes the heat: in other words, to take Osama bin Laden up on his "separate peace" proposal even while denouncing it. This might have made sense to some people immediately after 9/11, when violent Islamists seemed to be treating Europe only as a staging area for attacks on America. But in the succeeding months, al Qaeda affiliates and sympathizers repeatedly targeted E.U. citizens and assets—in Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey, and on the open seas. The Madrid train bombing brought the war to an E.U. capital. And even since Spain's elections, ongoing plots have been uncovered in Spain, France, and Britain. In the wake of Madrid, there is little evidence that many Europeans believe they can deflect the threat.

Another possibility is that Europe's multinational nature makes coordination and implementation complicated. That's no doubt true. But it does not explain the lack even of well-developed proposals for addressing the root causes of terrorism.

A more plausible explanation is that many Europeans aren't as convinced of their root-causes theories as their talk would suggest. Their skittishness over the Iraq operation in particular and the "greater Middle East initiative" in general leaves the distinct impression that it is Europeans who are averse to transformational agendas and more comfortable with the muddling-through approach that the Bush administration now criticizes. The E.U.'s December 2003 "European Security Strategy" traces "violent religious extremism" to "the pressures of modernization, cultural, social, and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies," including in Europe. In which case, they should be the first to mount a bold initiative aimed at alleviating those very pressures and crises. Yet what has angered Europeans most is not America's failure to pursue an ambitious strategy but its insistence on doing so—starting in Iraq. ♦

A Corrupted Punditry

Paul Krugman, political propagandist.

BY KEVIN HASSETT

N. GREGORY MANKIW, the delightfully nerdy chairman of the president's Council of Economic Advisers, has experienced a noteworthy public lashing in recent weeks. First he was caught up in the outsourcing spectacle, then a furor ignited when Paul Krugman of the *New York Times* began a crusade against his jobs forecast. The forecast was, Krugman wrote, "the signature of a corrupted policy process in which political propaganda takes the place of professional analysis." The ensuing uproar discouraged even administration officials, who have publicly distanced themselves from the council chairman and his forecasts.

Mankiw is one of the brightest and most successful economists of our time. It is interesting to pause and ask how it could be that such a man could find himself embroiled in controversy. The answer provides a troubling lesson to those who hope to participate in productive public policy debate. Mankiw was gobbled up by a character-assassination machine that increasingly is trying to turn Democrats and Republicans into Serbs and Croats or Hutus and Tutsis. If the "shock pundits" are not stopped by public disapproval, they may well succeed.

The jobs story is instructive. To indict Mankiw, the *New York Times* ran a graph headed "Wishful Thinking on Jobs," which we reproduce at right. The graph depicts the administration's jobs forecast for each of the past three years.

In 2001, for example, the administration believed that 2002 employment would increase sharply. When the jobs picture failed to meet expectations, the administration forecasted a similar correction starting from a slightly lower point a year later. When that forecast turned out to be short of the mark, the administration simply tried the same upward trajectory once again.

The chart reveals that job creation fell far short of expectations in 2001, 2002, and 2003. Krugman did not argue that the administration's forecasters were bad practitioners, but that the motive of their work was evil. "Wishful thinking on this scale," he wrote, "is unprecedented" and "corrupted." Such a startling accusation is sadly par for the course these days. It gives the uneducated the impression that forecasts by the Council of Economic Advisers are so contrary to professional standards

Corrupt Propaganda . . .



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

'2001-2004. Reproduced with permission of Macroeconomic Advisers, L.L.C.

Kevin Hassett is director of economic policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

that corruption is the only possible explanation.

The accusation is simply wrong. Mankiw has no motive to prostitute himself in Washington. He is a highly regarded professor at Harvard. He was once the youngest tenured there ever, and has made millions of dollars from his popular textbooks. Why would such a fellow risk it all, and for what?

The answer is, he didn't. He simply signed on to forecasts that met current professional standards. Indeed, economists who forecast job creation have just about all made the same mistakes as the council. For the past two years, job creation has been well behind the level we might normally have expected to see given the level of economic growth. For example, the highly regarded industry forecaster Macroeconomic Advisers kindly provided me with *its* jobs forecasts for the past few years. They are shown in the lower graph.

The second chart is, of course, stunningly similar to the first. Clearly, the errors are not a sign of corruption, but rather, an indication that the world surprises all economists from time to time. Those surprises challenge us to build better models.

If a graduate student presented a seminar attempting to establish bias at the Council of Economic Advisers with that chart, he would immediately be shot down by professionals who would see through the subterfuge. If he submitted his analysis to a peer-reviewed journal, it would be rejected. But in the new media culture, Krugman can insert into the public debate blatantly misleading content and the vilest accusations without suffering any negative consequences. As the blogosphere has documented, Krugman does such things all the time. This is tabloid economics, shock punditry, and apparently acceptable journalism.

Gentlemen like Mankiw suffer, but he is not alone. Many Democrats appear to want to believe that Republicans have foul intent. Republicans do the same in reverse. Accordingly, a kind of tabloid culture has arisen wherein wonks outdo each other in the attempt to insult and humiliate their opponents. It does not matter who is accurate or fair. The more shocking the accusation, the better. "Greg Mankiw is corrupt." How delicious! As Al Franken, Ann Coulter, and Paul Krugman have shown, being artful in this line can be quite profitable.

But it is also harmful. It destroys the climate necessary for honest debate and encourages cynicism in voters. Further, it is harmful because the Mankiws of the world more and more are deciding that public service is not worth the bother. Those choices may hand the public policy terrain to the lowest common denominator.

A wise rector once told my congregation: "One should never ascribe to malice that which equally well could be ascribed to stupidity." Shock pundits degrade the public discourse. The fact is, most Democrats I know want to make the world better. Most Republicans do too. They disagree about the methods, and one side might even be right. That does not make the other side dishonest.

Shock pundits, on the other hand, are not stupid. ♦

Melodrama in Manila

Movie stars don't always make good presidents.

BY GREG SHERIDAN

A FEW YEARS AGO I went to interview Joseph Estrada in one of his lush Manila mansions. A roly-poly former action movie star gone to seed—with his Errol Flynn moustache and his Elvis bouffant hair—he was, amazingly enough, at that time, vice president of the Philippines.

I was ushered in to meet Estrada's chief of staff, a casually dressed fellow absorbed in a cerebral looking journal called *The Denim Review*.

"I'm sorry," he said, "the vice president will be a bit late for your appointment. I think he's having a massage, but sometimes in the afternoon he has a nap."

Estrada went on to win a democratic election and become president—one of the worst the country has known. And believe me that's saying something.

He plundered millions of dollars in personal corruption and made all his real decisions in smoke-filled all-night drinking sessions with his "midnight cabinet" of gangster cronies and pals from the entertainment world. Under Estrada, foreign investment fled and Islamic terrorism took hold in the south.

Now the Philippines looks set to repeat this winning formula by electing another fading action movie star, Fernando Poe Jr., as president in national elections on May 10.

Poe is backed by some of the same cronies who surrounded Estrada and before that the late Ferdinand Marcos. Already serious discussion is underway in Manila about the prospects and mechanics of a military coup should Poe win.

Fernando Poe Jr.

But the truth is, even if the incumbent, the feisty but ineffectual Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, should hang on, the Philippines is on a one-way road to crisis and perhaps catastrophe.

With all the difficulties in Iraq and the Middle East, no one in Washington wants to hear this right now. But the Philippines could be the next giant mess for U.S. foreign policy. Already, the 7 million Muslims of Mindanao and surrounding areas in the southern Philippines form substantially a no-go area for the government. This no-go area provides the heartland for al Qaeda-linked terrorism in Southeast Asia.

But this is a symptom, rather than the cause, of the profound crisis of governance in the Philippines. Philippine politics has been so corrupt, so incestuous, and so ineffective for so long that most Filipinos no longer take it seriously. There is a blithe irresponsibility to voters' choices. Electing a movie star like Poe—who unlike Estrada has no history of seeking elective office or even expressing views on political issues—seems no more irresponsible than electing a regular politician.

This may change because things are steadily getting worse. The Philippines may be a failing state. It's not a failed state—that's some distance off. But it's failing. One telling sign is that all these years after the fall of communism there is still a serious Communist insurgency in the Philippines. Of course, it's fueled mostly by gangsterism rather than ideology, but a state has to have a very low level of legitimacy before the lunacies of Communist ideology, however attenuated, can have any appeal.

Beyond the Islamic and Communist insurgencies, all the social indicators are heading south. Asian Development Bank figures show that in 1996 per capita gross domestic product was $1,153. By 2002 it was $894. Population increase is out of control. Today's 85 million Filipinos will be 100 million by 2010.

Economic development is often stymied by a peculiar mixture of bad security, excess regulation, corruption, and mad, populist, left-wing activism.

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Mining is a classic example. The United Nations lists the Philippines as the fifth most mineral-rich nation on Earth. Yet minerals now account for less than 3 percent of exports, compared with 25 percent two decades ago. Under populist anti-foreign pressure, the Supreme Court ruled the Minerals Act unconstitutional because it allowed foreign ownership of mines. The result is minerals stay in the ground and Filipinos stay poor.

Now, however, the pervasive crisis of governance in the Philippines is hurting the interests of other nations. In Southeast Asia, Singapore excepted, it's as well to be fairly pragmatic about corruption. But corruption in the Philippines is now compromising the war on terror.

The Philippines' Muslims have a lot of legitimate grievances against the central government, and most of them want nothing to do with terrorist groups. But the ineffectiveness of the state means that many terrorist, separatist, and just plain criminal groups thrive now in the Muslim areas. The two most important Muslim terrorist groups are the Abu Sayyaf gang, a small, murderous crew who have specialized in kidnapping tourists for ransom but have recently branched out into bombings, and the much bigger Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

The MILF may have up to 12,000 men under arms. It tries to look more mainstream and legitimate than Abu Sayyaf and denies links to al Qaeda, though these links are well established.

It also has intimate cooperation with the al Qaeda affiliate based in Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah. JI carried out the 2002 bombings in Bali which killed more than 200 people, about half of them Australians.

JI uses MILF-controlled territory for rest and recreation purposes, and more important for training. Western intelligence knows of at least one functioning JI camp in Lanao del Norte, in Mindanao.

On its face, that is astonishing. The Philippines is a military ally in good standing with the United States, yet al Qaeda-linked terrorist training camps flourish in its territory. Not only that, they flourish in part through the assistance of corrupt elements of the Philippine military.

In July 2003 a ridiculously good-looking, young naval lieutenant, Antonio Trillanes IV, led an abortive coup attempt. He said he was disgusted at military corruption, especially the military's sale of weapons to the terrorists. After Trillanes went to jail, some public-minded citizen circulated the term papers Trillanes had written a year earlier while a student at the Philippines National College of Public Administration.

They laid out in astounding detail a catalogue of incidents in which the military had cooperated in seaborne smuggling of weapons and other supplies to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Throughout the south, terrorist groups have become deeply involved with organized crime and bribery of local officials, giving the Philippines that most deadly combination—terrorism intertwined with criminal and commercial networks.

What can Washington do?

It may soon have to make tough choices. Imagine the fallout of a major terrorist incident in Southeast Asia (or in the United States for that matter) in which large numbers of Americans die and it turns out the terrorists were trained in the Philippines. Would Washington feel obliged to take out, militarily, the JI camps then?

Imagine if Poe wins, governs appallingly, and there is a coup. Say the coup leader cracks down effectively on terrorists. Would Washington move to crush the coup in order to restore such a broken democracy?

The deeper tragedy of all this is that the Filipinos are mostly such likable and talented people. They deserve better. But their politics is broken. Helping them fix it should be a higher priority for a number of countries—Japan, Australia, its Southeast Asian neighbors—not just the United States.

Given the historical links, however, the United States is often presumed to play a unique role in Philippine politics. Certainly in recent years the Philippine military has performed well against the terrorists only when there have been American soldiers looking over their shoulders.

Washington hardly needs another crisis right now. But the Philippines may be heading for a train wreck in which we all get badly hurt. ♦

Vouchers Without Competition

Why conservatives' favorite education reform won't live up to its promise. BY FREDERICK M. HESS

THIS SPRING will see a milestone in American public education: The nation's first federally supported voucher program will be launched in Washington, D.C. The program will offer school vouchers worth up to $7,500 to about 2,000 students in the District of Columbia schools. Thrilled at this breakthrough after a decade of stop-and-start efforts, voucher advocates have rendered grand pronouncements about its likely impact on D.C. public schools.

Sorry to spoil the party, but these claims smack of Great Society-era wishful thinking. In truth, the D.C. program is unlikely to drive systemic improvement, which was always the ultimate promise of vouchers. The idea is that school choice not only benefits individual students by allowing them to move to better schools, but also unleashes competitive pressures that will force entire school systems to improve. The first claim is incontestable; the second is deceptively utopian.

The trouble is, school systems can't bear to subject themselves to true competition. Sure enough, the D.C. program is choice without consequences, "competition" as soft political slogan rather than hard economic reality. This is not only because the program is capped at about 3 percent of public school students and rewards the public schools with $13 million in new funding. More fundamentally, the program ensures that public schools have nothing to lose—and maybe something to gain—when students depart for private schools.

But competition only works when it hurts—when people have something to lose. Markets yield efficiencies precisely because they are unforgiving of failure. This harshness can make an unflinching embrace of markets difficult for reformers primarily interested in expanding parents' choices. For many voucher or charter-school proponents, "competition" is more a rhetorical device than a serious tool to promote educational excellence.

In the private sector, when competition is genuinely threatening—as when American automakers and electronics manufacturers were almost wiped out by Japanese competitors in the 1980s—firms either reinvent themselves or yield to more productive competitors. Unions make painful concessions or watch jobs vanish.

The absence of competition means that public schools, like other government agencies, typically are not subjected to this kind of discipline. No matter how inefficient, employees have little to fear. Subjecting school systems to real competition would indeed produce more effective schools —and other benefits as well. It would provide quality control beyond that afforded by standardized testing, empower entrepreneurial educators to offer alternatives to reigning orthodoxies, and permit good schools to multiply without waiting for permission from resistant district leaders.

Imagine the Wal-Mart manager who was told that losing customers would have no impact on her salary, evaluation, or job security and that attracting new customers would require her to hire more employees, assume greater responsibilities, and perhaps erect a trailer in the parking lot to handle the added business, all without extra compensation or recognition. In such an environment, only the clueless would strive to compete.

But this is exactly how schools—even most "choice" schools—compete today. Take the principal of a typical elementary school in Washington, D.C., that was built to house 400 students and currently enrolls 375 students. What happens if that principal loses 75 students to charter schools, or would happen if she were to lose 75 to the new voucher program?

Typically, three retiring teachers are not replaced, three classrooms are freed up, and the school loses a tiny amount of discretionary money. In short, the principal's job gets a little easier. Her salary and professional prospects are unaffected, yet she has fewer teachers to lead, fewer students to monitor, and a less crowded school.

But if the same principal moves aggressively to boost enrollment, prompting the school to add 75 students, she must take on responsibility for three new teachers, squeeze students into classrooms, add two trailers out back to serve as additional classrooms, crowd the school's cafeteria and corridors, and manage two teachers and 50 families unhappy about holding class in a trailer. In return for these headaches, the "successful" principal receives, at best, a small pool of discretionary money, usually less than $50 a student, but no extra recognition or pay.

Under these circumstances, no rational principal could be expected to compete in more than a token fashion. To achieve real competition—and reap its educational benefits—choice-based reforms alone are wildly insufficient. Here are five steps necessary to unleash real competition.

First, the sine qua non of educational competition is that parents' choices must deny resources to poor schools and bestow resources on good

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schools. The funds to educate a given student must follow the child to the new school. The political conceit that choice will spur public school systems to remake themselves *even if they get more money for serving fewer students* is false.

Second, principals whose schools attract students should be rewarded accordingly—even as safeguards are set up to ensure, for example, that popular schools are also producing adequate performance.

Third, principals and superintendents need the freedom to hire, fire, promote, and reward employees. Reducing the obstacles erected by regulations, professional norms, and contractual provisions will press employees to accept management direction to a much greater extent, even where workers are protected by strong contracts.

Fourth, it is necessary to overhaul rigid contractual arrangements that stifle potential entrepreneurs. Salary schedules based on seniority and pension plans based on continuous service penalize longtime educators who leave their position for a new opportunity.

Fifth, if competition is to threaten the status quo, the number of choice schools and the number of students they serve must rise. Many barriers, formal and informal, now curb the growth of choice options. The educators who open "mom and pop" charter schools or run private schools are unlikely to drive significant expansion. Most of them want to run small, familial schools and evince little interest in maximizing enrollment, running multiple schools, or managing a bureaucratic operation.

If choice schools are to serve more children, these entrepreneurs need to be enticed with money, prestige, and perks to trade the joys of their small enterprise for the headaches of expansion. Crucially, a significant increase in the number of choices requires the participation of for-profit operators, who have the capacity to dramatically increase the pool of capital available to support new schools.

It is these measures that will foster competition worthy of the name. In the 1970s, at the height of the Communist reign in the old Soviet Union, ordinary Moscow shoppers could choose from innumerable grocery stores, all of them equally grim. Neither producers' nor employees' job security, compensation, or promotion was much affected by how well or poorly they ran their stores. Transforming choice into the kind of competition that raises standards requires attaching consequences to behavior. For the public schools in Washington, D.C., to experience competition more vibrant than that of the old Soviet groceries, choice by itself is not enough. ♦



Michael Ramirez

Zapatero's Spain

Spain's problem with terrorism is Europe's: It does not want to defend itself

By Christopher Caldwell

Madrid

Between March 11, when terrorists linked to al Qaeda killed 191 Spanish commuters with bomb attacks on four trains, and March 14, when Spanish voters shocked the world by removing José-María Aznar's pro-war Popular party (PP) from power and electing the Socialist (PSOE) candidate José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the world's attention was riveted on Spain. But soon dozens were arrested, and on April 3 another 7, believed to be the ringleaders, killed themselves with a bomb when their apartment in the Madrid suburb of Leganés was surrounded by police. One of the policemen, 41-year-old Francisco Javier Torronteras, the father of two daughters, was killed, too. That seemed to be that. Attention drifted back to the deteriorating situation in Iraq, next to which the Spanish events seemed to be only a sideshow.

But just before sunrise on Monday, April 19, something happened that raised the possibility that Madrid and Europe generally are center stage in the war on terror. Unknown intruders broke into the cemetery where the policeman Torronteras was interred. With a pickaxe, they pried open the crypt where his body lay, smashing the plaque on which memorial verses had been written by his family. They removed the coffin, wheeled it 500 meters away on a hand truck, opened it, chopped off the left hand, doused the corpse with gasoline, and lit it on fire.

As in the aftermath of March 11, the reaction of Spaniards to the event was as curious as the event itself. While right-wing talk radio—a thriving industry here—was full of callers raving against the *moros* (as Arabs are known among the working class), authorities and the press were standoffish. That the desecration of Torronteras's tomb had been carried out in homage to the corpse-burnings of American contract workers in Falluja just days before was a possibility that went unmentioned. Police said the attack on the grave could have been committed by "hooligans." The country's most balanced and interesting newspaper, Barcelona-based *La Vanguardia*, hedged its bets:

> As for the possibility it was an act of vengeance carried out by radical Islamists, police sources said that Muslims usually have great respect for religious ceremony, and their rites seem not to embrace either amputation or the burning of remains. The act of burning the corpse and the coffin could also have been intended to destroy the evidence of whoever carried out the desecration.

El País, the Socialist party paper, read by the country's intellectual elite, speculated that skinheads could be involved. The paper wrote: "Mistreating a cadaver is a pagan practice, totally alien to the Koran, explains an expert in Islam." And in the photos they ran of Torronteras's funeral, all the papers took care to pixelate the faces of his pallbearers. Presumably to avoid their being targeted by "skinheads."

Less than three decades after the end of Francisco Franco's dictatorship, Spaniards are cautious about saying anything against the democratic process—or even against the results of a particular election. Most in the intellectual and political classes are reluctant to say that al Qaeda terrorism wrested a near-certain electoral victory from the party that al Qaeda hoped would lose, and handed power to the antiwar party that al Qaeda (at least according to its "strategy" document, which was intercepted on the Internet by Norwegian authorities) hoped would win. But this Spanish circumspection, admirable in many ways, has produced a chain reaction of self-interested self-deception: And

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from there it is only a short step to saying that Spain has no continuing problem with terrorism at all.

The Popular party would have won. It did better in absentee ballots this year—those sent by mail before the March 11 explosions—than in the 2000 landslide that gave it an absolute majority. In the days before this year's election, two prominent Socialists, the charismatic Castilian governor José Bono (whom Zapatero would name defense minister) and European Union foreign-policy chief Javier Solana, were jockeying for support as candidates for the PSOE leadership after Zapatero's inevitable loss. A balanced view was given by the long-time president of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol, whose Convergencia i Unió party backs neither the governing coalition nor the Popular party opposition. "Let us be clear about this," Pujol said in his office in Barcelona in mid-April. "The victory is legitimate. That cannot be discussed. But without the bombing, the other party probably would have won. March 14 was a legitimate victory but it was also a victory for terrorists."

In his first act, Zapatero ordered the troops home from Iraq. When the opposition asked for a parliamentary debate, he scheduled one for after the troops' return.

The best indication of the PSOE's slim prospects going into the election was Zapatero himself. He was the kind of candidate a party runs when it has slim hopes of victory. (Similarly the Popular party's candidate, Mariano Rajoy, was a complaisant, bipartisan fellow, meant to bring the country together after eight years of polarizing rule by Aznar.) Zapatero's investiture speech on April 17 proposed a range of boilerplate center-left reforms that Spain somehow got through the 1990s without (handicapped access, gay marriage) and then proposed giving Spain a few things that it already had (secular education and a law on violence against women). Zapatero nominated a record eight female ministers, called for the advancement of women through an equal rights commission, and promised a "new politics of water." This was a bric-a-brac agenda, the kind of governing proposal a European president would call for if he hadn't expected to have to propose one at all.

With one exception. Zapatero had wooed the nearly 90 percent of Spaniards who opposed their country's participation in the Iraq war. He had promised to bring Spain's troops back from their bases near Najaf unless the U.N. took over operations in Iraq. Now he decided not to run the risk that the U.N. might actually do so. In his first act after taking office, he ordered the troops home. When the opposition asked for a parliamentary debate, he scheduled one for after the troops' return. While the act enraged the United States and the Popular party opposition, Zapatero had already paid that price and would have been crazy (in domestic political terms) to do anything else. When, during the investiture debate, a Progressive party deputy asked him, "Can you explain, once and for all, what you want?" he replied simply: "To take Spain out of the Azores photo, take Spain out of the illegal and unjust war that took place."

The photo in question shows Aznar with George Bush and Tony Blair at the meeting Aznar hosted in the Azores on the eve of the Iraq war. The Spanish often talk of it as Americans do of the photo taken of Michael Dukakis in a tank during the 1988 presidential campaign: as a moment when a man with big pretensions steps into a situation in which his surroundings reveal him as too small for the job. But that was wrong. One didn't have to like the Spanish role in Iraq. But there was nothing preposterous about it.

Aznar is said to distinguish privately between politicians who are serious and those who are *simpático*, *simpático* being a synonym for unserious. In eight years in office, he had turned Spain from an unserious country into a serious one, in a way that was most obvious in his handling of the economy. Aznar broke the power of unions, froze the salaries of functionaries, privatized dozens of state enterprises, and won the intellectual argument that lowering taxes was sometimes more responsible than raising them. He entered office in 1996 with unemployment at 22 percent and cut it in half. Half the jobs created in Europe since 1996 have been created in Spain. After the dot-com bust, Spain never dipped into negative growth as other European countries did—and Spain is still growing at twice the European rate. Aznar's hopes of joining the G-8 group of major economies sounded absurd when he took office; now it seems absurd that Canada should have that honor and Spain not. It is true that Aznar received the free gift of monetary stability from the establishment of the Euro; but fiscal stability came from his living up to the E.U. stability-and-growth pact (unlike France and Germany) and balancing his country's budget every year. Zapatero has promised not to change economic course, and chose as his economics minister the highly respected Pedro Solbes, for five years the E.U.

economics minister in Brussels, who is unlikely to favor such a change.

In this economic climate, Spaniards began to tell pollsters they were more comfortable with a larger role for Spain on the world stage. In Aznar's view, this meant shifting Spain's allegiances from France and Germany to the United States. Aznar drew benefits for Spain from this partnership. U.S. assistance helped the government deal a serious blow to the Basque terrorist group ETA (presumably through communications intercepts). And it was the United States that mediated an end to the Moroccan army's seizure of the Spanish island of Perejil in July 2002, when Spain's E.U. partners, particularly France and Greece, then just starting its six-month term in the E.U. presidency, proved reluctant to alienate the new Moroccan king.

The idea that Aznar's foreign policy was an aberrant personal enthusiasm that could somehow be excised from the rest of his achievements was never true. But that foreign policy cut against other countries' obsession with building the E.U.—and against the grain of what Spain's intellectual elite considers the country's national identity. Spain's experience of right-wing dictatorship has made it a reflexively center-left country—and it is almost certainly the most anti-American country in Western Europe. Spain has reactionaries who resent Theodore Roosevelt for robbing it of its empire in 1898. It has anti-anti-Communists who fault President Eisenhower for propping up Franco in exchange for military bases in the 1953 Pact of Madrid. It has democracy activists who fault the month-old Reagan administration for sitting idly by on February 23, 1981, when army officers sought to topple Spain's new democracy in a coup d'état. (It is to "23-F," as the day is called, that all Spaniards repair when an argument turns to democracy in Iraq.) The Socialist Felipe González won the presidency the following year on an anti-American platform and ruled for a decade and a half. As one former PSOE cabinet member said in an interview, "Our experience of America is like Italy's experience of America turned inside out."

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So as Aznar drew closer to the United States, he was vulnerable to the accusation that he was reverting to an "older idea of Spain"—a *franquista* one. Juan-Luís Cambrián, editor of *El País*, sought to rally Spaniards around the idea that the Spanish right is inherently undemocratic, and that the shocking absolute majority Aznar won in 2000 had led him to succumb to "authoritarianism." Aznar fought this view. His goal was to create a democratic center-right party—a difficult task in a country where an actual fascist government had given way to a climate of political correctness where conservatives were routinely likened to fascists. To this end, he promised to step down after eight years in power, inviting comparisons to the undislodgeable Socialist González, whom the right had accused of having authoritarian tendencies of his own. "If they'd won," says the Spanish historian Charles Powell, "I'd've said the PP was a great gift to Spain."

The war was never popular, but the idea of Spain as a power on the world stage was. Still, the benefits Aznar was drawing from its involvement were hard to see, and the United States did a miserable job of offering him visible ones—whether in the form of bilateral trade agreements, the semiformal role as a U.S. partner in Latin America that Aznar sought, military procurement contracts, or simply a coherent account from the White House of why Spain was being asked to bear such a heavy burden in Iraq. Spain, which after all had sat out both the first and second world wars, was new to the world stage; unlike Tony Blair, Aznar was wholly dependent on George W. Bush to invite him into the coalition, and then to enunciate a rationale for why Spain was so desperately needed.

For the Spanish nation, the most important foreign policy issues are Europe, the United States, Latin America, and embittered, impoverished, militarily aggressive Morocco, just nine miles south across the Straits of Gibraltar. (Spain and Morocco have had territorial disputes over Mediterranean islands, Spanish cities on the African coast, and the former colony of the Western Sahara.) So it is only with reference to what Zapatero calls his "European vision" of Spanish foreign policy that one can understand the nomination of Miguel Angel Moratinos—who has spent the last eight years in Ramallah unsuccessfully trying to win a role for the European Union in the Middle East peace process—as his foreign minister.

One could see the difference of approach on April 15, when an audiotape from Osama bin Laden offered a separate peace to those European countries that withdrew solidarity from the United States. While most

news sources—and certainly all European ones—portrayed the European response as a univocal rebuff to bin Laden, there were differences in tone that one could pick up by contrasting Moratinos's remarks with those of Italian foreign minister Franco Frattini. What Frattini said was, "It's unthinkable that we open a negotiation with bin Laden. Everybody understands this." Moratinos said: "What we want is peace, democracy, and freedom. We don't have to listen to or answer it."

On an early visit to Washington, Moratinos said that, in the war on terror, he would send troops wherever the U.N. decides. Indeed, the troops Spain plans to send to Afghanistan to augment the 200 it already has there will go under U.N., not NATO, auspices. Never did he cite March 11 to assert Spain's right to self-defense under the U.N. charter, perhaps out of obedience to the strange reverse-Machiavellianism of European strategic thinking, which wields a double standard against itself. From the moment the bombs went off in Madrid, the statements one heard from Zapatero's circle were illogical: On the one hand, Iraq was so disconnected from al Qaeda that Spain's entry into the Iraq war was unjustified. On the other hand, Iraq was so tightly linked to al Qaeda that the March 11 bombings were just tit for tat.

This pair of irreconcilable views is widely held. According to one Aznar adviser, a few days after the March 11 bombings, some of the three dozen men arrested for the attacks brought to the neighborhood of Lavapiés where the attacks had been organized. It was not a perp walk—the goal was to get the terrorists *in situ* to answer investigators' questions. But the authorities noticed something odd. "There were a lot of people on the street," said the Aznar adviser. "But no one was yelling at them. Everybody was silent. The people didn't think the terrorists were responsible for the attacks. They thought the United States was responsible. Or Aznar, maybe."

Spain's entire sense of its safety rests on the idea that March 11 was condign punishment for its participation in the Iraq war. If Spaniards stopped believing that, they would fall into a panic, and they are fighting against a great deal of evidence to make sure they don't. Days after the Leganés raid, police found a bomb, set and armed, on the high-speed train tracks between Madrid and Seville. When a bomb-damaged videotape found in the raided apartment was reconstructed, it was found to contain a series of warnings—recorded on March 27—that the new government would face more attacks because of its announced wish to join the U.N. in Afghanistan. The tape demanded that Spanish troops retire immediately from "the land of the Muslims"—Afghanistan as well as Iraq. And implicitly one other country that jihadists regard as Muslim: Spain itself. Considering that Muslims ruled in Spain for twice as long as Europeans have lived in North America, many jihadist radicals treat Spain not as an infidel country but an apostate one: "If you don't do this, within the space of a week from today," the March 27 message continued, "we shall continue our jihad until martyrdom in the land of Tariq bin Ziyad"—that is, in Spain.

Spain's problem is basically Europe's: It does not want a strategic relationship with the only power that can defend it. And the accident of the Socialist victory has shifted thinking all across Europe towards a strange kind of fatalistic, let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may passivity. Certain intelligent opponents of the Iraq war understand this best. In an article on what he calls "Europa Zapatera" (Zapatero's Europe), Eugenio Scalfari, editor of Italy's *La Repubblica* daily, argued that following the United States into Iraq was a mistake, but he also despaired of entrusting the mission to the U.N. "For what is the U.N.? What can it do? And is it capable of doing it or is it only an alibi to hide the Europeans' impotence before the Iraq crisis?"

The accident of the Socialist victory has shifted thinking all across Europe towards a strange kind of fatalistic, let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may passivity.

The pipe dream is worth pursuing, though, Scalfari continued. "Europa Zapatera is in reality the only possible alternative. Defuse the Iraq bomb and undertake, with seriousness and intelligence, the war against real terrorism, and at the same time impose on Israelis and Palestinians a route to peace that, alone, they have never been capable of building." It is hard to imagine Italians responding the way they have to the holding of three of their fellow citizens in Iraq—sending friends and family of the hostages to beg for their release on Al Jazeera, trying to outdo each other in condemnation of Berlusconi's war—had Spanish voters not reacted as they had to al Qaeda's disruption of the Spanish elections.

The psychological strategy Spaniards have pursued since March 11 has become general across Europe, even in countries that (for now) still belong to the coalition. The strategy is to pretend that, just because an American-led invasion of Iraq seems to be the wrong solution, there is no problem. ♦

The Politics of Bioethics

Playing defense isn't enough

By Eric Cohen & William Kristol

"Nothing illustrates this administration's anti-science attitude better than George Bush's cynical decision to limit research on embryonic stem cells," declared John Kerry in a December 2003 campaign speech. He was referring to the president's August 9, 2001, decision to permit federal funding for existing embryonic stem cell lines, where the embryos in question had already been destroyed, but to deny funding for research involving further embryo destruction.

Ever since President Bush announced his stem cell policy, research advocates have attacked it as "not enough." They want more funding for more lines, without restrictions. They want the freedom to produce embryonic stem cell lines indefinitely, using as many embryos as necessary to advance research on a long list of terrible diseases. The idea of limits—in this case, no taxpayer funding for new embryo destruction—strikes them as incomprehensible and indefensible. In this spirit, Kerry attacks the Bush administration's "recessive gene of pessimism about progress and people," and declares that when "faced with a basic decision on America's health, George Bush chose to go to the right wing instead of the right way." Kerry aims to portray the Democrats as the party of health and progress, the Republicans as the party of suffering, death, and religious zeal.

The question is: How will President Bush respond? No doubt he will defend his policy on federal funding. And no doubt he will argue that the eligible stem cell lines are "enough" to get the medical benefits we seek, and that the issue is fundamentally about "respecting human life," not using it as a means to even the noblest ends. But it is not clear that simply playing defense on this and other bioethics issues will succeed. Indeed, over 200 congressmen sent a letter to the president last week demanding that the current restrictions on federal funding of embryonic stem cell research be lifted. Furthermore, it is increasingly clear that limits on federal funding alone do not guarantee our successfully navigating the "vast ethical mine fields" that President Bush warned of in his stem cell speech. This means reexamining what we have learned in the bioethics fight since it began in earnest in 2001, and sketching what a realistic *offense* might look like in the months and years ahead.

Since the president announced his stem cell policy in August 2001, the science of the brave new world has continued apace—not just the destruction of human embryos on a growing scale, but the manipulation of human reproduction in radical new ways. In its latest report, *Reproduction and Responsibility*, the President's Council on Bioethics finds that the practice of assisted reproduction technology (ART) is largely unregulated. New baby-making technologies are introduced willy-nilly into clinical practice, with little research regarding their effects on the children produced with their aid. Because so many embryos are implanted all at once, nearly half the children born using ART are twins or triplets with disproportionately and often dangerously low birth weights. Some ART clinics already advertise cosmetic baby-making services—such as preimplantation genetic screening to choose the sex of one's child—and these services only promise to increase as our genetic knowledge expands. And it is the ART clinics and their patients that produce thousands of "excess" embryos each year—embryos that are frozen indefinitely or destroyed for research.

Meanwhile, in February 2004, South Korean scientists announced the creation of the first cloned human

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embryos to the blastocyst stage—the stage when they could be implanted in a woman's uterus to initiate a pregnancy or destroyed in the laboratory to harvest stem cells. The report in *Science* magazine sounds hauntingly like the "decanting room" in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*—systematic, precise, unrepentant about its use of women as egg factories and human embryos as raw materials. The South Koreans harvested 242 eggs from 16 women, tested 14 different cloning "protocols," developed 30 human embryos to the 100-cell stage, and destroyed them all to get a single stem cell line.

Just a few months earlier, researchers working with animals showed that it is possible to produce both eggs and sperm from embryonic stem cells, including eggs from male embryos and sperm from female embryos. This means that it might be possible, someday soon, to produce a human child with two male parents or two female parents—and even a human child whose mother, father, or both is a dead embryo. Still other researchers fused together male and female embryos to produce a genderless human hybrid. Chinese researchers have already produced chimeric clones using rabbit eggs and human DNA. And what now seems prosaic—the destruction of IVF embryos for their stem cells—is a growing practice, with a number of states (New Jersey, California) contemplating new public funding initiatives, and a number of universities (Harvard, Stanford) actively creating new embryo research institutes.

While this research has proceeded, the political debate on bioethics has stalled. President Bush's August 2001 decision established an important moral principle, but also left an ambiguous legacy. The moral principle is that society as a whole, using taxpayer money, will not endorse the destruction of human embryos for any purpose; and it will not create public incentives for embryo destruction in the future. Zealous critics have denounced the policy as the 21st-century equivalent of silencing Galileo—attacking the president directly for imposing his personal religious views on science, and often ignoring the fact that Congress, not the president, made the law that prohibits federal funding of embryo research. More sober critics have argued that because more stem cell lines have been produced since the president's decision, these new lines should also be eligible for funding. The "life and death decision," they argue, has once again already been made. But moving the date of eligibility would undermine the moral logic of the Bush policy. It would send the message that the date will keep moving, and that embryo destruction today will be publicly funded tomorrow.

But the Bush decision, while principled, is also a partial decision: It offers no practical proposal for limiting embryo research in the private sector, though it probably discourages some scientists from engaging in research that cannot get NIH funding. It does not confront the question of what to do about excess embryo creation in in vitro fertilization (IVF) clinics during fertility treatment, or what to do about the roughly 400,000 embryos now frozen "in storage." (Only 3 percent of these frozen embryos, by the way, have been made available by their parents for research purposes.) Finally, the Bush decision gives the nation a stake in the success of embryonic stem cell research as a whole, and probably benefits (indirectly) those who destroy embryos with private funds by advancing the field.

In the end, neither side in the embryo debate is happy with the current policy: Embryo research opponents lament the ongoing destruction of embryos in the private sector; embryo research advocates resent the limits on funding. But both sides also fear that things could get worse than they are now—that is, funding limits could loosen (the conservative worry) or legal restrictions could tighten (the liberal worry). The difference, however, is that research supporters are on the offensive—lobbying Congress and the president to make the funding policy more liberal, and aggressively seeking funding in individual states. Embryo research opponents, by contrast, are on the defensive: trying to preserve the Bush policy, with little hope or expectation of banning embryo research in the private sector.

In the one area where conservatives have tried to set broader limits on biotechnology—human cloning—the political fight remains stalled. Since 2001, the cloning debate has been a battle between two competing bills: the Brownback bill and the Hatch-Feinstein bill. The Brownback bill would ban all human cloning, including the creation and destruction of cloned embryos for research. The Hatch-Feinstein bill would endorse the creation and use of cloned embryos for research, then mandate the destruction of all cloned embryos to prevent the production of cloned children. The Brownback bill is the best way to stop the creation of cloned children, by stopping this act at the very first step. And it would set an important precedent that we should not "create human life solely for research and destruction." The Hatch-Feinstein bill, by contrast, makes the American public an accomplice in this troubling practice, and it creates for the first time a class of human life—cloned embryos—that must by law be destroyed.

The case for the Brownback bill is as clear today as it has been for the last three years. But while the Brownback bill has passed in the House of Representatives twice, passage in the Senate is blocked. In the meantime, there remain no ethical limits on biotechnology of any kind: no limits on radical new ways of making babies (cloning and beyond) and no limits on the creation and destruction of human embryos or later-stage fetuses for research, so long as it is done with private money. We are left fighting for limits that may never come, and playing defense for a

policy that only deals with one small piece of the brave new world problem. Perhaps it is time to be both more realistic and more ambitious—more realistic about what is possible now, and more ambitious in seeking limits that go beyond the issue of cloning and beyond restrictions on federal funding for embryonic stem cell research.

For those who worry about where reproductive biotechnology is taking us, there are three fundamental concerns: the destruction of innocent life, the degradation of the family, and the threat of eugenics. Each one requires some elaboration.

The first concern is that in the desire to save human life and promote scientific progress, we will become callous towards life, using the weakest among us as tools to keep the stronger alive. This concern overlaps—both politically and morally—with the abortion issue. Both involve questions about the violability or inviolability of nascent human life, and what we are willing to endure or forgo to respect it. But embryo research is at once more defensible and more corrupting than abortion. It is more defensible because the goal is a humanitarian one (to ease suffering and cure disease rather than end a pregnancy), and because the early-stage embryos in question are so existentially puzzling. They are microscopic, developing, genetically complete human beginnings—not just any beginnings, but the beginnings of a particular human life. But they are created outside their natural environment in the human womb, and often left frozen for years in the IVF clinics where they are made. These embryos may be "one of us," but they don't seem like one of us. The moral transgression of embryo destruction, though real, is not so obvious, while the sick child or Parkinson's patient is obviously suffering.

For the very same reason, embryo research is potentially more corrupting than abortion. It is a fruit we seek, not a transgression we tolerate. It is a premeditated project, not a decision made in crisis. Only the most extreme pro-choice advocates see abortion as a "good" and abortionists as heroes. But embryo-based medicine, if it were possible, would quickly become "standard practice" for the entire society, with leading researchers winning Nobel Prizes and parents who reject it for their children seen as legally negligent. Once cures exist, we might quickly forget that there is a moral problem here at all. Late-stage abortion requires a greater willingness of mother and doctor to look away from the facts of what they are doing, because of the obvious humanity of the developed fetus. But embryo research, so closely tied to the modern medical project that we all esteem, could become a celebrated American way of life in a way that abortion has not.

The second concern about biotechnology involves the degradation of the family, and the possibility that new ways of making babies will undermine the relationship between parents and children. So far, we see this problem most clearly in our fears about human cloning. To clone a child is to wreak havoc on the ties that bind the generations; it is to make our twin brothers into sons and twin sisters into daughters. It is to impose our perverse self-love on innocent children. But cloning is only one part of a larger project to transform human procreation and the human family. This larger project aims to use our biological cleverness to make us into post-biological beings—to create a world where male and female no longer matter, and where welcoming the newborn child as a mystery gives way to genetic screening, selection, and quality control.

Ironically, what made this project possible in the first place was acting technologically on the desire of infertile couples to have a child of their own, flesh of their flesh. To fulfill this biological desire, we invented a way to initiate human life in the laboratory—a way to bring human origins into full human view, and thus make them available for manipulation and control. The first IVF child was born in 1978. Since then, many infertile couples have had children of their own, with IVF to thank for this blessing. But as a result, we also opened the door to new ways of making babies that undermine the very biological ties that IVF aimed to serve. Only by bringing the embryo outside the human body is it now possible to give birth to another couple's child; to have a child where the identity of the father is "anonymous"; or to contemplate women giving birth to genetic copies of themselves or two men having a child that is the fruit of their mixed genes. While of course not all families reflect the biological ties between the generations, there is a difference between adopting a child in need and creating an orphan by design.

Looking back, the significance of IVF cannot be overstated: It is the source of the embryos that are now available for research; it is the technological solution for couples seeking a biological child; and it is the crucial first step in transforming human procreation in radical new ways. Looking ahead, however, it is also clear that we stand at yet another major threshold. IVF, in most cases, still mimics nature—producing a child that is the fruit of a coupled male and female. The new ways of making babies, by contrast, radically depart from nature's sexual pairing, and they violate the family structure that has long imitated and civilized our given nature in the rearing of children.

The final concern about biotechnology is that our growing technical control over reproduction will open the door to a new eugenics—where parents pick and choose the genetic characteristics of their offspring, and society pressures families not to have genetically unfit children. The longtime fear of genetic engineering—superbabies made to

order—is far-fetched. The real danger is something more subtle. It is using genetic information to choose babies with a greater *probability* of their being superior in ways we desire—that is, a greater probability of being tall, or athletic, or musical, or smart. It is not so much the tyrannical parent as the tentative-obsessive parent that is the problem—the parent who is unwilling to accept the child as given, but obsessed with trying to get the best child possible.

The problem with assisted reproduction today is that infertile couples sometimes put their future child in danger. The problem tomorrow will be that fertile parents, so hungry to have the child they want, will forgo natural reproduction for the clinic—where embryos can be created, screened, and tested in advance. Today, we abort children with genetic diseases. Tomorrow, we will select children with genetic advantages—with all the expectations and deformations that this new imposition of parental will introduces into child-rearing.

Peter Steiner

At present, all of these practices remain unregulated and unrestricted in America: The use of genetic screening techniques to try to pick children with "superior" genotypes is ungoverned and unmonitored. Embryo destruction remains fully legal in the private sector, and a recent law passed in New Jersey protects the right of researchers to harvest later-stage fetuses as research tools. Revolutionary new ways of making babies are unhindered, including the now imminent possibility of using the South Korean "cookbook" (as one researcher called it) to try to clone a human child.

In thinking about how to govern this free for all, we have the benefit of the recent unanimous recommendations from the President's Council on Bioethics. The council calls for a ban on implanting human embryos into an animal uterus; a ban on producing embryos with human sperm and animal eggs or animal sperm and human eggs; a ban on initiating a pregnancy for research purposes; a ban on buying, selling, or patenting human embryos; a ban on destroying or harming embryos for research once they reach the 10-14 day stage of development; and a ban on radical new ways of producing a child, including "blastomere fusion" (which would create a child with four genetic parents, not two), conceiving a child whose father or mother is a dead embryo or aborted fetus, and human cloning.

It should be obvious that enacting such recommendations would be a great improvement over the laissez-faire status quo. But the recommendations involving embryo destruction and human cloning have been criticized by some pro-lifers on a number of grounds: for not going far enough, for accepting practices that are unacceptable, and for undermining the ethical clarity required for opposing the misdeeds of the biotechnology project. These criticisms are serious but not decisive. They force the question with which we began: What is a realistic conservative offense on bioethics issues? How does the president balance the steady support of the pro-life community—often the only reliable critics of the new practices—with the need to reach beyond the pro-life community to pass bioethics legislation? Is there wisdom in the partial limits proposed by the council? We believe there is, and that it becomes clear by taking up the two major pro-life criticisms directly.

The first criticism is that the council's recommendations separate reproductive cloning and research cloning, and propose a ban on reproductive cloning only. In doing so, the critics say, the council tacitly endorses the creation of cloned embryos for research; it offers another version of the Hatch-Feinstein bill that pro-lifers have been fighting against for three years. But this is incorrect.

The council's recommendations offer a way of banning reproductive cloning that differs from the two bills that have so far gone nowhere in Congress. When it comes to

the dignity of the family, the council is more ambitious than the Brownback bill—banning not only cloning, but a number of radical ways of making babies. But it does this by recommending a ban on the *creation* of cloned embryos (or other wrongfully produced embryos) *with the intent* of implanting them to begin a pregnancy. Such a law would not (like Hatch-Feinstein) mandate the destruction of any embryos. It would not (like Hatch-Feinstein) endorse the use of embryos for research, but rather preserve the status quo of public silence. The illegal act (unlike Hatch-Feinstein) would be embryo creation, if not all embryo creation. And it would allow the fight for the Brownback bill to continue in parallel, while banning a range of reproductive practices that everyone abhors.

The pro-life rejoinder is that silence means an implicit endorsement of cloned embryo research. And yet, as Leon Kass has pointed out, the Brownback bill, which aims to ban research on cloned embryos, is silent on the creation and destruction of IVF embryos for research. Of course, pro-lifers also reject this practice. They don't endorse it simply by not trying to ban it, and they don't imply that cloned embryos have a more sacred status than IVF embryos. Rather, they take aim at the evils they can limit in the real world, while remaining legislatively silent about the evils they cannot now stop. This is exactly what the council's recommendations do as well—protecting the dignity of human procreation, while remaining silent on the destruction of early embryos.

The second pro-life rejoinder is that by offering an alternative to the Brownback bill, the council recommendations will undermine ongoing efforts to pass the Brownback bill (or legislation like it in the states). They point to the fight in Nebraska, where a pro-embryo-research legislator introduced the council's recommendations verbatim in an effort to stop passage of the Brownback-style bill. But the fact that a pro-embryo research senator is willing to propose recommendations endorsed by pro-life council members like Robert George and Mary Ann Glendon suggests not a weakening of the pro-life side, but a possible movement of the pro-research side in a more conservative direction. Indeed, the Brownback strategy, by itself, may make pro-lifers *less* ambitious than they could be in conservative states, where they might ban all creation of human embryos for research, not just the creation of cloned embryos.

Another pro-life criticism of the council's recommendations is that banning the destruction of embryos for research once they reach the 10- to 14-day stage of development would implicitly endorse research on the earliest human embryos; it would suggest that the moral standing of developing human life changes at the 10- to 14-day line. But this argument seems to us to miss the wisdom of seeking partial—and principled—limits. To ban all embryo destruction after 10 to 14 days is the embryo research equivalent of a partial-birth abortion ban. The only difference is that instead of the 8- to 9-month fetus being given protected status under the law, it is the 10- to 14-day-old embryo. Imagine if a pro-abortion activist like Kate Michelman endorsed the proposition that all abortions after 10 to 14 days should be outlawed. Pro-lifers would be ecstatic. To enact a 10- to 14-day limit on embryo research would put in place the strongest legal protections of developing human life in the post-*Roe* v. *Wade* era. It would force the other side to accept that at least some embryos are morally and legally inviolable. And if those embryos are to be protected, why not others? It would shift the terms of the debate in a pro-life direction, and limit coming evils (like fetus farming) without betraying pro-life principles.

Certainly a total ban on cloning—indeed a total ban on embryo research—would be ideal from a pro-life perspective. But such bans do not seem forthcoming at the federal level. The status quo prevails—which is ultimately a victory for biotechnology without limits. What conservatives need, instead, is a realistic offense, and the council's recommendations are a good example of this approach, though one could imagine other initiatives along these lines as well. The council offers limits that are much better than nothing—by preventing the destruction of some innocent human life, stopping new ways of degrading human procreation and family ties, and shutting down some gateways to a new eugenics.

We stand at a crucial moment in the debate about reproductive biotechnology—a moment like the late 1960s and early 1970s on abortion, or the early 1970s on in vitro fertilization. Despite the many ethical and legal precedents cutting in the opposite direction—towards a culture of autonomy without limits—there is a widespread consensus today against the most radical new ways of making babies and against harvesting fetuses for research. Reproductive freedom does not yet mean the right to have a child by any means possible. And even the most ardent supporters of embryo research still say they would never harm an embryo after 14 days of development. This broad consensus leaves open a door for enacting limits on the most dehumanizing uses of biotechnology, but it is a door that will not remain open forever.

The council's report lays the groundwork for setting such limits. It establishes the principle that not all science is good for the country, and that scientists, too, must answer to the deliberative judgment of the American people. If we act today to prevent some of the worst abuses of biotechnology, we will at least have begun to face the task before us, governing scientific progress in a democratic and moral way. ♦

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The Don Quixote statue in Madrid's Plaza de España. CORBIS.

Quixotic Adventures

Cervantes and the coming of modern times

By Algis Valiunas

Don Quixote is the world's most famous madman—or, at least, the most famous madman who everyone can agree was definitely mad. And one thing his example seems to prove is that much, perhaps too much, of our fate depends on the books we read and how we read them: Ingested without precaution, even the stories of knightly adventures with which Don Quixote was besotted are as destructive of sound thinking as repeated blows to the head.

Of course, that opens another question: What are we to make of the book that points out this fact about books? Miguel de Cervantes's *Don Quixote* is a funny, occasionally hilarious, book. Yet this is comedy of the utmost seriousness: The laughs are played for the highest stakes. Not even Shakespeare's greatest comedies possess Cervantes's commanding ambition. He is out to remap the known world and is not bashful about pointing out where his most illustrious predecessors have gone wrong. The recent—and excellent—translation by Edith Grossman provides the opportunity for the general reader to return to *Don Quixote* and think again about Cervantes.

Daft and ridiculous as Don Quixote is in his untimely vocation of knight-errantry, Cervantes for his own part cut a noble and dashing figure, at least as a young man. The eighteenth-century novelist Tobias Smollett, whose translation of *Don Quixote* remains supreme for brio and dark sparkle, writes that Cervantes "had a turn for chivalry: his life was a chain of extraordinary adventures, his temper was altogether heroic, and all his actions were, without doubt, influenced by the most romantic notions of honor."

Don Quixote
by Miguel de Cervantes
translated by Edith Grossman
Ecco, 940 pp., $29.95

The son of a poor doctor, Cervantes was born in 1547 in the Spanish town of Alcalá de Henares, and little is known of his early years. In 1571, as a soldier of the Holy League, he took part in the celebrated victory over the Turks at the Battle of Lepanto; his taste of glory cost him his left hand, smashed by a shot from an arquebus. As Smollett puts it, with a peculiar mixture of reverence and what sounds to the sensitive twenty-first-century ear like malice, "This mutilation, which redounded so much to his honor, he has taken care to record on divers occasions; and, indeed, it is very natural to suppose his imagination would dwell upon such an adventure, as the favorite incident of his life."

In 1574 he was aboard a ship that fell prey to Barbary pirates, who sold him to a Moor, or perhaps a Greek renegade, in Algiers; he spent five-and-a-half years in slavery, under the regime of Hassan Aga, a tyrant so savage that even the Turks goggled at his inhumanity. Impalement was Hassan's favored trick, and Cervantes braced for an unpleasant end; yet he persisted in a course of brazen defiance, engineered a daring but unsuccessful plot to free himself and fourteen other Spanish captives, toughed out the aftermath,

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schemed at nothing less than the conquest of Algiers, barely eluded a grisly death on four occasions, and finally was released when a priest ransomed him for a thousand ducats.

Cervantes subsequently turned to more peaceable concerns: composing the Arcadian romance *Galatea*, writing some thirty plays, and establishing himself as the patriarch of the serious Spanish theater. Marriage brought financial responsibilities that his writing could not meet; he became a tax collector, got swindled, fell into debt, and wound up in prison. According to legend, Cervantes began to write *Don Quixote* while doing time; more likely, he waited until he got out to undertake his masterpiece. In any case, as Luigi Pirandello once suggested, the ignominy of this incarceration bred the mad fecklessness of Don Quixote, so unexpected from a writer who had been a sterling hero himself. It is a rare artistic master who does not pay dearly for his mastery, and from Cervantes's wretchedness blossomed a work of genius. The first part of *Don Quixote* appeared in 1605, the second ten years later. Cervantes died a famous man in 1616, on the same day as Shakespeare, who reputedly wrote a play based on an episode in *Don Quixote*.

As the story opens, Alonso Quixano is a gentleman in the village of La Mancha, where he is esteemed as the most learned and clever man in town; he owns a library of three hundred books, all tales of chivalry, which are as familiar to him as his own life. Merely to read of knightly exploits leaves him breathlessly unsatisfied, as though he were but half a man: Adventure and romance summon him. Taking lance in hand, clapping a visorless helmet on his head, he hops aboard his skeletal nag, Rocinante (which he imagines a handsome steed), and dedicates his life to the service of his beloved Dulcinea del Toboso, a stumpy peasant trull with a shrewish tongue and garlic on her breath (whom he imagines the fairest of damsels).

Committing himself to the hand of Providence, which steers every knight-errant to his appointed destiny, "Don Quixote," as he now calls himself, knows there has never been a knight more deserving of high glory than he. Soon enough he finds a local peasant, Sancho Panza, as round and earthy as Don Quixote is lean and ethereal, and convinces him to be his squire, enchanting him with the prospect of an island for him to govern, just as he pleases. They shall be companions in loneliness, pursuing dreams no one else can be expected to understand.

The modern world, Max Weber claimed, is a disenchanted one, shorn of the magic that once animated it, that filled it with spirits and gave it meaning; the seventeenth century stands on the cusp between medieval and modern, and Don Quixote is a man of the ancient sort forced to live in times that are becoming lethally uncongenial to souls like his. For him, enchantment is the ordinary state of being. Giants are as common as mushrooms. Demons troll for souls, and infect all they see. Sages and sorcerers patrol the night, seeking out worthy adventurers to aid on their quests. Necromancy is as natural as the sun is revolving around the earth, or the earth is revolving around the sun, and more readily explicable.

Such presuppositions about the character of reality can land a man in some serious difficulty, and Don Quixote careens from one outlandish mischance to the next, gaining no wisdom, deepening only in haplessness as he proceeds. When Sancho, in a hungry pinch, fills his master's helmet with curds and Don Quixote places the helmet on his head, the cagey squire protests that the mush must have been put there by some fiendish wizard out to do Sancho a bad turn. "All things are possible," Don Quixote observes with portentous sonority, unwittingly encapsulating his essential misconception; then he cleans himself off, and declares himself ready to take on Satan himself. Satan never actually does make an appearance, but his minions are everywhere: Believing that he is doing battle with giants, Don Quixote jousts with the renowned windmills, cuts an innkeeper's wineskins to pieces, assaults a pair of monks. When the error of his ways is pointed out to him, as it is after every fiasco, Don Quixote always has the same response: Enchanters have beguiled him once again. His mind is a perfect closed system, a psychotic fortress that reality cannot penetrate.

Reality hammers away at this impregnable bughouse, nevertheless. The new world is a relentlessly mercenary one; everybody worries about money above all, except for some desperate noble lovers and Don Quixote. The pie-eyed Don has no use for cash, because in his reading no knight ever has to pay for anything. He relies utterly on the world's charity, or tries to; uncharitable innkeepers and such tend to complicate his innocent progress. Don Quixote and Sancho meet a page on his way to join the army, singing a woeful little jingle: *I'm forced to go to the war / because I'm so poor; / if I had money believe / me I wouldn't leave*. To fortify the youth, who is consumed with thoughts of money, Don Quixote delivers a perfervid tribute to the soldierly life: the intoxicating smell of gunpowder, the cavalier indifference to death, the honor whose sweetness can be diminished by neither wounds nor poverty.

Splendid words, but in the next chapter one sees the unglamorous, even disgustingly preposterous origins of popular violence: after two councilmen of a village went braying through the woods in search of a lost donkey, the men of nearby villages have taken to braying whenever they encounter the councilmen's townsfolk. Don Quixote tries to head off the coming battle, instructing the angry men in the doctrine of just war, which is not to be conducted over trifles; but then Sancho in his enthusiasm starts braying, a villager attacks him, Don Quixote attacks the villager, a shower of stones pelts the knight and squire, and they retreat under the threat of crossbows and arquebuses.

Like Machiavelli in *The Prince*, Shakespeare in *Richard III*, and Francis Bacon in *The New Organon*, Cervantes plays seriously with the Christian

virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Don Quixote expects every tradesman to practice charity toward him, out of courteous regard for his profession; he places his hope in the love of Dulcinea, even before he has ever seen her; his faith lies in force of arms and a heroic destiny inscribed among the stars. This mad faith in his nonexistent prowess and misdirected virtue assails his own considerable Christian faith, quite literally: Mistaking a procession of penitents bearing a draped image of the blessed Virgin for a gang of evildoers abducting a gracious lady, he draws his sword on the priests and peasants, and of course gets a drubbing for his trouble.

This episode might seem to indicate that Cervantes is as ardent a defender of the One True Faith as he is a detractor of the don's aberrant faith in martial nerve and chaste eroticism. Yet in destroying the fancies of chivalric romance stories, Cervantes simultaneously mounts a sneak attack on Christianity itself, chipping subtly away at the faith based on yet another book—The Book. Indeed, Don Quixote insists on the literal truth of the Bible with the same force that he insists on the literal truth of the knightly adventures of romance literature. People disagree on whether giants ever walked the earth, he states, but Holy Scripture, "which cannot deviate an iota from the truth," proves they did, in the story of Goliath. It is the sort of testimonial designed to make a Christian cringe.

Similarly, there is Cervantes's sympathetic treatment of Islam. There are Muslims good as any Christians in this book—though the best of these Muslims are converts to or friends of Christianity—and their official persecution in Spain is presented as a dire human tragedy. That is not to say that Islam holds the truth that Christianity does not. Early in the novel, after Don Quixote has been pulped by a muledriver he crossed, he consoles himself by recalling a ballad about Valdovinos, "a history known to children, acknowledged by youths, celebrated, and even believed by the old, and, despite all this, no truer than the miracles of Mohammed."

This dismissal of the Koran acquires its full destructive significance only much later, when Don Quixote asserts the inviolable truth of the famous stories that he says everyone believes, but which the reader knows to be fictional.

CORBIS *Cervantes*

Cervantes leaves no orthodox religious hope untouched, and he operates with the cunning discretion of Machiavelli or Bacon, bold in what he discloses but far bolder in what he conceals. A definite chill underlies the warm geniality of *Don Quixote*; it is the breath of icy reason, threatening to blow the doors off revealed religion and the entire medieval world.

Although reason threatens, it also offers a new order of blessing to those willing to accept it. Reflecting on Sancho's abdication from his island governorship—a joke concocted by a playful duke and duchess—Cervantes concludes, "only human life races to its end more quickly than time, with no hope for renewal except in the next life, which has no boundaries that limit. So says Cide Hamete, a Muslim philosopher, because an understanding of the fleeting impermanence of our present life, and the everlasting nature of the life that awaits us, has been grasped by many without the enlightenment of faith but only with the light of their natural intelligence." The authority of Cide Hamete resides in the power of his mind—and it is not diminished by his being a Muslim, for native human reason is what Cervantes praises here.

Cide Hamete Benengeli (*Cide* meaning *señor*) is no marginal figure in the novel. In a curious moment, *Don Quixote* contains a discussion of itself—as, early in Part II, Don Quixote and Sancho discuss Part I, which a learned young graduate of the University of Salamanca, Sansón Carrasco, tells them about. And, it is claimed, Part I was written by Cide Hamete Benengeli—the "wise Moor" and "first author" of *Don Quixote*; the Castilian version of Cervantes is thus, supposedly, a Spanish translation from the original Arabic.

That the author of his story should be a Moor upsets Don Quixote; "one could not expect truth from the Moors, because all of them are tricksters, liars, and swindlers." In particular, he worries the lascivious Moor has made something unclean of the knight's spotless longing for Dulcinea. Sansón puts his fears to rest: The Moor writes not as a poet but as a historian, scrupulous with the truth. The captious Sancho frets that among the beatings his master got, his own might have been overlooked by Cide Hamete; Don Quixote tells him to be quiet so the main character can hear more about himself.

At Sansón's admission that some readers have found Hamete's work-

manship a touch slapdash—there are stories inserted that have nothing to do with Don Quixote—the hero is incensed and fumes that a commentary will be needed so the reader can make sense of his story. Sansón assures him the tale is clear as the purest water: Everyone can read it, and everyone who reads it loves it.

The Moor's authorship presents Don Quixote with a possibility he had not considered: The truth can come from an unauthorized source. The wise Moor may not subscribe to The Book, but he has written the book that Don Quixote regards as the greatest story ever told.

Of course, the reader knows that Hamete never wrote the book, never existed at all: He is as much Cervantes's invention as all the characters he purportedly wrote about. The historical truth about Don Quixote is that there can be no history of him, no truth; the book that appears to be the authoritative version of his life is a fiction within a fiction. True, there are flecks of the real world swimming in the brew: a copy of Cervantes's romance *Galatea* is found in Don Quixote's library; a character alludes to Cervantes's boldness in Moorish captivity; the outraged Don savages the bastardized sequel to Part I that one Avellaneda really did write. These droplets of reality only further enrich the confusion.

This dizzying uncertainty is very much a seventeenth-century phenomenon. The sixteenth century had been much more confident in its exuberance. François Rabelais, for instance, was a monk who left the cloister to study medicine, and his vast *Gargantua and Pantagruel* (1534-1551) celebrates the passing of the medieval order and the birth of a novel, superior wisdom in matters human and divine. The book tells the tale of two giants, father and son, in love with life: scholars of cosmopolitan voracity, philosophers of celestial lucidity, worshippers of reason who also happen to be breakneck roisterers, guzzlers, feasters, brawlers, athletes, comedians, warriors, and fornicators.

Gargantua and Pantagruel are creatures of an epoch that produced men of such capacious mind and formidable body—Leonardo, Michelangelo, Leon Battista Alberti—that they must have seemed giants: The spectacle of living human greatness inspired Rabelais in the creation of these hulking comic virtuosi. "Do what you will" is Rabelais's brash motto: He is confident that the anarchic monstrosities that explode into consciousness when the lid is removed—wild and sometimes foul energies embodied in Pantagruel's roguish sidekick Panurge—will be contained by reason or laughed into moral inconsequence. The fully human can hold both lewd hilarity—this is a book heavy on rhapsodic obscene delirium—and the noblest aspiration without fatal distress to either.

It took a while for the consequences of this Renaissance daring and innovation to be appreciated, and Rabelais's sixteenth century gives way to Cervantes's seventeenth. Don Quixote and his comedy are of a radically different sort. Gargantua and son are larger than any men imagined before; Don Quixote is less than he imagines himself to be. Rabelais conceived of giants and made them live; Don Quixote sees giants, but they turn out to be windmills. Rabelais presents men equal to their marvelous world; Cervantes portrays a man at once too large and too small for the world he inhabits. The disparity between what the hero wants the world to be and what in fact it is provides the source at once of Cervantes's antic humor and his profound sadness; Don Quixote is both a hilarious clown and the Knight of the Sorrowful Face, a man of sorrows for the really new dispensation.

Don Quixote represents a new condition for mankind which takes some getting used to, so that the mind of greatest sensitivity—a mind such as Cervantes's—finds itself uncomfortably poised between piety and irreverence, lurching now and then into one or the other, yet generally keeping a wary eye on both, unwilling or unable to come down decisively for either side. Cervantes is of the first generation of great modern agnostics. His pained ambivalence illuminates Don Quixote's glory and misery. He is superior to the unexceptional multitudes, who nevertheless point up his utter failure as a viable human specimen. His mad longing for the marvelous is shatteringly poignant, for the human arrangements of his time have no place for it. Neither do the human arrangements of ours. ♦

Indian Fighter

The American life and times of George Bent.

BY BILL CROKE

In 1915 the noted ethnologist George Bird Grinnell published his *The Fighting Cheyennes*, maybe the best book ever written about an Indian tribe. Grinnell's tome partly derived from the work of George E. Hyde of Omaha, Nebraska, a "housebound scholar," deaf and nearly blind after a childhood attack of scarlet fever, and Hyde's extensive archive was, in turn, the result of a voluminous ten-year correspondence with George Bent of Colony, Oklahoma.

Bent and Hyde were trying to get published Bent's memoir, which included the story of the Southern Cheyennes going back through George Bent's long life. Hyde's worsening health brought the project to a halt, and at Bent's urging, the manuscript was handed over to Grinnell with the idea that with his help the book that

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CORBIS

Bent's Fort

was Bent and Hyde's dream would emerge. Instead, Grinnell essentially stole it, adding the rich material to his own researches, and giving Bent and Hyde only passing mention as sources in *The Fighting Cheyennes*.

Now, in the well-written and detail-rich *Halfbreed: The Remarkable True Story of George Bent*, David Fridtjof Halaas and Andrew E. Masich give a perhaps deserved slap to the underhanded George Bird Grinnell. Bent had a remarkable pedigree. His father William and his uncle Charles were legendary figures in the fur trade era, building "the adobe castle" of Bent's Fort on the Arkansas River in Colorado in 1833, which became the trade center for the tribes of the southern plains. Uncle Charles Bent moved on to Taos, got rich on the wagon freight commerce of the Santa Fe Trail, married into a prominent Mexican family, and became New Mexico's first U.S. territorial governor (though he did not govern long, as he was killed in the Taos Uprising of 1847).

William Bent first made a favorable impression on the Cheyennes when he hid two of them from marauding Comanches intent on revenge for Cheyenne horse thievery. This led to his marriage to Owl Woman, daughter of Chief White Thunder, the keeper of the Cheyenne Sacred Medicine Arrows, thus a man of great influence among the scattered bands of the Cheyennes. The match gave William cachet not only among the Southern Cheyennes, but also their allies the Arapahos, and later—in more peaceful times—the Kiowas and Comanches. The union was a wise business decision, but also a loving one that produced four children: Mary, Robert, George, and Julia. William also had a son, Charley, by Yellow Woman in 1845 (a relative of Owl Woman, and a situation not unusual among the Cheyennes). Owl Woman died giving birth to Julia in 1847.

George Bent (*Ho-my-ike*, or "Beaver," was his Cheyenne name) was born on July 7, 1843, in Owl Woman's lodge, pitched outside the walls of Bent's Fort. His early life was lived as a Cheyenne boy who learned to hunt buffalo, ride (and steal) horses, practice the arts of war, and study the nuances of Cheyenne society, some of which was closed to him because of his mixed blood. He learned about the political interactions of the Cheyenne warrior societies: the Crooked Lances, the Bowstrings, the Kit Foxes, the Red Shields, and the feared and bellicose Dog Soldiers (or "Dog Men"), the latter playing a role in George's young manhood. His brother Charley would die a Dog Soldier.

Halfbreed
The Remarkable True Story of George Bent
by David Fridtjof Halaas and Andrew E. Masich
Da Capo, 447 pp., $30

Following the example of other traders, William sent the Bent children to Missouri boarding schools, in George's case the Christian Brothers Academy and Webster College in St. Louis. From there an educated George rashly enlisted in the Confederate army at the start of the Civil War. He served as an artilleryman, participated in a couple of small engagements, and in August 1862, was captured by Union forces in Mississippi and imprisoned near St. Louis. He was released thanks to his father's political connections, swore an oath of allegiance to the Union, and drifted back to the familiar world of the Colorado plains, where he eventually attached himself to Chief Black Kettle's Cheyennes, encamped on Sand Creek in the fall of 1864.

At dawn on November 29, Black Kettle's village was attacked by Colonel John Chivington's First Colorado Volunteers, a Union militia that had defeated a force of Confederate Texans at the Battle of Glorieta Pass, New Mexico, in 1862, halting the Rebel advance toward the Colorado goldfields. The First Colorado was also responsible for punishing Indian depredations, and Chivington was bound to make an example of a Cheyenne village following raids along the Arkansas and South Platte Rivers. As it happens, Black Kettle, a well-known "peace chief," had nothing to do with the raids, and for safety had been advised by government authorities to camp on Sand Creek. An American flag flew outside of his lodge.

Sand Creek (along with George Custer's similar attack on Black Kettle on the Washita River in 1868) has been recorded as one of the most gruesome atrocities of the Indian wars. Chivington's troops rode through the village literally shooting anyone who moved. In gloomy detail, *Halfbreed* records that 170 Cheyennes were killed, including 110 women and children. Bodies were scalped and mutilated as the soldiers sought grisly trophies that eventually were paraded through the dusty streets of Denver. Chivington had ordered his troops not to discriminate in the extermination, even to kill children: "Kill all—little and big—nits make lice." Leaving the lodges and personal possessions behind, George, Black Kettle, and four hundred others ran for their lives, and eventually found refuge—many wounded, naked, and starving—in Chief Tall Bull's Dog Soldier village on the Smoky Hill River.

The mindless carnage of Sand Creek embittered George, causing him and other young men to join the Dog Soldiers in a many months-long reign of terror on the central plains of Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas. The sometimes ostracized Dog Soldiers were suddenly seen by many Cheyennes as the tribe's only hope for survival, and they savagely attacked ranches, railroad camps, telegraph stations, and freight wagon traffic moving along the Santa Fe Trail.

In January 1865, they were bold enough to attack the town of Julesburg, Colorado Territory. In a running battle they killed fifteen soldiers from nearby Camp Rankin, along with several civilians, without losing a single warrior. The rest of the troopers shut themselves behind the walls of their stockade while the Indians ransacked a nearby government warehouse and ran off a large herd of horses, mules, and cattle. Amidst the wild looting in the warehouse, George broke open several tins of raw oysters (a delicacy to which he had been introduced in St. Louis) and slurped them down "to the amazement and disgust of his friends." The Dog Soldiers would not be broken until the Battle of Summit Springs in 1869.

Early in the struggle George saw the wisdom of a kept peace. His youthful adventures of riding with the Dog Soldiers were slowly replaced by actions that reflected the realization that opposition to the white advance was futile. His mastery of the Cheyenne and Arapaho languages made him valuable as a paid interpreter during the endless parleys between the government and the tribes. George was instrumental in the negotiations that resulted in the signing of the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867, which for the first time assigned reservations, with definite boundaries and promises of rations and other supplies, to the tribes of the southern plains.

In 1874, a clash of Indians and hide hunters at Adobe Walls, Texas, sparked the Red River War, involving the Cheyennes, Kiowas, and Comanches. Massive federal retaliation followed, as five columns numbering three thousand troops converged on the Texas Panhandle and neighboring western Kansas, where the last renegades were subdued, their villages burned, and horse herds shot. Indian resistance on the southern plains ceased in the winter of 1875, as the last starving stragglers returned to the reservations. The same was true on the northern plains following the Custer debacle at the Little Bighorn eighteen months later.

George Bent spent the remainder of his life among his Cheyenne brethren in Oklahoma, for in the end he despised the white world. He went through a period of severe alcoholism as whiskey trading was rampant on the reservation in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, and he himself participated in the trade. His periods of extreme drunkenness cost him a number of interpreter jobs and strained relations with his wives and children. And in the end—along with the tragic figure that was George Hyde—he had a great book stolen from him by George Bird Grinnell, a worldly intellectual and confidant of Theodore Roosevelt.

There is a history of America in the fact, about which Bent himself marvelled, that a man born in a buffalo-hide lodge could live to read about aerial combat in newspaper accounts of the Great War in Europe. He died in 1918, and his friends gathered to sing the Cheyenne death song: "Nothing lives forever, only the earth and the mountains." ♦

Blaming the Jews

Do we face a new anti-Semitism, or the return of the old anti-Semitism? **BY WERNER J. DANNHAUSER**

Keeping track of anti-Semitism is steady work. The next instance is always lurking in the wings—and those who point it out will always seem to be exaggerating and making matters worse by playing into the hands of "real" anti-Semites. Yet the people who worry about anti-Semitism know a big thing: Anti-Semitism thrives on denial. The work of those who keep track of it is therefore not only steady but mandatory, and both Abraham Foxman's *Never Again? The Threat of the New Anti-Semitism* and Gabriel Schoenfeld's *The Return of Anti-Semitism* are worthy endeavors.

Never Again?
The Threat of the New Anti-Semitism
by Abraham H. Foxman
HarperSanFrancisco, 305 pp., $24.95

The Return of Anti-Semitism
by Gabriel Schoenfeld
Encounter, 193 pp., $25.95

The books could hardly help overlapping. Each offers a diagnosis of the alarming increase of anti-Semitism since the end of World War II, and each surveys the current scene. To a great extent they feature the same cast: One can't write such a book without referring to Arafat in the Middle East, Jörg Haider in Austria, Louis Farrakhan in the United States, and the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* just about everywhere—but especially in Arab countries.

What is more, both books agree on a wide array of facts and assessments: that anti-Semitism was given a bad name, as it were, by Hitler and therefore went into a lull after the Nazis' defeat, for example. But it did not vanish, and all the signs point to a continuing upsurge today. That upsurge received a boost by the onset of the second round of the intifada in Israel in 2000. Today's anti-Semitism may not

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be identical with anti-Zionism, but it is inseparably linked to it—and, because of the situation in the Middle East, it is on the verge of becoming indistinguishable from it. This calls for alarm, especially since even the United States, historically blessed by the unparalleled weakness of anti-Semitism within its borders, today shows signs of a spreading infection of the disease.

Does all this mean that one can speak of a *new* anti-Semitism? On this point the authors disagree. Foxman refers to the "new anti-Semitism" in his subtitle; Schoenfeld speaks of the "return of anti-Semitism." The difference is real. Abraham Foxman is the national director of the Anti-Defamation League, for which he has worked since 1965; in the public mind he *is* the Anti-Defamation League. Both he and his organization tend to view anti-Semitism as fundamentally a right-wing phenomenon.

Thus "the Right" appears in the title of two of his book's chapters, and Foxman repeatedly mentions Mel Gibson and his popular new movie, while Gabriel Schoenfeld mentions Gibson only in one footnote. Thus, too, Foxman is more concerned than Schoenfeld about breaches in the wall of separation between church and state—believing, with less than compelling evidence, that any breach is bad for the Jews (and the nation) and not acknowledging the complexity of the Constitution on this point.

Still, Foxman recognizes that the newness of the new anti-Semitism is in large part due to the great upsurge of left-wing hatred of the Jews. Anti-Semitism today has learned to speak in terms of Jewish racism and Jewish colonialism. As he puts it: "In today's new mutant strain of anti-Semitism, traditional elements of the extreme right and the extreme left are working together, often in concert with immigrants of Arab descent and terrorist organizations based in the Middle East."

The term "new anti-Semitism" may have the advantage of drawing attention to current misdeeds, but it has the disadvantage of tending to sever those crimes from the past and thereby make denial easier. Thus when young thugs in France desecrate cemeteries and burn synagogues they can be reprimanded for their "misguided" acts instead of being charged with murderous hatred of Jews. Schoenfeld does not fall into this trap, although he does not at all deny that there is something new in the air. Indeed, at one point he speaks of "an unexpected twist in the helix of anti-Semitism's DNA."

Landov

CORBIS

Above: desecrated graves in Russia. Below: graves in France.

Foxman's book is more immediately personal than Schoenfeld's book. That is not surprising, because Foxman is more active in the public forum. Also, he likes to talk about himself. At one point, when he writes about his childhood, he tells a most moving story. Born in Poland in 1940, he was, for his safety, put in the care of a Polish Catholic woman by his parents, a woman whose obvious decency did not always eradicate her bias against Jews. At other times he fails to be as touching, as when he shows himself as exceptionally partial to the limelight, a man whom Jerry Falwell calls "Abe" and who redeems Dolly Parton from talking thoughtlessly about the Jews. At times he is simply unfair, as when he accuses William F. Buckley Jr. of either latent anti-Semitism or a flirtation with it, without deigning to offer any evidence whatsoever. These reservations are not meant to deny that Foxman has fought the good fight for many years; he has been dogged and fearless in holding public figures to account. But he might have written a better book if he had used a tone less brash.

Gabriel Schoenfeld's tone is perfect. He has thought deeply about the dreadful phenomenon he ponders. In spite of some similarities to Foxman's book, *The Return of Anti-Semitism* is really quite different. Foxman dwells on the public sphere; Schoenfeld specializes in the domain of theory, of thought that molds and sometimes determines practice. He deals deftly with dozens of intellectuals and their ideas. Thus one finds in his book mentions of names like Noam Chomsky,

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Left: An anti-Semitic attack in Buenos Aires. Center: The Israeli embassy in London in 1994. Right: Louis Farrakhan denouncing the Jews.

Edward Said, Norman Cohn, Karl Marx, Tony Judt, and Stanley Hoffman, all of whom fail to appear in Foxman's book.

Schoenfeld's heavy emphasis on the intellectual sphere is compelling. There may be no such thing as an entirely *new* hatred of Jews, but the disease today has a different visage than it did in the first half of the twentieth century: "One is less likely to find anti-Semites today in beer halls and trailer parks than on college campuses and among the opinion makers of the media elite."

Schoenfeld begins his dissection of the disease with an analysis of what he calls "the Islamic strain." That is a sensible and even obvious start, but not an inevitable one, for anti-Semitism has a long history. Christianity must bear some responsibility for spreading it, a fact acknowledged of late by the Vatican, but one finds anti-Semitism even before Christianity: when Haman in the Book of Esther plots against "a certain people," for instance, and when even as wise a Roman as Tacitus indulges it. In a cruel historical irony, the Muslim world inherited a long and dishonorable European legacy at a time when the illness at last showed signs of abating in Europe itself.

Nobody, certainly not Schoenfeld, denies that the state of Israel, productive and free and modern, is an irritant to the Arab world, a thorn in its side. Nobody, certainly not Schoenfeld, denies that Israel's policies and deeds are not always what they ought to be. Nevertheless, hatred of Zionism and Israel are today the core and essence of anti-Semitism. Israel is judged by standards not applied to any other country in the world, and only Israel (with the possible exception of the United States) is the subject of limitless calumny.

Some, of course, say they are harsh on Israel and the Jews because they *expect* more of Jews and their country. That might excuse the Biblical prophets, who gave evidence of their steadfast love of the Jews. Where is the love of Israel in the authors who issue after issue castigate it in the *New York Review of Books*? Having more or less exported modern anti-Semitism to the Muslim world, Europe has been reinfected by the disease it sent abroad. (That was a sad story, brought home to me personally when I realized I no longer felt comfortable visiting Paris, one of the cities of my dreams.)

The Return of Anti-Semitism tells a sad story that becomes especially worrisome toward the end, when Schoenfeld forces himself and the reader to consider the possibility of "the end of the American exception." He does not mean that we have ever been completely free of anti-Semitism; he knows all about Henry Ford and Charles Lindbergh. He worries about the combination of a new virulence and respectability. We would do well, all of us, to worry with him, as we brace ourselves against what he calls "a descent into delusion."

The only cure for delusion is understanding. One should not blame these books for their failure to offer complete understanding. Fully to understand anti-Semitism would mean fully to understand the Jews, and such understanding may well not be accessible to reason. It is surely not available to the vocabulary and methods of social science that are dear to Abraham Foxman, who has too much faith in surveys and in terms such as "stereotype." It eludes even Gabriel Schoenfeld, at least here. Neither book tells us enough about the Jews.

That may be wise, for both authors know to beware the insidious view, so chic in many circles, that where there are executions the victims are at least in part to blame. Nevertheless, one must occasionally ask what it is about the Jews that has made them such targeted victims from time immemorial. When one delves into their mysterious history, one begins to suspect that they are chosen—chosen, as Gershom Scholem once put it, by somebody for something. Many Jews have trouble believing that. Sometimes they have more trouble believing that than their enemies. ♦



"I understand you've taken a vow of silence."

Books in Brief

***Present Value: A Novel* by Sabin Willett (Villard, 416 pp., $24.95).** This fall Sabin Willett published an unexpected novel—and if you missed it before Christmas, now is the time to catch up with it. His two previous novels, *The Deal* (1996) and *The Betrayal* (1998), were both in the mystery-cum-business-and-law genre. Both were enjoyable, but neither seemed to aspire to be much more than a relatively well-done pop novel.

Present Value is different. Filled with satirical descriptions of life in the upper tiers these days, the book opens with a description of Fritz Brubaker pulling up to the ritzy private school to which he and his wife Linda send their kids. There's one long line of SUVs, and each one stops and the parent hops out to escort "Precious Cargo" into the school. One minivan in the midst of the SUVs, he thinks, looks like it's being held hostage. Not too long after, we see Linda in adultery with a fat, old partner in her law firm. Even before the four-minute act is over, she's already checking her email. And Willett then shows her attempts to justify herself to her psychiatrist, who knows exactly how to milk rich women.

But *Present Value* is more than just a source of many good laughs. At three points we flashback to lectures in an economics course at Amherst in 1976, and those lectures are a vehicle for making points about economic value and its profound limits. Few of the original reviewers of *Present Value*—all of them laudatory—picked up the underlying religion in the book. There's little on the surface of the book that would immediately point to it, but Willett is clearly presenting the book as an example of redemption. Fritz goes to jail for some insider trading that was actually done by his son, a fact that he refuses to reveal. When his son finally visits him in prison, Fritz tells him that he didn't maintain silence to protect his son from jail. After all, in our age, the son would simply have been shipped off for a while to a therapist, and at most would come to the conclusion that he had been stupid. Only by seeing his father in jail could he actually come to understand that what he had done was not just stupid but *wrong*.

A somewhat forced plot contrivance—the introduction of a much younger woman, Ronnie, who is a private detective—provides the temptation for Fritz to betray his marital fidelity. But the issue is not just adultery, because Ronnie turns out to be "faithful" to him, visiting him weekly throughout his jail term (unlike his wife). So when he gets out, where should he head? To New York and Ronnie, or to Wellesley and Linda (who is now engaged in an affair with a creepy artist) and his children? Willett, for all the broadness of the humor in his satire, is not so blunt with his most serious points, and he doesn't present the choice between Ronnie and Linda as a simple one.

Intellectuals, artists, and novelists have been in the forefront of modernity, and seem to enjoy nothing so much as undermining traditional ideals. That is why writers like Willett are so unexpected, so necessary, and so wonderful. It seems that there *are* people who can defend moral ideals and give us a bellyful of laughs in the process.

—Christopher Wolfe

***Vale of Tears* by Peter T. King (Taylor, 320 pp., $24.95).** A terrorist cell makes three attacks in New York. The intelligence community receives information that al Qaeda, aided by an IRA splinter group, is close to unleashing a dirty bomb on the city. Sean Cross, a Republican congressman, uses his contacts around the world to put the pieces together before it is too late.

In *Vale of Tears*, the real congressman Peter King combines two issues he knows well: terrorism and Irish affairs. His expertise is evident in the storyline, and his writing draws the reader into the shadowy world of modern terrorism. With half of the book dedicated to 9/11, however, the fictional terrorist plot seems hurried and ends abruptly. Still, *Vale of Tears* provides a chilling look at the terrorist threat and also a glimmer of hope that increased vigilance might thwart future attacks.

—Cory Crocker

NATION

Hair Force One

In a sudden switch, voters go for Bush's ragtop over Democrat Kerry's lush, well-attended coif

BY CRISTINA REIMER WASHINGTON

Even this early in the 2004 presidential campaign, things already are beginning to get hairy.

In a poll issued April 31 by CBS/*New York Times*, 53 percent of Americans preferred president George W. Bush's rather careless hairdo to that of his more militantly kempt Democratic challenger, John Forbes Kerry. This represents a dramatic switch from a month ago, when 75 percent of American women and 56 percent of American men expressed a preference for the Massachusetts senator's vastly more ambitious coif.

Many believe that this radical switch in national opinion is owing to the revelation, made by senator Kerry's stylist, Isabel Goetz of Salon Christophe in Washington, D.C., that the senator sleeps in a hair net. Thus far the candidate's campaign manager has refused to comment beyond admitting only that it is true that Kerry wears a cap in the shower.

"It's an expensive haircut, and a fairly elaborate do," said Terry McAuliffe, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, in a press conference after the new poll was released, "and it should come as no surprise that it requires careful maintenance. Besides, with the exception of Ronald Reagan, Democrats generally have more hair than Republicans and therefore more problems with grooming." According to political scientists at the Hair Institute in Washington, D.C., it was Ronald Reagan's low hairline that helped attract a great many so-called "Reagan Democrats" in the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections.

Mary Beth Cahill, Senator Kerry's campaign manager, in response to the revelations on the *Tonight Show with Jay Leno*, said at a news conference after the poll was released, "Even if the senator sleeps in a hair net—and I'm not saying that he does—it is certainly nothing to be ashamed of. Men should have the same rights as women when it comes to hair care."

Cahill refused to release any exact figures on the candidate's budget for hairspray, and whether or not this comes out of soft-money campaign contributions also remains unknown.

MANE EVENT: Kerry's support thins as Bush's workaday locks pull ahead.

Many people have noted that Senator Kerry has the lowest hairline of any Democratic party presidential candidate since John F. Kennedy. When apprised of the new hair poll, former senator Robert Dole said, "John Kerry is no JFK," adding, "but, then, as those of us old enough to remember know, neither was JFK."

"It's an unfair campaign tactic," said former President Jimmy Carter, the man who installed the first hotcomb in the White House. "If a man wishes to take good care of his hair and grooming generally, I see no reason why it should be used against him."

Republicans, meanwhile, have complained that, in recent Democratic party television commercials, President Bush is shown with the part on his left side crooked. The commercials also feature a photograph of the president, taken by Annie Leibovitz for *Vanity Fair*, showing both nose and ear hair.

"The man is our commander-in-chief," said Ken Mehlman, Bush campaign manager. "He's fighting a war and doesn't have time for worrying about careful grooming. Right now he has to leave the hair nets, shower caps, and spray to his opponent."

"This figured to be a low campaign," said Democratic senator Joseph Biden, patting his white hair plugs, worn *en brosse*, in place. "But I think everyone ought to leave hair styling out of it."

Senator Carl Levin, a Democrat who wears what his Republican colleague John McCain has called "the most elaborate combover on the Hill," agreed. "How a man chooses to deal with his hair is his own business," Levin said, "though I can see where a lot of politicians might be envious of Senator Kerry's vigorous growth of hair and admirable hairline."

According to the CBS/*New York Times* poll, Senator Kerry's hair plays least well in the upper-middle western states of Minnesota, the Dakotas, and Iowa. It won a 50 percent approval rating in Ohio, and 87 percent approval in California. ■