the weekly Standard

JANUARY 26, 2004 • $3.95

WHY WE DIDN'T GO AFTER AL QAEDA BEFORE 9/11
RICHARD H. SHULTZ, JR.

Does Wesley Clark Have a Prayer?

Matthew Continetti

The cultish Dean campaign
David Tell

The quiet Bush campaign
Fred Barnes

HILLARY: Dishonest, Grasping, and Corrupt

And, She's Going to Do Everything She Can to Become President



"THIS IS A WOMAN WHO'S BEEN FIRST LADY, WHO'S LIVED IN THE White House and shared power with a president," says one of Hillary's fellow Senators. "Her ambition is not the Senate leadership.... It's obvious she has a much greater goal in mind. Her ambition is the White House, with all the moves to prepare the way." Now, R. Emmett Tyrrell and Mark Davis reveal in ***Madame Hillary: The Dark Road to the White House*** that not only is Hillary determined to be President: she has the power, the influence, and the determination to attain that goal.

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The Scientific Basis of Teaching Reading

Herbert J. Walberg is a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution; a member of Hoover's Koret Task Force on K–12 Education; and University Scholar and research professor emeritus of education and psychology at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Because learning in most subjects depends on reading skills, reading proficiency can be considered the most important goal in the early grades. Yet a National Assessment of Educational Progress survey shows that only 29 percent of fourth graders are proficient in reading. **Children who fall substantially behind in reading in the early grades are unlikely to catch up**—meaning that the process of dropping out of high school often starts in the early years.

The problem is more acute for children who live in poverty. By age four, poor children are exposed to about thirteen million words used by their parents, mostly in simple sentences, whereas the affluent child is exposed to about forty-five million words, often in more complex sentences.

Researchers have synthesized a great number of control-group studies that reveal scientific principles for effectively teaching reading. Preschoolers, for example, benefit greatly from talking with and receiving coaching from their parents, from whom they learn vocabulary, grammar, pronunciation, and a general knowledge of the world. Their parents and teachers can also foster sound and letter recognition, knowledge of how letters combine to form sounds, and "decoding," or sounding out words.

After mastering these elements, students need sufficient practice to gain fluency and meaningful oral reading. If fourth graders are still struggling with sounding out words, and if they need a tongue between their teeth to remember the sound blend of "th," they are unlikely to enjoy reading and thrive academically. The more students read out loud and to themselves, the more they build their fluency as well as their vocabulary and the knowledge to understand new texts.

As readers progress, they learn "comprehension strategy"—the identification of questions or purposes—to guide their reading and measure their progress. They need explicit instruction in how to skim material for a quick overview or to find a given fact or idea, but they also need to learn to read a poem or scientific passage reflectively, intensively, and perhaps repeatedly until they have a deep and thorough understanding. Skilled readers have learned to adapt such methods to their purposes and to look for milestones of their progress.

Wise teachers know the inefficiency of teaching students things they already know and things they are not yet able to learn. Parents, teachers, and students themselves can make reading time more efficient by choosing material that is sufficiently but not overly challenging. Moreover, choosing material that is inherently interesting for particular students may enhance motivation.

Finally, students need to know how they are progressing. Conversations with teachers and parents, classroom discussions and quizzes, and formal examinations can provide useful information about students' mastery of texts and the strengths and weaknesses of their specific reading skills.

Each of these principles has an excellent record of fostering skilled, masterful reading. **If all children were afforded the scientific principles for effectively teaching reading, perhaps nine in ten rather than three in ten would be proficient readers by fourth grade**, and we could expect their success to show in later grades and in high school completion rates.

— Herbert J. Walberg

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The O'Neill Fizzle

Paul O'Neill's revenge on the Bush administration turns out to be the Comet Kohoutek of political scandals—over almost before it began and deeply underwhelming. The fired former Treasury secretary had a great 48 hours of publicity. Then, poof: The fizzle was so complete that by the end of the week, even the most partisan of columnists, *Slate*'s Michael Kinsley, would conclude: "The only solid punch he lands on President Bush is unintentional: What kind of idiot would hire this idiot as secretary of the Treasury?"

But hopes were high out in Bush-bashing land on January 9, the Friday before O'Neill's interview with Leslie Stahl aired on *60 Minutes.* CBS's publicity machine had released juicy excerpts from O'Neill's as-told-to memoir, *The Price of Loyalty*, by Ron Suskind. Drudge was in full-promotional mode ("Bush savaged by former Treasury chief"). There was O'Neill's very mean-sounding (though incomprehensible) criticism of the president and his cabinet: a "blind man in a roomful of deaf people." O'Neill was said to have proof of a secret Bush plan to invade Iraq in the early days of his administration. CBS was touting the "19,000 documents" O'Neill had provided to Suskind. One of those documents, held up on the *60 Minutes* camera, had the word "secret" on it. Oops.

Zachary Pullen

When Treasury announced it was investigating, O'Neill hastily backpedaled on Tuesday morning's *Today* show. He said the Iraq documents were ordinary government studies; "absolutely nothing" was wrong with them. He approved of the leak investigation but didn't think he had done anything wrong. What he gave Suskind, he claimed, had been vetted by the general counsel of Treasury, who put everything releasable from his tenure, some 19,000 documents, on "a couple of CDs which I've frankly never opened." Nonetheless, "I gave them to Ron believing, as I do, if you're going to trust someone you need to trust them completely. So I gave Ron the CDs."

That's a remarkable confession from a former cabinet officer. Would he have so lackadaisically released thousands of documents from his tenure as CEO of Alcoa? "Ideally, this book will cause people to stop and think about the current state of our political process and raise our expectations for what is possible," said O'Neill. Can't quarrel with that. As Kinsley was right to point out: The president certainly should have had higher expectations for his cabinet. ♦

A Specter Haunts Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania Republican Arlen Specter, senior senator from the state, must be having a senior moment. He can't seem to remember what he said last month. After U.S. forces captured Saddam Hussein in December, Specter was gung-ho to throw the dictator in jail—but not to execute him. As Alison Hawkes of the Doylestown *Intelligencer* noted last week, Specter said this repeatedly:

⋆ "If he's in jail for a long period of time, he'd be a constant reminder," to the world, said Specter in a *Bucks County Courier Times* editorial board meeting on Dec. 17. "We have a societal interest in exposing him."

⋆ "In this situation, I am not inclined to think that the death penalty would be the best for society's interests," Specter told a public gathering in Somerset County, as reported by the *Daily American* on Dec. 16.

⋆ "I think that Hussein being imprisoned for decades would be very salutary for minor tyrants. . . . I think society's best interests are served by keeping him on display," said Specter, according to a Dec. 20 article in the *Norristown Times Herald*.

That was then. Specter "is now, and always has been, for the death penalty for Saddam," the AP quoted him as saying on Jan. 7. And the Specter campaign told Fox News the following day that he's "never voiced an opinion that Saddam Hussein should not face the death penalty."

Naturally Rep. Pat Toomey, the self-term-limited conservative congressman who's taking on Specter in the Republi-

can primary, was all over the flip-flop, calling it "disturbing." We'd call it par for the course. It's hardly his first such flip-flop. In July 2001, Specter said on *Face the Nation*, "I certainly would never agree to cloning. I certainly would never agree to destroying a stem cell if there was any chance at all, any chance at all, that the embryo would turn into a human being." But at a press conference in April 2002 he said that he "disagrees with President Bush's statement in opposition to reproductive cloning." And now he's a leading sponsor of legislation that would authorize cloning. Probably just the sort of thing someone with two faces finds appealing. ♦

Molly's Sorry

Two weeks ago we reported on Molly Ivins's latest run-in with the plagiarism police. In her syndicated column last week, she fessed up: "Crow Eaten Here: I learn via THE WEEKLY STANDARD that I owe credit for a line I've used about Arnold Schwarzenegger—"looks like a condom stuffed with walnuts"—to an Australian journalist named Clive James. I first heard the line from a civil libertarian in Vermont and had no idea it had come from James, or I would have given him credit. My apologies."

Well, okay by us. But how come only journalists deserve credit? If THE SCRAPBOOK were a "civil libertarian in Vermont," it would be very peeved that Molly thinks it's okay to rip us off without credit. ♦

Miller Time

We're looking forward to comedian Dennis Miller's new cable talk show, which debuts on CNBC on January 26. Miller has been an increasingly out-of-the-closet right-winger since 9/11. And there's obviously no going back for him now. We refer to his January 15 interview with the *New York Times*'s Bernard Weinraub.

First, he's unapologetic about his "slide to the right," telling Weinraub, "'Well, can you blame me? One of the biggest malfeasances of the left right now is the mislabeling of Hitler. Quit saying this guy is Hitler,' he said, referring to Mr. Bush. 'Hitler is Hitler. [The comparisons are] grotesque to me.'"

Then he confesses: "I think abortion's wrong, but it's none of my business to tell somebody what's wrong. So I'm pro-choice." Nice try at keeping the closet door ajar, Dennis. But this definition of pro-choice will never pass muster with NARAL.

Finally, he writes himself out of polite Boomer society by taking an iconoclastic shot at comedian Lenny Bruce: "Lenny was a heroin addict, and I could care less about heroin addicts. Once I hear a guy is a heroin addict, and they tell me he's a genius, I think, really? I'm not trying to be judgmental. But anybody whose last vision is of a tile pattern on a bathroom floor, I don't know what kind of genius they are."

California Republicans tried to talk Miller into running for the Senate against Barbara Boxer. He was smart to resist their pitch. He'll do a lot more good on the outside. ♦

Casual

WHAT A WAIST

The khaki pants at Harold's clothiers were a steal at $20. That they had been marked down from $100 made them irresistible, even though the 38-inch waist was two inches bigger than I was wearing at the time.

"My Fat Pants," I explained to my wife, who knows well my Oprah-like fluctuations.

This purchase was a very bad idea. I had never needed pants any bigger than 36—the upper reaches of acceptable post-collegiate girth for a formerly athletic guy. But once you buy the bigger size, you've already conceded you will need them. I fought the change with everything I had. Not by dieting or exercising, but by continuing to wear my increasingly uncomfortable 36s.

As long as you wear pants that say "36" on the inside tag, you technically have a 36-inch waist.

This, at least, according to an exchange I had with a friend not long ago.

Friend: "I'm depressed. My tailor just told me my waist is 37 inches."

Me: "What was it before?"

Friend: "What do you mean, what *was* it? It's a 36. That's what all of my pants are."

Me: "But your tailor just measured you at 37."

Friend: "He's wrong."

(This same friend, when I called to ask permission to use his name, first tried to convince me that the numbers were 35 and 36. I wouldn't budge. He remains anonymous.)

Coming off of my sixth knee surgery, it took me just three months until my Fat Pants fit and another three months before they were too tight. There were real-world consequences. My wife is always in good shape, and soon we were getting quizzical stares in public places. We had become what I'd always mocked: the mismatched couple. What is *she* doing with *him*?

This bothered me. Not enough to diet or exercise, but it bothered me. So I came up with a brilliant plan. I started buying new 36s. The reasoning was simple. I bought the bigger size and gained weight until it fit, so I'd buy the smaller size and lose weight until it fit.

This doesn't work. After two years, I've collected nine pairs of unworn size 36s.

Eventually I was desperate enough to go on a diet. I tried Atkins, the Zone, the government-approved high-carb, low-fat plan. But I have trouble staying on any diet. Lately, I've taken to switching with each meal—bacon, sausage, eggs, and cheese for breakfast. Then, pasta and garlic bread for lunch. For dinner, a big steak—no potatoes—and a Michelob Ultra.

I don't recommend this.

So now I'm considering exercise. But there is the problem of my knees. My doctors tell me not to subject my knees to pounding or twisting of any kind—no more beach volleyball, no more soccer, no more hockey. In short, nothing manly.

Some of my friends have already accepted this. My anonymous friend has taken to wearing a pedometer. A year ago, he talked about his boxing workouts. "I spent an hour on the heavy bag," he would say, "and then jumped rope for 20 minutes."

Things are different now. "It's not even lunch and I've already taken 8,500 steps!" he informed me last week with evident pride.

Silly as he sounds, talking openly about your girly exercise regime is probably wiser than keeping it a secret. I was at dinner recently with my college roommate—we'll call him "Dave"—and our wives. At 6 ft. 2, Dave was a strapping young man; he played high school football and wrestled varsity for three years.

Our wives were complaining about men who work out in revealing short shorts. Dave's wife told us how Dave had avoided that problem.

"David just bought a new pair of pilates pants," she said, and continued talking. I looked at Dave just as he slumped in his chair, defeated. His secret was out.

"Pilates pants? What are pilates pants? What is pilates?"

Dave explained that pilates is a new, hip fitness regimen that "involves stretching and breathing" exercises. "It's a lot more masculine than yoga," was his flaccid attempt at a defense.

I never want to get to the point where my best defense is: *It's a lot more masculine than yoga*. But I must admit their new "lifestyles" seem to be working. Anonymous has walked off 15 lbs., and Dave is slowly getting himself back to wrasslin' form.

I still can't imagine participating in such activities. But I suppose now that I've written a full-page magazine piece about pedometers, pilates, and pants sizes, I can't have too much pride about anything.

And it would be nice to retire my Fat Pants.

STEPHEN F. HAYES

The Gift of Self-Reliance

High in the mountains of Peru, inbreeding was causing llamas of the Aymara people to decrease in size. And overgrazing was wearing down the fragile, rocky terrain. Heifer provided new llama bloodstock and training in planting native grasses and breeding, solving both problems.

ALL AROUND THE WORLD, Heifer International is working—giving cows, goats and other livestock to impoverished, undernourished families around the globe. With training in animal care and environmentally sound agricultural practices, recipients lift themselves out of poverty to become self-reliant. And they agree to "Pass on the Gift"—to share offspring of their animals with others in need. As recipients share their livestock and their knowledge with others, an expanding network of hope and dignity is created that reaches around the world.

Heifer International's decades of experience and worldwide network of programs earned it top spot in *Forbes's* Gold-Star List of the ten charities most worthy of donor support, a new feature in the magazine's 2004 Investment Guide.

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

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Elect Powell!

There is one problem with regarding the 2004 election as a referendum on the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War, as William Kristol does in his January 12 editorial, "A Choice, Not an Echo." There are some of us who think the war was a disastrous mistake, but still will support the president's reelection reluctantly, because we support his views on issues of domestic policy (abortion, taxes, etc.).

Conversely, there will probably be an equal number of people who agree with the president on the war, but will vote for Howard Dean because they are liberals on domestic policy.

Speaking facetiously, it's a shame we can't vote on the election of a secretary of state. That would be the real referendum.

John F. Bradley
Havertown, PA

In the Zone of Combat

Thomas F. Powers makes a compelling case for the establishment of a federal terrorism court after the bizarre rulings in the Padilla and Guantanamo cases in "Due Process for Terrorists?" (Jan. 12). One of the guiding rules of the new court should be common sense.

War is a nasty enough business without the Ninth Circuit Court saying, in effect, that U.S. soldiers must advise their opponents in combat of their Miranda rights, and ruling that detainees at Guantanamo Bay—prisoners of war captured on a foreign battlefield—must have access to lawyers and our court system. It is hard to tell someone trying to kill you that they have the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. The detainees at Guantanamo were not arrested for shoplifting or auto theft. They were taken prisoner in the middle of a war in Afghanistan, most of them after engaging U.S. troops in battle. They are prisoners of war and the rules of war allow us to detain them until after that war is over.

Equally goofy is the Second Circuit Court saying that Jose Padilla cannot be detained as an enemy combatant because Congress did not authorize detention of U.S. citizens outside "a zone of combat," a phrase which is meaningless considering that 3,000 Americans have already died in this new kind of war and that, in an age when terrorists have access to weapons that can kill thousands in an instant, all 50 states constitute a "zone of combat." The law says such detentions may be carried out "pursuant to an act of Congress," such as the one Congress adopted on Sept. 18, 2001, which authorized the president to "use all necessary and appropriate force" to prevent future terrorist attacks. Which part of "all" does the Second Circuit not understand? During World War II, the Supreme Court upheld the military trial of several German saboteurs caught in the United States, including one who claimed American citizenship. Perhaps the



Second Circuit judges should walk the few blocks from their Manhattan courtroom to the ruins of the World Trade Center and see for themselves what a "zone of combat" really looks like.

Daniel John Sobieski
Chicago, IL

World War Wilson

Thanks for Fred Barnes's very interesting review of books dedicated to World War I ("War and History," Jan. 12).

I assume that Barnes meant "citizens of German and Austrian descent" were scorned by Woodrow Wilson, instead of "German and Italian descent" since Italy was an ally of the Western powers during WWI and had to pay a horrendous price, not only in terms of casualties, but also politically, with the rapid rise of fascism in the aftermath of war and the subsequent involvement with Nazi Germany which led the country to disaster.

Fortunately, it looks like President Bush has a much better relationship with Austrian Americans than President Wilson, if I understand correctly recent developments of the American political situation—particularly in California.

Remi Doyen
Brussels, Belgium

Peanuts to South Park

The unofficial *South Park* patch reproduced in the January 12 edition of The Scrapbook reminded me of similar patches for sale everywhere in Vietnam during my tour there (1968-69). They usually featured obscene parodies of Charlie Brown, Snoopy, and an obviously pregnant Lucy. A famous non-Peanuts patch showed a large mushroom on a black background, surrounded by the initials "K.I.T.D.F.O.H.S." (for "Kept In The Dark, Fed on Horse S—").

Soldiers love to gripe after the fighting is over, and some of the best graffiti in the world have been produced at military encampments.

David Clayton Carrad
Augusta, GA

Ivins the Terrible

Just so you know, after reading The Scrapbook on January 12, I'm ashamed that Molly Ivins is from Texas.

Henry Christiansen
Hurst, TX

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the weekly Standard

The Library Lie

In small towns across America—from New England village greens to sun-drenched county seats in California—there are FBI agents pounding on the doors of libraries, demanding to know what books the citizens are reading. Inside stand librarians, white-haired and apple-cheeked, resisting as best they can the terrible forces of McCarthyism, evangelical Christian book-burning, middle-class hypocrisy, and Big Brother government.

It's a picture so poignant, one would need a heart of stone to mention that it's also false, a deliberate and cold-blooded fabrication. Who breaks a butterfly upon a wheel?

Certainly not our Democratic presidential candidates, each of whom at some point last week spoke the word "libraries" on the campaign trail, always with a reverential catch in the voice—and always followed, shortly after, by the name "Ashcroft," spat out with a sharp and holy scorn.

Certainly not the American Library Association, which denounced the anti-terrorist Patriot Act's destruction of literary freedom at its 10,000-member meeting in San Diego last week.

And certainly not the activists and potential voters in the upcoming Democratic caucuses and primaries. Take an identification of Attorney General John Ashcroft as the frontman for the evangelicals' plot to turn America into an illiterate theocracy. Add a long-festering distrust of federal law-enforcement that was denied outlet by the eight-year need to defend President Clinton's Democratic administration. Roll the whole thing up in a belief that Republicans are all peeking, prying bigots, and you have, somehow, this shorthand way of expressing everything that's wrong in President Bush's America: *They want to know what books we read!* Republicans should not underestimate this trope. It is perhaps the single most motivating talking point on the left today, even though it has been repeatedly debunked.

Such as they are, the facts are these. A month after the attacks of September 11, Congress passed in a rush the USA-PATRIOT Act to help fight terrorism. Buried deep in the text, Section 215 amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to allow the FBI to examine "tangible things" in a terrorism investigation, "provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution."

Late in 2002, the first rumors of the section's possible application to libraries began circulating. In January 2003, the American Library Association passed a resolution declaring the Patriot Act "a present danger to the constitutional rights and privacy rights of library users"—a declaration repeated in July 2003 and January 2004. Librarians across the nation began shredding records, posting frightening warnings, and even announcing their intention to refuse court orders: "I am literally willing to go to jail," one California librarian announced.

Some of this may have derived from real fear that the FBI, armed with new powers, was culling library records. Much of it, though, was simple anti-Republican activism. "If We Didn't Have Attorney General Ashcroft, We Would Have to Invent Him," the editor of *Library Journal* candidly entitled a December editorial, and several commentators have noted the American Library Association's apparent incapacity to show any comparable concern about the *real* imprisonment of independent librarians in Cuba this year.

Regardless, the brouhaha should have been put to rest by the revelation this September that Section 215 has *never* been used. "The Department of Justice has neither the staffing, the time, nor the inclination to monitor the reading habits of Americans," Ashcroft tried to explain.

The errors of the "Bush administration vs. the libraries" trope are nearly endless. The uninvoked Section 215 doesn't actually mention libraries and is aimed at things like airline, hotel, and bank records. Investigators have always been able to subpoena library records, and a judge still has to approve their requests—nor is it clear the new act has substantially reduced the requirements necessary to convince a judge. Besides, American law has never considered librarians as priests or doctors, holding privileged information. One doesn't remember this level of outrage during the wide discussion of the Unabomber's reading list.

It seems almost superfluous to add that every Democratic senator except one voted *for* the Patriot Act, and, anyway, Section 215 expires at the end of 2005 under the act's sunset provision. But facts have never been the motor for this story. It's always been about something else, something resonating at a level unreachable by appeals to reality or common sense. Republicans in Congress could pass a library exemption to the Patriot Act. Even that, we suspect, would not suffice. The picture of those white-haired librarians single-handedly braving the wrath of George W. Bush and John Ashcroft is too perfect to need to be true.

—Joseph Bottum, for the Editors

The Campaign in the Wings

The Bush forces bide their time.

BY FRED BARNES

Des Moines

Republican National Committee chairman Ed Gillespie spent last weekend in Iowa as the lone prominent defender of President Bush. Arrayed against him were the Democratic presidential candidates and their allies, who scorched Bush (and each other) on the eve of the state's caucuses. This was not unusual. For months now, Gillespie has been the only top Bush operative regularly combating Democrats in public. Bush himself has attended fundraisers, but hasn't made overtly political appearances. His reelection campaign has yet to broadcast a single TV ad, though the Republican National Committee aired a pro-Bush spot briefly in two states. Nor have Bush aides organized squads of well-known surrogates to tout the president's reelection around the country. And the Bush camp has been largely silent in the face of gang attacks by Democratic candidates at televised debates.

This above-it-all stance will end with a bang when the Bush campaign begins. Democrats expect a robust Bush effort, but they may be shocked by the sheer firepower of the Bush onslaught. The president already has $99 million in the bank to spend between now and the Republican convention on Labor Day weekend, and he'll raise millions more. He intends to spend it all. Most will go to finance TV spots at a saturation level normal for the fall general election season, but unprecedented in the primary and preconvention periods. Also, big-name surrogates and "truth squads" will suddenly appear everywhere, blitzing Bush's Democratic opponent. And of course there's the president. His campaign appearances are bound to attract enormous media attention. So will his official appearances, such as the G-8 meeting in June at Sea Island, Georgia, with leaders of the seven other leading industrial democracies.

A Bush adviser theorizes that the California gubernatorial recall grabbed the political spotlight from the Democratic presidential race. "The only way for the Democrats to get attention then was to talk louder, louder, and louder."

Bush is delaying the start of his reelection drive until a winner emerges in the Democratic race. That means February at the earliest, probably March, but possibly not until early April. That's later than Ronald Reagan, the first President Bush, or Bill Clinton kicked off his reelection. But why jump in sooner? Bush's job approval (60 percent in the Gallup poll) points to reelection. Even in California, a predominantly Democratic state, his approval has jumped to 52 percent in the Field poll. And the public now feels the country is headed in the right direction (55 percent in Gallup) after months of thinking otherwise.

"There's no need" for Bush to enter the race formally, a Bush adviser insists. "There's no utility to it, no advantage on a cost-benefit basis. He gets to be president as long as possible and not president *and* candidate." If Bush were faltering politically, he might crank up a full-blown campaign. But the way the Democratic contest is unfolding helps Bush. "It diminishes the Democratic candidates and makes them look like midgets," the adviser says. Another Bush adviser theorizes that the California gubernatorial recall grabbed the political spotlight from the Democratic presidential race last year, aiding Bush. "The only way for the Democrats to get attention then was to talk louder, louder, and louder," the adviser says, and the contrast favored Bush.

Meanwhile, the Bush campaign has concentrated on organizing at the state and local level for the fall. The effort is premised on the notion that Bush lost the popular vote in 2000 because Democrats did a better job of getting their voters to the polls. The RNC spent $1.5 million to figure out the best way to improve the voter drive. The answer was obvious: personal contact. This was emphasized in the 2002 midterm election with a "72-hour plan" for contacting voters in the three days before the election. It worked well and is being expanded for 2004. The Bush campaign has already trained 5,500 local leaders and expects to mobilize 10,000. It has amassed 6 million names of Bush supporters on its website, 10 times the number Howard Dean brags about collecting. The RNC is aiming to register 3 million new Republican voters.

"We're light years ahead of where we were in 2000," says Ralph Reed, Bush's Southeast coordinator. "This is the most extensive grassroots campaign I've ever seen in the Republi-

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can party. It's without precedent in the modern age of campaigns." It may need to be. Campaign officials are obsessed with averting the dip Bush experienced in the final week of the 2000 campaign. Reed can tick off the states where Bush lost five or more percentage points—Ohio, Florida, Michigan, Iowa, and so on. Bush won't rely solely on TV ads as Reagan and Clinton did in their successful reelection campaigns.

The Bush campaign is similar to Clinton's in one regard. Clinton aired a massive wave of TV ads outside major media markets in 1995. They were barely noticed by the media, letting Clinton appear as president but not as a candidate. Bush was a bit deceptive in 2003. His campaign did put forward surrogates to defend the president in the local media. But there was no national effort except for Gillespie's activity, permitting Bush to appear above the fray.

I suspect Bush's political team is also slightly disingenuous in forecasting the president will win by no more than 52-48 percent, hardly a landslide. At the same time, they argue that Bush has the advantage in each of the three most important issue clusters—the economy, national security, and the culture. If the Bush organizational drive—the ground game—is as aggressive as advertised and the issues are on Bush's side, he's likely to exceed 52 percent. No doubt the lowballing by Bush's operatives is a reaction to 2000, when they insisted throughout the campaign that Bush held a lead over Al Gore.

There's a sneak preview of the Bush campaign in Iowa on caucus day and in New Hampshire for the January 27 primary. The idea is for Republican bigwigs (Bill Frist, Tom DeLay, George Pataki, and friends) to show the Bush flag and step on the Democratic story. For the caucuses in 1984, Reagan himself went to Iowa, and Clinton did the same in 1996. David Yepsen, political writer for the *Des Moines Register*, thinks it's a mistake for Bush not to come. But for the moment, that's not the Bush style. ♦

The Diversity Taboo

You can't solve a problem no one will talk about.

BY HEATHER MAC DONALD

A RECENT PSEUDO-SCANDAL at the Justice Department is yet another depressing reminder of intractable racial taboos—although not the kind we usually hear about from hand-wringing pundits and civil-rights scolds.

At the end of October, the *New York Times* accused the Justice Department of covering up a study critical of its "diversity" hiring and management. The department had posted the study—a $360,000 piece of boilerplate from the diversity-consulting industry—on its website. About half the text had been very visibly blacked out. Among the redacted portions, gleefully reported on the *Times*'s front page, were such standard "diversity" findings as the fact that more minority lawyers than white ones perceive "stereotyping, harassment and racial tension" in their workplace.

For the *Times* and likeminded Bush administration critics, the story was a glorious twofer: Not only was Attorney General John Ashcroft, that scourge of civil rights, abusing his minority employees, but he was trying to conceal it. Senator Edward Kennedy blasted the department for ignoring "diversity" issues. Representatives John Conyers Jr. and Jerrold Nadler issued a demand, in self-professed "outrage," that the Justice Department's inspector general investigate Diversitygate.

This scandal was a fake. The missing portions of the diversity study (later exhumed by a computer sleuth) had been redacted for a perfectly good reason: A rule in the Freedom of Information Act exempts advisory and "predecisional" material from disclosure. The deletions contained positive information about the department, just as the posted text contained "negative" findings, such as the higher attrition rate of minority hires.

But there *was* a scandal in the episode, albeit a longstanding one: the enduring charade about minority underachievement in the workplace. Every month, businesses and government agencies lavish vast sums on diversity "consultants" to come up with every reason other than the correct one—the skills gap—for why they do not have a proportional number of black and Hispanic employees. And, just as regularly, elite opinion-makers hold up the results of such sham studies as proof of American racism.

The Justice Department's recent diversity study, produced by KPMG Consulting, was a classic of the genre. Here was page after page of complicated graphs calculating to the hundredth of a percentage point the ratio of black, Hispanic, and female attorneys in every possible position within the department. Here was the disparagement of the white male "dominant culture norms," along with the call to "be more creative about defining qualifications" (i.e., to gut standards for minorities). Here was the inevitable push for tying the pay of managers to their promotion of minorities. But, above all else, here was the scrupulous, all-encompassing silence on every page of the document about why this futile exercise was undertaken in the first place: the

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dearth of qualified minority attorneys to fill those minutely tabulated Justice Department slots.

The *real* missing data from the Justice diversity study are these: In 2002, only 29 black applicants were qualified without a racial boost for a top-ten law school (from which the elite branches of the Justice Department recruit), compared with 4,500 college seniors nationwide, as Jonathan Kay has reported in *Commentary*. The situation was identical a decade ago: Only 24 black applicants met the academic requirements for the top 10 percent of law schools in 1991, according to Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom. Naturally, those schools were not about to let the lack of preparedness among minority applicants stand in the way of demonstrating the schools' high-minded embrace of racial balance. They admitted 420 blacks to their first-year classes anyway, thus ensuring that nearly all would start out with a disadvantage compared with their white and Asian peers.

The results of such racial double standards are predictable: Over a fifth of affirmative-action law students from the 1991 cohort, for example, dropped out. With few exceptions, black students post grades near the bottom of their class. As a result, almost none qualify for law review. The bar exam failure rate for affirmative-action beneficiaries is far higher than for merit-based admits. Nearly a third of the 1991 quota admits failed after three attempts, a rate seven times that of whites, according to the Thernstroms.

The racial charade requires that law-school administrators express deep puzzlement about such facts, even though their own admissions policies produced the disparity. The dean of Vanderbilt Law School, Kent D. Syverud, recently told the *Chronicle of Higher Education* that the lack of minority representation on the school's law journals is "one of the biggest challenges I've faced as dean." Yet Syverud defended the use of racial preferences in law-school admissions in the recent Supreme Court affirmative action case *Grutter* v. *Bollinger*, so he is merely reaping what he has sown. True to form, many law schools, like New York University and the University of Pennsylvania, have rejiggered traditional law-review requirements to guarantee the presence of face-saving blacks and Hispanics on the review masthead.

The genius of the diversity charade is to turn a supply problem into a demand problem. The reason the Justice Department does not have a proportional sampling of black and Hispanic attorneys is simple: The numbers just aren't there. But the diversity industry tells us that the real reason behind the lack of racial proportionality is demand: Employers are not trying hard enough to recruit minority employees, and when they do hire them, they subject them to racism—

The diversity charade's most bizarre feature is this: Employers would rather take the rap for racism than tell the truth about minority underperformance.

which can be rooted out only by more diversity-industry interventions.

A fail-safe source for proving work-site racism is the minority employee survey. In 1990, New York's most exclusive law firms noticed that they didn't have many black partners. The obvious explanation—inadequate supply of partnership material—was taboo from the start. So New York's legal titans began the arduous process of ignoring the obvious. Working through the bar association, they hived off into a decade-long series of diversity committees and subcommittees, among whose initiatives was a poll of minority associates about their work experiences. Eureka! Here was an explanation for low minority head-count that the firms could live with: According to the subcommittee on minority retention, over 60 percent of black lawyers reported "race-related barriers to their professional development." Similarly, the recent Justice Department diversity study found that "significantly more" minorities perceived racism on the job than whites.

Now what is the cause of this perception? It may of course be the case that these elite employers, despite their years of schooling in the country's most liberal institutions and despite their strenuous efforts to find as many black employees as they can, are in fact racist. But here is an alternative possibility: Affirmative-action beneficiaries, having been admitted to organizations for which they are significantly less qualified than their peers, experience difficulties performing up to the norm and attribute those difficulties to their environment. Find an honest partner at a high-powered law firm, for example, and he will acknowledge, only on deep background, that many black associates struggle mightily with legal writing. But racial prejudice is the easy culprit—and little wonder. Minority students are fed a steady diet of victimology in colleges and law schools. Critical Race Studies courses in law schools, for example, maintain that legal rationality silences the minority voice. So, it is hardly surprising that overmatched minority attorneys blame bias for their plight.

The diversity charade's most bizarre feature is this: Employers and universities would rather take the rap for racism than tell the truth about minority underperformance. After the poll showing that black New York attorneys blame their firms' bigotry for their lack of advancement, the most that those firms would meekly say in their own defense was that such "perceptions are not based on the animus that we normally associate with racial discrimination." An understatement, if there ever was one.

Far from possessing "animus" against blacks, New York's most prestigious firms, like the law elite everywhere, spend hundreds of thousands of dollars a year on diversity

AP/ Mary Altaffer

Arthur Sulzberger Jr., Howell Raines, and Gerald Boyd at the height of the Jayson Blair affair

recruiting, diversity support groups, and diversity social functions like the party hosted last fall by the firm Paul Weiss. Young minority law associates from across the city were invited. The fancy Judson Grill was rented out, John Payton, the black attorney who argued *Grutter* spoke (gloating about the victory), and guests left with goody bags containing diversity paperweights, copies of the *Grutter* opinion, and a magazine called *Diversity Inc.* with articles on how to tell if firms value—you guessed it—diversity.

But faced with the choice of copping to bias or explaining the difficulty of finding qualified minority applicants, there's not a prominent organization that won't fall on its sword as a racist. (The Jayson Blair fiasco at the *New York Times* offered a variant on this formula: The *Times* preferred to let its journalistic standards be impugned rather than admit that it had overlooked reporter Blair's patent failings because of his race.) And so the New York Bar, skewered by its black associates, dutifully ordered itself into diversity training and set itself ever more rigorous hiring and promotion goals, as if its members hadn't already been frantically trying to find and promote black attorneys. Likewise, the Justice Department, accused by its minority employees of "harassment and stereotyping" and accused by the press of not hiring and promoting enough minorities, has merely hung its head and promised to do better through new undertakings like a loan repayment program and more "equitable" assignment of cases.

Although an event sometimes forces momentary honesty about the skills gap, the racial taboo always triumphs in the end. While covering the recent Supreme Court affirmative-action challenges, for example, even the liberal media could hardly avoid mentioning the 200-point SAT gap between whites and Asians, on the one hand, and blacks and Hispanics on the other. But those moments pass without a trace, and the *New York Times* and other press outlets quickly go back to reporting on the underrepresentation of minorities in this or that organization as a sign of bias, as the *Wall Street Journal* did in November, informing readers that "high turnover among people of color" suggests the employer does not value diversity.

The drive of elite institutions to fill their token roster of minorities, no matter the costs to the tokens or to their own standards, only perpetuates the racial taboo by giving a false impression. The smattering of black and Hispanic faces on the bench, in law and medical school classes, and on the brochures of selective colleges makes it harder for the public to grasp how severely minorities lag behind the norm in reading and math. Worse, preferences keep the institutions that use them on the sidelines of educational reform and cultural change. Remove their ability to practice racial window-dressing, however, and many would try to actually shrink the skills gap rather than just cover it up.

The only time the University of California system sought to systematically improve California's abysmal schools was after the U.C. Regents, in 1995, banned the use of race in admissions. In response, university administrators launched a massive outreach program into high schools and elementary schools to prepare minority students for competitive enrollment. Had the Supreme Court struck down educational preferences this summer, many colleges, law schools, law firms, and businesses would have been forced into a similar crusade—at least until the next dodge for covertly reinstating quotas had emerged.

In her recent decision upholding affirmative action, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor gave colleges and law schools 25 years to continue papering over the racial skills gap. Expect another 25 years of inaction on minority skills, more pseudo-scandals about low minority representation, and an ever fatter diversity industry laughing all the way to the bank. ♦

The Qaddafi Precedent

Now that Libya's disarming, who's next?

BY HENRY SOKOLSKI

WITHOUT ACTUALLY meaning to do so, the Bush administration has pulled off one of the most remarkable nonproliferation victories since the advent of the nuclear age: Libya, a hostile, isolated dictatorship, pledged to give up its support of terrorism and its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. This nonproliferation "walk-in"—a direct result of Bush's invasion of Iraq and U.S.-allied efforts to interdict illicit strategic weapons-related goods—breaks the mold of nonproliferation history and suggests not only what's possible, but what should be done next.

Muammar Qaddafi's nuclear renunciation is unprecedented. The handful of nations that previously relinquished their nuclear weapons capabilities—South Africa, Brazil, Ukraine, and Argentina—did so less out of fear than from confidence, which each of these nations experienced when they moved toward more democratic self-rule. Until Qaddafi's submission, there seemed little reason to believe that authoritarian proliferators would relent without liberalization (or overthrow). The hardest cases—Iran and North Korea—suggest this is still true.

Libya's example, though, provides hope for the cases in between. Neither Libyan backsliding nor a repeat of America's 1986 bombing run on Qaddafi's home now seems probable. If we are willing to enforce the nonproliferation rules we have—as we did with Iraq and are now doing against illicit nuclear trade—blocking the further spread of nuclear weapons may be possible, in brief, without bombing every proliferating prospect.

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The question now is how to exploit Libya's nuclear exit to accomplish this.

Many nonproliferation experts—including those that rushed off earlier this month to visit North Korea's known nuclear sites and those who still object to America's invasion of Iraq—insist that Libya's announcement means we should now cut nuclear deals with Pyongyang and Tehran. Shooting at these goals now, though, is a surefire loser.

To begin with, Pyongyang and Tehran are hardly contrite about violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). When uranium enrichment equipment bound for Libya was interdicted this fall, Qaddafi showed penitence; he immediately signed a sweeping missile, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons renunciation pledge (penned with British and American officials); and invited international nuclear inspectors in.

After U.S. officials confronted Pyongyang with evidence of nuclear cheating, it countered defiantly, threatening everything from nuclear testing to plutonium exports. Now North Korea refuses even to freeze its known nuclear facilities (much less its undisclosed uranium production plants) unless it is paid handsomely in advance with energy aid and security guarantees. Dismantlement is something Pyongyang claims it will consider doing only after two U.S.-promised plutonium-producing power reactors are completed (i.e., pretty much never).

Iran is no less shameless. Over the last four weeks, its leadership announced that President Bush deserved the same fate as Saddam, insisted Iran would resume enriching uranium (and admitted to expanding its enrichment capacity despite its pledge last October to freeze such work), demanded Bush apologize for accusing Iran of having a nuclear weapons program, blew off an American aid delegation headed by Senator Elizabeth Dole, and met with Russian officials to accelerate completion of a prodigious plutonium-producing power reactor at Busheir. Tehran is expanding its reactor and uranium enrichment efforts (both critical to making bombs) even though the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is still not yet able to find Iran in full compliance with the NPT.

Cutting a quick deal with Iran or North Korea, then, hardly guarantees another Libya. More likely, it will jeopardize the gains we have made. As a North Korean foreign ministry spokesman noted last week, the idea that Pyongyang might follow Libya's example by unconditionally renouncing its nuclear weapons capabilities is a delusion. "Expecting a change in our position," he explained, "is like expecting rain from a clear sky." Tehran's leaders, who insist on Iran's right to all forms of "peaceful" nuclear energy, are no less obdurate. If we make even partial concessions to their current demands, Qaddafi's worthy nonproliferation standard will be the first to suffer.

Focusing on Iran and North Korea as the next Libya is therefore, at best, a distraction. Meanwhile, adjacent to Libya, a clear nonproliferation opportunity has gone begging for attention. At Ain Oussera, in the middle of the Sahara, Algeria continues to expand a large nuclear "research" facility. This nuclear park, whose centerpiece is a large Chinese reactor covertly built during the 1980s, is capable of making approximately a bomb's worth of plutonium


Muammar Qaddafi

Reuters / Aladin Abdel Naby

a year. Unlike Algeria's smaller research reactor operating in Algiers, the Ain Oussera facility is encircled with SA-5 air-defense missiles.

If this second reactor were clearly needed to make medical isotopes (as Algeria claims it is), it would still be plenty worrisome. Spanish intelligence as well as disarmament experts, though, fear it is simply a bomb factory. Worse, Algeria has only grudgingly revealed the bare minimum about it to IAEA inspectors and did so only after U.S. intelligence discovered the project by accident months before it was to go critical. With Qaddafi's nuclear renunciation, U.S., Libyan, French, and Spanish officials should approach Algeria to close down Ain Oussera.

Then there's Egypt, which has chemical weapons and long-range missile programs (an overt, active SCUD program and a dormant Vector solid-rocket effort dating back to the 1980s). Egyptian officials claim they are planning to acquire a nuclear-desalinization plant, which, again, would make nuclear weapons-usable plutonium. Would Egypt be willing to renounce the plant if Israel shut down its own plutonium-production reactor, now well over 30 years old and in need of a billion-dollar-plus refurbishment? Finally, there is Syria, a state that has rockets and chemical weapons and recently tried to acquire a nuclear desalinization plant from Russia. Wouldn't our diplomatic hand be strengthened against Iran if we could get other Middle Eastern nations to swear off nuclear-power reactors, uranium centrifuges, desalinization plants, and large, unnecessary nuclear research facilities?

If the United States and its allies were to take this approach, it could succeed, but only if they insist that the NPT be read in a more sensible way—i.e., in a fashion that deprives members of the right to acquire all they need to break out and build a large arsenal of nuclear weapons within a matter of weeks. A good start here would be to demand that all countries, *including* the United States, terminate any large nuclear effort that isn't profitable enough to be fully financed by private capital. This rule would put a crimp on Iran's nuclear plans and those of many other would-be bombmakers. It's one principle Washington and its friends should insist upon at the upcoming NPT review conference in 2005.

Finally, to give meaning to the NPT, the United States and its allies will have to act against violators well before they have photographic proof they have a bomb. The IAEA didn't suspect Libya was covertly working to enrich uranium. Even U.S. intelligence was incomplete until this fall's interdiction. And so it has been historically with every other nuclear proliferator, from the Soviet Union to Iran: By the time it's clear we have a problem, the best options for dealing with it have evaporated.

What this suggests—contrary to the post-Iraq war rants for more intelligence and greater caution—is that we be prepared to act more quickly on *less* information. Of course, it would be helpful if we did not wait until the only option for action was regime overthrow. This, among other things, recommends Bush's international Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict illicit nuclear weapons-related trade: It gives meaning to the rules and offers nonproliferation officials an action plan other than wringing their hands or devising new ways to cave in to proliferators.

We've certainly tried the latter over the last half-century and produced abysmal results. After Libya, we have clear cause to stop. ♦

Born Again

The ranks of Christian conservatives aren't dwindling. BY MARK STRICHERZ

In December 2001, Karl Rove gave a provocative impromptu speech about the decline of the religious right. As a rule, presidential political strategists aren't paragons of forthrightness, but on this morning at least, Rove seems to have been wearing his neutral analyst's suit. Claiming that 19 million self-identified evangelical, fundamentalist, and Pentecostal Christians should have been expected to go to the polls in 2000, he noted that only 15 million did so. "Just over 4 million of them," he told his audience at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, "failed to turn out and vote. And yet they are obviously part of our base."

Since then Rove has not broached the topic (his office didn't return calls for this story). But it was a striking number, and the story of evangelical disaffection has had a long life in the press. *Newsweek* reported last fall that "the primary demographic objective of [the Bush-Cheney 2004 campaign] is to increase turnout among families that consider themselves evangelical."

Add all this to the well-publicized troubles of the Christian Coalition, and it's easy to conclude that evangelicals really are disengaging from politics. In his speech Rove echoed the gloomy thesis of the book by former Moral Majority staffers Cal Thomas and Ed Dobson, *Blinded by Might: Why the Religious Right Can't Save America*: "[W]e may . . . be returning to a point in America where fundamentalists and evangelicals and Pentecostals remain true to their beliefs," said Rove, "which are things of the—you know, politics is corrupt, and therefore we shouldn't participate."

There's only one problem with this analysis. There's no proof. Unless Rove has his hands on secret poll data, the evidence is that the turnout of white evangelical voters didn't change much from 1994 to 2000.

And that's the past. The future looks brighter. Whether galvanized by smart turnout strategies by Christian groups, Howard Dean's secularism ("I don't want to listen to fundamentalist preachers anymore," he told California Democrats), or the tyranny of the federal courts, evangelicals are more likely to go to the polls this November.

In claiming that evangelical voting strength had sagged, Rove seems simply to have repeated a common mistake: conflating white evangelicals, fundamentalists, and Pentecostals with self-declared members of the religious right. The latter category has indeed declined in recent years.

The two groups aren't the same. "You can't equate" them, says Corwin Smidt, a leading scholar of evangelical political behavior at Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Mich. "Evangelicals are a religious group, while the religious right is a socio-political group."

For reasons not clear, exit polls don't ask voters if they identify themselves as evangelicals or fundamentalists. Rather, voters are asked if they label themselves part of the religious right. The question causes many evangelical scholars to shake their heads. "It leads to misleading data," Smidt maintains. "One problem is that many African Americans say they're part of the Christian right, but in fact they don't vote Republican at all."

In Voter News Service exit polling data culled by American Enterprise Institute resident fellow Karlyn Bowman, voters identifying themselves as part of the religious right indeed shrank throughout the '90s. In the 1994 midterm elections, 19 percent of voters identified themselves as members of the religious right; in the 1996 presidential election, 16 percent did so. By 2000 the number had dropped to 14 or 15 percent.

Given that about 105.5 million Americans voted in 2000, it's easy to do the math and see how Rove could believe that 15 million evangelicals had voted and that 19 million should have. As for why a smaller share of Americans identified themselves as part of the religious right, one can only speculate. Possibly the media's vituperative sneering at the label made people loath to identify themselves with it.

Evangelicals, on the other hand, make up a much larger bloc, somewhere in the neighborhood of 25 million, or one quarter of all voters. Their ranks stretch across Christian denominations, although the term has far greater currency among Protestants (from the Lutherans to the Baptists) than Catholics. And though they were less politically active 30 years ago, before Supreme Court decisions like *Roe* v. *Wade*, today's evangelicals vote at about the same rate as the national average, according to University of Akron survey research conducted by Smidt, Lyman Kellstedt, John C. Green, and James Guth. "I've seen no [recent] drop-off in the number of evangelical voters," says Green, a professor of political science at the University of Akron.

While not all evangelicals are Republican or even conservative, it's certainly a group of voters that will be hugely important to the Bush campaign. What will it do to get them to the polls this year? In general Bush campaign officials and Christian conservative leaders are of two minds about this.

The former tend to stress turnout; the latter stress issues. As Bush-Cheney campaign director Ken Mehlman says, "We're encouraging voter registration big time in churches, mosques, and synagogues." This emphasis helps explain why Ralph Reed—onetime director of the Christian Coalition—has been hired as one of the campaign's 11 regional chairmen (Southeast). Talking with Reed

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nowadays is a bit like talking with a Chicago precinct captain: His favorite topics are numbers and the importance of knocking on doors. “In Florida,” he boasts, “we have 65,000 team leaders, 7,000 precinct workers, and we’ve added 55,000 Republican registered voters since the election.”

Although Reed also mentions the importance of the pro-family agenda, he is not nearly as insistent on this point as are many evangelical leaders. They say the Bush administration must emphasize its support for their issues: a federal marriage amendment to ban homosexual marriage and appointing pro-life judges, especially to the Supreme Court. Some bring up hot-button issues like support for former Alabama judge Roy Moore, whose judicial career ended in controversy over the Ten Commandments monument he installed in Alabama’s supreme court building. “I would strongly implore [Bush] to come out on behalf of Roy Moore and to try to get rid of this illegal court order,” says Rick Scarborough, the president of Vision America, a Houston-based nonprofit. “Judge Moore was removed from the bench because he would not renounce his belief in God.”

In between these two approaches is the Christian Coalition, back from its organizational woes of the late 1990s. The group has budgeted $4.2 million for identifying and mobilizing evangelical voters in 24 swing states. Drew McKissick, the group’s unflappable political director, thinks that they can be mobilized by Howard Dean’s secularism and support for civil unions, as well as by better outreach. Says McKissick: “If they receive phone calls, postcards, and pamphlets,” 80 percent are “likely to vote for the more conservative of the two candidates.”

There is evidence that the coalition’s new approach could succeed. Kellstedt, an emeritus professor at Wheaton College in Illinois, says his research shows that among traditionalist evangelicals, 89 percent who received campaign literature in 2000 went for Bush. By contrast, only 64 percent among those who didn’t receive literature voted for Bush. Boosting those numbers could be particularly important given that only 47 percent of traditionalist evangelicals voted in 2000.

Evangelical groups, however, say that they don’t have much money. Especially when compared with liberal interest groups such as America Coming Together and The Partnership for America’s Families, it’s not much of a contest. Those groups plan to spend $95 million in the election. “They’re well funded and if they know what they’re doing, they can get results,” says Ruy Teixeira, a Democratic-leaning demographer and author of *The Emerging Democratic Majority*.

Still, the Bush campaign will likely have far more money, about $200 million, to spend by election’s end. If evangelicals can persuade donors to direct some of that money their way, Karl Rove probably won’t be talking about their alleged decline next year. ♦

Abortion is a reflection that we have not met the needs of women.

Women deserve better than abortion.



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Strike Up the Broadband

What the FCC can do for the economy.

BY JAY LEFKOWITZ

IN HIS TENURE as chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Michael Powell has spoken eloquently, and with genuine foresight, about the "digital revolution," which he calls "the most important economic development of our time." Powell has made clear that if the United States is going to compete successfully in the information age, "we have to help get broadband built and deployed to every American." And the FCC has said its "strategic goal" for broadband is to "establish regulatory policies that promote competition, innovation, and investment in broadband services and facilities."

Unfortunately, despite Powell's powerful vision, nearly a year after the FCC boasted that it would provide "substantial" regulatory relief and "incentives for carriers to invest in broadband network facilities," the companies that have the money to invest in building these new networks are still being thwarted by an uncertain and often contradictory regulatory landscape. If the FCC does not follow through on its promise to provide real regulatory relief, there will be serious economic consequences.

There is no better engine for new jobs and growth than the telecommunications sector. Over the past decade, the number of U.S. cell phone subscribers increased by roughly 1,200 percent, and, from 1995 to 2002, the number of people with Internet access leapt from 18 million to 166 million. Cell phones, email, data networks, fax machines, web browsing, and PDAs have revolutionized the way Americans do business. Telecommunications has also been the backbone for growth in countless other industries. From the credit card reader at the gas pump to online product tracking, telecommunications advances stoked the economic growth of the last decade. Information technology now accounts for an estimated $825 billion of our current economic output, or 8.3 percent of the GDP.

Old "narrowband" telephone lines are stretched to capacity, but the market is begging for better, faster connections.

Much of the rapid expansion in telecommunications services has been built on the back of the old copper-wire telephone infrastructure. Fax machines, credit card readers, and computer networks, not to mention the proliferation of phone lines, all depended on existing infrastructure. Remember your first time on the web? Probably it was via a dial-up modem. Old "narrowband" telephone lines are stretched to capacity, but the market is begging for better, faster connections. Thus, the next several hundred billion dollars of spending in the telecommunications industry should be devoted to pushing the web to the speed of light. That investment—if it materializes—will enable a limitless range of productivity-enhancing applications, generating real revenues, for real companies, and improving the quality of life for everyone.

It has now been almost four years since the telecom boom went bust. The market capitalization of the telecommunications and equipment manufacturing sectors has declined by some $2 trillion from its peak; overall investment by wireline telecommunications carriers has declined by more than $60 billion. The Communications Workers of America reports that more than 900,000 jobs have been lost in telecommunications and information industries since 2001. The United States is also losing competitive ground in infrastructure. A recent study from the International Telecommunications Union found that the United States ranks a distant 11th in high-speed Internet connections per capita. This should all be of no small concern to policymakers in the White House and the FCC.

But the opportunity for a new boom is just around the corner if only the regulators will allow it. Over the next decade, telecom companies will have to make substantial decisions regarding investments in broadband and broadband services. These investments will be risky, given the dominant broadband position of cable companies and further competition from satellite and wireless operators. Some companies have moved aggressively to be ready to roll out the next generation of broadband, and are poised to begin making these investments in the coming weeks. But they will be hamstrung because of the commission's failure to deregulate broadband deployment. For example, a telecom company like Verizon could spend over a billion dollars laying fiber and then have to let its competitors use the fiber for a nominal fee.

Recognizing the economic significance of the issue, Powell has called broadband deployment "the most central communications policy objective of our day." In its Triennial Review Order last year, the FCC acknowledged that the so-called

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incumbent telephone carriers (the old Bell companies) "are unlikely to make the enormous investment required" for broadband deployment, "if their competitors can share in the benefits of these facilities without participating in the risk inherent to such large-scale capital investment." Accordingly, the FCC lifted many rules requiring telephone companies to sell all of their products to competitors at below-cost prices; this is called "unbundling" in FCC-speak. The FCC's decision was straightforward, and was based on its conclusion that unbundling broadband facilities is both *unnecessary*, because competing providers do not need access to those broadband facilities, and *harmful*, because it would deter deployment by all providers.

Unfortunately, as is often the case with regulatory agencies, what the FCC gave with one hand it seemed to take away with the other. Powell's clear vision of a digital future is now in danger of being lost in the quicksand of his agency. For example, the FCC removed the broadband unbundling requirements under one section of the law only to conclude that the carriers have other unbundling obligations under a *different* section. The sorry state of existing regulations is that both the former Bell companies and new market entrants are discouraged from building networks with new technologies and new facilities.

Unlike the old telephone market, broadband is one where everyone is starting from scratch—Bell companies, new competitors, and cable companies. New fiber is going to have to be laid by somebody. And there are strong economic incentives for companies to lay fiber where they can reach the most customers—businesses, apartments, and condominiums. You would think that the FCC would leave these most lucrative broadband markets—the ones most likely to attract fierce competition—unregulated and not subject to unbundling, because competition will naturally flourish, providing improved service and lower costs.

Guess again. The FCC has subjected broadband for businesses, apartment buildings, and even condominiums to the same tired regulations it uses for old copper-based systems. Worse, the FCC has created confusion as to when unbundling can be required by the states. Until the FCC removes the present uncertainty and, better yet, the obstacles it has created, investment will suffer.

A smart, forward-looking broadband policy would include certain key steps: *First*, fiber deployed to businesses would be unregulated. Has the FCC made this simple change? No. Indeed, the present approach is an invitation to widely disparate state-by-state, neighborhood-to-neighborhood, building-to-building, and even customer-to-customer regulation in an area where, without clearly defined rules, commercial investments are simply too risky. *Second*, apartment buildings and condominiums should not be subject to unbundling requirements at all. Cable providers have already made tremendous inroads in providing broadband services, giving stiff competition to telephone carriers. These are the *last* places where we need government trying to "foster competition" through regulation. Moreover, the FCC has set residential broadband deployment as a goal, and nearly one-third of the population currently lives in apartments, condominiums, and the like. But has the FCC encouraged a race to build new infrastructure for these facilities? Of course not. Instead, by allowing states to order unbundling, the FCC's rules actually encourage new competitors to piggyback on the Bell companies once they begin deploying broadband. After all, why build your own network when you can lease someone else's at a cheaper rate?

Finally, if the FCC is serious about promoting broadband deployment, it should make clear that the Internet is not going to be subject to the arcane regulatory rules that apply to traditional voice services. The FCC has already decided that cable's broadband services should be deregulated; there is no reason why a different set of rules should apply to Internet access from a telephone company. Consumers should have a choice between three different platforms for broadband service—telephone, cable, and wireless. The FCC should simply step aside and let the market work.

Last year's Triennial Review Order was heralded by the Republican commissioners as "bold action" (Kathleen Abernathy) and a "momentous step" (Powell), providing "sweeping regulatory relief for broadband and new investments" (Kevin Martin). But saying it doesn't make it so. We are on the verge of losing the FCC's promised revolution before it even begins. Leaving broadband trapped in a regulatory morass skews the incentives for deployment, ultimately hurting American consumers (fewer products) and workers (fewer jobs). It is time for the FCC to keep its promises and bring broadband regulation into the 21st century. If Powell's vision can be fully implemented, he will leave a lasting mark, not just on the FCC, but on the entire U.S. economy. ♦



Does Clark Have a Prayer?

With the general in New Hampshire

By Matthew Continetti

Manchester, New Hampshire

It's around 1 P.M. on Tuesday, January 13, and General Wesley K. Clark, the former supreme commander of NATO and Democratic presidential candidate, is visiting Child Health Services, a clinic for low-income children. He's locked in conversation with one Janet Clark, the director of special medical pediatrics, who has worked here for 20 years, and who is not, she is quick to say, related to the candidate. She mentions that the center engages in "child advocacy."

"What is 'advocacy'?" asks the general, interrupting. "That's a term of art. What does it mean? Lay it out for me: A, B, C, and D."

Janet Clark proceeds to explain, and the general stares at her with wide, unblinking brown eyes. After the impromptu lecture, he shakes hands with the staff. He donates a stuffed animal to the toy bank. He takes a quick tour of the facility, which is decorated in bold, primary colors, and asks questions about children's health issues, the clinic's funding, and what he as president could do to help.

During the general's tour, I chat with the receptionist. She mentions that John Edwards is scheduled to deliver a speech at Child Health Services later this afternoon. Clark's staffers, she confides, "weren't too happy about that."

They had reason not to be. Edwards, who has visited the clinic before, will speak in the "community room," a relatively spacious area with over a dozen chairs for press. Clark, meanwhile, has been assigned the cramped "adolescent waiting area," where about 50 journalists, photographers, and camera crews are jostling for space around the square table where Clark will hold a discussion with employees. "You'll need to pick a *smaller* room next time," grouses a CNN cameraman to a Clark campaign aide.

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"We're still humble," says Jamal Simmons, Clark's spokesman. "We don't expect anybody to show up."

That's because Clark, who is 59, is an unconventional candidate and a latecomer to Democratic politics. Until October he was a registered Independent. He's given talks at Republican fundraisers, and has intermittently praised the Bush administration. His background is full of superlatives—a Rhodes scholar, he graduated at the top of his class at West Point and is a champion swimmer, a retired four-star general, and a lover of Plato. But the last time he ran for office, it was for president of his 12th-grade class. He lost.

Hence the surprise at the Clark surge here in recent weeks. As the other Democratic candidates flocked to Iowa in preparation for the January 19 caucuses (in which Clark is not competing), and went to work beating each other up with attack ads and verbal barbs, General Clark stayed in New Hampshire, which holds its primary on January 27. As Joe Trippi, frontrunner Howard Dean's campaign manager, put it, "[Clark's] been shooting free throws by himself on one end of the court while we've been throwing elbows at each other at the other end."

From Clark's point of view, it's working. His poll numbers are up, as is attendance at the now-daily "Conversations with Clark" town-hall meetings, which are held throughout the state. One poll, from the American Research Group, shows that Clark has edged out Senator John Kerry for second place in New Hampshire, and is within 5 points of Dean. The Clark boomlet has attracted media from around the country and beyond—a crew from ZDF, a German television station, is here, along with CNN, ABC, CBS, and others. "I'd say we doubled our press every day for the last couple of days," says one of Clark's press aides.

The other candidates, of course, are doing their best to drag Clark back into the mosh pit. Nervously eyeing the general's ascent in the polls, Howard Dean called Clark a "Republican." The Lieberman campaign sent several pairs of flip-flops to Clark 2004 headquarters, taunting the candidate over his conflicting statements about the war in

Iraq. Not to be left out, the Kerry campaign has dispatched volunteers to crash Clark events, where they pass out flyers attacking the general's record.

Clark hasn't fought back. Instead, he's labeled the attacks "old-style politics." Which is, come to think of it, a good phrase to describe Clark's behavior as he sits down to his "roundtable" with a group of social workers and pediatricians who work at Child Health Services. Clark seems tired; his voice is hoarse, and he rushes through parts of his stump speech: "America needs leadership," he says. He's "going to put America back to work." He's "a big believer in family values," which means, among other things, "taking care of the environment."

It's standard Democratic primary fare, until Clark notices that the clinicians are uncomfortable with the dozens of cameras looming over their shoulders. Don't worry about the cameras, he tells them. A good way to ignore the whirr and buzz: "Imagine we're microbes on Mars."

"And these," he continues, gesturing toward the journalists surrounding him, "are the explorers." A bunch of us snicker at the bizarre analogy. But the clinic workers don't seem to mind.

After the roundtable, I ask Janet Clark what she thinks of the candidate. She tells me that she is a Democrat, and is planning to vote in the primary, but today, she's "just an impartial observer." Rebuffed, I turn to a 12-year-old boy who's here because his mother works at the clinic.

"And you?" I ask. "What did you think?" He looks at me and shrugs.

The next day finds General Clark at the Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord, where he is scheduled to speak on homeland security. Outside, a Kerry volunteer hands out flyers labeled "What Wes Clark Told the *Concord Monitor* About 9/11." They summarize an interview in which Clark stated, "We are not going to have one of these incidents"—meaning a 9/11-magnitude terrorist attack—if he is elected president.

It was an imprudent thing to say—can anyone *guarantee* there won't be another big attack on U.S. soil?—and after the other campaigns pounced, Clark was forced to backtrack. Not for the first time.

Start with his stance on the war in Iraq. These days, Clark is vehemently antiwar. The U.S. invasion, he says, was part of a "bait and switch" executed by the administration on the American people. "I've been against this war from the beginning," he tells audiences.

Clark's position, in fact, has been considerably more nuanced. Last September, shortly after he announced his candidacy, the general had a 45-minute talk with a group of reporters. In the course of the discussion, the *Washington Post* reported, Clark said he "probably" would have voted to authorize the war if he had been a member of Congress in the fall of 2002. He added that his views on Iraq resembled those of Senators John Kerry and Joe Lieberman, both of whom voted to authorize the conflict.

And both of whom, in all probability, would have agreed with Clark in 2002, when he told the Associated Press that, although he had "reservations" about a possible war, he saw some logic to President Bush's position. "Certainly in certain cases we should go to war before our enemies strike," Clark said. "*And I think this situation applies here*, [italics added] but I am not sure we should write it down and publish [the doctrine of preventive war] as policy."

In the spring of 2003, as American tanks rolled into Baghdad, Clark wrote several columns for the *Times* of London in which he praised the U.S. military effort. "Liberation is at hand," he wrote. "Liberation—the powerful balm that justifies painful sacrifice, erases lingering doubt and reinforces bold actions." Later in the same essay, Clark praised the war's architects: "President Bush and Tony Blair should be proud of their resolve in the face of so much doubt." (Last week, Clark reassessed the Bush presidency, telling an audience in Dallas that "I think we're dealing with the most closed, imperialistic, nastiest administration in living memory. They even put Richard Nixon to shame.")

Another misstep came on January 11, when a videotape surfaced of Clark in October 2002 saying, "Certainly there's a connection between Iraq and al Qaeda." Since running for president, Clark has said otherwise.

What he meant, Clark explained to the *New York Times*, was: "I never thought there would be any evidence linking September 11 and Saddam Hussein. Everything I had learned about Saddam Hussein told me that he would be the last person al Qaeda would trust or that he would trust them."

Then there's the interview Clark gave to the editorial board of the *Manchester Union Leader* in early January. When asked his position on abortion, Clark said, "I don't think you should get the law involved in abortion—"

"At all?" asked a puzzled Joseph W. McQuaid, the *Union Leader*'s publisher.

"Nope," Clark said.

"Late-term abortion? No limits?"

"Nope," Clark said.

"Anything up to delivery?"

"Nope, Nope."

"Anything up to the head coming out of the womb?"

"I say that it's up to the woman and her doctor, her conscience. . . . You don't put the law in there," Clark said.

Again, Clark was later forced to "clarify" his position, which, it turns out, does *not* sanction infanticide.

But these missteps have done little to stop Clark's rise in New Hampshire, and the Kerry supporter handing out attack literature at the Franklin Pierce Law Center is, for the most part, ignored. Inside, a packed crowd waits patiently for Clark, who starts his speech 40 minutes late. It's a diverse group of voters, equal parts students and senior citizens. Pop music is piped in over a loudspeaker—at one point, Madonna's "Beautiful Stranger" plays. Madonna is a Clark supporter. But the general, one campaign aide says, is not necessarily a Madonna fan. (He's told reporters that his favorite music act is the band Journey. "It's this song called 'Don't Stop Believin',," he said. "It's the music I remember.")

When Clark enters the lecture hall, the audience explodes into applause. A few people stand. Others snap pictures.

For the most part, the speech is Democratic boilerplate. "We're short on homeland security and long on homeland insecurity," Clark says. But there are a few interesting ideas. For example, in order to make us more secure, Clark proposes a "combined Joint Counterterrorism Strike-Force," formed under NATO, which would include troops from countries outside the alliance, among them "Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates." The strike force's mission would be to go into the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan and "capture or kill" Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders. Says Clark, "We've always had the ability to confront al Qaeda and defeat it." The implication is that the Bush administration, for some reason or another, doesn't want to.

After the speech, Clark's campaign bus, the "Wes Express," spirits journalists to a "Conversation with Clark" in Hudson, about 30 miles away. As the press van makes its way toward the event, where Clark will answer questions from voters, I talk with a reporter from one of the major news networks who has followed Clark for several months. It's the usual chitchat—where we're from, where we went to school—and after a few minutes, we fall back into silence.

For a moment, anyway. "It's funny," the reporter says eventually, under her breath. "I can't believe [Clark's] doing so well all of a sudden."

"Why is that?" I ask.

"Because he's so damn crazy."

The general is not really crazy. But, when you listen to him speak, it's hard not to notice that he has a slightly paranoid view of the Bush administration. He's said, for example, that the White House tried to have him fired from CNN, where he was a commentator during the Iraq war. He's said that "there's no way" the Bush administration "can walk away from its responsibility in 9/11." He meant that the administration did not do enough to protect America from terrorist attack—because it was preoccupied with war against Saddam Hussein.

In his recent book, *Winning Modern Wars*, as well as on the stump, Clark says that, in a visit to the Pentagon several months after September 11, he had a conversation with "a man with three stars who used to work for me." Clark's former subordinate showed him a "list of countries" that the Bush administration had targeted for invasion. According to Clark, the list was part of a "five-year plan" for regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan. Clark has presented no evidence to back this up, other than what he told the Arkansas *Democrat-Gazette* a few months ago: "You only have to listen to the gossip around Washington and to hear what the neoconservatives are saying, and you will get the flavor of this."

Last week, Clark found new "proof" for his theory. In an interview former Treasury secretary Paul O'Neill gave to *60 Minutes*, as well as in *The Price of Loyalty*, a new book by journalist Ron Suskind, O'Neill charges that the administration was planning to invade Iraq as early as January 2001. On the day of the *60 Minutes* interview, Clark released this statement: "Today, Paul O'Neill confirmed what I have been saying all along: The Bush administration's focus on Iraq was not tied to the war on terror. It was a long-standing plan that was discussed from the opening days of the Bush White House."

O'Neill's allegations—which are actually quite different from what Clark has alleged—have made their way into the general's stump speech. At the Franklin Pierce Law Center, Clark said, "The only name we hear [from Bush] is Saddam Hussein, and the only country we hear about is Iraq. According to former Treasury secretary Paul O'Neill, this isn't a coincidence: The Bush administration started planning their actions against Iraq during their first days in the White House . . . despite being warned that our greatest threat was Osama bin Laden."

The charge that President Bush was plotting regime change in Iraq and elsewhere early in his presidency has become the Clark campaign's central foreign-policy issue. "The Bush administration has an unhealthy obsession with Iraq," says Bill Buck, a Clark spokesman. "9/11 was an excuse to topple Hussein. That's what we're going to talk about."

And they're going to talk about it at places like Alvirne High School, in Hudson, the scene of Wednesday night's "Conversation with Clark." Like the general's speech in Concord, the "conversation" takes place before a standing-

room-only audience, which is an achievement in itself on a night so cold that the Kerry supporters picketing outside resemble nothing so much as screaming, adolescent Eskimos.

Before the general enters the school cafeteria, where the conversation will take place, I watch a screening of *American Son*, Clark's campaign film, made by Linda Bloodworth-Thomason, the Hollywood producer responsible for Bill Clinton's syrupy biopic, *The Man from Hope*. Thomason is one of many Clinton allies who have signed on with the general. Others include former Arkansas senator Dale Bumpers, former Clinton economic officials Mickey Kantor and Laura Tyson, former State Department spokesman James Rubin, Democratic congressmen Rahm Emmanuel and Charles Rangel—and, to some extent, former President Clinton himself, who speaks with Clark campaign chair Eli Segal daily and, according to the *New York Post*, has made fundraising calls in support of Clark (Clinton's office denied the report).

Clinton has not made an official endorsement. But many of his surrogates will descend on New Hampshire on Saturday, January 17, to campaign for the general. They will be joined by, among others, Enron whistleblower Sherron Watkins, Pulitzer Prize-winning author Samantha Power, and the filmmakers Barry Levinson and Michael Moore. "These are all individuals involved with the campaign," says Bill Buck, when I ask him if Clinton had any role in organizing the January 17 event. "They've each expressed interest in being involved."

The Clinton connection has its advantages. It's helped Clark collect money—he'd raised about $10 million by December 31; only Howard Dean raised more. And it's also helped a neophyte gain his political footing. Signature Clinton phrases have made their way into Clark's stump speech. On Monday, for example, during his appearance at Child Health Services, Clark told the press that no parent who "works hard and plays by the rules" should raise a child in poverty. Clark may not be a political natural, as journalist Joe Klein has called the former president, but he is a quick study.

You get a sense of how far the Clark campaign has come when you watch *American Son*. The slickly produced, 15-minute film attempts to sell General Clark's main strength: his biography. It is largely successful in doing so. One voter tells Clark after the film that, while he "expected to be impressed" when he showed up to see the general, he did not expect to have tears in his eyes. Campaign aides say this is a not uncommon reaction. The Clark campaign has already distributed 50,000 copies of the DVD to New Hampshire voters, and one Clark strategist tells me there are plans to distribute 20,000 more.

Clark enters the cafeteria to another standing ovation, after an introduction by a teacher from the school, who says the candidate "has spent countless hours thinking about the tough issues."

Maybe. Clark has definitely spent countless hours delivering his stump speech, which he has honed to perfection. By the end, he has the audience on its feet. Afterwards, the crowd mobs Clark. Ahmad Jackson, the general's personal assistant, has to pull him away from talking to every last voter. The scene seemed to confirm what Chris Lehane, Clark's senior communications strategist, told the *Washington Post* recently: "Something's happening here."

"It's funny," the reporter says, under her breath. "I can't believe [Clark's] doing so well." "Why is that?" I ask. "Because he's so damn crazy."

But what exactly? One morning in January, I meet with Andy Smith, the director of the University of New Hampshire Survey Center and an expert on New Hampshire's political demographics. Smith says that while Howard Dean's hard-core supporters still support the former Vermont governor, less-committed voters are wary of Dean's anger. These voters now support Clark. "If you think of the Dean campaign as a balloon," Smith tells me, "the air is seeping out a little bit. The message that's come from the other camps that Dean is unelectable is starting to take hold. This is the time of the campaign where moderate and conservative Democratic voters turn their attention to the election."

As we talk, Smith fidgets with his empty coffee cup. The main problem for Clark, he says, is that his campaign operation is not as well-oiled as Dean's. "I don't think Clark has people with the sort of intimate knowledge of politics that Dean's people have," he tells me. "A lot of the Clinton people have been through campaigns here, but not recently."

Clark's main advantage, on the other hand, is that he's the only candidate who has proved he can raise money as quickly as Dean. Says Smith, "The primary process will come down to money. It always comes down to money. If there's a bunch-up, if there are close races in both Iowa and New Hampshire, then Clark can go to the other states, the southern, more conservative states, and say, 'I'm the only guy who can stop Dean.'"

"Is he?" I ask. "Does Clark even have a chance?"

Smith pauses. "It's a slim chance," he says. "But it's a chance." ♦

The Dean Clap

. . . and other manifestations of political enthusiasm

BY DAVID TELL

Let us begin by acknowledging the many and various respects in which Howard Dean's presidential campaign isn't weird. I visited New Hampshire on January 2, the traditional stretch-run kickoff date for that state's primary, intending to see four of the candidates, Dean among them, all in a single 12-hour span, more or less back to back, for purposes of comparison. And I managed to pull off this plan. But just barely; Dean almost messed me up. By the time his 1 P.M. "town hall meeting" at a Nashua VFW post was supposed to get underway—only his second event of the day, and the one I'd chosen to attend—Dean was already running seriously behind schedule.

Perfectly normal. Successful insurgent campaigns usually work this way, in fact. The crowds swell up. The local staff offices swell up to handle those crowds. The traveling staff swells up to supervise the local staff and keep watch on a swelling press corps. And with the field operation so big and unwieldy—never mind what's going on in the national headquarters—moment-by-moment demands on the candidate's attention are constantly multiplying and he gets slowed down.

Sure enough, waiting for this particular slowed-down candidate at the Nashua VFW was a crowd so swollen that city fire marshals barred the front doors and started turning people away, dozens of them, a full 25 minutes before Dean arrived. No exceptions, there simply wasn't room; even Gina Glantz, Dean's senior traveling aide, got stuck outside in a light, sloppy snowfall. Ms. Glantz was Bill Bradley's national campaign manager in the 2000 primaries. She has since proved gullible enough to accept an offered ride from me, only to be held backseat hostage, for a comically frantic hour and a half, as I drove around—in a blizzard-level snowfall, in the pitch-black middle of Iowa's nowhere—trying to find her boss's tour bus. Ms. Glantz seems otherwise a highly intelligent, wise-in-the-ways, and charming woman, however. And this, too, as I say, is perfectly normal. Even before the first votes get cast, winning primary campaigns tend to attract more and more of their party's best and brightest operatives with every passing week. Glantz was then still new to the Dean team.

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Anyhow, back at the Nashua VFW post, Dean was late, and the 300 or so locals who'd been lucky enough to squeeze inside were murmuring away under a long, low ceiling hung with dim fluorescent lights and a single, crooked disco-era mirror-globe. Dean was *very* late; they had to murmur on like this for quite some time, interrupted only by the occasional public service announcement ("If you're parked in the Post Office lot, you're gonna get towed") and by a get-out-the-vote list come-on from one of Gina Glantz's junior-level colleagues—like the striking young woman who had a clipboard on which she was asking people to scratch down their names and addresses. More of them might have been complying, I suspect, instead of pretending to study the disco globe and light fixtures, if this woman hadn't also got what appeared to be a small, circular, silverplated key ring projecting up into the space between her slightly parted lips from its anchor in a hole that had been poked straight through the flesh of her cheek about an inch and a half north of her chin.

You oughtn't smirk. Imagine how this person's mother must feel. And you oughtn't jump to conclusions, or be worrying about all the other mothers, because, by my rough eyeball survey, no one else visiting the VFW that day looked anything like the clipboard lady. Far from it; she was an anomaly. Which is the only good reason I've got to mention her in the first place.

That and the fact that about this same time, a free-market advocacy outfit called the Club for Growth PAC began airing a puckish television ad in Iowa with the following, handy-dandy demographic exegesis of the Dean campaign: a "latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving, *New York Times*-reading, body-piercing, Hollywood-loving, left-wing freak show." A pair of actors speak these lines with exaggerated relish, making like Mr. and Mrs. Iowa Everycouple, closing with a demand that the freak show in question go "back to Vermont where it belongs." The ad's tongue pokes straight through the flesh of its cheek; it's mostly just a joke. And as just a joke, it's mostly funny.

But as a piece of implicit lifestyle criticism, however broad, it's worth pointing out—not to be too persnickety

Getty Images / Mark Kegan

Dean clappers in Iowa City

about it—that the ad might not be so well-grounded in reality as its creators imagine. Not any more. Even in New Hampshire, its original home and continuing epicenter, the Dean movement's famous visual uniformity is finally breaking down. They remain apart, different, a sharply demarcated subcategory of the American electorate. But it's no longer something you can easily spot in their clothes. With relatively few exceptions, the Nashua VFW was filled with people who could have been drawn at random from the phonebook of any middle-class community in the country.

While we were waiting, I fell into conversation with an enormously likable and gregarious woman named Deborah—"Don't I get to be quoted, too?"—who didn't want to tell me where she worked because she'd called in sick to come see Howard Dean. This, even though Deborah had already volunteered her extremely distinctive last name, which I think we'll leave go for now, just to be on the safe side. She looked to be in her late 40s, maybe early 50s, no body piercings. She also looked likely to have done a helluva lot less latte-drinking, sushi-eating, and *New York Times*-reading than, say, anybody they've got working over at the Club for Growth. "Oh, *yeah*," Deborah told me, "are you kidding?"—she'd already decided to vote for Dean.

And she'd made her decision when? "Oh, gosh, I don't know, after I saw the other guy, John . . . whatsisname," meaning Kerry. Though there was that "other guy, John . . . whatsisname," too, she remembered, meaning Edwards. In any case, Dean was the only candidate who'd impressed her, because "he's got something to back him up, you know? He's got a past." And "Everything I hear is good," she went on. "He's done a good job in Vermont"—which was a perfectly normal thing for her to say, I thought. Also, "He's a sweetheart."

Which was where things got weird, for reasons having nothing to do with Deborah (though that "sweetheart" business will be worth coming back to) and everything to do with the young Dean staffer at the front of the room who'd just tapped on the mike to get our attention. He wanted to welcome us, he said, and he wanted also to tell us, without further ado, how he'd first gotten involved in politics at age 6, when his older sister came home one day and told the family she was gay. And then his older brother turned out to be gay, too, so in solidarity with his siblings he started to wear gay-rights T-shirts to school, where more than once the other kids beat him up. Then, years later, Howard Dean signed Vermont's civil unions law, and there was finally an American politician who was brave enough to stand up for what was right and true.

It was an affecting story, actually. And, nowadays, it wouldn't have been that unusual, either—this fellow's

eagerness to deliver public testimony about deeply personal and sometimes painful experiences to 300 people he didn't know—had he been doing it someplace else. On *Oprah*, for example. But this was a presidential campaign event, not a true-life-drama daytime TV show. And presidential campaign events are generally designed to showcase their presidential candidates, in the most attractive possible and universal light, to the outside world of would-be-but-not-yet supporters. In such a project, the campaign's supporters are a secondary concern. And anything unpredictable, or emotionally volatile, or potentially embarrassing—like the autobiographical intimacies of those supporters—is shunned.

The Dean campaign routinely defies this rule, as if the outside world barely registers, and missionary work is hardly necessary, and the concerns of its self-identified initiates are all that count. Before he left the mike and walked toward the back of the VFW hall, the man with the two gay siblings told his listeners that they would soon be asked to share with their adjacent-seat neighbors some individual moment of revelation that had led each of them to The Cause. But first, he wanted to teach them the secret handshake. "You have to be organized in everything you do," he advised, "and that includes applause. So when we clap on the Dean campaign, we try to all do it together. So, real quickly—everybody who knows The Dean Clap can help me out, and I think everybody else will figure it out. Maybe you can join in when you figure it out. Hold on."

Whereupon he took a step or two away from the mike and led his 300 fellow tribesmen, most of whom seemed already familiar with the ritual, in a rhythmic, single-beat-per-second handslapping, which gradually accelerated until it ultimately dissolved into the kind of applause that ordinary people are used to.

Curious about this young man's background, I asked him for his name, which he gave me—Sam Simon—though only after a hesitant, sidelong glance at a woman who was evidently his staff superior. I wondered how old he was and where he was from. That he wouldn't give me. "Um, that's all I think I can say," he mumbled, turning to the boss lady for relief. "He wants to know how old I am and where I'm from," he told her. He'd have to go consult with "someone from Press," she instructed him. And so he did. Several minutes later, Sam Simon, who'd already been assigned to tell 300 perfect strangers that his brother and sister were gay, finally secured someone's permission to disclose that he was 19 years old and a native of New Mexico.

I have had numerous experiences like this with representatives of the Dean campaign. I imagine it's what covering a Scientology convention must feel like.

The candidate himself did eventually show up, 40 minutes or so into the proceedings. They did The Dean Clap again, and he ran through an unremarkable iteration of his current standard stump talk. Then Dean took about 20 minutes worth of questions, the last of which involved a low-voiced gentleman remarking that "elections are won in the center, not on the right nor on the left, and Bill Clinton taught us that." So "how and why and what is your strategy to capture the center," this man asked Dean, "so people like Rove and others don't depict you as a liberal, northeastern, bleeding-heart, kneejerk, et cetera?"

They're going to say that about us no matter who we nominate, Dean replied. And then he ran through an equally unremarkable iteration of his candidacy's central, organizing myth. "Rove and Ralph Reed" win elections for Republicans because they know how to "polarize the country and crank up their base," Dean explained. Democrats have to do the same. "You've got to really get the base excited." You've got to "energize disillusioned Democrats" and "get two million people in this country to give us $100 apiece," which they'll "gladly" do.

This is snake oil, of course, and it is already beginning to leak into view even from such unlikely places as the Dean campaign's own website, which had promised to "sign up" at least a million supporters by New Year's, and is still today, three weeks later, more than 400,000 supporters short. The number of new financial contributors the campaign attracted actually *declined* from the third quarter of last year to the fourth. Dean is not a "sweetheart," let's face it; he is chilly and abrasive and unusually prone to growl and bite. It's not really fair to call him a "left-wing freak show," but only because the ideological character of a prospective Dean administration is virtually unknowable: The man's campaign platform—I can't understand why more hasn't been made of this—is thinly articulated where it exists at all.

And so on, the point being that there is a clear upper limit to Howard Dean's support. As might be said of all the other Democratic candidates and George Bush, too, admittedly. But unlike the others, Dean has embraced his limits—rejecting "the center"—and declared them a virtue. And his present supporters love him all the more for it. That is what truly distinguishes them, not where they went to college or how many nose rings they have. It is a matter of temperament, elemental self-conception, more than anything else. Democrats good; Republicans bad. No series of gaffes Dean might commit, no surging poll numbers posted by one of his rivals, can dramatically affect such an orthodoxy or its adherents. And there are a godawful lot of them, apparently.

The point being that there is also a clear lower floor to Dean's support, below which he likely cannot fall. That rhythmic, tribal clap will be in our ears for quite some time yet. ♦

Showstoppers

Nine reasons why we never sent our Special Operations Forces after al Qaeda before 9/11

BY RICHARD H. SHULTZ JR.

Since 9/11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has repeatedly declared that the United States is in a new kind of war, one requiring new military forces to hunt down and capture or kill terrorists. In fact, for some years, the Department of Defense has gone to the trouble of selecting and training an array of Special Operations Forces, whose forte is precisely this. One president after another has invested resources to hone lethal "special mission units" for offensive—that is, preemptive—counterterrorism strikes, with the result that these units are the best of their kind in the world. While their activities are highly classified, two of them—the Army's Delta Force and the Navy's SEAL Team 6—have become the stuff of novels and movies.

Prior to 9/11, these units *were never used even once* to hunt down terrorists who had taken American lives. Putting the units to their intended use proved impossible—even after al Qaeda bombed the World Trade Center in 1993, bombed two American embassies in East Africa in 1998, and nearly sank the USS *Cole* in Yemen in 2000. As a result of these and other attacks, operations were planned to capture or kill the ultimate perpetrators, Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants, but each time the missions were blocked. A plethora of self-imposed constraints—I call them showstoppers—kept the counterterrorism units on the shelf.

I first began to learn of this in the summer of 2001, after George W. Bush's election brought a changing of the guard to the Department of Defense. Joining the new team as principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict was Bob Andrews, an old hand at the black arts of unconventional warfare. During Vietnam, Andrews had served in a top-secret Special Forces outfit codenamed the Studies and Observations Group that had carried out America's largest and most complex covert paramilitary operation in the Cold War. Afterwards, Andrews had joined the CIA, then moved to Congress as a staffer, then to the defense industry.

I'd first met him while I was writing a book about the secret war against Hanoi, and we hit it off. He returned to the Pentagon with the new administration, and in June 2001 he called and asked me to be his consultant. I agreed, and subsequently proposed looking into counterterrorism policy. Specifically, I wondered why had we created these superbly trained Special Operations Forces to fight terrorists, but had never used them for their primary mission. What had kept them out of action?

Andrews was intrigued and asked me to prepare a proposal. I was putting the finishing touches on it on the morning of September 11, when al Qaeda struck. With that blow, the issue of America's offensive counterterrorist capabilities was thrust to center stage.

By early November, I had the go-ahead for the study. Our question had acquired urgency: Why, even as al Qaeda attacked and killed Americans at home and abroad, were our elite counterterrorism units not used to hit back and prevent further attacks? That was, after all, their very purpose, laid out in the official document *Special Operations in Peace and War* (1996). To find the answer, I interviewed civilian and military officials, serving and retired, at the center of U.S. counterterrorism policy and operational planning in the late 1980s and 1990s.

They included senior members of the National Security Council's Counterterrorism and Security Group, the interagency focal point for counterterrorism policy. In the Pentagon, I interviewed the top leaders of the offices with counterterrorism responsibility, as well as second-tier professionals, and their military counterparts in the Joint Staff. Finally, the U.S. Special Operations Command, headquartered in Tampa, Florida, is responsible for planning and carrying out counterterrorism strikes, and I interviewed senior commanders who served there during the 1990s.

Some were willing to speak on the record. Others requested anonymity, which I honored, in order to put before the top leadership of the Pentagon the detailed

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report from which this article is drawn. My findings were conveyed to the highest levels of the Department of Defense in January 2003.

Among those interviewed, few were in a better position to illuminate the conundrum than General Pete Schoomaker. An original member of the Delta Force, he had commanded the Delta Force in 1991-92, then led the Special Operations Command in the late 1990s. "Counterterrorism, by Defense Department definition, is offensive," Schoomaker told me during a discussion we had over two days in the summer of 2002. "But Special Operations was never given the mission. It was very, very frustrating. It was like having a brand-new Ferrari in the garage, and nobody wants to race it because you might dent the fender."

As terrorist attacks escalated in the 1990s, White House rhetoric intensified. President Clinton met each successive outrage with a vow to punish the perpetrators. After the *Cole* bombing in 2000, for example, he pledged to "find out who is responsible and hold them accountable." And to prove he was serious, he issued an increasingly tough series of Presidential Decision Directives. The United States would "deter and preempt . . . individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such acts," said Directive 39, in June 1995. Offensive measures would be used against foreign terrorists posing a threat to America, said Directive 62, in May 1998. Joint Staff contingency plans were revised to provide for offensive and preemptive options. And after al Qaeda's bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Clinton signed a secret "finding" authorizing lethal covert operations against bin Laden.

These initiatives led to the planning of several operations. Their details rest in the classified records of the National Security Council's Counterterrorism and Security Group. Its former coordinator, Dick Clarke, described them as providing the White House with "more aggressive options," to be carried out by Special Operations Forces (or SOF, a category that includes the Green Berets, the Rangers, psychological operations, civilian affairs, the SEALS, special helicopter units, and special mission units like the Delta Force and SEAL Team 6).

Several plans have been identified in newspaper accounts since 9/11. For example, "snatch operations" in Afghanistan were planned to seize bin Laden and his senior lieutenants. After the 1998 embassy bombings, options for killing bin Laden were entertained, including a gunship assault on his compound in Afghanistan.

SOF assaults on al Qaeda's Afghan training camps were also planned. An official very close to Clinton said that the president believed the image of American commandos jumping out of helicopters and killing terrorists would send a strong message. He "saw these camps as conveyor belts pushing radical Islamists through," the official said, "that either went into the war against the Northern Alliance [an Afghan force fighting the Taliban in northern Afghanistan] or became sleeper cells in Germany, Spain, Britain, Italy, and here. We wanted to close these camps down. We had to make it unattractive to go to these camps. And blowing them up, by God, would make them unattractive."

And preemptive strikes against al Qaeda cells outside Afghanistan were planned, in North Africa and the Arabian Gulf. Then in May 1999, the White House decided to press the Taliban to end its support of bin Laden. The Counterterrorism and Security Group recommended supporting the Northern Alliance.

These examples, among others, depict an increasingly aggressive, lethal, and preemptive counterterrorist policy. But *not one* of these operations—all authorized by President Clinton—was ever executed. General Schoomaker's explanation is devastating. "The presidential directives that were issued," he said, "and the subsequent findings and authorities, in my view, were done to check off boxes. The president signed things that everybody involved knew full well were never going to happen. You're checking off boxes, and have all this activity going on, but the fact is that there's very low probability of it ever coming to fruition. . . ." And he added: "The military, by the way, didn't want to touch it. There was great reluctance in the Pentagon."

From my interviews, I distilled nine mutually reinforcing, self-imposed constraints that kept the special mission units sidelined, even as al Qaeda struck at American targets around the globe and trumpeted its intention to do more of the same. These showstoppers formed an impenetrable phalanx ensuring that all high-level policy discussions, tough new presidential directives, revised contingency plans, and actual dress rehearsals for missions would come to nothing.

1. Terrorism as Crime

During the second half of the 1980s, terrorism came to be defined by the U.S. government as a crime, and terrorists as criminals to be prosecuted. The Reagan administration, which in its first term said that it would meet terrorism with "swift and effective retribution," ended its second term, in the political and legal aftermath of Iran-contra, by adopting a counterterrorism policy that was the antithesis of that.

Special Operations soldiers crossing into Afghanistan from Tajikistan, November 15, 2001

Patterns of Global Terrorism, a report issued by the State Department every year since 1989, sets forth guidance about responding to terrorism. Year after year prior to 9/11, a key passage said it was U.S. policy to "treat terrorists as criminals, pursue them aggressively, and apply the rule of law." Even now, when President Bush has defined the situation as a war on terrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* says U.S. policy is to "bring terrorists to justice for their crimes."

Criminalization had a profound impact on the Pentagon, said General Schoomaker. It came to see terrorism as "not up to the standard of our definition of war, and therefore not worthy of our attention." In other words, militaries fight other militaries. "And because it's not war," he added, "and we don't act like we're at war, many of the Defense Department's tools are off the table." The Pentagon's senior leadership made little if any effort to argue against designating terrorism as a crime, Schoomaker added derisively.

"If you declare terrorism a criminal activity, you take from Defense any statutory authority to be the leader in responding," a long-serving department official agreed. Whenever the White House proposed using SOF against terrorists, it found itself facing "a band of lawyers at Justice defending their turf." They would assert, said this old hand at special operations, that the Pentagon lacked authority to use force—and "lawyers in the Defense Department would concur. They argued that we have no statutory authority because this is essentially a criminal matter."

In effect, the central tool for combating terrorism would not be military force. Extradition was the instrument of choice. This reduced the Pentagon's role to providing transportation for the Justice Department.

To be sure, Justice had its successes. With the help of the Pakistani government, it brought back Mir Amal Kansi, the gunman who opened fire outside CIA headquarters in 1993; with the help of the governments of the Philippines and Kenya, it brought several of the terrorists responsible for the first World Trade Center bombing and the attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa back to stand trial. But those were lesser al Qaeda operatives. Against the group's organizational infrastructure and leadership, there were no such successes. Law enforcement had neither the access nor the capability to go after those targets.

2. Not a Clear and Present Danger or War

Since terrorism had been classified as crime, few Pentagon officials were willing to call it a clear and present danger to the United States—much less grounds for war. Any attempt to describe terrorism in those terms ran into a stone wall.

For instance, on June 25, 1996, a truck bomb killed 19

Americans and wounded another 250 at the U.S. military's Khobar Towers housing facility near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath, a tough-minded subordinate of Allen Holmes, then the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, asserted that the Defense Department needed a more aggressive counterterrorism policy to attack those responsible for these increasingly lethal terrorist attacks. Holmes told him, "Write it down, and we'll push it."

The aide laid out a strategy that pulled no punches. Khobar Towers, the World Trade Center bombing, and other attacks were acts of war, he wrote, and should be treated as such. He called for "retaliatory and preemptive military strikes against the terrorist leadership and infrastructure responsible, and even against states assisting them." In his strategy, he assigned a central role for this to SOF.

Holmes ran the proposal up the flagpole. A meeting to review it was held in the office of the undersecretary of defense for policy. As the hard-charging aide explained his recommendations, a senior policy official blurted out: "Are you out of your mind? You're telling me that our Middle East policy is not important and that it's more important to go clean out terrorists? Don't you understand what's going on in terms of our Middle East policy? You're talking about going after terrorists backed by Iran? You just don't understand." And that was that.

In the wake of Khobar Towers, Secretary of Defense William Perry asked retired General Wayne Downing to head a task force to assess what had happened. Formerly the head of the U.S. Special Operations Command, Downing had been in counterterrorism a long time. He was more than willing to pull the trigger and cajole policymakers into giving him the authority to do so. Interviewed in 2002 during a year-long stint as President Bush's deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism, he reflected on his report: "I emphasized that people are at war with us, and using terrorism as an asymmetrical weapon with which to attack us because they can't in a direct or conventional manner." It *was* war, he told the department's senior leadership; they needed to wake up to that fact. But his plea fell on deaf ears. He lamented, "No one wanted to address terrorism as war."

Even after bin Laden declared war on America in a 1998 *fatwa*, and bombed U.S. embassies to show his followers that he meant business in exhorting them to "abide by Allah's order by killing Americans . . . anywhere, anytime, and wherever possible," the Pentagon still resisted calling terrorism war. It wasn't alone. A CIA assessment of the *fatwa* acknowledged that if a *government* had issued such a decree, one would have had to consider it a declaration of war, but in al Qaeda's case it was only propaganda.

During the late 1990s, the State Department coordinator for counterterrorism was Mike Sheehan. A retired Special Forces officer who had learned unconventional warfare in El Salvador in the late 1980s, he was considered one of the most hawkish Clinton officials, pushing for the use of force against the Taliban and al Qaeda. His mantra was "drain the Afghan swamp of terrorists."

I visited Sheehan at his office at the U.N. building in New York, where he had become assistant secretary-general for peacekeeping. He recounted how aggressive counterterrorism proposals were received in the Defense Department: "The Pentagon wanted to fight and win the nation's wars, as Colin Powell used to say. But those were wars against the armies of other nations—not against diffuse transnational terrorist threats. So terrorism was seen as a distraction that was the CIA's job, even though DOD personnel were being hit by terrorists. The Pentagon way to treat terrorism against Pentagon assets abroad was to cast it as a force protection issue."

"Force protection" is Pentagon lingo for stronger barriers to shield troops from Khobar Towers-type attacks. Even the attack on the USS *Cole* did not change that outlook. As far as causing anyone to consider offensive measures against those responsible, "the *Cole* lasted only for a week, two weeks," Sheehan lamented. "It took a 757 crashing into the Pentagon for them to get it." Shaking his head, he added: "The near sinking of a billion-dollar warship was not enough. Folding up a barracks full of their troops in Saudi Arabia was not enough. Folding up two American embassies was not enough."

Of course, Washington continued to try to arrest those who had carried out these acts. But the places where terrorists trained and planned—Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen—remained off-limits. Those were not areas where the Defense Department intended to fight. A very senior SOF officer who had served on the Joint Staff in the 1990s told me that more than once he heard terrorist strikes characterized as "a small price to pay for being a superpower."

3. The Somalia Syndrome

In the first year of his presidency, Bill Clinton suffered a foreign policy debacle. The "Fire Fight from Hell," *Newsweek* called it. The *Los Angeles Times* described it as culminating in "dozens of cheering, dancing Somalis dragging the body of a U.S. soldier through the city's streets." Those reports followed the 16-hour shootout portrayed in the movie *Black Hawk Down*, pitting SOF units against Somali warriors in the urban jungle of Mogadishu on October 3-4, 1993. The American objective had been capturing Mohammed Aidid, a warlord who was interfering with the U.N.'s humanitarian mission. The new

administration had expected a quick surgical operation.

The failure caused disquieting questions and bad memories. How could this happen? What had gone wrong? Some Clinton officials recalled that the last time the Democrats had held the White House, similar forces had failed in their attempt to rescue American hostages in Tehran ("Desert One"), a catastrophe instrumental in President Carter's 1980 reelection defeat.

Some senior generals had expressed doubts about the Mogadishu operation, yet as it had morphed from a peacekeeping mission into a manhunt for Aidid, the new national security team had failed to grasp the implications. The Mogadishu disaster spooked the Clinton administration as well as the brass, and confirmed the Joint Chiefs in the view that SOF should never be entrusted with independent operations.

After Mogadishu, one Pentagon officer explained, there was "reluctance to even discuss pro-active measures associated with countering the terrorist threat through SOF operations. The Joint Staff was very happy for the administration to take a law enforcement view. They didn't want to put special ops troops on the ground. They hadn't wanted to go into Somalia to begin with. The Joint Staff was the biggest foot-dragger on all of this counterterrorism business."

Another officer added that Somalia heightened a wariness, in some cases outright disdain, for SOF in the senior ranks. On the Joint Staff, the generals ranged from those who "did not have a great deal of respect" for SOF, to those who actually "hated what it represented, . . . hated the independent thought process, . . . hated the fact that the SOF guys on the Joint Staff would challenge things, would question things."

During Desert Storm, for example, General Norman Schwarzkopf was reluctant to include SOF in his war plan. He did so only grudgingly, and kept SOF on a short leash, wrote the commander of all Special Operations Forces at the time, General Carl Stiner, in his book *Shadow Warriors*. But SOF performed well in Desert Storm, and afterwards Schwarzkopf acknowledged their accomplishments. In 1993, Mogadishu turned back the clock.

4. No Legal Authority

August 1998 was a watershed for the White House. The embassy bombings led to the reexamination of preemptive military options. President Clinton proposed using elite SOF counterterrorism units to attack bin Laden, his lieutenants, and al Qaeda's infrastructure.

Also considered was unconventional warfare, a core SOF mission very different from counterterrorism. The Special Operations Command's *Special Operations in Peace and War* defines unconventional warfare as "military and paramilitary operations conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, and directed by an external source." For the White House, this meant assisting movements like the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

Both the Special Operations Command's counterterrorism units and Special Forces training for and executing unconventional warfare operate clandestinely. That is what their doctrine specifies. But because such operations are secret, the question arose in the 1990s whether the department had the legal authority to execute them.

This may seem baffling. If these missions are specified in the military doctrine of the Special Operations Command, and actual units train for them, isn't it obvious that the Department of Defense must have the authority to execute them? Perhaps, yet many in government emphatically deny it.

A gap exists, they believe, between DOD's *capability* for clandestine operations and its *authority* under the United States Code. In the 1990s, some Pentagon lawyers and some in the intelligence community argued that Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which covers the armed forces, did not give Defense the legal authority for such missions, while Title 50, which spells out the legal strictures for covert operations, gave this power exclusively to the CIA.

Title 50 defines covert action as "an activity of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." Covert action and deniability go hand in hand. If a story about a covert action hits the newspapers, the president must be able to avow that the United States is not mixed up in it.

But is it the case that *only* the CIA has this authority? Title 50, Chapter 15, Section 413b of the U.S. Code stipulates: "The President may not authorize the conduct of a covert action by departments, agencies, or entities of the United States Government unless the President determines such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States, which determination shall be set forth in a finding that shall meet each of the following conditions." The key condition is: "Each finding shall specify each department, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such action." Title 50 leaves the choice of agency to the president and does not exclude the Pentagon.

At the heart of this debate, said a former senior Defense official, was "institutional culture and affiliation." The department took the position that it lacked the

authority because it did not *want* the authority—or the mission. He told me, "All of its instincts push it in that direction."

One senior member of the National Security Council's counterterrorism group recalled encountering this attitude during deliberations over counterterrorism operations and clandestine support for the Northern Alliance. To the Joint Staff, neither was "in their minds a military mission. It was a covert action. The uniformed military was adamant that they would not do covert action." And, he added, if you presented them with "a legal opinion that says 'You're wrong,' then they would say, 'Well, we're not going to do it anyway. It's a matter of policy that we don't.'"

The authority argument was a "cop-out," said a retired officer who served in the Pentagon from 1994 to 2000. Sure enough, the Defense Department could have bypassed Title 50 by employing SOF on a *clandestine* basis. While both clandestine and covert missions are secret, only the latter require that the U.S. role not be "acknowledged publicly," which is Title 50's key requirement. Using SOF to preempt terrorists or support resistance movements clandestinely in peacetime is within the scope of Title 10, as long as the U.S. government does not deny involvement when the mission is over.

But this interpretation of Title 10 was considered beyond the pale in the 1990s. The Pentagon did not want the authority to strike terrorists secretly or to employ Special Forces against states that aided and sheltered them.

5. Risk Aversion

The mainstream military often dismisses special operations as too risky. To employ SOF requires open-minded political and military leadership willing to balance risks against potential gains. Supple judgment was in short supply in the Pentagon in the 1990s.

Walter Slocombe served as Clinton's undersecretary of defense for policy, and took part in all counterterrorism policy discussions in the Department of Defense. "We certainly looked at lots of options which involved the possible use of SOF," he stressed. But in the end they were never selected because they seemed too hard to pull off, he acknowledged. Options that put people on the ground to go after bin Laden were "much too hard." It was much easier and much less risky to fire off cruise missiles.

During Clinton's first term, someone would always find something wrong with a proposed operation, lamented General Downing. The attitude was: "Don't let these SOF guys go through the door because they're dangerous. . . . They are going to do something to embarrass the country." Downing recalls that during his years in command, he "sat through the preparation of maybe 20 operations where we had targeted people who had killed Americans. Terrorists who had done bad things to this country, and needed either to be killed or apprehended and brought back here, and we couldn't pull the trigger." It was too risky for the Pentagon's taste.

The other side of the risk-aversion coin is policymakers' demand for fail-safe options. A general who served in the Special Operations Command in the 1990s encountered "tremendous pressure to do something," he said, but at the same time, the requirement was for "perfect operations, no casualties, no failure." There were some "great opportunities" to strike at al Qaeda, "but you couldn't take any risk in doing so. You couldn't have a POW, you couldn't lose a man. You couldn't have anybody hurt." It was Catch-22. There were frequent "spin-ups" for SOF missions, but "in the end, the senior political and military leadership wouldn't let you go do it."

In the mid-1990s, and again at the end of the decade, the Clinton administration flirted with supporting the Iraqi resistance and then the Northern Alliance. An officer who served on the Joint Staff recounted how the senior military leadership put the kibosh on these potentially bold moves.

The CIA ran the Iraqi operation. But its unconventional warfare capabilities were paltry, and it turned to the military for help, requesting that SOF personnel be seconded to bolster the effort. The Joint Staff and its chairman wanted nothing to do with it, he said. "The guidance I got from the chairman's director of operations was that we weren't going to support this, and do everything you can to stall or keep it in the planning mode, don't let it get to the point where we're briefing this at the National Security Council or on the Hill."

Later, the National Security Council's counterterrorism group proposed supporting the Northern Alliance. They pushed the proposal up to the "principals" level. But attached to it was a "non-concurrence" by the Joint Staff, opposing it as too complex and risky. That was the kiss of death.

None of this was new to the Joint Staff officer, who had been in special operations for a long time. "Risk aversion emerges as senior officers move into higher positions," he explained. "It's a very common thing for these guys to become non-risk takers. They get caught up in interagency politics and the bureaucratic process, and get risk-averse."

A member of the counterterrorism group in the late 1990s noted that General Hugh Shelton, a former commander of the Special Operations Command, considered the use of SOF for counterterrorism less than anyone when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The official said Shelton directed the Joint Staff "not to plan certain

operations, I'm sure you've heard this from others." In fact, I had. "It got to the point," he said, where "the uniforms had become the suits, they were more the bureaucrats than the civilians."

6. Pariah Cowboys

When events finally impelled the Clinton administration to take a hard look at offensive operations, the push to pursue them came from the civilians of the National Security Council's Counterterrorism and Security Group.

One of the hardest of the hard-liners was the group's chief, Dick Clarke. For nearly a decade, this career civil servant began and ended his work day with the burgeoning terrorist threat to America. He knew in detail the danger the bin Ladens of the world posed, and it worried him greatly. Defensive measures were just not enough. "Clarke's philosophy was to go get the terrorists," one former senior Pentagon special operations official told me, "Go get them anywhere you can."

Asked if that meant using SOF, he replied: "Oh yeah. In fact, many of the options were with special mission units." But "Dick Clarke was attempting to take on a Pentagon hierarchy that wasn't of the same philosophical mindset."

Clarke was not alone. Mike Sheehan also pushed for assisting the Northern Alliance and striking al Qaeda with SOF. Such measures worried the senior brass, who proceeded to weaken those officials by treating them as pariahs. That meant portraying them as cowboys, who proposed reckless military operations that would get American soldiers killed.

Sheehan explained: Suppose one civilian starts beating the drum for special operations. The establishment "systematically starts to undermine you. They would say, 'He's a rogue, he's uncooperative, he's out of control, he's stupid, he makes bad choices.' It's very damaging. . . . You get to the point where you don't even raise issues like that. If someone did, like me or Clarke, we were labeled cowboys, way outside our area of competence."

Several officials who served on the Joint Staff and in the Pentagon's special operations office remembered the senior brass characterizing Clarke in such terms. "Anything Dick Clarke suggested, the Joint Staff was going to be negative about," said one. Some generals had been vitriolic, calling Clarke "a madman, out of control, power hungry, wanted to be a hero, all that kind of stuff." In fact, one of these former officials emphasized, "when we would carry back from the counterterrorism group one of those SOF counterterrorism proposals, our job was to figure out not how to execute it, but how we were going to say no."

By turning Clarke into a pariah, the Pentagon brass discredited precisely the options that might have spared us the tragedy of September 11, 2001. And when Clarke fought back at being branded "wild" and "irresponsible," they added "abrasive" and "intolerant" to the counts against him.

7. Intimidation of Civilians

Another way the brass stymied hard-line proposals from civilian policymakers was by highlighting their own military credentials and others' lack of them. One former defense official recounted a briefing on counterterrorism options given the secretary of defense by senior civilians and military officers. "The civilian, a political appointee with no military experience, says, 'As your policy adviser, let me tell you what you need to do militarily in this situation.' The chairman sits there, calmly listening. Then it's his turn. He begins by framing his sophisticated PowerPoint briefing in terms of the 'experience factor,' his own judgment, and those of four-star associates. The 'experience factor' infuses the presentation. Implicitly, it raises a question intended to discredit the civilian: 'What makes you qualified? What makes you think that your opinion is more important than mine when you don't have the experience I have?' 'Mr. Secretary,' concludes the chairman, 'this is my best military advice.'" In such situations, the official said, civilians were often dissuaded from taking on the generals.

Wayne Downing, the former special operations commander, had plenty of experience providing such briefings. "Occasionally you would get a civilian champion," he said, who would speak up enthusiastically in favor of the mission being presented. "And then the chairman or the vice chairman would say, 'I don't think this is a good idea. Our best military judgment is that you not do this.' That champion is not going any further."

During the 1990s, the "best military advice," when it came to counterterrorism, was always wary of the use of force. Both risk-aversion and a deep-seated distrust of SOF traceable all the way back to World War II informed the military counsel offered to top decision makers. Almost all those I consulted confirmed this, and many, including General Stiner, have described it in print.

When President Clinton began asking about special operations, one former senior official recounted, "those options were discussed, but never got anywhere. The Joint Staff would say, 'That's cowboy Hollywood stuff.' The president was intimidated because these guys come in with all those medals, [and] the White House took the 'stay away from SOF options' advice of the generals."

Another former official during both Clinton terms described several instances where "best military advice"

blocked SOF options under White House review. "The Pentagon resisted using Special Forces. Clinton raised it several times with [Joint Chiefs chairmen] Shalikashvili and Shelton. They recommended against it, and never really came up with a do-able plan."

Occasionally, policymakers kept pushing. When support for the Northern Alliance was on the table after the embassy bombings in Africa, the senior military leadership "refused to consider it," a former counterterrorism group member told me. "They said it was an intelligence operation, not a military mission."

The counterterrorism group at the National Security Council pushed the proposal anyway, but the Joint Staff strongly demurred and would not support it. They argued that supporting the Northern Alliance would entangle the United States in a quagmire. That was the end of the line. Let's suppose, said the former counterterrorism group member, that the president had ordered a covert strike "despite the chairman going on record as opposing it. Now, if the president orders such an operation against the best military advice of his chief military adviser, and it gets screwed up, they will blame the president who has no military experience, who was allegedly a draft dodger." The Northern Alliance was left to wither on the vine.

8. Big Footprints

The original concept for SOF counterterrorism units was that they would be unconventional, small, flexible, adaptive, and stealthy, suited to discreet and discriminate use, say those "present at the creation" following the Desert One disaster. Force packages were to be streamlined for surgical operations. The "footprint" of any operation was to be small, even invisible.

By the 1990s, this had dropped by the wayside. One former official recalled that when strikes against al Qaeda cells were proposed, "the Joint Staff and the chairman would come back and say, 'We highly recommend against doing it. But if ordered to do it, this is how we would do it.' And usually it involved the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. The footprint was ridiculous." In each instance the civilian policymakers backed off.

To some extent, SOF planners themselves have been guilty of this. "Mission-creep," one official called it. Since you can't "totally suppress an environment with 15 guys and three helicopters," force packages became "five or six hundred guys, AC-130 gunships, a 900-man quick-reaction force ready to assist if you get in trouble, and F-14s circling over the Persian Gulf." The policymakers were thinking small, surgical, and stealthy, so they'd take one "look at it and say that's too big."

One original Delta Force member traced this problem back to Desert One. "We took some bad lessons from that," he said. ". . . One was that we needed more. That maybe it would have been successful if we'd had more helicopters. That more is better. And now we add too many bells and whistles. We make our footprint too large. We price ourselves out of the market."

It's a way of dealing with the military's aversion to risk. "One way we tend to think we mitigate risk," he said, "is by adding more capabilities for this contingency and that contingency." Asked if this thinking had found its way into the Special Operations Command, he replied, "Yes. Absolutely."

9. No Actionable Intelligence

A top official in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the 1990s described the intelligence deficit with respect to targeting Osama bin Laden: "If you get intelligence, it's by definition very perishable. He moves all the time and he undoubtedly puts out false stories about where he's moving," making it extremely difficult "to get somebody from anyplace outside of Afghanistan into Afghanistan in time. The biggest problem was always intelligence."

But if the target had been broadened to al Qaeda's infrastructure, the intelligence requirements would have been less demanding, noted Dick Clarke. "There was plenty of intelligence. We had incredibly good intelligence about where bin Laden's facilities were. While we might never have been able to say at any given moment where he was, we knew half a dozen places that he moved among. So there was ample opportunity to use Special Forces."

In effect, to turn the need for "actionable intelligence" into a showstopper, all you have to do is define the target narrowly. That makes the intelligence requirements nearly impossible to satisfy. Broaden the picture, and the challenge of actionable intelligence became more manageable.

Special Operators are actually the first to seek good intelligence. But according to an officer on the Joint Staff at the time, "no actions [were] taken to pre-position or deploy the kinds of people that could have addressed those intelligence shortfalls"—people who could have provided the operational-level intelligence needed for SOF to deploy rapidly against fleeting targets in the safe havens where terrorists nest.

What was essential for counterterrorism operations was to establish intelligence networks in places harboring targets. This "operational preparation of the battlespace" is accomplished by infiltrating special operators who pass for locals. Their job includes recruiting indigenous elements who can help SOF units enter an area of interest, and organize, train, and equip local resistance and surrogate forces to assist them.

But no such preparation took place in the 1990s in ter-

rorist havens like Afghanistan, Yemen, Lebanon, and Sudan. Operating in those lands "would have taken official approval that prior to 9/11 would have never been given to us," one knowledgeable individual explained. "Prior to 9/11 there was no willingness to put Department of Defense personnel in such places. No such request would have been authorized."

Why? Because it's dicey, was the bottom line for a former senior Clinton appointee at the Pentagon. Asked if there were proposals at his level for it, he said: "Not that I remember," adding, "I can understand why. It raises a lot of questions. Without saying you shouldn't do it, it is one of those things that is going to cause concern. . . . You're talking not just about recruiting individuals to be sent, but recruiting whole organizations, and you think about it in the context of Somalia. I'm sure that would have raised a lot of questions. I can see why people would have been reluctant."

During Clinton's second term, then, the possibility of hunting down the terrorists did receive ample attention at the top echelons of government. But somewhere between inception and execution, the SOF options were always scuttled as too problematic.

War and tragedy have a way of breaking old attitudes. September 11, 2001, should have caused a sea change in SOF's role in fighting terrorism. To some extent, it has. Consider the stellar contribution of Special Operations Forces to the campaign in Afghanistan in 2001-02. In the early planning stages, SOF were only ancillary to the war plan; but by the end of October 2001, they had moved to center stage. They played a decisive role in toppling the Taliban and routing al Qaeda.

Since then, SOF have deployed to places like Yemen and the Philippines to train local militaries to fight al Qaeda and its affiliates. And last year, Secretary Rumsfeld ordered the Special Operations Command to track down and destroy al Qaeda around the globe. In effect, he ordered a global manhunt to prevent future 9/11s, including attacks with weapons of mass destruction.

In the war against terrorism, a global SOF campaign against al Qaeda is indispensable. Happily, our special counterterrorism units are tailor-made for this. And now that the United States is at war, it should be possible to overcome the showstoppers that blocked the "peacetime" use of those forces through the 1990s.

It should be—but will it? The answer is mixed. Some showstoppers have been neutralized. While law enforcement still has a role to play, we are clearly fighting a war, in which the Department of Defense and the armed forces take the lead. Thus, there should be far less latitude for turning advocates of tough counterterrorism missions into pariahs. September 11 and the president's response to it changed the terms of the policy discussion.

Yet the other showstoppers have not ceased to matter. Competing power centers continue to jockey for influence over counterterrorism policy. In a war in which the CIA may feel it has both a role to play and lost ground to regain, the Title 10/Title 50 debate and arguments over actionable intelligence are likely to persist. In our democratic society, fear of another Somalia remains. And the conventional military's mistrust of SOF has not evaporated.

Once again, a civilian is pushing for greater use of Special Operations Forces. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wants the Special Operations Command, for the first time in its history, to play the role of a "supported command," instead of supporting the geographic commands, as it has in the past. Neither those commands nor their friends on the Joint Staff are likely to welcome a reversal of the relationship in order to facilitate SOF missions. "Who's in command here?" could become a new wartime showstopper. Some in SOF believe it already has.

Once again, the problem involves institutions, organizational cultures, and entrenched ways of thinking. "Rumsfeld might think we're at war with terrorism," observed one former general, "but I'll bet he also thinks he is at war within the Pentagon. . . . The real war's happening right there in his building. It's a war of the culture. He can't go to war because he can't get his organization up for it."

Donald Rumsfeld may believe that Special Operations Forces should be in the forefront of the global war on terrorism. But for that to happen, he will have to breach what remains of the phalanx of resistance that blocked the offensive use of special mission units for over a decade—and he'll have to overcome the new showstoppers as well.

For now, it appears that the most powerful defense secretary ever has failed in his attempt to do this. In a disquieting October 16, 2003, memo to the Pentagon elite in the war on terror—General Dick Meyers, Joint Chiefs chairman; Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; General Pete Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and Doug Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy—Rumsfeld laments that progress has been slow and the Defense Department has not "yet made truly bold moves" in fighting al Qaeda. And he wonders whether his department "is changing fast enough to deal with the new 21st century security environment."

It's a good question. As al Qaeda regroups and deploys to new battlefields in Iraq and elsewhere, our special mission units—the Delta boys, the SEALs, and the rest—remain on the shelf. It's time to take them off. ♦

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The 1575 Map of Mantua

Princeton Art Museum

The City of Man

What we've forgotten about urban planning. By Catesby Leigh

In 1575, pilgrims in Rome for the jubilee could buy a souvenir map of the city. Included in a Renaissance collection of prints called *Mirror of Roman Magnificence*, the map is, in fact, radically distorted, highlighting the city's seven pilgrimage churches, with St. Peter's relocated to the center foreground. The Coliseum, the Castel Sant'Angelo, and even the Tiber are puny in scale, while the seven churches are aggrandized three-dimensionally, along with the eponymous saints and the pilgrims to whom they appear.

This souvenir map is what David Mayernik—author of a fascinating book called *Timeless Cities: An Architect's Reflections on Renaissance Italy*—would call an ideogram, an image whose principal objective is to communicate in symbolic rather than factual terms. Even this late in the Renaissance, Rome remained an underpopulated and largely neglected vestige of its ancient self. For the pilgrim steeped in a premodern consciousness, however, such ideograms "*were* the city," Mayernik observes. "Ready to embrace the marvelous and ignore the squalid, our model medieval visitor would have seen [Rome] exactly as the ideograms showed: scattered miraculous monuments in an indifferent sea of building."

Now, compare the Roman map with another 1575 image, a gorgeous color engraving offering a bird's-eye view of Mantua in flawless perspective. The engraving conveys a vivid sense of actuality. The enchanted island-city lies in the middle of the Mincio, which has seemingly bulged outward to accommodate it. Moles shelter two harbors. Alberti's great cathedral and its campanile dominate the skyline, while a monastery, a hospital, and public spaces are visible within the dense urban fabric. Two bridges, one of them doubling as a dam, link the city to one river bank and create a lagoon; a pair of causeways connect the city to the other bank. A fortified

Timeless Cities
An Architect's Reflections on Renaissance Italy
by David Mayernik
Westview, 274 pp., $26

Catesby Leigh writes regularly on architecture for The Weekly Standard.

Princeton University Press

The 1575 "Seven Churches of Rome," from Antoine Lafréry's Mirror of Roman Magnificence.

suburb lies on one bank, cloistered buildings on the other. A long wall extending to a distant stream encloses farmland. Close to the city the roads are thinly settled; beyond lies open landscape with hills in the background.

Although they date to the same year, there's a huge conceptual divide between these images of Rome and Mantua. One is a medieval artifact, the other Renaissance. The Roman picture conveys essentially an idea, while the Mantua picture conveys . . . , well, an idea, too, however much the accuracy of perspective tempts us to call it factual. But the idea has changed, for in the rendering of Mantua, the city and nature coexist as what Mayernik calls the "Idea of the City as a metaphor for the Earthly Paradise."

The notion of Paradise as essentially urban, Mayernik notes, can be traced through the Bible and on to St. Augustine's *City of God*. And, as was typical of the epoch, its Renaissance incarnation appeared in painting before it appeared in stone, bricks, and mortar. But once Italians began to build according to that idea, Western civilization's understanding of urban design was tied to it for centuries to come.

In *Timeless Cities*, Mayernik, an architect, painter, and fellow of the American Academy in Rome, looks at the Renaissance urbanism of five cities: Rome, Venice, Florence, Siena, and little Pienza (a Tuscan town with a main square brilliantly redesigned during the fifteenth century at the behest of Pope Pius II, after whom it was renamed). Mayernik draws heavily on the scholarship of academic art and architecture historians including Joseph Connors, John Onians, and Carroll William Westfall, but the resulting synthesis is very much his own.

So much information is packed into this short volume that certain essential themes do not receive the emphasis they probably deserve, especially where the general reader is concerned. Such is the case with the development of the modern conception of urban space. The perfection of the rendering of three-dimensional space by Florentine painters of the *quattrocento,* as Westfall has emphasized, introduced into Western consciousness the idea of space as a continuous entity extending throughout—and even beyond—the city.

This revolution in spatial consciousness stands between the Roman map and the view of Mantua. And it was crucial to the visionary transformation of medieval Rome by a long line of popes starting with Nicholas V (1447-1455). Nicholas made preparations for the relocation of an Egyptian obelisk (which the Emperor Caligula had brought to Rome) from the south side of St. Peter's to its east front.

More than a century later, Pope Sixtus V got the job done, setting the stage for the creation, after yet another century, of Bernini's incomparable piazza. At the same time, Sixtus placed other obelisks, as well as public fountains, around the city, with a plan to connect the seven pilgrimage churches by cutting new avenues and improving existing rights of way. Implementation continued for generations, and the result was one of the supreme achievements of Western urbanism.

Mayernik's concern, however, is not with urban space but with the rhetoric of Italian Renaissance architecture and urban design. He emphasizes the teleology of that rhetoric, and the consequent subordination of style to content. He describes the way Rome, in particular, "reads" in a narrative sense, and the way transcendent meanings are disclosed in space and time as we make our way through the city. Mayernik cites the experience of crossing the Ponte Sant'Angelo to the Borgo Vaticano. "Bernini," he writes, "saw the bridge then as the beginning of a powerfully integrated urban narrative that takes each pilgrim on a spiritual journey." On the great bridge, Bernini's mourning angels hold the instruments of Christ's passion.

Until Mussolini's time, one continued from there along one of two narrow streets separated by a long, thin island of buildings known as La Spina. After the symbolic tension created by the tragic figures on the bridge and the spatial tension generated by a narrow

street, the pilgrim's path opened, breathtakingly, onto the Piazza San Pietro, whose great colonnades Bernini conceived in explicitly anthropomorphic terms as the embracing arms of the Church. The narrative culminated at the apse of St. Peter's, with the "explosion of light and sculpture" of Bernini's cathedra. The narrative ends, in short, with a radiant glimpse of redemption. In demolishing La Spina, Mussolini's planners—harbingers of America's "urban renewers"—disrupted Bernini's spatial sequence in order to create a bloviated avenue called the via della Conciliazione.



Princeton University Press

A view of Rome's Castel Sant'Angelo, c. 1495.

Bernini's scenographic approach to design is no secret, and it was indispensable to his concept of urban narrative. One of his papal patrons, Alexander VII, routinely referred to his Vatican piazza as a "theater." Mayernik observes that Renaissance and Baroque Rome thought of itself, as did Venice, as the *teatrum mundi*, a microcosm of the cosmic stage on which the story of creation was unfolding.

The development of the Piazzetta di San Marco in Venice, facing the Doge's Palace, inspired, and was in turn inspired by, a brilliant urban stage-set reverie published by the architect and theorist Sebastiano Serlio. Facing the Piazzetta, Jacopo Sansovino's Libreria di San Marco is, as Mayernik notes, both a Roman stage-set façade and, thanks to its balustrades, a spectator's gallery for the theatrical processions that were a hallmark of the Most Serene Republic. Even the façades of Palladio's great Venetian churches, San Giorgio and the Redentore, seem two-dimensional theatrical backdrops when viewed from across the water.

Pienza's main piazza, too, was a microcosm. It included the cathedral, the bishop's and canon's residences, Pius II's palazzo, the *palazzo comunale*, and a humble inn—an encapsulation of the life of the town and the sources of authority within it. The communal pecking order was scrupulously articulated by means of distinct, readily legible building types, exterior surface materials ranging from the cathedral's travertine to the municipal palace's stucco to the humble brick of the inn, and widely varying degrees of decoration and ornament as well.

This articulation, Mayernik writes, was rooted in the classical rhetorical principle of *varietas*, controlled modulation, as well as the architectural principle of decorum or appropriateness. The teleology of the composition, however, involved more than symbolizing the town's communal life. And that teleology was musical rather than rhetorical. For his motet celebrating the completion of Brunelleschi's ingenious cathedral dome in Florence, the composer Dufay drew on the architect's proportional system. In the Pienza square, the architecture was composed of discordant elements that art brought into concord, and Renaissance humanists saw the resulting architectural harmony as a manifestation of the cosmic music of the spheres. This visual harmony was intended to nurture harmonious souls, as well as harmony within the body politic.

Mayernik notes the human body's drastic downgrading during the Enlightenment—from a figure made in God's image to a mere mechanism—which knocked Western design off its metaphysical base. As a result, he argues, architectural content gave way to style, urban "signs" (like Bernini's embracing colonnade) surrendered to mere "forms," and the urban designer became the urban planner.

But he fails to explore anthropomorphism's full significance. In *Architecture of Humanism* (1914), an English critic named Geoffrey Scott observed that anthropomorphism in classical architecture involves the projection of the human body into built form. This is one of man's most instinctive, and most profound, responses to mortality.

The anthropomorphic principle also involves the creation of spaces—architectural interiors as well as streets and public squares—that relate in a pleasing way to our embodied state. Its indispensable corollary is the concept of composition, the subordination of parts to an organic whole, of which the supreme example is the human figure. Composition makes the organized complexity of a building legible. It also underlies the integration of the private and public realms within the urban

organism, whether neighborhood or city. This, in a nutshell, is why the progressive dehumanization of art since the eighteenth century has been a catastrophe for architecture and urbanism alike.

Timeless Cities occasionally betrays signs of the haste of its own composition. ("Florentine ritual paths," Mayernik writes, "reverberated very little concrete back to new, permanent urban construction." Ouch.) A couple of the site descriptions are confusing. The author's iconographic orientation leads in a few instances to ponderous, unconvincing, or precious exegesis. And the reader could do without such words as "perspectively" and "loggiaed." I wish, too, that Mayernik's reading of architecture were less abstract. His assessment of the Saluté in Venice as an exercise in architectural theatrics excludes the sculpture—saints perched on the huge, rolling, wave-like console brackets surrounding the drum of the great church's dome: celestial surfers without equal in the history of art. Now, *that* is urban theater!

Mayernik's erudition commands admiration. And his assessment, in his concluding chapter, of the Enlightenment's impact on architecture and urbanism, along with the significance of Romanticism's replacement of the City with Nature as the "model and image of Paradise," is instructive.

He misses, however, more recent architecture—such as the Gothic buildings on numerous American campuses—that involves "signs" instead of "forms." Similarly, it will not do to disqualify big-city skyscrapers *en masse* as tokens of a commercially compromised set of societal values just because churches and city halls no longer dominate the skyline. In fact, the soaring classical and Flemish Gothic temples erected in Manhattan early in the twentieth century—to the greater glory of Standard Oil, Singer sewing machines, and Woolworth five-and-dime stores—proclaimed to the four winds that prosperity was not an end in itself but rather the bedrock of civilization.

Nonetheless, if the precipitous postwar artistic decline of America's skyscrapered downtowns resulted from modernism's advent, then it is undeniably the case that Enlightenment rationalism and Romanticism together set the stage for our ongoing catastrophe.

In his conclusion, moreover, Mayernik usefully raises the issue of landscape design's exaggerated role in urban design under the influence, first, of the classical garden at Versailles and, later, the Romantic longing for the dales of Arcady. His main point, however unfashionable in an age enthralled by Central Park's pastoral charms, is well taken: "In the [five Italian] cities we have visited," he writes,

> Nature is wholly herself in the countryside and rarely enters the city gates; conversely urban sprawl is contained by the walls, and building in the rural [surroundings] is sporadic at best. . . . Paradoxically, [such coherence] is achieved under the umbrella of the City as a metaphor for Paradise; whereas, since Nature has supplanted the urban realm as an ideal in our collective consciousness in the last two centuries, we have set about obliterating the natural landscape on an unprecedented scale.

The builders of the Renaissance city, Mayernik observes,

> even when the religion was corrupt or the learning narrow, sought to represent aspirations rather than reality. This allowed those cities to be always better than the people who made them, whereas politics and business [which shape contemporary American urbanism] rarely provide built contexts that transcend their immediate contingent reality and just as rarely equal the merits of the best people who made them. So we have the paradox today of being a generally more equitable society than, say, fourteenth-century Siena, but we have built for ourselves a far less humane environment.

This is all quite true. But what are we supposed to do about it? First of all, we need to recover the principle of anthropomorphism in architecture and urbanism. Modernists once pinned their hopes on the machine, and the result was a plague of glass boxes. And subsequent theoretical paradigms have merely bred new forms of dysfunction.

Even if the idea of man as the cosmic intersection between matter and the spirit doesn't grab you, the empirical evidence for the artistic validity of anthropomorphism and the superiority of the humanist tradition in design to any other the West has known is simply overwhelming.

Is it foolish to think of an idyllic image such as the Mantuan engraving as an urban ideal for our own time? Possibly not. Such images, as Mayernik suggests, can fire the public imagination, nurturing adherence to ambitious urban designs over the course of decades or even centuries. In other words, idealism rooted in deep and instinctive human preferences can work miracles. And let us not forget that the cultural memory of many Americans embraces the historic city and town, with their legible architectural hierarchy and orderly arrangement of public spaces.

Of course, modernists will presumably continue to run amok in Gotham, as they are now doing at Ground Zero. But other cities will increasingly turn to traditional architecture as the worthiest expression of their civic identities and ideals. Nashville's ambitious project for a classical symphony concert hall, scheduled for completion in 2006, is one example of this emerging trend.

And, as a result, the urban consciousness of an increasing number of Americans will probably be analogous to that of the pilgrims who took that Roman ideogram home. The handsome neighborhoods and even downtowns will register rather as those beautiful pilgrimage churches and their cloistered settings did in the pilgrims' memories.

The throwaway urban environments lying in between will register rather vaguely, as, for the pilgrims, did the undesigned city fabric between those churches: as something much less essential—a merely phenomenal reality, devoid of ideal substance. ♦

BCA

Out in the Cold

The using and abusing of Elizabeth Bentley.

BY STEPHEN SCHWARTZ

The story of Elizabeth Bentley—the disillusioned Soviet agent who revealed the extent of Moscow's penetration of the American government, and who was rewarded for that with decades of insult—represents one of the most extraordinary episodes of the Cold War.

Her allegations about the Soviet agents in Washington have now been corroborated by public release of the Venona decryptions, the secret Russian communications intercepted by Western military analysts at the time.

But, as the subtitle of Lauren Kessler's interesting *Clever Girl: Elizabeth Bentley, the Spy Who Ushered in the McCarthy Era* shows, we still haven't gotten away from the old picture. In reality, Elizabeth Bentley had little to do with Senator Joseph McCarthy, and she cannot be blamed for the events that followed on her revelations. The fact crying out from Kessler's fine account of Bentley's journey is that few people of responsibility and authority were prepared to admit, in the aftermath of World War II, the extent of Soviet duplicity toward America.

HarperCollins

Clever Girl
Elizabeth Bentley, the Spy Who Ushered in the McCarthy Era
by Lauren Kessler
HarperCollins, 372 pp., $26.95

Elizabeth Bentley appears to have been a product of the Depression and the sudden expansion of Sovietophilia in American intellectual and political life. Although the full circumstances of her recruitment remain mysterious, she joined the Communist party in 1935 at age thirty. Four years later, she was working undercover in a fascist propaganda agency, the Italian Library of Information, from which she was suddenly fired for her pro-Soviet associations. But in 1938, she had been introduced to a leading Soviet intelligence official, who became her lover as well as her operational chief. This was a man in his late forties, first known to her as "Timmy," a strangely childlike alias, but who is better known under the pseudonym "Jacob Golos."

Golos was a veteran of the radical left. His name derived from his involvement with a pro-Bolshevik daily newspaper published in New York, *Russky Golos* or *The Russian Voice*. Kessler misses that Golos was born Jacob Raisen in Ukraine in 1890, a fact included in the indispensable *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America*, by John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr. Jacob Golos ran a front operation called World Tourists, Inc., which arranged visits by foreigners to the Soviet Union. The prominence of Golos in socialist politics, ethnic Russian affairs, and, in effect, an official Soviet travel agency, demonstrates the absurdity of one of the favorite clichés of anti-anti-Communists, holding that Communist party activists were invariably kept away from secret work for the various networks dedicated to intelligence and repression.

Bentley was already, when she met Golos, an associate of fearsome Stalinists. Kessler refers to her previous handler, "F. Brown," but has apparently not found out that "Brown" was also known as "Alpi," an Italian Communist widely considered to be of the terrorist persuasion, fully capable of ordering and carrying out murders. Bentley herself was involved, in a subordinate position, in the plot to murder Trotsky, which was mismanaged by the Soviets from the United States.

In the Venona messages, Bentley was designated with the name *umnitsa*, meaning "clever girl" or "good girl." But after Golos died of a heart attack in 1943, her favorable reputation with her Soviet handlers began unraveling. In 1941, Golos had set up a commercial forwarding enterprise, called the U.S. Service and Shipping Corporation, with Bentley as one of its officers. With Golos's demise, she was assigned to other spy bosses, who demanded that her informants and operatives be turned over to more direct supervision. Stalinism required Soviet citizens to assume responsibility for handling American assets, without people like Bentley in an intermediary position. In retrospect, this was somewhat natural; a great number of the spies were unstable dilettantes who could not be expected to serve with the discipline men like Golos had acquired in years of conspiratorial activity. Indeed, the indiscretions of some of the agents and their associates had made Moscow suspicious of their capacity to remain effective.

But, as Kessler writes, "Bentley was hurt and angry and scared at the turn

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of events, and she often lashed out verbally at her Russian handlers." She had clearly begun to recognize the Soviet network as the criminal gang that it was. The situation deteriorated further, and soon her controllers were denouncing her to *their* bosses as "hostile, unreliable, and untrustworthy," in Kessler's account. There was serious discussion in Moscow about the need to remove her to Soviet territory, if not to simply kill her. But the top spies decided she still had some uses. Meanwhile, U.S. Service and Shipping had also come to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, other clandestine networks had been busted, and, in a situation of increasing insecurity and anxiety, it comes as no surprise that in 1945 Elizabeth Bentley decided to turn herself in to the FBI.

She soon denounced an extraordinary roster of Communists who had gained high posts as federal officials. Their ranks included Harry Dexter White, an undersecretary of the Treasury, and Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, an economist born in Russia, who had been known as a Soviet hatchetman on the West Coast and who had risen to leading responsibilities in the Treasury and Commerce departments. Others ranged from Duncan C. Lee, a top staffer in the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, to William Remington, a leading employee of the War Production Board.

She also declared that she had run the group of agents that included the atomic spy Julius Rosenberg. In this narrative, the names keep coming. The most startling and disturbing item in this book is the disclosure that Moscow was informed of her defection within three weeks of her first interview with the FBI, thanks to Kim Philby, the British liaison to United States intelligence, based in London, and perhaps the most notorious of all such traitors.

Polemicists who now look back in shock at the vulnerability of the Roosevelt administration to this subversion, and who react by charging the whole Democratic and liberal elite of those times with complicity in treason, simply demonstrate their lack of a historical sense. Most Americans were as surprised by the Soviet infiltration as their later counterparts were surprised by the attacks of September 11, and the caution of the Truman administration in reacting to the ugly facts is understandable.

Elizabeth Bentley achieved real status as a historical personage in 1947, when she described the activities in which she had participated before a New York grand jury. She was quickly labeled "the blonde spy queen," and, as in the case of Alger Hiss, attitudes toward her became a benchmark of "progressive" and "reactionary" sympathies. Kessler calls the section of *Clever Girl* describing the ensuing details of Miss Bentley's biography "The Ruin." Indeed, her service to the American cause brought her little beyond obloquy. Never again did she gain stable employment or enjoy a position of public respect. Although the FBI stood by her, many anti-Communists eventually considered her a cranky burden, and to all who wanted to believe the best about American leftists and their ideals, she was a figure of evil.

Elizabeth Bentley died in 1963 in obscure and painful circumstances. Although Lauren Kessler has done her best to defend her subject's honor, the weight of American popular memory remains against her. No one who reads Lauren Kessler's *Clever Girl* will come away satisfied that America did right by those who put loyalty to country ahead of personal interest—nor will anyone be inspired to emulate her. ♦

The Indian Novelist

James Welch's neglected classics.

BY BOB MERCER

"Even revenge had been slaughtered," James Welch wrote near the conclusion of *Fools Crow*, his 1986 novel about the massacre on the Marias River in Montana on January 23, 1870.

What happened at the Marias River that day—173 Pikunis were killed, including ninety women and fifty children, shot and burned to death—exceeded in its gruesomeness the better-known attack at Wounded Knee twenty years later. But as Welch diligently showed, both in *Fools Crow* and in the opening chapter of his 1994 *Killing Custer*, the Marias River massacre didn't happen out of the blue. A Pikuni leader named Owl Child and his gang had been on a rampage, murdering ranchers and teamsters, and raping women but purposely leaving them alive to spread the message of the terror. And Owl Child in turn justified his violence as standing up to the intruders while other Pikunis did not.

The immediate events began when a trader named Malcolm Clark took revenge upon Owl Child for a past theft by whipping the outlaw in front of his own people. That humiliation led Owl Child to murder Clark. And Clark's death led to the army's attack upon the camp of Heavy Runner, even though he and several of the other Pikuni leaders had agreed they would help bring in Owl Child. Unfortunately, Heavy Runner and his people had made camp at the spot vacated a few days earlier by Mountain Chief, with whose people Owl Child had traveled at times in the past into Canada.

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Tom Bean / CORBIS

"What man is capable of doing to man" is James Welch's constant theme. Indeed, that might be the most important thing to remember about the novelist. He wrote much about American Indians: for the most part the Blackfeet and Gros Ventre, among whom he grew up, as well as the neighboring Crow, Cheyenne, and Oglala Lakota. But Welch's characters were always people first, men and women who lived from the 1860s to 1980s on the northern Great Plains that form the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains. When Welch died this summer at age sixty-two, the country lost one of its most fluently beautiful but plainly honest voices. One of its funniest, too.

Born in Browning, Montana, in 1940, he studied with the poet Richard Hugo at the University of Montana in the 1960s, who advised him to write about the people he knew best. Down at the University of South Dakota, professor John Milton meanwhile had created a new platform for Western writers, the *South Dakota Review*. In the *Review*, Milton not only published recognized talents such as Wallace Stegner but new voices, and it was there that Welch published his first poems in 1969 and the first half of his first novel under its original title in 1971, "The Only Good Indian."

James Welch

Bassouls Sophie / Corbis Sygma

He always wanted to be a poet. Early in his career, he said, "Ever since I made the commitment I have just wanted to be a poet, without the 'Indian' label; but, at the same time, it was inevitable that people would refer to me as 'the Indian poet.' I have benefited materially from being an Indian poet, but I just hope that in twenty or thirty years people will take me seriously as a poet."

But it was not his poetry that made him a literary star, for no published collection followed his first, *Riding the Earthboy 40*. Instead came five novels. His critically favored debut, *Winter in the Blood*, appeared in 1974. *The Death of Jim Loney* in 1979 spoke perhaps truest about Welch's own heart. And the 1990 *The Indian Lawyer*, his best-known book, examines the suspense of congressional election politics and prison con games. But in all his work the settings is the confusing emotional and social environment that is the legacy of the twists, turns, and reversals of the government's Indian policies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

He also wrote a PBS film with Paul Stekler, *Last Stand at Little Bighorn*, in 1989, and a nonfiction book grew from the project, *Killing Custer*. Along the way, Welch volunteered for public service. "I served ten years on the Montana State Board of Pardons," he explained, "and just plain burned out on the gut-wrenching sadness of human experience."

It showed in his work. Injustice, revenge, despair, sorrow, the dark emotions, violence, all swirl through his writing. So too humor, lust, commitment, and honor—not to mention summer breezes, star-filled nights, good greasy meat, and snow on the land. Take away his beautiful and strong descriptions of the terrain, sky, and weather, and set aside the culturally destructive federal policies on land, treaties, language, and religion, you find that at their most basic, Welch's novels are about people's search for love; their acceptance, or not, of family and social responsibility; the weight of expectations; the value of strong parents; the power of dreams and beliefs; the demeaning changes in personality from alcohol misuse and abuse; and the good and bad of sexual desires.

Those are universal themes, and that really was James Welch's main point. Welch used the westward expansion of the United States in the nineteenth century, for instance, as the factual framework for the wonder, tragedy, and hope of his 1986 masterpiece *Fools Crow* and for his last and most mature novel, *The Heartsong of Charging Elk*, published in 2000, that tells the story of an Oglala Lakota man who must decide whether to remain in France as part of the bigger world in

which he's been forced to make his life, or return home to Pine Ridge and his remaining family.

At the end of *The Indian Lawyer*, a book that draws heavily upon his experience on the parole board, Welch describes elementary teacher Lena Old Horn driving home from a Sunday night dinner, content in her decision of a few nights past that she finally would leave Browning at the end of classes that spring—unable to stand any longer living in a place where she has to pull down the window shade to avoid seeing the inhumanity that people using alcohol were wreaking upon themselves at the edge of her backyard.

As she drove through the late-April slush, on the street, she noticed a rangy man shooting baskets on the grade school's playground. It was the Yellow Calf boy, who had led the high school team to two state championships and played to too much fanfare for his taste at the University of Montana. He had left to learn to be a lawyer at Stanford and came back to a Helena law firm, where he won a big injury suit against the powerful Anaconda mining company. His stature led to service on the parole board and then recruitment to be a candidate for the Democratic nomination to a congressional seat—before he fell into a seductive trap set by his inmates. Now he was working on the Standing Rock Indian Reservation in North Dakota, handling a tribal water-rights case. He was home again, temporarily, in Browning for the funeral of his grandfather.

> Impulsively, she pulled over to the side of the road and stopped. . . . She held her breath as she watched the moves that she still recognized—the left-handed jump hook, the delicate finger roll, and of course the raining jump shots from the top of the key, the corner, the flank. She thought of all the basketball games she had seen in Browning, all the kids who played with grace and intensity, but there had never been another Sylvester Yellow Calf.
>
> As Lena watched, the clouds grew lower and thicker and the first splotches of sleet hit her windshield and she could not see the mountains anymore. She started her car and crept up and over the hill. She glanced over at the basketball court, but Sylvester didn't notice the car. Nor did he notice the sleet, the freshening of the wind from the north. He was going one on one against the only man who ever beat him.

The search for maturity runs throughout Welch's novels. As for his own life as a writer, Welch said, "For the most part only an Indian knows who he is—an individual who just happens to be an Indian—and if he has grown up on a reservation he will naturally write about what he knows. And hopefully he will have the toughness and fairness to present his material in a way that is not manufactured by conventional stance." James Welch's main characters for the most part are everyday heroes in an ageless struggle—the struggle for humanity—his America is one that most Americans would never know but for his work. ♦

In an October 2003 survey from Luntz Research, fully 25% of top-level Congressional staff surveyed named The Weekly Standard the "most influential publication" in Washington-ahead of Roll Call, The Hill, and The New Republic.

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"How'd you wind up in Human Resources, Talbot?"

Books in Brief



***"The American Way": Family and Community in the Shaping of the American Identity* by Allan Carlson (ISI, 211 pp., $15).** Taking on those who posit individualism, capitalism, or diversity as the dominant theme of American life, Allan Carlson makes the case that the United States is best understood through images of home and the child-rich family.

Tracing the long-standing rivalry between maternal feminists and equity feminists, Carlson notes Teddy Roosevelt's call for every healthy American wife to bear at least four children. That pro-family rhetoric not only helped to assimilate immigrants, but also gave the edge to the maternal feminists, who advocated a public policy that protected men in the workplace and women and children at home. This family ideal, held together economically by the "family wage" agenda of the labor unions and reinforced by the New Deal and the Social Security system, prevailed until the 1970s.

Carlson also chronicles how the same federal power that shored up the family through the 1960s would haunt the family in subsequent decades. Reinforced by corporations, which generally sided with the equity feminists in enticing mothers into the workplace, these changes suggest any recovery of the American family ideal requires measures more substantial than the Republicans' rhetoric of "family values" and tax cuts.

—*Robert W. Patterson*



***The Spirits of America: A Social History of Alcohol* by Eric Burns (Temple University Press, 326 pp., $29).** "I am not, by training, a historian, but I play one in the preceding pages," writes Fox News Channel's Eric Burns at the end of his thoroughly enjoyable "social history of alcohol." Relying heavily on anecdote and biography, Burns examines America's complicated relationship with the demon rum—and he's at his best when he is dropping bits of trivia into longer tales.

Did you know, for instance, that "the real McCoy" was a particularly trustworthy bootlegger known for selling unadulterated hooch? Guinness Extra Stout has been proven to have positive effects on the health of dogs (when consumed in moderation). Rattle-skull, Calibogus, Bombo, Mimbo, and Sillabub were all mixed drinks popular in the 1790s, but to Burns their names "sound like they could just as easily be served today at one of our franchised singles bars, a paper umbrella in the glass."

The Spirits of America focuses on prohibition, and Burns leaves no uncertainty what he thinks of the "noble experiment." The Eighteenth Amendment, Burns writes with delicate hyperbole honed by over two decades in broadcast journalism, was "the worst idea ever proposed by a legislative body anywhere in the world."

—*Katherine Mangu-Ward*

***C.S. Lewis at the BBC: Messages of Hope in the Darkness of War* by Justin Phillips (Marshall Pickering, 144 pp., $15.95).** Most readers know C.S. Lewis as the writer of children's fantasies and such perennially popular apologetics as *The Screwtape Letters*. But it was his brief career in radio during World War II, argues Justin Phillips, that helped form even his written work. *Mere Christianity*, for instance, started as a series of broadcast talks and benefited from having been tailored to meet the requirements of radio.

James Welch, the BBC's director of religious broadcasting, was a practical visionary who realized that during the war the English needed to know Christianity "had something to say to the life of the nation as a whole." So he set out to create a religious department that would fulfill that need—and, along the way, found C.S. Lewis. Phillips himself, who died just before the book's publication, had a long career at the BBC, and his inside knowledge helps him picture what Lewis's experiences were like. Given the way the BBC behaves now, one wishes people of the caliber of Welch and Lewis were working there still.

—*Gina R. Dalfonzo*

Parody

Excerpts from the journals of former Treasury secretary Paul O'Neill:

February 1, 2001: Had a meeting with the Pres. I briefed him on my efforts to improve ergonomics at Treasury, but his look was vacant. Has he read all my memos?

February 5, 2001: Good meeting with Cheney today. Sometimes you've got to be outspoken, so I told him, "Lowering taxes is imbecilic. On the other hand, you morons are free to disagree." Dick was very quiet, but when he finally thanked me for my "sharp insights," I knew we were on the same page.

February 19, 2001: You make one comment about the dollar and suddenly everyone's in a lather. They ought to relax. A man's allowed to plunge a currency now and then.

March 1, 2001: Dick's been kind of quiet lately.

April 15, 2001: Reminded the Pres about CO2 emissions and global warming. He seemed inattentive and changed the subject. Must talk to Dick about this.

March 13, 2002: The Council on Foreign Relations asked me about W's steel tariffs today. I told them I thought it was a bad idea, bad policy. Why is Dick avoiding me?

July 28, 2002: This diplomacy thing is tiring, but I do my part. Instead of saying that Brazil is going to smoke up our foreign aid like a crack whore, I toned down my remarks and simply indicated that we should work to ensure that any assistance to Brazil doesn't "go out of the country to Swiss bank accounts."

August 22, 2002: Brazilians, I feel, are an overly sensitive people.

October 28, 2002: Brazil—back again. I said that markets would be trying to make sure their president-elect is "not a crazy person." Notice: I said NOT crazy. This administration cannot take honesty. As I said to Colin today, they're just keeping us around so they can look good. He seemed irritated by this.

December 1, 2002: Dick said there are going to be some changes at Treasury. I said that was fine with me. I'm happy as Treasury secretary as long as I can continue to say exactly what's on my mind.

December 4, 2002: I'm shocked. Et tu, Cheney?

December 5, 2002: Cheney asked me to say I chose to resign. I said I'm too old to start lying. Someday they're going to miss this kind of candor.