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

Saddam's Cash

and the journalists and politicians he bought with it

Stephen F. Hayes

Christopher Hitchens on Malcolm Muggeridge

James J. Buckley on John Henry Newman

AS THE

AMERICAN DREAM

GROWS, WE WANT

TO

MAKE SURE IT'S STILL

WITHIN REACH.



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Vaccine Development a Casualty of Flawed Public Policy

Henry I. Miller, M.D., is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

The death toll from SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) continues to rise. Thousands have been stricken, and hundreds worldwide have died. With the discovery of the causative agent—a previously unknown member of the Coronavirus family—and researchers' ability to grow the virus in tissue culture, American drug and biotech companies should be burning the midnight oil to create a vaccine. But flawed public policy discourages vaccine development; even supplies of vaccines from common, epidemic infectious diseases are in jeopardy.

Producers have abandoned the field in droves. From 1967 to the present, the number of U.S. vaccine manufacturers has fallen from thirty-seven to less than ten, and the number of FDA-approved vaccines has declined from 380 to a few dozen. Consequently, the nation has experienced shortages of essential vaccines, and many school systems have been forced to waive immunization requirements as a result of insufficient supplies. The reason is that, compared to therapeutic drugs, **vaccines traditionally offer low return on investment but high exposure to legal liability.**

This situation is largely the result of wrongheaded public policy. For example, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC)—the largest domestic purchaser of vaccines—uses its buying clout to compel discounts for purchases. Recently, the CDC rejected Wyeth Lederle Vaccines' proposed price of $58 a dose for its pneumococcus vaccine, demanding (and getting) a discount of $10 off the proposed price. Do not expect Lederle to invest much in vaccine R&D anytime soon.

Excessive regulation also blocks progress. Consider the FDA's inexplicable position on a vaccine to prevent meningitis C, an illness that infects thousands of Americans and kills hundreds each year. No state-of-the-art vaccine against this disease has been approved for use in the United States, although three products are available in Canada and Europe. The efficacy of these vaccines has been amply demonstrated, with more than twenty million doses administered. Yet the FDA refuses to recognize the foreign approvals. In addition, the FDA has a history of removing safe vaccines from the market because of mere *perceptions* of side effects—a prospect that terrifies manufacturers.

What can we do to make vaccine development more attractive? First, make vaccine regulatory approvals between the United States and the European Union reciprocal, which would cut development costs and rationalize the FDA's oversight of vaccines.

Second, stop public agencies from demanding prices for vaccines that are too low.

Third, give companies tax credits to defray research and development costs.

Fourth, ensure that companies' performing government-sponsored R&D under contract can realize commercial benefits when the vaccine is produced.

Finally, indemnify reasonable damages to consumers from harm caused by vaccines, and establish a regulatory-compliance defense against lawsuits for damages. Such a defense stipulates that, after a manufacturer has met the regulatory requirements for vaccine approval, any mishap from use of the product is considered to be unforeseeable and damages would be compensated by the government.

These much-needed reforms won't come easy. Getting the government to adopt them will be like dragging a child to the doctor for a painful shot.

— Henry I. Miller, M.D.

Paid for by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

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

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BPA INTERNATIONAL

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Human Rights, U.N. Wrongs

The United Nations has been front and center since April 9, when U.S.-led coalition military forces took control of Baghdad and effectively ended one of the bloodiest tyrannies in recorded human history. At U.N. headquarters in New York, of course, Secretary General Kofi Annan and his diplofunctionaries have been frantically attempting to reinsert themselves into the postwar Iraqi picture, claiming a unique mandate of legitimacy from the "international community" to administer the country they did absolutely nothing to help free. Things have been plenty busy in Geneva, Switzerland, too, where the U.N. Human Rights Commission has been wrapping up its annual six-week confab. And how has the "international community," there assembled, taken note of the Baath party human rights atrocities now being uncovered on a near-daily basis? Let's have a peek at the commission's recent agenda:

April 9

Crowds of Iraqis celebrate and pull down a statue of Saddam as Baghdad falls. Western newspapers publish reports from inside the infamous "White Lion" prison in the southern city of Basra, where for decades victims of the toppled regime were hung from ceiling hooks and tortured with hot irons, cigarettes, boiling water, pliers, and baths of acid.

The U.N. high commissioner for human rights, Sergio Vieira de Mello, announces himself "deeply disturbed" over civilian deaths and injuries resulting from the U.S.-led coalition war of liberation.

April 14

Western newspapers publish reports from inside suburban Baghdad's notorious Abu Ghraib prison, Saddam's largest, where thousands of people were tortured and murdered: forced to sit on glass bottles until their intestines were perforated, their lips and ears and tongues amputated with box cutters, and so forth.

Vieira de Mello tells the BBC that "war is always too high a price" to pay for freedom, that coalition forces are guilty of "serious breaches to the Geneva Convention," breaches that his agency will investigate if, "as I hope we will be able to," his staffers are allowed to return to Iraq. Meantime, the commission approves a resolution expressing "deep concern that Islam is frequently and wrongly associated with human rights violations and terrorism" and authorizing an inquiry into "the situation of Muslim and Arab peoples" with "special reference" to attacks against their persons and properties "in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001."

AP / Brennan Linsley

An Iraqi man kisses the disinterred remains of his murdered son.

April 15

U.S. Marines discover and free 123 prisoners, some of them women, from deep underground bunkers at the Baath party's Al-Istikhbarat Al-'Askariya torture facility west of Baghdad. All the prisoners are emaciated and some have survived by eating scabs off their sores.

In Geneva, the U.N. Human Rights Commission approves three separate resolutions condemning Israel for the "gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law" involved in its "policy of liquidation" against Palestinians and Syrians in the Golan Heights, which policy the commission calls an "offense against humanity."

April 16

Western newspapers publish reports on the thousands of documents British troops have recovered from Basra's "Mother of All Battles Branch" of Saddam's Baath party, documents detailing a decades-long and hair-raising program of systematic terror against Shiite locals.

The U.N. Human Rights Commission passes yet another resolution of censure against Israel, but declines to take any action on the epic human rights violations by Robert Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe or on the recent wave of political arrests and executions by Fidel Castro's government in Cuba.

April 23

Western newspapers publish reports from inside Al Hakemiya, a Baath party secret-police interrogation center in Baghdad, where surgical units appar-

ently harvested organs from the bodies of murdered torture victims. Western television networks broadcast film from Abu Ghraib prison, where crowds have begun gathering at recently discovered mass graves, now being exhumed so that relatives can inspect the decomposed corpses in hopes of identifying their loved ones.

The U.N. Human Rights Commission approves a resolution urging U.N. member states to respect "the rich and diverse nature of the community of the world's democracies" while "bearing in mind that each society and every context has its own indigenous and relevant democratic institutional traditions." There is "no one model of democracy," the commission concludes, and "therefore we must not seek to export any particular model of democracy." To underscore the point, the Commission formally rebukes (but does not name) one particular democracy-exporting nation for its planned use of military tribunals as a means to bring terrorism and war-crime suspects to justice.

April 24

Digging continues at Abu Ghraib prison as a newly formed Iraqi human rights group, the Committee of Free Prisoners, begins allowing public access to millions of documents recovered from Saddam's General Security Directorate, documents meticulously recording the torture and murder of tens—maybe hundreds—of thousands of people. Included in the archive are the before-and-after torture-session photographs Baath officials appear to have routinely recorded.

Speaking to a closing session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission annual assembly in Geneva, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan reiterates his regret over the coalition's "decision to go to war without specific authorization by the Security Council." Annan says "I hope" that U.S. and British forces will "act strictly within the rules" regarding prisoners of war and that they will otherwise accept their responsibilities as an "occupying power." In the future, Annan concludes, wars like this one should be avoided; the world will be "safer" in a system "governed by the international rule of law and principles set out in the United Nations Charter." The Commission officially declares itself in agreement with Annan, approving a resolution identifying "peace" as a fundamental precondition for human rights and calling upon member states to renounce the use of force against other member states "irrespective of their political, economic, or social systems."

Also, Western newspapers report—and Kofi Annan's spokesman confirms—that the United Nations continues to recognize Baath party diplomats as the only properly credentialed representatives of Iraq. More than a dozen such diplomats remain officially accredited at Iraq's U.N. mission in New York, and some two dozen others remain active at U.N. agencies in Geneva and Vienna. ♦

Casual

The Horse I Rode in On

The first leg of my trip to Costa Rica was exactly as I'd envisioned it: I ate a hearty breakfast of bacon, eggs, and *gallo pinto* (black beans and rice), followed by nine holes of golf at one of the premier courses in Central America. My friends and I then lunched poolside and returned to the links. Afterwards we headed to the 19th hole for "Michelada" Imperials—beer served in salted, frosty mugs with ice and a dash of lime. For dinner we feasted on grilled *corvina* (sea bass) and *ceviche* (raw fish cured in lime juice), and we ended the night playing blackjack (they call it "rummy") at the local casino.

That could have been the template for my entire week and I would have been perfectly content. But my hosts, J.C. and his wife, Julie, had other plans. After three days of this idyllic routine at the Los Sueños resort on the Pacific Coast, we headed inland to Chomes, a ranch that has been in Julie's family for almost a hundred years. Here, there was no air conditioning and no casino. Outside it was arid, dusty, and a sweltering 90 degrees. What was happening to my dream vacation?

It was about to get better. One of the things J.C. insisted on our doing was riding horses. "Sure, sounds like a great idea," I said, with a hint of reluctance in my voice. What I didn't want to admit was that, having grown up in Jersey and moved on to Washington, D.C., I had never been on a horse in my life (not counting the coin-operated ones outside K-Mart). We were actually approaching the stables before I confessed that I had no idea what I was getting myself into.

"*Never*?" asked J.C., incredulous. Sadly, the number of people who have never been on a horse is on the rise. As more of us spend our lives in cities and suburbs, the notion of horseback riding becomes as novel as parasailing and bungee jumping. It's gotten to the point where I now know people from Texas and Oklahoma who have not once been on a horse.



Darren Gygi

When the time came for me to mount, I had to picture Clint Eastwood in the movies, swinging one leg over the saddle. That was easy enough. But then what? I suddenly felt myself towering over everyone, sitting atop a powerful beast that could, at any moment, get spooked and drag me to an untimely death.

I located the stirrups and the reins, and was told how to make the horse turn, accelerate, and stop with just a tug of the rope. (It turns out verbal commands such as "Heeyah!" and "Whoa, Nelly!" do not work.) Still, I found myself gripping the saddle horn as if my life depended on it—even though we hadn't started moving yet. Meanwhile the local cowboys, known as *sabañeros*, were clearly amused at this gringo in a baseball cap and Skechers trying to show his horse who was boss.

It turned out the boss was J.C., who rode a white horse befitting Patton. It was feisty, or, as they say, *con brio*. As he and his stallion led the way, my gentle, ruddy horse and I followed without incident. And I discovered there's something exhilarating about riding a horse. You imagine you're the Marlboro Man rounding up the cattle, as breathtaking scenery unfolds around you. We rode through sugar cane fields as the sun set, throwing out movie lines from *City Slickers*. But just to remind us we were in Costa Rica and not New Mexico, black monkeys were staring down at us from the trees.

A couple of days later, we were back on the range, this time at J.C.'s family ranch, known as Las Delicias. We were joined by a cowboy who took us on a more advanced trail—through rivers, mud pits, and pastures filled with grazing cattle. Luckily, my horse was rather tame, though maybe too much so, for as we forded a river, he decided to lower his head and have a drink. He was parched, and we sat there, my stirrups underwater, for a good five minutes.

"Show him who's boss," advised J.C. "He sort of looks like a donkey," said our friend Pete. But my horse and I were undeterred. It was a hot day, and we both needed a break.

Later, we came upon a cow who had just given birth. As we rode up, she was licking her calf, and in a few moments the baby was struggling to take its first wobbly steps. The sight took my breath away. And to think I could've spent my whole vacation at the casino in Los Sueños drinking Micheladas and splitting aces.

Victorino Matus

Office of National Drug Control Policy, Monitoring the Future study, December 2002. University of Michigan.

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What's Next in Iraq?

Everyone is asking what's going to happen next, now that the war is over. Fred Barnes is right on the money about how to make the most of our victory in "The Tempting of the President" (April 21).

Change is generational, at best, and the biggest danger for the coming years is that the tone for generations to come will be set by the clutch of tyrants and terrorists surrounding Iraq, eager as they must be to fill the power vacuum that always follows war.

As for the Palestinians, Barnes is also correct that there has never been a better time to do nothing. The new realities in Iraq are likely to spark the beginning of a process of soul searching in the Arab world that might, if the pressure is kept on, lead to a two-sided peace process. Pushing the peace process now would undermine the introspection that is needed among Palestinians to make progress. When political discourse among Palestinians becomes alive and free, the time will come to make peace with them, but not before.

Barnes's most trenchant point, however, is that the president doesn't owe anybody anything. The world's evil aggressors are only made stronger if the United States behaves as though acting in self-defense requires apology or amends. On the contrary, the world has a debt to the United States and her allies, which it might begin to pay with radical reform at the U.N.

Shahar Tsadeek
Santa Fe, NM

France's Fatal Flaw

In "Forgiveness for France?" (April 21) Michel Gurfinkiel points to a "growing rift between America and many of its nominal allies or friends." This rift is neither recent nor is it based on the disagreement over Iraq. Its earlier, broader twentieth-century roots can be found in the inability or lack of desire on the part of its citizens to change a ruling class which has consistently suffocated the greatest catalyst of economic growth: the entrepreneur.

Historically, the French "state nobility" has demonstrated a fundamental disdain for countries such as the United States where, as Tony Blair put it a few years ago, "people who do well don't have questions asked about their accent, their class origin, their beginning."

The French placed their bet on the power of pedigree, not on the power of talent. It has been a disastrous bet, leading France into a steady economic decline, particularly during the past 10 years, when France's share of the world's GDP has gone from about 6 percent to 4 percent. A loss of economic power of this magnitude translates into a loss of military power and political influence. Rifts are inevitable among uneven partners who hold a fundamentally different



understanding of what makes a country great.

Gurfinkiel argues that the present time may be ripe for French citizens to debate "la pensée unique" (the "single thought"). Ultimately, only time will tell whether the French accept this challenge and abandon their second-rate status.

Enrique Bargioni
Miami, FL

The French have always been a little cantankerous on the world stage and at odds with the United States. The average American citizen didn't think twice about that. Such behavior was the concern of the French government and the American government in the minds of most Americans.

This time around, things are quite different. Every American citizen is aware of what the French have done. The French government has failed completely to appreciate the impact that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 had on American citizens and their opinions on foreign affairs.

Americans now consider the behavior of the French that of an enemy of our country, not an ally. French-American relations are no longer the province of diplomats.

France betrayed us in "our hour of need," and they did so after Americans fought and died to liberate them twice in the past century. Our American fallen still lie buried in French soil.

I have worked with the French for 25 years and have lived in France. I have always admired its culture. But France has definitely crossed the line this time and (rightly) will not be forgotten or forgiven anytime soon.

Richard Robbins
Santa Rosa, CA

Caveat Creditor

Here is one lawyer's response to "Forgive Them His Debts" by Irwin M. Stelzer (April 21).

Professor Alexander Nahum Sack had it right. Debts incurred by a despotic power for the purposes of staying in power by repressing the population that fights against it are not obligations of the nation.

A common Latin phrase in the arena of corporate law is "ultra vires" which means "unauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law."

Under this well-recognized American legal doctrine, when the board of directors of a corporation takes any action which exceeds the authority granted by the bylaws or by the law of the state of its organization, that action is void and unenforceable as to the corporation.

In the case of Iraq, Saddam Hussein may have been the only person with the apparent power to act for the nation as far as other nations were concerned, but when he borrowed money in the name

PRESERVING FREEDOM TO ROAM THE NET

Americans' freedom to connect to the Internet and roam wherever they choose in cyberspace could be jeopardized by decisions now pending in Washington. Ironically, the threat arises from regulatory proposals aimed at a laudable goal: promoting broadband Internet service.

Several times faster than a dial-up phone connection, broadband is delivered primarily via cable modem or over a phone company's Digital Subscriber Line (DSL). It makes Web surfing more fun and productive, and as more households sign up, its speed and "always-on" capability will drive many innovative online services. In time, it will be the prevailing way to access the Internet.

The Federal Communications Commission is developing a regulatory framework to make broadband more widely available at a lower cost. But the FCC could unintentionally hurt the interests of consumers if it does not retain the rules that have protected freedom to use the Net.

Currently, when consumers use a dial-up connection, phone companies cannot interfere with their choice of equipment or destination. This non-interference rule has benefited consumers with a proliferation of telecommunications services and devices—more than 34,000 different devices, including inexpensive handsets, fax machines and computers. Yet, the FCC may decide to exempt all broadband providers from this simple rule that encourages innovation and results in more choices for consumers.

Some broadband providers say the rule should not apply to them because they intend to continue allowing customers to use a variety of equipment to go anywhere they want on the Internet. But this one FCC rule, which has served the nation well for decades, assures that consumers will always be able to connect with new devices and new online content and services, regardless of how an access provider's business model or management might evolve.

As the Internet gains speed, policymakers must safeguard its freewheeling soul

In general, less regulation of technology is better than more. But the existing non-interference rule has been key to the Internet's growth and vitality. To abandon it now could inhibit further development of Net content, technologies and services. This belief unites Microsoft with a broad coalition of consumer groups and companies, from Apple Computer and Amazon.com to Yahoo! and the Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network.

As America enters the broadband age, policymakers should preserve the Net's benefits by reaffirming a basic principle: consumers, so long as they do not harm the network, should be free to access all lawful Internet content and use the applications and devices of their choice.

One in a series of essays on technology and society. More information is available at microsoft.com/issues.

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of Iraq for what was obviously his personal use, the lenders were on notice that this was not the will of the people of Iraq. Such lenders/nations have no standing, therefore, to try to enforce such debts against the Iraqi people who neither wanted nor authorized the debts to be incurred in their name.

What is a good rule for American corporations would also be good for aiders and abettors of terrorist organizations. To paraphrase, let's say "caveat creditor" should be the applicable principle. Consistent with the president's policy that those who support terrorists are themselves terrorists, nations who supported Saddam Hussein should be made to pay and not profit.

Countries claiming to be creditors of Iraq should be denied any recovery from the people of Iraq absent a conclusive demonstration that the debt was incurred in good faith and that the Iraqi people benefited from it directly.

DONALD E. CASEY
Chicago, IL

KRUGMAN'S INFALLIBILITY

STEPHEN F. HAYES is to be congratulated for exposing the blatant hypocrisy of many liberals in their effort to promote their own moral and intellectual superiority over those who support President Bush and the war in Iraq ("Beyond Baghdad," April 21).

Hayes's comments regarding *New York Times* columnist Paul Krugman's self-serving inconsistencies made for especially good reading. I would like to further point out that following Krugman's April 1 column, in which he sarcastically wrote about "the recriminations fly[ing] over Operation Predicted Cakewalk," he quickly reversed course on April 11 when he reminded his readers that "even skeptics about this war expected a military victory. ('Of course we'll win on the battlefield, probably with ease' was the opening line of *my* start-of-the-war column)" [emphasis added].

What is most impressive about Krugman is that he has a remarkable knack for never being wrong about anything. His April Fool's comment resulted from the temporary "slowdown" on the path to Baghdad. His April 11 comment followed the near completion of the brilliantly planned and executed U.S. war plan.

Ah, the joy of being right all the time!

STEVEN MORRIS
East Hampton, NY

TALKING HEADS

THE SCRAPBOOK (April 21) really picked out some of the worst predictors of the war in "The Cassandra Chronicles."

But what professional embarrassment will those incorrect and foolish predictions cause for the commentators, writers, and pundits? Judging from the past, they won't suffer at all. We will be seeing Chris Matthews chattering on television for a long time to come.

Peter Arnett and Geraldo Rivera were both employed in this war by prominent news organizations in spite of their backgrounds. American television provided them with a big sounding board to again treat us to their profound wisdom, and they screwed up again. The big news organizations themselves are to blame for failing to learn from the past.

Perhaps some of the new talent among the embeds will exhibit a bit more realism in the next crop of talking heads. But the majority of the people quoted in THE SCRAPBOOK will continue doing business as usual.

LARRY G. DEVRIES
Eden Prairie, MN

INBOX ANTI-SEMITISM

JOHN PODHORETZ'S WIFE, although well-meaning, is wrong. People who excrete the kind of anti-Semitism he describes in "Watching the Invective" (April 21) need to be squashed, albeit verbally, like bugs.

I was in the audience many years ago at Trinity University in San Antonio to hear Elie Wiesel. During the Q&A, an elderly man stepped up to the microphone and took his opportunity to let us all know that Hitler should have finished "the job" of ridding the world of Jews. The audience erupted verbally in response, but Mr. Wiesel asked us to let him speak so that we would know that anti-Semitism is alive and well and waiting for its chance.

I admire Elie Wiesel, but I felt that bearing the weight of an auditorium full of angry people would have been more instructive. Backing down, letting it go, turning the other cheek, not dignifying—doesn't cut it.

Podhoretz is a writer—he should use his gift to do a little "squashing."

PAM SALIMENO
Westerly, RI

CLEARLY, JOHN PODHORETZ has not read Donald Westlake's three rules for living: (1) Never carry a sofa up stairs alone, (2) Don't get involved with a Scorpio unless you are serious, and (3) Never argue with a crazy person.

JOSEPH VASS
Maplewood, MN

AS A RABBI, I'm well connected to the international Jewish Banking Conspiracy, so John Podhoretz should let me know if he needs any help ruining credit ratings, cancelling bank accounts, and the like. Also, as a former prosecutor, I'm intimately acquainted both with The Man and his methods for keeping the poor in their place.

If he asks nicely I might even teach him the secret handshake.

MARK ANKCORN
Manhattan Beach, CA

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A Real Peace Process

Palestinian Authority president Yasser Arafat doesn't yield easily. He responds only to force and pressure, never to appeasement, unilateral concessions, or "confidence-building" gestures. The good news is that arm-twisting has finally been applied—by President Bush, Europeans, and Egypt—and Arafat has yielded twice in ways he didn't want to. The first was to name a Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas, the second to compromise with Abbas last week on a cabinet that includes several Arafat critics. These concessions do not mean peace is at hand. There is much more to do and much more pressure to be applied.

Start with Arafat himself. He remains the Palestinian strongman, able to fire Abbas or thwart his initiatives. There will be no peace with Israel so long as Arafat retains power. He is the fellow who turned down in early 2001 a settlement in which Palestinians would have gotten 98 percent of the West Bank, half of Jerusalem, a land bridge between Gaza and the West Bank, and the elimination of a host of Israeli settlements. Sadly, the just-completed negotiations with Abbas over his cabinet sent the message to the world that, still, nothing important can happen in Palestinian affairs unless it goes through Arafat.

Who can change this? President Bush has already done his part by announcing, in his speech on Israel and the Palestinians last June 24, a ban on American dealings with Arafat. This weakened Arafat, but didn't cripple him. Now it's time for the Europeans, especially British prime minister Tony Blair, and the Arab states (especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan) to do their part. They should stop supporting Arafat. Blair, in particular, should end his chummy phone relationship with Arafat. The Arab states, if they're sincere in wanting a peace accord, can help by sending no more money to Arafat and refusing to treat him as the man to see among Palestinians. If they walk away from Arafat, he will quickly fade.

More important, they must embrace Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen). For the Arab states, this means declaring support for him in public. Dennis Ross, the former Middle East negotiator, has suggested the Saudis, Egyptians, and Jordanians issue a joint statement with Abbas to declare undying support for the Palestinian cause. But the statement would insist the cause be pursued the legitimate way—without terrorism or violence—and include political and economic reforms.

Israel, too, has a vested interest in Abbas, since the alternative is Arafat. Israel can help, but only if Abbas meets his obligation to crack down on terrorist attacks against Israelis by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigades. The members of the "quartet"—the United States, United Nations, European Union, Russia—must hold Abbas accountable for suppressing terrorism, which is part of their "road map" toward a peace settlement in three years.

As Abbas works to improve security for Israelis, Israel can reciprocate by making life better for Palestinians. Without that, Abbas will never gain real authority among Palestinians, and Arafat will find himself in a still stronger position. What could the Israelis do? Lots of things: Reduce checkpoints, allow more Palestinian workers into Israel, channel resources to productive Palestinian enterprises, and release some of the 5,000 to 6,000 Palestinians in Israeli jails. Discussions between Abbas and Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, private or public, can work out exactly what each side should expect from the other in coming weeks. For Israel, it's a reduced threat of terrorism, for the Palestinians an easing of Israeli control.

Bush has a significant role to play. He's already done the hard part by liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein. Now he needs to keep up the pressure on Middle East governments that support terrorism and Islamic extremism and block the emergence of democracy. That means, for starters, Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Maybe we're wrong, but the president seemed too hasty in praising Syria for aiding the United States by promising to turn over Saddam's henchmen who seek sanctuary. That's fine, as far as it goes. But more should be required of Syria, such as ending support for Hezbollah, the world's largest terrorist organization, and tossing out of Damascus the 10 terrorist groups with headquarters there. One result will be a weakening of Palestinian terrorists, who now depend on Syria's aid.

Years ago, the late Abba Eban said the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. But that outcome is not inevitable. As a new prime minister without Arafat's bloody history but with tangible support from European and Arab leaders, Abbas could make a dramatic difference. But only if people who acted wrongly in the past—by backing Arafat, for example—do the right thing now.

—Fred Barnes, for the Editors

There's No Place Like Iraq . . .

For new U.S. military bases.

BY TOM DONNELLY

"PARSING RUMMY" is getting to be as common a Washington game as "Parsing Bill" used to be. The defense secretary hasn't yet asked about the definition of "is," but if he needs to wiggle out of a tough question—well, never say never.

The latest rhetorical cat-and-mouse contest with the press came over the issue of U.S. military bases in Iraq. A week ago, the *New York Times* reported that the Pentagon was—surprise!—facing up to the need to maintain forces in the Persian Gulf region. Given that the Turks had been truculent about access by ground before Operation Iraqi Freedom, that the use of Saudi Arabia has been a delicate matter for the past decade, and that Iraq is ideally situated for operations throughout the region, there is a compelling case for siting U.S. bases in Iraq.

With Rumsfeld himself pushing for an overdue review of America's posture and garrisoning around the world, with another round of base closures and realignments scheduled for 2005, and with the pressing need to rationalize the burdens on an overstretched force bearing global responsibilities, the idea of locating bases where troops are required might seem obvious. But all the secretary could say at a recent press conference was the epically cryptic: "I have never, that I can recall, heard the subject of a permanent base [in Iraq] discussed in any meeting. . . . The likelihood of it seems to be so low that it does not surprise me that it's never been discussed in my presence—to my knowledge."

Is that clear?

What is clear is the rationale behind a quasi-permanent American garrison in Iraq—with, say, a Guantanamo-style long-term lease. President Bush has plainly stated his intent to stabilize and liberalize the entire region. He did not define victory as simply the toppling of Saddam and his statues in the squares of Baghdad. The protection of the embryonic Iraqi democracy is a duty that will likely extend for decades, as did our commitment to defend the fragile democracies of Western Europe from the Soviet Union after World War II.

In one sense, the burden will be lighter than during the 1990s, when U.S. forces were run at full speed to "keep Saddam in his box."

The greater Middle East is still a nasty neighborhood. Iraq is surrounded by two terror-sponsoring states, Syria and Iran, who will become increasingly agitated by an increasingly free Iraq. The royal family in Saudi Arabia understands that the Gulf order is changing—the crown prince has even hinted at the possibility of a little liberalization. But he has been a man of day-late and dollar-short plans. Nor will it be easy for the House of Saud to renegotiate its pact with homegrown Wahhabi extremists.

In short, the liberation of Iraq adds to the substantial list of U.S. interests in the region. Indeed, what before was regarded as simply an economic interest in Gulf oil has been transformed into a central question about America's global leadership. We cannot afford to let Iraq fail.

The idea that U.S. military forces can "come home" from Iraq is thus spectacularly myopic. While the troops' role is already changing from combat to nation-building inside Iraq, the regional-security mission will endure even when Iraq matures as a democracy and stable state. In one sense, though, the burden will actually be lighter than during the 1990s, when U.S. forces were running at full speed to "keep Saddam in his box." The number of air sorties flown during the decade of no-fly-zones roughly equals the total flown in both operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. There has been an armored brigade stationed in Kuwait on almost a full-time basis since 1994. And the navy and Marine Corps have essentially kept battlegroups in the Gulf ever since the 1987 "Tanker War."

Garrisoning U.S. air and ground forces in western Iraq—at the "H2" and "H3" airfields, for example—would kill a number of birds with a single stone. The airfields are ideally located for deployments throughout the region, and indeed to provide regional missile defense. There's plenty of space, not only for installations but for training. And they are far enough removed from Mesopotamia that they would not be "imperial" irritants to the majority of Iraqis.

Such facilities would dovetail neatly with other U.S. installations in the region, including the airfields and ground-force garrison in Kuwait, the new Central Command headquarters in Qatar, and the traditional home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. Importantly, they would allow U.S. forces to withdraw from Saudi Arabia, easing the pressure on the Saudi government while making our access to the region less dependent on the anxieties of the royal family. They would also deprive Osama bin Laden

Tom Donnelly is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

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of one of his main talking points.

Such a posture in Iraq and in the Gulf would further fit well with the larger rationalization of the U.S. military posture in Europe and the certainty of continued operations in Central and South Asia. There is no doubt that, as forces are drawn down in Iraq, the American garrisons in Germany will begin to shift eastward in Europe; Rumsfeld and NATO commander Gen. James Jones are determined to use this opportunity to make long-overdue changes, even while retaining important facilities like Ramstein Air Base in Germany. A chain of NATO bases in Eastern Europe extending from Poland to Romania and Bulgaria could be easily linked to those in the Gulf, helping to support operations from the Balkans to Central and South Asia. Over the long haul, there is no reason why Iraq could not join an expanded "Partnership for Peace," or even the alliance itself.

Moreover, these bases would lessen the pressure on the new Turkish government. The snafu over the deployment of the 4th Infantry Division prior to the war underscores the shifting nature of Turkish domestic politics. Insulating Turkish-American relations from machinations in Ankara would be very wise, and indeed we should try to be supportive of the new pluralism there, and be ready to resume a close partnership when the Turks have sorted themselves out. And from a strictly military perspective, the airbase at Incirlik is too small and too close to the surrounding city to allow for expansion.

The sooner Rumsfeld fesses up and makes this issue a plain part of the public debate over post-Saddam Iraq the better. Already, the enemies of a free Iraq—Iranian-sponsored Shia clerics, the other forces of totalitarianism and terror in the Middle East, and their "Arabist" allies in America and around the world—are arguing that any U.S. military presence in Iraq is "colonialism" or "imperialism." It is no such thing. U.S. bases are the surest guarantor of Iraqi freedom—and an essential underpinning for our ability to sustain a larger struggle. ♦

North of the Border

The Saudis meddle in Iraq.

BY STEPHEN SCHWARTZ

WHILE WESTERN MEDIA and politicians peddle their alarums in the aftermath of Iraq's liberation, focusing on Syria and Iran, attention should also be paid to Saudi Arabia. Throughout the military campaign, the royal regime publicly sought to maintain its alliance with the United States without reining in the venomous rhetoric of its religious bureaucracy opposing Western influence in the Islamic world. Behind the scenes, the regime viewed the Iraq war as an opportunity to expand its ideological influence through outreach by its official missionary networks dedicated to the global spread of Wahhabism, the ultra-strict, separatist form of Islam that is the official sect in the country. And where Wahhabism goes, terrorism is seldom far behind.

Indeed, we should not overlook the Saudi-Wahhabi hand in promoting suspicion and rumor against the Iraqi Shias. The Wahhabis hate Shia Muslims more than they hate anyone else in the world, Jews and Christians included. The Saudi monarchy fears Shias more than it fears anyone else in the world, Osama bin Laden included. This anxiety has very little to do with alleged Shia sympathies for Iranian radicalism—and much to do with domestic Saudi politics.

Saudi Arabia has a large and discontented Shia minority concentrated in the oil-bearing Eastern Province and southern region and notably represented in the technical elite. The Shias of Arabia, although systematically undercounted by the Saudi regime, are believed to constitute at least 10 percent of the population, or 2 million. They have suffered a long history of discrimination—Shias are generally barred from government and media employment—and cruel treatment under Wahhabi dominance.

Unsurprisingly, with the fall of Saddam's statue in Baghdad, a group of 13 Saudi Shia clerics came forward to celebrate the defeat of the Iraqi dictatorship. Their statement could be read as implicit criticism of the Saudi government for its mistreatment of its Shia subjects. The rulers, however, show no sign of softening their hostility toward the Shias, which Western public relations firms, academics, and media help them hide.

Thus, as the fighting in Iraq wound down, the Saudi daily *al-Riyadh* announced that an 18-member Saudi delegation was headed to Washington to burnish the regime's image. The team was set up and paid for by the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) with the support of the Saudi intelligence service. Saudi intelligence officers, including a few brought out of retirement, were ordered to work on the effort. Saudi subjects residing and studying in the United States were also hired by SAGIA to assist.

Meanwhile, the Washington-based public relations firm Qorvis Communications continued to benefit from its contract with the Saudis, last month reporting a 52 percent increase in its annual fee income, to

Stephen Schwartz is director of the Islam and Democracy Program at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

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"GENERAL PRINCIPLES"

Born to Mother Faith and Father Hope was their son, displayed to the world as deserving the nickname charity. In time, he came to be known as George W. Bush. Let's see if his parents' fondest dreams and prayers for him were realized and answered.

A cadre of United States generals, retired to a better world, met for their regular meeting. This time, their Superior, through his chief of staff, decided on the subject for discussion.

At this particular gathering, generals George Washington, Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant and Dwight D. Eisenhower were in attendance. The subject for consideration concerned American presidents and their roles as commanders in chief of all the armed forces. On this occasion, they were to concentrate on the evaluation of George W. Bush as president and commander in chief.

There followed preliminary conversation between the four legendary generals as to the roles played by President G.W. Bush. Quickly there appeared their Superior's Chief of Staff, General Principles.

General Principles, sans medals, sans necktie or jacket, looking more like any private soldier, reintroduced himself, "O.K, gentlemen, lets hear what you have to say."

Said General George Washington, "General Principles, you well know three of us here were commanders in chief as well as regular generals, specifically Grant, Eisenhower and myself. Up here, yesterday's enemies are today's friends. General Lee, of course, wasn't ever President and commander in chief. He was President Jefferson Davis' top commander in the field."

"So?" wondered General Principles.

"Well," continued George Washington, "three of us were, to begin with, generals, only later becoming presidents and commanders in chief. President Bush may have served in the National Guard first and, subsequently, was president and commander in chief. In all fairness and simple charity to him, its as though Mr. Bush catapulted over the heads of a lot of other West Point generals, Lee, Grant and Eisenhower, included or excluded. Pretty good for a novice would not you, in all charity and in fact, agree?"

"Good point George. Yes, I agree," responded General Principles. Turning to Robert E. Lee, he invited him, "Please, Bob, your thoughts?"

"General, said General Robert E. Lee, "Sam Grant and I get along just fine up here. About President Jefferson Davis and myself, we lost a war. About President Bush and his commanding general, Tommy Franks, they won one. I told Jefferson Davis, my president and commander in chief, we couldn't win. We didn't. Mr. Bush told General Tommy Franks to win. He did. In truth and becoming charity, it's that simple."

"Thanks, Bob," General Principles replied.

Next, General Ulysses S. Grant spoke up. "Happy to see you, General. My best to our Superior."

"Sure, Sam. He'll be happy to know you think of Him."

"General," General Grant continued, "As you know, shortly before meeting with General Lee at Appomattox, I had a terrible migraine. It left as fast as it came. General Lee will tell you I was firm but fair. As for the Confederate army, Mr. Lincoln's exact words to me about them were to 'let them down easy.' I did. I told them just to go back home to be loyal citizens again. Mr. Bush told General Tommy Franks the same, to let all the Iraqi soldiers down easy and just send them home. History does repeat itself. It's to their great credit that Mr. Bush and his top general did what was charitable and wise."

"O.K. Ike. It's your turn," General Principles told General Eisenhower.

"General, President Roosevelt knew my limitations just as President Bush knew those of General Tommy Franks. I got along well with our allies. So did Tommy Franks. The same for him and me with people and politicians. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill got along famously. It was and still is the same with President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair. The Brits' generals and ours worked smoothly thanks to General Tommy Franks. The same again with me in World War II. I'm saying to you, General Principles, America and the world owe a huge debt to Mr. Bush and his commanding general for their common sense and charity toward a defeated and humbled nation, Iraq."

Then, finally, George Washington speaking for them all, asked General Principles, "General, what will you now say to the Superior of us all?"

"That it's any time and all is well," replied General Principles. "That I met with other principles who know as much or more than me. That our Superior's last best hope for planet earth, America, rests securely in the hands of men of high principles, just like the four of you. And that the love affair of President Bush and his fellow citizens with America continues on apace. That the United States practices the charity it preaches."

"Thanks and God bless you, General Principles!" said the four great generals speaking as one.

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$10.7 million in 2002. And the Saudi monarchy's largesse continued to flow to think tanks like the Middle East Institute in Washington and the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, as well as the National Council on U.S. Arab Relations, an advocacy group.

Complacency on the part of U.S. diplomats further benefits the Saudi cause. In a recent incident, U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia Robert Jordan gave an interview to the *Future of Islam*, a monthly publication of the Riyadh-based World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), which was involved in the financing of al Qaeda and the dissemination of extremist literature in the United States and throughout the Muslim world. Ambassador Jordan, however, has declined to meet with Saudi democratic activists.

In the same April issue, the *Future of Islam* published a cover interview with Saudi cleric Ayed al-Qarni, an adviser to prince Abdel-Aziz bin Fahd, youngest son of the elderly and ailing King Fahd. Al-Qarni is also the author of a poem he recorded for repeated broadcast on Saudi-subsidized television and radio during the war, which says in part: "Slaughter the enemy infidels and say there is but one God." In the interview, he stated that he prays for the destruction of America, the main source of global suffering, several times a day. He also urged Saudi subjects to go fight in Iraq and contribute money to help defend Saddam.

Al-Qarni was not alone in his call to arms. In the first week of April, another Wahhabi cleric, Naser Al-Omar, preached in favor of suicide attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. In an interview with the Saudi government-backed Al-Majd Television, established in Dubai at the end of 2002, Al-Omar said, "We should hope for more [terror bombings] to kill more of the enemies of God, the Jews and Christians." He praised terror as a means to keep the Jews and Christians in a state of fear in many countries. At the beginning of the Iraq operation, he was among the signers of a fatwa calling for the defense of Saddam's Iraq, which was distributed in Saudi government offices and hospitals.

Significantly, Al-Omar has been a prominent advocate of increased Saudi repression of Shias. In 1995, he called for the arrest of their religious leaders, confiscation of their mosques and other religious facilities, and their forcible conversion to Wahhabism. The recent incitement

AFP

A member of the Wahhabi-backed Ansar al-Islam

to terrorist "martyrdom" did not go unheeded. Dozens of Saudis joined the hundreds of "volunteers" who went to Iraq to confront the coalition, and a number have been killed, with their photographs printed in Saudi media. In addition, Saudis played a major role in the Wahhabi terror group Ansar al-Islam, which attacked Iraqi Kurds until it was destroyed by coalition forces. The commander of Arab volunteers in northern Iraq, a Saudi subject from Dammam named Yassin al-Sihli, was killed by Kurdish troops.

Spurious claims by Western experts that Saddam's Baathist state was so secular as to be anathema to Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda's Saudi backers, and other Wahhabis were never taken seriously in the Muslim world, where the Wahhabis were understood to be natural allies of the Butcher of Baghdad in his campaign against Shias. Furthermore, in the long decay of Saddam's regime, the Iraqi Baathists repeatedly tried to salvage their image by claiming an Islamic mantle, with such gambits as the inscription of the Islamic slogan "Allahu akbar" (God is great!) on the national flag. In turn, the Saudis valued Saddam as a bulwark against Iran.

Most recently, the Wahhabi-Saudi religious bureaucracy has made clear that it would seek to influence the religious life of a new Iraq. Already, Wahhabi clerics boast of their large mosque in Sulaymaniyah. Anti-Wahhabi Muslims have warned for the past year that the Saudis would attempt to worm their way into the U.S.-directed rebuilding, with the intention of "Talibanizing" Iraq's Sunni Muslims. True to form, the Saudis have announced another of their notorious telethons to raise money for the relief of Iraq, which—as in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Palestinian Authority—will doubtless be spent mainly on Wahhabi colonization and the fomenting of terror.

Even now, Wahhabi agents are working underground to incite Iraqi Shias against cooperation with the temporary occupation authorities. As New York Shia leader Agha Jafri put it, "The Arab street is the Wahhabi street, and when the Arabs demonstrate against the United States in Iraq, the Wahhabis are never far from the scene."

Whatever course we follow in dealing with Syria, Iran, or any other perceived threat, we should attend to Saudi Arabia's mischief north of its long and porous border with Iraq. Saudi organizations should be prevented from aggravating rivalries between Iraqi Sunnis and Shias—and demands for change by Shias inside Saudi Arabia should be greeted with support, rather than fear and trembling, by the West. ♦

Great Wall of Lies

What the SARS coverup tells us about the Chinese regime. **BY ELLEN BORK**

When the Chinese leadership was forced to admit it had covered up the extent of the infectious disease called severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS, it responded with what many called the most serious political shake-up since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. The government sacked the minister of health and the mayor of Beijing from their government and party posts, admitted that the number of patients and deaths in the capital was radically higher than previously disclosed—in other words that it had lied—and launched a mass propaganda campaign to deal with the illness.

If these dramatic moves were intended to distract attention from months of deception and negligence, they succeeded. Senate majority leader Bill Frist, visiting Beijing with a congressional delegation, offered President Hu Jintao "tremendous compliments because he took bold action over the last 48 hours while we were here in China to boldly and courageously address this virus." With all due respect to Dr. Frist, there are exemplars of courage in the SARS fiasco, but Hu is not among them.

Understandably, however, the unusual firings and rapid about-face have fed hopes that China has turned a political corner. "This is the beginning of the end," a senior Chinese official credited with democratic sympathies told the *Washington Post*'s John Pomfret. "This is the spark many of us have been waiting for."

If China's policy reversal in its handling of SARS is a political watershed that signals greater openness and accountability, then we need to know what brought it about. After all, for months, China's government chose the costs that Communist regimes will tolerate—illness and death—over those they cannot accept—political and economic turmoil.

There are two answers. First, international pressure became too intense to ignore. Once the disease spread abroad, via Hong Kong, China's callous neglect of its people's health was no longer only its affair. Foreign governments coping with SARS were furious. Even Hong Kong's favored elite, always quick to take Beijing's side, felt betrayed. China's response to the disease was embarrassing by comparison with that of Taiwan, which sought to cooperate with the World Health Organization even though it is denied membership by the international "One China" policy. Prominent visitors like British prime minister Tony Blair postponed visits. The Rolling Stones cancelled concerts. Business and tourist travel fell off. Even the WHO—which had publicly praised China for its cooperation, while itself being barred from the site of the outbreak in Guangdong province—privately welcomed press scrutiny and external pressure on the regime. Ultimately, the WHO told China, "The international community doesn't trust your figures."

This skepticism arose from the second factor behind the regime's abrupt reversal: truth-telling from inside China. A lone retired military doctor—Jiang Yanyong—contacted the media to say that Beijing was lying about the number of cases in the capital. Personnel from other hospitals followed his example, telling reporters that they had been told to hide patients suffering from SARS in a hotel and in ambulances that were driven around the city while WHO investigators conducted visits.

It is too soon to judge the political impact of SARS on China's one-party rule. The fall of the health minister and mayor of Beijing may have been part of a deal to apportion the fallout among political factions while protecting senior leaders. The health minister was an ally of former president and party boss Jiang Zemin, who seeks to retain influence despite his retirement from key posts, while the mayor is associated with the Hu Jintao camp. The Beijing Communist party leader survived and was even appointed to a new task force on SARS although he is thought at least as culpable as the mayor. As yet, there have been no political casualties in Guangdong, where the problem festered for months without an adequate response, reflecting the regime's desire not to further damage the economically important province's international reputation, or possibly the clout of its party apparatchiks.

The human toll of SARS in China's enormous population is also unclear. It has spread to poorer, inland provinces where health care is woefully inadequate. The impact of the disease on populations like factory workers and the military who live and work together at close quarters is an open question. Failure to include data from military hospitals was a major reason for underreporting in the capital. Resentment from workers and the military could play out unpredictably in the weeks and months ahead.

The SARS outbreak provides yet another object lesson in Chinese politics. A political shake-up, complete with firings and a commitment to eradicating SARS, may not be all that it seems. If, however, it is the beginning of change within the regime, the international community needs to understand why and act to encourage it. There are people in China who are willing to take risks to tell the truth—in this case, to safeguard the health of ordinary citizens rather than of the Communist party. They are the people who deserve to be called courageous. They need support from the international community, and they benefit from pressure on the regime. As one Chinese citizen said of China's leaders, "They are only going to be as open as they have to." Another truth. ♦

Ellen Bork is a deputy director at the Project for the New American Century.

Dennis Is No Menace

At least not to the other Democratic candidates.

BY KATHERINE MANGU-WARD

PRETTY MUCH EVERYONE agrees that Dennis Kucinich is a long shot for the Democratic nomination for president of the United States. Everyone, that is, but the man himself.

Kucinich, who represents Ohio's 10th District in Congress, has run for office 18 times in the last 35 years. He got started with a petition to run for Cleveland city council as a college sophomore in 1967, before he was old enough to vote. And he is confident about campaign number 19: "I fully expect to be the nominee of this party," said Kucinich earlier this month, "and I fully expect to be the president of the United States."

Trailing major candidates by millions in campaign contributions, Kucinich, 56, has been surpassed by everyone but Carol Moseley Braun in fundraising, and is polling at less than 1 percent among voters nationally.

But Kucinich has beaten long odds before. He won a seat in the House and has held it for four terms after coming off one term in the Ohio Senate, 15 years in political exile, and a single term as mayor of Cleveland that even he described as "absolute chaos." On Kucinich's watch, Cleveland became the only municipality to formally default on its debts since the Great Depression. His refusal to sell off the public utility Muny Light in order to avoid bankruptcy earned him a few dedicated supporters, but when the "boy mayor" came up for reelection in 1979, he was soundly defeated.

During his tenure as mayor—which coincided with Jerry Springer's stint as mayor of Cincinnati and Jerry Brown's second term as "Governor Moonbeam" in California—Kucinich banned nuns from City Hall, held a press conference to fire a popular police chief on Good Friday, and was so hated that he had to wear a bullet-proof vest when he threw out the first pitch of the 1978 Indians season. He survived a recall vote by just 236 votes out of more than 120,000 votes cast. But he remains proud of his Cleveland ties, promising in an early campaign appearance to "replace Crawford, Texas's square dancing, tractor pulls, and pork rinds with Cleveland's polka, bowling, and kielbasa."



Dennis Kucinich

Earl Keleny

A self-described "dynamic, visionary leader . . . who combines powerful activism with a spiritual sense of the essential interconnectedness of all living things," Kucinich has recently become a vegan at the urging of his girlfriend, and is the leading opponent of genetically modified foods in Congress. He would prefer, he says, to "go right for the ban," but last year he worked with Sen. Barbara Boxer to introduce four bills targeted at crippling manufacturers of GM foods.

Kucinich's belief in the "interconnectedness of all living things" is central to his philosophy of governance. "Spirit merges with matter to sanctify the universe," he explained last summer at the Praxis Peace Institute Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia. "Matter transcends to return to spirit. The interchangeability of matter and spirit means the starlit magic of the outermost life of our universe becomes the soul-light magic of the innermost life of our self."

Kucinich's thoughts often turn to the heavens, it seems. In 2001, he introduced a bill to ban space-based weapons. The bill would ban the use of "radiation, electromagnetic, psychotronic, sonic, laser, or other energies . . . for the purpose of information war, mood management, or mind control."

So it is clear why few are optimistic about Kucinich's chances for the presidency. He's a little odd. Far worse than his personal quirks in the eyes of primary voters, however, are his unorthodox positions on some major issues.

The *Nation* has called Kucinich a "regressive progressive." And his voting record shows more than the ordinary share of conservative moments for a Democrat, including his 1997 vote in favor of a constitutional amendment banning flag burning and his support for the impeachment of Bill Clinton.

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But Kucinich's biggest point of divergence from the Democratic party has been abortion. The week he entered the presidential race, Kucinich, a Catholic, announced that his thinking on abortion had "evolved." Despite consistently voting with pro-lifers on bills regarding RU-486, partial birth, and parental consent, he now says, "I believe in choice"—an abrupt about-face for a man who recently received a zero on the National Abortion Rights Action League scorecard.

When asked to explain this change of heart, Kucinich said, "It took a lot for me in the last Congress to recognize what I saw was an agenda being developed that would divide this nation." As the *Cleveland Scene* quipped, "Abortion, a wedge issue? Say it ain't so!"

One can't help but suspect Kucinich's reversal has more to do with politics than personal evolution, but with Kucinich it's hard to tell, since such flip-flops have characterized his public career, particularly on Iraq.

Kucinich voted to disarm Iraq in 1998, but has since become a vehement advocate of peace at any price. He led House Democratic opposition to the resolution authorizing force in late 2002. He called for lifting the sanctions on Iraq for years, but now says the sanctions would have worked in the absence of war, and that he always supported "smart sanctions."

Frequent statements like, "Let us support the troops, but not the administration. Let us support the troops by bringing them home alive and healthy!" earned Kucinich a few moments in the difficult-to-grab wartime spotlight, but little support in a Democratic field crowded with antiwar candidates.

When Kucinich reintroduced a bill for the creation of a cabinet-level Department of Peace on April 8, the idea garnered more national attention than it had the first time around. It actually earned a front-page story in the *Washington Post*. Front page of the *Style* section, that is, below the fold, beaten out by an enormous photo of scruffy actor Colin Farrell. Still, it was coverage in a major paper for what had been previously dismissed as a "crackpot idea." Such is the power of the prospective presidential candidate.

The Department of Peace, which has 46 other sponsors in the House, would be responsible for developing policies to address all kinds of violence, domestic and international. The bill features plans to establish a Peace Academy offering a four-year program in "peace studies," followed by five years of mandatory service at home or abroad.

The department, says Kucinich, would get at the "root causes" of violence and war. "Poverty is a weapon of mass destruction. Homelessness is a weapon of mass destruction. Hopelessness is a weapon of mass destruction. No health care is a weapon of mass destruction."

Activist and Kucinich adviser Carol Rosin, who helped send Timothy Leary's cremated remains into space, sees the situation in similarly apocalyptic terms. Kucinich's election, she says, "is the only chance we have to get to enter into a new paradigm, or otherwise we are all going to die." ♦

Anti-Liberation Theology

The clerics got it wrong on Iraq.

BY JOSEPH LOCONTE

RELIGIOUS FIGURES who opposed the liberation of Iraq have a lot of explaining to do. Fashioning themselves prophets of peace, they caustically denounced the "rush to war." Having granted the United Nations an almost transcendent moral authority, they declared Operation Iraqi Freedom an "immoral" act of aggression. In the months leading up to the conflict, they made a litany of brash claims and gloomy predictions—all proven to be utterly false.

Take their suggestion that Saddam Hussein was not the devil many made him out to be. Some religious leaders even denied that he ever used chemical weapons against the Kurds. George Hunsinger, professor at Princeton Theological Seminary, cited approvingly the *Nation*'s dismissal of the charge as "a catchy slogan to demonize Saddam in the popular American imagination." Meanwhile, Frank Griswold, presiding bishop of the Episcopal Church, derided prowar Christians for holding "simplistic views of good and evil."

Yet "evil" is the word that most often passes from the lips of newly liberated Iraqis to describe Saddam's regime. "If you only knew what this man did to Iraq," said an elderly man in Baghdad beating Saddam's portrait with his shoe. "He killed our youth. He killed millions." Day by day we learn more about the arbitrary arrests, tortures, and executions; the special prisons for children of dissidents; the diversion of food and medicine intended for needy Iraqis. None of it should surprise anyone: For years, the same facts had been uncovered by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the U.N. special rapporteur. Not since Cambodia's

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killing fields had a government terrorized so many of its own people.

Antiwar clerics remained silent about these facts, apparently in order to keep the faith about containing the Butcher of Baghdad: He had no serious interest, they said, in weapons of mass destruction. Seeing little evidence that Saddam was rearming, editors at the *Christian Century* rejected arguments for war as "extreme and unfounded." Jim Winkler, of the United Methodist General Board of Church and Society, complained of "an astonishing lack of evidence" to justify military intervention.

What's truly astonishing, however, was the clerics' willful neglect of Saddam's deception and defiance of U.N. weapons inspectors. Kenneth Pollack, a former Iraq specialist with the National Security Council and a scholar at the Brookings Institute, doubted that any inspections regime could prevent Iraq from developing the most deadly weapons. "Saddam is working to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction programs," Pollack wrote on the eve of war, "and the more time he has, the more lethal that arsenal will become." Even German intelligence services concluded in a December 2000 report that Iraq was close to producing a nuclear bomb. Yet church leaders said nothing when Secretary of State Colin Powell exposed Baghdad's "web of lies" with chilling clarity before the U.N. Security Council.

As to the conduct of the war, opponents were certain that a U.S. strike would devastate Iraq's infrastructure and foment a humanitarian crisis. The Church World Service, an association of faith-based relief agencies, expected "horrendous humanitarian consequences." Jonathan Frerichs of Lutheran World Relief complained bitterly that "we're attacking the government who's running the food distribution system for two-thirds of the country." The reality, of course, was that Saddam built lavish palaces and hijacked the country's oil-for-food program while 400,000 Iraqi children under the age of five died of malnutrition.

In fact, Pentagon planners engineered a brilliant military campaign that minimized the war's effects on daily life. Five months prior to the invasion, the State Department assembled emergency relief organizations at Iraq's border. Thousands of tons of food, water, and medical supplies were delivered within days after the conflict began. By quickly putting troops on the ground, coalition forces secured the nation's 600 oil fields, preventing an ecological disaster. Bombing raids, which focused intently on military targets, left bridges and power grids mostly untouched.

The most shameful accusation made by religious liberals was that American troops would blithely ignore the rules of warfare.

Indeed, the most shameful accusation made by religious liberals was that American troops would blithely ignore the rules of warfare and kill "massive" numbers of non-combatants. Joseph Sprague, a bishop of the United Methodist Church, said innocent civilians "will not be protected." Bob Edgar, general secretary of the National Council of Churches, insisted that U.S. forces wouldn't hesitate to kill women and children. Rose Marie Berger, an editor of *Sojourners*, agreed: "Imagine our 200,000 troops . . . bringing home pictures of kids they helped save, rather than images of children they were trained to kill."

Innocents have died in this conflict, as they do in every war, which is one of the reasons war should be a last resort. But considering the tactics of the Iraqi military—using human shields, dressing in civilian clothes, hiding in schools and mosques—civilian deaths could have been much higher. Indeed, in an extraordinary effort, the U.S. military linked moral principle to modern combat. Satellite-guided bombs were carried by almost all navy and air force fighters, giving them unrivaled accuracy. Cities were bypassed to avoid bloody urban campaigns. Coalition troops put their own lives at risk to get civilians out of harm's way. When all is said and done, military historians will identify Operation Iraqi Freedom as the most justly fought war in the history of modern warfare.

What of the wailing prophets? Susan Thistlethwaite, president of Chicago Theological Seminary, warned that if America attacked Iraq, "then it is Americans who have become the barbarians." Catholic Bishop John Michael Botean called the war an "objectively grave evil." Any killing associated with the conflict, he intoned, is "unequivocally murder." Even Pope John Paul II, no pacifist, declared it "a defeat for humanity." Compare all this with the cries of joy from Iraqis after Saddam's 40-foot statue was toppled in Baghdad: "We are still scared but we are happy," said Maysoun Raheem. "Thank God this has happened and the Americans have come." For them, this was indeed a war of liberation. "I am 50 years old," said Kareem Mohammad Kareem, "but my life just started today."

The victims of tyranny always seem to understand the implacable nature of its evil better than anyone—better than those who safely hurl jeremiads at the world's injustices as their bread and butter. The clerics were wrong about this war, wrong about the despicable regime it toppled, wrong about nearly everything. And yet they remain unrepentant: "Prophetic voices are always way out ahead of the congregation," boasted the NCC's Bob Edgar. "None of the Old Testament prophets had a majority."

Perhaps, but at least their predictions conformed to reality. That's a lot more than can be said of the prognosticators of our own day. ♦

Bear Market for Bush?

Why the president—and the economy—really need a tax cut. BY STEPHEN MOORE

LIFE DOESN'T GET any better than this if you're a Republican. The decisive triumph in Iraq has sent President Bush's approval ratings soaring back above 70 percent, according to an April 15 NBC poll. If things go right for Republicans in '04 they could *really* go right. Under many plausible scenarios, 2004 could deliver for the GOP the kind of landslide that 1964 was for the LBJ Democrats.

Could Republicans possibly lose in 2004?

Oh, they could find a way. After all, the GOP has been here before—in 1991. After Bush Sr. muscled the Iraqis out of Kuwait, he was surfing on a crest of popularity higher than his son now enjoys or anything Reagan ever saw. Still, less than two years later, Bush Sr. was evicted from office—because he lacked a coherent program for reviving the economy after a relatively mild and short-lived recession. He also lost because he seemed completely inattentive to the anxieties of American workers and investors. To jittery voters, it seemed as though, to borrow a phrase from Clinton, Bush Sr. didn't "feel our pain."

This president is also vulnerable—though the well of support among conservatives enjoyed by George W. Bush runs far deeper than it ever did for his father. But there is no denying the economy has performed rottenly. And, if we suffer another year of a bear market and stagnant growth in the private economy (the public sector has been growing like gangbusters), voters may again rebel against a successful wartime president.

Not long ago, I sat through a Ted Kennedy slideshow presentation on the economy. It was depressingly persuasive. To summarize a 20-minute talk in two sentences: Under Clinton, the budget deficit and unemployment went way down, while the GDP, jobs, and the stock market soared upward. Under Bush, the deficit and unemployment went up, while the GDP, jobs, and the stock market went down. The Democrats are preparing to Herbert Hooverize George W., and they've got a lot of ammunition to do it with.

In particular, if the stock market doesn't recover soon, Bush will be running headlong against history in his reelection bid. Since Bush was inaugurated in January 2001, the Dow Jones has fallen 20 percent and the Nasdaq has tumbled 45 percent—though the mini-rally since the end of the Iraq war is helping to reverse these declines. Still, the stock market collapse has led to a liquidation of $5 trillion in wealth—some of which has been absorbed by foreigners, but most of it by American shareholders. These losses are bigger than the GDP of virtually every country in the world.

So I got to wondering how many times in the last 100 years a president has been reelected when the stock market fell during his first term, as it has under George W. Bush. Not once has this happened. Twice a president came up for reelection after a term in which the stock market fell, and both incumbents got the boot. They were Herbert Hoover and Jimmy Carter—not the kind of company Bush wants to keep.

Bush has two advantages in defending himself on the economy. First, most Americans acknowledge that the recession and stock market collapse began under Clinton. This was an eco-

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

nomic tailspin that Bush inherited rather than created. The stock market hit its peak in the spring of 2000—about nine months before Bush was inaugurated. Signs of an economic slowdown first emerged in the third quarter of 2000. Moreover, voters seem to understand that the 9/11 attacks created a jolt to the economy from which we are still recovering. Bush's other advantage is that the Democrats are countering his tax cuts with moldy 1970s-style governmental expansionism that few Americans buy into. The Democratic stimulus package is pitifully unimaginative: more spending on infrastructure, on aid to states and cities, on expanded welfare benefits. Polls show the public is skeptical that the Bush tax cut will work, but even more distrustful that big government solutions are the key to growth.

So Bush may well coast to victory, even in a bear market, but why tempt fate? The political penalty for a lousy stock market should be even stiffer now, because of the sudden emergence of the new investor-class voter. The 2000 election was the first in which a majority of voters owned stock, up from about 20 percent as recently as 1976. Pollster Scott Rasmussen reports that Bush won a slight majority of these shareholders in 2000; and Republicans got nearly 55 percent of them in 2002. In 2004 these wealth-depleted voters might not be so forgiving to GOP incumbents.

In fact, it's a bit of a mystery why investor-class voters didn't abandon the GOP in 2002. The answer seems to be that Republicans caught a lucky break. It turns out that, for the average family, the loss in household wealth from the stock market freefall has been almost completely offset by the increase in value of the other major asset held by Americans: their homes. Home values have continued to rise since 2000 as a result of the 30-year lows in interest rates. This helps explain why consumer spending has remained robust even as Wall Street keeps liquidating wealth. But it also carries with it a flashing danger signal: If the housing market bubble pops, and stocks and housing prices take a parallel tumble—and that is a big *if*—then the economy could be in real trouble.

Which is to say the Bush administration would be wise to pursue a course that firms up its weakest point: the stock market. Wayne Angell, the former Federal Reserve Board member and now a guru on Wall Street, tells me, "Few policymakers seem to understand that the overall U.S. economy simply can't improve until the stock market recovers."

The obvious prescription is a battalion of investor-friendly policies. So far, Bush's record has been spotty at best in this regard. Bush is a free trader, but we have had steel quotas. Bush is against big government, but he signed and even praised the most expensive and protectionist agriculture bill in American history. Bush is a free marketer but has approved multibillion dollar bailouts of the insurance and airline industries. Bush says he wants to create a more pro-business regulatory environment, but economist Brian Wesbury reports that the Federal Register, a good proxy for federal rule-making, has been rapidly fattening with new pages in the past couple of years. In sum, the government is growing like weeds under Bush.

Bush's tax policies have been well-intentioned, but he was forced to make compromises that neutered the impact of his 2001 bill. Bush's critics sneer that his tax cuts haven't stimulated the economy. But the supply-side, wealth-inducing aspect of the first Bush tax cut doesn't take effect, for the most part, until 2005. So far the top income tax rate has come down by only one percentage point. That's hardly going to generate a flurry of economic activity.

So what economic policy options does Bush have now to reverse the stock market slide? First, he must salvage his stimulus package and get the wayward Senate Republicans, namely Olympia Snowe of Maine and George Voinovich of Ohio, back on board. The battle to save the tax cut isn't over by a long shot.

Bush was right to call for acceleration of income tax cuts. The economy needs steroids now, and the president should ask Democrats who voted for his plan in 2001 why it makes sense to cut taxes in 2005 and 2006, but not now. The dividend tax cut will instantaneously increase stock values when it's passed. Economists have a range of estimates of how much stock valuations will increase as a result, but most fall in the 5 to 15 percent range. Now that would make investors happy.

Also, Bush must slam the breaks on this horrendously costly spending spree on Capitol Hill. In just two and a half years, the 10-year budget outlook has gone from a benign $3 trillion surplus projection to a gloomy $2 trillion deficit. That is about as bearish a turn of events as one can imagine. "There are a surprisingly small number of people in Congress in either party who have a philosophical commitment these days to smaller government," complained Arizona Republican congressman Jeff Flake, after some 350 House members approved a $400 billion pork-spending bill earlier this year. If, between now and the elections in 2004, Bush would start to simply say no to all new spending, no to all new regulations, no to all industry bailout requests, the stock market would take note and reward him.

Twelve years ago, when Bush Sr. was basking in the afterglow of his Gulf War triumph, his administration had a brief opportunity to pass almost any legislation it wished for. The White House called for a $150 billion highway bill ("jobs, jobs, jobs," as Bush Sr. put it). That was the beginning of the end of papa Bush's presidency. This President Bush has now arrived at his own defining moment of domestic policy. He should strong-arm Congress into passing his stimulus bill—intact. He should reject the half-loaf non-stimulus alternative that the Senate has offered. If he fights for the tax cut, there's a good chance he will win. And if he loses, he can still solidify the loyalties of investor-class voters by fighting their battle.

That's how this president can defy history and survive a bear market. ♦

An Embryo by Any Other Name

A bill that claims to be against cloning isn't.

BY JIM TONKOWICH

In the United States Senate there is proposed legislation sponsored by Sens. Orrin Hatch and Dianne Feinstein, S. 303, titled "A bill to prohibit human cloning and protect stem cell research." Despite this label—and Sen. Arlen Specter's insistence that the bill would ban "all" human cloning—the legislation actually would ban the implantation of a cloned embryo into a uterus, while allowing human cloning for medical research. Welcome to Newspeak.

In the real world, "cloning" is a short way of saying "somatic cell nuclear transplantation"—that is, the removal of the genetic material from an egg cell and its replacement with the genetic material of another human cell. This produces what the bill calls an "unfertilized blastocyst." In the real world, there is no such thing: The product of cloning is simply a human embryo. But then, avoiding simplicity and taking refuge in confusion seems to be the game plan.

Whether Specter himself is confused is a matter for speculation, but the public is certainly meant to be confused by what Douglas Johnson of National Right to Life describes as "linguistic cloaking devices."

Sen. Orrin Hatch contributes the idiosyncratic belief that an embryo is only an embryo if it happens to be in a uterus. Outside the uterus, it is just . . . presumably an "unfertilized blastocyst." Either way, it's fine with Hatch if you exploit it for parts. With artificial wombs just around the corner, cloning enthusiasts no doubt will use the same logic to argue that their pals in the biotech industry should be allowed to grow embryos and fetuses for spare parts and medical experimentation hitherto unthinkable.

Scientists prominent in this twilight zone include Dr. David Baltimore of Caltech. Baltimore is an avid supporter of embryonic stem cells, and wants nothing to do with adult stem cells since he believes they only cloud the argument. In the *Wall Street Journal*, Baltimore said that embryonic stem cells "hold remarkable promise for reversing the devastations of human disease." This tugs on American heartstrings. The problem is that there is no evidence—none at all—that embryonic stem cells from cloned human embryos will ever allow anyone to walk again or cure anyone's Parkinson's or restore anyone's grandma's memory.

Testifying before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee in January, Rep. David Weldon, M.D., entered 80 journal articles into the record. They document peer-reviewed studies of human therapies using adult stem cells. Weldon defied those who babble on about the "remarkable promise" of embryonic stem cells to cite even one study indicating that there is "hope" for cures using embryonic stem cells from human clones. No one took him up then, and no one has taken him up since. There are no such studies. In fact, after more than 15 years of work on embryonic stem cells, researchers have yet to develop an animal model, let alone a human model. That happy little white rat that ran around on TV because his broken spine had been healed by embryonic stem cells died a few weeks later, its body bloated with tumors resulting from the out of control growth of the embryonic stem cells.

At a Judicial Committee hearing on March 19, Sen. Dianne Feinstein mentioned Emma Arvadon, a little girl with juvenile diabetes. Sen. Feinstein wants this ailing child to receive embryonic stem cells to recreate the cells in her body that should be producing insulin. Now, Sen. Feinstein knows that animal clones often have genetic abnormalities. This is why she is against producing cloned babies. Is she willing to inject stem cells from clones—complete with genetic abnormalities—into children with diabetes? Presumably not. Any clone used for such a purpose will have to be genetically normal. And once such genetically normal clones are at hand, who will want to legislate against their implantation and birth? The Hatch/Feinstein bill is the perfect vehicle for spurring scientists to perfect the techniques that will result in cloned babies.

Much of the confusion goes away once one realizes that the key letters in this debate are not DNA, but IPO—initial public offering. Biotech is the high-tech of the twenty-first century. And right now, biotech entrepreneurs are selling what computer types call vaporware to raise the needed cash.

Human cloning is a gateway technology. It is the gateway to allowing scientists to use cloned embryos and fetuses grown in artificial wombs as the next generation of white rats. It is a gateway to the genetic reprogramming of humans (rich humans, since this will cost you). It is a gateway to genetic discrimination and the eugenics that go hand in hand with the ability to identify the "best" people from their genes. Fortunes will be made on each of these endeavors. But cloning is also the gateway to viewing human beings as means rather than ends, stripping from us the very value and dignity that make biomedical research worthwhile in the first place. ♦

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Saddam's Cash

And the journalists and politicians he bought with it

By Stephen F. Hayes

Scattered among the loose papers and bound files unearthed last week at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry in Baghdad was "letter no. 140/4/5," labeled "Confidential and Personal" and addressed to "The President's Office—Secretariat." The letter concerns George Galloway, a pro-Saddam member of the British Parliament, who founded a charity known as the Mariam Appeal, ostensibly to aid Iraqi children suffering under U.N. sanctions. The missive, from the Iraqi Intelligence Service, is a request that money be funneled directly to Galloway. It reads in part:

> His projects and future plans for the benefit of [Iraq] need financial support to become a motive for him to do more work. And because of the sensitivity of getting money directly from Iraq, it is necessary to grant him oil contracts and special and necessary commercial opportunities to provide him with a financial income under commercial cover without being connected to him directly.

The letter further conveys Galloway's demand that "the name of Mr. Galloway or his wife should not be mentioned."

It also describes a meeting between Galloway and an Iraqi intelligence officer and states that Galloway sought to "ensure confidentiality in his financial and commercial relations with the country and reassure his personal security." Galloway, the letter went on, "needs continuous financial support from Iraq." He got it. Galloway "obtained through Mr. Tariq Aziz three million barrels of oil every six months, according to the oil-for-food programme. His share would be only between 10 and 15 cents per barrel. He also obtained a limited number of food contracts with the Ministry of Trade."

The letter, discovered by David Blair, a Baghdad-based reporter for the London *Daily Telegraph*, and his Iraqi translator, was revealed early last week. The next day, the *Telegraph* reported that Galloway had asked for more money, something the regime initially said it couldn't provide. But late Thursday, the *Christian Science Monitor*, relying on separate documents, reported that Galloway received $3 million a year from April 4, 2000, to January 14, 2003.

A letter accompanying that final payment authorizes the "Manager of the security department, in the name of President Saddam Hussein, to order a gratuity to be issued to Mr. George Galloway of British nationality in the amount of three million dollars only." It praises Galloway for "his courageous and daring stands against the enemies of Iraq, like Blair, the British Prime Minister, and for his opposition in the House of Commons and Lords against all outrageous lies against our patient people."

The bottom line: George Galloway was paid more than $10 million to propagandize for the Iraqi regime.

Galloway denies everything. He says the documents were forged—perhaps by foreign intelligence or by the *Daily Telegraph*. In a move sure to galvanize his critics, Galloway issued his denials from his vacation home—worth $400,000—on the coast of Portugal.

The Galloway revelations surely help explain the ravings of a fringe British politician. But they are more important for what they reveal—or more precisely, remind us—about the Iraqi regime.

Saddam Hussein has a long history of bribing anyone who could help his regime—businessmen, diplomats, politicians, and journalists. Throughout the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted from 1980 to 1988, Saddam lavished Arab leaders with gifts and contracts in exchange for their support. Shortly before his 1990 invasion of Kuwait, he shipped 100 new Mercedes 200 Series cars to top editors in Egypt and Jordan. Two days before the first attack, he offered Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak $50 million in cash, ostensibly for grain. After the invasion, he sought to buy neutrality or at least complacency by promising Mubarak and other Arab leaders that he would forgive all Kuwaiti debts once Iraq annexed the tiny nation as its nineteenth province.

As the Galloway affair makes clear, these practices continued throughout the 1990s, despite the increased scrutiny of Iraq's financial dealings by the United Nations. Before the recent conflict, says Tareq al-Mezrem from the Kuwaiti Information Office, the Iraqi regime gave journalists luxury "villas in Jordan, Tunisia, and even Lebanon."

Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at The Weekly Standard.

L.A. Times / Rick Loomis

Boxes holding part of the $800 million in U.S. currency soldiers found in Baghdad last week.

Some of the transactions were straightforward cash payments, often in U.S. dollars, handed out from Iraqi embassies in Arab capitals—luxury cars delivered to top editors, Toyotas for less influential journalists. "This was not secret," says Salama Nimat, a Jordanian journalist who was jailed briefly in 1995 in that nation for highlighting the corruption. "Most of it was done out in the open."

Other transactions were surreptitious or deliberately complex—coveted Iraqi export licenses for family members of politicians, oil kickbacks through third parties, elaborate "scholarship" arrangements. In a region where leaders count their fortunes by the billion and workers by the penny, such payoffs are common. The Saudis, of course, have financed public works throughout the Middle East and Africa. But no one played the game like Saddam Hussein.

The Galloway affair was triggered when a reporter happened upon a slim, blue folder at one of the 23 Iraqi ministries—a snowflake in the avalanche of information loosed by the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Some of the regime's records no longer exist. Iraqi officials destroyed some before the war began. Coalition bombs wiped out others. Looters made off with more. Still, Bush administration sources say they have recovered enough Iraqi government and Baath party documents to fill 100 semi-trailers. "We're overwhelmed with information," says one Pentagon official. "It's going to take a long time to go through it all."

That process is just now beginning—a fact that is surely rattling nerves around the world.

Iraq is winning the battles in the propaganda war with a modest media strategy, despite a multi-million dollar U.S. campaign featuring painstakingly choreographed briefings and Hollywood-style sets. Undeterred by America's elaborate media plan, Iraq is making its mark on the airwaves with its decidedly basic approach, media pundits say.

From a crude Baghdad set, Iraqi ministers each day knock down Western media reports and list their latest claims of conquest, sometimes wielding chrome-plated Kalashnikovs. Unlike America and its allies, theirs is a simple message delivered directly: "We will defeat the infidel invaders."

Despite poorly-lit surroundings and a sea of microphones often crowding the view, Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf has become something of a global television star . . .

Those words came from Reuters' European media reporter Merissa Marr on April 1, 2003, in a news report that despite the dateline apparently was not a parody. Marr either did not know or chose to ignore a crucial fact: Scores of journalists throughout the Arab world and Europe were on Saddam Hussein's payroll.

"For years, the Iraqi leader has been waging an intensive, sometimes clandestine, and by most accounts highly effective image war in the Arab world," wrote *Wall Street Journal* reporters Jane Mayer and Geraldine Brooks in an exposé published February 15, 1991. "His strategy has ranged from financing friendly publications and columnists as far away as Paris to doling out gifts as big as new Mercedes-Benzes."

That campaign continued until days before the regime

was deposed. "If they're not bought and paid for, they're at least rented," says a top national security official, who adds that the administration has intelligence implicating big-name journalists throughout the Arab world and Europe.

"I could give you lots of names," says Tareq al-Mezrem. "Everyone knows them on the street. Everyone knows this information."

In a series of interviews conducted in Kuwait City and Washington in recent weeks, Arab journalists and media experts said the same thing. Several of those interviewed, with assurances of confidentiality, provided names, lots of them. If their reports are accurate, the Iraqi regime's "modest media strategy" so appealing to Reuters' Marr was actually an elaborate scheme to buy victory in the propaganda war with the United States.

"To lots of people, Saddam Hussein and his regime was a godsend," says a Washington-based columnist for a prominent Arabic-language newspaper. "Only a few journalists [in the Arab world] didn't take money from him."

Estimates of Saddam Hussein's personal fortune range from $2 billion to $40 billion. Over the past two weeks, coalition soldiers found nearly $800 million in U.S. cash stashed in a high-rent Baghdad neighborhood. With that kind of money at his disposal, it's no wonder Saddam Hussein could buy journalists in countries like Jordan, where the average per capita income is $1,630.

The boxes of money found in Baghdad last week were tied with ribbon stamped "Bank of Jordan," which doesn't surprise Salama Nimat, who spent much of his career exploring the shady financial ties between Saddam and the Jordanian elite.

At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, Nimat explains, Saddam Hussein began cultivating the political and business establishment in Jordan. Encouraged by Washington's support of the Iraqi government, Jordan increased trade and diplomatic relations with Saddam. Fifty percent of Jordan's exports went to Iraq, trade facilitated by sweetheart deals between the regime and family members of leading Jordanian politicians and journalists.

At the same time, Saddam began to realize the importance of good press. "Media people were paid monthly by the Iraqi embassy in Amman," says Nimat, "in cash. They were also given presents, like cars and expensive watches." And Saddam built a "housing complex for the Jordanian Press Association" in Amman, according to Nimat, at a cost of $3 million.

Saddam bought good press in less obvious ways, too. "He would award big contracts to newspapers in Jordan to publish all sorts of stuff, like Iraqi schoolbooks and other things," says Nimat. "The contracts were worth millions, and no one ever found out if they ever printed the books. No one cared."

Saddam got what he wanted. His atrocities mounted, but newspapers in Jordan—even those that offered pointed critiques of Jordan's King Hussein—would print nothing critical of Saddam Hussein.

"It's been going on for almost a quarter century," says Nimat. "In the newspapers in Jordan, you wouldn't have seen anything negative about Saddam Hussein. I don't want to generalize too much, but many of the editors were bought by the regime."

"What Saddam did in Jordan, he did in other poor countries in the region like Egypt and Yemen and Mauritania," says Nimat.

One "top Egyptian editor" told the *Wall Street Journal* back in 1991 about a conversation he had with Saddam. "I remember his saying, 'Compared to tanks, journalists are cheap—and you get more for your money.'"

Many of these corrupt practices are confirmed in a CIA report entitled "Baghdad's Propaganda Apparatus" obtained by THE WEEKLY STANDARD. The report indicates that the Iraqi regime redoubled its information efforts in 1998.

"Iraqi propaganda themes are delivered effectively and resonate with many worldwide audiences and with those in the region predisposed to anti-US messages," the report says. Saddam Hussein personally supervised the effort, keeping "close control over the messages and delivery mechanisms."

The Iraqi Intelligence Service, in coordination with the Ministry of Information, ran the propaganda operation, according to the report. Written before the regime fell, the report claims the Ministry of Information was "focused on determining the stories to be pushed, and assigning Iraqi resources overseas to conduct media operations," while "the IIS participates in the internal decision-making process, recruits media and other assets, delivers propaganda material and instructions to them, and provides payoffs. A variety of reporting indicates that journalists in the Middle East and Europe have been recruited to assist Iraq."

In July 1998, "a committee was formed to improve Iraqi propaganda in the region. It would establish relationships and provide financial support to Arab journalists . . . as well as other Arab journalists in Europe. The Iraqi Intelligence Service, which sat on the committee, was instructed to increase financial support to journalists controlled by Iraq."

Two years later, apparently not satisfied with the work of the existing propaganda mechanism,

Saddam created another committee under [Tariq] Aziz, to expand and improve media operations worldwide . . . by financing . . . friendly newspapers and other media outlets, giving the owners and workers awards and monthly salaries, and bringing them to Baghdad to coordinate. The Ministry of Culture and Information, IIS, Baath Party and the Iraqi Press Association, which is headed by Uday Husayn, were represented on the committee.

In early 2001, Uday Hussein dispatched the editor of his newspaper *Babil* to Lebanon, on orders to recruit additional propagandists. The editor was to invite Lebanese journalists to Baghdad, where they would receive instructions on story content and their payoffs. Uday, the CIA report concluded, "was trying to rebuild relations with Lebanese media and convince them to create propaganda for Iraq in return for large sums of money. He also wanted to encourage some to work for his new satellite channel."

The Iraqi Ministry of Information, according to a report on an unnamed Arab nation, "pays substantial sums of money to the principle daily newspapers . . . and gives expensive gifts, such as costly cars and special printing contracts, to their editors."

In an April 2, 2003, speech in New York City, British home secretary David Blunkett complained about Arab journalism. "It's hard to get the true facts if the reporters of Al Jazeera are actually linked into, and are only there because they are provided with facilities and support from the regime." The accusation caused a minor stir in Britain, with several scathing editorials in left-wing newspapers calling for Blunkett's head.

In fact, he may have simply revealed something that wasn't meant for public consumption. According to the CIA report, "Saddam's son Uday . . . assigned a writer, closely associated to him, Rahim Mizyad, as the correspondent to the al-Jazirah satellite television channel. Mizyad also is head of several weekly newspapers in Iraq and General Press Coordinator of all Iraqi governates, but Uday oversees his work."

According to the CIA report, Saddam's son Uday "assigned a writer closely associated to him . . . as the correspondent to the al-Jazirah satellite television channel."

Salama Nimat, the Jordanian journalist, says it's not just Arab journalists who took money. "The Western media has been playing the game, too, including Americans."

In Dearborn, Michigan, one radio station has for years broadcast a weekly, two-hour pro-Saddam program. According to Iraqi Americans who monitored the broadcasts, each program began with the Baath party anthem.

Ismail Mansour, a Pentagon-trained Iraqi American working with coalition forces in Iraq, says the regime's money reached well inside the United States, going to journalists and others. "In America, Saddam friends give money and they make protest," he says. "In the Arab world, it's the same thing. They pay money to do that."

One of those "Saddam friends" is Shakir al-Khafaji, an Iraqi-American businessman from Detroit. Since 1992, al-Khafaji has served as president of the regime-backed Expatriate Conferences, held in Baghdad every other year. The government provided subsidized travel for Iraqis living outside of the country.

On October 17, 1992, the official Iraqi News Agency reported on the activities of that year's session, "Our Roots Remain in Iraq Wherever We Are." Iraqi prime minister Muhammed Hamza al-Zubaydi spoke of the United States and its coalition partners in Operation Desert Storm as Iraq's "enemies" and "referred to the U.S.-led aggression, saying it meant to hamper the country's progress by trying to overthrow the government, destroying Iraq's infrastructure and harming its national and historical unity."

The news report continues, "In their final statement, the participants pledged to exert efforts to lift the embargo imposed on Iraq and to foil the enemies' attempts to divide Iraq and interfere in its internal affairs." The participants sent Saddam Hussein a telegram of support, promising "to do their utmost to defend justice, peace and freedom, especially at this time when the Iraqis are suffering from sanctions. The expatriates said they lived days of love, work and true dialogue to reach means of serving the motherland, and convey its message of civilization sincerely to [their] countries of residence." Al-Khafaji called the gathering "a sincere and faithful response to our motherland."

At the 2000 Expatriate Conference, according to a report in the Jewish newspaper *Forward*, Al-Khafaji appeared on stage with Tariq Aziz, who was then foreign minister. The pair railed about economic sanctions, which they said were starving the Iraqi people. The official conference website accuses the United States of "terrorism and genocide" in Iraq.

A group of Iraqi opposition figures, alarmed by the rise of the regime-sponsored expatriate organizations, published a letter in London's *Al Zaman* newspaper on June 13, 2000. They warned that the expatriate groups existed "to throw dust in people's eyes . . . and convince Iraqis abroad that their actions are purely humanitarian

and that their only objective is to remove the blockade imposed on our people. In time, however, they revealed themselves to be offshoots of the regime's intelligence services." The opposition warned that "these associations pose a threat to Iraqis abroad and particularly to the dissidents among them, since they spy on their activities and gather information about them which is sent to Iraq and used to threaten their families that are still in the homeland."

Al-Khafaji first came to public notice after revelations that he gave former U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter $400,000 to produce a film that criticized the United States for its role in the inspection process. Al-Khafaji, who is listed as a "senior executive producer" of the film, arranged meetings for Ritter with high-level officials in Saddam's government, a feat *New York Times* magazine writer Barry Bearak found "impressive." Ritter had previously been an outspoken critic of Saddam Hussein, and issued dire warnings about the status of the Iraqi dictator's weapons of mass destruction. His sudden flip—he is now a leading apologist for Saddam's regime—and revelations about Ritter's 2001 arrest for soliciting sex with minors have fueled speculation about the nature of his relationship with al-Khafaji.

Al-Khafaji told Baghdad Radio in June 2000 that he hoped to arrange a delegation of members of Congress. He got his wish two years later.

Al-Khafaji has long claimed that he cares only about the Iraqi people, an assertion too preposterous even for Ritter, who told THE WEEKLY STANDARD in 2001 that his patron was "openly sympathetic with the regime in Baghdad." That stands to reason. The Falcon Trading Group, a company that al-Khafaji founded in 1993 in Johannesburg, South Africa, has done nearly $70 million of business with Saddam's regime.

Al-Khafaji told Baghdad Radio on June 14, 2000, that he hoped to arrange a delegation so that members of the U.S. Congress could "get acquainted with the Iraqi people's suffering as a result of the unjust embargo clamped on it." He got his wish two years later, when he accompanied Reps. Jim McDermott, Jim Thompson, and David Bonior to Baghdad last fall.

McDermott, in particular, caused quite a fuss when in a September 29 appearance on ABC's *This Week* from Baghdad, he claimed, "The president of the United States will lie to the American people in order to get us into this war." Moments later, despite 12 years of evidence that the Iraqi regime had lied about its weapons program, McDermott said, "I think you have to take the Iraqis on their face value."

The same day, *Babil* ran a brief item in its local news section. "Saddam Hussein received cable of support from Shakir al-Khafaji, president of the 17th Iraqi Expatriate Conference, on behalf of Iraqis who are living abroad."

The members of Congress returned to the United States facing intense criticism, and quickly sought to reassure an angry public that the objective of their mission was, in Bonior's words, "to impress upon the Iraqi government and the people of Iraq how important it was for them to allow unconditional, unfettered, unrestricted access to the inspectors." He reiterated the point at an October 2 press conference, telling reporters, "The purpose of our trip was to make it very clear, as I said in my opening statement, to the officials in Iraq how serious we—the United States is about going to war and that they will have war unless these inspections are allowed to go unconditionally and unfettered and open. And that was our point."

Of course, no one can say what the congressmen's motives were for their trip. But judging from a press release the trio issued before they left, on September 25, it's clear it wasn't to secure unfettered inspections. Although the congressmen warned about the "dangerous implications of a unilateral, preemptive strike," they didn't mention inspections once.

On October 25, McDermott received a check for $5,000 from Shakir al-Khafaji. The money, first reported by Amy Keller in *Roll Call*, had been deposited in an account for the McDermott Legal Expense Trust, a fund the congressman set up to pay legal bills in a lawsuit brought against him by Rep. John Boehner. (In 1996, McDermott had released to the media the transcript of a phone conversation between Boehner and Newt Gingrich, taped by a Florida couple.)

No one has accused McDermott of being a mouthpiece for Saddam Hussein simply for financial reasons. Indeed, McDermott has been saying stupid things for years with no evidence anyone has paid him to do so. A spokesman for McDermott says he "doesn't know off the top of [his] head" whether McDermott has plans to return the money.

The formidable task of sifting through the mountains of documents Saddam's regime left behind is only beginning. Many of the answers at this point are obscured by more questions.

But George Galloway most assuredly wasn't the only person lining his pockets by defending Saddam Hussein. Journalists and diplomats and businessmen have been doing it for years. Their stories will be told. ♦

What Next?

The Bush foreign policy agenda beyond Iraq

By Max Boot

A group of foreign policy thinkers led by Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge spent much of the 1890s arguing that America needed to build up its navy and take a leading role on the world stage. The most influential expression of their views was Alfred Thayer Mahan's book *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. Teddy Roosevelt and his friends were winning the intellectual argument, but they did not really win the policy argument until the battleship *Maine* blew up in Havana harbor in 1898. It was the Spanish-American War that heralded America's arrival as a Great Power.

Another group of foreign policy seers, led by Winston Churchill and George Kennan, spent much of the late 1940s arguing that America had to take a leading role in combating the spread of communism. Their arguments won a respectful hearing as evidence of Communist expansionism piled up in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere. But a hard-line version of "containment" became formal U.S. government policy only with Harry Truman's approval of the Cold War strategy document known as NSC 68 in April 1950. A military buildup did not start until after the commencement of the Korean War two months later.

It is too early to gain much historical perspective on the Second Gulf War, but its significance may well be similar to that of the Spanish-American War and the Korean War: conflicts that led the United States to expand its power and to "operationalize" what until then had been mere theories of foreign policy. It may be argued, with some justice, that it was really 9/11 that was the seminal event here, the moment that propelled America out of the "strategic pause" of the 1990s. But any U.S. government would have invaded Afghanistan following the heinous attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It is doubtful, by contrast, that a Gore administration would have followed up with the invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration launched this supremely successful war because it was following an ambitious foreign policy blueprint. Its version of *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* and NSC 68 is known as the *National Security Strategy of the United States*. This document, which was released on September 17, 2002, builds on more than a decade of hard work by many thinkers associated with this administration (and this magazine). It has become known mainly for announcing a policy of "preemption," but this is only part of a much broader, neo-Wilsonian vision of foreign policy it capably lays out.

The broad goal of the strategy is to create "conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty." While this has long been standard rhetoric for any U.S. government, the *National Security Strategy* is particularly uncompromising on this point. Echoing one of President Bush's speeches, it says, "Freedom is the nonnegotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person—in every civilization." The strategy is so emphatic because the administration embraces the theory of a "democratic peace"—the notion that liberal democracies are unlikely to use weapons of mass destruction, sponsor terrorism, and undertake other activities that threaten their neighbors and the United States. Therefore, the United States has a vital stake in fostering the spread of representative government.

While this is a long-term objective, the *National Security Strategy* places emphasis in the short term on defending America from the danger that "lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology." Traditional theories of containment and deterrence are insufficient to deal with the shadowy foes we now confront. The United States is forced to act, and sometimes to act preemptively, to deny terrorists "new home bases" and to deny our enemies weapons of mass destruction: "America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed." Like its predecessors, the Bush team pledges to "preserve the peace" by cooperating with other great powers such as China and Russia through "long-standing alliances" like NATO and the United Nations, as well as through "coalitions of the willing." But while allies are all well and good, the *National Security Strategy* leaves little doubt that, in the

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end, the United States must use its overwhelming power to keep the peace. The strategy includes this unapologetic declaration of American hegemony: "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."

It is obvious that America's two post-9/11 wars—Afghanistan and Iraq—fall squarely under the *National Security Strategy*. The Afghan War was fought primarily to deny terrorists a home base. The Iraq War was fought primarily to deny our enemies weapons of mass destruction. But it is not at all obvious what the administration should do next to implement its ambitious strategy. This is, in fact, a subject of much debate within the administration and without. Since the fall of Baghdad, the press has been consumed by feverish speculation over whether Syria or Iran is "next"—a suspicion fueled by the warnings from leading administration figures to Damascus and Tehran not to hinder the U.S. occupation of Iraq. The question of what's next should not be considered in a narrowly military context, however, since JDAMs are only one tool in the arsenal of democracy. The question thus becomes: What's next not only for American military power but also for American diplomacy in the post-Gulf War II world?

Many voices in the foreign policy community, indeed many voices in the administration, suggest that we must return as quickly as possible to President Bush's pre-9/11 foreign policy, the policy of speaking humbly and acting cautiously. They warn that, however successful the war in Iraq has been, it has engendered too much resentment of American power in the Middle East, in Europe—everywhere, really. They suggest that we should turn Iraq over to the United Nations as soon as possible; end the dangerous talk of "preemption"; make up with France, Germany, and other erstwhile allies; and in general act as a kinder, gentler empire.

This advice has an obvious attraction. Victory in the Second Gulf War has not come cheap. It has cost the lives of more than 125 American soldiers. It will cost untold billions of dollars. And—hardest to quantify—it has cost George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Condi Rice, and other senior policymakers incalculable psychic energy, the cost of pushing through a policy opposed by much of the world and even by much of their own State Department. There will be a great temptation now to rest on our laurels, to downsize the foreign policy agenda, and to turn back to domestic concerns—the neglect of which, as George W. Bush well remembers, cost his father a second term.

A short pause to rest, regroup, and recharge is fine, even necessary. But turning away from the world's dangers for long would be a mistake, possibly a fatal one. The war against Islamist terrorism and against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not over. Two battles have been won, but that is not enough. World War II was not finished after El Alamein and Midway, or even after D-Day and Iwo Jima. Much remained to be done before the monstrous evils of fascism and Nazism were defeated. So it is today. In a world where North Korea may already have nuclear weapons, and Iran is less than two years away from having them; in a world where al Qaeda continues to plot, and states like Syria continue to support transnational terrorist groups; in a world where U.S. security depends on alliances with shaky dictatorships like Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—in such a world, much remains to be done before Americans can feel safe.

If we revert to our pre-9/11 passivity, if we return to the 1990s policy of pretending globalization will solve all our problems, if we place our faith once again in accommodation and "stability," then we may awake before long to a disaster worse than 9/11. The horrors of the day are now receding into memory; if you do not wander down to Ground Zero, September 11, 2001, can seem almost as distant as December 7, 1941. It is for that very reason that we must keep our gaze resolutely focused on Ground Zero and our mind fully engaged to imagine worse horrors that may yet transpire. We must never forget, never forgive—and never flag in our determination to prevent a recurrence.

The first priority lies in Iraq. We must not repeat the mistake of the First Gulf War, when we confused battlefield victory with long-term political success. Today our armed forces have won a triumph, but an inept political strategy can easily leave the fruits of victory to rot on the vine. The administration must—*must*—carry out President Bush's plainly stated policy of democratizing Iraq. It must do this not just to secure its own credibility but also to vindicate American actions and American principles. The United States defied several members of the U.N. Security Council and much world opinion when it led a coalition to overthrow the Iraqi tyrant. It now bears the responsibility to demonstrate that the reorientation of U.S. Middle East policy—away from collusion with the region's fascist regimes and toward promotion of freedom and opportunity—is for real, and is for the ultimate good of the region's people.

Unfortunately this viewpoint is not popular within the State Department, the CIA, or even among many at the Pentagon—the very people who will have to implement the policy on the ground. All those bureaucracies prefer promoting "stability" to the hard work of making democracy flourish in barren soil. Their most powerful argu-

ment is that, if we stick around too long, we will become resented by the Iraqis. Soon, they suggest, those who greeted us as liberators will be staging suicide bombings of American headquarters. To avoid the taint of being imperial occupiers, better that we should hand off power as soon as possible to the United Nations or some other organization.

That is a temptation to be resisted. The U.N.'s record in running Kosovo, Bosnia, Cambodia, and other international protectorates inspires little confidence. As Stephen Schwartz has argued in these pages, the U.N. and its fellow multilaterals, the E.U. and OSCE, have not managed to keep electricity turned on regularly in Kosovo's capital, much less to energize genuine democracy. This does not matter too much in a backwater of the Balkans. It would matter enormously in the heart of the Middle East. If the United States were to turn Iraq over to international bureaucrats—instead of to Iraqis, as the president has promised—the rebuilding of Iraq would be set back immeasurably. Before long, the Iraqis would start to wonder how much they had truly gained from their liberation. Nothing could be better calculated to engender resentment of America than such an outcome. By contrast, if an Anglo-American occupation can leave Iraq even half as well off in 2013 as Germany and Japan were 10 years after the end of World War II, this will cement long-term links of affection between our countries. We will know our policy is a success if, in 50 years' time, a democratic Iraq embraces pacifism so resolutely that it refuses to support U.S. military actions around the world.

That does not mean, of course, that Americans should run Iraq indefinitely. Formal empire is passé, and Americans have little enthusiasm for it. Promoting liberal democracies with U.S. security guarantees is more our style. In Iraq, that means purging the Baathists, providing humanitarian relief, starting to rebuild, and then setting up a process to produce a representative local government. Under such a process, the next leader will almost certainly be a Shiite, since Shiites make up a majority of Iraq's population. The State Department and CIA will have to abandon their old policy of supporting Sunni strongmen. And the Pentagon will have to resist the temptation to lean too heavily on sundry warlords and thuggish militias, as it did in Afghanistan.

This means using American troops to secure all of Iraq. It will be insufficient to set up a peacekeeping force whose authority extends only to the capital. It will be unacceptable to say that peacekeeping is not a job for the U.S. military. Since the United States is committed to a "unitary" Iraq, it will have to commit sufficient force to make this a reality. This probably will not require the 200,000 troops suggested by Army chief of staff Eric Shinseki, but it will require a long-term commitment of at least 60,000 to 75,000 soldiers, the number estimated by Joint Staff planners. It is obviously important to build up an indigenous Iraqi army, really a constabulary force, to keep order on its own. But it would be a grave mistake to look for an early "exit strategy." Only U.S. troops can guarantee Iraq's peaceful development in such a rough neighborhood. Their stay will have to be measured in years, not months.

As Iraq liberalizes, the next task will be to spur the liberalization of its neighbors. How to achieve this goal is now the subject of intense debate. The familiar cry is already going up from Europe, the United Nations, the Arab world, and National Public Radio: Restart the "peace process" between Israelis and Palestinians. Alas, there is no reason to imagine that "Oslo II" will turn out any better than the original. Indeed it's hard to see how any Israeli government could make Yasser Arafat a more generous offer than the one he rejected at Camp David in 2000. If he turned down 98 percent of the West Bank then, what could Israel possibly offer him now? The way to achieve peace with the Palestinians—as President Bush has recognized—is to change their government and liberalize their society. This is not a process that can be completed overnight, and it will not be helped by premature Israeli concessions that appear to reward terrorism. By hanging tough, Israel seems to be defeating the suicide bombers and even forcing introspection and reform in the Palestinian Authority. U.S. intervention now would set back this overdue process.

Just as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, so in the rest of the Middle East: The problem isn't the existence of Israel, the only democracy in the region. The problem is the existence of so many nondemocratic regimes. Progress requires liberalization. Democratization alone is not enough, since, as Algeria shows, elections may bring to power Islamist radicals committed to "one man, one vote, one time." In Iraq, nothing would be more disastrous than to allow foreign-backed religious extremists bent on establishing a theocracy to take power through the ballot box. Secretary Rumsfeld reiterated the other day that "an Iranian-type government . . . isn't going to happen." Still, the United States should be doing much more to promote Shiites committed to a pluralist state (yes, they do exist). It is vital to implement the rule of law, freedom of speech, property rights, and other guarantees that can act as a safeguard against majoritarian oppression. That should not temper our commitment to democracy; it merely means that we are committed to liberalism, too.

The United States should push reform even among

allies like Egypt and the Gulf sheikhdoms, because alliances built with unpopular strongmen are unlikely to last. But the United States must be careful to avoid a repeat of the fiasco of Iran in 1979, when we abandoned a friendly dictator and got an unfriendly one instead. With careful attention, it is possible to get the transition process right, as the Reagan administration proved when it nudged Ferdinand Marcos out of office and helped pave the way for democracy in the Philippines.

Democracy promotion is a tricky business among our allies; it should be more straightforward among our enemies. Saudi Arabia presents the toughest case because it is both friend and foe. For too long we have turned a blind eye to the Saudis' abundant financial support for virulently anti-American mullahs and outright terrorists because we needed their oil. That dependency will be somewhat lessened once free Iraq returns its oil fields to full production. But in any case we cannot afford to trade the lives of 3,000 Americans for cheap oil. We must make it plain to the Saudis that they, like everyone else, must choose sides in the war on terror. As President Bush said nine days after 9/11, "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." The presence of tens of thousands of U.S. troops on their border should be a powerful inducement to the Saudis to make the right choice. If the U.S. armed forces made such short work of a hardened goon like Saddam Hussein, imagine what they could do to the soft and sybaritic Saudi royal family. It is a threat best left unstated, but one that should inform the new relationship between Riyadh and Washington.

The same might be said of our relationships with Syria and Iran. Both regimes have been put on notice by Operation Iraqi Freedom: This is what happens if you scheme to acquire weapons of mass destruction or sponsor terrorism. Just in case Damascus didn't get the message, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, and other leading administration figures have been warning Damascus to stop hindering the U.S. occupation of Iraq. This has led to speculation that the U.S. military could take a "left turn" from Iraq and head into Syria. Powell's reply to this suggestion was not designed to be reassuring: "There is no war plan right now to go attack someone else," he said. *Right now*. With that statement, Powell was sending a powerful message. It will not have escaped Damascus and Tehran that the U.S. armed forces could easily do to them what they did to Saddam Hussein's regime. There is good reason to hope that the implicit U.S. threat will never have to be carried out. Both Bashar Assad and Ayatollah Ali Khameini may be scared into better behavior, and in the case of Iran there is at least a decent chance that a homegrown democracy movement will overthrow the mullahs. We must do everything in our power to help these and other democrats in the Muslim world, as once we helped the democrats of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

But while we can hope for democratic revolutions, hope is not a durable foundation for national policy. Critics of the Second Gulf War have been disappointed not to see the "Arab street" rising in favor of Saddam's tyranny; supporters of the war may be disappointed not to see the Arab street rise in favor of freedom, either. Oppression runs deep in the Arab world, and, as the case of Iraq showed, it may take outside intervention to break the Arabs' chains. Nevertheless, we are not likely to go to war simply for Arab or Persian freedom; it will take a threat to our own security to send our troops marching. Thus, to avoid a visit from the 3rd Infantry Division, Iran and Syria do not have to democratize. They simply must refrain from crossing certain red lines laid out in the *National Security Strategy*: They must stop trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and stop supporting international terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and al Qaeda. Two dangers loom especially large: that Iran and Syria will try to turn Iraq into Lebanon redux by staging terrorist attacks on U.S. forces; and that Iran will develop nuclear weapons in a couple of years. Neither eventuality is one that an American president could tolerate. Either action should be regarded as a *casus belli*.

The one place where forcible disarmament of an enemy state may not be an option is North Korea. Kim Jong Il has built such a formidable military apparatus that he has, in effect, deterred us from attacking him. It is possible that Operation Iraqi Freedom may in turn deter him from attacking us, or from selling his nukes to those who would attack us. It is striking in this regard that, contrary to the widespread expectation that he would take advantage of a distracted America to stir up trouble, Kim was not seen or heard from while U.S. forces were marching on Baghdad. Perhaps he was cowering in a bunker somewhere, wondering whether a satellite-guided bomb could pierce its layers of concrete. But as the *National Security Strategy* implies, deterrence may not work against a madman who fills Olympic-size stadiums with zombies who worship at his feet. Safety for North Korea's neighbors lies only in the extinction of this monstrous regime. But even South Korea is wary of pursuing that goal for fear of the cost of picking up the pieces.

The most immediate threat is posed by Pyongyang's nuclear program—a threat severe enough that even the Clinton administration seriously contemplated preemptive military action in 1993. Given the devastation that would result from a second Korean War, military action must remain a last resort. Better that the United States

Peter Steiner

should first apply all its diplomatic and economic muscle on North Korea's patrons in Russia and China to force Pyongyang to give up its nuclear designs. This strategy—combined with the persuasive effect of America's quick victory in Iraq—may already be bearing fruit: North Korea has finally agreed to bargain with Chinese and U.S. representatives over its nuclear program. If those negotiations fail, the United States could institute a quarantine of North Korea, as John F. Kennedy did with Cuba in 1962, to prevent its nuclear weapons from leaving the country. While the United States easily could seal the North's air and sea lanes, cutting off land routes would require the cooperation of Russia and China. This is shaping up as a test of whether America's putative allies are willing to work with us against a common threat.

So far, our would-be friends are getting at best a mixed grade. It is striking that while China, Russia, France, and the rest insist that America act multilaterally in the Middle East, they insist on U.S. unilateralism when it comes to North Korea. The United States would love to get cooperation from other countries to punish North Korea for walking away from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The U.N. refused to oblige. But China did start to turn the screws by briefly shutting off the flow of oil to North Korea. A little more such pressure could go a long way.

This brings us to the subject of alliances, and their uses. The Bush administration is accused of being recklessly unilateralist. The charge is untrue. The administration has tried hard to rally support from international organizations and allies; it even spent months in fruitless dickering at the United Nations with French representatives who were not bargaining in good faith. But at the end of the day the security of the world rests on the shoulders of America, not of France or the U.N. The policy of Republican and Democratic administrations alike has been: with allies if we can, alone if we must.

NATO, at first blush, holds some promise in this regard, since it is a military alliance with fellow democracies. But even though France does not participate in the military structure of NATO, it is doubtful that the alliance can be an effective military instrument absent some major changes. For a start, it would have to stop functioning on the basis of unanimity; as the Kosovo war showed, targeting by committee works poorly. Even if NATO were to adopt some kind of super-majority voting procedure, it would still have to develop useful power-projection capabilities. The rapid deployment force, agreed to at the Prague summit last year under U.S. prodding, would be a nice start if it ever became operational. But even this force would be at best a marginal addition to U.S. military capabilities. NATO could make a more meaningful contribution if it agreed to take a larger role in policing and reconstruction in places like Iraq. Its agreement to take over peacekeeping in Afghanistan in June is a good start, but it has not been easy for an alliance originally created to oppose Soviet expansion in Europe to adopt such "out of area" missions.

Various schemes have been bandied about for security alliances that might better serve U.S. interests in the future. How about a community of democracies? Or an Anglosphere made up of English-speaking countries? Or a league of anti-Islamist countries that would include India, Israel, and Turkey? Or an Asian NATO designed to contain China and North Korea? Perhaps soon there will be talk of recreating the Baghdad Pact, Britain's failed attempt in the 1950s to knit together an alliance of friend-

ly Middle Eastern countries centered around Hashemite Iraq. All these ideas have their attractions, and it would be good if America's chattering classes, instead of simply berating the Bush administration for not working miracles within our existing alliances, debated how to create new frameworks of security.

But in the end, it may not be worthwhile for the administration to spend a lot of time and trouble to create new alliances that might prove no more viable than those 1950s curiosities, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The late 1940s, when NATO was born, were conducive to building a long-term alliance because the United States could focus on one threat—the Soviet Union. Today, by contrast, we face multiple threats all over the world. We need one set of countries to deal with Iran; another set to deal with North Korea; a third set for al Qaeda. "Alliances of the willing" may be the most flexible, and perhaps the only workable, approach.

This requires putting attention where it should have been all along—on cultivating relationships with individual countries, not with abstract entities like the United Nations. It is often said that the Second Gulf War has done irreparable damage to U.S. relations with France and Germany. We will see. Already there are indications that they may come crawling back. Not having cooked the dinner, they want a double helping of dessert. Uncle Sam should be a stern parent, and resist their importuning.

It is debatable whether we can or should punish France and Germany for their obstructionism; but we certainly should not reward their support for the evil Saddam Hussein regime with oil and rebuilding contracts in post-Saddam Iraq. If they want to contribute to the reconstruction effort, we should accept their help; but we should make no concessions to get it. Their current behavior, tying a permanent lifting of U.N. sanctions to a larger political role for the U.N. in running Iraq, amounts to blackmail, and needs to be resisted strongly.

America can cultivate truer friends in the "new Europe" of the East. It helps that Britain, America's closest ally, is also the only European country with any substantial military expeditionary capability. The United States should look to cement these relationships by extending trade deals and military bases to key European allies so that they do not become entirely dependent on the Berlin-Paris axis operating through the European Union bureaucracy. A centralized E.U. will be an Atlanticist's nightmare, for it will give clout to France, Germany, and their lapdog Belgium over those nations that are more sympathetic to America. For too long, Washington has looked benignly on European integration; we should awaken to the potential danger before a Brussels bureaucracy robs us of our remaining allies on the continent.

Our major concern at the moment should not be that Gulf War II has alienated France and Germany; we should worry more about Russia and especially Turkey. Our frayed relations with Turkey are the worst consequence of the war, and both sides must work diligently to patch up this relationship. We cannot hope to promote democracy in the Middle East if we are estranged from the only Muslim democracy in the region. Meanwhile, we have a common interest with Russia in combating Islamist terrorism; that mutual interest should come to the fore now that Russia's old client, Saddam Hussein, is gone from the scene.

Important as allies are, they matter less in a world in which America wields unrivaled power. Our primary goal should be to preserve and extend what Charles Krauthammer called the "unipolar moment." That moment has now stretched into a decade and shows no sign of waning. This confounds the confident prediction of academic theorists that any hegemon will call into being an opposing coalition. It happened to Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany. It hasn't happened to America. Why not? The reason should be obvious to anyone without a Ph.D.: America isn't like the empires of old. It does not seek to enslave other peoples and steal their lands. It spreads freedom and opportunity. The American security umbrella, which shields a large chunk of the world, offers protection not only to the United States but to all democratic governments. The fundamental reason why you won't see France, Germany, Russia, and other jealous states ganging up on America militarily is that they know America presents no security threat to them. Whether they admit it or not, we actually serve their security interests by dispatching potential threats like Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. Some of our allies even acknowledge their reliance upon us. Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi recently said, "The United States is the only ally providing Tokyo with deterrent power against any foreign country that could threaten regional security, such as North Korea, and the Japanese people should never forget it."

Having seen that the world is not ganging up on America, some political scientists posit that "soft" balancing is going on instead. By this they mean that other nations seek to use their diplomatic, cultural, and economic influence to contain U.S. power. There is some evidence of this phenomenon—witness the recent debate over Iraq at the United Nations, where France, Germany, Russia, and China combined against us. The limits of this strategy were also revealed at the U.N. All those states blocked an eighteenth resolution on Iraq—and

Britain and America acted anyway. "Soft power" is an interesting concept for academic discussion; it is not a serious threat to American security.

The greatest threat to American power comes not from without but from within: Only if we lose our confidence and our resolve, at this moment of supreme opportunity and imminent danger, will our security be imperiled. To preserve and extend the Pax Americana, we will need to increase our defense spending. We already have the most magnificent military in history, but it is stretched thin by all the assignments thrown its way. The army is deployed in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai, South Korea, Afghanistan, and now Iraq. The Marines are filling some of the gap, but they're stretched thin, too. And successful as the armed forces have been in Iraq, it's alarming to see how old a lot of their equipment is—many helicopters date back to the Vietnam War, and the B-52 bombers are even older than that.

Carrying out all of our current global missions will require reversing the military downsizing of the 1990s. In 1991, the United States had more than 2 million active-duty soldiers; today we're down to 1.4 million, a decline of 30 percent. The army went from 18 active-duty divisions to 10; the navy from more than 550 ships to fewer than 315; the air force from 25 fighter wings to 13. We need to return to our 1990 strength, which will require boosting defense spending by more than $100 billion a year. Add billions more for homeland security, which, despite impressive advances, still needs to be beefed up, especially to safeguard our vulnerable ports. That sounds like a lot of money, but even with recent increases we're still spending under 3.5 percent of our vast GDP on defense, considerably less than during the Cold War. That's a small price to pay to police the globe.

Even after 9/11, some Americans might shrink from this task. But Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that the mission is achievable. Iraq should not be seen as an aberration, but rather as another important step in a larger campaign to make the world safe for democracy. Sophisticates may laugh at Woodrow Wilson's objective, but it was the right one; the problem was that he was unable to mobilize American society to achieve it. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush have been more successful in pursuing this noble vision. We have already vanquished Nazism and communism; only one of the twentieth century's evil ideologies—fascism, this time in its Islamist variant—remains to be defeated for liberalism to breathe easier. Victory is almost in sight. We ought not return to passivity now. ♦

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A Hundred Years of Muggery

The life and times of Malcolm Muggeridge

By Christopher Hitchens



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There are numberless ways in which the faithful may taunt, or perhaps I should better say tease, the unbeliever. One such tactic—and for my money the most irritating—is to say that God believes in *you*, even if you can't return the compliment. Another is to contrast the modest simplicity of belief with the contortions of the malcontent intellectual. "Don't mind me," says the humble friar or devoted nun, brushing past on some modest errand of altruism. "I'm just doing the Lord's work."

Those of us who experience difficulty in recognizing this as genuine humility always used to have a fine old time at the expense of Malcolm Muggeridge, the centennial of whose birth in 1903 has caused a small flurry of notice this year, thirteen years after his death in 1990. Here was a man ever-ready to uncork a sermon about the fallen state of the species and the pathetic vanity of our earthly desires—all while he was notorious as an apostle of carnality and a ringmaster at the circus of his own self-promotion. Every personality type in the eternal argument over divinity is to be discerned in John Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, that founding text of Protestant fundamentalism. And it was there in *Pilgrim's Progress*—winding between Vanity Fair and Doubting Castle, encountering the likes of "Great-Heart," "Mr. Standfast," and "Little-Faith"—that one seemed to have the best chance to catch the lineaments of Muggeridge. He was Mr. Worldly Wiseman.

Malcolm Muggeridge
A Biography
by Gregory Wolfe
ISI, 490 pp., $15

A difference between American and British audiences is that Americans tend to know Muggeridge by his writing, while the British associate him with the early days of television celebrity. When I was young in the 1960s, Muggeridge seemed to be ubiquitous, on game shows and quiz-marathons no less than on brow-furrowing panels about serious matters. The man appeared to have no unaired thoughts.

An excellent mimic would be required to do an impression of his face, which resembled that of a vain old turtle. But almost anyone could have a shot at imitating his voice, with its commingled bray and bleat. My own first appearance on the tube was to debate apartheid as a guest on his Sunday-evening chat-show, portentously called *The Question Why*. (I forget if it had a question mark or not. Perhaps it was like the title of Sidney and Beatrice Webb's apologia for Stalinism: *Soviet Communism—A New Civilization*, which had a question mark for its first edition and none for the second.)

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Muggeridge in the 1930s

Muggeridge was married to Beatrice Webb's niece, Kitty, and had been brought up in that area of the British Left that was bounded by the Fabian Society, the *New Statesman*, the London School of Economics, and Bloomsbury more generally. The tone-setters of this melioristic and high-minded environment placed a lot of faith in social action for the improvement of health, housing, and the rights of labor. But they also stressed the improveability of human nature, this last to be attained by more sexual and educational freedom. In those days, the word "crusade" was still acceptable, and the great anthem of the movement was William Blake's "Jerusalem": *I will not cease from Mental Fight, / Nor shall my Sword sleep in my hand / Till we have built Jerusalem / In England's green & pleasant Land*.

It's easy to mock this tradition, though it has some great achievements still standing to its credit. But one would not wish to sneer at a man like Henry Thomas Muggeridge, Malcolm's father, who devoted a good life to the socialist cause. One of the several merits of the recently reprinted biography *Malcolm Muggeridge* is that its author—Gregory Wolfe, the editor of the American art magazine *Image* and author of such previous books as *The New Religious Humanists*—understands the duality of motive. He shows us a young Muggeridge who became impatient with his father's do-good schemes and with the heresy of the perfectibility of man. Yet Wolfe also describes a rather selfish and unappealing figure, embarrassed by his family's dowdiness and desiring to be more dashing and fashionable and renowned.

No serious person is without contradictions. The test lies in the willingness or ability to recognize and confront them. Wolfe's biography suggests that Muggeridge was sometimes opaque to himself and sometimes not. But the book is clear on one thing. Those of us who had thought that the man came to religion only late in life, after years of exhausting debauchery, were quite mistaken. I once contributed some doggerel to the *New Statesman*, expressing the received opinion about Muggeridge: *In my youth, quoth the sage, as he tossed his grey locks, / I behaved just as any young pup. / But now I am old I appear on the box— / And tell others to give it all up.*

The time has come to take back those lines. Wolfe establishes that Muggeridge had a sort of epiphany as a very young man, being overwhelmed by a rural sunset which "in its all-embracing beauty conveyed a oneness" and deciding "that to identify oneself with the spirit animating it and giving it meaning, contained the promise of ecstasy." This trope recurs in an undergraduate study that Muggeridge did at Cambridge, based on the *Evidences of Christianity* by the early-nineteenth-century natural philosopher William Paley. The result may be no more than the Argument from Design writ large, but there's no reason to doubt Muggeridge's sincerity about it.

Continuing this rather soft-centered, impressionable attitude to the Numinous, Muggeridge made the voyage to India that so many progressive-minded young Englishmen undertook in those days, and he was duly impressed with the saintliness and simplicity of Gandhi. But paradox intrudes itself here at once. When Muggeridge was not being awed by spiritual simplicity, he was being attracted by religious complexity. He wrote about his "love" for "the inconsistencies of Christianity" and his belief that "faith must be based on doubt." He was still a long way from Roman Catholicism, but his quest for the "inclusive"—for a reconciliation between the sacred and the profane, as well as between the simple and the difficult—already involved catholicity.

Perhaps, like St. Augustine, he didn't want full acceptance quite yet or, knowing himself pursued by the Hound of Heaven, was prepared to give it time to catch him. Meanwhile he had a certain toughness and curiosity to keep him going. He saw plainly that the British day in India was waning (he was ahead of his time in this respect), and he was soon to see through communism, the grand illusion of the twentieth century. Enlisting at the *Manchester Guardian*, another flagship of the English *bien-pensant* class, he was quick to realize that its lofty policies masked an institutional hypocrisy about, among other things, the true source of the newspaper's income. Satirizing this in his first novel, *Picture Palace*, he made the valuable discovery that there is no intolerance like liberal intolerance. (The paper's owners took harsh legal steps to ensure that the novel was suppressed.) Thus, when he became the *Guardian*'s correspondent in Moscow in 1932, he was riper than perhaps he understood for a crisis of belief.

A.J.P. Taylor told him as he was embarking, "If the Russians do not come up to your expectations, don't take it out on them." Muggeridge's reply is worth quoting: "No, no. It will be Utopia. I must see the Ideal even if I am unworthy of it." This Mosaic echo is evidence that Muggeridge already had a religious cast of mind. Of course, it was not only the Left in those days that believed in the virtues of a planned economy and hungered for an alternative to post-Versailles chaos and misery. But the disillusionment in Muggeridge's case was on a scale commensurate to the original fantasy. Stalin's Russia hadn't just fallen short of the ideal; it had become a plain Hell for the body and the mind. His reports from the Ukraine in the year of the famine stand comparison with André

Gide's *Retour de l'URSS* and Eugene Lyons's *Assignment in Utopia* as irrefutable evidence of a new barbarism. The ancillary lesson he drew, about the gullibility and credulity of Western intellectuals, was to last Muggeridge the rest of his life.

Muggeridge's sheet isn't as snow-white, however, as some of his admirers like to believe. A previous and more hagiographic biography, written by Richard Ingrams, mentions that in his dotage Muggeridge became prey to anti-Semitic outbursts and paranoid suspicions. I had thought that this late lapse was the extent of it, but Wolfe bluntly points out Muggeridge's lifelong susceptibility to this most toxic of all prejudices. And in *Winter in Moscow*, a 1934 novel that dwells on the most lurid aspects of Judeo-Bolshevism, he gave full vent to his dislike. Some subsequent exposure to Nazi ideology and practice qualified, but did not entirely dispel, this disfiguring element.

While he was thus engaged in becoming a failed novelist and a brilliant journalist (his book *The Thirties* remains a classic snapshot of what his friend Claud Cockburn called "The Devil's Decade") and managing to turn up always in the right place at the right time, his private life was a cauldron of adultery, misery, and penury. He fought incessantly with Kitty, whom he may not have forgiven for his repeated betrayals of her, and she requited this by openly bearing another man's son. (The boy was to become in some ways Muggeridge's favorite child.)

All the while, Muggeridge could not shed the fear that he was a phony and a failure. Enlisting in British Intelligence in World War II was a near-faultless decision on his part, because it gave him the excuse to leave home and it caught him up in a world where things were deceptive and dishonest by definition. From this came his long friendship with Graham Greene. From this, also, came the moment of despair in which he attempted suicide.

Muggeridge had actually been rather a good British agent in the Portuguese African port of Lourenço Marques, hampering the German spies at every turn and even helping to trap and capture a U-boat. But he felt himself a hollow poseur and one night swam out to sea with the intention of drowning. He changed his mind only at the very last minute. Even on this grave matter, he could not quite achieve authenticity. At the time, he passed off the fiasco as an attempt to baffle the local Nazis, and he stuck to this version for many years before confessing in his autobiography that he had sincerely meant to take his own life but had undergone yet another epiphany when he saw the lights of the shore. (I cannot resist adding that he was challenged to come up with a true account only because David Irving had unearthed the cover story while making one of his dark trawls through the German archives.)

All this invites the question: Was Muggeridge a "fool for God," or just a fool? For the first four or even five decades of his life, he could scarcely tell his alienation from his anomie. Despite the steadying influence of his old Cambridge companion Alec Vidler, an unassuming priest who really did have a vocation, Muggeridge rolled and pitched from job to job, home to home, and mistress to mistress. Claud Cockburn, who despite their vast quarrel over communism really admired Muggeridge for his qualities as a friend, made an excellent diagnosis when he told him, "With you, the tendency to become bored has the quality of a vice." Kingsley Amis once told me of a night of impossible squalor and depression, when a drunken Muggeridge proposed that both men try and take advantage, *seriatim*, of an equally sozzled Sonia Orwell. This joyless, wretched orgy was proposed merely in order that an already dispirited evening should not end.

It seemed at one stage that his appointment to the editorial chair at *Punch* would give Muggeridge something solid to do. The venerable Victorian weekly had a big circulation but a flickering pulse; it urgently required what P.G. Wodehouse would have called snap and vim. The appointment of Anthony Powell as literary editor and Claud Cockburn as roving scribbler at the magazine resulted in two excellent pen-portraits of Muggeridge, who might have become the English Harold Ross.

Muggeridge in the 1940s

Cockburn wrote, "I began to have the feeling that with this fiercely gentle, chivalrously ungentlemanly man on the far side of the grandiose editorial desk, jerking and flashing his eyes, from time to time cackling out a cacophony of furiously raucous expressions like a sailor's parrot loose in the Mission Hall, something new and special in the way of clowning and satire might yet be made of this ancient publication."

Powell, not atypically somewhat more circuitous, added:

> In the beginning . . . was the sceptical wit mocking all, and the wit was with Muggeridge and the wit was Muggeridge. This first Muggeridge—never wholly exorcised but undergoing long terms of banishment from the Celestial City of his personality—would sometimes support, sometimes obstruct, what then seemed his sole fellow, Second Muggeridge.
>
> Second Muggeridge, serious, ambitious, domestic, . . . with a strain of Lawrentian mysticism, . . . had a spell-weaving strain and violent political or moral animosities (animosity rather than allegiance being essential expression of Second Muggeridge's teachings), both forms of vituperation in the main

The elderly Muggeridge listens to his wife Kitty reading.

> aimed at winning a preponderant influence in public affairs. . . .
>
> In due course, . . . Third Muggeridge became manifest at full strength, hot-gospelling, near-messianic, promulgating an ineluctable choice between Salvation and Perdition. He who was not with Third Muggeridge was against him, including First and Second Muggeridge. In this conflict without quarter First Muggeridge, who treated life as a jest—now so to speak a thief crucified between two Christs—came off worst.

That last arresting image, of a uniquely Muggeridgian Golgotha, illuminates the way in which Cockburn and Powell both naturally employed the image of the clown or the jester. As it happens, this was Muggeridge's own favorite point of comparison between religion and Shakespeare—for both afforded special roles to the "rough and tumble acrobat, horseplay jester for God": religion with St. Francis of Assisi and Shakespeare with King Lear's only sincere and simple friend. Occasionally, and despite his reputation for hard-headedness about totalitarianism, Muggeridge would enact the role of the *naif* without apparently volunteering for it. He described the KGB's most ruthless agent, his former acquaintance Kim Philby, as "a boy scout who had lost his way." And, during much of World War II, he preferred to think of the Nazis as absurd and pitiable rather than wicked.

Having briefly been banned by the BBC for a 1955 *New Statesman* attack he wrote on the soap-opera culture of the British royal family—a polemic that now seems astonishingly mild—and having drifted morosely away from the *Punch* editorial chair as if to vindicate Cockburn's judgment, Muggeridge was at last to find his milieu.

Again, he was drawn compulsively to that which he found loathsome. Television, he could plainly see, would be the death of literacy and the handmaid of instant gratification. It would instill cheap and commercial values and incite the nastiest forms of populism. He fell for it like a ton of bricks. He wallowed exuberantly in its corruption. He was a natural. He was perfectly well aware, as his diaries show, that he was expending his spirit in a waste of shame. But he enjoyed it and excelled at it, and he may have hoped to turn the greatest weapon of crass modernity against itself.

Sex was the selling point, overtly and subliminally, of the television "mass-cult." (Did Muggeridge ever read or encounter Dwight Macdonald?) Very well, then, a guru would appear on the seductive screen and warn that sex was ultimately a disappointment. Ridicule was the predictable harvest for this, of course, and Muggeridge reaped it in heaping measure. I think it's clear that he enjoyed the obloquy and felt that he was earning it, so to speak, vicariously. He plodded on with a series of well-made television documentaries, which I personally find intolerably mawkish but which gradually won him a sort of underdog's respect. Gnarled pilgrims at Lourdes, simple fisherfolk on the shores of Galilee, mitered bishops with the common touch. . . . And then the jewel in the crown. In a 1969 film entitled *Something Beautiful for God*, he launched the persona that we all came to know as Mother Teresa.

In a near-perfect return-serve to the hedonism of the day, he made a star out of a woman who scorned pelf and pleasure. Wolfe's book gives this chapter fairly straight. I have a minor quarrel to register with a biographer who is in general punctiliously honest. Wolfe has obviously read the testimony of Ken Macmillan, Muggeridge's ultra-professional cameraman, but he chooses to elide it, and thus lets stand the claim, directly rebutted by Macmillan, that the filming of the documentary involved a miracle, manifesting allegedly divine light around the figure of Mother Teresa. The simple explanation involves a Kodak film especially designed for crepuscular scenes. (Simplicity isn't always to be despised, as I may have hinted.)

Wolfe's *Malcolm Muggeridge* begins with a pledge. "The temptation," the biographer writes, "is to play Boswell to Malcolm's Johnson, concentrating on his innumerable witty retorts, *bons mots*, and other examples of his dazzling sense of humor. This is a temptation that I have resisted." He keeps

Muggeridge in the 1980s

that rather forbidding promise throughout, and I'd say that the world of the devastating riposte was not Wolfe's natural territory in any case. "Urbane and witty," he writes about the magazine *Night and Day*, which was brought low by a lawsuit from Shirley Temple against Graham Greene, "it could also be acerbic and satirical. Ironically, this satirical sharpness was to hasten its downfall." The contrasts here are non-contrasting, and the irony is no irony at all. Having met the Muggeridges in Canada, Wolfe records in a deadpan fashion that "after partaking of the simple dinner that was their regular fare . . . ," and one wants to say, yes, well, that's quite enough about that.

Wolfe makes some errors that may be simple clumsiness: George Orwell underwent no "disillusionment" with communism, in which he had never believed. But other errors are not stylistic. I'll eat my shoes if Claud Cockburn was ever even for a moment a religious "seeker." Still, the cumulative effect of Wolfe's narrative in *Malcolm Muggeridge* is so serious and so genuine that the biography ultimately forces a reconsideration of its subject.

Muggeridge was not the C.S. Lewis of his time, any more than he was the Samuel Johnson. Just as his actual witticisms were few (is there really a Muggeridge epigram or aphorism for the ages?), so his grasp of theology was slight. But he was the first to admit the latter deficiency, and not even Wolfe will defend his *Confessions of a Twentieth-Century Pilgrim.* One respects Muggeridge, rather, for his imperfections and contradictions and shortcomings, and for his readiness to be boring rather than fascinating on questions that he believed to be important.

In his later years, Muggeridge formed alliances with moralistic authoritarians like Mary Whitehouse of Moral Re-Armament, who were not so much foolish as plain sinister. (His other colleague, the late Lord Longford, was a fool for God, all right, and a tremendous fool in his own right, but would never have harmed so much as a fly.) And these alliances—together with his own behavior—left Muggeridge easy to make sport of, as long as you could be convinced that there was nothing meretricious about the various shallow theories of "liberation" that were near-regnant at the time.

Most impressive to me is the anticlimax of his reception into the Church of Rome very late in life. This did not give Muggeridge the peace that he had expected (Ingrams's biography is better on this than Wolfe's), and he may have vaguely understood that it wasn't really peace he had been desiring. He was a fair example of restlessness and unease—of what has been called divine discontent. There certainly remain moments when Muggeridge was entirely Mr. Worldly Wiseman. But to read his biography is to see there are other moments in his turbulent life when he was temporarily promoted in Bunyan's cast of characters and could stand in for Mr. Valiant-For-Truth. ♦

BOOKS

A New Newman?

Two accounts of England's most famous convert.

BY JAMES J. BUCKLEY

John Henry Newman is modernity's most famous Catholic convert—and, at least until Frank Turner's *John Henry Newman: The Challenge to Evangelical Religion* appeared late last year, the prevailing wisdom was that Newman managed in his conversion to become a very good Catholic, indeed. Perhaps even a saint. Turner challenged that prevailing wisdom in a variety of learned, although often implausible, ways—almost all involving Newman's place in the historical tides that washed through the nineteenth century.

Newman
Outstanding Christian Thinkers Series
by Avery Dulles, S.J.
Continuum, 168 pp., $22.95

John Henry Newman
The Challenge to Evangelical Religion
by Frank Turner
Yale University Press, 752 pp., $35

Now, in a volume called *Newman*, the American Jesuit, Cardinal Avery Dulles, undertakes a focused reading of Newman's theology. The result is a revival of much of the traditional understanding of John Henry Newman. Still, Turner's *John Henry Newman* is extremely useful in laying out the historical conditions in which the Englishman's conversion occurred. Newman began, of course, as an Anglican, and, according to Newman's own version, the nineteenth-century Church of England contained four parties: conservatives, liberals, evangelicals, and catholics.

The first party, the conservatives, advocated the union of church and state, and the conservatives' principles were, Newman said, "political or at least ecclesiastical rather than theological."

The second party, the liberals, wanted to dissolve this union of church and state. Unlike the conservatives, these liberals held theological views as well as political, although their God was (Newman thought) a false god, the god of "deism," and they marched beneath the banner of what Newman called "false liberty of thought."

That left the evangelicals and the catholics—theological parties "violently opposed" to each other. Although the evangelical party was, as Newman put it, "by far the most important" in his day, he nonetheless thought it "almost justifiable to believe that in the coming generation the religious world will be

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University of Notre Dame Press

divided" between the deistical liberals and the catholics.

Newman was born in 1801 to a conservative family. According to his autobiographical *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, however, he was also influenced both by "superstitious" Catholic practices such as crossing himself in the dark and by the liberal skepticism common among intellectuals in his day. He tells us that at fifteen he became an evangelical (what we might call today a born-again Christian, indebted to the theology of Calvin as well as to Lutheran pietism's call for a devout and holy life). Shortly after that he went to Oxford, where he became a part, and eventually far more than a part, of the famous "Oxford Movement," which was determined to reform the Anglican church in an anglo-catholic—and even Roman Catholic—direction. The movement published a series of "tracts," and when one of Newman's tracts argued that it was possible to give a Catholic interpretation of Anglicanism's Thirty-Nine Articles (promulgated in 1563 as part of the Church of England's Elizabethan Settlement), resistance was vigorous.

Newman soon began reconsidering his attitudes toward the Roman Catholic faith. He also founded what he called "a parsonage-house" at Littlemore, a few miles outside Oxford, for his personal edification and that of his friends. By a series of "accumulated probabilities" narrated in his *Apologia*, he overcame his difficulties with certain Catholic practices (devotion to Mary and the saints, in particular) and became a Catholic in 1845.

Many of England's conservative and liberal Protestants (many Roman Catholics, for that matter) were suspicious of his conversion at the time. Indeed, the *Apologia pro Vita Sua* was written twenty years after Newman's conversion to refute the charge that Newman had not been truthful—indeed, that he, and perhaps all Catholics, not only held untrue beliefs but were systematic liars.

Now, according to the usual way the story is told, Newman overcame such suspicions among both English Protestants and European Catholics when he wrote his wildly popular spiritual autobiography, the *Apologia*, in 1865 and when Pope Leo XIII made him a cardinal in 1879. His other works—particularly *The Idea of a University*, *Grammar of Assent*, and the long narrative poem *The Dream of Gerontius*—became enduring contributions to the intellectual life of the West. So vast was his appeal to Catholics in America that institutes of Catholic life at non-Catholic colleges and universities throughout the nation quickly came to be called "Newman Centers."

Newman also became a central figure among the reformers who formed the background to the Second Vatican Council. That meeting of Catholic bishops in the early 1960s brought about the largest changes in Catholic life and thought at least since the Gregorian Reform a millennium earlier. Vatican II opened the way to new relations with Orthodox and evangelical Christians as well as Jews, members of other religions, and the modern world. Interestingly, Vatican II also opened the door to new forms of Catholic dissent, and the new dissenters equally claimed Newman as their precursor.

The questions of the time remain unanswered. Did Vatican II call Catholics to reform as a way of recovering the best of their traditions in Scripture and liturgy and theology—a conservative strategy? Or did the council call Catholics to reform as a way of becoming more up-to-date, more modern or even postmodern—a liberal strategy? In any case, both sides appeal to Newman. We have versions of Newman that focus on his dramatic readings of Scripture in his sermons and his reading of tradition as an organic whole—a key precursor of the theologies of such contemporaries as John Paul II. But we also have readings of Newman that focus on his calls for religious and intellectual freedom as well as a tradition that has to change. As Cardinal Dulles explains, "Modernists, liberals, and theological conservatives can all find texts from his writings to support their preferred theses."

At 176 pages, Dulles's *Newman* is a clear, concise, and insightful survey of Newman's ideas. Frank Turner needed a much more massive 750 pages to make the case that who Newman is today depends crucially on who he was yesterday. Turner is not the first skeptic about Newman, but his way of questioning the convert is quite original. According to Turner, the path Newman took depended on two aspirations, to Catholicism and to monastic celibacy, "with Catholicism more often than not serving the goal of monasticism."

In this view, Newman's community at Littlemore reestablished the monastic form of life founded in the early church by the likes of St. Benedict and violently overthrown by the Protestant Reformation. It also flew in the face of Victorian evangelical assumptions about marriage, family, domesticity, and business.

As it happens, Newman himself "displayed a talent for modest entrepreneurship" that enabled him to spurn Anglican orthodoxy even while enjoying its economic and social advantages. In contrast to many of his friends, "Newman became a Roman Catholic so that he could continue to remain a monk, and if possible, a monk surrounded by his Littlemore male friends." He was not a Catholic like William George Ward and Henry Manning, who were equally dogmatic but more accommodating to the evangelical and liberal world of domesticity and business.

Turner argues, however, that Newman also stands "among the first cultural apostates"—indeed, "the first great, and perhaps the most enduring, Victorian skeptic," like Nietzsche in this one respect. Newman underwent "one indeterminate metamorphosis after another, with no certain teleological direction necessarily leading him into the Roman Catholic communion." He thus helped create an English culture "that would be pluralistic religiously, morally, and intellectually, rather than exclusively Protestant in character." Newman was, in sum, an anti-evangelical monk and a founder of pluralistic skepticism—but not, at least primarily, a Catholic.

This means, of course, that Newman got himself wrong in his *Apologia pro Vita Sua*—which will seem equally implausible to modern Catholics and pluralistic skeptics. Still, Turner is one of the premier historians of Victorian England. He has long resisted, for example, histories that isolate "religion" and "science" from each other. One of the main themes of his 1993 *Contesting Cultural Authority: Essays in Victorian Intellectual Life* is that modern historians have persistently separated religious and social history, ignoring the intersections of the two for most nineteenth-century English people.



CORBIS

What Turner rightly understands is that Newman wrote for an audience that was suspicious of his conversion, and that we are not such an audience. In his time, as Newman saw, it was "almost unavoidable" that his conversion seem a violation of "Christian simplicity and uprightness"—if only because of the unchristian divisiveness the public debate that his conversion created. Turner's careful historical settings, combined with Turner's skepticism about Newman's Catholicism, help recreate for the modern reader the problem Newman presented to the Victorian reader.

This seems to make Turner more persuasive than Dulles in explaining Newman's career. And yet, this is also where Turner's account begins to break apart. Unlike Dulles's book, Turner's volume ends with Newman's 1845 conversion, twenty years prior to the *Apologia*. Of course, Turner could hardly avoid periodically mentioning the *Apologia*, which he finds sometimes correct, sometimes self-serving, and sometimes self-deceptive. (One of the few times Turner believes Newman shows "mature, even incisive, self-knowledge" is when the young Newman in 1826 writes "I am full of art and deceit, double dealing, display.") But Turner does not provide the extended analysis of the *Apologia* that he needs to make his case.

So, for example, Turner finds Newman and other "Tractarians" needlessly polemical, pressing a Catholic case in a way that could only have been done in a Protestant context. And it's true, as Dulles points out, that Newman considered himself even more a "controversialist" than a "theologian." But in the *Apologia* Newman confessed that his behavior sometimes had "a mixture in it both of fierceness and of sport," which he regretted—even as he repented of none of his arguments.

Such thin readings of the *Apologia* trap Turner in various ways. He contends, for instance, that Newman's *Apologia* "imposed a structure of spiritual search on what in actuality had been a series of contingent events infused with enormous personal confusion, anger, despondency, and mixture of other motives"; Newman even "imposed a divine pattern upon events that he could no longer influence or determine." But why cannot an authentic "spiritual search" include a series of contingent events? Every conversion ever recorded tells of contingency after contingency. God's providence, one recollects, often consists of writing straight with crooked lines.

Curiously, Turner imposes his own quite determinate teleology on Newman's story. *John Henry Newman: The Challenge to Evangelical Religion* opens with a wonderfully thick description of England's domination by evangelical Protestant culture—and the book closes with what it conceives as the happy ending that evangelical religion is no longer dominant, thanks in part to unwitting Catholic skeptics like Newman.

It's true, of course, that Newman challenged the Protestant empire, but he did so while leaving evangelical religion thriving in the home and the public square. Indeed, as Dulles points out, Newman himself knew his continued debt to his evangelical heritage.

Newman's father had several business failures, and Newman became essentially the head of the household, supporting his mother and two brothers and three sisters financially, educationally, and spiritually. The death of his sister Mary in 1828 was a deep and enduring sadness. His brother Charles was a follower of religious socialist Robert Owen, and his brother Francis embraced a more radically evangelical way of life and eventually became Unitarian. It was thus, as Turner says, within his own family that Newman encountered the "radical secularism and radical evangelicalism" he considered most dangerous to Christian faith.

Turner rightly wonders how these events affected Newman. But is it really the case that "the driving psychic force" behind Newman's critique of evangelical religion comes from his family? Or that his early sermons reveal an eldest child looking for praise for his ascetical obedience as well as condemnation of his brothers' disobedience?

Turner admits that we know almost nothing about why Newman chose the celibate path, and he acknowledges that Newman's remarks about love and affection for men express "an unfulfilled desire for emotional intimacy" and have "no hint of sexual relation or contact." But he also says that "it is by no means clear that Newman ever achieved that level of adult emotional development and personal confidence required for a committed relationship of love or sexuality."

Even more extreme is Turner's suggestion that the enduring tragedy of his sister Mary's death helps explain how Newman overcame his difficulty with Catholic Marian devotions: If devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary did not violate the distinction between Creator and creature, it "seems possible that" his intense affection for his sister Mary did not violate familial relationships. Turner candidly admits that this last comment is "speculative and tendentious"—to which the response must be: Yes, it is.

Turner feels confident enough to offer Newman not just psychological advice, but theological advice as well. What Turner finds missing in Newman's theology of development of doctrine and practice is "a significantly articulated consideration" of the Holy Spirit.

It's true, as Dulles once again points out, that Newman focused more on issues of philosophical theology and the Church than on the traditional doctrines of the Trinity and Jesus Christ. But Turner has a remedy. Newman would have done well to make use of German idealism's "theology of divine immanentism," like the American Evangelical Reformed theologian Philip Schaff. This would offset "the empiricist philosophy that, despite his efforts to resist, nonetheless largely determined his frame of mind."

This is an intriguing aside. German idealism shaped European evangelical theology from Friedrich Schleiermacher in the nineteenth century to Karl Barth and Paul Tillich in the twentieth—as well as European Catholic theology from Johann Sebastian Drey and Johann Adam Möhler in the nineteenth century to Hans Urs von Balthasar and Karl Rahner in the twentieth century. Barth and Balthasar were critical of modern efforts to make God a function of our social or psychological histories (one kind of "divine immanentism"), while Tillich and Rahner were more accommodating to such efforts.


CORBIS

It is a crucial question, for both Catholics and non-Catholics, where Newman fits into all this, or whether he offers a third option and, potentially, a path out of the endless debate. Turner's first Newman—the self-deceived celibate in a male ghetto that needs a more immanent God—provides more ammunition for liberal than conservative Catholics. Turner's second Newman—the Nietzschean skeptic about domesticity and business—will not please those who wish to be more accommodating to culture.

Avery Dulles's *Newman* ends with a comparison of Newman and Vatican II on many issues, concluding—with typical Dullesian balance—that "they often supplement each other, offering alternative perspectives that can be helpful for facing the problems of our day." Along the way, Dulles gives a more accurate reading of Newman's theology and intellectual life than Turner can.

Still, in opening up a thinker who is neither a liberal nor a conservative Catholic, Turner offers us resources for rediscovering the radical Newman. The famous Victorian convert may well be a different sort of Catholic—philosophically more Aristotelian than empiricist or idealist, more like St. Benedict's churchly monk than the leader of a sectarian coven, as much a debtor to his evangelical roots as a challenge to evangelical religion. ♦

Books in Brief

The Morality of Laughter **by F.H. Buckley (University of Michigan Press, 240 pp., $35**). Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia once began an opinion with, "I join the opinion of the Court except that portion which takes seriously, and thus encourages in the future, an argument that should be laughed out of court."

We don't laugh enough at silly ideas, says George Mason University law professor F.H. Buckley—and he doesn't just mean in the law, but also in urban planning, art, and academia in general. In *The Morality of Laughter* Buckley points to the tarps Jackson Pollock used to keep on his studio floor, which sold at astronomical prices. From splotchy art barely distinguishable from paint rags (Buckley also slights cubism, rectangles and circles, and toilet fixtures) to the erection of antihuman box-shaped buildings, bad art and architecture would not have proliferated had people been willing to laugh at it. A too-uncommon instance of corrective public laughter occurred in 1990 when "performance artist" Karen Finley, whose performance was to smear chocolate over her body to symbolize excrement, complained after she lost her NEA grant. The public howled.

"Whether they realize it or not," Buckley writes, "those who laugh are moralists, for they uphold a set of comic norms." We laugh, for example, at both misanthropy and hypocrisy, extremes on either side of integrity. Likewise, the virtue of learning is a normal point between the risible extremes of true and false pedantry. In these virtues lies laughter's conservative tendency, its signal that there is a better way to live.

Buckley also manages a few sly cracks of his own, though his prose tends to overthink its subject. How funny can it be, after all, to lay out the sociology of joke-telling and divide comic vices and virtues into categories? Nevertheless, *The Morality of Laughter* is a useful reminder that a cheery society is a healthy one.

—Beth Henary

In the Hands of the Great Spirit: The 20,000-Year History of American Indians **by Jake Page (Free Press, 464 pp., $30)**. The five hundred years of relations between Euro-Americans and American Indians are controversial of late, mostly thanks to frankly bad scholarship mired in political correctness. But now, with *In the Hands of the Great Spirit*, the former *Smithsonian* magazine editor Jake Page starts at the beginning to give a comprehensive look at the Indians' journey from the Bering Strait land bridge to Fox Woods Casino.

The pre-Columbian story in North America is fascinating, particularly the "high society" architectural achievements of the Midwest Mound Builders and the cliff-dwelling Anasazi of the Southwest. Later came the savage geopolitics of the Six Nations of the Iroquois that for two centuries would influence the struggle between England and France for North American dominance. Page covers it all, and, admirably, he does not shy away from the formerly taboo subjects of torture and cannibalism. He also dispels the New Age myth that Indians lived in harmony with the environment, citing many examples of their manipulating it for their own ends.

Once the Europeans arrive, the story is ultimately tragic, of course, but Page chronicles it dispassionately. Along the way are names as familiar as Sacagawea, Tecumseh, Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, and Geronimo. You can read here about the great battles, massacres, broken treaties, famine, disease, and the purgatory of reservation life. But Page also tells the story of the arrival of the horse on the Great Plains and the resulting golden age of the nomadic buffalo culture.

Page remains clear-eyed when writing about Indian life today, observing, "one is constantly aware that the Indian peoples have accomplished more than survival. They have, in many instances, thrived." Still, life "on the Rez" is one of poverty, political corruption, and a host of social ills, though a few improvements seem to be coming. Jake Page's well-researched history for the general reader is refreshingly free of victimology—which is exactly what makes the tragedy of its story stand forth so clearly.

—Bill Croke

Parody

Ye Newe York

VOL. -LXII . . . NO. -31,744 "ALL THE NEWES THAT FITS OUR VIEWES" NOVEMBER 11, 1781 PRICE: ONE PENNY

THREE WEEKS AFTER YORKTOWN, STILL NO CONSTITUTION READY

Hamilton, Fellow 'Neo-Federalists,' Said Eyeing Empire Across Continent

By R. Berke

BOSTON, NOV. 6 —After days of meetings, Leaders of the former Colonies still have not devised a system of Government that will stand through the Ages. And there are troubling signs that American Culture might not be compatible with Democracy. "Look at the rhetoric," observes Doris Kearns Goodwin, a Historian waiting for Television to be invented, "'Give me liberty or give me death,' 'Don't tread on me'—These are partisan, radical, and uncivil statements, not the kind consistent with Democracy."

Plotter Hamilton

'Neo-Federalist' Plan

Meeting in small Think Tanks, a group of influential intellectuals known as "Neo-Federalists" is now plotting to extend American Democracy as far west as Ohio, envisioning a vast, sprawling Nation under one system of Government. "The arrogance, the stupidity, the naivete of this Scheme is appalling," says Jessica Matthews of the Tudor Endowment for International Peace and Stability. "Who are we to impose our

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War Viewed As Disafterous By Dismayed Citizenrie

Reconstruction Costs Doom New Nation To Destitution, Obscuritie

By A. H. Clymer

BOSTON, NOV. 9 — The Cost of the recently ended Hostilities with Great Britain will consign the new American Nation to Several Centuries of Penury and Insignificance, saye Leading Observers.

Colonial Governments are

Continued, page A16

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Soap, Tub Indus Thought Likely Windfall In S

By Stephen C

BOSTON, NOV Americans who ba as often as once a more likely to avo Infestations and A the Skinne, accor Rev. Dr. A. Dean of the Yal Medical Artes.

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Analyfis

Triumph Over Britifh Empire Was Easy Part

Mayheme, Discontent Betray Hollow Victory

Desire To Return To Britifh Sovereigntye Becoming Widespread

By R.W. Apple

The easy part is over. Defeating the world's greatest Empire, enduring the winter at Valley Forge—those were simple military problems. But Nation-Building, as Geo. Washington likes to call it, is proving insurmountably difficult. Many Americans already long for a return for British

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Inside: Special 4-Page Pull-Out Section For Easy Reference & Pulitzer Submission

Ye Shattered Dream: Revolution's Grievous Wake

❖ ***Calvinists, Other Extremists Planning Theocracies***

Hopes That New Nation Might Emerge As Enlightened, Secular State Dashed As Hundreds Of Shakers March On Boston Waving Wicker Chairs, Calling For Universal Ban On Procreation

❖ ***Harvard Tutor: Sanctions 'Gainst George III Would Have Worked***

❖ ***Poll: War A Flop Among Ladies; Congrefs Faces 'Gender Breache'***

'If We Could Vote, This Would Indeed Matter,' Sayes Strident, Mannish Hillary Rodhamme

❖ ***Clog Dancing Troupe Retracts Disparagement Of Washington***

Head Clogger Regrets 'Wood-Toothed, Slave-Owning Stiff' Slur; Group Seeks To Regain Favour By Circulating Engraving Of Selves In Nightelothes

Washington: No Stiff

❖ ***Mr. Thomas Jefferson Surfaces***

Appearing Rested, Declaration Author Proclaims Self Willing To Fight—Even In Paris

❖ ***Pudding Renamed 'Freedom Pastry'***

IN THE NEWES:

Subsidies For Tobacco, Peanut Farming Announced; To Be Temporary

'Price Stabilitye Benefits The Publick As Well As The Grower,' Sayes Mr. Furd, Leading Farmer

Five Houses Planned In Field Near Boston

Right-Minded Souls Fear Unbridled 'Sprawle'

Cold Since Mid-1700s A Wood-Stove Legacy

Leading Natural Scientists Say Ice Age by 2000 A.D. A 'Certaintye'

New Jigs And Reels, Favoured By Young, Denounced As Satanic Debaucherye

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the weekly Standard

May 5, 2003