the weekly Standard

SEPTEMBER 30, 2002

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PRESENT AT THE RE-CREATION
NOEMIE EMERY

The Fog of Peace

The evasions, distractions, and miasma of the anti-war left

By David Brooks

QUICK.

PICK THE CAPSULE THAT HASN'T BEEN TAMPERED WITH.

Americans depend on the safety of their prescription drugs. But with reimported drugs, there can be no guarantee. Reimportation would weaken the consumer protections that keep counterfeit and contaminated drugs from crossing our borders. U.S. health and safety officials from the Department of Health and Human Services, the Food and Drug Administration, the Customs Service, and the Drug Enforcement Agency have warned Congress that reimportation could open America's medicine cabinets to an influx of dangerous drugs. **It's time for Congress to listen.**

OPPOSE REIMPORTATION.
KEEP BLACK MARKET DRUGS OUT OF AMERICA.

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

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the weekly Standard

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BPA INTERNATIONAL

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The Kibitzer-in-Chief

All indications are that the Democratic party's congressional leadership will soon join forces with the Bush administration in a united proclamation of American resolve to oust Saddam Hussein's terrorist regime from Baghdad—by force, and unilaterally, if necessary. Which development will be all to the good. And pretty much what's supposed to happen, in an ultimate-deference-to-presidential-foreign-policy-authority kind of way.

What's not supposed to happen, however, in any kind of way, is what former president Bill Clinton has been doing. Clinton, by dint of his "former" status and according to well-established and much-justified tradition, is either supposed to (a) offer general support for his successor's conduct of national security affairs, or (b) shut the hell up. Instead, defying this custom of presidential comportment, Clinton has spent the past couple of weeks issuing barbed stage whispers about what George W. Bush "ought" to do with respect to Iraq.

In between funnel cakes at the New York State Fair in Syracuse on September 1, Clinton publicly questioned "whether an attack now, especially if we would have to go it alone, would be a net increase in the security of the United States and our friends and allies. . . . [W]e could respond to all these things in a way that undermines the character of our nation and the future of our children."

Two days later, on CNN's *Larry King Live*, Clinton allowed that U.S. policy to remove Hussein from power is "a good one," but insisted that "we should try the arms inspection one more time" before settling on a military course of action.

Three days after that, at a California fund-raiser for Democratic Rep. Lois Capps, Clinton was significantly bolder and more explicit in his opposition to a military strike against Baghdad, warning that no such move should be taken without widespread international assent or before another U.N.-sponsored disarmament inspection has been conducted. Otherwise, the former president warned, Saddam might well start setting off chemical and biological weapons around the world: "That's what you would do if someone was coming after you."

It is?

Never mind. At another Democratic fund-raiser on September 9, this one for Rep. Jim Maloney in Connecticut, Clinton told a rapt audience of $1,000 donors that necessary global support for a U.S. fight against terrorism would be impossible so long as the Republican party maintained its current policy positions on the environment, Medicare, Social Security, education, and taxes. THE SCRAPBOOK is not making this up: "We have to lead this integrated world," Clinton argued. "We can't run it. We can't dominate it. We have to lead it. And we can't lead it in a positive way unless we are first doing the right things at home."

Granted, "former president" is a problematic job title. But it surely has more dignity than backseat driver. ♦

Loss of Faith

President Bush's faith-based initiative has been endorsed by everyone from Americans for Tax Reform to Sen. Hillary Clinton, who's a co-sponsor. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle published an op-ed in the *Rapid City Journal* praising the bill as the kind of bipartisan measure there should be more of. "I look forward to working with President Bush to get this proposal signed into law," he wrote. It passed the House in 2001 by a healthy margin.

And yet Democrats have quietly and mysteriously moved to block the bill in the Senate, where it will come to the floor this week if all goes well. The original plan was to have a two-hour debate, allow two amendments (one Democratic, one Republican), then vote. Now Sen. Jack Reed, Democrat of Rhode Island, has made clear he'll insist on multiple amendments and a prolonged debate. Daschle's office told the *New York Times* in July that he's in no hurry to bring the measure to a vote. On top of those obstacles, House Democrats who opposed the bill have been lobbying senators to back away from it. And of course People for the American Way has continued its demagogic campaign against any faith-based legislation at all.

The bill is in no way radical or revolutionary. The controversial "charitable choice" section that was part of the House bill has been dropped in the Senate version. The chief effect of the bill would be to level the playing field for religious groups in applying for government grants. No longer would they be disqualified if they displayed religious icons in their offices or had religious leaders on their boards. And the measure would allow non-itemizers to deduct up to $400 a year ($800

for couples) for their donations to religious charities.

If Democrats oppose the bill, fine. They should do so openly, not by subterfuges such as refusing to reveal the content of their amendments. In a speech last July, the president lauded Daschle for supporting the initiative. But last week, the chief Republican sponsor, Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania, noted on the Senate floor that while Daschle has promised Bush he'd bring the bill to the floor, "we are winding down to the final days of the session and that has yet to happen." Daschle is often wary of leaning on Democratic senators when they're carrying water for Democratic interest groups like PAW. But if Daschle doesn't intervene now, he'll have reneged on a promise and let an important piece of bipartisan legislation die. ♦

Fear of Flying

In the October issue of *Vogue*, supermodel Christy Turlington says that her engagement to actor/director Ed Burns was called off largely because Burns and his family were afraid to fly to Europe for their wedding after September 11. Now, The Scrapbook can think of lots of good reasons to call off this wedding: Burns's stringy greasy hair, his tiresome Irish Woody Allen shtick, the fact that the bride was scheduled to be given away by U2 singer Bono (how many pretentious Irishmen do we need at one wedding, anyway?). But for being afraid to fly? This must mean the terrorists have won. ♦

Euro-allergy

This page has consistently found the euro irritating, and we're sure you secretly agree. Admit it, you hate that it's impossible to find that annoying little symbol when you type. And the way they set the conversion rate just above the dollar when it was introduced. Not to mention that whole One-Europe thing. Which is why you'll be as amused as we were to learn that the euro has one more irritating attribute: It can cause eczema, skin irritation, and other allergic reactions, according to a new study from the University of Zurich.

Swiss scientists say at the points where the two alloys in the 1- and 2-euro coins meet, the salt in sweat can cause an electrical current. Though there is very little nickel in the coins themselves, the current corrodes the metals and more nickel is released from a single coin placed against the skin than would be released from a piece of pure nickel.

The E.U. has safety regulations (surprise!) on the nickel content in items worn close to the skin, like jewelry and watches, because nickel allergies are fairly common. The report estimates that the nickel released by a euro is 240 to 320 times the legal limit.

So it turns out that the old wives' tale is true: Itchy palms are a sign of riches. ♦

Casual

Back to the Future

A few weeks ago, as I left the house I grew up in, my stepmother remembered, as she always does, that she had "some of my things." These "things" are the treasures of my youth—my first baseball glove, letters from friends now dead, my college diploma—which are fighting a losing battle for attic space against various fruit bowls and beer coolers. This particular tranche, as I discovered on opening it in my kitchen in Washington, contained thirty-year-old pro football memorabilia and—tumbling out of a dog-eared *NFL Encyclopedia*—the first autographed picture I ever owned.

One night in 1970, my father and I were discussing football in the kitchen. He told me about his friend Jack Mattock. "Jack travels with the Cleveland Browns. Goes to all their games. Stays in the team hotel, watches their practices, that kind of thing."

The implications weren't lost on me. "Has he ever met Leroy Kelly?" I asked. Kelly was the Browns' star running back.

"I'm sure," said my dad. "He knows all those guys."

This was the first indication I'd ever had that my father was a man of such importance. He knew a guy who knew Leroy Kelly. By the next morning, every one of my second-grade classmates knew that I was the *son* of a guy who knew a guy who knew Leroy Kelly.

One night the following week, my dad came in the front door and handed me a manila envelope. "Open this," he said. It didn't dawn on me what I was looking at until I had the black-and-white photo all the way out and saw Leroy Kelly charging into the camera with the ball tucked under his arm. And then the inscription: *To my friend Chris—Leroy*. I was shocked. I was trembling with joy.

"Now, listen," my father said. "Remember to write a thank-you note."

I was lying on my bed with a pencil and a pad of lined paper within seconds. *Dear Mr. Kelly* . . . "Or is it Dr. Kelly?" I wondered. *Dear Leroy* . . . I decided to mention some of the carries I'd seen him make on *This Week in Pro Football*, just to reassure him I was as ardent a fan as he'd doubtless been told. But I couldn't lie, either. I had to

tell him my team was the Patriots, not the Browns. Should I promise to *sort of* root for the Browns? Would that be indelicate? Or insincere? By the time my father came in to kiss me goodnight it was clear I had a larger task in front of me than I had thought.

I took the finished product out to show my Dad a couple nights later. Drafted and redrafted, it was a two-page-long masterpiece of second-grade wit, openheartedness, good manners, and perfect penmanship. I waited for his compliments. Instead he said: "What's *this*?"

"It's my thank-you note."

"I meant a thank-you note to Jack Mattock!"

The thought had never—not for an instant—occurred to me. When my father saw this in my face, it threw him into a fury. "*Jesus!* Have you no *manners*?" he said. "It's *Jack* who got this thing. Leroy *Kelly* doesn't know who the hell you *are!* He signs a hundred of those things a day." He probably would have said more had I not begun sobbing inconsolably.

So my father said, oh heck, Leroy Kelly probably knew who I was. We came up with a compromise. He'd mail the note to Kelly the following morning, and I'd write one to Mr. Mattock later.

My father reminded me the following night. And the night after. But I couldn't write the note. I'd been depleted by the effort of the first one. I had no more to say. Besides, I didn't *know* Jack Mattock the way I knew Leroy Kelly—I hadn't seen him run, or heard him speak. I didn't know what he did for a living. I couldn't even picture him. He was, literally, nothing to me. Pretty soon my dad was reminding me only once a week or so, but the unwritten note poisoned my joys.

One evening months later, my father came glumly in the front door and asked, "You ever write that thank-you note to Jack Mattock?"

"I'll get right on it."

"Don't bother," my dad said. "He had a heart attack this afternoon. He died."

In my father's stricken face, I saw Jack clearly for the first time. He was my dad's friend. (I could picture them laughing together.) He had a family. (What would happen to his children?) He liked the Browns. (I could have talked about *that* in the letter.) I kept the autographed picture on my desk for a few more days. But it was now the source of such burning shame that, one night before bed, I slipped it into the gutter of my *NFL Encyclopedia*, where it would remain, unseen and forgotten, until it fell out onto my kitchen table in Washington three decades later.

For what it's worth, thank you, Jack.

Christopher Caldwell

Now, the easy part:

Vote ☑ YES

on the State Department Conference Report

The House passed its State Department Authorization Bill in May 2001, the Senate in May 2002. Last week, Members met and agreed on a conference report that will close a long and important chapter in our relations with the UN, and allow us to avoid accruing $79 million in new arrears. Now, voting "YES" is the easy part.

The State Department Conference Report will settle our past debt by paying our third and final arrears payment to the United Nations, and provide for our fair share of peacekeeping dues. These important steps will honor our commitment to the UN, and strengthen America's leadership at the world's most important international body.

Honor our commitment to the United Nations.

BETTER WORLD CAMPAIGN

[illegible]

Happy as a Pig in Print

Allow me to respond to Wesley J. Smith's "Life, Liberty, and a Mudhole to Lie In" (Sept. 16), on the Florida ballot initiative to let voters decide if mother pigs should be allowed to nuzzle and interact with their babies.

Presently, mother pigs are confined to crates that do not allow them to touch their babies. The babies can only stick their heads through the bars of their mothers' crates to suckle their nipples. They are then removed much earlier than nature intended, so the mothers can be reimpregnated, leaving the immobilized mothers moaning and crying for their babies.

In John Robbins's Pulitzer-nominated book *Diet for a New America*, he tells of one factory farmer who said, with tears in his eyes, "It just tears me up, some of the things we are doing to these animals. These pigs never hurt anybody, but we treat them like, like, like I don't know what. Nothing in the world deserves this kind of treatment. It's a shame. It's a crying shame."

I urge Smith and others to see the reality of factory farming on their computers at *PETATV.com*. Click on "Meet Your Meat" and also on the pig farm investigations. Here, PETA exposes the factory farmers' dirty secrets.

Carla Bennett
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
Norfolk, VA

Wesley J. Smith's dismissive argument against a Florida initiative to combat animal cruelty on industrial farms is stunning in its misrepresentations. He seems not to have read the measure itself, but only the literature of the pork industry. He inaccurately states that the measure targets "farrowing crates," which, he says, "prevent mother pigs from accidentally rolling on and crushing their offspring." The truth is, the measure only bans "gestation crates," tiny two by seven foot cages in which sows are confined for pregnancy after pregnancy. The cages are so small the pregnant animals cannot turn around, and they develop terrible physical and psychological problems.

In an attempt to codify this most basic humane standard—allowing sows to turn around freely—the initiative adds one simple provision to Florida's 38,000-word constitution, which already contains provisions dealing with the lottery, fish and wildlife protection, and mass transit. The idea that Florida's constitution deals with only basic human rights, as Smith asserts, is false, and even a cursory glance at it reveals that fact.

Wayne Pacelle
Humane Society of the United States
Washington, DC

In "Life, Liberty, and a Mudhole to Lie In," Wesley J. Smith describes quite clearly why the Florida initiative banning farrowing crates is indeed about more than just a cruel animal husbandry

practice. But his claim that a state's constitution should be concerned only with human rights is not founded on anything but his own prejudice.

He quotes Florida's constitution to say that it was established to "perfect our government, insure domestic tranquility, maintain public order, and guarantee equal civil and political rights."

It doesn't mention that we need only guarantee these rights for humans! In fact, when it was written, it was primarily a guarantee of the rights of white men who owned land. I'm sure many people at that time would have felt equally outraged at such an initiative if it had been aimed at qualifying just how we should house and treat our human slaves. Thank goodness our society has evolved since those days and we now universally regard (at least legally) the rights of all humans to be equal. I wonder if it was extremist groups with, as Smith says, a "radical agenda" such as, say, the abolition of slavery, that helped bring about this evolution in thinking? Perhaps we could use *more* radical thinking in this day and age.

As Schopenhauer said, all truth passes through three stages: First it is ridiculed. Second it is violently opposed. Third it is accepted as being self-evident.

Mark von Schlemmer
Baldwin City, KS

Wesley J. Smith responds: The crates in question are indeed gestation crates rather than farrowing crates. But for the purposes of my article, that is a distinction without a scintilla of difference. As many of the other letters sent in response to my piece clearly demonstrate, the true radical agenda in this initiative is to include animals as beneficiaries of constitutional rights.

In this regard, it is worth noting that Florida already has statutes that prohibit animal abuse. Indeed, the initiative explicitly states that the constitutional right of pregnant pigs that would be created if it should pass will be enforced as if the constitutional provision were contained in an already existing anti-cruelty statute.

Moreover, should pregnant pigs be granted the constitutional right to have sufficient space to turn around, any further changes that might be required to the law could also require a constitutional amendment, further enmeshing animals into human constitutional processes. As stated in the article, this seems to be the true point of the enterprise.

As to the letter from the PETA representative: Let us not be fooled. PETA does not believe that humans should be allowed to engage in animal husbandry. Indeed, many animal rightists take the misanthropic position that pig farming and cattle ranching are akin morally to holding human slaves. As to consuming information presented by PETA on any subject involving the human use of animals, caveat emptor.

Mark von Schlemmer's letter proves my point quite well, for which I thank him.

The declaration of independence.



Jackie worked hard for this moment. She paid off her student loans, saved enough for a down payment, and got her financing from a mortgage lender whose funds came from selling the mortgage to Freddie Mac. Our ready supply of mortgage funds drives down mortgage rates by roughly half a percent, saving the average homebuyer $1,000 on a $150,000 loan. Which was just enough to bring Jackie home. Our efforts to reduce mortgage rates make it possible for 700,000 more people to own homes. And that helps us create a nation of homeowners. For details, visit freddiemac.com

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In conclusion, I did not write in support of gestation crates, about which I am agnostic. However, *if* these crates are inhumane, they should be outlawed by statute. Pigs should not have constitutionally enforceable rights in the same way that people do. Making pregnant pigs explicit holders of rights blurs the crucial distinction between humans and animals. The degradation of humans can be resisted and animals can still be protected from abuse.

Be Fruitful and Multiply

Nicholas Eberstadt rightly argues in "Population Sense and Nonsense" (Sept. 16) that the central premise of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, is itself unsustainable. The participants argue that man, particularly capitalist man, is draining the Earth's resources.

Nightmare scenarios regarding overpopulation have made the rounds since Thomas Malthus predicted in 1798 that overpopulation would outstrip England's food supply and the British Empire would literally starve to death.

Similar nonsense was expressed in Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb* (1968), which warned: "In the 1970s, the world will undergo famine—hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked on now." Today, one of the major problems America faces is not famine, but obesity.

Malthusian thinking fails to grasp that human beings are the ultimate resource, that with more bodies come more minds that create more ideas. Neither Malthus or Ehrlich could envision the advances in medicine, science, technology, and biotechnology that would tame disease, increase the food supply at exponential rates, find new resources, or create new substitutes.

For example, predicted copper shortages never materialized because someone decided to replace old-fashioned phone wires with fiber-optic cables. Similarly, in agriculture the plowhorse was mechanized out of existence, as pesticides and fertilizers and now genetic engineering have created such abundance that we actually pay farmers not to grow food.

The view that human beings are inexorably outstripping the globe's capacity to sustain them is one of the most vivid, powerful, and enduring economic myths of the modern era because the chicken littles who argue it forget one simple fact—with bodies come minds. We are not cattle that graze until there is no grass. Our species, unlike all others, can consciously apply problem-solving techniques to the project of expanding its resource base. Minds matter economically as much as hands and mouths. And minds arrive only in company with bodies. Be fruitful and multiply.

Daniel John Sobieski
Chicago, IL

Germanophobia?

It is hard to understand what motivated The Weekly Standard to publish such an anti-German diatribe as "Ja wohl mein General Inspector" (The Scrapbook, Sept. 16). Under the pseudo-guise of anti-Nazi concerns, the piece is without any basis. The text reeks of anti-German venom. The London *Times* never got the story straight because they either did not read or intentionally distorted the statement by German defense minister Peter Struck on August 26, 2002.

In contrast to The Scrapbook's uncalled for and false insinuations about recreating the General Staff, the General Inspector would have in the future only larger responsibilities for Bundeswehr planning. He will be the chairman of the newly established council for the employment of the Bundeswehr. This body will be responsible for decisions on planning, preparation, and execution of the employment of the Bundeswehr. The Commander of the Employment Command Staff (EinsFueKdo) will be subordinate to the General Inspector only in questions of the employment of the German armed forces.

These changes have been in the works for about two years. They were the result of increased planning and coordination requirements for the Bundeswehr employment on various peacekeeping missions overseas. Hence, it is reprehensible to imply a latent rising of Nazi-like inclinations in the German military.

Besides the pointless insinuations, there were quite a number of avoidable errors in the short piece. First, the position of the General Inspector (GI) is not new, but dates from the creation of the Bundeswehr in 1956.

Second, there was never a position called "Chief of the General Staff and High Command" in the German army. Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke Sr. and his successors until 1918 were Chiefs of the Great General Staff. When Hitler created the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht—OKW) in February 1938, he abolished the Ministry of War. He himself took the title "Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces." Wilhelm Keitel became then "Chief of the OKW," not Chief of the General Staff. OKW was de facto Hitler's personal staff. Keitel was Hitler's executive officer in the administration of the Wehrmacht and in carrying out Hitler's policies and plans. After February 1938, and until the end of the war, the post of Chief of General Staff of the Army continued to exist. Von Moltke, Hindenburg, and Keitel did not occupy the same positions as you asserted.

Also, the correct pronunciation for "Yes, Sir" is "Jawohl" not "Ja wohl."

One has to wonder whether the editor of The Scrapbook slept on his watch or if he was just blinded by his knee-jerk Germanophobia.

Milan Vego
Naval War College
Newport, RI

• • •

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welcomes letters to the editor.
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the weekly Standard

A Winning Strategy

What follows is excerpted from "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," submitted by the president to Congress on Friday, September 20. (The full text is available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.*) The document expresses so well so much of what* THE WEEKLY STANDARD *has argued for over the last seven years that it seemed appropriate, this week, to let George W. Bush speak for the editors.*

Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. By making the world safer, we allow the people of the world to make their own lives better. We will defend this just peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent. . . . The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.

DEFEATING TERRORISM

Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror—because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization. The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn.

The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq's designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world's principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD [weapons of mass destruction] arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations.

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.

Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes proactive counterproliferation efforts. We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities—detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities—are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland security systems. Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.

DETERRENCE AND PREEMPTION

In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile

crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is far less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.

In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.

Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.

Alliances

We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions. In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.

In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment, and interests of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require. When we disagree on particulars, we will explain forthrightly the grounds for our concerns and strive to forge viable alternatives. We will not allow such disagreements to obscure our determination to secure together, with our allies and our friends, our shared fundamental interests and values.

Military Strength

It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our military's highest priority is to defend the United States. To do so effectively, our military must: assure our allies and friends; dissuade future military competition; deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.

The unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and their forward presence, have maintained the peace in some of the world's most strategically vital regions. However, the threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces.

We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from experience that some enemies cannot be deterred. The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy—whether a state or non-state actor—to impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces sufficient to support our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.

Defending Freedom

Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person—in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and it has been tested by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom's triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission. ♦

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

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Where Incumbents Tremble . . .

In Iowa, a "good government" reform actually works. **BY FRED BARNES**

Cedar Rapids, Iowa

REPUBLICAN JIM LEACH of Iowa is the rarest of exceptions in the 2002 midterm election—a House incumbent facing a stiff challenge for reelection. In the first congressional election after reapportionment, you'd normally expect rough-and-tumble competition in House races. But 2002 is anything but normal, except in Iowa with its unique system of redistricting. Amazingly, Iowa has more competitive House contests than Illinois, California, and Texas combined. And this in a year when nearly as many Senate seats are up for grabs—maybe a dozen—as House seats. That's a dozen out of 34 Senate seats at stake this year. All 435 House seats are up.

The distinguishing feature of the 2002 election is shameless incumbent protection. More incumbents will probably lose in primaries than in the general election on November 5. Iowa alone has shaken up its entire House delegation. House seats were gerrymandered by Republicans in three states (Florida, Pennsylvania, Michigan) and by Democrats in two (Georgia, Maryland). This will force a half-dozen incumbents out of office in 2002, while making virtually every seat safe for one party or the other in the next four House elections of the decade. In the other 44 states, incumbent protection has reigned. And it's not because voters demanded House members be assured of easy reelection. Rather, politicians—in some cases, as few as two party leaders, one Republican, one Democrat—got together and protected their own. Voters and even state legislatures were not involved.

The result: strikingly reduced competition in House races. This, of course, is exactly what House members sought, and so has the Bush White House, which is eager for Republicans to keep control of the House. The sharp turn toward incumbent protection represented a victory in another fight as well. For three decades, a populist campaign has been waged to inject into American politics more competition, more grassroots candidates, and more turnover of seats. Most incumbents, given their interest in keeping their jobs, are opposed. In the 1990s, they staved off the drive to impose term limits. Now, through redistricting, they've moved closer to giving themselves life tenure.

What's wrong with this? Almost everything. Money may be the mother's milk of politics, but competition is the lifeblood of good governance, particularly conservative governance. Competition requires members of Congress to keep in close touch with their constituents, who in most states tend to be conservative. It produces new faces and hastens the flow of new ideas to Washington. It combats the tendency of incumbents to become representatives of Washington to their districts, rather than the other way around. It makes it harder for lobbyists and special interests to develop lifelong relationships with members of Congress. In short, it makes Congress more representative.

Iowa, alone among the 50 states, has found a way to thwart this by maximizing competition for House seats. In the 1970s, the state legislature created the Legislative Research Bureau (LRB) to handle reapportionment every 10 years. Its rules allow only one factor to be taken into account—counties. They can't be broken up. Party registration and history and incumbency—those don't count. "It's a change oriented, anti-incumbent oriented system, and that's basically healthy and that's why I support it," says Leach, first elected in 1976, the only Republican to defeat an incumbent Democrat that year. The legislature can reject an LRB plan, and it did so with the first one for 2002. But the system is popular, and the legislature went along with the second version.

The LRB produced five entirely new House seats for 2002. Iowa lost its sixth seat because of the census, but one incumbent, Republican Greg Ganske, is running for the Senate against Democrat Tom Harkin, so his seat was cannibalized. Of the five new districts, four are competitive this year, three with Republican incumbents, one with a Democrat. The fifth, in western Iowa, is safely Republican. Democrat Leonard Boswell had to move to Des Moines from rural Iowa, but no one was more affected than Leach.

At the time the new lines were drawn last year, Leach was a power in Congress, having just stepped down as chairman of the House Banking Committee. His hometown of Davenport had always been in his district.

Fred Barnes is executive editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

Neither of these mattered to the LRB. Worse, he was thrown into a district with a Republican colleague, Jim Nussle, that contained 70 percent of Nussle's old district and only 30 percent of Leach's. Next door was a vacant district, but it had the most Democratic voting record of any in Iowa. George Bush got less than 43 percent there in 2000. "I had a choice of having a pretty tough primary, retiring, or moving," Leach says. He moved to Iowa City, forcing his daughter to switch high schools.



Leach, 59, is hardly a stranger in the district. He represented the new counties before the LRB drastically altered the districts after the 1990 census. But he has real disadvantages. He's a top target of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. He faces an attractive and well-known Democrat, Cedar Rapids pediatrician Julie Thomas, 57. Not surprisingly, she loves Iowa's way of reapportionment. "It's good to stir the pot every 10 years," she says. "Incumbents have so much power that to get a new voice, a fresh face, it takes this kind of system." She'll outspend Leach, who doesn't take PAC money or out of state contributions.

Okay, now compare the districts in Iowa with those in neighboring Illinois (see maps). Iowa's are compact and reasonably homogenous. They make sense. They're honestly arrived at. In Illinois, the districts look like a collection of toads and snakes. They're neither compact nor geographically logical. The nonpartisan Iowa system, says state Republican chairman Chuck Larson, "brings a higher degree of credibility." That's putting it mildly. The Illinois scheme smacks of insider dealing to protect the seats of incumbents.

Indeed, that's precisely what happened in Illinois. Two Illinois House members, Republican Speaker Dennis Hastert and Democrat William Lipinski, drafted the new map. The role of the governor, the state legislature, a special redistricting commission? Zilch. Hastert is a close friend of the state's most powerful Democrat, Chicago mayor Richard Daley, who handed redistricting off to Lipinski. The census took one seat away from Illinois, and initially it was to be Democrat Rod Blagojevich's on Chicago's North Side. Blagojevich is the Democratic nominee for governor. But Chicago, it turned out, had gained in population (Hispanics mainly), so the seat came out of southern Illinois, where Democrat David Phelps was forced to run against a GOP incumbent, John Shimkus, who's favored to win.

The new plan is the first bipartisan redistricting of House seats in Illinois. And you might think that's a step forward. In fact, it simply means the fix was in. Incumbents in marginal seats got better seats. Republican Jerry Weller's old seat voted 45 percent for Bush in 2000. His new one went 51 percent for Bush. Democrat Lane Evans, often a GOP target, got a slightly less Republican district—from 46 percent Bush to 45 percent.

In California, incumbent protection was even more blatant. Karl Rove, the White House political director, was deeply involved. Rove told Jim Brulte, the GOP leader in the state senate, that Republicans would have a far better chance of holding the House in 2002 if all 19 Republican seats in California were protected. Brulte agreed. Republicans, fearing they'd otherwise lose 4 to 6 seats, proposed to cooperate with Democrats, who control the governor's office and both legislative houses. Democrats seemingly had nothing to gain from this—except Republicans had a

weapon, the referendum process. In the 1980s, they'd won voter approval of a referendum upsetting Democratic redistricting. If necessary, Rove told California Republicans, the White House would help on a referendum.

None was needed. Democrats reluctantly went along. As in Illinois, a few pols approved a new map drawn by Democratic consultant Michael Berman. Republicans swapped a seat that had become strongly Democratic in voter registration, Rep. Steve Horn's in Long Beach, for a safe GOP seat in the Central Valley. Horn retired. The endangered GOP seats of David Dreier, Mary Bono, and Elton Gallegly were made solidly Republican. The marginal Democratic seats of Jane Harman, Lois Capps, and Susan Davis got more Democratic. In the end, Republicans wound up with 20 seats, a gain of one, and an outcome helpful in keeping GOP control of the House. "By taking California off the table," says Brulte, "we shrunk the number of competitive seats and minimized the chances of the other side gaining seats."

Virginia was the flip side of California: Republicans brushed aside a bold plan to gain a seat and instead protected incumbents. Former governor Jim Gilmore had talked about chopping up the heavily Democratic, inside-the-Beltway district of Jim Moran and shifting its parts to more Republican districts. Republicans, who held the legislature and governorship, balked. Instead, they fashioned for Republican Randy Forbes, who'd narrowly won a special election in a formerly Democratic seat last year, a district with a better GOP tilt. They did the same for Republican Jo Ann Davis. The fallout: Democrat Moran was not only spared, his district became more Democratic than ever.

In Illinois, California, and Virginia, the outcome of the midterm congressional elections was decided the year before, and decided not by voters but by a few men in a room. It's been argued that the return of incumbents insures an experienced, wise, and stable House next year. A better description might be cynical, compromised, and entrenched. The goal of the Iowa system, however, is to produce a different kind of House member, and maybe it will work. Leach, a moderate in a moderate state, is a slight favorite to win in his new district. Even if he's returned to Washington, there's one thing he won't feel, and that's entrenched. ♦

A Bush Nominee Ted Kennedy Likes

Why Michael McConnell may make it to the federal bench. **BY TERRY EASTLAND**

LAST WEEK, the Senate Judiciary Committee took up the nomination of Michael McConnell to a seat on the Tenth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Toward the end of the hearing, Sen. Edward Kennedy, who had missed much of the session and was only now engaging the nominee, thanked McConnell for counsel he had provided the committee in the past in drafting legislation. Kennedy cited two occasions. McConnell then reminded Kennedy of a third time he had lent the committee his legal services. Acknowledging the point, an amused Kennedy commented, "We don't want to go over the top on this." As laughter filled the hearing room, committee chairman Patrick Leahy pointed to the place where the Republican members sit and reminded McConnell, "You have to get votes over there, too."

When the committee does vote—possibly in November, after the election—McConnell can count on all nine of the votes "over there." But will he also get the support of at least one Democrat, needed to send his nomination to the Senate floor?

To judge by the hearing, the answer appears to be yes. As the pleasantries of Kennedy and Leahy suggest, the Democrats were friendly, and McConnell was at ease with them. The Democrats had their disagreements with the nominee, but seldom expressed them with the kind of edge that signals serious confirmation trouble. Indeed, the likelihood is that more than a few Democrats will vote for him.

Terry Eastland is publisher of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

It's fair to ask why McConnell's prospects seem so good. Committee Democrats have tended to hold hearings relatively quickly for circuit nominees they regard as more "moderate" and to confirm them, but to delay hearings for those they deem more "conservative." Delay was the experience of a group announced in May 2001, including Fifth Circuit nominees Charles Pickering and Priscilla Owen, both of whom were eventually given hearings, then rejected 10-to-9 by the committee on party-line votes. McConnell was another in that group. After waiting 16 months for his hearing, would he become the third Bush circuit nominee to go down to defeat?

Michael McConnell

Darren Gygi

Until the hearing, that seemed possible. The liberal interest groups came out strongly against McConnell, and it was easy to see why. On issues of legal interpretation and the role of the courts, McConnell holds conservative views. A graduate of the Chicago Law School and now a professor at the University of Utah College of Law, he is one of the nation's most accomplished legal scholars (and has been published in these pages). He is also a skilled appellate lawyer with impressive Supreme Court wins. To the extent the High Court has become less hostile and more accommodating to religion in public life, you can credit McConnell as much as anyone.

And then there are McConnell's views on abortion. Throughout his career he has been critical of the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence. Moreover, he has opposed abortion on moral grounds and supports a constitutional amendment that would extend the right to life to the unborn.

At the hearing, the Democrats queried McConnell on religious liberty, federalism, the new campaign finance law, and the duties of a judge. But mostly they asked about abortion. They asked about his views on *Roe* v. *Wade*, the 1973 case declaring the abortion right; *Griswold* v. *Connecticut*, the 1965 case announcing the unenumerated right of privacy that the *Roe* Court would later maintain included the abortion right; and *Planned Parenthood* v. *Casey*, the 1992 case holding that the abortion right is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Addressing the various opinions in those decisions, McConnell observed that Justice John Marshall Harlan's account of privacy in *Griswold* was "the most successful" in that case, that the opinions for the *Roe* majority were "analytically weak," and that *Casey* at least did a better job than earlier decisions of linking the abortion right "to traditional legal materials."

The Democratic questioners came

out the worse in these exchanges. Senator John Edwards, for example, did not seem to know that McConnell's criticisms of *Griswold* and *Roe* are well within the legal mainstream. Nor did it appear to have occurred to Edwards or Sen. Maria Cantwell that there might be anything problematic about extending the *Griswold* privacy right to include the abortion liberty, as the Court did in *Roe*. McConnell patiently explained that in *Griswold* the privacy right involved only the person asserting the right, whereas in *Roe* the privacy right just might have involved "something on the other side." It finally dawned on Cantwell: "You mean," she said haltingly, "the right of the fetus?"

At times the hearing seemed like a tutorial on abortion law, with McConnell as teacher. But throughout he emphasized that the abortion liberty is "well-settled" in constitutional law, and that as a lower court judge he would be obligated to enforce the High Court's decisions. While he didn't back away from his policy views on abortion—"I do believe the state should extend protection to the fetus," he said—he emphasized that "whatever constitutional amendment I might favor has nothing to do with how I would enforce the law." Indeed, enforcing the law and only the law was the theme McConnell pressed throughout the hearing, seldom provoking a Democratic demurral.

So it seems that McConnell will go through. Why, is less clear. Maybe some behind-the-scenes deal was struck. Or maybe he'll go through because Sen. Orrin Hatch, his chief sponsor, successfully pleaded his case. Or maybe it's simply because the Democrats, having worked with McConnell in the past, respect and like him. Or maybe it's because so many liberal law professors—including Chicago's Cass Sunstein, who has advised the Democrats on judges—have vouched for him. He's "conservative but not an ideologue," they say, citing his "unpredictable views." McConnell opposed the Clinton impeachment and was critical of some aspects of *Bush* v. *Gore*. He differs with Justice Antonin Scalia on certain religious liberty questions and on the recent school prayer cases.

Something could happen to derail McConnell's nomination. You can bet the liberal groups opposing him haven't laid down their arms. But if McConnell is confirmed, he could turn out to be the right kind of judge—one who doesn't substitute his own views for the law. That, not incidentally, was the problem with *Roe* v. *Wade*, and McConnell has obviously absorbed its negative teaching. As he told the committee, "I have the ambition not to have an agenda but to be a model rule-of-law judge." ♦

Pataki Versus the Résumé

Can a Republican still win in New York?

BY JAMES HIGGINS

AMAZINGLY, in a state that Al Gore carried in 2000 by 1.7 million votes, the gubernatorial race in New York this year long looked to be a walkover for the Republican incumbent. Not only did Gov. George Pataki benefit from public unity following 9/11, but the Democratic party started the year ready to nominate Andrew Cuomo, the electorally untested former Clinton housing secretary and son of former three-term governor Mario Cuomo. Since then, the race has taken some unexpected turns.

For one thing, Andrew Cuomo is out of the picture. At first, his strengths had seemed impressive. He knows New York well from his days dispensing HUD pork and from his earlier time as his father's chief political operative. He is an effective fundraiser and was presumed to enjoy the reflected glamour of his wife, RFK daughter Kerry Kennedy Cuomo. But on the campaign trail, his personal abrasiveness overshadowed any message. Many voters came to share the view of Sol Wachtler, a pro-Mario Cuomo Republican and former chief judge of the state's highest court: "Andrew has many of his father's bad qualities and very few of the good ones."

Favorable through all of 2001 and most of 2002, Cuomo's poll numbers buckled as the September 10 primary neared. The Clintons, who had remained neutral for much of the race, apparently decided late in August that their best bet for victory in November was Cuomo's opponent, Carl McCall. Hillary Clinton gave Cuomo a surprise stick in the eye by appearing publicly with McCall over Labor Day weekend and not appearing with Cuomo. Cuomo quit the race with only a week to go, handing McCall an uncontested win.

McCall is a classic résumé candidate: former state senator, U.S. representative at the U.N., board of education president, bank vice president, and now state comptroller—the first African American elected statewide in New York. Sixty-six years old, McCall had waited patiently for his turn to run, then built his support among Democratic organizations club by club and county by county. McCall faces the same question that so many résumé candidates face: Why exactly is he running? The ex-divinity student is a charismatic speaker, but the it's-my-turn premise of his bid brings

James Higgins is a partner in a private equity firm in New York.

to mind another patient seeker of higher office, Bob Dole.

McCall's running mate, perennial office-seeker Dennis Mehiel, offers comic relief. A businessman and Democratic chairman in the Clintons' adopted county of Westchester, Mehiel made news in August as New York's answer to Democratic sugar daddy Steve Bing. It turned out that Mehiel had fathered at least two children by two different women while married to a third. That this behavior might set a bad example did not disturb Democrats, who instead focused on the quality that Clintonian Democrats most value: money. Mehiel funded most of his own primary campaign.

Together, the McCall-Mehiel team seems a political version of the *Lethal Weapon* buddy-movies: the African-American politician from the inner city grown up careful, responsible, and professional; and his white suburban sidekick, a self-promoting roving inseminator bursting with self-esteem.

Before Cuomo's implosion, Democrats lived with a sense of impending disaster. Many recognized that an Andrew Cuomo primary victory would trigger an exodus of African-American voters. Even Rep. Charles Rangel made early noises about voting for Pataki in a race against Cuomo. Such a racial schism among Democrats had played a major part in defeating Mark Green in the 2001 election for mayor of New York City. Now Democrats' hope is restored, not just because McCall leads a unified party but because a skunk has appeared at Pataki's garden party in the form of Rochester businessman B. Thomas Golisano, the founder of Paychex.

If you have a small number of employees, there's a good chance that Golisano's company draws up your paychecks and prepares your payroll tax returns. Golisano is the nominee of a Felliniesque political organization called the Independence party. The nuances of New York's minor parties could fill an entire issue of this magazine, but the crucial fact to know is that the state's impenetrable election laws make it advantageous to a candidate to be the nominee of as many parties as possible.

George Pataki

Thomas Fluharty

Golisano competed in two primaries (Independence and Conservative), considered securing a third line on the ballot by petition, and reportedly negotiated with a fourth party (the Liberals). The outcome of the Conservative primary is still uncertain, but Golisano won the Independence primary, having spent about $3,000 per vote to do so. That isn't a typo. He spent almost $30 million and got slightly more than 9,000 votes. Much of Golisano's advertising touts his business acumen. The balance trashes Pataki.

Golisano is making his third run against Pataki. Each time, he has defined himself by whatever Pataki is not. In 1994, Pataki ran as an undiluted conservative on most issues. Golisano ran to his left. In the 1998 race, Golisano ran as an anti-incumbent reformer. Now, Golisano is trying to run to Pataki's right. Such a citizen-businessman-flake would be of small consequence except that he may spend a total of $100 million on the race.

Golisano's standing among conservatives and Republicans has not been helped by the revelation that his team includes both Roger Stone, the Roy Cohn protégé who tried in 2000 to recruit Donald Trump to run against George W. Bush, and Emily Lenzner, a daughter of Terry Lenzner, who headed what Dick Morris calls the Clintons' "secret police."

Golisano seems less like a serious candidate than like the children's-book character Old Sneep: With no real role in a homecoming parade, Old Sneep tries to ruin the day by sucking on lemons in full view of the marching band's brass section, causing them to pucker up and rendering them unable to continue the parade.

Golisano's campaign may set the New York standard not just for spending but for weirdness. Daniel Mahony, Golisano's Conservative party running mate of choice, left the state and took the Fifth Amendment in ballot access hearings after the *New York Post* published evidence that

Mahony had registered and voted twice in several elections.

That contretemps might have ended with the primary, but in the days after the primary, New York's Conservative party suggested that Golisano's campaign committees might have made illegal contributions to the campaigns of Mahony and of William Neild, Golisano's preferred running mate in the Independence primary.

According to Paul Windels, an attorney with years of experience navigating New York's Talmudic election laws, loans to those candidates had to be repaid by primary day or be classified as contributions—potentially subjecting the donor to *criminal* penalties if the loans exceeded the legal limit for donations. So far Golisano has not said whether he or his committees were repaid.

In almost all normal situations, prosecutors would ignore such "loans" because of the difficulty of proving that the failure to repay resulted from anything but the candidate's excessive optimism about his prospects. But is this a normal situation? The Golisano campaign will almost certainly set a new spending record, and several media outlets have reported that the Manhattan district attorney is scrutinizing Mahony for his alleged double voting.

Amidst the electoral chaos, the man still in the driver's seat is George E. Pataki. With slightly rumpled suits, disorderly hair, and an asymmetrical smile, Pataki appears the un-pol. His informal demeanor is the antithesis of the smug certainty that defined predecessors Nelson Rockefeller and Mario Cuomo. The biggest problem facing both McCall and Golisano may be that few voters anywhere on the spectrum dislike Pataki.

Pataki has never lost an election, and he has won every office he has ever held by defeating the incumbent. With crime and taxes down on his watch, and with a capital punishment statute enacted soon after he entered office, a less-skilled politician would have put himself at risk of obsolescence, having disposed of the issues that got him elected. But Pataki reached out to Hispanics, now the largest minority in New York City. The governor came out early for closing the Navy bombing range in Vieques, Puerto Rico, irritating some conservatives but enraging Democrats, who wanted the issue to themselves. Pataki then got personal credit when his college classmate and friend George W. Bush sided with him and announced that Vieques would be closed.

The loudest screams of Democratic political pain came when Pataki agreed to give the health and hospital workers' union, Service Employees 1199, a generous new contract. The union is 250,000 strong, heavily minority, and in the view of many the best organized political force in the state. Union president Dennis Rivera, a hero with his members for bringing home the contract, delivered the union's endorsement of the governor.

Democrats denounced the contract as a crass giveaway. But it was a political masterstroke by both Pataki and Rivera. And it was no easy thing for Pataki to accomplish. The leadership of many other unions in New York, notably the teachers' union, is so deeply attached to the Democrats' extreme positions on racial quotas, partial-birth abortion, and other social issues that it is inconceivable they could support a Republican no matter what that Republican did for the union's rank and file.

Pataki's lead in the polls has slimmed from an unsustainable 30 points to the mid-teens, with Pataki in the high 40s, McCall in the mid 30s, and Golisano struggling to break into double digits. Pataki had a large edge over McCall in cash on hand, with $20 million on primary day to $2.5 million for McCall. That advantage will narrow now that the Clintons have given McCall their blessing. The wild card is Golisano, with his anti-Pataki fulminations. Even Old Sneep in the end decided the spoiler's role was no fun and gave up being a lone grouch. Will Golisano do the same? ♦

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Currying Favor with Washington

Is this the beginning of a beautiful U.S.-India friendship? BY MELANA ZYLA VICKERS

New Delhi

WHILE PRESIDENT BUSH was meeting with Indian prime minister A.B. Vajpayee at the United Nations recently, back in New Delhi a Sikh pilot of Soviet-made fighter aircraft, sporting a turban, beard, and substantial handlebar mustache, was regaling American cocktail party guests with an account of his most recent U.S. trip. The senior officer had gone gambling in Las Vegas, netting a steady $200 per night and attracting a gaggle of followers fascinated by the winning streak he credited to his crafty "Indian mind." But a few nights of American glitz was all the pilot could afford on his rupee-denominated salary, and he'd soon quit the high-rollers for the safety of his native shores.

The pilot's cautious American fling may be an apt analogy for current U.S.-India relations: The new partnership seems to be a winning combination, so long as the powerful United States can stay alert to India's fear of getting burned.

In the aftermath of last September 11, the Bush administration moved firmly to strengthen relations with the democracy of one billion people that neighbors such hotspots as Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the Arabian Sea. Within weeks of the terrorist attacks, President Bush had waived sanctions that the Clinton administration and Congress had imposed after India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices in 1998. Bush's lifting of the sanctions immediately freed Delhi from what had become Washington's single-issue obsession with India's nuclear-power status, a myopic stance that had earned the Clintonites the moniker, among Indians, of "non-proliferation ayatollahs." India, for its part, rallied to Washington's side after the terrorist attacks. Prime Minister Vajpayee even offered to lead some efforts to stamp out terrorism. The show of friendship served to burnish an image already improved by India's moves, in the 1990s, to dump its 50-year attachment to Moscow and to socialist economics. By February of this year, U.S. ambassador to India Robert Blackwill was saying that President Bush seeks "to intensify collaboration with India" in a way that's "consistent with the rise of India as a great power."

The American and Indian militaries have seen their missions converge. But this closeness has not yet made for political warmth.

In the ensuing year, military-to-military ties in particular have flourished. What's more, they go beyond joint defense exercises and training, to substantive cooperation on policy. Consider that India's navy has taken on a partnership with the Americans that is unique in the world: Since the spring of 2002, it has patrolled jointly with the U.S. Navy the waters from its shores all the way up through the Strait of Malacca—ensuring safe passage for commercial vessels that carry the bulk of world trade. Indian and American boosters of the new partnership posit that in the future, Indian vessels may accompany American ones on patrols of the Persian Gulf as well, to protect their oil interests.

The two countries' defense establishments seem to recognize their extensive common interests. Wherever one casts an eye—warily, to nuclear-armed China, where the regime is actively seeking to extend the reach of the People's Liberation Army into the shipping lanes of southeast and southwest Asia; uneasily, to Afghanistan and nuclear-armed Pakistan, where leaders friendly to the United States are at constant risk of being violently deposed; or to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, where fuel tankers need strong protection—the American and Indian militaries have missions that converge, and that are now the subject of regular discussions between them.

The trouble is that this newfound military closeness is not matched by commensurate political warmth. Indian officials see the State Department as being so preoccupied with stroking Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf—who truly is vital to the war on al Qaeda—that it won't risk any dealings with India that could offend Islamabad. A case in point: Earlier this year, a high-level Indian military delegation proposed to Washington that India, having pulled off the rare feat of building a united, multi-ethnic armed force, advise the Afghans on how to build their own multi-ethnic military. The idea went nowhere, even though India has the world's second biggest Muslim population and has had good relations with Afghanistan for decades. Pakistan would go ballistic if India had a large presence in Afghanistan.

The State Department's skittishness may be somewhat unwarranted, but it will continue until India and Pakistan can improve their relations, poisoned by the violent politics of disputed Kashmir. It's encouraging, therefore, that India has responded to

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pressure from Washington by holding elections in the territory, due to be completed in early October. If the elections are relatively calm and turnout is fair, Washington will be able to nudge the two countries toward talks. If instead the South Asian enmity continues, or the State Department remains overly cautious, the emergent United States-India relationship will be prevented from deepening. If ever there were a love triangle in foreign policy, Washington-Delhi-Islamabad is it.

India has more to lose than the United States should their new ties weaken. Indian officials are forever reminding their American interlocutors that they're new at this, and they don't want to get burned. Already, Prime Minister Vajpayee faces domestic criticism for abandoning leftist India's precious policy of "nonalignment." If India can't point to clear benefits from its U.S. relationship—an increase in international prestige, or growing trade, or assistance in acquiring high-tech military equipment—the critics will howl more loudly, putting the ruling party at risk in the next elections.

Tangible benefits are beginning to flow: The United States sold India advanced weapon-locating radars this year, and the Bush-Vajpayee talks last week cleared the way for more cooperation in space, civil nuclear energy, and advanced technology, according to a U.S. Embassy spokesman. Nevertheless, some observers have concluded that Washington already shows signs of loosening the embrace it tendered in the fall of 2001.

"The sense that U.S. policies are unpredictable is a very strong one in Delhi," says Lt. Gen. (Ret.) V.R. Raghavan, a former director-general of military operations who now heads a think tank called the Delhi Policy Group. Rather than a lasting partnership, India's relationship with the United States "can only be a patron-client relationship," he says, adding, "They will dump you like they have so many others."

It's up to a jumpy State Department to prove that isn't so. ♦

A Walk on the Supply Side

The view from the White House economics team.

BY IRWIN M. STELZER

IT ISN'T EASY being on the White House economic team these days. For one thing, the public and the pundits seem fixated on the volatile stock market, to the virtual exclusion of the steadily growing economy. For another, the public face of the team is gaffe-prone Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, who manages to say the right thing at the wrong time, and then is forced to eat his own words. Aid to Brazil will very likely end up in Swiss bank accounts, he warned, a few days before signing on to a record $30 billion aid package. Finally, there is the "if someone is up, someone must be down" dynamic of the press. There can be no denying that the foreign policy team is "up." That means someone must be "down," and the economic team is a handy candidate.

Although none of these negatives goes to the substance of the Bush administration's economic policy, it seemed a good time to catch up last week with my former think tank colleague, Larry Lindsey, to find out what the real story is. Lindsey is the president's chief economic adviser, a man who talks to the president at least three times a week and is responsible for seeing to it that the president regularly hears a range of policy views.

Perhaps not surprisingly, Lindsey expects the economy to keep growing. Although there is always the possibility of a shock to the system, such as the collapse of some over-extended financial institution, there is every reason to believe that growth in the fourth quarter of this year will be at a rate of somewhere between 3.8 percent and 4 percent, and that next year will see the economy grow at a rate of 2.8 percent to 3 percent.

Does this warrant a "he would say that, wouldn't he" response? I think not. Lindsey is a man who can be more candid than politically optimal. Immediately after his boss's inauguration, he told me that the administration would be facing a 6 percent unemployment rate come the November 2002 elections. Not news the Republicans wanted to hear from their lead economist.

As for the growth estimates, Lindsey reasons that two of the three components of GDP, government spending and consumer spending, will keep rising. The only sector not growing is business investment, but neither is it likely to shrink. The policy trick is to make sure consumers keep spending until business investment recovers. Fortunately, incomes are rising faster than spending, which means consumers can continue to buy cars and houses and still have something left over with which to pay down their debts. "It's a question of buying time until business investment recovers, and using that time wisely by putting more money in consumers' pockets, which is what the tax cuts have done."

So Lindsey sees little danger of the dreaded "double dip," even if there is a war with Iraq. Indeed, a world free of the risk posed by Saddam seems to him self-evidently likely to grow more rapidly than one that lives under the shadow of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. A successful war will mean more, not less prosperity, regardless of its short-term cost.

What about deflation—the Japanese sickness? Not likely, says Lindsey. It is true, he points out, that the prices of durable and other goods are lower now than they were in 1995. No surprise, since rising productivity in the 1990s drove costs down, and competition in our increasingly deregulated economy forced producers to pass those savings on to consumers. But we have bankruptcy laws that work, and Japan doesn't. When our companies have trouble paying their debts, they go bust. In Japan, on the other hand, there is no mechanism for what Lindsey calls "resolution." The companies join the living dead. Their debts, although never to be repaid, remain on the balance sheets of the banks, making them unable to lend to healthy companies, old and new.

Talk turned to the outlook for the dollar. The White House sees little reason to worry about a flight from the dollar. For one thing, European stock markets are lagging behind America's. For another, many currencies of America's trading partners—notably China's yuan, Hong Kong's dollar and, by virtue of government policy, Japan's yen and Mexico's peso—are more or less tied to the dollar, and so can't rise freely against it, at least not by very much. But most important, as Lindsey asks, where else would investors put their money? Germany's economy is not growing; France doesn't welcome foreign capital; Latin America is having problems. America is enough of a magnet for foreign investors that we should be able to sustain an annual trade deficit on the order of $250-$300 billion. That means that the current annual trade deficit of about $450 billion needs to come down, but not by so much as to demand a vastly weaker dollar.

If the White House had its way, Europe would solve its problems and contribute more to world economic growth. But like other members of the administration, the president's economist cannot publicly criticize the European Central Bank, and so confines himself to the comment that the E.U. is getting what it asked for when it imposed on the bank a narrow man-

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date to control inflation, rather than ordering it to balance the need for price stability against the need for economic growth.

On the trade front, the administration remains committed to freer trade. The tariffs on steel were designed to let the Europeans know that we won't sit by and let them indefinitely subsidize inefficient capacity. We are determined to see some of the European steel companies follow the path of their American competitors—declare bankruptcy and exit the business. And the president is hoping that the new round of trade talks will end steel protection in all producing countries. But all is not likely to remain peaceful on the trade front. Europe allows the rebating of indirect taxes, such as the VAT, to encourage exports, but is opposed to the rebating of direct taxes, which is the American practice in some cases. This creates a playing field tilted in favor of Europe, something the administration sees as unfair and in need of change—soon.

Most interesting of all is that the Bush administration has not abandoned its long-run economic goals. Given what's on Congress's plate in the next month—some 13 appropriations bills, not to mention the Iraq debate—it is unlikely that any of the reforms the president wants to leave as his legacy can be enacted in this session of Congress. "This president is not given to posturing," says Lindsey, and so won't just send up bills that he knows can't be considered and passed.

But the long-term goals have not changed. They hinge on fundamental reform of the tax system. The goals are simplicity, lower marginal rates (which any good supply-sider will tell you does not necessarily mean less revenue), and removing economic distortions. The latter should be of special interest to investors. The current system favors debt (interest charges are deductible expenses for tax purposes) over equity (dividends are not a deductible expense), and is also, in the administration's view, biased against saving. So look for a move to allow dividends to be treated as a deductible business expense, and for the tax burden on interest earned by savers to be lightened or removed.

Parting shot: What about the stock market? Lindsey quite famously got out of the market before the bubble burst, missing the final uptick in prices, but also the following calamitous decline. The minutes of the meetings of the Federal Reserve Board's monetary policy committee show that as early as September 1996 Lindsey was warning of a share price bubble—at a time when it was the position of the Fed that asset prices are not a proper concern for central bankers.

But other than pointing out that "there are risks out there," and that the outlook for the American economy is bright, the president's chief economy watcher is not willing to roil markets by sharing his views on the future course of share prices.

There you have it—an analysis and a policy program as coherent as that of the much-praised foreign policy team. And forecasts that we all hope prove right. So where does the president go from here? The course of the economy between now and the November elections is beyond the reach of administration policy. But despite Tom Daschle's best efforts to mount an attack on economic policy, it's hard to see political vulnerability at the polls if the unemployment rate stays below or around 6 percent and if real incomes continue to grow.

But what might well affect the 2004 elections is what the administration can say about the economic issues that seem to be of most concern to Americans. Bush's push to make dividends tax deductible for corporations, or to make them tax free to the recipient, no matter how sensible, is likely to raise cries of "favors for the rich," as would any renewal of the effort to make the end of inheritance taxes permanent. Simplification of the tax code is not a banner likely to get the juices of voters flowing: Who now remembers Steve Forbes's flat-tax proposal?

What Bush needs from Lindsey and his other economists is a series of thought-through reforms of various sectors of the economy. Health care costs are rising because, as Lindsey is the first to point out, competition in that sector is ineffective. If the president's men could overcome their antipathy to a vigorous antitrust policy, they might inject some cost-containing competition into that area.

And if they would concentrate on how to make the distorted market for prescription drugs work better, protecting intellectual property rights while at the same time preventing other countries from using price controls that permit them to avoid bearing some of the research and development costs of America's highly productive pharmaceutical companies, they would earn the gratitude of seniors. Making the market for life-enhancing drugs work better is surely something regulation-averse compassionate conservatives should find attractive.

So far, such an agenda has eluded the administration. Sure, concentration on ending the dangerous regime in Iraq is and should be at the top of the president's agenda. And certainly the administration's overall management of the economy, including the well-timed tax cuts that gave the economy a boost when it most needed it, deserves two cheers. But laurel-resting is not an option. And the buck stops with Lindsey and his team to develop attractive economic policies that the president can put before the voters as an alternative to the domestic agenda of Democrats bent on a huge and inefficient expansion of the welfare state. ♦

CHURCHILL AND CHAMBERLAIN

Michael Ramirez

Not an Olympic Sport?

The International Olympic Committee has baseball on the chopping block. **BY JOSH CHETWYND**

WHILE Major League Baseball and its players' union grabbed headlines last month by successfully reaching a labor agreement, disturbing news regarding the future of the game was coming out of Switzerland. The International Olympic Committee recently disclosed that it is considering dropping a number of sports, including baseball, America's national pastime, from its program for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, China.

What baseball fans should realize is that as bad as a strike might have been, this would be worse. (That is, if it happens: The recommendation from the Olympic Program Commission to cut baseball must first be accepted by the organization's executive board in late November, and then ratified by the IOC's general assembly.) Given the global nature of entertainment today, it is vital for baseball to branch out beyond its core audience. This is happening slowly but surely in unexpected places. In just the past couple of years, players from countries like Germany and Russia have signed minor league contracts with major league teams, and even China recently established a professional league.

But for many emerging baseball nations, it is money provided by their national Olympic committees that is the key to the sport's growth. I should know. As a member of the Great Britain National Baseball Team since 1996 (I was born in England, but grew up in the United States), I'm keenly aware that without the support of baseball from government organizations, the game's nascent development here would be hindered.

So why is the IOC considering dropping baseball and its sister sport softball, among others, from its program? Could baseball's Olympic jeopardy have something to do with the sport's central place in American culture, and with a belief among some in the IOC that Americans are arrogant and should be punished? Nobody at the IOC is admitting this. But look closely at the three main reasons given for axing baseball—its lack of worldwide popularity, the cost of building venues, and the fact that the best players don't participate in the Games.

Could baseball's Olympic jeopardy have something to do with the sport's central place in American culture?

These arguments ring pretty hollow. More than 110 countries play baseball—a number far above the 75 minimum the IOC sets for a sport's inclusion. And that's considerably higher than the 92 nations that play rugby, a sport now being recommended as a new Olympic event. (Incidentally, IOC chief Jacques Rogge happens to be a former Belgian International Rugby player.) Moreover, there are professional baseball leagues in Asia, South America, North America, and Europe. Even Iran and Pakistan have baseball federations. And the venue argument is also disingenuous: Many Olympic sports—think of cycling and its velodromes—require costly venue construction.

The IOC also says America needs to send a "Dream Team" of top major leaguers to the Olympics (just as pro basketball has done since 1992). The baseball season occurs during the Olympics, which would make meeting that request logistically difficult but not impossible, as the National Hockey League has proven. The NHL temporarily stops its season to allow its best players to compete in the Olympics. But even if Major League Baseball did agree to send top players, it's unclear how long that would last. We just saw the erosion of the "Dream Team" concept at the World Basketball Championships. Team USA consisted of good but not elite NBA players, and lost three games en route to a dismal sixth-place finish.

It's possible, of course, that the IOC just wants to pressure baseball powers to commit to sending their best players in order to further exploit the American television market—one of the key pots of gold that makes the Olympics the behemoth it is today. Games pitting the New York Yankees' Derek Jeter (playing for the United States) against the Boston Red Sox's Pedro Martinez (pitching for the Dominican Republic) would certainly be tantalizing television that could increase the "value" of the Olympics.

Ultimately, baseball's Olympic situation probably comes down to money, on which some in the IOC appear to be wholly focused. Still, you can't help but think that if baseball's roots weren't so closely aligned with America and Americans this wouldn't be an issue. After all, soccer—the game Europeans spend most of their sporting energy on—doesn't send its best players to the Olympics, and there is no call for its ouster.

Luckily, no final decision has been made yet. Here's hoping the IOC will ultimately take the long view on the issue and see beyond any anti-American biases. ♦

Josh Chetwynd lives in London, where he co-hosts the British telecast Major League Baseball Live.

The Fog of Peace

The evasions, distractions, and miasma of the anti-war left.

By David Brooks

Either Saddam Hussein will remain in power or he will be deposed. President Bush has suggested deposing him, but as the debate over that proposal has evolved, an interesting pattern has emerged. The people in the peace camp attack President Bush's plan, but they are unwilling to face the implications of their own. Almost nobody in the peace camp will stand up and say that Saddam Hussein is not a fundamental problem for the world. Almost nobody in that camp is willing even to describe what the world will look like if the peace camp's advice is taken and Saddam is permitted to remain in power in Baghdad, working away on his biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs, still tyrannizing his own people, fomenting radicalism, and perpetuating the current political climate in the Arab world. And because almost nobody in the peace camp is willing to face the realities that a peace policy would preserve, the peace proponents really cannot address the fundamental calculation we confront: Are the risks of killing Saddam greater or less than the risks of tolerating him? Instead of facing the real options, they fill the air with evasions, distractions, and gestures—a miasma of insults and verbiage that distract from the core issue. They are living in the fog of peace.

When you read through the vast literature of the peace camp, you get the impression that Saddam Hussein is some distant, off-stage figure not immediately germane to matters at hand.

For example, on September 19, a group of peaceniks took out a full-page ad in the *New York Times* opposing the campaign in Afghanistan and a possible campaign in Iraq. Signatories included all the usual suspects: Jane Fonda, Edward Said, Barbara Ehrenreich, Tom Hayden, Gore Vidal, Ed Asner, and on and on. In the text of the ad, which runs to 15 paragraphs, Saddam Hussein is not mentioned. Weapons of mass destruction are not mentioned. The risks posed by terrorists and terror organizations are not mentioned. Instead there are vague sentiments, ethereally removed from the tensions before us today: "Nations have the right to determine their own destiny, free from military coercion by great powers. . . . In our name, the government has brought down a pall of repression over society. . . . We refuse to be party to these wars and we repudiate any inference that they are being waged in our name." The entire exercise is a picture perfect example of moral exhibitionism, by a group of people decadently refusing even to acknowledge the difficulties and tradeoffs that confront those who actually have to make decisions about policy.

Frances FitzGerald recently wrote a long essay in the *New York Review of Books* headlined on the cover "Bush and War." In the piece FitzGerald portrays the Bush foreign policy team as a coterie of superhawks driven by a fierce ideological desire to act unilaterally. This unilateralism leads the Bush advisers, FitzGerald asserts, to see or invent enemies, such as Saddam Hussein. "If one decides to go it alone without allies or reliance on the rule of law, it is natural to see danger abroad."

If you are a writer setting out to evaluate the Bush foreign policy team and its longstanding worries about Saddam, it would seem reasonable to measure whether or not those fears are justified or exaggerated. This is Journalism, or Scholarship, 101. But this is the question FitzGerald cannot ask, because that would require her to enter the forbidden territory of Saddam himself. FitzGerald raises the possibility that war against Saddam might lead to a Palestinian revolt in Jordan, oil shortages, and terrorist attacks. She mentions the daunting cost and scope of an American occupation of Iraq. She approvingly quotes Brent Scowcroft's warning that taking action against Saddam would inflame the Arab world and destroy the coalition that we need to wage war on al Qaeda. But what of the risks of doing nothing? This issue she does not touch. This is the issue that must remain shrouded in the fog of peace.

Reviewing Noam Chomsky, legal scholar Richard Falk, a member of the editorial board of the *Nation*, observes that while he agrees with much of what Chomsky writes, he is troubled by the fact that Chomsky is "so preoccupied with the evils of U.S. imperialism that it completely occupies all the political and moral space."

That is exactly what you see in the writings of the

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peace camp generally—not only in Chomsky's work but also in the writings of people who are actually tethered to reality. Their supposed demons—Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Doug Feith, Donald Rumsfeld, and company—occupy their entire field of vision, so that there is no room for analysis of anything beyond, such as what is happening in the world. For the peace camp, all foreign affairs is local; contempt for and opposition to Wolfowitz, Perle, Rumsfeld, et al. is the driving passion. When they write about these figures it is with a burning zeal. But on the rare occasions when they write about Saddam, suddenly all passion drains away. Saddam is boring, but Wolfowitz tears at their soul.

You begin to realize that they are not arguing about Iraq. They are not arguing at all. They are just repeating the hatreds they cultivated in the 1960s, and during the Reagan years, and during the Florida imbroglio after the last presidential election. They are playing culture war, and they are disguising their eruptions as position-taking on Iraq, a country about which they haven't even taken the trouble to inform themselves.

The noted historian and Columbia University professor Simon Schama wrote a long essay for the *Guardian* that was published September 11. He begins by defending President Bush's use of the term "evil." But as he starts to talk about the war on terror and the possible war in Iraq, suddenly all logic is overtaken by his disgust for the Bush crowd:

> The United States Inc. is currently being run by an oligarchy, conducting its affairs with a plutocratic effrontery which in comparison makes the age of the robber barons in the late 19th century seem a model of capitalist rectitude. The dominant managerial style of the oligarchy is golf club chumminess; its messages exchanged along with hot stock tips by the mutual scratching and slapping of backs.

Schama goes on to attack Dick Cheney for Halliburton, Bush for Harken Energy, Secretary of the Army Thomas White for Enron, the proposal to eliminate the death tax, the banality of the architectural proposals for ground zero, Bush's faith-based initiatives, and so on and so on. It all adds up to one long rolling gas cloud of antipathy, which smothers Schama's ability to think about what the United States ought to do next.

This is the dictionary definition of parochialism—the inability to consider the larger global threats because one is consumed by one's immediate domestic hatreds. This parochialism takes many forms, but all the branches of the opposition to the war in Iraq have one thing in common: Iraq is never the issue. Something else is always the issue.

For Schama and many others, the Bush crowd is the issue. They stole the election. They serve corporate America. They have bad manners. This is the prism through which Maureen Dowd, Molly Ivins, and many others view the war. Writing in the *Boston Globe*, Northwestern University's Karen J. Alter psychoanalyzes the groupthink mentality that she says explains the Bush crowd's strange obsession with Iraq. The real problem, you see, is in their psyches.



Illustrations by Thomas Fluharty

Among some Democrats in Washington, a second form of parochialism has emerged. They see the Iraq conflict as a subplot within the midterm election campaigns. "It's hard not to notice that the sudden urgency of war with Iraq has coincided precisely with the emergence of the corporate scandal story, with the flip in congressional [poll] numbers and with the decline in the Republicans' prospects for retaking the Senate majority," Jim Jordan, the director of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, told the *Washington Post*. "It's absolutely clear that the administra-

tion has timed the Iraq public relations campaign to influence the midterm elections."

What's fascinating about this wag-the-dog theory is what it reveals about the mentality of the people who float it. These are politicians (far from all of them Democrats) who have never cared about foreign affairs, have no history with the Cold War, have no interest in America's superpower role. One sometimes gets the sense that these people can't imagine how anybody could genuinely be more interested in matters of war and peace than in such issues as prescription drugs, Social Security, and Enron. If the president does pretend to care more about nuclear weapons and such, surely it must be a political tactic. For them, the important task is to get the discussion back to the subjects they care about, and which they think are politically advantageous.

This explains the strange passivity that has marked much of the Democratic response to Iraq. The president must "make the case," many Democrats say, as if they are incapable of informing themselves about what is potentially one of the greatest threats to the United States. Tom Daschle's entire approach to the Iraq issue has been governed by midterm considerations.

On September 18, as the U.N. was consumed by debate over Iraq, as the White House was drafting a war resolution on Iraq, Daschle delivered a major policy address. The subject? The tax cut Congress passed over a year ago. The speech, the *New York Times* reported, was "the beginning of a party-wide effort to turn attention away from Iraq and back to the domestic agenda." The United States is possibly on the verge of war, and Tom Daschle is trying to turn attention away from it. He's running around Capitol Hill looking for some sand to bury his head in. This is parochialism on stilts.

The president must "make the case," many Democrats say, as if they are incapable of informing themselves.

For a third branch of the parochialists, Iraq is not the issue, America is the issue. The historian Gabriel Kolko recently declared, "Everyone—Americans and those people who are the objects of their efforts—would be far better off if the United States did nothing, closed its bases overseas, withdrew its fleets everywhere and allowed the rest of the world to find its own way without American weapons and troops." For peaceniks in this school, the conditions of the world don't matter. Whether it is Korea, Germany, the Balkans, or the Middle East, America shouldn't be there because America is the problem. This is reverse isolationism: Whereas the earlier isolationists thought America should withdraw because the rest of the world was too corrupt, these isolationists believe that America should withdraw because the United States is too corrupt.

"I Hear America Sinking" is the title of James Ridgeway's recent piece in the *Village Voice*: America is too corrupt and troubled to attempt any action in Iraq. "American foreign policy is like their television," writes John O'Farrell in the *Guardian*. "It has to keep jumping from one thing to another because the president has the remote control in his hand and his attention span is very limited." Writers in this school derive an almost sensuous pleasure from recounting how much people in the rest of the world dislike America; whether those anti-Americans also, by the way, kill homosexuals, oppress women, and crush pluralism is relegated to the background. For these parochials, the immediate priority is hating America.

A fourth form of parochialism is what might be called modern multilateral gentility. For people in this school Iraq is not the issue—the U.N. is the issue. Now, it should be said that there are substantive reasons to care about whether or not the United States has allies. We need friends to help transform the Middle East. But for many of its supporters, multilateralism is purely a procedural matter. They seem to care less whether an action is undertaken than whether it is undertaken according to all the correct and genteel multilateral forms.

Like all forms of American gentility, this multilateralism is greatly concerned with refined manners. There can be no raw bullying around the earth, no passionate declarations of war, no ungentlemanly crusades. Instead, the conflict must be resolved through the framework of the United Nations (which for some reason is seen as a high-toned and civilized center of conflict resolution). Like all forms of American gentility, multilateralism carries a strong aroma of cultural inferiority. We Americans are sadly crude and uncultured. The Europeans are really

much more sophisticated and subtle than we are about the affairs of the world. Their ways and manners are more mature.

Multilateral obsessives tend to be more centrist than other people in the peace camp. They are more respectable and more establishmentarian. But like many other members of the peace camp, they simply do not tackle the question of what Saddam might do or what the future might look like. Preferring process over substance, they hold to a multilateralism descended from previous genteel causes, such as civil service reform and campaign finance reform. In their quiet and sober way, they too contribute to the fog of peace.

Now it should be said that within the peace camp, there are honorable exceptions to this pattern. Adam Shatz recently wrote a long piece in the *Nation* surveying left-wing thought on the war. The left is wrapped around its own axle, Shatz noted, because it can't come to terms with American power.

Richard Falk, the left-wing legal scholar, himself has argued that in deciding whether to go into places like Afghanistan and Iraq, "we should look with as much care as possible at the case where the interventionary claim is being made, and consider the effects of intervening and not intervening." This hardly seems like a radical notion, but of course it is precisely this approach that the peace camp, by and large, refuses to take. As Shatz observed in his piece, "Falk has been widely chastised for his vacillations."

Moreover, there are some in the peace camp who are willing to grapple head-on with the risks of preserving the status quo. Madeleine Albright, Bill Clinton's secretary of state, has argued that there is no need to take on Saddam right now because the efforts to thwart him have worked. "Since the administration of former President George H.W. Bush, each time Mr. Hussein has pushed, we have pushed back," she wrote in a recent *Times* op-ed. Furthermore, she argued, "Saddam Hussein's military is far weaker than it was a decade ago. And he must surely be aware that if he ever again tries to attack another country he will be obliterated. All that is grounds for calm, but not complacency."

When you come across the Groundhog Day predictions of what will happen if the United States invades Iraq—the Arab Street will explode, we will create a thousand new bin Ladens, we will become stuck in a quagmire—you're actually relieved. Here are writers who are at least willing to compare the risks of action with those of inaction. Stephen Zunes argues in the *Nation* that Iraq is not a center of anti-American terrorism, international inspectors can insure that Saddam will not obtain weapons of mass destruction, and the Iraqi people would not welcome a U.S. effort to topple the current regime. Writing in the *New York Times*, author Milton Viorst predicts that if the United States goes into Iraq, Islamists in Pakistan will overthrow the government there and launch a nuclear attack on India. These assertions and predictions may be wrong and far-fetched, but at least Zunes and Viorst are willing to think about the world and about the future.

They are still the exceptions. For most in the peace camp, there is only the fog. The debate is dominated by people who don't seem to know about Iraq and don't care. Their positions are not influenced by the facts of world affairs.

When you get deep enough into the peace camp you find fog about the fog. You find a generation of academic and literary intellectuals who have so devoted themselves to questioning meanings, deconstructing texts, decoding signifiers, and unmasking perspectives, they can't even make an argument anymore. Susan Sontag wrote a *New York Times* op-ed about metaphors and interpretations and about the meaning and categories of war. It filled up space on the page, but it didn't go anywhere.

Tony Kushner, the fashionably engagé playwright and most recently the author of *Homebody/Kabul*, contributed to a symposium, also in the *Times*. Here is the complete text of his essay:

> Change is not the substitution of one static state for another. The meanings of Sept. 11 continue to be fought over, and the prevailing interpretations will direct future action. Colossal tragedy has made available to America the possibility of a new understanding of our place in the world.
>
> Tragedy's paradox is that it has a creative aspect: new meaning flows to fill the emptiness hollowed out by devastation. Are we dedicated to democratic, egalitarian principles applicable to our own people as well as to the people of the world? And do we understand that "our own people" and "the people of the world" are interdependent? Will we respond with imagination, compassion and courageous intelligence, refusing imperial projects and infinite war?
>
> The path we will take is not available for prediction. We ought not to believe columnists, think-tank determinists or the cowboy bromides of our president and his dangerous handlers and advisers. We, the citizenry, are still interpreting.
>
> Our conclusions will then force our reinterpretation. Urgency is appropriate but not an excuse for stupidity or brutality. Our despair over our own powerlessness is simply a lie we are telling ourselves. We are all engaged in shaping the interpretation, and in the ensuing actions, we are all implicated.

Tony! We can hear you but we can't see you! You are lost somewhere in the fog of peace. ♦

Present at the Re-creation

The newest world order takes shape.

By Noemie Emery

Like the Cold War, the War on Terror is being defined even as it is fought, by a president who didn't expect it. In 1945, Harry Truman finished a hot war and stepped into a postwar world that seemed stable and certified: The United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China, the victorious Big Five of the World War II coalition, would keep order together through the United Nations, designed as their hand-crafted instrument. In 2001, George W. Bush stepped into a world in which history itself was believed to have ended, the United States was secure as the sole superpower, and the peace disturbed only by unconnected and regional quarrels. Neither man was known for his passionate interest in world affairs or grand strategy. Yet Truman ended up as the conceptualizer of the Cold War, the president who set American foreign policy on the path it would follow for the next half-century. And Bush now bids fair to do the same for the War on Terror.

For Truman, the moment of truth was more subtle than September 11—intense Soviet pressure on Greece and Turkey, and Britain's announcement that it could not guarantee their security. On March 12, 1947, Truman went before Congress to ask for $400 million in aid to those countries, and pledged to confront Russian expansionism wherever it arose. On September 20, 2001, Bush went before Congress promising to avenge the terrorists' carnage, and pledging to confront terrorists wherever they might be. Six weeks later, he launched his campaign in Afghanistan. Both men soon sought to give institutional form to their new policies. In June 1947, the Truman administration unveiled the Marshall Plan; the following month, Congress passed the National Security Act, which combined all the military services in the Defense Department, set up the new CIA, and created the National Security Council to give expert advice to the president. On June 12, 2002, Bush asked Congress to create a new Department of Homeland Security, to combine all or part of 22 different federal agencies, to merge the intelligence gathering capabilities of the CIA and FBI, to allot $1.6 billion to the states to prepare against possible future emergencies, and $4.3 billion for drugs, vaccines, and other safeguards against a potential bioterrorist onslaught.

To cope with a different and new kind of menace, Truman adopted the theme of containment, based on the idea that the Communists, while aggressive and ruthless, had no great desire to murder Americans, had no interest in seeing their people and countries demolished, and could therefore be deterred from expansion by persistent and credible threats. To cope with a different and new kind of menace, Bush is elaborating a preemption doctrine, based on the belief that terrorists are ruthless and also have a lively desire to murder Americans, have no concern for the welfare of the states they work out of, and subscribe to a death cult in which murderous martyrdom is the highest good. "Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation—means nothing against the shadowy terrorist networks with no nations or citizens," Bush said on June 1. "Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles. . . . The war on terrorism cannot be won on the defensive. . . . We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge."

Truman began 1946 concentrating on Greece and Turkey. He then moved throughout the year after to make himself the protector of the entire non-Communist world. The Marshall Plan, which addressed Western Europe, was proposed in June, and passed six months later. In June 1948, he reacted to the Russian blockade of Berlin by beginning an airlift that saved the city. It was this event, and Communist coups soon after in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary, that spurred the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, signed April 4, 1949. That same year, the administration drafted the strategy document known as National Security Council Report 68, a long-term plan for a very long and grim conflict, that

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assessed the Communist threat to the world and laid out a grand strategy able to fight it. In time, in the words of Paul Johnson, "it produced specific alliances or agreed obligations to 47 nations and led American forces to build up or occupy 675 bases and station a million troops overseas."

Like Truman, Bush began moving out into global commitments in the first months of 2002. In his State of the Union address on January 29, he extended his focus out from the Taliban and into Iran and Iraq. In May, he signed an arms pact with Russia and declared an end to the era of great power conflicts (to free them to battle the small, nasty movements). On June 1, in a commencement address at West Point, he announced his preemption doctrine and declared his intention to push for democratic reform in the Islamic world. Truman and the men around him had come to realize that the world and their country could know no real security unless they stabilized Asia and Europe, by bringing democracy to Germany and Japan, which had no prior record of popular governance. Bush and his people have now come to realize that their world and country can have no real security unless the Middle East can be stabilized, by encouraging democratic reforms in Iraq, Iran, and the Palestinian entity, which have no prior record of popular governance. "The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America, and the entire Islamic world," said Bush on June 1. "The people of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as the people in every nation, and their governments should listen to their hopes."

Both Bush and Truman had to wage conflicts in which concepts of war were remade. Truman's war was against both traditional Russian expansionism and a radical movement that knew no national boundaries; a war of threats and rapprochements, in which American presidents walked a 50-year tightrope between risking Armageddon by being too aggressive, and inviting aggression by appearing too weak. America amassed a vast stockpile of terrible weapons, but the aim was never to use them. Great wars usually inflict great pain on their people; during the Cold War, Americans lived better than ever before in their history; there was great suffering for some (in Korea and Vietnam), but most were untouched. The Cold War brought five decades of low-key anxiety, broken by moments of breath-holding terror. It was a war in which provocations were met by a wide range of responses, based on refined calculations. Truman chose to circumvent the blockade of Berlin, rather than force a direct confrontation with Soviet power. Kennedy let the Berlin Wall rise without incident, but was prepared to face war over missiles in Cuba. In the early years of the Cold War, "liberationists" decried the containment doctrine as being too passive. But it was Ronald Reagan, a liberationist by temperament, who finally won it, by his aggressive use of containment tactics—economic, psychological, and political warfare, first recommended back in 1946.

Bush's first year of war has already been hotter than Truman's, and looks to become hotter still. But it has the same mixture of multiple weapons, on the military, economic, intelligence, and diplomatic fronts. It has the same (seemingly) on-and-off nature, and the same unequal distribution of sacrifice. (After the attacks, people were urged to go out and buy things: "Ask how much you can spend for your country," as JFK might have said.) In World War II, success was defined in terms of ground taken, and ended in formal surrenders. In the Cold War, success was determined as what failed to happen: the bombs that weren't dropped, the guns that weren't fired, the incursions and coups that never took place. Success in this war is defined by attacks that don't happen, whose numbers we may never know. In both wars, private vulnerability seemed to increase in direct proportion to national power. "The events of 1947-1950 changed Americans' view of their place in the world forever," writes Michael Barone in *Our Country*. "Before WWII, their country had been physically invulnerable but militarily weak. After victory in WWII and the emergence of the Cold War, Americans had a country which was militarily strong, but for the first time, they realized with a sinking feeling, also physically vulnerable." In the Cold War, we were one of two superpowers, but open for the first time to attack via missile. Now, we are the world's sole superpower, and our people have never been in more danger at home.

If the Cold War differed from most wars before it, the new war is different again. In the Cold War, we faced an empire that wanted more land and power, but had no intrinsic, discernible bloodlust. Now, we face a movement that seeks psychological dominance, and is hungry for blood. Then, we faced a large bloc of countries whose influence had to be contained. Now we face not a state, but a transnational network with no fixed address, a vine to be ripped up in numerous countries, while leaving those countries (in most cases) as unharmed as possible. Then, we faced a bloc of nations with vast armies and arsenals. Now, we face a transient force, with a great deal less power, but with weapons of frightening virulence. The immense damage incurred on September 11 cost the perpetrators barely the price of one tank.

The first year of this war often seemed confused and confusing. So did the Cold War. The early years of the Cold War (the late years, too, for that matter) were ugly and partisan. There were also the normal mistakes. "The Truman reorganization was far from the simple and solid success that many now assume," writes Fred

Hiatt in the *Washington Post*. "It failed to accomplish much that Harry Truman had hoped for, and it set the stage for much that he never anticipated. . . . Its success was greatly circumscribed by parochialism, pettiness, and personality. . . . Its first iteration, in 1947 . . . was such a disaster that it had to be redrawn two years later—and was still being amended 37 years after that." Likewise, the development of the new Department of Homeland Security has been beset by wranglings, complicated by the fact that most of its duties—securing bridges, tunnels, and nuclear plants against possible assault by terrorists; procuring vaccines, drawing up plans against poison gas and deadly diseases—are themselves new and different. Authorities were slow off the mark in diagnosing the anthrax attacks of last autumn; most American doctors had never *seen* anthrax. Americans slipped up somewhat in letting terrorists slip through the border to Pakistan; next time they'll know better. The Wise Men themselves had made numerous errors. Their grand plan of aiding regimes under Communist pressure was most successful, from its first great triumphs in Greece and Turkey in 1947 to its last in Nicaragua some four decades later. But there were disasters along the way—as in Vietnam, when the regime being pressured was too inept, too corrupt, or too justly unpopular to use their aid properly. Still, the blunders did not prevent the eventual triumph.

Several presidents have had to wage wars, but only two, Bush and Truman, have had to perceive them, and then to define them as wars.

In this context, one of Bush's big problems may be in reminding us that this really is war. It does not, as some say, "feel like a war," but this is what modern war feels like. It is episodic, off-center, and often invisible, but it is also dangerous and deadly. "We have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, and the international authority of our state be broken," as George Kennan, the great theorist of containment, once said. This new war, like the Cold War, requires a new vocabulary to convey its reality. The color-coded threat levels of the new homeland security apparatus, the reds and oranges and yellows, have been much derided. But something like them is necessary and will come to seem as unremarkable as the jargon of the Cold War—massive retaliation, mutually assured destruction—now seems.

The Cold War brought us the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO and SHAPE, containment, deterrence, and an alliance of the United States with its former enemies—Japan, Germany, and Italy—against its former allies, Russia and China. The new war has brought us (so far) the Bush Doctrine, preemption, regime change (making war on rulers, but not on a people or country), and a new set of alliances including, once again, between the United States and Russia (or at least between Putin and Bush).

Truman urged the non-Communist world to recognize a threat that had split the United Nations, and to form structures outside to contain it. Bush is now asking the United Nations to save itself, by mobilizing under U.S. leadership against a menace that transcends the traditional national structure. "By defining the challenge as of a magnitude requiring cooperative action by the world community, Bush has affirmed America's commitment to a new world order," writes Henry Kissinger, one more sweeping than the Cold War order. But whether the patrolling is done by a new, revised post-Cold War United Nations, or a more NATO-like bloc of the United States, Britain, and possibly Russia, it will be a protracted and painstaking struggle. Dean Acheson, whose memoir *Present at the Creation* described the order that he, Kennan, and Truman established, gave this description of the first years of their struggle (as quoted by his biographer James Chace): The problems, he said, were not like headaches—"take a powder and they are gone. They are like the pains of earning a living. . . . All our lives, the danger, the uncertainty, the need for alertness, for effort, for discipline, will be upon us. . . . They will stay with us until death."

Several presidents have had to wage wars, but only two, Bush and Truman, have had to perceive them, and then to define them as wars. In 1946 Truman was faced by a specific event: the declaration by Britain that it could not protect Greece and Turkey. He might have said he was stepping in to take Britain's place *in this one instance*. He didn't. Instead, he announced, in his great speech to Congress, that he intended to check the onslaught of Communist power, wherever it rose up on Earth. On September 11, Bush was faced by a specific event, the attacks on New York and the Pentagon. He could have defined these as criminal acts and announced his intention to bring those who planned them to justice. He didn't. Instead, he took the occasion of *his* great speech to Congress to declare a world war on terrorists, including the states who harbor and fund them. Each took a specific event and responded to it on the maximum level, extrapolating from and beyond it to a long-term commitment of national power. Each moved from a local event to a global crusade. Truman's took 54 years.

In the 20 years between the time that Vietnam turned rancid and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe at the end of 1989, it was said and written that Truman had been too expansive and bellicose, Kennedy far too grandiloquent in his promise to "pay any price," and Reagan too blunt in his talk about "evil." They took on too much, were unnuanced, had too great a belief in American power, and bit off far more than the country could swallow, the hubris that had met its nemesis in Vietnam. But Vietnam itself has been slipping from prominence, and increasingly looks like a shattering sideshow in the larger war. If the decades just after Vietnam seemed to show these men's excesses, the years since 1989 have showed their strength and sound judgment. In *The Wise Men*, their multibiography of Acheson, Kennan, and four other cold warriors, Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas deemed their work successful, in that they had "created an alliance that has securely preserved the West from aggression for onward of forty years." This book was published in 1986. Five years later, it would be revealed that this was only a small part of the story; beyond saving the West, they had also in the long run freed Eastern Europe, and allowed even Russia to embark on a future which, if not quite yet flourishing, at least has the promise of becoming much better. They had won a world war.

None of this at the time appeared certain or likely. If the hardest job of the 20th century went to Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had to deal with both economic collapse and the worst war in history, the hardest decisions were left to Truman, who had to pick his own way through a nuclear landscape in a new kind of multi-hued struggle. There had been one way alone to respond to Pearl Harbor. There were many ways to respond to the slow accumulation of encroachments and incidents that made up the Soviet record at the end of 1946. Only one of these was to see them as an ominous and enlarging pattern, which demanded a global response. This decision, of course, was just the beginning: There was no easy way to explain to a country exhausted from four years of struggle that it needed to suit up again.

Before September 11, the emerging progression of terrorist incidents had been carefully defined as criminal acts by the people in power, eager to avoid connecting the dots, or even to notice them. Bush connected these dots in a very few minutes, in the fierce light projected by jet fuel on fire. Such acts of cognition save people and nations. History, which these days looks kindly on Harry S. Truman, may one day look kindly on Bush. ♦

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Puppets from *Spitting Image* on sale at Sotheby's, after the program closed in 1998. AFP / CORBIS.

Fawlty Humour

The limits of British satire

By Brian Murray

The hit revue *Beyond the Fringe* opened in London in 1961. Humphrey Carpenter, then fifteen, attended the show with his father, a bishop in the Church of England. Carpenter recalls that his father "was laughing as helplessly as everyone else." And Carpenter—who describes himself as a largely obedient schoolboy, "fairly conventional in my outlook"—found himself transfixed and transformed: "My world turned upside down."

Beyond the Fringe was highbrow vaudeville written and performed by four Oxbridge students in their early twenties: Peter Cook, Alan Bennett, Jonathan Miller, and Dudley Moore. The show, Carpenter writes, "systematically mocked everything that the British had held sacred since time immemorial." And it played a key part in sparking the 1960s' "satire boom" that Carpenter entertainingly chronicles in his new *A Great, Silly Grin*.

Brian Murray teaches writing and film studies at Loyola College in Baltimore.

Beyond the Fringe wasn't entirely original. British humor had long specialized in targeting cant and pomposity (think only of Dickens). And during the 1950s, the BBC radio's *Goon Show*, featuring Spike Milligan and Peter Sellers, offered a similar mix of wit, impertinence, and whimsy. But *Beyond the Fringe* was more directly political, mocking not only such hallowed institutions as the Royal Family and the Church of England but living politicians—particularly Harold Macmillan, the patrician prime minister who came to represent, for the young at least, all that was outmoded and inept about a Victorian Empire that was finally shrinking to size.

A Great, Silly Grin
The British Satire Boom of the 1960s
by Humphrey Carpenter
Public Affairs, 400 pp., $27.50

Much of *Beyond the Fringe* remains funny today. In the monologue "Take a Pew," for instance, Alan Bennett assumes the part of a fatuous cleric sermonizing dubiously on that most uplifting of Biblical verses: "My Brother Esau is a hairy man, but I am a smooth man." In another, "The Heat Death of the Universe," Jonathan Miller drolly recalls purchasing pants from the Lost Property Office of London Transport—an act involving "a certain amount of fastidious conflict with my inner soul as I was not very keen to assume the trousers which some lunatic had taken off on a train going eastbound toward Whitechapel."

In what proved to be the show's most controversial sketch, "The Aftermyth of War," the Fringe troupe ridiculed clichéd dramatizations of World War II, in which the "humble little people of Britain" endured the "gathering storm" and the "turning tides" of the conflict with unflagging pluck and endless pots of tea. At least one critic thought it "vaguely indecent for twenty-year-olds to be making fun of Battle of Britain pilots."

But in the early 1960s, indecency and irreverence were becoming com-

mon comic fare as younger performers—infants or children during the Blitz—came to the fore. Fifteen years had passed since the war ended, and for most Brits the years that followed had been drearily difficult, an interminable wait in an endless queue. By the late 1950s, however, a decade of rationing and rebuilding was finally ending and the promise of prosperity loomed. Leisure time grew and the entertainment industry expanded rapidly—helped in part by vast advances in global communication.

Thus the working-class Beatles and other pop groups—the most visible representatives of the New Britain, stylish, upbeat, and hip—turned first to American models: Elvis, Chuck Berry, Buddy Holly. And, no less inevitably, as Carpenter reveals, clever university lads like Miller and Cook found inspiration in the "new American humor" of, among others, Lenny Bruce and Mort Sahl.

Bruce and Sahl broke the mold in several ways. They were monologists, not joke tellers, and they wrote their own material. Bruce, the most influential comedian of his era, was the anti-Jack Benny, displaying an open contempt for authority and an unhidden interest in sex. Although less profane, Sahl was no less the studied outsider, ridiculing politics and politicians with bitter glee. Sahl's caricature of President Eisenhower as a golf-playing dullard almost certainly inspired the similarly dismissive impersonation of Macmillan in *Beyond the Fringe*.

The British satire boom continued with varying degrees of success for much of the decade. In 1961, Peter Cook opened "The Establishment," a "satirical nightclub" where Bruce himself appeared in "his usual mood of tormented derision," as the influential critic Kenneth Tynan admiringly pointed out. *Private Eye*, a national humor magazine, was launched in 1961. Edited by Richard Ingrams and Christopher Booker, among others, *Private Eye* (which is still being printed) offered far more bite than its more-venerable counterpart, the now-defunct *Punch*.

Meanwhile, in 1962, the BBC began *That Was the Week That Was*, hosted by David Frost. As described by Carpenter, the program seems mild by today's standards—part Mark Russell, part *Capitol Steps*. But in the early 1960s any sort of political humor on the BBC, one of the nation's most powerful cultural institutions, was sure to stir attention—particularly since *That Was the Week That Was* dealt, however obliquely, with religion and sex, broadcasting's oldest taboos. Carpenter cites one particularly contested sketch marking the close of the Second Vatican Council. It showed the cast costumed as cardinals and singing "Arrivederci Roma." This, forty years ago, was still considered shocking—an "insult to religion" and "near blasphemy" in the words of the British press.

Dudley Moore and Peter Cook

Bettmann / CORBIS

But the members of *Beyond the Fringe* weren't much impressed, considering *That Was the Week That Was* a vulgar, showbiz version of their own more cerebral—and rather more innocent—show. Carpenter notes that Jonathan Miller, years later, would come to characterize *Beyond the Fringe* as the largely "affectionate" display of topical cabaret in which some playful undergraduates, uninterested in stardom, simply went public with their private jokes. Initially, *Beyond the Fringe* was one of several competing student productions staged on the outskirts—or "fringe"—of the long-running Edinburgh Arts Festival.

But Frost and others, Miller complained, "rather took up the idea of its *being satire*, and then explicitly promoted it." Writers, entertainers, publishers "took the bit between their teeth and then raced in the direction of what they thought was a satirical goal." Satire—rather like boots for women, as one contemporary critic put it—became yet one more hyped-up 1960s craze. Certainly television producers, ever mindful of trends, ordered up ever more topical, provocative comedy programs.

That Was the Week That Was ran out of steam fairly quickly, in late 1963. But then came *The Frost Report* and Alan Bennett's *On the Margin* in 1966. Satirical serials bloomed on television and radio, including *Till Death Do Us Part*, the British basis for the American *All in the Family*, which began its long run on CBS in 1971. In both programs, a working-class bigot battles verbally with his more politically sensitive son-in-law. But satire, in its purest sense, is always intellectual and aloof—permitting no warm regard for the ridiculed victim. The American *All in the Family*, at least, was at bottom a warm-hearted comedy. Archie Bunker, the mouthy bigot, eventually emerges as a likable figure who, deep down, has a heart of gold.

There was certainly no tenderness in *Monty Python's Flying Circus*, which made its first appearance on the BBC in 1969 and became, without question, the most influential comedy series of its time. Two of its members, Michael Palin and Terry Jones, had written for *The Frost Report*; another, John Cleese, had contributed to *That Was the Week That Was*. *Monty Python*, however, was better tuned to the dark-

er and weirder cultural mood that began to form at the close of a decade and that was simultaneously yielding the likes of Frank Zappa, Tiny Tim, and Pink Floyd. The Pythons famously promised "something completely different"—a weekly mix of black humor, surrealism, and the theater of the absurd. By comparison, the writers behind *That Was the Week That Was* and *Private Eye* no longer looked particularly daring, but politically and aesthetically conservative—which in fact they mainly were. (The novelist Emma Tennant, Carpenter notes, once aptly described the editors of *Private Eye* as "*Daily Telegraph* readers in disguise.")

But was *Monty Python* satire? Were the Pythons or any of the figures now linked to the "satire boom" really satirists—in the more traditional, literary sense of the word? One thinks, for example, of Dante's *Inferno*, the most scorching piece of satire ever written. Dante assumed that his audience, small initially, shared an understanding of the world based largely on Catholic moral teaching. And his relentless depiction, in the *Inferno*, of the inversion of holiness—of pride, gluttony, avarice, lust—is balanced by the *Paradiso*, which glorifies holiness, and holds forth the miracle of redemption for wretched humankind.

In *Monty Python* (and in much of the American satire of the 1960s and beyond, from *Laugh In* to *Saturday Night Live*) one finds no desire to reform or instruct—only a schoolboy's urge to shock, most infamously with jokes about cannibalism, dismemberment, and disease. Carpenter alludes to one Python sketch, nixed by the BBC, in which a prince "ignores a cancerous spot which eventually kills him; the cancer itself survives, and gets married and lives happily ever after." He also mentions the Pythons' movie *Life of Brian* (1979), in which a hapless man living at the time of Christ is mistaken for the messiah and ends up singing a music hall ditty—"Always Look on the Bright Side of Life"—as he hangs with other unfortunates, crucified.

Monty Python was full of smart and funny bits, and *Life of Brian* is no exception. But the film's core assumption is that Christianity is a vast joke conceived and fostered by muddling dupes—a notion entirely at one with the group's bemusedly contemptuous view of human life. The Pythons were cynics, not satirists, a band of comic Hamlets pondering the empty absurdity of life beside poor Yorick's grave.

P.A. NEWS / CORBIS KIPA

Monty Python's Flying Circus

A recent profile of John Cleese, the most recognizable Python, describes him as "an unrepentant advocate of bad taste in comedy." Cleese insists that good comedy is almost always "mean"—a sentiment that the late Peter Cook, the satire boom's most influential figure, would have certainly endorsed. When their careers briefly faltered in the 1970s, Cook and Dudley Moore began performing as "Derek and Clive," and their various recordings, tissued with profanity and images of sexual mayhem, remained popular on college campuses through the 1980s. In an interview Cook once described Derek and Clive as "two ignorant berks, and their natural language is four-letter almost the entire time." The British humorist John Wells, himself a former contributor to *Private Eye*, once noted that "infantilism is possibly the hallmark of our generation." He must have been thinking of Derek and Clive.

Back in the 1960s, Carpenter tells us, the prominent Tory Edward Heath was one of several political leaders who looked at the satire boom with a wary eye and wondered what would happen if satire, once the sport of artists and intellectuals, became mainstream—a mainstay of the popular media. Heath gloomily predicted that *That Was the Week That Was* and similar programs would play their own part in breeding a wide disdain for all forms of authority and a smug detachment from civic life—a "death of deference," to be precise.

But after his retirement from politics, Heath, a former prime minister, appeared as a guest on a facetious chat show hosted by the admittedly delightful "Dame Edith Everage" (the comedian Barry Humphries, dressed in drag). It was a sign of the times: Satire and its twin, irony, while no longer fresh, are certainly ubiquitous—an integral part of the daily news and entertainment flow.

Thus, in the United States, Bob Dole takes his turn on Comedy Central. Bill Clinton, a sitting president, stars in his own comic video released for the amusement of reporters. NPR airs *Wait, Wait, . . . Don't Tell Me*, a radio panel show in which several of the network's reporters and news readers crack weak jokes about the week's headlines. It all reminds us anew of Peter Cook's often-quoted remark, in the 1960s, that as satire continued its spread, leading nations like Britain ran the risk of "sinking giggling into the sea."

Carpenter notes the huge popularity, during the 1980s, of *Spitting Image*, which portrayed public officials as hideous rubber puppets, including the Queen Mother, who appeared as a

gun-toting gangster bearing the words "Gin" and "Tonic" as proud tattoos. He also points to BBC radio's *The News Quiz* and its television counterpart, *Have I Got News for You*, which "have provided a weekly deflation of the latest absurdities—the participants in the latter sometimes being the very politicians who are being mocked."

Ridicule is crucial to functioning democracies, and hypocrisy and arrogance must forever remain its prime targets. Carpenter knows this—as do we all. But after celebrating the "satire boom" in its earlier phases, Carpenter's book takes an understandable—and rueful—turn as it extensively quotes an array of comic writers and satirists troubled by the continuing relevance of Cook's dark remark.

Michael Frayn, for example, once a contributor to *That Was the Week That Was*, concedes that 1960s satire "may have been partially responsible for the fact that there is now a tone in a lot of the press of a permanent sneer at almost everything, which is very depressing." Meanwhile, former *Guardian* columnist Jeremy Hardy notes that the BBC's *Newsnight* sometimes includes comedians who "do funny little skits," which is a way of "basically saying" that, "oh no, this isn't really that important—it's all just frippery, really, what goes on in politics."

Taken one by one, these 1960s satire programs—from *Beyond the Fringe* to *Monty Python's Flying Circus*—were sharp, witty, and fun. But their legacy seems somehow less appealing these days. In the long years since its British beginning, this kind of satire has grown dull, ubiquitous, and ordinary. Barry Humphries may have put it best. The marriage of satire and mass media has produced a pervasive "frivolity, cynicism, and finally a vacuousness." Everything now, Humphries suggests, is "a send-up," and "everyone is a satirist."

Moreover, there's no one left to shock. When satire itself becomes the culture, who does that leave to ridicule our pretensions and commonplaces? Who can satirize satire? ♦

Give War a Chance

Could we have won in Vietnam?

BY CHRISTOPHER LYNCH

The word "tragedy" is perhaps the most frequently intoned about the Vietnam War, and usually what is intended by it is a sense that American involvement in the war was a mistake and American defeat was inevitable. That kind of proposition, however, is like a gauntlet thrown down to historians, and an interesting turn has begun to take place in recent years as more and more historians start to suggest the exact opposite of the conventional understanding of Vietnam—namely, that the war was just and necessary, and that an American victory was entirely possible.

So, for instance, C. Dale Walton, in *The Myth of Inevitable U.S. Defeat in Vietnam*, catalogues the errors that led to the fall of Saigon in 1975, persuasively—if inelegantly—arguing that they could have been avoided. Walton maintains that Vietnam "has consistently been the most strategically misappraised of all U.S. conflicts." His work shows the path by which the experts' "tendency to view operational difficulties . . . as insurmountable barriers to U.S. victory" and their corresponding "reluctance to acknowledge that the United States had compensating advantages" have led us into moral as well as strategic confusion.

The Myth of Inevitable U.S. Defeat in Vietnam
by C. Dale Walton
Frank Cass, 176 pp., $45

Steel My Soldiers' Hearts
The Hopeless to Hardcore Transformation of the U.S. Army, 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry, Vietnam
by David H. Hackworth and Eilhys England
Rugged Land, 512 pp., $27.95

Real Lessons of the Vietnam War
Reflections Twenty-Five Years After the Fall of Saigon
edited by John Norton Moore and Robert F. Turner
Carolina Academic, 536 pp., $60

Walton rightly resists the temptation to pin American failure on a single problem—political, cultural, or military. But he turns that point around to make it a stinging indictment: "There were *numerous* roads to victory, but . . . Washington chose none of them." Victory, according to Walton, was attainable by means ranging from a slightly modified version of the limited-war strategy actually adopted to a full-blown invasion of the North. Properly aware of the limits of counterfactual arguments, Walton offers considerable evidence that his preferred alternatives (the hot pursuit of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces into their Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries and the effective coordination of the bombing campaigns in the North with the ground war in the South) were genuine possibilities at the time. A fear of Chinese intervention prevented leaders from availing themselves of either option.

The high point of *The Myth of Inevitable U.S. Defeat in Vietnam* is its analysis of how an independent and sustainable South Vietnam could have been attained relatively early by an intelligent prosecution of the ground war. Walton shows that the American commander, General William Westmoreland, was dealt a bad hand and then played it poorly. Washington refused him sufficient troops for simultaneously defeating both the enemy's

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main forces and their small, widely dispersed guerrilla cells. Westmoreland chose to put all his eggs in the search-and-destroy basket, first in the hopes of repeating early successes in major engagements, then in order to "attrit" an enemy constantly replenished by the North. Walton argues that Westmoreland should have instead cut his army's disproportionately long logistical tail and aggressively trained the South Vietnamese army in order to tap into its vast manpower; at the same time, he should have built up successful counterinsurgency programs. By so doing, the United States could have fought well in the big war *and* the small war, destroying "main force units" while "pacifying" rural areas.


Hulton / Archive

Meanwhile, for another recent author—Colonel David H. Hackworth—Vietnam was all about beating the guerrillas at their own game. *Steel My Soldiers' Hearts*, Hackworth's account of his third tour in Vietnam, is as riveting and profane as Walton's strategic analysis is sober and clinical. The book chronicles Hackworth's four-month transformation of a demoralized, ragtag battalion fighting in the Mekong Delta into a staggeringly effective force. Hackworth seems a combination of General Patton, Mel Gibson's stolid Colonel Moore in *We Were Soldiers*, and *M*A*S*H*'s gung-ho and slightly demented CIA officer, Colonel Flagg. But Hackworth's self-promotion and occasional recklessness can be forgiven in light of his well-attested tactical brilliance, devotion to his men, and ability to inspire by "leading from up front"—not to mention his (and his co-author and wife's) narrative gifts.

Hackworth's desire was to out-guerrilla the guerrillas. He put to good use the rule of thumb—anathema to doctrinaire Clausewitzians but heartily recommended by Machiavelli—that it's more important to avoid being hit by the enemy than it is to hit him. In the wrong hands, this principle could lead to the wasteful "search-and-*avoid*" tactics practiced by soldiers disgusted with Westmoreland's strategy of attrition. In Hackworth's hands it meant properly training his men to set ambush after ambush of their own, resulting in an astounding 100-to-1 ratio of enemy to friendly killed in action. Had commanders come within hailing distance of that rate, the Ho Chi Minh trail operating at full bore could never have supplied enough soldiers to threaten the independence of South Vietnam.

Hackworth's caution regarding the lives of his men didn't extend to himself. When in his absence several of his troops became trapped by heavy fire in an open field, Hackworth returned toward nightfall to find the thorniest tactical problem of his career: how to save them before dark without losing more men to an enemy lying in wait beyond a tree line offering perfect cover. Rather than order any of his 800 troops to attempt a dubious rescue, he commandeered several helicopters to provide covering fire. His helicopter riddled with bullet holes, Hackworth whisked the awestruck men away, an action that won him a recommendation (still pending) for virtually the only decoration he has yet to receive, the Medal of Honor.

Such stories sustain one into the second half of the book, but at that point Hackworth inserts into *Steel My Soldiers' Hearts* a long chapter on the heroism of the war's medics (already amply recounted) and another on the effects of wartime VD that reads about as well as a textbook description of a bad head cold. Curiously, the book is most wanting when it comes to describing what motivates soldiers. Hackworth repeats the by now well-worn military refrain that men fight and die not for patriotism or principle but only for each other. But such motivation seems insufficient, even for Hackworth. He describes a Viet Cong soldier who, as Hackworth's helicopter narrowed in and wounded him, continued firing long enough for his comrades to escape. Hackworth wonders, "How can you beat such fighting spirit? One man against a war machine. In a small way, his stand symbolized the war: a small backward country taking on a superpower and winning because its people believed their cause was right and stubbornly refused to give up." With this nod to the conventional belief in the inevitability of defeat, Hackworth seems to forget not only his own outstanding successes, but also our failure to nourish our soldiers' will to fight on the principles at stake in the war.

John Norton Moore and Robert F. Turner's *Real Lessons of the Vietnam War*, a compilation of papers from a conference held in 2000, has more to say regarding the principles guiding American involvement. The book's

only serious defect is that it appears to be a record of the conference containing superfluous material such as several brief, contentless "papers," and others wholly lacking supporting evidence. The result is a remarkably uneven volume. But summaries by five authors—including B.G. Burkett on the media, Lewis Sorley on the war's winnability, and Michael Lind on its necessity—of their book-length studies are useful to general readers.

The remaining chapters are aimed at serious students of the war. For instance, in a study of the legality and constitutionality of the war, Turner explodes the assumption—pervading nearly every other account—that the war arose from extra-constitutional executive usurpation of congressional authority. The historical case that the war was well authorized by a Congress aware of every major escalation is accompanied by a persuasive constitutional argument that war-making is an essentially executive function.

In the book's final chapter, Gregory H. Stanton takes aim at the standard portrayal of the bloodletting that swept Indochina, especially Cambodia, after the war. These atrocities are usually cast as a tragic turn in the cycle of violence initiated by American carpet-bombing of civilian areas. Though Stanton condemns this bombing, he rightly directs most of his moral fire at those who fail to see the perversity of blaming the United States for the Khmer Rouge's systematic killing of millions.

After our military success in the Gulf War, the first President Bush announced that we had kicked the "Vietnam Syndrome"—our sense that we could not, or even *should* not, win again. But for all its successes and difficulties, the Gulf War was less a test of our abilities and our endurance than was the Vietnam War. We need not balk at the fact that the current war on terrorism has more in common with Vietnam than with the Gulf War. By showing that our national failure arose not from blind fate but from deliberate policies and actions that could and should have been otherwise, these three books can help us to face it squarely and learn its real lessons well. ♦

BCA

Courtly Love

The Tale of Genji—a translation for our time of a work for all time. **BY LAURANCE WIEDER**

Like Homer and Shakespeare, Lady Murasaki occupies a place alone. Epic poetry begins with Homer. Shakespeare invented modern tragedy. Murasaki, a lady-in-waiting in the eleventh-century court of Imperial Japan, wrote the first and still the greatest psychological novel. Her *The Tale of Genji* offers moments straight out of Jane Austen, plots worthy of Henry James, and characters as complex as Marcel Proust's.

The Tale of Genji
by Murasaki Shikibu
translated by Royall Tyler
Viking, 1,174 pp., $60

The first time I read *The Tale of Genji*, in Arthur Waley's 1920s translation, I felt like William Butler Yeats encountering Byzantium. In Murasaki's tale of tenth-century Heian Imperial Japan, unlimited power and privilege enabled the fortunate to follow the promptings of the heart, for good or ill. With their singing and dancing and painting and poems, the courtiers and women of the palace are akin to the circle surrounding Queen Elizabeth I, but even more refined, and without Francis Walsingham—or the headsman. At least no word of such things reached the women's quarter, from where *The Tale of Genji* is told.

When Edward Seidensticker's version of Genji appeared in the mid-1970s, I read the novel a second time, paying more attention to the generation of sons that inhabits the last third of the novel, after Genji's death. Now the Australian Royall Tyler has produced yet another translation, my third encounter with Murasaki's vanished world. This time, it was much easier to keep track of who was who (characters in the Japanese don't have proper names, as in English, but are known by rank, or attribute, or family relation, all of which change over the course of a life), and to understand how much time elapsed between chapters. As the characters talk about women and men, or reflect upon the quality of another's calligraphy and skill at music, poetry, and craft, an entire world arises from the page—a world of love, ambition, intrigue, surprise, dashed hope and synesthetic splendor. Murasaki's *Tale of Genji* stands without equal as a nuanced meditation on human perfectibility, desire, and regret.

For those unfamiliar with this book—which is longer than all three volumes of *Lord of the Rings*, though shorter than *Remembrance of Things Past*—the first two-thirds of the novel follows the cradle-to-grave career of Genji, the Shining Prince. The story begins with the death of Genji's mother, the emperor's too-beloved minor consort. This early loss determines the trajectory of Genji's career, and frames the entire tale. The novel's first exchange occurs between the three-year-old Genji's dying mother and the emperor: "'You promised never to leave me, not even at the end,' [the emperor] said, 'and you cannot abandon me now! I will not let you!' She was so touched that she managed to breathe: '*Now the end has come, and I am filled with sorrow that our ways must part: the path I would rather take is the one that leads to life.* If only I had known . . .'"

In the key of that initial and final uncertainty, Murasaki composes life.

Laurance Wieder's forthcoming book of poems, Words to God's Music: A New Book of Psalms, *will be published by Eerdmans.*

Art Resource, NY

"Shining Genji: the name was imposing," the novelist observes at the beginning of her second chapter, "but not so its bearer's many deplorable lapses; and considering how quiet he kept his wanton ways, . . . whoever broadcast his secrets to all the world was a terrible gossip."

Physically beautiful, wealthy, powerful, cultured, talented, intelligent, and good-hearted favorite son though he was, Genji could not be named heir apparent. So the prince served the empire as a commoner. After experiencing one political setback, Genji rose to unrivalled eminence in the Heian Empire: unacknowledged father of one emperor (by the Empress Fujitsubo); father of an empress by his wife from exile, the Akashi Princess; grandfather to the heir apparent; chief minister. A master poet, gifted musician, fascinating dancer, irresistible lover, builder of palaces, connoisseur of the brushstroke, Genji for all his talents is nonetheless an attainable model of what human beings might be—while never denying the truth of what they are.

In many ways, *The Tale of Genji* is a success story like the life of King David. But where David is faithful to the God of Israel, Genji is faithful to his human attachments, to emotional obligations. Where David is the hero of history, Genji is the hero of domesticity. His lapses are rueful rather than sinful. He can have any woman he can see. His difficulties and failures have to do with establishing and sustaining intimacy, attaining not so much carnal union as mutual awareness. The barriers are sometimes erected by his public duties, sometimes by fortune. Whether his affairs succeeded or languished, Genji never forgot a woman—as Murasaki reminds us time and again. This is his perfection.

Western heroism is compounded of the convergence or dissonance of human impulse and divine law. The story of the Shining Prince oscillates between the frustration and fulfillment of waking desires and glimpses of other powers, other inklings from a world of dreams. The action occurs on the border between the material present and the fullness of time. Here, as in both our sacred and our psychologized world, there are no accidents, only hidden purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the great thing is to know.

The impulses and attachments of Murasaki's characters puzzle those characters as much as they puzzle readers. Musing on his marriage to the daughter of the Akashi prince during a political exile from the capital—an attraction built on the woman's rumored existence and her reputation for musical talent—Genji remarked: "We must have had some connection in a previous life."

Just what "connection in a previous life" might entail is revealed in the story of Genji and his young lady (also known as Murasaki). While still in his teens and on one of his first journeys away from the palace, Genji caught sight of a ten-year-old girl through a brushwood fence. "The little girl sat down. She had a very dear face, and the faint arc of her eyebrows, the forehead from which she had childishly swept back her hair, and the hairline itself were extremely pretty. *She* is the one I would like to see when she grows up! Genji thought, fascinated. Indeed, he wept when he realized that it was her close resemblance to the lady who claimed all his heart that made it impossible for him to take his eyes off her."

The child was the niece and image of the Empress Fujitsubo; Fujitsubo was Genji's childhood companion in the palace and first great love. Encouraged to keep each other company by the old emperor—Fujitsubo's husband, Genji's father—the pair once met secretly. The child of that covert connection became the heir apparent. Genji's young lady Murasaki resembled Fujitsubo, yet it was also said that the empress looked very like Genji's mother.

Perhaps that was why the emperor had chosen that young girl to console him after the early death of his beloved favorite. Spiriting Murasaki away from her guardians before her father recalled her existence, Genji established young Murasaki in a wing of his palace. There he personally educated

and trained the child to be his life's companion.

The Tale of Genji is a spiritual journey, religious in the personal rather than the institutional sense. What might be mistaken for an overdeveloped aestheticism and emotional pulse-taking are expressions of an impulse to know as much as possible about the fashioned and social world. Genji's whole being is engaged in finding a way to navigate the waters of this life through attachments and feelings. Love and loss, beauty and time solemnize every act, every appreciation—a kind of talmudic connoisseurship attentive to the scent, the overtone, the implication of every gesture. Feeling is meaning—and endures.

The characters in *The Tale of Genji* act on impulse and weigh their actions against custom and opportunity. Dreams also exert a force and presence in waking life. This is not some atavistic streak of superstition or of magic. Rather, dreams in this world are a dialogue with or eavesdropped hints from outside the limits of waking vision. Dreams are not to be dismissed as glosses on desire, or as oraculations.

One striking example of the interpenetration of dream and policy is found in a letter the Akashi Prince wrote to his daughter after his granddaughter gave birth to the heir apparent (making the old father the future Emperor's great-great-grandfather). The letter explained how he was able to raise his daughter for a great destiny and sustain his courage all those years in exile from court: "My dear," he wrote, "one night in the second month of the year when you were born, I had a dream. My right hand held up Mount Sumeru, and to the mountain's right and left the sun and moon shed their brightness on the world. I myself stood below, in the shadows under the mountain, and their light did not reach me. I then set the mountain afloat on a vast ocean, boarded a little boat, and rowed away toward the west. That was my dream. I then woke up, and that very morning I, even I, began to hope." The dream tableau was more than a picture. As the father wrote his daughter, "Then you were conceived. After that, both secular writings and the scriptures gave me so many reasons to believe in dreams that although unworthy I was awed, and I sought to rear you fittingly. . . . Our young lady has become Mother of the Realm and all that I have prayed for is accomplished. Doubt is no longer possible."

After a valedictory couplet, the old man cautioned: "Do not seek to know the month and day of my death. . . . Whatever pleasures this life offers, do not forget the life to come. We shall meet again, as long as I reach the place where I long to go."

Art Resource, NY

For a novel written in the eleventh century about a world that even then had vanished, in a translation that has to fold in stylized and alien-to-English poetic forms, *The Tale of Genji* is amazingly fresh and immediate. At least two springs feed the well.

To begin with, *The Tale of Genji* is a performance. Homer and Shakespeare's immediacy flows in part from the doing of voices and acting of parts, whether their tales were told after a banquet, in the marketplace, beside a campfire, or at the Globe. For Murasaki, the act of composition is a performance. Large enough to contain the practice of all the other arts, her novel is an improvisation in the same way that the poems her characters produce on occasions are improvised. Not naive, not ignorant, well practiced, yet able to make a stroke like the calligrapher's or watercolorist's brush when the moment arises, Murasaki wrote a book that assumes a reader. *The Tale of Genji* is an extended confidence.

Another source of Murasaki's vitality is the way she tells her story: as a poised, balanced, omniscient participant. Her book is graceful, knowing, ambiguous, horrific, smiling, an immersion in duration. *The Tale of Genji* speaks directly to those who would like not to make a muddle of life, who need to come to terms with mortality, loss, and misapprehension, rather than with glory, triumph, and everlasting fame. The self-consciousness, appreciation for ideas, unerring taste—all this in a form so indissoluble from its content, so beyond fashion, that the chapter where Genji dies is entitled "Vanished into the Clouds," and is blank.

Henry James thought that a story should go on for as long as the thing hangs together and not beyond. *The Tale of Genji* ends some 335 pages and twenty years after the death of its central character. The narrative or karmic thread, which began with the too-passionate and ill-fated love between the emperor and Genji's mother, unspools in the following generation with the disappointment of Genji's putative son, Kaoru. This sorry heir of the Shining Prince dispatches the last poem in the book: "*Following the path I trusted would take me to a teacher of the Law, / I lost my way and wandered a mountain never sought.* Have you forgotten this boy? I keep him beside me in memory of someone who vanished without a trace."

Of course, everyone vanishes without a trace eventually. But some still seem more permanent than others, and some memories are more persistent than most, which slide away like water. That is why stories get told. Murasaki, the most omniscient and honest of narrators, began her story one generation before her hero and concluded it one generation after—stopping at the moment it no longer hangs together. ♦

Books in Brief

Shooting Straight: Telling the Truth about Guns in America **by Wayne LaPierre and James J. Baker (Regnery, 202 pp., $27.95) and *Can Gun Control Work?* by James B. Jacobs (Oxford University Press, 288 pp., $27.50).** Read these two books and you'll discover a curious thing: The case against gun control is made better by a left-wing academic than it is by the leaders of the nation's foremost pro-gun lobbying group.

LaPierre, the NRA's executive vice president, and Baker, a former director of its lobbying arm, have produced a book that is windy, sloppy, and unenlightening—padded with white space, pulled quotations, a speech by Senator Zell Miller, and off-topic rants about subjects ranging from tort law to Oliver Stone. Worse, it doesn't show even the most perfunctory signs of fact-checking: The authors use outdated crime statistics, take on straw men that even the most zealous gun-control groups have stopped talking about, and even mistype the names of such well-known organizations as AOL Time Warner. LaPierre and Baker offer almost no original thoughts: Their short chapters combine oft-repeated pro-gun arguments with random dollops of commonsense advice about fighting terrorism. They even claim that Israel has permissive gun laws, though Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership—a group that equates nearly all gun regulations with Nazism—finds that it does not. LaPierre and Baker repeatedly put forward the sensible idea that an armed citizenry provides good protection against terror attacks, but they support it with little more than quotations from Teddy Roosevelt and boasts about the NRA.

Meanwhile, NYU professor James B. Jacobs, a former student of the prominent left-wing criminologist Franklin Zimring, is hardly the person one would expect to make LaPierre and Baker's arguments for them. He "assumes that guns are a problem" and says, repeatedly, that he has no ideological problem with efforts to limit the availability of firearms. In spite of himself, however, he makes a compelling case against existing gun-control measures and the wisdom of new ones. Jacobs's lucid history of twentieth-century gun control and its abject failure in preventing crime is a good reason to read *Can Gun Control Work?*

Unlike most scholars—not to mention a great many politicians—Jacobs has taken the time to understand how guns actually work and which groups of people firearms regulations typically harm. He comes up with a modest series of proposals: improved efforts to catch criminals who use or possess guns (a proposal LaPierre and Baker also endorse); a total ban on gun shows; one-gun-per-month restrictions on purchasers; and devolution of many gun-policy issues to the state and local level.

Although an all-out ban on gun shows seems extreme given the scanty evidence that criminals get weapons there, Jacobs still makes a convincing case that such shows are "tailor-made for selling stolen guns and . . . avoiding . . . background checks." Most refreshingly, Jacobs acknowledges that the 1990s' epic decreases in crime—along with the preceding decades' increases—had little to do with guns and suggests that policymakers could better direct their energy and attention elsewhere.

—Eli Lehrer

The War Against the Terror Masters: Why It Happened. Where We Are Now. How We'll Win **by Michael A. Ledeen (St. Martin's, 262 pp., $24.95).** We neither foresaw nor forestalled the attacks of September 11—but we could have, and our "primary failure," says Michael Ledeen, "was political, a lack of will." If that's true, then the terrorists made a terrible miscalculation when they escalated their attacks to destroy the World Trade Center. The long series of small murders and petty slaughters since the 1970s—an American Jew here, a pair of Marines there, even a destroyed barracks and a downed airplane—seemed to be sapping our will. September 11 restored it, and Ledeen, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, sets forth a quick and readable case for the political and military steps necessary to translate that will into success.

—J. Bottum

Not a Parody

Lebanese model Nathaly Fadlallah models the "Dress of the Revolution," a tribute to Palestinian terrorism, at a fashion festival in Beirut, Sept. 17, 2002. Replete with faux bloodstains and bullet holes, the dress is the work of Saudi haute couture designer Yehya al-Bashri.

Intifada Chic



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United States–European Union Split

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Old habits die hard. The West European democracies have a history of tossing the weak off the speeding sled in hopes of appeasing the wolves. Czechoslovakia was tossed off the Anglo-French sled in 1938 to satisfy a ravening Hitler. When the Soviet satellites rose in rebellion in 1953, 1956, and 1968 against the Kremlin tyrants, the bordering West European democracies did nothing. Their behavior then as now is reminiscent of Benjamin Disraeli's judgment of English statesman Sir Robert Peel: "His judgment was faultless provided he had not to deal with the future." That the Soviet Union finally fell has little to do with Western Europe and everything to do with President Ronald Reagan. Had it been up to continental Europe in the 1980s there would still be a Bolshevik Russia.

The United States is now the victim that the European Union (EU) would like to toss off the sled. Fortunately, we are not in the EU sled, nor, despite the pressing invitations, do we intend to get on. **The EU is building up the United States as the rogue elephant superpower whom it is trying to cage.** What an amnesiac EU forgets is that it is not the United States alone that is the Islamist target but Western civilization itself. Czechoslovakia was to be Hitler's last target; he even signed a piece of paper to that effect. Neville Chamberlain (England) and Edouard Daladier (France) scoffed at the notion that Hitler's real target was the West European democracies. And today? I'm not sure whom the EU regards as the greater threat to world peace: America or Saddam Hussein? Perhaps French president Jacques Chirac really believes that the terrorist wing among the Islamist migrants who live in high-rise slums outside of Paris is dreaming of the day when they become part of the French haute bourgeoisie.

A recent episode demonstrates the EU finger-in-the-eye attitude toward America. Last year the *New York Times* reported on May 4 what in effect was a victory for Europe over the United States: "In a move that reflected a growing frustration with America's attitude toward international organizations and treaties, the United States was voted off the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR) today for the first time since the panel's founding under American leadership in 1947. . . . The unexpected move, which came in a secret vote, was apparently supported even by some friends of the United States. . . . Friends of the United States in Europe and elsewhere have grown increasingly impatient, disappointed and annoyed with actions by Washington."

So to get even with the United States, they elected these undeviating violators of human rights: China, Cuba, Syria, Libya, and, unbelievably, slaveholding Sudan. And even more unbelievable, the CHR has just elected Libya as its chair!

Western Europe has made its choice: keep Saddam Hussein in power. President Bush says no. We are virtually alone in our determination to go to war against the Iraqi dictatorship. So was Britain in 1940 when Winston Churchill took over the reins of a tottering nation. The difference today is that the United States is not tottering.

— Arnold Beichman



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