the weekly Standard

JUNE 24, 2002

$3.95

BIOTECH LOSES ITS INNOCENCE
ERIC COHEN

All the King's Architects

The surprising success of Prince Charles's anti-modernist crusade

by Catesby Leigh

A world of ideas on public policy.

Europe Must Improve its Pharmaceutical Competitiveness

by Fabio Pammolli

Pharmaceuticals have long been a strategic economic sector for Europe. They have contributed greatly to the continent's balance of trade in high-technology, research-intensive fields. In recent years, however, Europe's pharmaceutical sector has come under considerable pressure. In a recent study, several colleagues and I found that European pharmaceutical firms have become less competitive vis-à-vis U.S. companies, and are losing ground in terms of innovative capabilities and performance.

Reversing a previous trend, Europe's pharmaceutical market grew more slowly than the U.S. market throughout the 1990s. This relative decline resulted from a slowdown in Europe's own market growth and an increase in U.S. growth. American pharmaceutical firms rely heavily on high-tech, non-labor inputs, while those in Europe are far more labor-intensive. Investment in pharmaceutical R&D fuelled U.S. market expansion throughout the '90s, while Europe's pharmaceutical-sector growth depended on factors other than R&D, capital, or labor. In other words, capital and R&D investment in Europe has translated less markedly into sales growth.

When we compare new-product sales of leading pharmaceutical firms in Europe and the United States, we find that sales by U.S. multinationals grew far more rapidly than those of European multinationals, even though companies in both markets discovered and developed equivalent numbers of new medicines. Among the explanations for Europe's relative sales weakness are, first, a growing U.S. advantage in sales generated by new medicines, and second, a trend towards relative obsolescence in European corporate drug portfolios.

During the 1990s, the United States supplanted Europe as the seat of pharmaceutical innovation. This is, in part, because the United States fostered a division of labor between smaller biotech companies specializing in drug discovery and larger firms adept at commercializing new products. The U.S. comparative advantage is also evident in the greater use by U.S. firms of new drug development tools such as genomics and high-throughput screening. Because European companies have been content to rely on technological advances generated by U.S. firms, they have forfeited a critical source of growth.

> ***EU member-state governments should guarantee and enforce strong patent protection for innovative medicines, and… avoid excessive intervention in pharmaceutical markets in ways that restrict patient access and discourage innovative research***

Specific frameworks to regulate prices have exacerbated the lack of competition in some European pharmaceutical markets, causing greater inefficiency. Some countries – especially those that have adopted systems to regulate drug prices in order to protect marginal local companies – have seen no significant fluctuation in prices or market share, both of which would normally decline as patents expire and generics enter the market.

Europe's pharmaceutical sector must address its relative disadvantage in technological innovation vis-à-vis the United States. To excel in this area, Europe must upgrade its research base to ensure that its scientists have a solid biomedical educational and research infrastructure. Although extremely high-level research communities exist at the national level, they are fragmented, frequently small-scale, and often cosseted by state protection. Integration of labor markets for researchers and competition among research units in a system based on peer-review constitute an important component of this process.

Without question, Europe's pharmaceutical sector needs an integrated research infrastructure, as well as more links with university-based researchers. Greater collaboration among Europe's public research institutions and private firms would boost research productivity, without minute segmentation of development efforts.

Europe can most effectively boost its competitiveness by abandoning protectionist pricing and marketing strategies that discourage pharmaceutical innovation. European Union (EU) member-state governments should guarantee and enforce strong patent protection for innovative medicines, and their national health authorities should avoid excessive intervention in pharmaceutical markets in ways that restrict patient access and discourage innovative research. In particular, EU countries should foster a wider variety of mechanisms and sources for financing healthcare and pharmaceuticals, and they should adopt more open formularies as a way to spur market competition.

Movement toward a more market-based environment will become even more important as the EU expands to include Central and East European countries. If enlargement takes place within a market-oriented context, it can help to make Europe's pharmaceutical sector more globally competitive. If not, enlargement might simply aggravate the existing distortions.

Fabio Pammolli (pammolli@cln.it) is Professor of Economics and Management at the University of Florence in Italy. This article is based on a longer study entitled* "Global Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals: A European Perspective" *(November 2000), co-authored with Alfonso Gambardella and Luigi Orsenigo. The full study can be found at http://www.unisi.it/epris/abstract/pdf/pharma.pdf

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the weekly Standard

THE WEEKLY STANDARD (ISSN 1083-3013) is published weekly (except the second week in January, the fourth week in April, the second week in July, and the fourth week in August) by News America Incorporated, 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036. Periodicals postage paid at New York, NY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. For subscription customer service in the United States, call 1-800-274-7293. For new subscription orders, please call 1-800-283-2014. Subscribers: Please send new subscription orders to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96153, Washington, DC 20090-6153; changes of address to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. Please include your latest magazine mailing label. Allow 3 to 5 weeks for arrival of first copy and address changes. Yearly subscriptions, $78.00. Canadian/foreign orders require additional postage and must be paid in full prior to commencement of service. Canadian/foreign subscribers may call 1-850-682-7653 for subscription inquiries. Visa/MasterCard payment accepted. Cover price, $3.95. Back issues, $3.95 (includes postage and handling). Send manuscripts and letters to the editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Suite 505, Washington, DC 20036-4617. Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. For a copy of THE WEEKLY STANDARD Privacy Policy, visit www.weeklystandard.com or write to Customer Service, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th St., NW, Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20036. THE WEEKLY STANDARD Advertising Sales Office in Washington, DC, is 1-202-293-4900. Advertising Production: Call John L. Mackall 1-202-496-3354.

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The Problem of the Law-Abiding Terrorist

There were two civil-liberties sob stories in the news last week. The better known is the case of the "dirty bomber" and U.S. citizen Abdullah al Muhajir (né Jose Padilla), an al Qaeda associate who was snatched up entering the country on May 8 and turned over to the military last week to be held and questioned. The second is that of Nabil Almarabh, who is maddeningly and typically referred to as a "former Boston cab driver," though he is credibly suspected of having been a consequential figure in al Qaeda's North American operations before September 11. He has been detained since last September as a material witness to the attacks, and after spending eight months in solitary confinement without legal representation, was charged in late May with relatively trivial violations of immigration law.

What both these cases raise is what THE SCRAPBOOK hereby dubs the problem of the law-abiding terrorist. If the well-founded suspicions about them are true, these are extremely dangerous men. But it is not conceptually helpful to think of them as *criminals*; rather, they are *enemies*. And we can't wait for them to become criminals before we round them up. Obviously, the reason Almarabh has been confined is not that the FBI is too busy admiring its jackboots to know what to do with him. It's pretty clear that they know exactly what they're doing, and it has nothing to do with immigration-law violations. One, by detaining him in solitary confinement for as long as possible, they hope to break the guy's will and get him talking; two, they're afraid simply to deport him. He might take part in an al Qaeda plot against America or one of our allies.

Obviously, there are differences between how we will want to treat enemy-citizens like al Muhajir and enemy-aliens like Almarabh. But the Bush administration is clearly on the right track in making the interrogation and detention of such men a priority. Indeed, the defense-lawyer bellyaching about such cases has the effect of reassuring one that the right eggs are being broken in the making of the homeland-security omelette.

The administration may not yet have done an optimal job of articulating this distinction between criminals and enemies. But it's clearly keeping them up late, as can be seen in this overlooked Donald Rumsfeld interview with editors and reporters of the *Washington Post* on June 3. (The full text is available at *www.dod.gov/news/Jun2002/t06042002_t0603edb.html*.)

"RUMSFELD: We are constantly putting pressure on [al Qaeda] every time we arrest somebody in some country around the world and start asking questions and learn a little bit more. Then that whole network knows that [inaudible] was arrested and he's being asked those questions and he may or may not be providing information.

"The problem we've got is the one you're seeing manifested in the press [and] to a certain extent in our society. That is the tension between treating something as a law enforcement problem and treating it as an intelligence-gathering problem, and that is not an easy thing to deal with for a country that has historically [not had] a domestic intelligence-gathering entity. Most countries do. Anything that comes up in the United States tends to be looked at as a law enforcement matter. Gee, we just found this person doing something they shouldn't have, let's go punish them. Give them their rights, stick them in a jail, hire a lawyer at government expense and decide whether or not he's guilty or innocent and give him due process.

"Of course if you're worried . . . that you've got the risk of terrorists getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction or killing thousands or tens of thousands of people, you're not terribly interested in whether or not the person is potentially a subject for law enforcement. Your interest is what in the world do you do to find out what that person knows so that you can prevent an attack with thousands more Americans being killed, and that is a mindset that does not even exist domestically in our country. It doesn't exist in the population, it does not exist in the press, it does not exist in how our government is organized and arranged. . . .

"But here, once somebody is in the Justice Department they are looked at as a law enforcement problem as opposed to an intelligence-gathering problem. Therefore the question is how do you deal with that? It is not an easy question for us and we've got a lot of good, fine people who are worrying that through and wondering what that all means in our society." ♦

Wacky Journalists

THE SCRAPBOOK is a little late on this one; all the people involved have probably already been hired to write editorials for the *New York Times*. Just the same, let's hie on over to *www.journalism.berkeley.edu/alumni/enews0202.html* and get a behind-the-scenes look at Professional Journalism, elite graduate school division. The link is to the University of California, Berkeley School of Journalism's electronic alumni newsletter for February 2002.

One is instantly struck by the newsletter's very first item, written in the J-School's institutional voice, which describes how "Former President Bill

Clinton addressed an adoring full house at Zellerbach Hall on the UC Berkeley campus on Tuesday in an event sponsored by the Journalism School." Granted, THE SCRAPBOOK never went to journalism school, so maybe we're just naive. But still, isn't it . . . um, unusual for journalists to serve as—much less announce themselves to be—a politician's "adoring" audience?

Anyway, the real eye-opener in Berkeley Journalism's alumni newsletter is the dispatch it publishes, in the form of a letter to Professor David Littlejohn, from one Malcolm Garcia, Class of '97. Note please: Mr. Garcia has already graduated. He already has a big-league job, covering a major foreign war for a major American newspaper chain, the Knight Ridder Newspapers. What's that like, you wonder?

"Dear David," Garcia begins. "Arrived about 4-5 weeks ago in Kabul and have been working ever since." Turns out they shoot off actual weapons in a major foreign war and there are "shell casings all over the place," which is "kind of a trip." Garcia finds that "when I am ensconced on the thrown [sic] with my jeans around my ankles and shivering and hear gunfire at night, I feel a certain kind of vulnerability that goes behind [sic] wondering if we're out of toilet paper."

But mostly, Malcolm Garcia is having a ball!

"Saw Rumsfeld today at the airbase. . . . At one point the PIO cut off my probing questions about policy (do you think marijuana should be legalized, things like that that had nothing to do with the price of butter but I felt like twisting the minds of 21 year olds) and said, 'They are trained to fight, not think.' Ahh, the world we live in. I hang out with a wacky freelance guy out of Bangkok. He walked up to the Secret Service guys who had leather pistol grips inside their thighs and said, 'So tell me about this bondage thing you're into.' Then, to some of the soldiers, 'So if you unlock your safety's [sic], you could just blow Rummy away, right?' He's a perfect match for me and behind the insanity a very good reporter."

Great business we're in, huh? ♦

China Stall

Why is the Bush administration sitting on a long-completed report on China's military power? By law, the Pentagon is required to produce an annual report on Beijing's military strategies and capabilities. And it's an open secret in Washington that the report has been done for some time now. Senior officials on the National Security Council staff and at the State and Defense departments, however, continue to block its release, apparently afraid that its frank assessment of where the Chinese military build-up is headed will complicate relations with Beijing. The irony of course is that the previous version of the report dates from the Clinton administration and was widely respected for its blunt but careful analysis of China's military plans. You would think an administration whose president has said he would do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan would want to make public what in fact it would take. ♦

Casual

Shuttered Thoughts

From early adolescence, I never doubted that my writerly life would lead me into a romantic European exile. I was right. Here I am! Just like Goethe, just like Henry James: standing on the edge of Lake Como, staring a mile across the water at the wall of pine-speckled, auburn-colored Alps that rears up behind a row of villas, gardens, and sailboats. Okay, not standing, exactly, more like stooped over and pecking nearsightedly at my laptop. And maybe a week doesn't count as an exile. But it's enough to bring a rush of writerly thoughts to mind.

Unfortunately, they're all shit-in-the-shuttered-château thoughts. By these I mean the ones Philip Larkin evoked in his most burningly jealous poem, which describes his own writerly routine. Larkin scratched out poems in hours stolen from his job as a university librarian. This was not the writing life as he'd imagined it in his youthful fantasies, which dogged him well into middle age. This was literature as lived by:

The shit in the shuttered château
Who does his five hundred words
Then parts out the rest of the day
Between bathing and booze and birds.

The bathing and booze and birds must be across the lake, where the novelists live. This is the *conference* part of the lake, where writers of my sort get to discuss the "European-American Security Landscape after September 11" and related topics. But don't think I'm jealous. Just substitute "working lunch" for bathing and "roundtable discussion" for booze, and it's the same literary life. We journalists are artists, too.

But of course we're not. This was something Rilke understood when, in his *Letters to a Young Poet*, he wrote to congratulate his correspondent for having enlisted in the army: "Art too is just a way of living," Rilke wrote, "and however one lives, one can, without knowing, prepare for it; in everything real one is closer to it, more its neighbor, than in the unreal half-artistic professions, which, while they pretend to be close to art, in practice deny and attack the existence of all art—as, for example, all of journalism does and almost all criticism and three quarters of what is called (and wants to be called) literature." I believe I committed that passage to memory before I became a journalist.


Darren Gygi

There's no arguing with Rilke. If that guy thinks you're poetic, you can take it to the bank. And, to follow his reckoning that one is more poetic in "everything real," it's the arms-control specialists and the union-hall political hacks at this conference who are the real poets, not us novelists *manqués* gazing goofily across the lake, pretending we're F. Scott Fitzgerald.

If political journalists don't suffer "real writer"-envy, they ought to. You wonder how they (we) live with them-(our-)selves. Political journalists all belong to one of two types. Some are political junkies who want to be politicians and have all the necessary insight to do so, but lack the God-given pizzazz—so they take a job that allows them to be in the presence of politicians. They're like the kid who knows exactly how to slam-dunk, but happens to be 5'2"—and so becomes the trainer on the high school basketball team. Then there are the better kind, my kind, in fact: those born denizens of the shuttered château, who would abide there today but for some petty piece of bad luck (slobbering inarticulacy, say, or abject laziness). We're different. We're more like . . . well, we're like the *other* trainer on the high school basketball team.

This brings me close to admitting that political journalists all belong to one type: failures. Most learn to make a virtue of necessity—I've heard even ballet critics dismiss any attempt to treat them as writers with a scornful, "Nah. Ah'm jessa beat reporter." But as long as reporting consists largely of trying to find a comfortable spot in a hotel room without a chair, and spending an hour working up the nerve to call some local political hack who doesn't want to talk to you, the shuttered château will probably continue to beckon.

For me, at least, it looks like help is on the way. At the conference a European delegate told me stories of how Western aid workers in the mid-1990s provoked resentment in the Balkans. One "development facilitator" in Bosnia was a bossy American girl of 24, whose job "qualifications" consisted of her having worked for two years after college in an "interracial high school." She got not only $120,000 a year but also a driver (a Bosnian former surgeon), a cook (a Bosnian former fashion designer), and a gardener (a Bosnian former dentist). Is that a great setup for a novel or what?

And suddenly, it's evident what all this research, all this "reporting," has been for. Right now, I'm just worried about getting the novel finished. I figure the film will take care of itself. As will the château. I already have it picked out. It's the one over there on the left, behind those yachts.

Christopher Caldwell

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Congress Avoids Its Job

In two recent editions of The Weekly Standard, Robert Kagan and William Kristol have argued for a nonpartisan committee to investigate what happened in the intelligence community and to see if pre-September 11 information was bungled ("Time for an Investigation," May 27 and "Still Time for an Investigation," June 10). Kagan and Kristol claim that Congress is too partisan to make an adequate determination and uncover anything meaningful. I disagree.

The U.S. Constitution puts oversight in the hands of Congress. This is where it belongs. These are the people we elected to serve us. Maybe I am naive in believing that they are answerable to us and should therefore do the job for which they were elected. If we do not have the faith in our elected representatives to do the oversight, then we are electing the wrong people to Congress.

Just exactly whom would Kagan and Kristol appoint to their commission? Any accountability that would be present with a congressional committee would be absent with an appointed one. Most commissions are filled with retired political hacks planning to supplement their political retirement with the consulting fees we pay them. They could stretch out the investigation as long as they wish without any meaningful information being made public. It would be a challenge to find enough individuals who would be unbiased and diligent in their duty to this "blue-ribbon commission." People have political opinions, and their opinions will guide them to their findings.

Vice President Dick Cheney is concerned about safeguarding our secrets for national security. He should be. The more people are privy to sensitive information the greater the chance of a leak. But on the other hand, Senator Patrick Leahy has been accused of leaking secrets. At least with Congress we have a better chance of safeguarding the information that may be detrimental to our war effort.

We elect our congressional representatives to be partisan in running the government. Partisanship is part of politics. With oversight at least both sides of the issue—especially since the House is Republican and the Senate Democratic—would be forthcoming.

Arnold Krabbenhoft
Tremonton, UT

Prize-Winning Fiction

A toast to David Skinner for keeping the Michael Bellesiles incident alive with "The Cowards of Academe" (June 10). I remember the storm *Arming America* stirred when it hit the shelves two years ago, complete with unwavering praise from liberal intellectual circles.

Bellesiles was fast and loose with his facts, and that bothered me greatly. He had written an opinionated fantasy that

was being passed off as history. I would have had more respect for him if he had just sat down and written a 200-page treatise against the Second Amendment.

It seems Skinner caught Bellesiles supporters by surprise, judging by the uncoordinated—even rude—responses he got from them. We should never forget that Michael Bellesiles's book belongs in the fiction section.

Richard Brownell
Brooklyn, NY

Shameful Secrets

I graduated from a Jesuit college in Maryland that seems to be wholeheartedly ashamed of its Catholicism. The phenomenon described in Paul Shaughnessy's "Passionate Uncertainty: Inside the American Jesuits" (June 3) was thus quite familiar to me. Though my college allows a pro-life group to meet on campus, no one seems to feel any pangs of guilt about inviting pro-choice speakers to address the student body. The school's official motto is "Strong Truths Well Lived," but its unofficial motto has become, "Sssshhh . . . Don't Tell Anyone We're Catholic Or We'll Lose All Our Money." As long as the Jesuits remain ashamed of their Catholicism, I will remain ashamed of the Jesuits.

Paul L. Turner
Glen Burnie, MD

The Law is a Morass

Was the FBI really constrained by lawyers and judges and procedural issues before September 11 as David Tell claims in "The Law Is a Ass" (June 10)? Come on. You guys have been in Washington too long.

All they had to do was make a list of hijacking "prospects": Islamic aliens who had been trained to fly commercial jets. Set up a system with airline security, and have sky marshals standing by at major airports. When one of the prospects checked in for a flight, put a visibly armed marshal on the plane.

Had this simple system been installed before September 11, most or all of the planes that crashed would have had marshals aboard. From that point on, the outcome would have been up to the marshals and the terrorists—but the FBI would have been off the hook.

Don't forget, it's not just the Minneapolis and Phoenix memos. The owner of the flight school in Florida where Atta trained says he also contacted the FBI. If he had gone to the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*, or The Weekly Standard for that matter—don't you think something more would have been done?

Phil Miller
Annandale, VA

The real story appears between the lines of "The Law Is a Ass": The federal government has failed miserably in

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Two years ago, we made a promise to the United Nations: America would pay its overdue UN bills, a debt that was straining the UN's ability to do its job. For the last two years, we've kept our promise and helped the UN make a difference.

But with a third payment still due, we haven't kept the promise of the 1999 Helms-Biden legislation. We should do so now. Congress should act quickly to complete legislation to settle our UN debt.

At a time when U.S. leadership in the United Nations is so important to the success of the UN's efforts around the world, we must keep our promise.

Honor our Commitment to the United Nations.

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its first Constitutional duties. It is too busy engineering society and redistributing wealth—two powers that are not enumerated—to attend to more essential functions. When a sports team performs poorly, it goes "back to basics." I fear that we have not yet suffered a sufficient blow to bring a similar notion to the consciousness of our decadent culture.

I cannot help but wonder if a death wish permeates the ongoing debates regarding ethnic profiling and the cushy treatment of the prisoners at Guantanamo. Will the American experiment extinguish itself for want of a societal survival instinct born of the sense that it is indeed worth saving? Perhaps we are about to witness the ultimate victory of modern liberalism: the destruction of America and its history. This has been accomplished by converting the firm ground of the Constitution as written into the slippery bog in which we now find ourselves mired.

Tell's editorial might have been more accurately titled "The Law Is a Morass."

STEVEN CHERNUS
Pittsburgh,PA

THE LAW is not an "ass." The law cannot pass a law.

Both parties in America have been passing laws for over thirty years that weaken the ability of anyone to protect Americans. Bush is just one more in a long line of not-so-conservatives who play the politically correct game that could result in the deaths of thousands of Americans, not just those in the World Trade Center and Pentagon massacres.

Police departments are punished for using common sense techniques like racial profiling, one of the very best tools to catch criminals and terrorists. President George W. Bush even railed at the airlines when his Arab Secret Service agent was pulled off an airliner immediately after September 11.

Crafting policies that root Islamic terrorists out of the United States and keep them out should be our leaders' number-one priority; that makes civil liberties for potential terrorists a distant second.

DON RORSCHACH
Irving, TX

IN ADDITION to the bureaucratic protocol at federal agencies that may or may not have led to September 11, I believe liberal policies and a politically correct mentality are in many ways equally as threatening to our way of life. This is particularly true when it comes to issues relating to national security.

And while everyone is interested in finger-pointing, we cannot forget former president Bill Clinton. His lenient foreign policy and his behavior in general combined to ensure the terrorists that America was ripe for an attack.

CHUCK GALLUP
Seattle, WA

O CANADA!

AS A CANADIAN, I disagree with Lionel Chetwynd's belief that United Nations peacekeeping duties are necessarily humiliating, but on his other points in "Dulce et Decorum Est" (June 3), he is right on the money.

A thought that has occurred to me since the deaths of four members of the Canadian military in April is that there was a disparity between the American media coverage of this event and of an earlier event involving Canadians that was less significant in any important context.

During the Salt Lake City Olympics earlier this year, many Canadians could be forgiven in thinking that the Americans regarded the actions of figure-skating judges who under-scored skaters Jamie Sale and David Pelletier as a grave insult to Canada and something that should be rectified immediately. Yet nary a peep was heard in the American media regarding the first Canadian wartime fatalities since the Korean War. Their silence was inexcusable.

ANDREW NORRIS
Canada

I APPRECIATE Lionel Chetwynd's "Dulce et Decorum Est," about the four Canadian soldiers tragically killed in April by "friendly fire." As an Air National Guardsman, I had the pleasure of spending two weeks at a Canadian Air Force Base in August of last year. I like and admire the Canadian military tremendously.

Chetwynd inspired me to sit down and write a letter of condolence to the Consul General of Canada here in Atlanta. I wish Americans would take time to thank all of the countries that stand with us against terrorism.

BILL BROCKMAN
Atlanta, GA

IN SEARCH OF A GOOD FRY

I CLIPPED David Brooks's Casual "The Fryers Club" (May 27), not because it brings to mind the vagaries of good and bad french fries but because it states so eloquently and with such wonderfully ironic humor the sad truth that "the key to success in this world is having the ability to focus an entire lifetime's worth of fevered zealotry on one trivial thing, product line, or concept." Brooks's example is of course Ray Kroc's infatuation with the french fry.

Since I read the article, the words "Find Your Fry! Follow Your Fry!" have echoed a thousand times in my mind. Each time, I smile. In one sense, you have to love America. I'm glad there are those out there who can find their fry and make it the alpha and omega of their existence, if for no other reason than that they give birth to the creative genius of such writers as David Brooks.

If Brooks can pen such penetrating insights about such seemingly trivial objects, what other priceless nuggets lurk in the pages of THE WEEKLY STANDARD?

DIANE OTTLINGER
Folsom, CA

• • •

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The Problem with K Street Conservatism

It must be miserable to be on the Democratic left. For decades you've been inveighing against the evils of corporate power. For decades you've been waiting for a popular backlash against concentrated wealth, one that would finally provide momentum for the liberal economic policies you've been championing all along—for redistribution, for tighter regulations on business, for bigger and more active government.

And then suddenly, the moment comes! Almost everyone acknowledges that income inequality is on the rise. The rich are getting richer. The dot-com collapse has exposed the foolishness of the investor class. You've got the most corporate presidential administration in history, topped by two former oil executives and a former aluminum CEO. Then come a series of business scandals that exemplify a level of corporate greed that surpasses even your most pinko fantasies—Enron, Arthur Andersen, Tyco, Allfirst, Merrill Lynch, ImClone. And the biggest of these scandals, the Enron scandal, revolves around a man, Ken Lay, who is one of the biggest supporters of the president of the United States!

This is incredible! This is the perfect storm. Never before in your lifetime has there been such a confluence of events all pointing in the direction of a popular revolt against overweening corporate power. Surely now, the moment of economic liberalism is at hand.

And what happens? Nothing. A fizzle. The corporate scandals roil and roil, but their effect on American politics is practically nil. The president's approval numbers suffer not a bit. The Republican party loses no support and the Democratic party fails to gain. The liberals express joyful satisfaction at the scandals; they confirm everything liberals think they know about the rotten core of corporate America. But even Democratic leaders know that there will be no massive popular call for any of the things on the class-warfare liberals' wish list. The polls indicate that the general public does not see these as political scandals. Such issues are not playing a big role in the midterm elections. Republicans are now watering down measures to regulate the accounting industry, and Democrats concede that there will be no popular backlash.

The fact is the public is disgusted by Enron and the other scandals, but most Americans have not generalized their disgust into a widespread loss of faith in the current political-economic system. Unlike Washington activists or academic polemicists, most Americans live in the world of corporate America. It didn't take a series of scandals to teach them there are greedy and rotten people in corporations. Furthermore, the scandals don't negate the evidence they see every day—that there are many more decent and honorable people in corporations, and these businesses do far more to build wealth and improve lives than they do to mar them.

Furthermore, though there has been a loss of confidence in corporate elites, that does not mean Americans want to see government taking a dramatically more aggressive role in economic life. Outside of the liberal hard core, there is very little of what you would call class consciousness. Everybody gripes about the bosses, but that doesn't mean most Americans see the world as being divided between the People and the Powerful, as Bob Shrum and Al Gore preached in the 2000 election.

And if the economic liberals can't ride a wave to power now, when they have so much going in their favor, then they never will be able to ride a wave to power, certainly not when the economy finally recovers and when this amazing wave of scandals fades away. That's why it must be miserable to be on the Democratic left.

But that doesn't mean that all is hunky-dory for the right. Just because the class-warfare liberals are wrong, with their 1930s-style indictment of corporate power, doesn't mean that the increasing identification between the business community and American conservatism is not a problem. When conservatism was at its healthiest, it often allied with parts of the business community, but there were clear distinctions, and very often the two communities clashed. During the Cold War, conservatives wanted to topple communism, the business community wanted to trade with communism. During the early days of the Reagan administration, conservatives advocated supply-side tax cuts, while the business community by and large preached green-eyeshade fiscal austerity. During the Clin-

ton administration, conservatives fought Hillary Clinton's health care plan, while many businesses initially sought to manipulate it for comparative advantage.

But now free marketeers and business organizations are more likely to work hand in glove. Many conservatives who came to town as activists now double as paid lobbyists. Now, typically, business groups provide the bucks and conservatives provide the troops for many of the ginned-up lobbying campaigns.

That's fine; corporations deserve representation. But over recent years, Tom DeLay, Grover Norquist, and others have set up a K Street patronage operation that effectively obliterates the distinction between conservatives and corporatists. And remember, when they brag about the growing merger between conservatives and the business community, they are talking about something akin to a merger between Sam's Video Shack and Blockbuster. The culture of the corporate community is bound to dominate the culture of conservatism, not the other way around.

That means there will be more resources and entrée for Washington activists, but there will be less intellectual creativity in the Republican party. There will be fewer big ideas. There will be less principle, less of an insurgent spirit, and more corporate pork. Instead of a fundamental debate about ideas, conservative politics becomes transactionalism.

Republican education policy now reflects corporate priorities, not conservative priorities. It provides better management, more money, and pseudo-accountability, while rejecting the core conservative insight that schools will only get better as a result of choice, competition, and parental pressure. As the economy appeared to be slipping into recession, Republicans came up with a stimulus package that contained almost no conservative ideas. Indeed, it contained practically no ideas of any sort. It was just a collection of corporate pork, self-serving subsidies, and narrowly focused favors. Long gone are the days when Republicans championed dramatic plans for fundamental tax reform, such as the flat tax, a consumption tax, or a radical simplification of the tax code.

It's odd. In some ways the Republican party seems more conservative than it ever has been, but somehow in the realm of domestic policy conservative ideas don't seem to matter very much. Conservatives correctly argued that the United States had to work toward a more market-oriented agriculture system. Yet in the post-Gingrich Congress, almost nobody is willing to stand up and defend conservative convictions. The farm bill that Republicans supported and the president signed shreds market-based reforms. It happens to be good for agribusiness.

In place of ideology, too often we have cynicism. The steel tariffs measure the president signed this year is perhaps the worst piece of trade legislation in half a century. In the culture of corporatism, free trade ideology takes a back seat. You cut the deals you need to cut.

Meanwhile, big opportunities are missed because the business community is properly focused on the here and now, and not on grand possibilities for the future. For example, this past year presented a golden opportunity to put together a large plan that would one day rid us of our dependence on Saudi oil. But no business lobby is interested in what might be achieved in the year 2015, and oil companies don't exactly mind continued dependence on the Saudi royal family, no matter how much it dilutes our efforts to fight Islamic extremism. So in the end, there was no impetus toward any ambitious energy bill or any major compromise.

Maybe the sorry stagnation in domestic policy is simply the result of the amazing parity in American politics or the unusual urgency of foreign policy. But the fact remains that conservatism, even with a conservative president, has lost some of its insurgent energy and has become corporatist.

Corporate elites are not blackhearted materialists who exploit the working man, as the economic populists imagined. They organize American drive and creativity to produce the wealth and the living standards we all enjoy. But it still remains true that leading America is a higher calling than leading IBM, GE, or Alcoa. It requires grander visions, higher aspirations, and broader perspectives. If politics is overtaken by the corporate mentality, then government just becomes a grubby enterprise of redistributing federal dollars from their people to our people. The country deserves better.

—David Brooks, for the Editors

The Homeland Security Two-fer

The smart politics behind Bush's new cabinet agency proposal. BY TOD LINDBERG

WHO SAYS YOU CAN'T have more than one good reason to do something? Of course, the proposition that disparate federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities should be combined into one massive cabinet department ought first to be judged on the contribution such consolidation will make to security. But if it also happens to be smart politics—a way for a wartime president to get some control over a domestic agenda that was badly adrift—well, what's wrong with that?

Democrats have been warning since shortly after September 11 that George W. Bush would risk the bipartisan support he enjoys in the war against terror if he tried to leverage his high job-approval ratings to advance a conservative domestic agenda. Meanwhile, Democratic strategists looking at upcoming congressional elections were urging their clients to concede the war to the president and open up differences on domestic policy in areas of traditional Democratic strength. Here again, if Bush opposed Democratic initiatives or propounded conservative policies of his own, he might be vulnerable to the charge that he was trying to exploit the war.

It's a nice box to have a president in: If he isn't bipartisan—which is to say, if he doesn't accommodate Democrats' desires in the fashion of the Kennedy-friendly education bill—then he is playing politics with the war and putting Americans at risk. Either Democrats get what they want on substance, or they get what they want politically—which is substantial consolation for your opponent's (hopefully temporary) popularity.

There are a couple of problems, though. First, the proposition that if Bush doesn't behave on domestic policy, Democrats will turn on the war effort. It really does lack credibility. Most Democrats, after all, genuinely support a robust war effort. But this is another case in which there is more than one good reason to do something—because as an empirical matter, whenever Democrats have voiced criticism of Bush on the war, they have been hammered for it. The only political danger Bush faces on the war effort, and it is currently quite remote, is from the right: an emerging sense that he is not being tough enough. The idea that there is an effective opposition to Bush from the dovish left is just entirely out of sync with American opinion.

Second, Bush has a little assignment of his own for Congress, namely, the biggest government reorganization in two generations. He would like it completed in a matter of months, please. In presenting his proposal, he has essentially colonized in the name of the war the vast bulk of the political space in which Democrats were hoping to put forward a domestic agenda.

During the 1980s, Republicans thought they had learned a lesson from the experience of the Reagan and first Bush administrations, namely, that when it comes to domestic policy and especially government spending, Congress has the upper hand. The capacity of the executive to check Congress is limited. Republicans learned the lesson so well that when they became the congressional party against a Democratic president in 1995, they immediately began to act as if they had the upper hand, pressing a balanced budget on the Clinton administration by means of a government shutdown. This enabled them to learn another lesson: No, Congress does not have the upper hand. The balance between the executive and Congress, as Clinton demonstrated, is more contextually determined than it is structurally fixed.

Bush has learned from Clinton. He doesn't need to accept a fight on Democrats' terms if he can orchestrate a fight on his terms. Here, he has proposed something so massive that, as has been widely reported, 88 different congressional committees and subcommittees have jurisdiction over pieces of the proposed Homeland Security Department. Congress has a hard time with cross-jurisdiction issues even on a good day. Moreover, the structure of congressional committee oversight tends to mirror the structure of the executive branch. That means Bush has also in effect invited Congress to reorganize itself.

Contributing editor Tod Lindberg is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and editor of Policy Review.

He has turned Congress inward, as the biggest fights in the coming months will be behind-the-scenes struggles for clout. It's hardly an environment in which staging politics for purposes of outreach to voters will be top priority.

If Bush learned from Clinton's successes, he seems also to have learned from his biggest failure, the ill-starred health care reform proposal. Don't expect Bush's legislative language, when he releases it, to run to a thousand pages, à la Hillary Clinton and Ira Magaziner's overhaul plan. "The president proposes; Congress disposes," as the saying goes. Bush delivers the broad outlines of a proposal and lets the process work.

Under different circumstances, Congress would have the option of saying, "Forget it." That was the fate of Clintoncare. But this is homeland security we're talking about, and so not only will Congress want to do something for the good of the country out of principle, but also Bush is positioned to inflict grave political damage on a dilatory Congress that isn't doing what's necessary to make people safer. The more people saw of Clintoncare, the less they liked it, and there was a lot to see buried in its details. Plus, an industry-financed television campaign, "Harry and Louise," hammered the point home to the tune of a multi-million dollar ad buy. People have probably already seen about as much detail from the administration as they are likely to. And who is going to finance an ad campaign against the Bush proposal for homeland security?

There was an interesting headline in the *Washington Post* June 13: "Hill Eyes Shifting FBI, CIA." The story was speculating about a possible effort by congressional leaders to move parts of the two agencies into the Homeland Security Department, a move Bush opposes. But here's the real problem: There is no "Hill," not in the sense of an organized entity that sees through one pair of eyes and speaks with one voice. Instead, there are 535 people with turf to protect and ambitions to advance. Bush just figured out how to set them loose on each other. Homeland security, don't you know. ♦

An Election Year with No Races

With incumbents more protected than ever, the House will be little changed. **BY FRED BARNES**

Rep. Ronnie Shows

Roll Call Photos

DEMOCRATIC REP. Ronnie Shows is a pro-life populist with a moderate record. A National Rifle Association rug is ostentatiously placed at the entrance to his office on Capitol Hill. Republican congressman Chip Pickering is a smooth New South conservative who once was Senate GOP leader Trent Lott's top aide. Because Mississippi lost a House seat in the 2000 census, Shows and Pickering were thrown together in a single congressional district. Keeping Shows in the House has become a Democratic cause. Sen. Hillary Clinton of New York gave him $5,000. Another cause has aided Pickering: his father's nomination to a federal appeals court. When Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected Charles Pickering, it infuriated many Mississippians and indirectly boosted his son's campaign. The Shows-Pickering showdown, two incumbents going head-to-head, is one of the most competitive races in the midterm election.

It has another distinction: It's one of the few competitive congressional races in the entire country this year. It's also one of even fewer that could be called exciting, interesting, or even mildly intriguing. True, there are three other races pitting House incumbents against each other (in Illinois, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania). They're the result of population shifts and redistricting. Plus, a small number of other incumbents such as liberal Republican Connie Morella of Maryland and Democrat Karen Thurman of Florida are in trouble. And shamelessly partisan reapportionment has made a few House races—in Georgia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania—worth watching. But that's about it.

Fred Barnes is executive editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

The reason is incumbent selfishness. All over the country entrenched incumbents, both Republicans and Democrats, used redistricting required by the 2000 census to entrench themselves further. Democrats controlled the reapportionment process in Alabama, California, West Virginia, and Mississippi and could have carved out more potentially Democratic seats. But they'd have had to swipe some Democratic voters from the districts of incumbents, and the incumbents wouldn't have it. In Ohio, Republicans were in charge and could have made Rep. Sherrod Brown and several other Democrats vulnerable. But Gov. Robert Taft feared Brown might run against him for governor and so his district was protected. Instead of picking up four seats in Ohio, Republicans now will settle for a gain of one. In Virginia last year, then-governor Jim Gilmore dreamed of eliminating the seat of Democrat Jim Moran inside the Washington Beltway. That would have required at least two Republicans to give up GOP voters, and it proved too much to ask. In Kansas and New York, too, Republicans failed to maximize their chances, thanks to incumbents.

Political professionals argue not over how many House seats are toss-ups in 2002 but how few. Charlie Cook, a highly respected analyst, says 18. Mark Gersh of the National Committee for an Effective Congress thinks it's 15. Steve Schmidt of the National Republican Congressional Committee says 10 to 12. Stuart Rothenberg of *Roll Call* says he can find only 9. Howard Wolfson of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee says there are 40 competitive House races. But he sets the bar pretty low, accepting as competitive any race in which both the Democratic party and the Republican party spend money.

The paucity of available districts leaves Democrats with a difficult job in trying to capture the House, now held by Republicans 223 to 212. Democrats need to win only six seats to take over, seven if you count Texas Democrat Ralph Hall's promise to vote with Republicans when the House is organized next year. Terry McAuliffe, the Democratic National Committee chairman, recently told journalist Mort Kondracke he'd given up on winning the House. (He called Kondracke back later to say Democratic prospects would be better by Election Day.) Republicans are confident they'll hold the House and win seats.

Of course the rule of thumb is the party that doesn't hold the White House gains seats in midterm elections. The rule has held all except in two elections—in 1934 and again in 1998, when Democrats netted one seat. It's not farfetched to think it might happen a third time in 2002. Democrats have won House seats in three straight elections. Four would be a stretch. Pickups by the out party are usually a reaction against the president. But George W. Bush, already enormously popular, has been gaining in polls in recent weeks. The losers are often House members swept in with the president's election. Bush, however, had no coattails in 2000. Voter intensity is normally with the out party. The terrorist attacks on September 11 changed that, stirring Republicans. This spring, though, Democratic intensity has grown.

Another downer for Democrats is the issue agenda. For the foreseeable future, it's dominated by the war on terrorism and the matter of homeland security. The fear among Democrats is this will drown out their issues—defending Social Security, a prescription drug benefit, a patients' bill of rights, the tax break Enron would have received if Republicans had killed the alternative minimum tax for corporations. Wolfson, for one, insists one set of issues "doesn't exist at the expense of others" and thus Democrats will be heard.

In any event, the salient issues often change overnight, as does voter sentiment. In 1982, for example, Republican operatives were convinced they'd break even, despite a recession. But voters turned away massively in the final weeks of the campaign and they dropped 27 seats.

In 1996, Republicans were on the verge of losing the House, but President Clinton's questionable fund-raising became the overriding issue with two weeks left—and the GOP held on. Now the best Democratic scenario is for the economy to follow the stock market into stagnation or worse. This is hardly inconceivable. So a Democratic victory is still quite possible, if unlikely.

To win, unexpected things would have to happen for Democrats. They'd have to pick up more seats in Georgia, mainly through redistricting, than they lose in Pennsylvania through redistricting. They'd have to do far better in taking open seats, not their forte. In 2000, Democrats won but 5 of 26 GOP open seats and lost 6 of 9 Democratic ones. And they'd need to win at least 2, probably 3, and maybe all 4 of the incumbent versus incumbent races. Their best shot is in Connecticut where Democrat James Maloney, an able campaigner, has roughly a 50-50 chance of beating Republican Nancy Johnson, a moderate. Slightly less rosy are Democrat Tim Holden's prospects against Republican George Gekas in southern Pennsylvania. The district favors Gekas, but Holden is a better campaigner. And in central Illinois, Republican John Shimkus, a West Pointer, is narrowly favored over David Phelps, a moderate Democrat.

In early 2002, Shows was favored to defeat Pickering. The Mississippi House had produced a redistricting plan that chopped up Pickering's old district. But Pickering and his allies, including Lott, intervened in the state senate, and in the end the legislature failed to agree on any reapportionment blueprint. Then Democrats filed suit with a chancery court judge, who created a new district that tilted slightly in Shows's favor. Pickering challenged it in federal court and a three-judge appeals panel—all three Republican appointees—imposed its own plan. The new district voted 65 percent for Bush in 2000 and its percentage of black voters shrunk to 30 percent from 37 percent in the chancery judge's plan. The assumption in Mississippi is blacks vote 90 percent Democratic, so this was a blow to Shows.

In its odd way, the Shows-Pickering race brings together the battle to control Congress and the fight to control the federal judiciary. And it's a clash of social classes as well. Shows is a hardscrabble Democrat, Pickering a Republican from the party's elite. "He's a good guy," Shows says of Pickering. "I have nothing bad to say about him. There's as much difference between us as bluebloods and blue jeans. The bluebloods are sending our blue jeans to Mexico." That's a dig at Pickering's support for free trade and a reference to the loss of textile jobs to Mexico and China. Pickering has taken the measure of Shows. "He's not an opponent you can underestimate," Pickering says. He doesn't and neither do Republicans in Washington. Which is why Pickering is expected to win and the GOP favored to hold the House one more time. ♦

REINVENTING THE MIDDLEMAN...

Michael Ramirez

A Real National Security Debate

Some issues are too important not to have a partisan fight over. **BY WILLIAM G. MAYER**

IT WASN'T A SPEECH you'd expect to cause an uproar. Karl Rove, President Bush's chief political adviser, addressed the winter meeting of the Republican National Committee on January 18. Looking ahead to the midterm elections, Rove suggested that the Republicans had a number of issues that resonated well with the American people and might therefore serve as a basis for GOP success—among them the administration's handling of the war on terrorism. "We can go to the country on this issue," Rove said, "because [voters] trust the Republican party to do a better job of protecting and strengthening America's military might and thereby protecting America."

The Democratic response was swift and harsh. Calling Rove's comments "nothing short of despicable," Democratic National Committee chairman Terry McAuliffe said, "For Karl Rove to politicize the issue is an affront to the integrity of the entire U.S. military." House minority leader Richard Gephardt, speaking one day later at a meeting of the DNC, called Rove's statement "shameful," adding, "This is not a partisan issue."

The tempest blew over in a couple of days, but it offered a preview of what may turn out to be one of the most significant questions in the 2002 campaign. Not, Which party is better at protecting American national security? But, Is national security a legitimate issue at all? By any reasonable standard, it should be. But the Democrats, as their behavior last January makes clear, will do their very best to try to keep the subject off the table this fall and to argue that any attempt to raise it is illegitimate.

We need to be clear from the outset about just what the issue is that ought to be debated. The issue is not patriotism. Every member of Congress and every candidate running for that body presumably loves our country. Many have given tangible evidence of that commitment by serving in the military or by doing substantial volunteer work.

But it is not enough just to say that we all want to protect the nation and leave it at that. The more important question is, How exactly will we enhance our national security? For all their agreement on a number of fundamental goals and values, Democrats and Republicans have sharply disagreed about the best ways to achieve those goals.

Democrats and Republicans have sharply disagreed about how to protect the nation. They should take the debate to the voters.

Many Democrats spent much of the 1990s advocating positions and voting for national security policies that were ill-advised at the time—but look particularly embarrassing in the aftermath of September 11. If democracy means anything, it means that they ought to be held accountable for those decisions.

Take the case of Senator Paul Wellstone of Minnesota. From the very beginning of his first Senate campaign in 1990, Wellstone advocated large cuts in military spending—not incremental trimming here and there, but deep cuts in defense. In an op-ed written in 1990, for example, Wellstone advocated cutting "at least $200 billion in the military budget over the next five years" (this at a time when total defense spending was just over $300 billion). He also urged that we "halt work" not only on a national missile defense system, but on the B-1 and B-2 bombers and the Midgetman missile. In 1995, Wellstone voted to freeze defense spending for the next seven years. In 1999, he was one of just five Democratic senators who voted against a defense authorization bill that included a 4.8 percent military pay raise, at the time the largest military pay raise in 18 years.

For his first 11 years in public life, in short, Wellstone staked out a clear philosophy of national defense. With the end of the Cold War, he insisted, America no longer needed a very large or powerful military. Rather, we needed to put "gunboat diplomacy" behind us and "move forward toward global cooperation." Wellstone should not be allowed to walk away from that long record simply because he has been singing a slightly different tune for the last eight months.

The same point applies to Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, who is also up for reelection this fall. One of the cornerstones of Harkin's career has been his opposition to defense spending. While running for president in 1992, Harkin called for a 50 percent reduction in the military budget. Like Wellstone, he has voted for just about every resolution to cut defense spending that has made it to the Senate floor.

A good case can be made that in his past campaigns Harkin derived some net political advantage from his calls for defense cuts. The public wasn't too concerned about the nation's security in 1990 or 1996. More important, cutting the defense budget solved an otherwise difficult problem for Harkin: It allowed him to explain how he could increase spending on education and health care without

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increasing taxes. It will be a signal disservice to the principle of democratic accountability if Harkin is not required to defend his record just because it no longer works to his benefit.

Did Wellstone's and Harkin's actions make it more difficult for America to respond effectively to the events of September 11? The answer is probably no—but only because their advice was generally ignored. The military budget was not cut by $200 billion or 50 percent; it wasn't even frozen for seven years. And the 1999 pay raise did pass. As it is, military analysts may at some point raise questions about just how well prepared the American military was to take on its new assignments in Afghanistan. But it is almost inconceivable that the fighting would have gone so smoothly if the military budget had been cut in half ten years ago—particularly if we had halted work on both the B-1 and B-2 bombers.

Wellstone and Harkin are admittedly exceptional cases, but only in the extremity of their opposition to defense spending. Across a considerable range of defense and national security issues, party-line votes—with most Democrats on one side and most Republicans on the other—are actually quite common. Take the issue of U.S. intelligence activities. For all the concern that Democrats have expressed over the failure to foresee the attacks of last September, throughout the 1990s Democrats were quite willing to reduce intelligence spending. In 1998, for example, the House of Representatives considered cutting the intelligence budget by 5 percent. Republicans opposed the amendment 196-21, but Democrats supported it 98-95. In 1997, a similar amendment attracted 114 Democratic supporters.

Similarly, Democrats and Republicans have long taken opposite positions on whether it is desirable to make public the total amount the United States spends on intelligence activities. Republicans insisted that this was inadvisable, since it might give adversaries a better sense of American capabilities, particularly if these were in the process of being changed. The Democrats, by contrast, argued that while keeping the total spending figure classified might have been a reasonable policy during the Cold War, it was no longer necessary. The last time this issue came up before the Senate, in 1997, Republicans voted against the motion 54-1; Democrats supported it 42-2.


Paul Wellstone

AP / Wide World Photos

Or take the issue of a national missile defense system, which is starting to look a lot more appealing to many people given what we know now about Osama bin Laden's obsession with acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Even many Democrats who cultivate an image of being moderate or conservative, such as Max Cleland of Georgia, have sometimes voted against missile defense. In 1999, the Senate put together what one might have thought was the most inoffensive possible resolution on this issue, pledging to deploy an "effective" nationwide defense system "as soon as technologically possible," while also promising to continue negotiated reductions in nuclear forces. Just three senators voted against this bill. One of them was Dick Durbin of Illinois, now desperately trying to convince that state's voters that he is a proper guardian of the nation's security.

To be sure, all of the votes just mentioned were cast before September 11. But if this is an explanation, it is not an excuse. We elect our public officials to exercise foresight, not just to react to crises after the fact. It is no defense of Neville Chamberlain to say that after September 1939 he did everything in his power to oppose Hitler. The problem was all the things he did prior to that time, when he manifestly failed to understand what he was dealing with. If the Democrats' recent mistakes are not that serious, they are of the same type: a simple failure to recognize that, even with the Cold War over, the world was still a dangerous place.

In 2002, these issues ought to be part of the debate. Many Democrats will no doubt insist that they have ready explanations for the votes they cast throughout the 1990s. The point is simply that they should be required to provide those explanations. They should not be given a free pass on the matter. National security should not be declared out of bounds simply because Democrats—or editorial writers—think the subject is unseemly or inappropriate. ♦

The Ultimate in Oversight

Four ex-CIA men are running for Congress this year. **BY STEPHEN F. HAYES**

WHEN Mike Battles launched his long-shot bid for a seat in Congress from Rhode Island last summer, he was told to scrub his résumé. The experts recommended he downplay his service as an Army Ranger and hide his years in the clandestine service. "At that point, it wasn't hip to have been a Ranger or in the CIA," he says. "And everyone told me they thought the Democrats would use that stuff to paint me as a right-wing nut." No doubt incumbent Patrick Kennedy will still try to paint him as a right-wing nut, but nowadays the bad-boy congressman won't be able to do it by suggesting that a passion for national security is somehow unhealthy.

Battles is one of four former CIA men running for Congress this year. All four are Republicans. Rep. Porter Goss, who chairs the House Intelligence Committee, postponed his expected retirement to stay on, and first-term Rep. Rob Simmons is running for reelection in Connecticut. Two challengers, Mike Battles in Rhode Island and Herb Meyer in Washington, must first win contested primaries before they can try to unseat Democratic incumbents. While most politicians these days are spouting self-serving platitudes ("I care deeply about this nation") or worthless banalities ("We can never let this happen again"), this quartet talks seriously about intelligence gathering, interagency communication, enemy infiltration, and the importance of oversight. If the unfamiliar and potentially crucial question of the 2002 election cycle is how to deal politically with the war on terrorism, then these races are ground zero.

"We're at war and we have a fragile economy," says Herb Meyer, who's running in a three-way GOP primary in Washington state. "You can't have 14 number-one priorities in that context. People just don't believe that. Sewers and everything? That's fine. But if we don't deal with these two issues—war and the economy—nothing else matters."

Meyer served as a special assistant to CIA director William Casey in the Reagan administration. Working on the 7th floor at Langley, Meyer helped develop the theory that the Soviet economy was crumbling from within. He had come to Casey's attention when Heritage Foundation president Ed Feulner gave the CIA boss a copy of Meyer's book on economics, *The War Against Progress*.

Meyer had never even considered a bid for public office. "Guys like me don't do that," he says. But then a group of Republicans in San Juan County asked him to challenge Rep. Rick Larsen, a first-term incumbent who won in 2000 with just 50 percent of the vote. With September 11 still fresh in his mind, he agreed. "The only reason I'm running is because we're at war and we have a fragile economy. People are worried about their jobs and they're worried about their lives." So when Meyer talks to

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voters, he focuses almost exclusively on those two issues. Sure, he says, other issues matter. But voters in Washington's second district recognize that providing security and safeguarding the economy are government's first two responsibilities.

Meyer believes current members of Congress aren't asking the right questions about the intelligence failures of September 11. This failure, this oversight on oversight, is caused by ignorance. Few politicians, he complains, have more than a passing knowledge of intelligence issues. "I know how that place [the CIA] works. I have clearances that some members of Congress don't know exist."

Just to face Larsen, Meyer will first have to beat two Republicans in a late-September primary. His strategy for all of his opponents is the same: stick to the war and the economy.

Across the country, Mike Battles is pursuing pretty much the same strategy, though he faces the added challenge of dealing with Patrick Kennedy's habit of passing out pork to seemingly anyone who asks. So Battles is careful to address local issues, too. "I spend a lot of time talking about education and small business," says Battles, whose parents were both teachers. "But the populace is really focused on terrorism and homeland security."

Naturally, then, the Battles campaign is highlighting the very things he was told to purge from his résumé last summer—West Point graduate, Army Ranger, CIA analyst, intelligence expert. Even after he left the CIA, the boyish-looking Battles sat on the board of a company that provides high-tech intelligence for businesses.

By contrast, the highlight of Kennedy's homeland security experience came on March 26, 2000, when he assaulted an airport baggage screener at Los Angeles International Airport. That confrontation, which Kennedy recently paid an undisclosed amount to settle, was captured on videotape and would make a highly entertaining campaign ad.

Battles, who last week won the Rhode Island GOP endorsement for his party's primary, is getting a hand from another former CIA operative, Rep. Rob Simmons. Simmons pulled the upset of the 2000 election cycle when he beat veteran Democrat Sam Gejdenson. Battles has hired two of Simmons's top advisers and otherwise seems to be copying from his playbook. Simmons himself helps out, too, not least by pitching in on the retail politics. In late March, the Connecticut lawmaker braved a spring New England snowstorm to speak at a Battles fund-raiser, where he called his new protégé "uniquely qualified" to serve in a time of war. Simmons believes Battles's national security experience will be a major asset in his first run for public office. That's a different story from Simmons's own career.

"I ran for state rep five times and my CIA background came up repeatedly," he says. "And not in a positive way." More recently, when polls showed Simmons was closing the gap on Gejdenson, two of the Democrat's staffers even suggested Simmons was a "war criminal" for some of his CIA activities. (Gejdenson said he knew nothing of the effort to smear his opponent and quickly fired those responsible.) Simmons ended up winning by a narrow margin, and that fact had Democrats targeting him as particularly vulnerable. But strong fund-raising and a high post-9/11 profile appear to have enhanced his chances for reelection.

It's unlikely that Simmons, Meyer, and Battles will all be in Congress next January. But even if they were, there's no guarantee that they would be in a position to immediately affect the intelligence debate, not formally anyway. Although lawmakers have regularly sought out Simmons's thoughts on making U.S. intelligence more effective, he was passed over for a seat on the Intelligence Committee that Porter Goss chairs. Still, with the massive intelligence reform effort underway, Congress could use more advice from those who know the problems and the institutions from the inside. ♦

A Less Liberal Minnesota?

On his feet again after the Ventura takedown, Norm Coleman eyes the Senate. **BY BARRY CASSELMAN**

St. Paul

FIVE YEARS AGO, the Democratic mayor of St. Paul switched parties. The move was scripted to be a disaster for the party Norm Coleman was leaving. He had worked under two popular Democratic attorneys general, then was elected mayor of the state capital. Clearly a political talent, Coleman not only had begun to reverse St. Paul's economic decline, he had ambitions to be governor. But he had a problem. A pro-business, moderate DFLer, as Democrats are known in Minnesota (for the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party), Coleman was pro-life. The DFL establishment had become overwhelmingly pro-choice, and it was made clear to Coleman that his political ambitions would have to stop at the city line.

Amid considerable hoopla, Coleman embraced his new party, and won reelection in 1997. With no obvious Republican in line to succeed the

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popular Republican governor, the moderate (and pro-choice) Arne Carlson, Coleman emerged as the party's candidate for governor in 1998. As it turned out, his DFL opponent was Hubert (Skip) Humphrey III, state attorney general and the man under whom Coleman had served as solicitor general before running for mayor. A huge battle loomed. Coleman, coached by party leaders, presented himself as an economic and social conservative, in contrast to the traditional liberal Humphrey, son of the legendary Minnesota senator and former vice president. Then the unexpected happened.

A local talk show host, once mayor of a Minneapolis suburb and before that a professional wrestler, decided to run for governor on the ticket of the marginal Independence party. Jesse Ventura was treated as a joke by the two major parties and the media. With Coleman and Humphrey locked in a tight race through the summer and autumn, Ventura remained under 10 percent in the polls until September.

Then three critical developments precipitated Ventura's sudden rise. First, it was decided to include him in the public debates that have become a hallmark of Minnesota statewide elections. One reason for the decision was that the Independence party candidate for the U.S. Senate in 1996 had received more than 5 percent of the vote, the threshold for entitlement to campaign funds from a state income-tax check-off. Second, as a consequence of the Independence party's entitlement, the Ventura campaign received a sudden infusion of cash, more than $300,000, in the final weeks of the race.

Finally, both Humphrey and Coleman were advised to stick to their campaign scripts, repeating over and over the mantras their respective consultants and aides had determined would sway voters. In the debates, Humphrey and Coleman sounded programmed and wooden, in contrast to the populist Ventura, whose performance was colorful, ungrammatical, and plain-spoken. What's more, Ventura was something new—a *centrist* populist. On Election Day, Ventura beat Coleman by only 50,000 votes (out of more than 2.4 million cast), with Humphrey coming in a humiliating third.

Coleman threw himself back into his job as mayor of St. Paul, and over the next three years accomplished his most dramatic successes. These included the construction of an arena to house a restored St. Paul NHL franchise, considerable downtown construction, several new corporate headquarters, museums, restaurants, and the attendant new jobs, all without any tax increases during his eight years as mayor.

After he left office in January 2002, Coleman announced he would run again for governor. But he had distanced himself from many in the GOP who had supported his candidacy in 1998, and the Republican establishment had already coalesced behind a political neophyte with conservative views, a successful business background, and millions of his own money to spend on the campaign. Many urged Coleman to run instead for the U.S. Senate seat held by DFLer Paul Wellstone, who had broken a pledge to limit himself to two terms. Then in the spring, President Bush called Coleman to ask him to run for the Senate seat. Facing a flight of financial support from his race for governor, and universal GOP support if he heeded President Bush's request, Coleman did an about-face and announced he would run against Wellstone.

Since then, much has gone well for Coleman. He has toured the country to raise funds, often teaming up with two other GOP Senate challengers from nearby states—John Thune of South Dakota and Jim Talent of Missouri, both of whom also have excellent chances of defeating incumbent Democrats this year. (In fact, if the party is to retake control of the Senate, each of these "Three Republican Musketeers" must probably win in November.) President Bush came to Minnesota recently and raised about $2 million for Coleman in a single night.

After September 11, Senator Wellstone's well-known liberal message no longer resonated with many voters, who have clearly moved to the center since the heralded days of liberals Hubert Humphrey, Walter Mondale, and Eugene McCarthy. Further, Wellstone's breaking his pledge not to run again detracted from his image as a maverick politician. Stressing education and jobs, Coleman moved toward the center. He reinforced the move by opposing oil drilling in Alaska (which President Bush favored) and endorsing a raise in the minimum wage. The Wellstone strategy of portraying Coleman as a right-winger has so far been frustrated. As elsewhere in the country, Bush has high approval ratings in Minnesota, and his personal support for Coleman is seen as an asset for the state. Wellstone, even under President Clinton, seemed unable to deliver for Minnesota. Coleman's campaign theme has become, "I will get the job done."

Wellstone's poll numbers are remarkably low for a two-term incumbent: His own pollster places him in the low 40s. Complicating the

AP / Wide World Photos

Norm Coleman

race further is the emergence of a fourth political party in the state, the ultra-liberal Green party, whose Senate candidate will appear on the November ballot. Wellstone is still popular with many ultra-liberal voters, but if even a few percent defect to the Green candidate, they could fatally hurt the senator in a close race. (The Independence party is also likely to have a candidate in the race, but it is unclear who this would hurt more, Coleman or Wellstone.)

A curious sidelight to this race is the fact that since 1978 the seat has been held by someone who is Jewish. In fact, since 1990 the candidates of both major parties have been Jewish, as they are this year. The Jewish population of Minnesota is less than 1 percent.

In spite of his current problems, Wellstone remains formidable. He has the best grass-roots organization in the state, and his emotional oratory, especially his class-warfare rhetoric, still resonates with many Democrats in this affluent state. He continues to raise substantial campaign funds, especially from national contributors including well-known liberals in Hollywood. But Coleman is a natural politician and a quick study. Often likened to the legendary Hubert Humphrey, he is a charismatic campaigner and public speaker.

His campaign, of course, is not without potential problems. His poll numbers in rural Minnesota, usually a GOP stronghold, are weak, and Wellstone is attempting to capitalize on the farm bill recently signed by President Bush. Polls also indicate that Coleman lacks support among women voters. Although there is no formal opposition to Coleman's candidacy in his adopted party, some very conservative Republicans are skeptical of the former St. Paul mayor who moved to Minnesota from Brooklyn. They will not be ecstatic as Coleman stresses centrist themes during the summer and autumn.

Beyond its importance for Minnesota, the Coleman-Wellstone race is a barometer of several political trends. For one thing, the outcome will be a measure of President Bush's impact on the 2002 elections, given the president's very visible intervention on Coleman's behalf. In early 2001, Wellstone spokespersons predicted the president's unpopularity would drag Coleman to defeat. For another, Coleman is testing the Rove/Bush "compassionate conservative" strategy for the president and the national party with his campaign of economic conservatism and social pragmatism. Like the president, Coleman remains solidly pro-life, but, sensitive to GOP pro-choice voters, he has stressed other issues in the campaign. In 2000, Rod Grams, then Minnesota's Republican senator, made himself an easy target for Democrats by proclaiming positions considerably to the right of most state voters. Grams was roundly defeated. Coleman is showing the kind of flexibility on several issues likely to appeal to "soccer moms" and moderates of both parties.

As Michael Barone has pointed out, Republicans have been gaining sharply in suburbs since September 11. Early polls indicate that Coleman's message is well received in such suburbs, and if he can continue to appeal to the state's independent voters, coax moderate DFLers to support him, and keep his conservative base—no small acrobatic feat—he will win.

In these uncertain times, of course, no prediction is reliable, especially this distance from Election Day. The DFL seems on the defensive, as Democrats are nationally. But the war against terrorism and the fragile economic recovery compel a new vigilance unknown to virtually any American now alive.

And as we have learned, even with millions voting, an election can turn on a single ballot. Overnight, one senator can shift control of a whole branch of government. A handful of persons can wreak terror and death on a community, the nation, and the world. With all these uncertainties, with two additional political parties, and with Jesse Ventura as governor, Minnesota voters seem braced for the unpredictable. ♦

Biotech Loses Its Innocence

War and peace in the brave new world

By Eric Cohen

In a recent report for investors in the biotech industry, the relationship between biotechnology and terrorism is described as follows: "Ugly as bioterrorism is, bringing biotech back into the headlines in the capacity of a savior has done much to stimulate the sector since its mid-September 2001 lows on Wall Street."

In other words, terrorism is useful for the reputation and prospects of the biotech industry. Biotechnology is necessary for survival in war—since biological weapons require biological remedies. And biotechnology is a "savior," a redeemer from the troubles of the world.

How this savior operates—what it promises and what it endangers, why we need it and why we might want to resist it—is a difficult moral and political question. It requires thinking clearly about the limitations and waywardness of American civilization, and the much greater catastrophes that might be inflicted on us by those who hate life and worship death, and are aided in carrying out this fundamentalist-nihilist program by (our own) modern technology.

George Poste, a leading figure in the biotechnology industry and chairman of the Pentagon's Task Force on Bioterrorism, described this dilemma in a speech last October: "Biotechnology is about to lose its innocence. We are going to be playing in a very different world. We will have to seriously contemplate that some of our discoveries will, in fact, be classified. It is this dilemma, which has always been the dilemma of advanced technology throughout history, of dual use application."

Such realism about biotechnology is much needed after September 11. But it is only part of the story. For the fact is, biotechnology has never really been "innocent"—not in its origins, and not recently. In Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis*, the creation story of the modern biological republic, the scientists meet to decide which of their inventions to make public and which to keep secret. The purpose of this discretion is in part to protect society from the dark side of science, and in part to protect science from the dogmatic or skeptical backlash of society. Even as they saw themselves as man's benefactors, the first modern scientists had no illusions that all their inventions would be beneficial, or that the beneficiaries would always be enlightened enough to embrace them.

Moreover, the reason for bringing this "new" society into existence was precisely man's lack of innocence. Biological science was conceived as an answer to war, suffering, death, and religious violence. It sought to moderate man's passions by making men more comfortable. It may have always been (or may have become) *utopian*, but it was not, and still is not, *innocent*.

The last 18 months of debate over human cloning and embryonic stem cells make this lack of innocence quite clear. Most contemporary biologists might believe, in their heart of hearts, that they are not "political animals." They believe they are scientists. They trade in scientific truths, not political ideology; in facts, not metaphysical speculation or subjective values.

But the political skill of biology in protecting its interests—including (but not exclusively) its vision of the good life for scientists and citizen-patients alike—has been impressive. Not facts but pragmatism has been the order of the day. And so we are told that science should not be judged on moral or social grounds, but according to scientific criteria alone. Then we are told that science is a moral crusade to improve the human condition. We are told by the biotech lobby that the biological powers we desire (stem cell therapies) are imminent. Then we are told that the biological powers we fear (cloning and eugenics) are so far away that we need not worry about them. We are told that placing moral limits on science would infringe on the separation of church and state. But then we are told that it is God's will that we should use our intelligence to heal the sick. We are told that opponents of research

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cloning are scientifically ignorant of the facts that only the microscope can reveal. But then advocates of research cloning make moralistic claims such as "an embryo is simply the size of the period at the end of this sentence" and therefore not worth protecting. Of course, it is precisely the microscope that reveals how little size has to do with the worth, beauty, and power of living things. (Not to mention, it is these tiny entities—human embryos—for which scientists claim extravagant healing properties; and it is the emerging area of nanotechnology that scientists see as leading to the next great revolution in the life sciences.)

Such political tactics are justified, in the scientific mind, by the twin goods that scientists believe they are defending: the relief of suffering and the freedom of the scientist to push the boundaries of his research. No one can deny that these are indeed goods. The problem is that this most pragmatic of human undertakings—mastering nature to relieve man's estate—is in fact an unrealistic (or incomplete) way of seeing the world. It inspires dreams of health and longevity which it can never perfectly deliver. It does not educate human beings for finitude. It does not prepare them morally for living well with the dangers that science itself produces. Instead, the vision of a salvific biotechnology often harbors the following illusion: If the world is simply "natural"—and can be understood solely in naturalistic terms—then the problems of sin and evil can be solved. Once we understand how the brain malfunctions, science can give us the tools (or the drugs) to correct it.

This leads us to another interesting implication of Poste's insight about biotechnology's loss of innocence: namely, that the souls suited to waging and enduring war, on the one hand, and those destined for the bourgeois-utopian consumption of biotechnology, on the other, may be in important respects deeply at odds. Biotechnology, more than simply the pursuit of less physical suffering, has become the pursuit of increased psychic well-being. Unhappiness is increasingly treated as a disease; anxiety as a disorder. On the Health and Human Services website, you can find in a "fact sheet" dated February 13, 2001 (i.e., before September 11), that 56 million Americans annually "experience diagnosable mental disorders." A few clicks away, you can find endless material on the "mental health aspects of terrorism." There is advice, such as "things may never be the same, but they will get better, and you will feel better." There is a list of reactions that are "typical" after terrorist attacks ("fear of loud noises," "confusion," etc.) and that may require professional attention.

And what most mental-health professionals do for those in need of attention is write prescriptions. As the *Wall Street Journal* reported last week, "demand for antidepressants is huge and growing—they are now the second-most prescribed drugs after anti-infectives." Biotechnology's greatest crusade (and most lucrative business) seems to be chemically reconciling us to our mortality, not overcoming it. The problem, however, is that national service and national therapy are not easily reconciled. The Prozac-spirit and the warrior-spirit are rivals, not allies.

There is, of course, another way to look at this: Perhaps the cold-blooded, dispassionate ethos of experimental science, which is willing to destroy (nascent) human life for what it sees as a greater good, is precisely what war demands. Just as generals might see enemy soldiers (and sometimes civilians) as mere objects on a strategic chessboard, biologists might treat embryos as "collateral damage" in the war against disease. And perhaps, alternatively, if large segments of the Arab world were on Prozac, there would be no need for the war-making spirit. Our enemies would be cheerful nihilists instead of violent ones. The end of history would be here. And it would look—as it must—like the Brave New World that Aldous Huxley imagined between this century's two great wars.

The final dilemma Poste raises is that a clear-eyed assessment of biological science—as both a tool of perfection and a tool of destruction—might lead to two opposing conclusions: On the one hand, we might conclude that some avenues of scientific investigation should not be pursued (or disseminated) at all, even if those who seek to pursue them have only the best and most innocent motives and even if very real good would likely come from them. Alternatively, we might conclude that some avenues of biotechnology, however dangerous and harmful, must be pursued, because we need them to deter and defend ourselves against our enemies. Both conclusions, of course, are antithetical to the bourgeois-utopian spirit, which believes that well-meaning science is never guilty, and that dangerous science is always unnecessary.

In contrast, one must admire the metaphysical realism of the pro-life opponents of embryo research (that is, when they are not promising that "all" the same therapies promised by embryo research can be achieved using adult stem cells). These pro-lifers are realistic about both human suffering and human evil. Their supposedly irrational love of the human embryo—"smaller than the period at the end of this sentence"—is in fact a redemptive answer to the mystery, harshness, and uncertainty of life in this world. They love something that seems lesser and smaller than us—even at a great potential cost to their own well-being—in the belief that God loves them the way they love the unborn. They seek to do good in the face of great temptation, and to uphold the inviolability of life even at the cost of suffering to themselves. One might believe this answer to the harshness and disorder of

human life to be wrong. But only those fully incapable of awe, wonder, or the capacity for sacrifice would not admire it.

But finally, such an "ethic of ultimate ends," as Max Weber would have called it, is not *by itself* sufficient for thinking about the moral and political dilemmas of biotechnology. In a footnote to his classic 1979 essay on embryo research, Leon Kass wonders the following: "Faced with the prospect of the end of the race, might we not condone the deliberate institution of pregnancies to provide fetuses for research, in the hope of finding a diagnosis and remedy for this catastrophic blight?"

In making our own moral and political judgment about embryo research, we face no such plague or necessity. We face no threat to the race. And so, rejecting this research—by legally banning it—would mark a serious achievement in our capacity to set moral limits on science, and in our capacity to face up to the guilty (though well-meaning) nature of this particular form of humanitarian biology.

But as we contemplate the dilemmas of war and medicine in the future—and the central place biotechnology holds in each of these endeavors—we will require new political thinking. We will need to grapple with our dependence on modernity (e.g., new industries of "biodefense"), the failings of modernity (e.g., harvesting embryos and mass consumption of Prozac), and the superiority of modernity to backward-looking fundamentalism (e.g., al Qaeda). This is, indeed, the political and philosophic challenge of our time. The bourgeois-utopian age, on the brink of its greatest humanitarian triumphs, is over. ♦

Anyone But Chalabi?

Washington battles over how to organize the Iraqi opposition.

By Eli J. Lake

On June 11, the Pentagon's number three official, Doug Feith, delivered a blunt defense of the Iraqi National Congress to four Iraqi opposition leaders dissatisfied with the INC, the U.S.-supported umbrella group of those working to unseat Saddam Hussein.

According to minutes of the private meeting, Feith told the four that the Pentagon encouraged all Iraqi rebels to work within the INC and not to undermine it. "You have talked more about the INC today than overthrowing Saddam. This is not helpful to your cause," he said. Soon after, Feith ended the meeting ahead of schedule and walked out, impressing upon those left behind in his office that the Pentagon's top civilians still support the man they always have—Ahmad Chalabi.

In that Pentagon crowd, Chalabi is revered as a rare democrat—albeit one with the political cunning of a seasoned ward boss—in a region of despots and monarchs. In other Washington circles, however, his stock rises and falls. In 1992, following the Gulf War, when Chalabi and others came together to create the INC, the CIA provided support, seeing the need to unify Iraq's anti-Saddam Kurds, monarchists, disloyal military officers, Sunnis, and Shiites. Now, just when President Bush has signaled he is finally prepared to win the war left unfinished a decade ago, the CIA and the State Department are trying to dismantle the very opposition network they helped create.

Through these vicissitudes, Chalabi has shown some staying power. The Agency pulled the plug on INC operations in 1995, and the next year the group's forces suffered a crushing defeat in northern Iraq at the hands of Saddam's army. The same year also saw a new eruption in the Kurdish civil war. Yet Chalabi managed to hold together the disparate elements of the INC. He did this at a time when the CIA's strategy for toppling Saddam was evolving from foolish to feckless. In 1999, the Agency abandoned plans to foment a coup among disloyal Iraqi officers in favor of seeking out a lone gunman to assassinate Saddam Hussein—what U.S. officials call the "silver bullet" option.

In 1998, Chalabi took his case to Congress, which authorized $97 million for military training for the rebels through the Iraq Liberation Act. To this day the money has not been disbursed, though the paperwork approving "lethal" aid has sat on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's desk for six months. But in the short term, the Iraq Liberation Act revived Chalabi's reputation in some quarters as one who could secure American political support when it counted. In other quarters, feuding continued. The INC's executive committee stripped Chalabi of his title and power the following year.

Now, the INC may be on the verge of shutting down. Its executive committee—of which Chalabi is just one member, though the driving force—rules by consensus, which is often elusive. And just as President Bush (though not his generals) seems ready to come to grips with Iraq, many in the Iraqi opposition are again getting cold feet about Chalabi. The INC's official spokesman, Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein (also the leader of the movement for constitutional monarchy in Iraq), put it this way: "Ahmad is fighting yesterday's battles. He has brought the U.S. around to a policy of regime change, but now it is time for him to be a team player."

Sharif Ali was in Washington last week to assure the State Department that the INC's executive committee wanted to accept an $8 million grant but could not reach consensus because Chalabi objected to the terms. As a condition of the grant, Chalabi would have to suspend a $320,000-a-month intelligence operation he controls inside Iraq. "We are in danger of losing everything," Sharif Ali told me. "And why? Because of an information-collection program."

Eli J. Lake covers the State Department for UPI.

If the INC collapses, there are many who feel they can fill the void. At the June 11 meeting, Feith rebuked Hoshyar Zebari, Mohammad Sabir, Hamid al-Bayati, and Salah Shaikhly for suggesting this. They represent respectively the Kurdish Democratic party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (the two Kurdish parties that share semi-sovereignty in northern Iraq); the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Iranian and Syrian supported Shiite activists, also called SCIRI); and the Iraqi National Accord (a loose affiliation of exiles with close links to the CIA). The London representatives of these groups, who have been meeting regularly for over a year, call themselves "the Group of Four."

Zebari, who is a member of the INC's executive committee, said last week, "The Group of Four is the real opposition. We have people on the ground and we are exploring a real opposition strategy." But Zebari was careful to add, "This is not to replace the INC or to divide the Iraqi opposition. This is a solid political platform for real, genuine opposition forces to work together and to coordinate."

It should be noted that while Feith was delivering his tongue-lashing in Washington, Chalabi was in Tehran meeting with Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, the SCIRI leader, in an effort to lure that group back into the INC fold.



Ahmad Chalabi

Illustration by Ismael Roldan

Unlike the Pentagon, the State Department believes the Group of Four presents a more viable Iraqi opposition than the INC and Chalabi. The Friday before the Feith meeting, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman told the four Iraqis that he did not care under what structure the Iraqi exiles joined together; all that mattered was that the opposition stop bickering. As one administration official put it, "We're not forcing anybody into any boxes."

Unfortunately for Chalabi, however, the State Department controls the INC's budget, and the diplomats have used the power of the purse to marginalize him. His friends at the Pentagon have failed to stop them.

Thus, last fall Congress removed a restriction on funds for Iraqi opposition activities that required the vast majority of the money to be earmarked for the INC. At the end of May, the State Department notified Congress that it intends to disburse $315,000 to a new group, the Iraqi National Movement, a Sunni-led coalition of exiled Iraqi military and civilian leaders formed this year. According to a State Department budget justification document for the group, the money "will specifically support an Iraqi National Movement representative in Syria, travel to the Middle East for meetings with the Iraqi expatriates and regional governments, and media outreach, focusing on Arabic language TV, radio and printed media outlets."

The mission of this organization is nearly identical to that of the INC, which is no accident. As State Department spokesman Richard Boucher told reporters on June 10, "The Iraqi National Congress is a significant member of the opposition community, but they're not the only opposition group."

The trouble is, the whole purpose of the INC was precisely to allow the opposition to present a united front. Article I of the INC's charter, drafted during a conference in Vienna on June 16-19, 1992, under Chalabi's leadership, begins: "The INC will work to absorb, unify and organize political forces, currents and personalities (groups and individuals) to cause the desired transition in Iraq."

If the Pentagon were as adept at bureaucratic turf war as the State Department, Chalabi would be in less trouble. But

in the absence of any policy consensus on Iraq in the Bush administration, the utterances of the State Department spokesman and even the granting or withholding of small sums of money matter a great deal.

There is little doubt among House and Senate staffers that the INC would have received a portion of the $30 million the Pentagon sought from Congress for "foreign entities" in its supplemental budget request this year, but for intervention from the State Department. Phone calls to key Senate lawmakers this spring from Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage killed the funding, according to these sources. In the interagency battles over Iraq policy, the State Department and CIA have also stalled any decision to authorize INC activities inside Iraq.

Danielle Pletka, a Middle East expert and until recently a senior Republican staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said last week, "On a wide range of issues, from money issues to bureaucratic battles inside the administration to actions they could have taken themselves, DOD is not winning the fight. Washington is not about having your heart in the right place, it is about winning."

Posing the most immediate risk for Chalabi is the State Department's insistence on closing down his information-collection program. Chalabi has refused to accept any U.S. money that requires him to forgo this intelligence work, and his position has left the matter deadlocked since last fall. Meanwhile, Foggy Bottom has the INC on barest life support, wiring just enough money to Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation accounts in Delaware to keep the INC's offices in London, Washington, Damascus, Tehran, and Prague from closing. Liberty TV, the INC's television station in London, shut down on May 1 for lack of funds.

The information-collection program was spawned in January 2001 at a meeting of Chalabi, his Washington adviser Francis Brooke, and the State Department's special coordinator for Iraqi transition, then Frank Ricciardone. Brooke and Chalabi said they knew of people in northern Iraq who had a videotape of war crimes against Kurds being committed by Iraqi soldiers. In order to retrieve the tape—which would be valuable for Foggy Bottom's effort to rally international support for war crimes charges against Saddam—the INC would need authorization to spend American money inside Iraq.

Ricciardone went along with the plan, and the State Department secured the proper clearance. Soon after, INC officials told many in the media that the administration had finally approved their operations inside Iraq. In fact no decision had been taken on broader operations.

The INC's plans called for the sorts of things the CIA ought to be doing in a country with links to international terrorism and large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons—in a word, espionage. Under the proposal, Chalabi's men would send teams of U.S.-trained rebels into Iraq from neighboring Iran to photograph military installations, recruit operatives inside Saddam's intelligence services, provide on-the-ground verification of weapons facilities, and persuade defectors to share details on all three.

In this last area, the INC has been surprisingly effective. So far, INC operatives and assets have arranged for the defection of two Iraqis claiming to have knowledge of Saddam's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons facilities and one man who claims to have seen non-Iraqi Arabs training inside the Salman Pak terrorist training facility. A fourth defector will soon grant an exclusive interview to CBS.

One of these defectors is a civil engineer named Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Hadeiri. Al-Hadeiri first revealed to *New York Times* reporter Judith Miller in an interview published December 20 that Iraq had facilities for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in wells, private villas, and even beneath the Saddam Hussein hospital in Baghdad. An internal U.S. intelligence report on the three defectors reveals that al-Hadeiri was in fact a gold mine of information (the other two were less valuable), according to three administration officials familiar with its findings. Since being debriefed by the Defense Intelligence Agency, al-Hadeiri has revealed new data not only on the extent but also the location of Saddam's weapons-of-mass-destruction programs—information critical not only for future U.N. weapons inspectors but for war planners as well.

Why go to the *New York Times* with such information, and not to the CIA? There is a long history of bad blood between Chalabi and the Agency. Langley's files contend that he compromised a 1996 military officers' coup inside Iraq led by rival Ayad Alawi's Iraqi National Accord, information the Agency has made available to Congress over the years. The coup was scheduled for the third week in June that year but was foiled when Iraqi agents arrested a man carrying a CIA-donated satellite communications device for the plotters, according to *Out of the Ashes*, the history of Iraq after the Gulf War by Andrew and Patrick Cockburn.

The Cockburn brothers write and Brooke corroborates that Chalabi flew to Washington in March 1996 to warn CIA director John Deutch and Near East Division chief Steve Richter that the coup had been compromised. Saddam's men had the names of all the officers involved. But

the Agency did not heed the warning and went ahead with the plan, leading to a spectacular operational failure. On the very day the coup was supposed to go down, Iraqi officers loyal to Baghdad beamed praises for Saddam to the CIA station in Amman on the Agency's secure communications system. This CIA disaster left some in the Agency looking for a scapegoat. Chalabi, they say, is not to be trusted.

The feeling is mutual. Randy Scheunemann, a former national security adviser to Trent Lott now working with the INC, was involved in negotiations with U.S. officials last year over access to the defectors and is familiar with the Agency's numerous concerns about Chalabi. He asks, "Would you trust these guys, if you had a sensitive defector who had family inside Iraq, to ask the right questions and disseminate the information?"

Another contentious issue is accounting. The State Department, which is sympathetic to the CIA's concerns about Chalabi, would like the INC to provide documentation for expenses incurred in recruiting defectors and obtaining sensitive intelligence inside a hostile police state. One can only imagine an operative asking a corrupt border official to provide a receipt for the bribe just paid to take a frightened intelligence officer in his car into Kurdish controlled territory.

At one point the State Department offered a compromise. The INC would be allowed to use the Defense Intelligence Agency's accounting procedures—which protect the names of sensitive assets by restricting access to the records to officials with secret clearance—but the department refused to provide the procedures (which themselves are classified) to the rebels.

One consequence of the INC's fight with the State Department and CIA has been to cool the organization's usually reliable support on Capitol Hill. Indeed, the $8 million the State Department has notified Congress it intends to give the INC for the remainder of the calendar year has been put on hold by Senators Patrick Leahy and Mitch McConnell, the chairman and ranking member of the Senate appropriations subcommittee for foreign operations. "We need to have further discussions about the INC and what its role is and what its capabilities are," Leahy senior aide Tim Rieser said last week. "What could reasonably be expected of them to be accomplished?" It's a fair question, especially if you're more concerned about effecting regime change in the INC than in Iraq. ♦



All the King's Architects

The surprising success of Prince Charles's anti-modernist crusade

By Catesby Leigh



Thomas Fluharty

The village of Poundbury in southwest England is a conventional real estate development, in financial terms. But its residences—ranging from spacious, detached homes to little rowhouses—are built in traditional regional styles with façades of brick, stone, or stucco. An interconnected network of winding streets and lanes—a departure from the cul-de-sac paradigm that took hold in both Britain and the United States after World War II—creates picturesque views, while the limited sight-lines force cars to slow down and make the streets more pedestrian-friendly. It would be hard to find a more beautiful community built in the last half century.

Poundbury has also worked in practical terms. Its houses sell at a generous premium, architecture critics have had to shelve their knee-jerk "theme park" clichés, and Tony Blair's New Labour government has directed local planning authorities to consider the village a pattern for environmentally sensible town planning. Developers see it as a model for marketing.

Poundbury is exceptional in another way: The man behind it is Charles, Prince of Wales. A few years ago, the prince's widely publicized campaign for humane architecture seemed in collapse. Labour's massive 1997 electoral victory was great news for Blair's pals Richard Rogers and Norman Foster, both leading exponents of flashy "high-tech" design, and the modernist architectural establishment. Three months later, Princess Diana's death in a car crash sent the prince's already battered public image into a tailspin—and it was his role in the architecture wars that suffered most.

The Institute of Architecture, whose establishment he had promoted, became a shambles (and is now defunct). A magazine sympathetic to his architectural philosophy folded. And his longtime advocacy of an ambitious classical scheme for Paternoster Square—the ancient London precinct adjacent to St. Paul's Cathedral that was rebuilt with stark, ugly towers under a 1956 master plan—simply evaporated, allowing developers to substitute a meretricious postmodern alternative.

Not surprisingly, the traditional architects in the prince's camp reaped almost no commissions in the millennial building patronage that soaked up $3 billion in lottery funds. Against the wishes of many Labourites, Blair followed through on the riskiest bet of them all, the Millennium Dome, originally embraced by Michael Heseltine, deputy prime minister in the preceding Tory government. Designed by Rogers's office, the dome is a gigantic, glass-fiber object—somewhat like an upside-down Chinese cooking wok—suspended from tilted steel masts. The dome and its multimedia extravaganza, which cost over a billion dollars, attracted half the people expected after opening on New Year's Eve 1999. A year later, the dome was shut down. (Last month, the Blair government

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struck a risky and controversial profit-sharing deal under which American telecommunications magnate Philip F. Anschutz will pay nothing for the structure, while assuming the cost of converting it into a 20,000-seat sports arena.)

Despite the ignominious defeats Charles has suffered, traditional architects are very busy, while the urban-planning ideas the prince has championed are starting to catch on. If classical architecture didn't become extinct in Britain in the aftermath of World War II, it came close, and what success it currently enjoys is largely attributable to the prince. As in the United States, the most fashionable architects, professors, and almost all of the critics are modernists. In Britain, elite opinion has more sway over cultural life than in the United States. Even Britain's formidable historic-preservation *apparat* is more or less wedded to the bogus Hegelian doctrine that modern times demand modernist architecture.

But Britain also has something the United States lacks: royal patronage, which continues—even after Prince Charles's retreat from controversy—to be a vitally important asset to the cause of traditional architecture. A reminder of the benefits of such patronage came last month with the opening of the expanded Queen's Gallery at Buckingham Palace. Designed by John Simpson, the prince's favorite architect, the gallery consists of two new structures erected at right angles and inserted into the already densely built Buckingham Palace complex. The smaller of the structures is an open, Doric-columned entrance pavilion resembling a miniature Greek temple.

On the outside, the gallery complex is a bit academic. (An opening in the entrance pavilion pediment exposes the wooden king-post of the pavilion's roof truss—a belabored archaism.) Inside, however, Simpson has risen to the occasion. The visitor passes from the little pavilion into a double-height entrance hall dramatically decorated with sculptural friezes by the sculptor Alexander Stoddart. The friezes portray Britain's patron saints and episodes from the Homeric epics. A pair of free-standing classical genii bearing torches, also by Stoddart, are perched above stout Doric columns in a lofty portal. This portal leads to a grand hall with a double stairway whose balustrades are spangled with golden ropework. The hall's upper level boasts Ionic columns and pilasters whose shafts are coated with scagliola plasterwork that looks like richly veined green marble, with capitals of white stone above. Beyond the hall, the galleries—which are largely inspired by nineteenth-century classical work at the palace—are exuberant in color and ornament, and, like the entrance hall, dramatically skylit.

Courtesy John Simpson & Partners

The Queen's Gallery at Buckingham Palace.

John Nash was one of the Buckingham Palace architects on whose work Simpson drew. Nash introduced the classical Regency style, and is responsible for the extensive use of white stucco on London façades, having employed it on his terraces, or townhouse blocks, adjacent to Regent's Park. Since the late 1980s, the dean of Britain's classicists, Quinlan Terry, has been working on a half-dozen villas whose garden façades look out on the canal running along the park's northern edge. Terry obtained this sumptuous commission from the Crown Estate, whose administrators are appointed by the queen.

Nash was a romantic, and something of a jack-of-all-styles, and Terry's work at the park ranges from a "Gothick Villa" after the manner of Horace Walpole's Strawberry Hill to a sober Regency-style "Doric Villa" decorated with relief panels derived from the Parthenon frieze in the British Museum. Then, too, there's an "Ionic Villa," with exterior decoration that includes a pediment adorned with rinceaux and a pair of rampant elephants flanking a heraldic shield. And there's a baroque "Corinthian Villa" sporting intricately modeled swags and Corinthian capitals with spiral fluting on the column shafts.

It must be said that the proportions of a number Terry's buildings—including his Maitland Robinson Library at Downing College, Cambridge, which was completed in

Courtesy Robert Adam Architects

Robert Adam's Sackler Library at Oxford, with Alexander Stoddart's relief panel.

1992—are somewhat cramped and convey a sense of top-heaviness. At the library, the cupola contributes to this effect; what's more, Terry placed columns on its Doric porch in front of windows, which is not where they belong. Like Simpson, however, Terry has developed a lively appreciation for decorative enrichment.

This marks a welcome change in the traditional camp. Terry's mentor, Raymond Erith, for example, tended to be quite austere. Erith's provost house at Queen's College, Oxford, completed in 1960, offers a handsome contrast between its base of rusticated split-face masonry, with its deeply recessed joints running halfway up the two-story façade, and the smooth, seamless ashlar stonework above. Erith had a fine sense of abstract line, but much less feeling for ornament.

The full use of traditional architecture's expressive resources continues to elude some classicists. Demetri Porphyrios, a native of Greece whose practice is based in London, is a noteworthy example. In order to commemorate antiquity's achievement, Porphyrios emphasizes those elements of the traditional canon that derive from the construction of early temples in wood—which ends up producing something a little theoretical and rationalized. Porphyrios's white stucco rowhouses in posh London neighborhoods are chilly by comparison with their neighbors. The eye could use more figurative diversion than he seems willing to provide.

Porphyrios has also built a quadrangle at Magdalen College, Oxford, which nicely complements a nineteenth-century quadrangle by Bodley and Garner. Though the classical auditorium that forms part of the complex is so understated it scarcely makes an impression (apart from its awkwardly attached little entrance pavilion), this otherwise Gothic quadrangle represents a refreshing departure from the generally depressing drift of Oxford's postwar architecture.

It was Prince Charles who brought Porphyrios to the attention of Magdalen's president, Anthony Smith. And largely as a result of this project, Porphyrios has won a commission to design a $100 million Gothic residential college at Princeton.

A less-appealing traditional building is Robert Adam's new Sackler Library at Oxford. The library is an addition to the Ashmolean Museum, designed by the great classicist C.R. Cockerell a century and a half ago. Adam's library is entered by way of a circular, glass-roofed pavilion crammed on a narrow street, with a pair of stout Doric columns flanking the door and a heavy entablature above. A five-story rotunda housing the library stacks is situated behind the pavilion, but on a diagonal. A third, four-story building adjoining the rotunda faces a stark sunken courtyard.

With its heavy cornice, narrow upright windows sunk in thick masonry frames, and lack of surface enrichment, the rotunda resembles a stylized donjon. It is odd, moreover, to see it stashed away behind converted rowhouses—but then, that's part of the problem architects face building in England. These undistinguished rowhouses are not Cockerell's and should have been demolished to create a less-irregular site for the Sackler. In Britain, however, it seems every old building is a "listed," or landmarked, building. This ubiquitous, neurotic preservationist impulse is the second bad result of modernism: First the British got those awful Corbusian building-slabs, and then—because of the public's assumption that anything new replacing anything old will be uglier—they got stuck with every piece of architectural flotsam and jetsam antedating the Corbusian flood.

The four-story building facing Adam's courtyard boasts a striking classical relief in bronze (again by Alexander Stoddart) that runs across the top of the façade. But the panel is just implanted in the building without any kind of ornamental border, and the frieze's allegorical meanings are anything but self-evident. It represents, among other things, what Stoddart sees as the struggle between the noble Apollonian spirit of epic, symbolized

by a relief of Homer adorning one urn, and the destructive Dionysian spirit of satire, symbolized by a relief of Archilochus on another. (The large, blank urn in the middle symbolizes the Oxford authorities' hostility to any meaning.) The truth is that Robert Adam's stylistic innovations at the Sackler don't arise from any instinctive insight into the expressive possibilities inherent in the classical forms. At this early stage in the process of cultural recovery, we don't yet have architects operating at that level. Adam's innovations stem instead from a conscious desire to avoid looking stodgy.

Perhaps the finest residential work of recent vintage has been done by Julian Bicknell. During the 1980s, Bicknell built Henbury Rotunda, a magnificent Palladian villa in Cheshire with freestanding sculpture adorning its four pediments. Bicknell, along with Terry, is the most conventional of the British classicists. But his sense of proportion, of correct distribution of building masses, is unsurpassed by any architect in Britain or America. He also knows where to place ornamental accents. These qualities, rather than innovation as an end in itself, are what bring traditional architecture to life. Bicknell has done plenty of big houses in the English countryside since completing Henbury, but he has yet to carry out a major institutional commission in Britain. His non-residential projects include a handsome Georgian golf clubhouse and a Shakespeare Country Park with fine, half-timbered buildings—both, significantly, carried out in Japan.

The sculptor Alexander Stoddart, meanwhile, is as significant a figure in the classical community as any architect. A fiercely nationalistic Scot, Stoddart has built on Glasgow's rich heritage of classical architecture generously adorned with sculpture. He has crowned the city's Italian Center with impressive figures of Mercury and Italia, and added beautifully inlaid little ornamental capitals with the heads of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Glaswegian worthies in the moderne façade of a building next to the Center. Stoddart has also modeled imposing public monuments to Robert Burns, John Wilson, David Hume, and John Witherspoon.

Britain has never had a plebiscite on architecture, but every indication of public preference points in tradition's direction. When John Simpson produced his Paternoster Square redevelopment scheme at Prince Charles's urging, the *Evening Standard*, sensing that the public was with the prince on this issue, sponsored an exhibition of the scheme in St. Paul's Cathedral. The scheme was shown a few years later in a nearby gallery, and visitors' comments were overwhelmingly favorable. The public response to Charles's 1988 BBC documentary, *A Vision of Britain*, in which he called for the restoration of a sense of human scale and amenity to British architecture and urbanism, was enormous. And at Magdalen College, the student union took a vote between Porphyrios's quadrangle scheme and another by a prominent modernist architect, Ian Ritchie. Porphyrios prevailed by a vote of 114 to 2.

Photos this page and next: Courtesy Catesby Leigh.

Quinlan Terry's Maitland Library at Downing College, Cambridge.

The traditional design community nevertheless sees itself operating in a hostile cultural environment. "Until the architecture schools change, traditional architects will be a tiny minority," says David Watkin, Cambridge architecture historian and author of an excellent diagnosis of the intellectual pathologies riddling academic apologias for modernism, *Morality and Architecture*. "If you're an architecture school graduate, you have to be really dedicated to go and sit at the feet of John Simpson. You have to be taught. Students come out of the [modernist] architecture schools unable to draw a building. They can't even design a door case."

So, too, the romantic stereotype of the architect as a Promethean genius—a man who invents the terms of his art more or less *ex nihilo*—has done the profession considerable harm. Most clients haven't much use for visionaries who aspire to erect gigantic upside-down woks. A small number of high-profile jobs allows a well-placed coterie to inflict their "creativity" on the hapless public. But meanwhile, more and more work slips away from architects, as clients get the job done with construction engineers and tradesmen. Add on top of this the preservationists' listing of everything they can get their hands on, and the average architecture-school graduate finds it very hard to be "creative" and make a living.

Even so, Julian Bicknell, a founding trustee of the prince's Institute of Architecture, says he regards the Institute as "misconceived, precisely because it chose to set up in opposition to the general culture." He adds, "I always felt that more would have been


Left: Longmoor Street in Poundbury. Right: Poundbury's market hall, designed by John Simpson.

achieved if the resources that the prince's initiative attracted had been put into scholarships and professorships at established schools and colleges."

Bicknell is reconciled to a sort of postmodern territorial dispensation. The cost of land in city centers demands tall buildings, he says, and the tall classical office buildings of a century ago he feels were not notably successful (although Daniel Burnham's Flatiron Building and McKim Mead and White's Municipal Building in New York, not to mention John T. Windrim's Bell Telephone Building in Philadelphia, suggest the opposite conclusion). "I believe traditional architecture is suited to traditional environments—most obviously in my case the English countryside, suburbs, and small towns," Bicknell declares. "There is in the world of business and government a culture of modernity which favors the use of exciting technology and short-lived buildings. Classical building is after all about buildings made to last hundreds, if not thousands, of years."

Indeed, British classicists believe the key to architectural longevity lies in low elevations, with walls of load-bearing masonry. They think building tall is immoral. This vision is, in the end, antiquarian and self-defeating. But one understands why they hold it. Out-of-place tall buildings are a menace to London's historic character. An office tower project presently threatens the most sacrosanct portion of the city's skyline—the portion dominated by the dome of St. Paul's. For the first time, the dome will be eclipsed, when viewed from the Embankment or Waterloo Bridge, by a sterile pile rising above it, if developers get government approval.

As Bicknell's remarks indicate, however, classicists' big-city commercial commissions have been few. During the 1980s, Quinlan Terry designed a large and very attractive office, retail, and residential complex in Richmond, a densely urbanized London district. Terry broke the exteriors of his buildings down into a series of façades that were treated in a variety of styles, ranging from Venetian Gothic to Georgian. Pundits and even preservationists protested that there should be just one façade mirroring the modern, open-plan office space within the principal building block. "They were espousing the moralizing belief of 'truthful' modernism that the façade must reflect the interior, which is nonsense," says Watkin.

Prince Charles's disengagement from the architectural arena was never absolute. Behind the scenes, he helped persuade the millennial building commission to contribute to the conversion of a very fine church with a late medieval nave in Bury St. Edmunds, a town northeast of London, into a cathedral. This ambitious Gothic project was started after World War II but came to a halt in 1970, before construction on the cathedral's main tower had begun.

And then there's Poundbury. Fifteen years ago, Dorchester authorities decided they wanted to extend the city's urban boundary into the prince's Duchy of Cornwall. Charles commissioned his architectural *éminence grise*, Léon Krier, a longtime advocate of traditional urbanism, to draw up a master plan for a four-hundred-acre tract. Krier's plan calls for development in four phases and leaves a third of the tract open for parkland and recreation space.

Construction got underway in the depths of a recession, and "the Duchy of Cornwall had to subsidize some of the initial infrastructure costs in order to kick-start the development," says Andrew Hamilton, Poundbury's development director. But this is not an exercise in princely largesse. As with the Crown Estate, the Duchy is required to make money on its holdings and pass it along to the government. Once the economy recovered, Poundbury became a commercially successful development.

Tiny though it is, Poundbury is at the heart of the prince's struggling cultural counterrevolution. It embodies his alternative "vision of Britain," with potentially broad ramifications for the nation's built environment. It reflects a profoundly conservative cultural vision which many conservatives (especially those of a libertarian bent) loathe, and which many liberals (especially those who don't bother with architecture reviews) love.

Poundbury's list of architectural prohibitions is long. No windows with frames of aluminum or plastic-coated timber or any kind of synthetic materi-

al—the same goes for doors—and no clip-on muntins. No fanlight inserts in the doors. No overly elaborate door hoods, least of all the off-the-shelf kind made of plastic. No fancy, chalet-style garden sheds. No interlocking concrete roof tiles. No bubble skylights. No plastic awnings. No dishes (but satellite and terrestrial television cables, together with telephone and utility lines, are compactly channeled to make repair and maintenance less disruptive).

None of Poundbury's houses is McMansion scale, but this is an expensive development. The quality of the construction and materials is high, and builders can't economize by plopping down uniform "product," as they do in most residential subdivisions. Buildings have to be individually designed because of the complexity of the village's layout and the architectural variety each block is intended to offer.

Hamilton says the prices the houses fetch and the rapidity of sales more than compensate. "High-quality design schemes are at present relatively scarce," the development's consulting architect, David Oliver, adds. "Poundbury-type schemes are for the moment in great demand and therefore command a premium." That should change over time, Oliver maintains, noting that the Poundbury model is already influencing the mainstream homebuilding industry in England. He says that in the Dorchester area, housing associations—non-profits that build public housing for rent—have found it easier to borrow money for new projects after investing in well-designed developments. "Good design pays," he says.

The British traditionalists' architectural project—Prince Charles's project—is not just about striking a better balance between automobile and pedestrian, the familiar objective of America's New Urbanists. It is about recovering a humane architectural culture in an era in which art's role in the shaping of the human habitat is far too small.

Confronted with the razzle-dazzle of the high-tech crowd, Britain's classicists have tended to be a little too stiff and self-conscious in their approach—and sometimes just plain silly. The Queen Elizabeth Gate in Hyde Park, erected in 1993, awkwardly combines classical gateposts with the rather preposterous effusion of art-nouveau feuillage of the gates, while the rampant lion and unicorn of the royal coat of arms are rendered as two-dimensional, Babes-in-Toyland cutouts.

Surely most people would prefer the more muscular 1880s take on the royal insignia adorning the Brasenose College entrance on High Street in Oxford. Surely most people would prefer the more soundly conceived intricacy of the baroque south portal of St. Mary the Virgin Church, also on High Street, with its richly wrought gate and broken pediment, its twisted columns and abundance of sculpture.

But it's going to take time to recover the kind of architectural culture that can generate such work on a significant scale. Traditional architects should be making the fullest possible use of Britain's generous supply of skilled craftsmen. And while there's nothing wrong with cooling the anti-modernist rhetoric and seeking a role in establishment organizations like the Royal Institute of British Architects, Britain's classicists should think of themselves as an artistic counterculture—offering a comprehensive alternative to the postmodern dispensation.

And what of Prince Charles? The queen mother's funeral seems to have reminded Britons that they had forgotten about Diana, despite the unprecedented national plague of lachrymosity that set in after her death. It seems unlikely Charles could ever again generate the kind of public support for his architectural cause that he did during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

But he's already made a positive difference. Had it not been for his almost pathologically indecisive nature—the main reason for the Institute of Architecture's collapse in a factional tug of war—and his somewhat tumultuous personal life, he might have made a bigger difference.

Still, so long as he offers an alternative to modernist patronage, he is doing what he can to make people understand that true architecture is not a mere commodity, nor the province of egomaniacs, but one of the noblest, most precious expressions of the human spirit. ♦

Southern Partisans

How Dixie went Republican.

BY DAVID LOWE

Advocates of activist government in the United States have long looked with envy at West European countries with ideologically based party systems. In 1950, a special committee of the American Political Science Association (APSA) argued: "An effective party system requires, first, that the parties are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs."

The Rise of Southern Republicans
by Earl and Merle Black
Harvard University Press, 442 pp., $29.95

Thirteen years later, during the Kennedy administration, the political scientist James MacGregor Burns, reflecting a widely held view in the profession, bemoaned what he called "The Deadlock of Democracy." The

David Lowe heads the president's office at the National Endowment for Democracy.

main culprit was a fragmented politics that prevented parties from developing clear, undiluted national platforms, compounded by a congressional committee system that bestowed power on those members best able to insulate themselves from two-party competition. Behind the high-flown academic analysis was a clear bias in favor of the agendas of presidents from the Democratic party.

Today American politics has become nationalized. Intraparty divisions are not what they were as recently as a generation ago. There are many possible explanations for this transformation, including the growth of the federal government, a surge in America's geographical mobility, and the influence of an increasingly nationalized news media.

But by far the most significant factor has been the movement of the eleven states of the old Confederacy away from one-party domination. In 1950, the year the special APSA Committee issued its report, there was not a single Republican senator from the South. And of the 105 southern House members, a total of two were from the GOP.

Today, by contrast, for the first time since Reconstruction, Republicans hold majorities in both of the South's congressional delegations: 13 of 22 senators and 71 of 125 representatives. Meanwhile, the region's congressional Democratic delegation, in dramatic contrast to the days when southern barons clashed with northern liberals, votes more often than not with their fellow Democratic party members from other regions.

In *The Rise of Southern Republicans*, brothers Earl and Merle Black explain the partisan realignment that has brought the South into the national political mainstream. The Blacks, who are not (as one might think from their names) drivers on the NASCAR circuit, but rather longtime serious students of southern politics, focus most of their attention on the congressional arena, where voting patterns reflect long-term partisan loyalty more closely than at the presidential level.

Bettmann / CORBIS

Southern Democratic senators in 1964: Ervin, Eastland, Ellender, Byrd, and Johnston.

The authors' workmanlike competence, complete with tables, charts, and graphs, mirrors the bland style of contemporary southern politics, which differs starkly from the colorful era that produced the demagogic politician immortalized in such classics as *All the King's Men* and *The Earl of Louisiana*. Nonetheless, the story the authors of *The Rise of Southern Republicans* tell is a fascinating one, with implications for American politics that are both profound and uncertain.

The roughly ninety-year period from the end of Reconstruction to the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act was the heyday of Democratic party dominance in the South. While the political tides were shifting in other parts of the country, the "solid South" remained committed to the party that promised not to disturb Jim Crow. That commitment was reinforced by the congressional seniority system, which enabled long-serving "old bulls" like Senator James Eastland of Mississippi and "Judge" Howard Smith of Virginia to thwart the party's more activist wing, particularly following the growth of the Democratic party in the North during and after the Great Depression.

It is hard to convey to anyone who did not grow up in the South before the civil rights era (as I did) just how strange the concept of southern Republicanism was as recently as a couple of generations ago. The authors quote Trent Lott, a onetime staffer for a Democratic congressman from Mississippi, who recalled that while growing up during the 1940s and 1950s, he "never met a live Republican." The GOP was no match for the ghosts of the "War Between the States." Bitter memories of the Civil War and Reconstruction, combined with the death of the short-lived populist movement of the late nineteenth century, set the tone of southern politics for the next century. According to the authors, the pattern was in place by the early 1870s, when the South became the largest regional bloc in Congress.

Racial politics based on white supremacy could best be served, particularly in those parts of the South with substantial black populations (sometimes referred to as "black belts"), by one-party dominance. According to the late Harvard professor V.O. Key Jr., himself a native Texan, in his 1949 study of the region's politics: "Two party competition would have been fatal to the status of black-belt whites. It would have meant in the 1890s an appeal to the Negro vote and it would have meant (and it did for a time) Negro rule in some black-belt counties."

According to Key, it was the black-belt states of the Deep South (South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana) that dominated the politics of the region. This would continue to be the case until the Republicans began to gain a foothold.

Still, despite the tendency of northerners, in Key's wonderful phrase, "to regard the South as one large Mississippi," there has always been another South, one with smaller numbers of blacks, higher levels of urbanization, greater social and economic diversity, and even some mountainous areas that opposed secession. The authors point out that it was this subregion they refer to as the "Peripheral" South (consisting of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, Florida, and Texas) that was susceptible to periodic Republican inroads even before the demise of regional Democratic dominance, and whose demographics today make it more of a Republican stronghold than the Deep South.

If the Civil War and Reconstruction cemented the attachment of the South to the Democratic party, the Great Depression served only to reinforce it, as the national Democratic party's appeal to the "common man" would have strong resonance throughout the region. When the New Deal brought to Washington a new group of Democrats who would set the party on a different course, southern Democrats in Congress would forge coalitions with conservative Republicans to thwart liberal legislation and delay the advent of civil and voting rights for blacks.

A major turning point came in 1957 with Lyndon Johnson's masterful shepherding through the Senate of the first Civil Rights Act. Within a decade, the South's politics would be turned upside down, with the Republican Barry Goldwater carrying all five states of the Deep South in 1964 and the third-party George Wallace carrying four of the five (plus Arkansas) four years later.

The best part of *The Rise of Southern Republicans* is the analysis of the factors that delayed the extension of Republican success in the South to the grassroots. Conservative Democratic senators and congressmen continued to chair key committees from which they could deliver goods and services to constituents, support popular Great Society programs such as Medicare,

Lyndon Johnson

Bettmann / CORBIS

and demonstrate enough independence from national party leaders to make them trusted in their districts.

But cracks would soon begin to appear. While the Deep South would continue to be grounded in the politics of race, the Peripheral South, with its growing middle class, was beginning to focus on economic issues. And at the same time that blacks were beginning to be enfranchised on a large scale, congressional Democrats were beginning to demand more accountability within the party to its national (i.e., liberal) wing, particularly following the Watergate landslide of 1974.

It took Ronald Reagan to complete the realignment. In the words of the authors, "his optimistic conservatism and successful performance in office made the Republican party respectable and useful for millions of Southern whites." The Reagan realignment was based on a top-down approach to party-building that both realigned white conservatives and neutralized white moderates, persuading those who were not prepared to become Republicans to think of themselves as independents. These trends were reinforced by long-term demographic factors based on migration patterns among blacks (out) and whites (in) that, by 1990, made the South look more like the rest of the nation than ever before.

President Reagan's attachment to traditional values and his calls for lower taxes, a stronger military, and slowed federal spending "resonated powerfully among conservative and moderate whites in the South." An important new element of the southern Republican coalition was the religious right, which saw much to laud in the GOP's national platform. By 1984, for the first time in the 20th century, the Democratic party could claim the loyalty of fewer than half of southern whites (43 percent).

Five years later, Newt Gingrich was elected to the House Republican leadership, setting the party on a path toward aggressive recruitment and fund-raising aimed at reducing "the immense surplus of southern seats that House Democrats had enjoyed throughout the twentieth century." In 1994, 84 percent of southern white conservatives and 48 percent of southern white moderates voted for Republican congressional candidates. Republicans were now in control of a majority of southern House seats. Exit polls conducted two years later confirmed that southern Republican support was dominant in both rural and metropolitan areas.

The Reagan realignment not only transformed the face of southern Republicanism, it also produced significant consequences for Democrats, whose base of support now ironically rested with the blacks the party had long disenfranchised. As the authors note, with conservative voters increasingly preferring to cast their ballots in Republican primaries, "Democratic Senate candidates can now safely ignore the preferences of the most conservative whites."

The result has been the emergence of southern Democratic senators in step with the national party. Another important dynamic that emerged in the 1990s has been the creation of majority black districts which, by ghettoizing black voting strength, has paved the way for the election of additional Republicans.

For the first time since the pre-Civil War era of Democrats and Whigs, two American parties now face one another without major internal divisions, fulfilling the goal of those who have advocated a coherent political system with clearly defined partisan differences.

What are its implications? Careful analysts that they are, the brothers Black are content to reach the end of their study of southern voting patterns without risking a great deal of speculation about the future. They do point out, as The Weekly Standard's Christopher Caldwell argued after the demise of the Gingrich revolution, that the Republican party, having made the conservative South its strongest base of support, faces the danger of becoming a minority party by alienating non-southern moderates needed to maintain national power. They also point out that Republicans are by no means guaranteed regional domination, since they concede at least 90 percent of the black vote in any given contest.

Are there benefits to be derived from the political realignment of the South for the region and for the nation? In the South's patterns of one-party voting, V.O. Key identified a phenomenon he called the politics of "friends and neighbors," i.e., a form of extreme localism by which candidates for state office pulled overwhelming majorities in their home counties and heavy support in adjacent counties. The result was "the absence of stable, well-organized, state-wide factions of like-minded citizens formed to advocate measures of common concern." For all of their shortcomings, political parties with identifiable policy goals, continuity in their leadership, and accountable candidacies, are far superior to what Key referred to as "pulverized factionalism." A party system without continuity, accountability, or responsible leadership was always ripe for demagogic appeals based on personality (a quality that applies in many struggling new democracies and quasi-democracies around the world today) with all the resulting problems for democracy itself. Happily, the South's demagogic politics are a thing of the past.

What about the nation as a whole? Certainly the clarity provided by coherent parties is to be welcomed. But as long as the national partisan balance is as close as it is today, the kind of party government favored by early advocates of clearly defined parties will simply be an illusion. This is reinforced by the dramatic increase in the number of safe congressional seats, which makes it very difficult for large-scale partisan change to occur in any given election.

As Madison predicted, governing a large diverse society is best achieved by the building of temporary coalitions. Contemporary issues such as agriculture, trade, and energy that tend to have more of a regional than a partisan focus and that rarely fall neatly along the ideological divide will continue to provide a counterweight to the streamlined politics of partisan division. Still, the rise of two-party competition in the most populous and fastest-growing region of the country will, in the long run, have a significant impact on American politics. Earl and Merle Black have given us a thoughtful epitaph for the once-solid South. ♦

The Standard Reader

Victor's Remorse

Derek Leebaert weighs the costs of the Cold War

The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America's Cold War Victory by Derek Leebaert (Little Brown, 704 pp., $29.95).

A sore loser is easy to find, but you don't come across many sore winners. Nonetheless, they exist—and for proof, you need look no further than Derek Leebaert, whose book on the Cold War adds new worries to the truism that history is written by the victors.

Make no mistake: Leebaert is clearly glad the West won the Cold War. But in *The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America's Cold War Victory*, he piles angry account upon account to show that we did so in the most hamhanded and ultimately damaging fashion. A Georgetown University professor and former editor of the prestigious journal *International Security,* Leebaert believes the cost of victory for the United States was unnecessarily high: a waste of treasure, talent, and civic capital. If only we had been smarter. But we weren't, and "splendid cities of the mind and spirit have been lost—ones that might have towered in place of missile silos, command centers and barracks."

The Fifty-Year Wound is written with zip and often with insight. But it suffers from the lack of a convincing alternative strategy for the Cold War. And, more to the point, the principal lesson it teaches is getting a little long in the tooth. It's hardly news that "big government" is not the most wise or efficient instrument for conducting human affairs.

Moreover, the damage done was not nearly as profound or as lasting as Leebaert suggests. Remember the great warning—issued over and over again by America's anti-anti-Communists—that the United States was going to turn into the very kind of totalitarian state it was fighting? As Aaron Friedberg's *In the Shadow of the Garrison State* convincingly documented a few years ago, it never happened. But that hasn't killed off the old, Dr. Strangelovian claim of America's Cold War mirroring of its enemy.

What is new is a curious convergence of the left and the right—joining together to mourn the freedoms lost in the fifty-year struggle against Soviet Stalinism. It's clear that a good portion of America's elite now believe the Cold War was less a noble endeavor than a necessary evil. *The Fifty-Year Wound* will do nothing to check that view. To the contrary, it's a good bet that factions on the left and the right alike will preemptively use Leebaert's account to cast doubts on the global call to arms being issued by President Bush. ♦

Rep. Bob Barr (R-GA) has sued former president Bill Clinton, celebrity pundit James Carville, and pornographer Larry Flynt for defamation of character. ***—News Item***

Parody

FBI-302 (Rev. 8-19-94)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

IN RE: Barr v. Clinton, Carville, Flynt et al.

Date of transcription 2/12/03

On below date, WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON was advised of the identity of the investigating Agents, SA [redacted] and SA [redacted], and the purpose for the interview. CLINTON was interviewed in the presence of his attorney, DAVID KENDALL, at KENDALL's office, 725 12th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, telephone number (202) 434-5605. CLINTON provided the following information:

CLINTON, date of birth 8/19/46, place of birth Hope, Arkansas, currently resides in Westchester County, New York, and Washington, D.C., but has no specific recollection of his exact addresses or home telephone numbers. He is currently self-employed as a world historical figure and travels a lot in that capacity.

On or about 7/1/97, while he was building a bridge to the twenty-first century, CLINTON first became aware of BOB BARR, whom he described, upon knowledge and belief, as a congressman from Georgia of mixed-race parentage and unusual sexual appetites. CLINTON advised that he does not think there is anything wrong with that, especially the last part. CLINTON advised that he learned these facts about BARR during a meeting in the White House Oval Office with JAMES CARVILLE and SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL. CLINTON advised that he has no specific recollection who these gentlemen are.

CLINTON advised that he thought SA [redacted] could probably [redacted] through a garden hose and requested that she "[redacted]." CLINTON advised SA [redacted] that she could always say she had been delivering some papers for him to sign. CLINTON advised that KENDALL and SA [redacted] appeared hungry and that they should go ahead to lunch, he and SA [redacted] would join them later. CLINTON and KENDALL argued about this for some time.

CLINTON advised that on or about 9/13/02 he was deposed in connection with a civil defamation action against him by BARR. During that deposition, BARR's attorney, LARRY KLAYMAN, asked CLINTON if he had ever been alone in the Oval Office with CARVILLE and BLUMENTHAL. CLINTON recalled replying in the negative. CLINTON advised that his answer was true because CARVILLE and BLUMENTHAL had both been present at the 7/1/97 meeting, and he had therefore been alone with neither of them. At this point, CLINTON advised that SA [redacted] should apply the Heimlich maneuver to KENDALL because KENDALL appeared to be choking.

CLINTON advised that KLAYMAN also asked him whether he knew who LARRY FLYNT was and CLINTON again recalled replying in the negative. CLINTON advised that although he had in fact been familiar with FLYNT's work at the time, the truth of his answer to KLAYMAN depended on what it means to "know who" a man really is. Elaborating on his knowledge of FLYNT's work, CLINTON advised that SA [redacted] reminded him of a series of photographs in which a woman is surrounded by

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Investigation on 1/12/03 **at** Washington, D.C. **File #** 29D-FBI-LR-35063

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] **Date dictated** 1/12/03

the weekly Standard

JUNE 24, 2002

School Choice: A Civil Rights Issue

Paul E. Peterson is director of the Program on Education Policy and Governance, Harvard University; senior fellow, Hoover Institution; and member, Hoover's Koret Task Force on K–12 Education.

William G. Howell is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

Just as the Supreme Court prepares to rule on the constitutionality of school vouchers, President Bush has set aside in his budget proposals $50 million for trial school choice programs. Bush has called for giving parents "expanded school choice options, including the option of a private school." It's the civil rights issue of our time! he might have added.

Bush refers to "expanding" school choice with good reason. For decades Americans have had school choice—provided they've got the money to pick their place of residence. And for decades the education gap between blacks and whites has remained intact, despite a host of compensatory education reforms. Nor—and here is the civil rights issue—is this gap likely to close if most whites have residential choice and most blacks do not.

African Americans are the losers in this arrangement. Holding less equity and facing discrimination in the housing market, blacks choose from a limited set of housing options. As a consequence, their children attend the worst public schools. The results are clear. **Despite the efforts of the civil rights movement, public schools today remain just as segregated as they were in the 1950s.**

Since blacks have the least amount of choice among public schools, they benefit the most when choice is expanded. In multiyear evaluations of private voucher programs in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Dayton, Ohio, we and our colleagues found that African American students, when given the choice of a private school, scored significantly higher on standardized tests than comparable students remaining in public school.

These test score gains were accomplished at religious and other private schools that had little more than half the funds available to their public school counterparts. Nevertheless, parents reported much higher levels of school satisfaction. Private school parents were more likely to report that their children were in smaller schools, smaller classes, and an educational-friendly environment. Their children had more homework, and the schools were more likely to communicate with the family. Nor were the private schools any more segregated than the public ones.

So what should Congress do with the Bush administration proposal? Assuming the Supreme Court finds vouchers constitutional, Congress should put bipartisan bickering aside and launch a demonstration program that can fully explore the potential of choice programs. Demonstration programs should be initiated in one or more cities where African American students are concentrated in sizable numbers and private schools are not being fully utilized. Congress should make sure voucher programs receive monies comparable to what public schools receive. In this way, founders of new schools, both secular and religious, will be motivated to participate in the demonstration and bring new ideas and new energy into urban education. All the schools should be held accountable for results within a reasonable period of time.

In short, it's time to take the American commitment to equal educational opportunity seriously. Precisely because African Americans suffer most in today's real estate–driven system of school choice, they stand to benefit the most from school vouchers.

— Paul E. Peterson and William G. Howell

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