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THE ARAB TYRANNIES?**
Amir Taheri

the weekly

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**Dubious
Diversity**

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A Rare Opportunity for Postal Reform

Rick Geddes is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and is an assistant professor in the Department of Policy Analysis and Management at Cornell University.

The commission President Bush established to analyze the workings of the U.S. Postal Service will issue its recommendations for reform on July 31. This is the first such presidential commission since the Johnson administration, and it is long overdue. The need for reform is critical because the Postal Service's revenue base is eroding rapidly; the institution is a train wreck waiting to happen.

Last year, for the first time in recent history, the volume of first-class mail—which constitutes more than 57 percent of the Postal Service's revenue—actually declined. Standard mail dropped even more precipitously. Not surprisingly, the Postal Service's financial condition has suffered. Its net loss in 2002 was \$700 million, on top of a \$1.7 billion loss in 2001.

The Postal Service needs to undergo a major restructuring. If such restructuring is not implemented, the system will become more dysfunctional and more difficult to overhaul in the future. The president's commission enjoys the rare opportunity to save the Postal Service before it implodes.

Increasing rates will not solve the problem but rather encourage the use of substitutes for mail, such as e-mail, phones, and faxes. Nor is enhanced commercial freedom for the Postal Service a viable alternative, as such freedom would only encourage it to push its monopoly power, tax-exempt status, and other government-granted privileges into competitive markets, thus unfairly competing with private rivals.

More fundamental change is needed. Fortunately, many countries have undertaken postal reform, providing valuable guidance for the United States. Those initiatives suggest that three key changes are required for successful reform: (1) limitations on or elimination of the postal monopoly, (2) full-scale privatization, or (3) both.

Many countries have limited or eliminated their postal monopolies, creating substantial benefits for consumers and simultaneously improving the performance of their postal services. New Zealand, for example, eliminated its postal monopoly in 1998, allowing full competition for letter delivery. As a result, New Zealand Post has *reduced* its basic stamp price and maintained profitability. Australia limited its letter delivery monopoly in 1989. Its basic postage rate has remained the same for more than eight years. Australia Post has earned profits for more than a decade, and on-time delivery has increased.

The main argument against repealing the postal monopoly is that service to rural customers will somehow suffer, but neither New Zealand nor Australia has experienced problems with rural delivery. Numerous other countries have limited their postal monopolies, yielding similar benefits.

Other countries have undertaken privatization. Germany's Deutsche Post has had several successful public offerings (but remains primarily government owned). The post office in Holland, TPG, is now a predominantly privately owned, publicly traded company. The effects in both countries have been positive. Because there is an explicit group to which they are accountable, both companies are more innovative, competing aggressively for business and offering their customers new products and services.

No entity would benefit more from repeal of its monopoly than the U.S. Postal Service itself.

Combined with government ownership, its monopoly status eliminates its incentive to improve its service and opens it up to political interference. Unless its structure is changed, it is unlikely that the Postal Service will evolve on its own. The president's commission has the opportunity to make that happen.

—Rick Geddes

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A photograph of a person mowing a lawn with a riding mower. The person is in the foreground, wearing shorts and a light-colored shirt, holding the handle of the mower. The mower is black and green, and is moving across a green lawn. In the background, there is a large, two-story house with a white porch and a black car parked in front of it. The sky is blue with some light clouds.

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The Jurisprudence of Elvis

Poor Dick Gephardt. Summoned to Chicago to appear, along with all the other dwarfs, at a bow-and-scrape “forum” of Democratic presidential hopefuls sponsored by Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow/PUSH Coalition on June 22, Gephardt merely did what he was supposed to do. He bowed. He scraped. Specifically, Gephardt, a well-informed and reasonably intelligent person, made a series of whatever-you-want-I’ll-give-it-to-you-twice pronouncements that no well-informed and reasonably intelligent person could possibly believe.

For instance: Asked what his White House would do were the Supreme Court to rule affirmative action unconstitutional, Gephardt said this: “When I’m president, we’ll do executive orders to overcome any wrong thing that the Supreme Court does, tomorrow or any other day.”

Here in Washington, this is being treated as a gaffe of the revealed-ignorance variety: Doesn’t Gephardt know that presidents are legally powerless to countermand Supreme Court decisions

about the meaning of the Constitution?

Actually, yes, we’re pretty sure Gephardt does know that. We’re pretty sure, in other words, that his remark reflected cynicism, not stupidity. And cynicism is plenty bad, and worthy of criticism, don’t get us wrong.

But why pick on Gephardt, we wonder? Just within the past two months, at least two other Democratic presidential wannabes have said something remarkably similar, and neither of them, in the process, appeared any less cynical—or smarter—than Gephardt.

Item the first: The Rev. Al Sharpton, who unleashed the following gem at a Children’s Defense Fund conclave on April 9, according to a transcript on their website. If the Supreme Court overturns *Bakke*, Sharpton offered, “I would by executive order use as much of my presidential power to try to enact programs, and I would welcome someone to then bring me to court so we could reargue this case, and if we had to argue it over and over again, we’d argue the case, because if we had given up

with *Presley v. Ferguson*, we’d have never got to *Brown v. Board of Education*.”

Also, without *Presley*, there could never have been the Beatles.

Moments after Sharpton’s howler, Sen. Joseph Lieberman disclosed what he would do in response to a Supreme Court ruling invalidating *Bakke*: “As president of the United States, I would do everything I could in my power to introduce and pass legislation that would make it legal and constitutional once again for America’s colleges and universities to have affirmative action programs. That’s the American way.”

It’s the “American way” for presidents to send Congress legislation enacting programs that the Supreme Court has determined violate the 14th Amendment? In that case, President Lieberman could propose legislation providing federal agencies with separate bathrooms for black people. Funny thing, too: We wouldn’t have figured the senator for a *Presley* man. He always seemed more the Perry Como type. ♦

Ho Diversity

Civil rights activist/gangsta rapper Snoop Dogg has struck a blow for . . . “ho-kind,” we guess you’d call it, ending his association with the “Girls Gone Wild” video series. All installments of which feature the same basic plot: boy meets dangerously intoxicated girl; boy persuades intoxicated girl to let him film her while she performs an act of indecent exposure; boy wins fruitless lawsuit later brought by sobered-up girl and her horrified family back home. Needless to say, these videos have proved an astonishing commercial success.

So why is the host of “Girls Gone Wild Doggy Style” walking away from

the franchise? It’s a matter of principle, dammit: The “Gone Wild” project’s exploitation of women, Mr. Dogg has decided, is just plain wrong—at least insofar as the videos fail to provide their audience with what the Supreme Court might call the educational benefits of fully diverse student bodies. “If you notice,” observes Dogg, “there hasn’t been no girls of [ethnicity] at all on one of these tapes. No black girls, no Spanish girls—all white girls, and that [stuff] ain’t cool, because white girls ain’t the only ho’s that get wild.”

And that ain’t no [stuff].

In other crisis-of-conscience news, actor Jason Alexander, who parlayed his amusing TV turn as Jerry Seinfeld’s annoying friend into an annoying TV

turn as KFC’s unamusing chicken pitchman, has been dismissed from that latter job. *Msnbc.com*’s Jeannette Walls reports that KFC took exception to Alexander’s recent emergence as a poultry rights activist.

The animal-liberation group PETA had threatened protests after it was announced that Alexander would begin appearing in a Broadway show. Whereupon Alexander made a startling, life-and-morality altering discovery: Turns out that KFC chickens, before they become Honey BBQ whatnots, are first killed, dismembered, breaded, and plunged into boiling oil. Who knew?

PETA—now with Alexander’s support, apparently—will continue pressuring KFC to gas its chickens instead



of beheading them. Meantime, the group is concentrating on incremental reform of the chicken-genocide industry. KFC has already agreed to install cameras in its slaughterhouses. (The first abattoir reality show?) KFC has also agreed, for those death-row chickens still awaiting the guillotine, to provide enlarged holding sheds offering “simple mental and physical stimulation.” THE SCRAPBOOK has no idea what that means, but we do have a suggestion. How’s about showing the chickens “Girls Gone Wild on Campus 2,” in which viewers are invited to “see what these girls do when they’re not studying

for finals.” That oughtta be plenty stimulating, even if it does involve white-meat breast parts exclusively. ♦

Galloway-gate (cont.)

On June 20, 2003, the *Christian Science Monitor* published a lengthy reconsideration of its previous reports indicating that antiwar British Labour MP George Galloway had accepted an undisclosed \$10 million payment from Saddam Hussein—and had lobbied Hussein for even more. Those reports were based on documents from Baghdad which, the *Monitor* has now con-

cluded, are “almost certainly forgeries.” THE WEEKLY STANDARD, regrettably, made past reference to the documents in question—in an article by Stephen F. Hayes describing the Iraqi regime’s long practice of bribing journalists and politicians.

In leftist peace-movement circles, the *Monitor*’s new report is being celebrated as proof that Galloway was framed. But it appears he was not. A second set of documents implicating Galloway in Iraqi bribery, first reported by London’s *Daily Telegraph* (and also referred to in the same WEEKLY STANDARD article), has been judged authentic by the same expert who conducted studies on the *Monitor* documents. “Our documents are not forged,” *Telegraph* editor Charles Moore says. Reporter David Blair “found our documents himself in a box file labeled ‘Britain’ in the foreign ministry in Baghdad a few days after the fall of Saddam.” And just last week, the credibility of those documents was further confirmed—by Galloway himself, when he was finally forced to admit that they correctly place him in Baghdad in late December 1999. Yes, “I was in Iraq on Boxing Day, 1999,” Galloway told the BBC.

Galloway has said little else about the matter, however, and the *Telegraph* would like some specifics: “First, he could address the question of where and with whom he was on Boxing Day, 1999,” Charles Moore points out. “Did he indeed have a meeting arranged by Fawaz Zureikat, as the memo says? Did he meet another man who may (possibly without his knowledge) have been an Iraqi agent?”

Good questions. ♦

He Said It, Not Us

“I don’t need Bush’s tax cut. I have never worked a f—ing day in my life.”

—Rep. Patrick Kennedy, June 25, 2003

Casual

NO OPINION

During a question-and-answer period following one of his lectures, the political philosopher Michael Oakshott was asked what he thought about England's place in the European Union. "I don't," Oakshott replied, "see that I am required to have an opinion on that."


I found that response very helpful, for more and more things crop up on which I, too, feel having an opinion is unnecessary. Especially has this become so in the realm of popular culture. On the movie *The Matrix* and its sequel, for example, I have no need to weigh in with a penetrating, or even banal, insight. This is a subject best left to those pop culture pundits who specialize in being ten minutes ahead of the *With-It Express*.

In his novel *Guerrillas*, V.S. Naipaul says of a character whom he loathes that "she had a great many opinions but taken together these did not add up to a point of view." I like to think that I have by now a point of view: a reasonably settled sense of what is and isn't significant in life. Such things as *The Matrix*, the rise of rap music, the fall of the sitcom, the future of the Women's National Basketball Association, and a number of other items touching on the epiphenomena of the ephemeral do not qualify as requiring my opinion.

I'm not such an immitigable high-brow that I don't watch movies or my share of television, but I just don't feel the need to deliver finely honed opinions about them. I am content not to go beyond the subtlety of the Hollywood producer who is said to have divided all the screenplays sent him into two categories: "Piece of Crap" and "Not a Piece of Crap." Being a textured thinker, I would sometimes call upon a third category: "Not Entirely a Piece of Crap."

Other people's opinions, on popular culture, and much else, help us feel them out. Most of us search for people whose opinions are roughly congruent with our own, believing, I suppose, that anyone who doesn't share our distastes is himself distasteful. Yet congruence of opinion isn't a good test for judging character. A better test is if you think well of someone despite his opinions. More disturbing

still is to encounter someone



whose opinions on a great many subjects are very close to your own whom you recognize as unmistakably a creep.

Economists trained at the University of Chicago can be death on the thinness, the utter airiness, of much opinion. They make a specialty of knocking down your opinions, no matter how trivial. ("Why, exactly, would you say it's a nice day?") When last I lunched with my late cousin, the Chicago economist Sherwin Rosen, who was very good at this, he asked if he could pay his share of the lunch. "Not necessary," I said, "if you'll just give me back my assumptions."

In the political realm, of course, judging people on their opinions is trickiest of all. I know a woman who is trying to break up her dearest friend's dalliance with a man whose

standard Republican politics she, the first woman, despises: How can one possibly love a man who isn't pro-choice? I don't happen to think that politics are always, or even often, a strong index of character, especially since so many people's politics don't really touch their lives. "He takes his politics from Moscow," an old put-down of fashionable left-wingers used to run, "and his cooking from Paris." For many people, political opinions are to be worn, like designer clothes, for their brand quality. But just as it wouldn't do to make a final judgment on a woman for wearing a DKNY T-shirt, neither is it smart to admire a man simply because he believes in the Invisible Hand of the market.


I imagine there must be an intellectual somewhere who has averred he could not possibly love a woman who does not hold the novels of Thomas Pynchon in high esteem. I myself have had no difficulty loving women who wanted to, and others who didn't in the least care about, saving the whale. My own preference is for people who have the independence and confidence to proclaim perfectly heterodox opinions in hostile territory. Someone at a meeting of, say, the Modern Language Association who says that he is nuts about the singing of Wayne Newton. Or a woman who announces that she thinks pro football an elegant sport.

I once read a letter that Edward Shils wrote to a young contributor of his magazine, *Minerva*, in which he offered to publish an article she had sent him if she would remove the opinions in the article, which he found callow and untrue. If she felt the need of opinion in the article, he added, he would be only too glad to supply his own. That seems to me to get the notion of opinion in right perspective: as something transient, arbitrary, and shallow.

"Crudity and Falsehood copulate," wrote Paul Valéry, "and give birth to Opinion." Attend the christening, by all means, but I wouldn't send a gift.

JOSEPH EPSTEIN

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CREDIBILITY GAP?

GIVE STEPHEN F. HAYES CREDIT. With only a couple of days between the *New Republic's* deadline and THE WEEKLY STANDARD's, he didn't have much time to defend the Bush administration from our charges that it systematically exaggerated what American intelligence knew about Iraq's nuclear program and alleged links to al Qaeda ("The War Against Bush," June 30). Unfortunately, it shows.

Start with the alleged al Qaeda ties. As we reported, the FBI and CIA examined thousands of documents—"from flight reservations to car rentals to bank accounts," in FBI Director Robert Mueller's words—before determining in early 2002 that there was no evidence that September 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta met an Iraqi agent in Prague in April 2001, as has been alleged. (Indeed, American intelligence concluded Atta was in Virginia Beach at the time.) This is also the position of the Czech government. Only one person—an informant to Czech intelligence—claims to have seen Atta meet with the Iraqi agent, and even Czech intelligence officials have questioned the informant's reliability in conversations with reporters. Hayes admits the Atta meeting is "disputed," saying (without any evidence) that it could have occurred at another time. But, even if you accept this highly charitable assessment, the Bush administration's public statements were still dishonest. In September 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney said accounts of the meeting were "credible." How can they be "credible" when the CIA and FBI have said there was no evidence?

Hayes also casts aspersions on our report that high-level al Qaeda terrorists Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, and Ramzi bin Al Shibh have rejected a link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden's group, saying these are merely "denials from terrorists." That's true. But, in his January 2003 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush cited "statements by people now in custody" as evidence that Saddam and al Qaeda *were* linked. If Hayes wants to discount the testimony of captured terrorists, he should begin with the testimony brandished by the president himself.

Hayes cites an administration leak to *Newsweek* earlier this month about a for-

mer Iraqi diplomat confirming contact between al Qaeda and an Iraqi operative in the mid-90s. But, as Walter Pincus reported in the June 22 *Washington Post*, American officials knew last fall of such early ties and attributed them to mutual enmity toward the Saudi monarchy rather than the United States. Hayes also cites ties between Saddam and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, whom Hayes identifies as "an al Qaeda leader." For starters, there is no evidence of *any* agreement, arrangement, or plot involving Zarqawi and Saddam's regime. Moreover, Pincus reports that "U.S. intelligence had already concluded [by last October] that Zarqawi was not an al Qaeda member but the leader of an unaffiliated terrorist group who occasionally associated with al Qaeda adherents."

Then there is Saddam's nuclear program. Hayes defends the administration's claims that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes for its nuclear program by noting that the CIA believed it was true: "Why administration critics who are eager to defer to the CIA's skepticism about Saddam's al Qaeda links would rather not believe the CIA about the aluminum tubes is not explained." But his characterization of the CIA's position is inaccurate. As sources familiar with the relevant documents told us, the CIA *did not* unequivocally endorse the view that Iraq's aluminum-tube imports were designed for uranium enrichment in its classified reports, instead presenting it as the subject of internal intelligence-community debate. Even in the declassified version of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's WMD threat—largely written by the CIA—the intelligence community again noted that some experts doubted the aluminum tubes could be used for creating nuclear weapons. But, to the consternation of intelligence analysts, the NIE did not reveal that the dissent came from experts at the Department of Energy, who, thanks to their expertise with nuclear technology, were most qualified to make the final judgment. (The International Atomic Energy Agency later came to the same conclusion, using a similar expert-based process, as did British intelligence.) And Hayes doesn't acknowledge that Bush mischaracterized *even the declassified NIE*. In his State of the Union address, the president said, "Our

intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production," never noting that it was a topic of dispute, let alone disputed most strenuously by those intelligence agents who know the most about nuclear weapons.

While Hayes accuses us of "limitless credulousness," he himself stretches credulity when he asserts that Vice President Cheney's highly unusual pre-war visits to the CIA occurred merely because Cheney "might want to be briefed as thoroughly as possible." After all, we are not the only journalists who have reported that the visits were perceived by many at Langley as an effort to pressure intelligence analysts. On June 5, the *Washington Post*, drawing on interviews with senior intelligence officials, wrote that "some analysts felt they were being pressured to make their assessments fit with the Bush administration's policy objectives." Evidently the *Post* is displaying "limitless credulousness," too.

More broadly, Hayes tries to exonerate the Bush team's inaccuracies by noting that "intelligence is an art, of course, not a science." Perfectly true, and perfectly irrelevant. The issue is how the Bush administration represented the qualified, imperfectly sourced, inconclusive, disputed, and, in some cases, discredited evidence the intelligence community had about Iraq's nuclear program and al Qaeda links. Again and again, the administration asserted what "we know" on the basis of "the evidence," when the intelligence agencies knew no such thing. Hayes commends the administration for "emphasizing the most alarming evidence, considering the most dangerous possibilities, and outlining the most terrifying threats." But, by knowingly failing to communicate the less alarming, dangerous, and terrifying possibilities, the administration prevented the public and Congress from making an informed choice about whether or not to go to war. JOHN B. JUDIS, SPENCER ACKERMAN
The New Republic
Washington, DC

STEPHEN F. HAYES RESPONDS: There can hardly be a better example of the problems with Judis and Ackerman's article than the second paragraph of their letter.

Correspondence

The words of FBI Director Robert Mueller that they quote—"from flight reservations to car rentals to bank accounts"—are from a speech he gave to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, California, on April 19, 2002. The speech had nothing whatsoever to do with Iraq-al Qaeda links. He did not mention Mohamed Atta. He never referred to Iraq. Here is the relevant section, which came in the midst of Mueller's recollection of the September 11 attacks:

The FBI began working in concert with its many partners to find out everything we could about the hijackers and how they pulled off their attacks. We ran down literally hundreds of thousands of leads and checked every record we could get our hands on, from flight reservations to car rentals to bank accounts. What emerged from our massive investigation was a sobering portrait of 19 hijackers who carried out their attacks with meticulous planning, extraordinary secrecy, and extensive knowledge of how America works. (You can read the full speech at www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/speech041902.htm.)

Judis and Ackerman continue: "American intelligence concluded Atta was in Virginia Beach at the time," which is "also the position of the Czech government."

Both of those claims are wrong. "American intelligence" has come to no such conclusion. Numerous high-ranking intelligence officials believe to this day that a meeting between Atta and Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani took place. Others disagree. (Those who believe the meeting took place cite two reasons: the intelligence provided by the Czechs and Atta's bizarre travel the previous spring en route to the United States. Atta flew to Prague from Germany on May 30, 2000, but was initially denied entry because he did not have a valid visa. He returned to Germany, obtained the proper paperwork, and hopped a bus back to Prague. He left for the United States the day after arriving in Prague for the second time.)

As for the Czech government, no fewer than five Czech officials believe the meeting took place: Milos Zeman, prime minister; Stanislav Gross, interior minister; Martin Palous, Czech ambassador to the United States; Hynek Kmonicek, Czech ambassador to the U.N.; and Jiri Ruzek, Czech intelligence chief. (Former Presi-

mind?

Cheney: Well, I want to be very careful about how I say this. I'm not here today to make a specific allegation that Iraq was somehow responsible for 9/11. I can't say that. On the other hand, since we did that interview, new information has come to light. And we spent time looking at that relationship between

Iraq, on the one hand, and the al Qaeda organization on the other. And there has been reporting that suggests that there have been a number of contacts over the years. We've seen in connection with the hijackers, of course, Mohamed Atta, who was the lead hijacker, did apparently travel to Prague on a number of occasions. And on at least one occasion, we have reporting that places him in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official a few months before the attack on the World Trade Center. The debates about, you know, was he there or wasn't he there, again, it's the intelligence business.

Russert: What does the CIA say about that? Is it credible?

Cheney: It's credible. But, you know, I think a way to put it would be it's unconfirmed at this point. We've got—

Russert: Anything else?

Cheney: There is—again, I want to separate out 9/11 from

the other relationships between Iraq and the al Qaeda organization. But there is a pattern of relationships going back many years. And in terms of exchanges and in terms of people, we've had recently since the operations in Afghanistan—we've seen al Qaeda members operating physically in Iraq and off the territory of Iraq. We know that Saddam Hussein has, over the years, been one of the top state sponsors of terrorism for nearly 20 years.

So Cheney, speaking carefully, making sure to separate September 11 from Saddam Hussein, calls the reports "credible" but "unconfirmed"—which seems to capture the split within the intelligence community. *This is dishonest?*

One final point on the Atta-in-Prague issue. Let's assume that, indeed, a consensus has developed among American intelligence officials and the Czech government that the meeting was bogus. Does the administration's behavior concerning



Peter Steiner

dent Vaclav Havel has cast doubt on the meeting, at one point suggesting only a 70 percent chance that it took place.)

Ackerman and Judis continue: "The Bush administration's public statements were still dishonest. In September 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney said accounts of the meeting were 'credible.'"

Here's the context. Readers can decide for themselves who is being "dishonest." Cheney made that comment on September 8, 2002, in an hour-long interview on *Meet the Press*. Tim Russert showed Cheney a clip, from *Meet the Press* on September 16, 2001. Russert had asked Cheney if there was any indication that Iraq had anything to do with the attacks five days earlier. Cheney's flat response: "No."

Russert followed up. Here is the exchange:

Russert: Has anything changed, in your

Correspondence

the alleged meeting support the Ackerman/Judis dishonesty thesis? When was the last time a high-ranking Bush administration official invoked the Prague meeting as evidence of an al Qaeda-Iraq link?

The Cheney interview came on September 8, 2002. Condoleezza Rice was also asked about the Atta meeting that day by Wolf Blitzer on CNN's *Late Edition*. Blitzer: "Can you confirm absolutely that that meeting took place?" Rice: "We continue to look at evidence of that meeting. And it's just more of a picture that is emerging that there may well have been contacts between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime. There are others. And we will be laying out the case. But I don't think that we want to try and make the case that he directed somehow the 9/11 events. That's not the issue here."

What's happened in the intervening 10 months? Not much. Martha Raddatz of ABC News reported on September 26, 2002, just three weeks after Cheney and Rice addressed the issue, that the administration had "dropped the subject." It may well be that top administration officials determined the alleged Atta meeting was too iffy to include in its case for war. In any event, the Bush administration fell silent on the subject. And it did so more than a month before Congress voted on war with Iraq and two months before the Security Council voted on Resolution 1441. That reality would seem to undermine the Ackerman/Judis contention that the administration relied on selective and dishonest use of the most frightening evidence to make its case.

Ackerman and Judis shrug off a meeting in the mid-1990s between Faruq Hijazi, a former diplomat and high-ranking Iraqi intelligence officer, and Osama bin Laden. So on the one hand, they now concede that there were high-level contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq. But they also cite a *Washington Post* article, published after their piece and mine, that downplays the links. They write: "American officials knew last fall of such early ties and attributed them to mutual enmity toward the Saudi monarchy rather than the United States."

Which American officials? How do they know this? Did Ackerman and Judis know about this interpretation in the forthcoming *Washington Post* article? Is

that why they didn't once mention contacts between bin Laden and Hijazi, including a second meeting many intelligence officials believe took place in Afghanistan in 1998? And is that why they failed to cite documents from that same year found in the rubble of the Iraqi Intelligence headquarters that allegedly detail plans for stepping up contact between bin Laden associates and the Mukhabarat? We're left to wonder.

In fact, "American officials" knew of these links well before last fall and believed that such contacts—given Saddam Hussein's fondness for deadly weapons and Osama bin Laden's desire to use them against Americans—were deeply disturbing. Reasonable people can come to different conclusions about the threat, which is exactly what appears to have happened in the intelligence community. But an emphasis on one interpretation hardly constitutes deception.

It's hard to know what to make of the Ackerman/Judis claim that there is no evidence of an "agreement, arrangement, or plot" involving Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Iraq. Zarqawi fled to Iraq after he was wounded fighting with al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists in Afghanistan. Several intelligence reports reveal that he not only took refuge in Baghdad, but also received medical treatment there for his injuries in May 2002. Subsequent news reports of the capture of Zarqawi associates in Baghdad support administration claims that Zarqawi was operating a cell in the Iraqi capital. Captured Zarqawi associates, whom Ackerman and Judis cannot discount given their reliance on other terrorist informants, have told their interrogators that Zarqawi masterminded the assassination of American diplomat Laurence Foley in Jordan.

Iraq was a dictatorship. Iraqi civilians lived in constant fear because Saddam Hussein and his internal intelligence monitored their activities. There can be little doubt that Saddam Hussein knew about Zarqawi's operation. And that—not an "agreement, arrangement, or plot"—was the substantive allegation Colin Powell made in his presentation to the U.N. Security Council of February 5, 2003. "Iraqi officials protest that they are not aware of the whereabouts of Zarqawi or of any of his associates. Again, these protests are not credible. We know of

Zarqawi's activities in Baghdad."

It may be true that Zarqawi traveled to Baghdad in search of a good doctor. And it may be true that Zarqawi, as an unnamed intelligence official told the *Washington Post*, merely headed an "unaffiliated terrorist group who occasionally associated with al Qaeda adherents." As I say, there are different interpretations of the evidence. Choosing one over another doesn't constitute a "systematic exaggeration" of intelligence.

On nukes, Ackerman and Judis complain that my "characterization of the CIA's position [on aluminum tubes] is inaccurate." And they're right to note that there was not unanimity in the intelligence community on this issue. But my characterization comes directly from their source, who told them that the CIA clung "tenaciously to this point of view about it being a nuclear weapons program."

Finally, Ackerman and Judis accuse me of trying to "exonerate the Bush team's inaccuracies," by noting that "intelligence is an art" and "not a science." To which they reply, "perfectly true and perfectly irrelevant."

Except it's not irrelevant. Indeed, one might say it's the most relevant point of all. Top officials in the Bush administration determined that Saddam Hussein, with his nuclear ambitions and his collaboration—real and potential—with terrorists posed a grave threat to the United States. Most of the world agreed. The U.N. Security Council voted 15-0 that Iraq was in "material breach" of previous resolutions. The House overwhelmingly approved the resolution authorizing force. Seventy-seven of the Senate's 100 members voted the same way.

Still, as I pointed out in this magazine just last week: "There are serious questions the Bush administration will have to answer" about its case for war. At the top of my list was this one: "How did a forged document about Iraq's pursuit of uranium make it into the State of the Union address?" That is the one "inaccuracy"—as distinct from disputed analyses—that we know of thus far. My words are hardly an exoneration.

There is no question that once the Bush administration decided to take its case to the U.N. last fall, it heavily emphasized Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. (The WMD case took up



The “L” Word

In Bush We Trust?

Is George W. Bush a liar?

People across America have the “L” word on their lips, but here in D.C. it’s been a hard one to mouth. Mr. Bush is a wartime president, and despite a catalogue of lies and distortions on many issues, his political opponents and most commentators have avoided the “L” word. Perhaps no more.

The AWOL WMD story could mark the end of the president’s post-9/11 free ride.

A full-page ad in *The New York Times* last week by **MoveOn.org** and **Win Without War** got to the heart of it. Under the headline “MISLEADER” the ad stacked up five of Mr. Bush’s pre-war whoppers and noted, “It would be a tragedy if young men and women were sent to die for a lie.” It put the issue of trust front and center and hoisted the president on his own pointed WMD – words of mass distortion.

Presidential Brain Karl Rove must be worried. He knows that any president’s popularity rests more on whether voters think he’s a believable and admirable leader than on the substance of issues. George W. Bush has that going for

him – people might not like his policies (if they understand them at all), but they like his swagger and certitude, and they trust him to do what he says.

But it’s a thin façade. And it’s been showing cracks from the strain between the rhetoric and the reality of Mr. Bush’s policies: endorsing Medicare while trying to undermine it; a “Clear Skies” plan that leads to more pollution; promising to “leave no child behind” but underfunding his own education plan; and Robin-Hood-in-reverse tax policies masked as “compassionate conservatism.”

Public trust in the president could crumble if questions linger about whether the White House deceived us into war. Few of the president’s allies could defend that – even GOP-TV (a.k.a. Fox News) would have trouble explaining away that one.

TomPaine.com – The “L” Word

Featuring “In Bush We Trust?” by John Moyers... and “All The President’s Lies” by Drake Bennett and Heidi Pauken, from www.PROSPECT.org.

Correspondence

approximately 85 percent of Colin Powell's presentation to the Security Council.) I agreed with their assessment of that threat, but wished—and said so at the time—that they would focus more on the Iraqi dictator's unspeakable human rights record. They chose to stay focused on WMD. The critics are right to hold them to those arguments. It's disingenuous for hawks defending the war now to speak only of human rights abuses. But emphasizing some arguments over others hardly qualifies as deception and dishonesty, as Ackerman and Judis surely know.

CREDIBILITY GAP? (CONT.)

THE LATEST ISSUE of THE WEEKLY STANDARD twice accuses the *New Republic* of changing its position on war with Iraq. In his article "The War Against Bush," Stephen F. Hayes describes our cover story on Bush administration deception in the run-up to war as a "reversal on the part of the previously hawkish *New Republic*." Huh? In an editorial in the very same issue (never mentioned by Hayes), we explicitly reaffirm our support for the war. The apparent lack of an ongoing nuclear program, we write, "undermines one of the magazine's central rationales for war. But not the only rationale." We subsequently reiterate the moral case for war: that Saddam Hussein was a genocidal monster and replacing him with an "Arab democracy would provide the best long-term protection against terrorism." Even some well-known conservatives now de-emphasize the WMD threat. Ken Adelman, for instance, has taken to arguing that Saddam's regime was the "main weapon of mass destruction." Is he "previously hawkish," too?

Elsewhere, THE SCRAPBOOK claims the *New Republic* is rewriting its own history when we say the national security (as opposed to the moral) case for war hinged on the possibility that Saddam might obtain nuclear weapons. As proof, it quotes a September 2, 2002, editorial that, it claims, shows we were equally concerned with the danger posed by chemical weapons. Remarkably, the very quotes it selects make an altogether different case—a case for the moral necessity of toppling Saddam, regardless of whether or not he poses an imminent threat to the United States: "And it should not matter to us

that [Saddam's uses of chemical weapons] were not committed against the United States, or that Saddam Hussein's missiles do not have the range to hit American places, because the use of weapons of mass destruction, rather like genocide, represents an international emergency. In international emergencies it is we who must lead. The physical defense of the United States includes also the moral defense of the United States; but the defense of American values sometimes requires action in non-American places."

THE WEEKLY STANDARD also conveniently fails to note that, in an editorial three weeks later, on September 23, 2002, we wrote that "the case is clear: Saddam Hussein is pursuing nuclear weapons, and the only way to make sure he does not use them against the United States or its allies is to remove him from power." Two weeks later, we published a cover story by Gregg Easterbrook, which argued, "The phrase 'weapons of mass destruction' . . . muddies the American rationale for military action against Iraq. That rationale should be to prevent Saddam from acquiring atomic weapons. That alone is reason to go to war." And, the week after that, we ran yet another editorial noting that "[t]he White House's arguments for invading Iraq have repeatedly shifted. Even worse, in recent days, they have shifted away from the real threat—that Saddam will get a nuclear bomb—and toward speculation that Iraq is in bed with al Qaeda."

Both the Hayes article and the SCRAPBOOK item follow the same basic formulation: The *New Republic* used to be hawkish; now, it is outraged by the Bush administration's deception. Nowhere do they concede that a magazine can both advocate a hawkish foreign policy and demand honesty on matters of war and peace. The STANDARD's inability to conceive such a position reveals little about the *New Republic* and a great deal about itself.

PETER BEINART
Editor, The New Republic
Washington, DC

STEPHEN F. HAYES RESPONDS: In the September 30, 2002, issue of the *New Republic*, Peter Beinart worried that by citing the many U.N. resolutions Saddam Hussein has violated over the years,

President Bush "had obscured the real" rationale for war: Saddam Hussein's continued thwarting of weapons inspectors and his pursuit of nuclear weapons. Beinart further accused the administration of "cooking up new and disingenuous reasons for attacking Saddam." Beinart cited three issues from Bush's speech that, he argued, were "peripheral": Accounting for prisoners from the first Gulf War, ensuring that oil-for-food money went to the Iraqi people rather than their brutal leader, and, most relevant to the current discussion, Bush's demand that Saddam Hussein's Iraq "cease persecution of its civilian population, including Shia, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and others." In focusing on these U.N. resolutions that reflect such moral concerns, Beinart wrote, "Bush raised a number of previously ignored—and entirely unconvincing—pretexts for war." He summed up the debate this way: "As much as the Turkmen deserve not to be persecuted, as much as Oman deserves a full accounting of its Gulf war prisoners, and as much as it galls us to see Saddam spending his oil revenue on palaces, these are not the reasons we are going to war."

The *New Republic* did, as Beinart claims, offer more than one reason for war. But it has now abandoned its primary one in favor of the "moral" case its editor once dismissed as peripheral. To suggest that it is somehow misleading to point out this "reversal" is a stretch.

THE SCRAPBOOK RESPONDS: The White House made several arguments for invading Iraq. So did the *New Republic*. (So did THE WEEKLY STANDARD, for that matter.) And why not? There were many valid reasons for the war.

Last week, though, the *New Republic* wrote a repositioning editorial, to heighten the contradictions between its stance and that of the Bush administration, which it now wishes to assail. In so doing, it referred to "this magazine's argument for war" in the singular—glossing over and contradicting other arguments it had once eloquently made. We chose to highlight one of these because, in our view, the many similarities between the arguments made by the Bush White House and those advanced in the prewar editorials of the *New Republic* are nothing for the magazine to be ashamed of. ♦

Supreme Confusion

In response to the Supreme Court's decisions in the Michigan race-preference cases, President Bush issued a statement. "I applaud the Supreme Court for recognizing the value of diversity on our nation's campuses," he said. "Diversity is one of America's greatest strengths. Today's decisions seek a careful balance between the goal of campus diversity and the fundamental principle of equal treatment under the law."

From the president's statement, you'd never know that in its briefs the administration hadn't even addressed the most important issue the Court resolved in the Michigan cases—whether "diversity" is a compelling interest that can justify race preferences, and therefore racial discrimination, in admitting students. Justice Department lawyers were prepared to take a principled stand against the notion that diversity is just such a compelling interest. But the administration decided not to do that. Silent on the diversity rationale, the administration may have contributed to the Court's decision declaring diversity a compelling interest—a decision the administration surely should not be applauding.

Twenty-five years ago, in the landmark *Bakke* case, the Supreme Court left unsettled the role race might play in admissions, though it did outlaw quotas. Writing only for himself, Justice Lewis Powell set forth the view that "educational diversity" is a compelling interest sufficient to support making race a "plus" factor in admissions. Selective schools quickly embraced the diversity rationale and used it to support race preferences. In recent years, however, lower court rulings had questioned and even repudiated diversity, and the High Court itself had issued a series of equal protection rulings that seemed to leave in doubt whether a majority of the justices would accept the rationale. Even so, when the race-based policies used by its undergraduate and law schools were challenged, the University of Michigan resolved to persuade the Court of the merits of diversity. It enlisted scores of allies and pressed the matter as hard as it could—and it won.

Declining to challenge the diversity rationale, the Bush administration argued in its brief only that the admissions policies at both the law school and the undergraduate

school weren't tailored narrowly enough—indeed that their use of race amounted to unconstitutional quotas. The administration's refusal to take issue with the diversity rationale (even as its brief effusively praised diversity as a concept) could not have escaped notice inside the Court. And it may well have influenced the Court's decision to endorse the rationale.

Writing for the Court in *Grutter v. Bollinger*, the law school case, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor announced "our conclusion" that a school's "interest in [assembling] a diverse student body" is indeed compelling. That conclusion was essentially an act of deference, as O'Connor put it, to "the law school's educational judgment that diversity is essential to its educational mission." The Court's deference extended to the law school's further judgment that it must enroll a "critical mass" of minority students—critical mass being something expressed in numbers—in order to achieve the educational benefits of diversity. O'Connor also accepted the law school's view that, notwithstanding the similar percentages of minorities admitted each year, it did not engage in racial balancing, which would be unconstitutional. And she accepted the law school's representations on the educational benefits of diversity—that having a "critical mass" of minorities helps break down racial stereotypes, enables students "to better understand persons of different races," and makes classroom discussion "livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting."

O'Connor's treatment of the diversity rationale was hardly searching. In a vigorous dissent, the justice the president has held up as a model for the kind of judges he'd appoint—Clarence Thomas—scored devastating points. The law school seeks to obtain the "educational benefits that flow from student body diversity," he wrote, pointing out that diversity is thus supposed to be the means to the educational benefits, not an end of itself. And yet the law school "apparently believes that only a racially mixed student body can lead" to those benefits. Thomas asked: "How, then, is the law school's interest in these allegedly unique educational 'benefits' not simply the forbidden interest in 'racial balancing' that the majority expressly

rejects?” He drew the obvious conclusion—that the distinction between the two ideas is “purely sophistic.” Thomas sharply observed that the O’Connor majority conceded the point by using the terms interchangeably: He invited readers to compare two passages in the Court’s opinion. One refers to the law school’s “compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body,” the other to “the compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.”

Thomas also cited social science disputing the claimed educational benefits of diversity. And he emphasized that diversity not only works discrimination against applicants of nonfavored races but also constitutes “racial experimentation” upon “test subjects.” Such experimentation is at odds with the moral imperative of treating people not as means to other ends, but as the individuals they are.

What would have happened had the administration articulated some of the same points in challenging the diversity rationale? Maybe O’Connor, a split-the-difference justice often looking for the middle ground, would have deferred to the government’s view. Maybe she would not have embraced the diversity rationale as easily as she did, or even at all. Maybe she would have voted to decide both cases on narrow-tailoring grounds, leaving for another day the whole diversity issue. And then again, maybe not. Maybe she would have voted as she did and written the opinion

she did. What is clear is that the administration failed to take the stand that was needed in the Michigan cases.

There is something good to say about the two decisions. Now that the Court has settled the diversity question (at least for the time being), future litigation over preferences will deal with “narrow tailoring.” And on that issue, the Court’s decision in the undergraduate case, *Gratz v. Bollinger*, may prove helpful in limiting race preferences in admissions.

In *Gratz*, Chief Justice William Rehnquist concluded that the automatic award of 20 points to minority applicants on account of their race was a violation of narrow tailoring. The admissions policy was interested only in the fact of a person’s race, a constitutional violation. *Gratz* is a victory for equal treatment under the law, and its application could lead eventually to a different evaluation of even a preference scheme like the one upheld in *Grutter*.

Gratz points to a day that cannot come too soon in America—when people truly are treated as individuals, without regard to race or ethnicity. It’s too bad, then, that the president’s statement didn’t make more of *Gratz*, which, after all, is the case in which the administration was on the winning side. The long-term goal of achieving a color-blind Constitution will require sounder judicial opinions, but also firmer leadership from the president.


—Terry Eastland, for the Editors



Michael Ramirez

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
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
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Dubious Diversity

The corrupting influence of the Supreme Court's favorite doctrine. BY PETER BERKOWITZ

BACK IN THE LATE 1980s, several of my Yale Law School classmates and I launched into yet another earnest and well-meaning discussion about racial diversity. On that particular evening we turned to the faculty and proceeded empirically.

As we counted the individuals of minority race, I casually added to the list the name of Stephen Carter, soon to be well known to the general public as the author of *Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby*, and already known at Yale as a serious scholar and no-nonsense teacher who tended to avoid public involvement in Yale's persistent internal battles about law school diversity. Immediately, a classmate—bright, progressive, and now well into a successful law career—blurted out indignantly, “No! Carter doesn't count as a . . .”

My classmate caught himself, blushed, and let his incomplete utterance hang in the air. We felt his embarrassment. Even among friends he had the good sense to be flustered at having nearly put into words the widely held opinion at Yale Law School that to be counted as an African American you had to meet at least two criteria: Your skin had to be black, and your opinions had to be left-liberal.

For those concerned about the deceptions upon which the diversity rationale depends, the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in *Grutter v. Bollinger* will provide little comfort. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote for the majority, and she was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer,

and Ginsburg. She held that “educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body” are a “compelling state interest”—a good, that is, of overriding importance—which permits public universities, despite the Fourteenth Amendment's core purpose “to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race,” to count race as one factor among many in university admissions decisions.

But can the quest for racial diversity avoid stereotyping? Are the official means and ends of the diversity rationale in harmony and consistent with actual practice? What kinds of intellectual habits does the diversity rationale cultivate? To these questions, the majority gives answers that range from the highly unsatisfying to the deeply disturbing.

Both sides agreed, as Justice O'Connor notes, on the huge impact of racial preferences on the admissions process at the University of Michigan Law School. Barbara Grutter's experts testified that race “is an extremely strong factor in the decision for acceptance” (disclosure: Grutter's lawyers serve as co-counsel in a lawsuit to which I am a party). The Law School's experts concurred: “a race blind admissions system would have a ‘very dramatic,’ negative effect on underrepresented minority admissions.” Justice O'Connor embraced the Law School's contention that if it did not grant racial preferences to underrepresented minorities—African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans—it would not achieve a “critical mass,” which means “numbers such that underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race.” And she accepted the Law School's conclusion that

without a critical mass, it could neither reap diversity's benefits nor play its important role in training minorities for positions of civic and commercial leadership.

Effectively establishing as the law of the land Justice Powell's strictures in the landmark 1978 *Bakke* decision that public universities may use race only as a “‘plus’ factor” while ensuring that “each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application,” Justice O'Connor purported to subject the Law School's policy to the strictest scrutiny and found it constitutional.

In fact, Justice O'Connor's scrutiny is lax and her reasoning is weak. First, the idea of a “critical mass” is a sham. As Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, in practice the goal of a “critical mass” in Law School admissions functions as a quota whose purpose is to achieve racial balancing, which Justice O'Connor's majority opinion recognizes as “patently unconstitutional.”

In a typical year, the Law School will admit a class of between 1,130 and 1,310 students; the class will contain between 91 and 108 African Americans, between 47 and 56 Hispanics, and between 13 and 19 Native Americans. The Law School, however, does not explain why critical mass varies so dramatically among underrepresented minorities. The data, though, are telling. Year after year, the Law School admits African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans in approximately the same proportions in which they apply.

Moreover, the Law School can't keep its story straight about the purpose of obtaining a critical mass of minority students. On the one hand, the Law School seeks minority students for the benefits that come from a racially and ethnically diverse student body. On the other hand, the Law School claims that critical mass is needed so that minority students can express themselves in class with-

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out feeling isolated or like spokesmen for their race. In other words, the Law School wants minority students for the distinctive viewpoint that they bring and wants them in significant numbers so that they will not feel that they are at the law school in order to represent a distinctive viewpoint.

Second, although she claims to be endorsing Justice Powell's views on diversity, Justice O'Connor in effect changes his meaning. In *Bakke*, Powell argued that a public university could seek a heterogeneous student body so long as race was only one factor in student admissions and one component of heterogeneity. Yet aside from repeating the Law School's assurances, O'Connor gives little reason to believe the Law School seeks any form of diversity—say diversity of political party or religion—beyond racial or ethnic diversity.

Third, contrary to Justice O'Connor, who defers to "the Law School's assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits," diversity's benefits in the areas where everyone agrees it counts most—the robust exchange of ideas in the classroom and the development of friendships between students of different races—remains hotly contested. Indeed, as Yale Law School professor Peter Schuck observes in his meticulously argued and indispensable new book, *Diversity in America*, the weight of evidence casts serious doubt on the claims that affirmative action programs promote either lively classroom debate or interracial understanding. Nor would one guess from O'Connor's analysis the sad fact explored by Schuck that "preferentially admitted students . . . tend to have much lower academic performances and higher drop-out rates."

The flaws of the diversity rationale should not be surprising. A law school is an educational institution, and the diversity that truly educates is what John Stuart Mill calls "diversity of opinion." While himself a man of the left, Mill argued forcefully that

the vigorous contest between conservative and progressive opinion was crucial to the refinement of both and a great boon to moral and political life. Although the Law School pays lip service to diversity of opinion, the diversity based on racial preferences that it practices works to defeat it.

This is in part because the Law School policy traffics in stereotypes. Protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, the diversity rationale for granting underrepresented minorities a substantial advantage in



Ismael Roldan

Sandra Day O'Connor

the competition for scarce seats at elite universities presupposes a minority viewpoint. On the basis of what the justices in the *Grutter* majority have previously said, one might have thought that this practice, akin to racial profiling, was unconstitutional. In *U.S. v. Virginia*, the 1996 case striking down single sex military training at the Virginia Military Institute, Justice Ginsburg, in an opinion joined by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, argued that one reason

that VMI must admit women was that their exclusion was based on constitutionally prohibited generalizations about the tendencies, roles, and abilities of a group that had long been subject to discrimination.

The diversity rationale also officially countenances treating minority students as a means to improving the education of majority students while disguising the costs. It's not only that all minority students are stigmatized. Forced to compete with the best and brightest white and Asian students, minority students with substantially lower academic skills are bound to resent their competition and eventually lash out at the academic criteria by which they are judged and unfortunately often found wanting. And those responsible for administering affirmative action programs expose themselves to the corrupting effects of arranging matters so as to have their cake and eat it too: They want theirs to be an elite university that maintains exceptionally high standards and so serves as an effective credentialing mechanism insuring graduates' access to high paying and prestigious jobs—but also an institution consistent with their vision of social justice, whose costs they do not pay.

Finally, the diversity rationale contributes to the cultivation of intellectual conformity inside the university, with ripple effects throughout the wider culture. The chief beneficiaries of affirmative action at elite universities come from middle and upper middle class families. It is widely presumed that these beneficiaries will come to class and make points and tell stories about being victims of societal and unconscious discrimination and about the need for government to take aggressive action to combat the nation's pervasive racism.

As it happens, the diagnosis and the prescription are shared by the vast majority of administrators and faculty at elite universities. As a result, the diversity rationale helps to create an echo chamber in the class-

room, with minority students reinforcing the opinions of their white professors. The homogeneity of opinion causes everybody's intellectual habits to suffer.

There is a direct line from the widespread embrace of the diversity rationale to the vulgar, if representative, warning about the future of the Supreme Court issued by Yale Law School professor Bruce Ackerman in the *American Prospect* in the wake of *Bush v. Gore*: Ackerman warned that "the president will nominate a right-wing extremist who happens to have a Hispanic surname rather than a black face." The underlying message is the same one that I heard 15 years ago from my Yale Law School classmate: Real Hispanics, like real blacks, are determined not by the color of their skin but by the conformity of their opinions to the left wing of the Democratic party.

Proponents of affirmative action contend that the consequence of its elimination—elite campuses composed almost entirely of whites and Asians—is unthinkable. It's not. Were racial preferences eliminated, and were race-neutral means not found to achieve racial diversity, those minority students no longer able to gain admission to elite schools on the basis of their academic skills would still attend very good schools a rung or so lower in the rankings and would graduate with excellent opportunities—perhaps improved, given that they would have been competing in the classroom against students with similar academic skills—to make their mark in the world.

In view of our nation's cruel history of racial discrimination, the prospect of an almost all white and Asian Harvard or Yale, Swarthmore or Oberlin is certainly unnerving to contemplate. But given our universities' chief and overriding responsibility to promote free inquiry and to foster intellectual integrity, the reality of the diversity rationale for affirmative action—which traffics in stereotypes, rewards hypocrisy, and cultivates intellectual conformity—is difficult to swallow. ♦

Recall California!

Land of the Progressives' bad ideas.

BY GLENN ELLMERS

CALIFORNIA, it appears, is on the verge of staging its first ever recall vote on a sitting governor. If the requisite nearly 900,000 signatures are gathered, as now seems imminent, and the recall petitions qualify in July, a special election will be held in the fall. Voters will decide whether Democratic governor Gray Davis should pack his bags and if so who should replace him.

People's reasons for wanting Davis out are as varied as the Golden State itself. Republicans—but also many Democrats—dislike Davis's anti-business agenda, including an onerous family-leave law, a worker's compensation system that bankrupts some small businesses, and one of the highest sales tax rates in the country. But the *casus belli* is Davis's squandering of the \$8 billion budget surplus he inherited and his racking up in its place a \$38 billion deficit. During last year's gubernatorial campaign, Republican nominee Bill Simon warned that the state was likely facing a \$20 billion deficit. Davis's aides and the media scoffed, even though Davis had demonstrated his profligacy in his first term. State senator Tom McClintock—who lost the race for controller by a whisker—points out that California's spending has grown much faster than warranted by either population growth or inflation.

The backers of the recall hope the voters will replace Davis before he can do more damage. This could be an opportunity for a tough-minded conservative. California has the line-item veto. A Republican like Simon or McClintock who used it vigorously to restore the state's fiscal health could find himself in the national

spotlight. But no one knows who Davis's successor would be. Once the recall petitions are certified by the secretary of state, ensuring that a vote will take place within 60 to 80 days, the free-for-all to replace Davis will begin.

On the same ballot as the recall, voters will pick his replacement from a list of candidates who have plunked down 60 signatures and \$3,500 to get into the race. Senator Dianne Feinstein and Arnold Schwarzenegger are expected to be among them. Whoever gets the most votes, however small the plurality, wins. In a large enough field, the winner might have as little as 10 percent.

The recall is a legacy of the Progressive revamping of the California constitution instigated by governor Hiram Johnson in 1911. Along with the initiative and the referendum, the recall was intended to allow the voters to circumvent regular elections—and even the principle of representation—in favor of direct democracy. The people would change both men and measures—and amend the state constitution—not only when they were feeling Grumpy (as now), but also when they were Bashful (see California's successful 2002 Defense of Marriage Initiative), or even Dopey (the 1996 legalization of the medical use of marijuana). What the Progressives didn't reckon on was how all this would make us Sleepy—when confronted with a 50-page "California Voter Information Guide and Ballot Pamphlet" to explain the bewildering array of propositions.

Notwithstanding the Progressives' pretension to originality, direct democracy was well known to the Founding Fathers. The *Federalist Papers* takes up the question in *Feder-*

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alist 49 in discussing the idea of regular alterations to the Constitution. Publius notes (but will later qualify) that “the people are the only legitimate fountain of power. [Thus] it seems strictly consonant to the republican theory to recur to the same original authority” whenever they wish to rearrange the principles or powers of the government.

This is the spirit that animated Hiram Johnson, and its results can be seen in the California constitution, a bloated, incoherent hodge-podge stretching more than 130 pages and covering such vital subjects as horse-racing, fruit and nut trees, and assessment rates for golf courses.


The U.S. Constitution, by contrast, has a brevity and has enjoyed a stability that reflect the Founders’ belief that direct appeals to the people ought to be reserved “for certain great and extraordinary occasions.” Publius warns against using this expedient often or capriciously: “[A]s every appeal to the people would carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in great measure, deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability.”

No one, of course, venerates the government of California or, for that matter, reads the state constitution. So should the direct democracy measures that make California politics so volatile be blamed? Given the systemic dysfunction of California’s government, the initiative process, and perhaps even the recall, may actually be constructive. Some initiatives have been noble in purpose and effect: Proposition 209 (repealing racial quotas) restored the principle of color-blind equality before the law to the largest state in the Union.

There is, in fact, a conservative defense of this populism. When the Progressives created the recall, they were looking for a mechanism to check the influence of newly emer-

gent corporate powers. Today, it is the special interests *within* the government that have the most debilitating influence in our politics.

It is no accident that Davis’s diehard supporters are the unions of public employees, who have benefited greatly under Davis. The governor gave the prison guards a



Gray Davis

stunning three-year pay raise of 33.7 percent last year (and a few months later received a quarter-million-dollar campaign contribution from the corrections officers’ union). Now the public employees’ unions are closing ranks around their most precious asset: a don’t-rock-the-boat, liberal establishment in Sacramento.

Davis may not be as liberal as some Democrats would like, but he has kept the public trough filled. Hence it

is the unions, led by the firefighters, that are spearheading the anti-recall effort. Purely to confuse the public and confound the pro-recall petitioners, they are employing their own signature-gatherers. More important, they have muscled a pledge out of every Democratic statewide officeholder to stay off the ballot, in a risky calculation that if the voters are given a choice between Davis and a Republican, the recall can be defeated.

It is noteworthy that today’s liberals, the ideological heirs of the Progressives, aren’t always pleased with direct democracy in action. The most divisive and decisive ballot initiatives in California have been championed by conservatives: eliminating affirmative action, government largesse to illegal aliens, and bilingual education; preempting the recognition of same-sex marriage; and—granddaddy of them all, Proposition 13—capping property taxes, to change California politics ever since.

Given the overwhelming liberal majorities in Sacramento—no Republican holds statewide office, and Democrats control close to two-thirds of the legislature—it’s easy to see why the recall has gained momentum. For many Californians, anything that unsettles the status quo must have some merit. Yet the constant recourse to direct democracy may undermine a healthy, representative constitutionalism. Conservative critics of the recall have pointed to the possibility of “blowback.” Once the nuclear weapon of recall is used, it could become a regular tool of both parties.

The recall is one of the Progressives’ sharpest instruments. By turning its edge against the liberal establishment at its most spendthrift, the present recall effort could have the paradoxical effect of prompting new debate about the purpose and limits of government. At the very least, it should remind voters that elections matter. ♦

Teddy's Triumph

What Kennedy knows that the other Democrats don't. BY FRED BARNES


SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY is more politically astute than Senate Democratic leader Tom Daschle. He understands the legislative process far better than Senator Hillary Clinton does. He is a much cooler head than Senator Jay Rockefeller. And there's a good chance he'll turn out to be smarter than the entire Bush administration on the subject of Medicare and a prescription drug benefit for senior citizens.

Kennedy was the key figure in last week's Senate approval of a drug benefit and modest Medicare reforms. Without his support, the measure would not have passed. By backing it, Kennedy angered many liberal Democrats who want a more lavish benefit and no reform of Medicare at all. But Kennedy decided it was time to grab a Medicare compromise backed by President Bush and improve it later along liberal lines.

Oddly enough, Kennedy agrees with the analysis of the legislation by conservative critics who want to take Medicare away from the federal government and run it through private insurance companies. Conservatives fear the new legislation will have the opposite effect, keeping seniors in the traditional Medicare system where they'll miss out on free market reforms. Which is exactly what Kennedy wants to happen. He openly says the measure would kill privatization of Medicare, which is a big reason he supports it and conservatives oppose it. "If you think Medicare

should be privatized, then you should oppose this bill," Kennedy said in a speech on the Senate floor last month.

The Bush administration takes a different view. It calculates that 48 percent of Medicare recipients would jump to private insurance



under the bill, which was negotiated by Chairman Charles Grassley of the Senate Finance Committee under the watchful eye of majority leader Bill Frist. After all that attrition, old-fashioned, government-run Medicare would gradually fade away. Kennedy and conservative opponents don't believe this, and neither does the Congressional Budget Office, which says no more than 12 percent would jump to private plans. The administration originally demanded a strong incentive for seniors to switch: They wouldn't get the drug benefit unless they did. But this provision has been jettisoned. Now seniors would get the benefit either way.

So why is Kennedy wiser than anyone else in dealing with Medicare, wiser than his liberal colleagues and the White House? Because he, unlike them, has figured out how to get what he wants.

For starters, Kennedy is prepared to seize the current opportunity to add a prescription benefit, having seen numerous other opportunities missed. He argues that deficiencies in the Bush-backed bill can be eliminated by the next Democratic president and Congress. My guess is he doesn't really expect Democrats to regain control of Washington any time soon. But he sees the legislation (correctly, as far as I can tell) as the last chance for a long time to get a prescription drug benefit. "We must get started," he said.

When he was majority leader, Daschle could have gotten the same deal. But because he wanted to use the absence of a drug benefit against Bush and Republicans in the 2002 election, he didn't act. Daschle and Kennedy view things differently. Daschle is chiefly interested in exploiting issues for political gain. Of course, Democrats reaped little advantage from the Medicare issue in 2002, as national security dominated the campaign. Kennedy is interested in legislative accomplishment, in getting things done, liberal things. If that requires settling at times for a foot in the door, he's

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agreeable. And this time, it's a big foot in the door. Sure, Bush will claim political credit, but Democrats will get some, too. That's what happened when Kennedy compromised with Bush on an education reform bill in 2001.

Democrats would get nothing if they followed the advice of Hillary Clinton. She is notoriously inept at judging what can get through Congress. Recall the health care scheme she concocted in 1993 that was summarily rejected on Capitol Hill. Now she says: "We do not want to rush through this legislation at the risk of getting it wrong." She would make the perfect (from a liberal standpoint) the enemy of the good. Kennedy wouldn't.

What about hotheads like Rockefeller who say the Medicare legislation will play into the hands of those who want to kill traditional Medicare? Advocates of free-market Medicare, and I'm one of them, don't think it will happen. The Rockefeller types are reactionary liberals who would preserve and expand every government program outside of the Pentagon, no matter the cost or resulting inefficiency. No change is acceptable to them. Kennedy, however, is not a standpatter. He recognizes that to get a drug benefit, liberals have to give up something, at least in the short run.

Kennedy is gambling. He kept abreast of talks as Grassley and Democratic senator Max Baucus reached a compromise and quickly endorsed it. He's gambling the incentives to lure seniors to private health insurance plans, contained in the Medicare bill passed by the House, will be weakened or dropped when the House and Senate meet in conference to hash out the differences in their bills. He's probably right. Bush, who needs a domestic policy triumph, can't afford to have Kennedy drop his support. Another gamble is that the measure, which would go into effect in 2006, will not prompt a migration out of government-managed Medicare. Bush believes it will. They can't both be right. ♦

What's Gone Right

Not all the news from Iraq is bad.

BY JOSH CHAFETZ

NOT EVEN the most determined Pollyanna would claim that the reconstruction of Iraq has gone smoothly. Although many early reports of trouble were exaggerated (*see* Baghdad Museum, looting of), instances of civil unrest continue, including protests and even a few riots. Neither weapons of mass destruction nor Saddam and his sons have been found. Islamism seems to be gaining ground in some areas. Remnants and supporters of the Baathist regime continue to sabotage infrastructure and attack American and British soldiers. Twenty-two American troops have been killed in attacks since President Bush declared an end to major combat on May 1. Indeed, every day seems to bring front-page news of something going wrong in Iraq.

But that isn't the whole story. In the first opinion poll of liberated Iraq, Dr. Sadoun Dulaimi of the Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies found that 65 percent of Baghdadis want U.S. troops to stay for now; only 17 percent want them to pull out immediately. Clearly the United States is doing something right. In fact, if you read past the front pages, you find many signs of improvement in the four major areas of reconstruction: providing security, improving public utilities, rebuilding civil society and laying the groundwork for democracy, and getting the economy moving.

First, security. Coalition forces have brought in at least 32 of the coalition's 55 most wanted Iraqis. This includes the June 16 capture of Abid Hamid Mahmud al-Tikriti, the most wanted man in Iraq after Saddam and his two

sons. Coalition forces have also launched countrywide sweeps, seizing weapons and capturing hundreds of lower-level Baath loyalists.

Equally important, the United States is training Iraqis to take over policing and security. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted in his June 18 press briefing that thousands of Iraqi police officers are back at work. And on June 23, U.S. administrators announced the creation of a national army. The Iraqi army—expected to have 12,000 troops within a year and 40,000 within three years—will be "professional, nonpolitical, militarily effective, and truly representative of the country," according to Walter Slocombe, head of security and



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defense for the Coalition Provisional Authority. The coalition has also announced that dismissed soldiers will receive a stipend, a move designed to neutralize ex-military resentment of coalition authorities. And Jordan's King Abdullah has indicated a willingness to provide police officers to train and conduct joint patrols with Iraqi police.

Moreover, some security problems that had been previously reported never, in fact, materialized. Despite reports that several tons of uranium had gone missing from the Tuwaitha nuclear research facility southeast of Baghdad, the International Atomic Energy Agency recently announced that nearly all of Tuwaitha's uranium was accounted for.

Second, Iraq's public utilities and hospitals are performing relatively well and, in some cases, improving. Critics must remember that utilities were in a decrepit state long before the war. Maj. David Hylton, the Army's principal officer for civilian affairs, recently told *World* magazine, "What we're realizing is that Iraq doesn't produce enough power for Baghdad. Saddam used to forcibly black out other cities to keep the lights on here." Because the provisional authority has not continued this practice, Baghdad has less power than it did before the war. But Basra—Iraq's second-largest city—now has power 24 hours a day for the first time since 1991. Indeed, Rumsfeld recently pointed out that cities throughout the northern and southern regions now have better electrical service than they've had in over a decade. And even Baghdad, as Thomas Friedman noted in his June 18 column, is getting about 18 hours of electricity per day.

There is no functioning phone system in Iraq, but elsewhere there are improvements afoot. Long lines for gasoline, ubiquitous a month ago, have disappeared, and garbage is, once again, being collected. The water supply is more uneven: Rumsfeld announced that it is operating at about 80 percent of prewar level, but some areas—including Basra—have "more

and better water, cleaner water, than existed prior to the conflict." Upon returning from a tour of western and northern Iraq, Mark Steyn reported in *The Spectator* that "everywhere I went I drank the water and, aside from mild side-effects like feeling even more right-wing than before, I'm fine and dandy."

And while "fine and dandy" may not describe the general state of health in Iraq, neither can it be said that the country is suffering an acute health crisis. While many hospitals face shortages of medicine and equipment, this is nothing new: Saddam diverted most of the U.N. money meant for health care into weapons programs and palace construction. Now, how-

There are new Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish papers; democratic, Communist, and Islamists papers; and even a satirical weekly.

ever, U.S. troops and Iraqi doctors are working together to vaccinate children and treat the sick, using supplies donated from abroad. Steyn reported that none of the hospitals he visited were even close to full.

Third, civil society is coming to life in Iraq. Perhaps most important is the process of de-Baathification—not simply the purging of former party officials from positions of power, but also the attempts by the Iraqi people to come to terms with the atrocities of Saddam's regime. A recent Knight Ridder story notes that Baghdad markets are selling videos chronicling Saddam's torture chambers, and a vendor says that they are selling thousands of copies. Victims of torture—those who were lucky enough to survive Saddam's dungeons and the families of those who weren't—are free for the first time to tell their stories. A grocer now hangs outside his store a picture of his brother, executed in

prison, with the words, "He was arrested by the criminal Saddam Hussein." In cities and towns throughout Iraq, Baath propaganda and offices have been destroyed. Only by such a thorough repudiation of the past can the ground be cleared for a healthy democratic culture.

And there are signs that such a culture is starting to develop. The *Washington Post* recently noted that "dozens of daily and weekly newspapers have sprung up in the capital since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in April, a raucous rush of unfettered expression that is utterly new to this country, and rare for any part of the Middle East." There are new Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish papers; democratic, Communist, and Islamist papers; and even a satirical weekly. The *Post* estimated that Baghdad alone has 70 publications, with new ones sprouting every week. And it's not just the print media that are growing: satellite dishes, banned under Saddam, are popping up, and walls once decorated with portraits of Saddam now sport political slogans of all stripes.

As a democratic culture begins to take shape, democratic institutions are slowly being introduced. Political parties are forming, and L. Paul Bremer III, the U.S. official in charge of civilian administration in Iraq, has begun selecting 25 to 30 Iraqis for a council that will appoint temporary cabinet ministers and select delegates to a constitutional convention. Bremer recently told the *Washington Post*, "I am committed to establishing a democracy here. But to do this right, it will obviously take time."

Of course establishing a democracy can be tricky business. One challenge Bremer faces is to avoid handing over power carelessly, lest it end up in the hands of people unfit to wield it. Another challenge is to encourage the emergence of democratic norms—to firm up the legitimacy of democratic institutions. On this front, the outlook may be better than expected: The *Toronto Globe and Mail* reports, "Things are actually quite peaceful right now on the Sunni-Shia front. Imams from both sides met and

agreed that the sects should join hands for the wider good of Iraq, at least in the short term.”

And it is not just politics and government that are coming to life—so is the public square. Restaurants, shops, and schools have reopened, and street life is reviving. As security continues to improve, civil society will become more vibrant.

Finally, there is hope on the economic front, as well. The U.N. Security Council lifted sanctions on May 22, and Iraq began exporting oil again exactly one month later. By the end of the year, officials hope to return oil production to prewar levels (about 2 million barrels a day). In a recent *Wall Street Journal* op-ed, Bremer predicted that Iraq will export more than \$5 billion worth of oil in the second half of this year. He has proposed that ordinary Iraqis get a share of oil revenues, either via dividend payments (à la Alaska) or public pensions. Giving every Iraqi a stake in the national oil revenues will encourage the growth of a middle-class nation—the kind of nation where democracy is most likely to thrive.

Bremer has also proposed other sensible economic policies, including the privatization of state-run industries (along with the creation of a social safety net to aid displaced workers), the establishment of a strong system of property rights, reductions in state subsidies, and the promotion of foreign trade. The sooner Iraq's economic and trade policies are liberalized, the better it will be for the Iraqi people.

The liberation of Iraq might benefit non-Iraqis as well. Democratic ideas have a way of leaking across borders, spelling trouble for authoritarian institutions.

Iraq could still turn out badly. There is a tremendous amount of work to be done—to establish law and order, to improve infrastructure, and to nurture a democratic society into existence. The peace is by no means won.

But it is by no means lost, either. In fact, the glass may be a little over half-full. ♦

An Army of Lots More Than One

Our military is too small for the jobs it has to do.

BY **FREDERICK KAGAN**

THE ARMED FORCES of the United States are too small to support the missions required of them in the post-9/11 world. In many of the situations we now face, using troops on the ground is nonnegotiable, and America has too few of them. If that assertion seems counterintuitive given the impressive performance of the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq, two numbers may help drive it home: Of the 495,000 troops in the U.S. Army, 370,000 are already deployed around the world.

The destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq has always been rightly seen as only the first step in a reorientation of America's security policy toward the Middle East. If the United States proves to have eliminated the Baathist regime in Iraq only to replace it with chaos and violence, we clearly will have failed to enhance our security. The threats, to be sure, will be different. The imminence of Saddam's development of weapons of mass destruction posed a clear and present danger to the United States and its citizens at home and abroad. Chaos in Iraq will pose a less obvious threat, but the danger to Americans will be no less substantial.

We have already seen how chaos and civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990s provided the breeding ground for terrorists and a haven for the bases where they trained. If U.S. forces are reduced or withdrawn too soon, similar conditions in Iraq will nurture the al Qaeda operatives of the future. The U.S.-led attack could end up bringing about the very threat that prompted it

in the first place—the proliferation of Iraqi weapons to terrorist organizations—if we do not finish what we have begun by establishing a stable and peaceful regime in Iraq.

This will not be accomplished, however, without the prolonged deployment of significant numbers of American ground forces. Smart weapons cannot keep peace. They cannot get schools and hospitals running, or keep electricity and water flowing, or keep hostile neighbors from attacking one another, or provide a police presence to deter looters and criminals, or hunt down and capture individual terrorists, interrogate them, and learn from them the nature of the organizations to which they belong, or find traces of a WMD program hidden carefully in a country the size of California. Only soldiers and marines can accomplish these tasks, and, given the size and complexity of the country, only in fairly large numbers. Given the unrest and political chaos that currently engulf Iraq, it is hard to imagine that the United States will be able to withdraw any significant portion of its 146,000 troops from that country in less than a year without compromising our vital objectives.

The problem is that we cannot maintain such a large force in Iraq for a year without seriously damaging the Army and harming our ability to pursue other critical objectives. Given the normal requirement to have two units at home for every one deployed, the 11-division-equivalent U.S. Army could support a three-and-two-thirds division commitment to Iraq indefinitely—at the cost of having no forces available for operations anywhere else in the world. But the current deploy-

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ment is the equivalent of more than five divisions (the 101st Airborne, 4th Infantry, and 1st Armored divisions, two brigades of the 3rd Infantry Division, the 2nd and 3rd Armored Cavalry regiments, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and elements of the 1st Infantry and 10th Mountain divisions).

In addition, more than 200,000 reservists and members of the National Guard have been called up to support the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and on the home front. Some of these troops have been deployed for more than a year, many of them earning a fraction of their civilian pay. There is reason to fear that the hardship on them and their families may damage recruiting for the Guard.

Within months the U.S. leadership will face a difficult choice: reduce the commitment to Iraq regardless of whether the country is ready for such a reduction, or extend the deployment of many of these units indefinitely. The first choice is unacceptable because it may well compromise our ability to achieve our objectives in Iraq. The second will do great harm to the Army.

It is not merely that soldiers in Iraq


are under strain from having to be peacekeepers and warfighters simultaneously and from coming under periodic attack at the hands of the populations they are trying to police, or that morale in those units will deteriorate as their deployments extend with no clear end in sight. Units engaged in peacekeeping (if it can be called that) in Iraq are not training for war. The more forces we maintain in Iraq, the fewer we have available to face other potential enemies. Right now there is hardly a single division in the U.S. Army that could take the field as a unit without our hurriedly withdrawing important elements from Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan and sending them to war without the opportunity to retrain them. That is an unacceptable situation.

Nor can we look to our allies to help us. All of the European states have cut their armed forces so dramatically over the past decade that they are not capable of deploying large forces to Iraq. The British are already maintaining half of their deployable forces there. Virtually none of the European states has the command, control, and communications facilities required for the

job, let alone the strategic transportation capabilities needed to get forces to Iraq and sustain them there. Furthermore, states like France and Germany that vigorously opposed the war have demonstrated an equal unwillingness to support the peace we have imposed on Iraq.

It is time to stop pretending that the United States can prosecute a war on terror, conduct peacekeeping operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia, and maintain the security of the homeland without a substantial increase in the size of the armed forces. General Shinseki, the recently retired Army chief of staff, warns us to “beware the 12-division strategy for a 10-division army”—and even he understates the problem. In truth, the armed forces need an increase in size of at least 25 percent.

The current military structure was designed in the 1990s when all the talk was of a “strategic pause” and a prolonged period of peace. What pause there was has vanished, and it is not peace that now looks likely to be prolonged. Expanding the armed forces to match the missions they must perform is an urgent task. ♦



Michael Ramirez

First in Her Class

The valedictorian sued, and the town turned on her.

BY JONATHAN V. LAST

Moorestown, New Jersey

No one in Moorestown can remember a graduation day quite like the one the class of 2003 had on June 19. The valedictorian was nowhere to be seen. The salutatorian was greeted like a conquering hero, with a long standing ovation. And then of course, there were the media. Television crews and print journalists descended on the small Philadelphia suburb, while banks of photographers crowded in the gymnasium's crevices. They came not to see graduation but to report on the girl who had graduated top in the class and wasn't there, Blair Hornstine.

Blair Hornstine became a celebrity this spring by suing the Moorestown school district. To accommodate unspecified disabilities, the district had arranged home instruction for most of her high school career. This proved an academic boon—she ended up with a 4.689 grade point average, .055 higher than runner-up Kenneth Mirkin's 4.634. For a variety of reasons, superintendent Paul Kadri wanted to name the two of them co-valedictorians. Whereupon Blair sued—not just to retain the distinction for herself but also for \$2.7 million in damages. She won the first round—getting an injunction that made her the sole valedictorian. But in the process, she made a lot of enemies in this one-Starbucks town.

In a few months Blair will leave Moorestown and begin her freshman year at Harvard with a star-quality résumé—academic honors, extracurricular achievements, scholarships and charitable works galore. A surprising number of townspeople, though, will be delighted to see her go. They view her no-holds-barred effort to secure the top spot in the Moorestown class of 2003 as a Bobo version of the Texas cheerleader case—a combination of obsessive pursuit of academic credentials and parental ambition run amok. In recent years, an increasing number of American high schools have given up naming valedictorians altogether—a move that proponents of excellence and high achievement

typically denounce as misplaced egalitarianism. It may be that in part. But the Moorestown saga suggests a simpler explanation: self-defense on the part of school officials.

Blair Hornstine lives in a pristine neighborhood where the houses sell for anywhere from \$550,000 to \$1.5 million. Her father, Louis, is a New Jersey superior court judge in neighboring Camden County, and her mother, Linda, is a stay-at-home mom who's been active in the community for many years. Her brother, Adam, graduated as Moorestown High's valedictorian in 1999 and also went to Harvard.

In 1999 Blair enrolled as a freshman and began compiling the type of résumé that college admissions counselors dream of. That first year, she won the Prudential Spirit of the Community award and was featured on CNN for her extensive volunteer work. As a senior, she was a third-team member of *USA Today's* All-USA High School Academic squad. Over the past four years, she's won enough scholarships and awards to fill a small truck, including an essay prize from MENSA (the high-IQ club), \$20,000 from Toyota, a \$20,000 Coca-Cola scholarship, and a \$25,000 award from Discover, the credit card company. She also joined the model Congress and debate team and became captain of the moot court team.

Then there's the charitable work. As chair of the Tri-County Food Drive she collected, according to her bio on the Points of Light Foundation's website, 56,000 pounds of food for the Food Bank of South Jersey and some 600 prom dresses for needy teens with the Tri-County Prom Dress Drive, which she founded. As the New Jersey state chair for the Smile Train, she raised money for cleft palate surgeries in China.

But Blair's health was poor. She and her family have never disclosed the exact nature of her disability; it is alternately referred to as "chronic fatigue" and an "immune system disorder." A close friend of the family told me "she developed an illness when she was visiting Turkey, and when she came back—it's kind of a disease that you break out in blisters all over you. And the only way you can control it is medication," which made Blair "very tired."

Following federal and state disabilities law guidelines,

Jonathan V. Last, online editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD, was a 1992 graduate of Moorestown High School. He was not valedictorian.

the school district's child study team came up with an Individualized Education Program (IEP) to accommodate Blair's health problems. Mostly this meant home tutors and extra time for assignments and tests. She took two classes at home during her freshman year. Her sophomore year, she took four classes at home. By junior year she was coming to school only for homeroom and two periods. During her senior year she came to school for homeroom and one class—all of her other instruction was provided by home tutors.

Blair thrived academically under this plan, finishing each year with a GPA in excess of 4.0. (Moorestown uses a weighted grading system, where an A- is worth 3.7, an A is 4.0, and an A+ is 4.3. Honors courses add 0.5 to each grade, and Advanced Placement classes a full point.) But as Blair's senior year began last fall, a trickle of parents began making their way to the new superintendent, Paul Kadri, complaining that it was unfair to compare the grades earned under the ordinary regimen of classes and exams with the grades Blair had earned from her special arrangement. As one parent put it, "Lou Hornstine was bragging about the fact that he was manipulating the system and that his daughter was going to be valedictorian."

Because he was new on the job, Kadri began looking at the district's home instruction programs, and on September 19, he met with Judge Hornstine. There are conflicting accounts of the discussion. In court documents responding to Blair's lawsuit, Kadri claimed that Hornstine "told me that he had been salutatorian in school, and that he did not want his children to face 'the same embarrassment.'" Therefore, "he would 'use any advantage of the laws and regulations to give [Blair] the best opportunity to be valedictorian.'" According to Kadri, Judge Hornstine "told me that he was going to manipulate rules designed to protect disabled students" and said, "All I'm interested in is what is best for my daughter."

Eventually, Kadri concluded that Blair had received an unfair advantage over her fellow, full-time students. She "could take as many AP or Honors courses as she wanted to" because her home schooling eliminated scheduling conflicts—and the grades in these courses added extra points to her average. An A+ in an advanced placement course was worth 5.3 points. What's more, she had been medically excused from the gym course other students were required to take. The best a student could do in gym was an A+ worth 4.3 points, which would have dragged down her GPA. Kadri also believed that the home tutors did not grade as rigorously as some of the regular AP teachers.

Because he thought these findings raised concerns "about the fundamental fairness of the academic competition," Kadri decided to elevate the number two student to

co-valedictorian with Blair. He then set out in search of a policy that would allow him to do so. In January, he met with the class officers for all grades and brought up the idea of co-valedictorians. In February, he met with the entire senior class and told them that the school was going to start having co-valedictorians. His plan was for the school board to vote at its May 12 meeting on the new policy, which would allow the board, at "its discretion, with the assistance of the administration," to "designate multiple valedictorians and/or salutatorians to ensure that all students have an equal opportunity to compete for these awards."

Kadri wanted the new rule to apply retroactively to the class of 2003. But before the board had a chance to meet, Blair sued. In a tort claim filed on April 3 against Kadri and the school district and school board, she argued that she "should have been awarded sole valedictorian" and that the superintendent and school district were attempting to deny her that status "solely by virtue of her disability." For violating her rights under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and other state and federal statutes, she sought \$200,000 in compensatory damages, and \$2.5 million in punitive damages. On May 1, she filed suit in federal court.

The case immediately made headlines, and not just because of the eye-popping price tag. There was also her choice of lawyer. Instead of hiring an expert in education law, Louis Hornstine hired Edwin Jacobs Jr.

Jacobs is something of a legend in Jersey legal circles. He first rose to prominence in the mid-'80s defending Nicodemo "Little Nicky" Scarfo, a legendary Philly mob boss. With a practice in Atlantic City, Jacobs has represented a colorful array of organized crime figures along the Broad Street-Boardwalk corridor. How good is he? In 1998, he represented Philly drug kingpin Louis Turra, accused of plotting the assassination of underboss Joseph "Skinny Joey" Merlino. Jacobs never got to show his stuff on that case—Turra hanged himself in his cell before the trial started. But just three years later, Jacobs was defending Skinny Joey, who needed help beating a rap for three murders, two attempted murders, and a murder conspiracy charge.

The Hornstines may not have needed that good a lawyer, however. If the school board's case was weak to begin with, it teetered on collapse after Jacobs produced a certification from Judithann Keefe, Moorestown's assistant superintendent. Keefe sat in on the September 19, 2002, meeting between Superintendent Kadri and Judge Hornstine, and in her May 7 filing she contradicted her boss's account no fewer than eight times: "Louis Hornstine's



Blair Hornstine and Edwin Jacobs Jr.

Philadelphia Daily News / Alejandro A. Alvarez

threatening letter which warned that she “would have trouble” if she came to graduation. She stopped coming to school altogether.

“The kids have been awful,” says Mary Betancourt, a retired English teacher who taught Blair in a number of courses and coached her throughout her debate career. “They have threatened to boo when she gets up to speak; to turn their backs while she’s speaking. The school has let them have meetings where they talk about—some of them say ‘rip her heart out’ and ‘they know how to take care of her, whether it’s during graduation or after graduation.’”

On June 10, Jacobs sent a letter to Kadri informing him that “the hostile envi-

ronment at the school has traumatized Blair both physically and emotionally, to the point that she cannot and will not attend the graduation ceremonies.” At graduation, amidst the TV cameras and standing ovations, Blair Hornstine’s name was not mentioned even once. The only allusion to her came from Kadri, who said in his speech, “In life, in order to pursue your goals, you will need to interact with or compete against others” (Kadri’s underlining).

educational record was never discussed,” she said, and he “did not state that ‘he would manipulate the system to benefit his daughter.’”

The next day Judge Freda Wolfson granted Blair’s request for a temporary restraining order to prevent the school from changing its valedictorian rules, and the judge took every opportunity to thump the administration while she was at it. “I think you don’t have a leg to stand on,” she told school board attorney John Comegno. “Whether or not Mr. Hornstine intended to manipulate the system is immaterial,” because over the course of four years, “the Board approved every aspect of [Blair’s] curriculum.” She commended Blair, saying “the evidence in this case has shown that Ms. Hornstine earned her distinction as the top student in her class in spite of, not because of, her disability.”

Moorestown went into an uproar. A petition supporting Kadri flew around town and collected 862 signatures almost overnight—275 of them from the senior class, nearly every member. Another petition materialized online, urging Harvard to rescind its offer of admission. Students made computer icons of Blair’s face with tears streaming from her eyes. A cartoon appeared in the local paper, the *NewsWeekly*, showing Judge Hornstine shining his shoes with Lady Justice’s robe. The Hornstines’ house was egged twice and hit with black paintballs once. Blair received a

Why would an entire town go into a frenzy over a relatively straightforward disabilities case? “I don’t think it’s an accident,” says one high school humanities teacher, “that the closer one is to this, the harder it is to find anybody who is supportive of Blair.”

Maybe the biggest reason the town turned against the Hornstines is money. Blair’s lawsuit puts the township on the hook for \$2.7 million when the entire school system’s annual budget is only \$50 million. But there’s also a real belief that, even though it was legal, Blair and her father did manipulate the system, and were acutely aware of every subtlety in the grading system.

For instance, Blair took Latin 1 in middle school, over the course of 7th and 8th grades. Unusually, she then retook Latin 1 as a freshman—and got an A+. During her sophomore year, Blair was enrolled in AP U.S. History and

was taking it at the school with a teacher whose policy is to never give A+ marks. But she dropped the course and finished it the following year at home, with a different instructor. She got an A+. Blair was enrolled in gym class in 9th and 10th grades (receiving an A and A+, respectively). Just weeks before the end of her junior year, she received a doctor's note waiving her from gym altogether. Still, an A+ for the class showed up on her transcript. Her father wanted the grade removed, and since she shouldn't have been graded for a waived class, it was. As Kadri explained to the court, an A+ in gym is worth only 4.3, and thus would have lowered her cumulative GPA, which was well above 4.3 by that point.

At Moorestown High, the calculations for valedictorian are made at the end of the first semester senior year. Just a few weeks before that semester ended, Blair dropped AP European History—one of the two courses she was taking at the school—citing exhaustion. “The papers are killing her,” Judge Hornstine told the child study team while trying to withdraw Blair from the class. At the time, Blair had an A- in the class. It would have been one of the lowest grades of her high school career.

And while she was on home instruction, Blair's experience was markedly different from that of other students. At the most basic level, she had about half as much class time as school-bound students, freeing her up for extracurricular activities. (When asked by the Discover Card scholarship how she got everything on her résumé done, she replied, “There's plenty of time in the day!”) Her education plan stipulated that she would be allowed “more time to take tests and quizzes,” and “will not be required to take more than one test or examination per day.” What's more, “When absent or significantly fatigued, teachers will make appropriate accommodations to due dates for assignments. The parents will advise teachers when Blair has been too fatigued or otherwise unable to complete or to submit work in timely fashion.”

It's important to remember that such accommodations are commonplace under modern disabilities law. All of these arrangements were checked off from standard bureaucratic forms used by school districts across the state. And David Rhody, a Latin teacher who's also a lawyer, remembers Blair as “very bright, very interested, very curious—good student.”

Except, of course, for the plagiarism. On June 3, the local paper, the *Courier-Post*, published a brief editor's note explaining that five essays Blair had written for the paper contained “information from sources that was not properly attributed.” Beginning in October 2002—the same time she was struggling with the killer papers in

AP European History—Blair began contributing to the *Courier-Post*. Mary Betancourt, an exceptional teacher with 43 years of service who spent her last 25 years as head of Moorestown High's English department, says that she's the one who “encouraged Blair to submit her writing” to the paper.

So Blair threw herself into the task, writing on such topics as religion in public schools and art censorship. She even tackled tough geopolitical issues, such as the conflict in Iraq and U.S. policy on the Korean peninsula. In the process she used large unquoted chunks of other people's writing—a speech given by Bill Clinton, the Family Research Council's *i.e.* magazine, Christian Teachers Aid, Justice William Brennan, and Steve LaMontagne, an analyst at the Nautilus Institute in Washington, D.C. Sometimes she would change a word in the middle of the sentence. More often she would lift them whole. As a follow-up article in the *Courier-Post* noted, two of the articles were “composed mostly of material written by others.”

The Hornstines went into damage-control mode. Jacobs, their lawyer, told the Associated Press, “It was a whole lot of nothing. She wrote some fluff pieces for a kid-chat column. We have more important things to deal with.” The immediate concern was that Blair's GPA might take a hit because of a provision in the student handbook which says that plagiarism in school work “will result in a failure for that course.” In a statement printed in the *Courier-Post*, Blair noted that “these voluntary articles were not written for class assignments.” She then allowed, “I erroneously thought the way I had submitted the articles was appropriate. I now realize that I was mistaken.” The nature of the mistake? Newspapers don't have footnotes. “Footnotes provide not only an outline of the logic of the author, but also a detailed road map to the past. Like bread crumbs dropped along a path, footnotes and citations allow aspiring academics to follow previous scholarship to better enhance our general knowledge.”

Meantime, two other lawyers, Warren Faulk and Steven Kudatzky, played offense with Harvard to make sure Blair's acceptance there wasn't jeopardized. Kudatzky told the *Harvard Crimson*, “I am confident that, at the end of the day, Harvard will see that this is a non-issue, and quite frankly, something that is another example of Blair being singled out and victimized.”

And the Hornstines' old family friend Mary Betancourt also swung into action. She wrote Harvard a multi-page letter defending Blair and attacking the *Courier-Post*, accusing the paper of hypocrisy, mismanagement, and systematic plagiarism, concluding that “If the paper's adult writers cannot give proper citations or attribution, how can they question a student who received no guidance?” She chalked the entire episode up to “an effort to discredit Blair.”

"Newspapers do it all the time," she told me. And Betancourt smelled a rat. "I don't think the paper's ethical motives are pure," she said. "Guess who has an aunt who works for the *Courier-Post*?" she asked. "John Comegno." Comegno, the school board attorney, replies, "I think that statement's unfortunate and it really doesn't justify a response. Following that logic, though, I don't have any relatives at any other papers that I'm aware of, so I would assume that all the other papers are out to get her, too."

Those other papers include the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, which in late May reported that Blair's volunteer work is often helped along by her father. "Most of her volunteer work is done by phone now," Jennifer Moroz and Toni Callas reported. "And Louis Hornstine often is the one on the other end of the line," said Kristin Valente, volunteer coordinator for the Food Bank of South Jersey. "I have dealt a lot with her father because we're open during school hours," Valente told the *Inquirer*. "A lot of times it would be their father delivering [the food donations]," Betty Mendez, the executive director of the Food Bank told me. "He would come in his car. . . . That's the one thing I admired, he would bend over backwards for his children."

Beyond the résumé jealousy, small-town rivalries, hostility to litigiousness, and concern for fairness is a deeper reason for Moorestown's hostility to its valedictorian, which finally comes up in almost every interview: Few people in town believe that she's really sick. This cynicism is fed by the fact that the Hornstine family guards its privacy and won't explain what her illness is, which is of course their right. (Through a family friend, Blair and her family referred my interview requests to her lawyer, who did not respond to requests to be interviewed for this story.)

"I think that the view is there is not a genuine disability," explains a parent from the community. "And if there is any disability, it was inflicted by the father. . . . I think most people's view is that this man put so much pressure on his daughter to be perfect that she literally is a nervous basket case." One of Blair's former friends expressed similar sentiments to the *Crimson*: "From what I've seen and heard, I don't believe she has a disability that really prohibits her from going to school," said Allie McGuigan. "And I'm not sure whether it's all her, or whether it's her father. Knowing her and knowing her father, I think he owns this situation as much as she does."

The cynics point to her activities. In 2000, Blair ran with the Olympic torch when it came through Philadelphia. The *Inquirer* reported in May that she works out at a local gym. She went on the senior class trip to Disney World this spring, and in the summers, she does intensive academic work. During previous summers she enrolled at the University of Pennsylvania and Cornell. Last summer she spent eight weeks at Stanford taking classes in Expository Writing (A-), Psychology (A), and Philosophy of Public Speaking (A). Interviewed in July 2002, she told a reporter from the *Courier-Post*, "If I didn't lead a busy life, I'd be bored. And I hate being bored."

In June 2001, Blair was given the Congressional Award Gold Medal. To qualify for this honor, students must complete and document 400 hours of voluntary public service, 200 hours of personal development, 200 hours of physical fitness, and a 4-day exploration. Kelly Fanning, from the Congressional Awards office, says, "For her physical fitness she did jogging, power-walking, and dance." Moorestown High School students, it should be noted, take roughly 75 hours of Phys. Ed. class per year.

The trial phase of Blair's lawsuit will unfold slowly over the coming months, in part because Judge Wolfson is pressuring both sides to settle. Observers with varying sympathies think Blair is in a position of strength, with a friendly judge and an opportunity to seek further damages since, as she told the *Courier-Post*, she was "victimized" and "terrorized" out of attending her own graduation. Having vociferously supported Kadri, the school board is in a tough spot. They will have to publicly vote on the terms of any settlement, leaving them vulnerable at the voting booths.

And what about Blair? She'll go off to Harvard with the rest of her family. Brother Adam will be entering Harvard Law School this fall, and according to one of the court documents, Judge Hornstine will "be spending a lot of time in an adjunct position that he accepted at Harvard." And salutatorian Mirkin, who ended up with a cumulative GPA .055 points behind Blair Hornstine? He'll also be going to Harvard.

It's easy to wonder, under the circumstances, if being valedictorian is all that it's cracked up to be. But there are always the intangibles of being Number One. Three years ago, a newspaper reporter spoke briefly with 16-year-old Blair and asked her what it was like to carry the Olympic flame: "Not many people get this honor," she said. "When I am running with that torch, I will be the only person on Earth at that time who has it. To me, that's fascinating." ♦

Having vociferously supported Kadri, the school board is in a tough spot. They will have to publicly vote on the terms of any settlement.

The Crackup of the Arab Tyrannies?

*They tried every bad idea of the 20th century.
Maybe it's time for liberal democracy.*

BY AMIR TAHERI

In a speech in Washington on February 26, 2003, President George W. Bush spoke of his hope that a change of regime in Iraq would herald the Arab nations' joining the worldwide movement toward democracy. Some critics dismissed this "pious hope," arguing that Arab culture, and Islamic civilization generally, were unready for so momentous a transformation. Others questioned the president's sincerity, at a time when members of his administration were still debating Iraqi self-rule after Saddam.

Yet one thing was certain then and remains so today: The Arab world is in crisis, and change in Iraq could trigger change across the whole arc from North Africa to the Indian Ocean. While it is too soon to tell the shape of things to come in Iraq, it is clear that we are witnessing the end of a certain nationalist and socialist model developed in several Arab countries in the 20th century.

Most of the states where the nationalist-socialist model developed were created after the First World War, with the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France played the central role in shaping them. Sometimes described as "Sykes-Picot" offspring, the new states were designed to protect or further the strategic interests of the colonial power. Iraq, for instance, was created around the oil fields of Mosul and Kirkuk. Egypt's task was to protect the Suez Canal. Lebanon was carved out to place the interests of the Maronite Christians under French protection. Transjordan was a British military outpost with the task of keeping an eye on the Arabian Peninsula, to the south and east, and providing a base for intervention in the Levant.

Each new state was built around an army created by the colonial power largely for policing purposes. In almost every case, the new army drew its officer corps from eth-

nic and religious minorities. In Iraq, Assyrian, Turkmen, Kurdish, Faili, and Arab Sunni Muslims provided the backbone of the British-made army. In Syria, the French favored officers from the Alawaite minority. In Transjordan, most of the officers were Bedouin, Circassian, or Chechen fighters. In Egypt, many senior officers had Turkish or Albanian ethnic backgrounds.

With the advent of decolonization, these newborn army-based Arab states lost their original function. Anxious to protect their power and privilege, the military elites decided to seize power. Armies that were originally instruments of colonial domination redefined themselves as standard-bearers of Arab nationalism. The excuse they found for intervening in politics was the Arab defeat at the hands of the new state of Israel in 1948. The Arab armies blamed their poor performance on incompetent or even treacherous political leadership, and vowed that, once they were in power themselves, they would restore Arab honor.

A series of coups d'état began in Syria (1948) and continued in Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958), Yemen (1960), the Sudan (1962), Algeria (1965), and Libya (1969). In most cases, the military overthrew a traditional regime that derived its legitimacy from Islam and tribal loyalties. The new military regimes, by contrast, found nationalism doubly attractive because it cut across religious divides and thus legitimized rule by officers who subscribed to creeds other than mainstream Sunni Islam. Socialism appealed to the urban poor and a secular intelligentsia that wanted to distance itself from tribal and "feudal" social and cultural structures.

The army's direct assumption of power led to a gradual militarization of Arab politics. Force came to be seen as the main source of legitimacy, and the rulers did what they knew how to do: wage war. They began by waging war on their own societies, with the aim of destroying

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within them all potential alternative sources of authority.

They disarmed as many of the tribes as they could and executed, imprisoned, exiled, or bought most tribal leaders. In some cases, these measures reached the level of genocide—the anti-Kurd campaigns in Iraq between 1932 and 1988 come to mind. Operations akin to ethnic cleansing were also conducted against Coptic Christians in Upper Egypt and against Jews and Persians in Iraq. (At one point almost a fifth of Baghdad’s population were Jews. By 1968, only a handful remained, all others having fled to Iran, emigrated to Israel, or been put to death by military rulers. In 1972-73, Saddam Hussein conducted the biggest ethnic cleansing campaign in Iraq’s history when he expelled over 600,000 Iraqis to Iran on the grounds that they might have had Persian ancestry.)

Next it was the turn of religious authorities to be brought under state control and deprived of the independence they had enjoyed for over 1,000 years. Traditional religious organizations such as Sufi fraternities, esoteric sects, and charitable structures were either infiltrated or dismantled. The new states assumed control of these groups’ property, worth billions, depriving civil society of its most important economic base.

The military state also annexed the educational system, nationalizing thousands of private Koranic schools and dictating the curricula at all levels of schooling. The traditional guilds of trades and crafts, some with centuries of history, were also disbanded.

Political parties and cultural associations did not escape the destruction. In the 1950s, some of the newly independent Arab countries were home to genuine political movements representing the various ideologies of the 20th century. By the end of the 1970s, all of them, including parties such as the Baath that were nominally in power in Syria and Iraq, had been destroyed.

The elimination of the independent press, state ownership and control of all radio and television networks, and the vast resources allocated to “information” ministries enabled the new Arab regimes to stifle dissident voices and impose their version of reality.

Evolving toward totalitarianism, the Arab military state embarked upon wholesale nationalization. In some cases, such as the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, this clashed with the interests of the former colonial powers and led to war. In other cases, such as land reform in Egypt in the late 1950s and the seizure of small businesses by the first Baathist regime in Iraq in 1963, the

result was economic dislocation and widespread hardship for the most vulnerable strata of society.

The fact that the state now controlled the biggest sources of national revenue—the canal in Egypt, oil in Iraq—facilitated the imposition of a command economy. It also meant that the state had no real need of the population. Foreign experts and workers managed and ran vital sectors of the economy. (In 1990, Iraq hosted 1.5 million foreign experts and workers, almost 50 percent of the non-military, non-civil service urban work force.) And the government drew little or no revenue from taxes, relying instead on national assets like oil and the canal—and, from the 1960s onwards, on foreign aid.

The new Arab state could also do without the people when it came to national defense. The officer corps provided the bulk of the manpower for special units designed to protect the regime. In a broader context, the regimes relied on foreign alliances, mostly with the Soviet Union,

for arms, training, and ultimate protection against potentially hostile neighbors. (Thus, in the late 1960s, Egypt was host to some 25,000 military experts from the Soviet bloc.)

Finally, the new regimes didn’t need the people to vote for them. Although elections were introduced in the 1980s, their aim was merely to confirm the rulers in power, with 99.99 percent or even 100 percent majorities. By the start of the 1970s,

traditional Arab society had been all but destroyed. Totalitarian states—ideologically confused, unsure of their legitimacy, addicted to violence, and ridden with corruption—dominated all aspects of life.

The allocation of large budgetary resources to the military further warped the economies of these countries. Average spending on Arab armies in the 1950s was no more than 2.3 percent of their estimated gross domestic products. By the mid-1980s, however, the figure had risen to 18 percent, with some countries, Iraq and Syria notably, spending as much as 23 percent. Virtually all Arab states maintained armies far larger than their demographic base warranted. The military machine also distorted labor markets by sucking up most of the scant technical and managerial skills available.

In time, the military in these countries developed into a new caste of rulers that controlled most decision-making positions: High government officials, provincial governors, ambassadors, chief executives of state-owned companies, and even media editors were recruited from the ranks of active or retired officers. The new caste was reinforced by an even more tightknit sub-caste, the intelli-

Virtually all Arab states maintained armies far larger than warranted. The military sucked up most of the managerial skills available.

gence and security services (*mukhabarat*), which eventually established themselves as the source of power in almost all the Arab states.

The emergence of this monstrous new state apparatus was accompanied by tens of thousands of executions, the imprisonment of countless people, the flight into exile of millions, and, last but not least, the destruction of the moral fabric of Arab society.

It was not only against its own people that the new Arab regime waged war. Almost inevitably, it became embroiled in foreign wars—conflicts unrelated to the national interests of the countries concerned.

The Suez dispute could have been resolved through negotiations to phase out Franco-British ownership. Instead, the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, provoked a war that he must have known he could not win against a Franco-British-Israeli triple alliance. That he was bailed out of his crushing defeat by the diplomatic efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union working in tandem does not alter the fact that Nasser took a reckless risk with Egyptian national interests. In 1960, Nasser intervened in Yemen, first covertly, then openly, dispatching a 60,000-strong army of occupation, which remained bogged down for almost seven years. In the early 1960s, Nasserite agents and sympathizers engineered Egypt's annexation of Syria. In 1967, Nasser provoked another, more disastrous, war with Israel, which ended with his losing the Sinai Peninsula and the Israeli army dipping its feet in the Suez Canal (which remained closed for a decade). Syria, Jordan, and Iraq also participated in the Six Day War, this time sharing defeat with Egypt. Syria lost the Golan Heights, while Jordan lost the West Bank, the eastern part of Jerusalem, and chunks of territory along its border with historic Palestine. And Egypt engaged in smaller military adventures, in the Sudan, the (Belgian) Congo, Somalia, and the British protectorates of southern Arabia.

The Iraqi military regime flexed its muscles with an attempted annexation of Kuwait in 1961, setting the pattern it would follow for three decades. Between 1969 and 1975, Iraq fought a major, but unpublicized, border war against Iran that ended with Iraqi capitulation in 1975. In 1977, Iraq had a military showdown with Turkey over the water of the Euphrates river. Border clashes took place between Syria and Iraq in 1978. In 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, starting a conflict that lasted eight years and claimed a million lives on both sides. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and remained in a state of war against the United Nations until the fall of Saddam Hussein.

The Syrian military regime, for its part, clashed with

Turkey over the Iskanderun enclave, and fought several battles with the Jordanian army on the pretext of protecting the Palestinians. From the late 1950s onwards, military intervention in Lebanon was to become a permanent feature of Syrian policy. Then in 1973 came defeat in the Six Day War.

Other Arab military regimes had their share of war. Algeria triggered a war against Morocco over the issue of the Spanish Sahara starting in the 1970s. In the 1980s, Libya tried to conquer Chad, an adventure that ended, despite the investment of billions of dollars, in a decisive defeat for Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's government.

All the Arab military regimes also used terrorism as a routine instrument of policy. One can hardly find a terrorist organization, from the Japanese Red Army to the Irish Republican Army, including the Basque ETA and the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso, that did not forge some link with one or more of the Arab military regimes. In some cases, the links came via Palestinian terror organizations, including Yasser Arafat's Al Fatah. In other cases, the link was the Soviet or East German intelligence service. In the 1970s, Syria and Iraq were the most active centers of international terrorism, providing shelter and diplomatic and sometimes financial support to dozens of groups.

Depending on the Soviet bloc for aid, protection, and diplomatic guidance, the Arab regimes closed their societies to influences from the West, thus reversing a trend that had started in the 19th century. Many of the Arab regimes concluded treaties of friendship and cooperation with the USSR and sent tens of thousands of their young men and women to study in the Soviet empire. The result was a deepening of the culture of totalitarianism within the ruling elite. By the mid-1980s, the last representatives of Western-style liberal thought in the Arab world were either dead or dying.

That opened the way for the reemergence of Islamic extremism as the only alternative to military rule. In Egypt, the regime alternated between ruthless repression of the Islamists (under Nasser), unsuccessful co-optation (under Sadat), and a mixture of the two (under President Hosni Mubarak). In Libya, the state has been fighting an Islamist insurgency since 1986. In Syria, the regime managed to break the back of the Islamist movement by organizing the massacre of an estimated 20,000 people in the city of Hama in 1983. In Iraq, the regime used the iron fist against the Islamists, mostly Shiites, throughout the 1980s, then adopted an Islamist posture of its own in 1991 to rally support against the U.S.-led coalition. In 1991, Saddam ordered the slogan *Allah Akbar* (God is supreme) inscribed on the Iraqi flag. In Algeria, the government's war against the Islamists started in 1986 and intensified after 1992. In the Sudan, the military came to power in

alliance with the Islamists but broke with them in 1999 and has cracked down on their leaders and organizations ever since.

By the start of 2003, the Arab Islamist movement was in deep crisis. It was split in Egypt between those who urged accommodation with governments and those who preached endless war. In the Sudan, the Islamists were going through a process of “self-criticism” and trying to recast themselves almost as Western-style democrats, though few people were convinced. In Iraq, the Islamist movement found itself faced with a choice between alliance with the United States to topple Saddam Hussein and alliance with him in the name of patriotic unity. In Algeria, despite persistent terrorist violence, the divided Islamist movement seemed to be petering out. In Libya, the Islamist guerrillas appeared to be reduced to an enclave in the Jabal al-Akhdar region, while in Syria, hopes for reform under President Bashar al-Assad led to a split within the Islamist movement.

The pan-Islamist movement seems to have suffered a strategic setback with the failure of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the tragic experience of Islamism in the Sudan, and the dramatic end of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The emergence of al Qaeda as the most potent symbol of Islamism also weakened the movement by alienating key elements within the Arab urban middle classes. Al Qaeda’s extremism frightened large segments of Arab traditional opinion, forcing them to rally behind the regimes in support of the status quo.

The present season of change in Iraq comes at a time when both the Arab military state and its principal challenger, the Islamist movement, are both in crisis. Nor can traditional monarchy, still present in some Arab states, offer a serious alternative. (Jordan’s campaign to restore the monarchy in Iraq has been rejected by virtually all Iraqi political parties.) So what might a new Arab state look like?

The failed model is the power state, known in Islamic literature as “*saltana*,” whose legitimacy rests on the possession and use of the means of collective violence. In *saltana*, there are no citizens, only subjects, while the ruler is unaccountable except to God.

The only alternative to this failed model is what might be called the political state, whose legitimacy rests on the free expression of the citizens’ will. Such a model could be based on what the 14th-century historian Ibn Khaldoun called “*al-assabiyah*,” a secular bond among citizens. The key feature of this model is pluralism, known in modern Islamic political literature as “*ta’adudiyah*” and “*kisrat-garai*.”

Both the Islamists and the secular authoritarians of the Arab world have persistently opposed the idea of bonding through citizenship. Nevertheless, Islamic political and philosophical literature offers a wealth of analyses that could be deployed in any battle of ideas against both the Islamist and secular enemies of pluralism. Both Farabi (d. 950) and Avicenna (d. 1037), partly inspired by the work of the Mutazilite school, showed that there need be no contradiction between revelation and reason in developing a political system that responds to the earthly needs of citizens. On the contrary, because Islam places strict limits on the powers of the ruler, it theoretically cannot be used as the basis for tyranny.

The new model for the Arab state should reassert those limits. It should allow civil society to revive. The resuscitation and renewal of nongovernmental institutions should be accompanied by a massive program of privatization, designed to reduce the government’s power to dictate economic policy, including the allocation of national resources. The early privatization of the media should receive top priority, as it did in post-Nazi Germany and Japan.


In a multi-ethnic, multi-faith country like Iraq, a federal structure would encourage popular participation in decision-making while limiting the power of the central authority to impose any radical ideology on the nation as a whole. The army should be reduced in size, its role redefined to emphasize defense against external threats and rule out internal repression. Its relationship with the political authority should be clearly stipulated.

The Arab Middle East is one of the few parts of the world as yet untouched by the wave of democratization that eventually swept away the Soviet empire and numerous dictatorships in the Third World. The liberation of Iraq provides a historic opportunity to open the entire Arab world to democracy. For the liberators to allow tactical concerns to distract them from that strategic opportunity would be a grave mistake.

To sell the democratic ideal, it is important to draw on the experience of past generations of Arabs and Muslims who struggled for democracy and in some places—Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, and elsewhere—achieved certain victories against tyrannical regimes. It is essential to show that the ideal of self-government is not alien to Islam and that, given a chance, many Muslims will reject the despotic model in favor of one respectful of human rights and popular participation in the political process.

Winning the military war against Iraq’s dictatorship may prove to have been the easy part. Defeated in war, despotism must also be defeated politically. The hardest battles remain to be fought on the field of ideas. ♦

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Hillary's History

By P.J. O'Rourke

Reuters / CORBIS

If you plan not to read this summer, *Living History* is just the book. Hillary Clinton's new memoir is more than 100,000 pages long. At least I think it is. There are only 562 page numbers, but you know how those Clintons lie. A mere ream of paper could not contain the padding that has gone into this tome. Hillary—with the help of at least six ghostwriters—nails the goose of a manuscript to the barn floor and force-feeds it with lint.

We are informed, for instance, that Jackie Onassis was once, herself, a first lady and later married a Greek shipping magnate. We learn how a chief executive walks to the podium to deliver a State of the Union speech: "The president greets members of both parties who, by tradition, sit on opposite sides of the aisle." Even Hillary's grief over the death of her dad is padded: "My father would not be at the table

P.J. O'Rourke is a contributing editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

vying with Hugh and Tony for one of the drumsticks or asking for more cranberries and water-melon pickle, two of his favorites from childhood." And then there are the fulsome tales of official junkets—unimportant, uninteresting, uneventful, and unending. "I had given a lot of thought to how Chelsea and I should dress on the trip.

Living History

by Hillary Clinton
Simon & Schuster, 562 pp., \$28

We wanted to be comfortable, and, under the sun's heat, I was glad for the hats and cotton clothes I had packed." And I was glad for the scopolamine transdermal patch.

Nausea, however, is interesting compared with the actual symptoms of going-through-the-motions sickness induced by *Living History*. The book does not contain even a dog-worthy return to the vomit of the Lewinsky scandal. And the stingy-mama-bird

regurgitations of Whitewater excuses and evasions will leave the most adoring Hillary chick wanting more worm. Hillary has spent forty years with the pros on the fairways of prevarication, yet her gimmes lack audacity, her muligans do not astonish, and her foot-played "improvements of lie" are no more subtle than "Whitewater never seemed real because it wasn't."

Vituperation is supposed to be another of Hillary's salient features. But she spritzes, rather than splashes, acid and then only on the dead, the powerless, and Ken Starr. Hillary calls Bill's mother "Virginia Cassidy Blythe Clinton Dwire Kelley" and eulogizes her as "an American original—big-hearted, good humored, fun-loving"—by which she means a drunk. "I didn't use makeup," declares Hillary, "and wore jeans and work shirts most of the time. I was no Miss Arkansas," but "no matter what else was going on in her life, Virginia got up early, glued on her false eyelashes and put on bright red lipstick, and sashayed out the door."

Damning stuff. But the junior senator's insults are preferable to her compliments. Hillary's friend Jean Houston "wraps herself up in brightly colored capes and caftans and dominates the room with her larger-than-life presence and crackling wit, . . . reciting poems, passages from great works of literature, historical facts and scientific data all in the same breath."

Let's take a deep one. Boring others is a form of aggression, and Hillary attacks her public with the weapon of brutal dullness. Ms. Clinton has led a busy, meddlesome life from an early age. "I was elected co-captain of the safety patrol. . . . This was a big deal at our school." But until page 440 of her memoir, nothing happens. You know the nothing I mean. Any number of Clinton friends and supporters told us it was nothing. And, as a result of nothing happening, nothing—as you may remember—happened. So, starting on page 440, that nothing happens, and by page 472 (that is to say immediately, given the high-speed laser-printing prolixity of *Living History*), Hillary is announcing, "Life moved on, and I moved with it."

Unlike ordinary humans, Hillary had a choice about that move. After all, life revolves around Hillary. "In my own life I have been a wife, mother, daughter, sister, in-law, student, lawyer, children's rights activist, law professor, Methodist, political advisor, citizen and so much else." So very much else. "I was raised to love my God and my country, to help others, to protect and defend the democratic ideals that have inspired and guided free people for more than 200 years," a slap in the face to those of us who were raised to say please and thank you and not track mud into the house. Little wonder that when Hillary meets Queen Elizabeth, "She reminded me of my own mother."

Compared with Hillary Clinton, Bill is a big pile of humility. "While Bill talked about social change," says Hillary, "I embodied it," to loud hosannas and wild exaltations. In China, at the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, "The serious

and stony-faced delegates suddenly leaped from their seats to give me a standing ovation. Delegates rushed to touch me, shout words of appreciation and thank me for coming." In Chicago, at the 1996 Democratic Convention, "The crowd erupted into a frenzy of clapping, chanting, and foot-stomping. . . . My motions to urge the crowd to sit down were futile, so I just waved and let the cheers wash over me."

Living History traps us in the heated daydream of an earnest and lofty-minded high school student—the kind who belonged to the Methodist youth group, sat on the student council, was elected junior-class vice president, got appointed to the principal's Cultural



AFP / Corbis / Manny Centa

Values Committee "to promote tolerance," and would go on to become president of student government at some college for girls. As Hillary did. With a wonderful young person like that, well, some people are bound to be jealous and just act mean. Hillary points out that, during the Whitewater investigations, "public discourse was increasingly dominated by reactionary pundits and TV and radio personalities." You remember how the popular kids at summer camp got together and made sure we had acne.

But it's beyond me how those reactionary pundits concluded that Hillary is representative of the 1960s generation. Hillary's countercultural experi-

ence seems to have consisted of one visit, with another suburban girl, to Grant Park during the 1968 Democratic convention. "In the crowd behind us, someone screamed profanities and threw a rock, which just missed us." Heavy.

In fact, Hillary and her husband aren't representative of much of anything American. Neither can drive a car. Hillary hasn't been behind the wheel since 1996. ("I cajoled my lead [Secret Service] agent, Don Flynn, into sitting beside me. . . . Don's knuckles were white as dice by the time we arrived.") And Bill should never try. ("He has so much information running through his head at any given moment that he doesn't always notice where he's going.") In nearly twenty years of family life, the Clintons did not own a home or go to the mall without armed guards. And when they had a cat and dog, "I had to set up a separate correspondence unit . . . to answer their mail."

One senses profound superficialities here. Plumbing the shallows of Hillary is no easy matter, even for Hillary. She tries to give us the genesis of her worldview, but the anecdote runs out of control:

One snowy night during my freshman year, Margaret Clapp, then President of the college, arrived unexpectedly at my dorm. . . . She came into the dining room and asked for volunteers to help her gently shake the snow off the branches of the surrounding trees so that they wouldn't break under the weight. We walked from tree to tree through knee-high snow under a clear sky filled with stars, led by a strong, intelligent woman alert to the surprises and vulnerabilities of nature. . . . I decided that night that I had found the place where I belonged.

No fair consulting Freud. We need to work from primary sources. We must listen to Hillary's insights. About Princess Di and Mother Teresa, for example: "Aside from the obvious differences, each of these women had a talent for spotlighting the most vulnerable and neglected people and using her celebrity in calculated ways to help others." Aside from the obvious differences.

We must watch Hillary learn: "I always knew that America matters to the rest of the world; my travels taught me how the rest of the world matters to America."

We must recognize Hillary's principled outspoken feminism as elucidated in her U.N. Conference on Women speech: "It is a violation of human rights when women are doused with gasoline, set on fire and burned to death because their marriage dowries are deemed too small."

We must understand her ability to commune with the strong, intelligent women of past generations: "So, what would Mrs. Roosevelt have to say about my present predicament? Not much, I thought."

We must understand her sense of humor: "No one can make me laugh the way Bill does."

And understand her hair: "Thus began my lifelong hair struggles." "That was when my hair got me in more trouble." "It was another hair crisis."

And understand her stupidity. Now, Hillary's stupidity is of a Monday's-homework-done-on-Friday-night, 1,400 on her SATs kind, but nonetheless stupid for all that. She has lunch with Jackie Onassis, who "cautioned me that Bill, like President Kennedy, had a personal magnetism that inspired strong feelings in people. She never came out and said it, but she meant that he might be a target." Was Jackie talking about the grassy knoll or about a different kind of *mons*?

Hillary serves roasted eggplant soup and sweet potato puree to Jacques Chirac and doesn't get the joke when Chirac says, "Of course, I love many things American, including the food. You know, I used to work in a Howard Johnson's restaurant." After listening to Jiang Zemin explain that the Tibetans had been liberated by the Chinese, Hillary concludes, "I don't think Jiang... was being quite straight with me on Tibet."

Hillary failed the District of Columbia bar examination, but she passed in Arkansas—and "in the first jury trial I handled on my own, I defended a canning company against a plaintiff who

found the rear end of a rat in the can of pork and beans he opened for dinner one night."

Has *Living History* been dumbed down for its intended reader? Yes, assuming its author read it. I don't doubt that she wrote part of it, but no one seems to have read the final text. Otherwise, how to explain such sentences as, "The dominant architecture was Soviet-style socialist realism," or "Tom and I spent late nights wrestling over the fine points of legal interpretation" (a euphemism sure to be taken up by the British tabloid press), or this description of a 1992 bus trip campaigning: "Bill, Al, Tipper and I spent hours talking, eating, waving out the window." Which must have been a sight, though nothing compared with the trip to Russia when Hillary and Mrs. Boris Yeltsin "laughed our way through a day of public appearances and private meals with local dignitaries." I hesitate to think there was a logical explanation, but Hillary does say, "Ireland invigorated and inspired me, and I wished we could bottle up

the good feelings and take them back home." It's been done before.

Living History arrived from the publisher with a seven-page executive summary (itself ferociously tedious) that indicates no one is intended to read this book. Of course, a couple of people had to. There is the junior associate—doubtless a strong, intelligent woman—at the law firm of Bland and Blander who slogged through every word to make sure nothing was actionable. And then there's me. Poor me. But, except for us, *Living History* suffers the fate of modern poetry, with an authorship of many and an audience of none.

Not that the book isn't supposed to sell. And I understand it's selling nicely. I do not begrudge Hillary and her publisher their profits. The money will allow them, per Dante, to visit the fifth cornice of purgatory, where avarice is atoned, whenever they can get family leave from the ninth circle of hell where they'll be eternally tortured for spreading false doctrine. The free market is a good thing.

The purchasers of *Living History* can count themselves benefited, also. They



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could have had Hillary as their legal aid defender instead of merely their senator. Her argument to the jury that “rodent parts which had been sterilized might be considered edible in certain parts of the world” would not be of much use in a felony narcotics trial, despite the admirable multiculturalism of the sentiment.

However, it says something unflattering about our era that prominent political figures—who used to write declarations of independence, preambles to constitutions, Gettysburg addresses, and such—now use the alphabet only to make primitive artifacts, like the letter-inscribed tablet that Charlemagne is said to have put under his pillow each night, in the hope he’d wake up literate. Conservatives, including most of the Founding Fathers, have always worried that the price of a democratic system would be a mediocre nation. But George Washington and William F. Buckley Jr. put together could not have foreseen, in their gloomiest moments, the rise of Clinton-style *über*-mediocrity—with its soaring commonplaces, its pumped trifling, its platinum-grade triviality. The Alpha-dork husband, the super-twerp wife, and the hyper-wonk vice president—together with all their megaweenie water carriers, such as vicious pit gerbil George Stephanopoulos and Eastern diamondback rattlesnake Sidney Blumenthal—spent eight years trying to make America nothing to brag about.

They failed. And that is, ultimately, what makes *Living History* such a good nonread. If they’re going to throw the book at us, and the book is by Hillary, the republic will endure (and the Republicans will prevail). Plus, there’s a bonus. *Living History* contains a surprise unmentioned, I believe, by other reviewers. On page 402 we are presented with a rare, possibly unique, portrait of the likeable side of Robert Mugabe: “President Mugabe said little during my courtesy visit with him in the presidential residence in the capital, Harare. He paid close attention to his young wife, Grace, while I made conversation with her, and he periodically broke into giggles for no apparent reason.” ♦



Book of Books

The genesis of the King James Bible.

BY ALAN JACOBS

When I first saw Adam Nicolson’s new book about the King James Bible, I feared that it would be no more than a belated competitor to two volumes that appeared a year or so ago: Alistair McGrath’s *In the Beginning: The Story of the King James Bible and How It Changed a Nation, a Language, and a Culture* and Benson Bobrick’s *Wide as the Waters: The Story of the English Bible and the Revolution It Inspired*. But Nicolson’s book is something much different, and, I think, richer and deeper than those two useful studies. This is popular history at something close to its very best.

God’s Secretaries counts as “popular” history because it lacks footnotes; that is, Nicolson focuses on creating a compelling narrative rather than emphasizing (as professors usually do) the sources supporting the narrative and specifying the inferences the author has drawn from them. Although Nicolson

is not a professional scholar, his learning is both impressive and well managed. Especially noteworthy is his discretion in speculating—noteworthy because the story he has to tell is one

that cannot be told without some guesswork. As Nicolson notes, at the end of several chapters tracing the lineaments of Jacobean (that is, early seventeenth-century) political and religious culture:

it was an intense, competitive and vital world. But the question remains: how did this Bible emerge from it? How did the selected men deliver? After the initial flurry of documents [stemming from a 1604 conference at which the idea of a new translation first arose], there is a dearth of evidence almost until the final printed volume appeared in 1611. Once the king had decided

it should happen; once [Archbishop of Canterbury Richard] Bancroft had disseminated the Rules; and once the Translators had been chosen, almost the entire process drops from view.

No wonder then that, despite McGrath’s title, only two of his twelve chapters focus on the King James Bible itself; similarly, Bobrick is more con-



God’s Secretaries
The Making of the King James Bible
 by Adam Nicolson
 HarperCollins, 281 pp., \$24.95

Alan Jacobs teaches English at Wheaton College in Illinois. His most recent book is A Theology of Reading: The Hermeneutics of Love.



Courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery, London.

Somerset House Conference, 1604.

cerned to trace the theological, political, and linguistic developments of the century prior to James's commission of six Companies of Translators, and the subsequent cultural influence of that Bible, than to trace the production of the book itself.

Nicolson, however, is not deterred by the poverty of documentation: His book is a wonderful example of what the determined researcher can find and use where the less diligent or imaginative see only deficiency. Typical of Nicolson's scrupulousness is his skillful exploration of the theological and political context for each of the fifteen Rules that Archbishop Bancroft, working from King James's own instructions, disseminated to the Translators. It is likewise typical of his skill as a writer that he makes this exploration fascinating.

He does so largely through his description of the personalities that give energy and tension even to the mere elaboration of rules for translation. Perhaps Nicolson's greatest gift is his ability to portray the vibrant characters of the men responsible for the unfolding of this story. Without speculating unnecessarily, he draws on letters, diaries, governmental reports, and every other kind of document available to reveal the minds and hearts of the Translators.

A particularly lovely example is Nicolson's account of John Layfield, a Translator who in the 1590s had been chaplain to the Earl of Cumberland on a voyage to Puerto Rico and had writ-

ten an account of the voyage "as bright-coloured an adventure as anything by Robert Louis Stevenson." Layfield seems to have been particularly interested in the richness and profusion of the flora of the New World, and racked his brains to find a way to describe the taste of pineapples: "I cannot liken it in the palate to any (me thinks) better then to very ripe Strawberries and Creame." How appropriate, then, suggests Nicolson, that Layfield would be one of the men responsible for translating the first chapters of Genesis, whose Eden must have called to Layfield's mind his voyage to a strange land where "the trees doe continually maintaine themselves in greene-good liking" and the rivers provide "a continuall refreshing of very sweete and tastie water."

Examples of this kind could easily be multiplied. Nicolson describes the culture of affection in Jacobean England—in which friendships with no element of sexuality would nevertheless find passionate expression in words and embraces, something visitors from the more restrained Continent (how times have changed!) often commented on—and considers how that passionate intensity found its way into the translation of the Song of Solomon.

More than just resourceful, Nicolson is scrupulously fair, even to those Jacobean figures for whom the twenty-first century reader is likely to have the least sympathy. Take, for instance, Lancelot Andrewes, perhaps the most famous preacher of his time, the leading light among the Translators, and

(three centuries later) a hero of T.S. Eliot's. Nicolson calls our attention to Andrewes's tendency to coldness and moral indifference, as when Andrewes considers an outbreak of the plague in London a punishment for the people's sins, yet leaves town to wait out the pestilence in the safe and peaceful countryside; or when he tells a long-imprisoned Puritan, Henry Barrow, that he shouldn't complain about imprisonment: "The solitarie and contemplative life I hold the most blessed life. It is the life I would chuse." But Nicolson also emphasizes Andrewes's genuine piety, his overwhelming sense of his own sinfulness: "Everybody reported on his serenity, the sense of grace that hovered around him. But alone every day he acknowledged little but his wickedness and his weakness."

Andrewes, in short, was an immensely complicated man, in a way that we can scarcely comprehend. "People like Lancelot Andrewes no longer exist," Nicolson writes. But it is precisely the job of historians like Adam Nicolson to help us see that such people once existed. Otherwise we can never understand something that Nicolson is at great pains to make us understand: "It is because people like Lancelot Andrewes flourished in the first decade of the seventeenth century—and do not now—that the greatest translation of the Bible could be made then, and cannot now. The age's lifeblood was the bridging of contradictory qualities. Andrewes embodies it and so does the King James Bible." ♦



Foxy Pundit

Two cheers for Dick Morris.

BY FRED BARNES

The tendency of the political community is not to take Dick Morris seriously. A former political adviser to President Clinton, Morris is often his own worst enemy. He was caught with a prostitute in a Washington hotel in 1996 and tossed from the Clinton entourage. In 2000, he insisted Hillary Clinton wouldn't run for the Senate in New York almost to the day she announced her candidacy. And having been spurned by the Clintons, he seems sometimes exaggerated and vengeful in his criticism of them.

Morris doesn't help his cause with the packaging and structure of *Off with Their Heads: Traitors, Crooks & Obstructionists in American Politics, Media & Business*. The title suggests the book is a crude populist tirade. Each chapter begins with a synopsis of the case against some malefactor followed by, in capital letters, "OFF WITH THEIR HEADS." For example, noisy Hollywood leftists must be identified, exposed, and corrected, Morris writes, "so we may be immune to the blandishments and reject their seductions." So, declares the next paragraph in its

Fred Barnes is executive editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

entirety, "OFF WITH THEIR HEADS!"

All this is unfortunate because Morris has one of America's great political minds, and a good chunk of the book is worthwhile, original, and even riveting. He should not be dismissed as a crank or a television blowhard, though the front of the book jacket identifies

Off with Their Heads
Traitors, Crooks & Obstructionists
in American Politics,
Media & Business
by Dick Morris
Regan, 343 pp., \$24.95

him only as a *Fox News* political analyst and *New York Post* columnist. Morris is especially astute in scrutinizing the press, particularly the manipulation of opinion polls by the *New York Times*, and his analysis of Clinton's failure to crack down on terrorism, while overheated, is buttressed by first-person anecdotes from his years as a White House adviser. Still, on several subjects—the French, securities law, governors who spend tobacco settlement money to balance their budgets—he merely flails.

I've been looking at *New York Times/CBS News* polls for years, and I've always suspected they were tilted to promote Democrats and liberal crusades. Morris confirms my suspicion. In compelling detail, he explains how the paper shapes the results of its polls. One tool is weighting. All polling organizations do this to offset what they may feel is an unrepresentative sam-

pling of voters. Sometimes they'll add Republicans, sometimes Democrats. But in its polls from January 1, 2002, until Election Day in November, the *Times* always added Democrats and subtracted Republicans. This wasn't really weighting, Morris insists. It was slanting. And it wasn't that the *Times* had a preconceived notion of the Democratic and Republican shares of the electorate. Whether Democrats came in at 32 percent or 34 percent or 36 percent of a poll's sample, the *Times* increased their percentage.

Morris reveals other tacks used by the *Times*. It conducted polls on favored liberal issues to build momentum behind them. Morris says a pattern developed while Howell Raines, recently deposed, was editor. "The pattern was always the same, following the Raines formula: flood the front page with stories and photos, push the party line on the editorial and op-ed pages, and gin up the impression of public support through weighted polling to show how popular the issue du jour was politically."

After the Enron scandal broke, the *Times* ran numerous stories on President Bush's financial dealings years ago. Then they conducted a poll to see if the public was angry at Bush. It wasn't, but the *Times* headlined its story on the poll with the public's vague worry Bush was too influenced by business. Deep in the story it was noted that Bush's approval rating was 70 percent, and a solid plurality of the public believed he was honest in his business practices.

Last fall the *Times* sought to play up a supposed lack of progress in the war on terrorism. Again, it turned to a poll, asking if the public saw "a lot of progress" or "some progress" or "not much progress" or "no progress at all." The normal way to handle the data would have been to combine those who endorsed "a lot" or "some" progress and label those respondents as favorable. Instead, the *Times* lumped those seeing "some progress" with those who saw little or none and "branded them all as negative." Thus, the paper could report the public was

unimpressed with Bush's progress in winning the war on terrorism when it in fact it was impressed.

Morris's criticism of the press goes beyond the *Times*. Citing the major media's wildly inaccurate coverage of the war in Iraq, he concludes that network news, big newspapers, and news magazines have "produced a credibility gap," which has sharply reduced their influence. "The era of media dominance of our political system has lasted forty years, ever since the news organizations brought down first Johnson and then Nixon," he writes. "But it lasts no longer. It has lost the one thing it could not afford to lose: our trust and confidence in its impartiality."

On fighting terrorism, my inclination has been to absolve those who did little prior to the attacks on September 11, 2001. That day changed everyone's take on the terrorist threat. Morris doesn't agree. His verdict on Clinton is harsh: "If history is just, President Bill Clinton's [name] will be blamed for leaving George W. Bush a nation unaware of, and unprotected from, the deadly peril that hit seven months later." Morris says Clinton could focus intently on domestic issues, but on terrorism "he knew little and cared less." Morris says he participated in seven private meetings with Clinton in late 1994 and early 1995 and the subject of terrorism in America never came up.


Morris elaborates on one critical meeting at the White House after the Oklahoma City bombing in May 1995. It's a self-serving tale, but revealing. Morris advocated a national crusade against terrorism, but George Stephanopoulos raised civil-liberties objections and told Clinton the Justice Department would block a full-scale crackdown by leaks and bureaucratic inertia. "Stephanopoulos's comment is typical of how the White House staff sought to disempower the president," according to Morris. "By threatening leaks and administrative non-cooperation ... they gleefully controlled this oft-weak chief executive. Can you imagine a White House staff member having the temerity to pull this kind of stuff on George W. Bush?"

Morris made a wise decision to put

the media and Clinton sections at the front of *Off with Their Heads*—that is, the good stuff first. The later chapters are nothing special. Sure, it's nice to see the French zinged and Hollywood lefties excoriated. The celebrities, Morris writes, have in common that they don't know what they're talking about. And his advice is for the media to quit covering their political rantings. Actually, that's good advice, but I'm not getting my hopes up.

Don't jump to the conclusion, based

on criticism of the press and Clinton, that Morris is a conservative. He's not. I'm not sure what he is. As a political consultant, he worked for both Democrats and Republicans. Now he devotes himself to writing a column and books and delivering political commentary on television. For what it's worth, I always read his columns, his books, and stop and listen if I find him holding forth on *Fox News*. Forget what the political community thinks. Dick Morris shouldn't be ignored. ♦



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Home Run

Michael Lewis's book on baseball may be the best book ever written on business. **BY MARK GERSON**

After beginning his career on Wall Street, Michael Lewis turned to writing and focused his ironic sensibility on the world of commerce. His memoir of the bond-trading business, *Liar's Poker*, has become a Wall Street classic—and rightly so. But his most recent book, *Moneyball*, is the best business book Lewis has written. It may be the best business book *anyone* has written.

Focusing on Billy Beane, the general manager of the Oakland Athletics baseball team, *Moneyball* tells the story of how someone considers his business in an entirely different way from his competitors—and achieves consistently outsized returns.

Of course, the fact that Beane works in baseball helps make *Moneyball* so compelling, but anyone in business can derive lessons from the book. The central question asked and answered in *Moneyball* is, How can the Oakland A's consistently be at the bottom of the league in payroll and at the top of the league in performance?

One answer is, essentially, luck. That's the answer of Commissioner Bud Selig and the blue-ribbon panel (with George Will, Paul Volker, George

Mark Gerson is CEO of the Gerson Lehrman Group, a New York-based investment research firm.

Mitchell, and Richard Levin) he commissioned to study the issue of payroll parity. Given the abundance of baseball information and its transparent distribution to countless participants and observers, the market for baseball players should be perfectly efficient—

which means, absent luck, teams that can afford to sign the most expensive players will win, and teams that cannot afford expensive players will lose. The solution is payroll parity, which can be achieved through a mechanism like a salary cap or a tax on high-spending teams.

But perhaps the market isn't as efficient as we think. According to Billy Beane, most of the criteria baseball people use to identify a valuable player are overrated or simply wrong. And most of

the criteria they should use are underrated or simply ignored. Beane's competition uses a combination of conventional wisdom, sentiment, and superstition, allowing Beane to get the players that he wants for low prices and to trade the players that he does not want for high prices. As Paul DePodesta, Beane's twenty-eight-year-old Harvard-educated protégé, says, "What gets me really excited about a guy is when he has warts, and everyone knows he has warts, and the warts just don't matter."

Most general managers are excited

by great high-school athletes; Beane won't look at them because high-school competition is too variable for its statistics to be meaningful. Conventional wisdom holds that it is important a prospect "look like" a baseball player; Beane, who tells his scouts they aren't "selling jeans," believes players who can get on base come in all sizes. Conventional wisdom holds that good "closers"—the pitchers who finish games for teams—are worth millions of dollars. Beane's analysis has not uncovered anything remarkable in retiring the final three batters for a team that's ahead. So he has twice had pitchers accumulate many saves, become regarded as outstanding closers, and traded them to teams who valued this contribution a lot more than he does.

Most baseball people believe in "manufacturing runs" through bunting, base stealing, and the hit and run. Beane believes that staying on base is the important thing. His analysis shows that stealing bases only contributes to a team's "expected run value" when it is done successfully 70 percent of the time—which only very rare players can do. So Beane will trade a fast player for a guy who can get a walk. Working the count for a walk might not be conventionally regarded as a glorious activity, but it is a beautiful thing to Billy Beane, who says, "Baseball is a game of attrition. And what's being attrited is pitchers' arms." No wonder Oakland A's pitcher Tim Hudson referred recently to a thirteen-pitch duel that ended in a home run as "the best at-bat I've ever seen."

And who is often best at working a count? Beane has determined that the last skill to disappear is the ability to get a walk—so he will happily use older and cheaper players whom other teams have discarded. Sure, they are slower as fielders, Beane concedes, but there is a greater variance in on-base percentage than in fielding—making the difference between getting on first base and not getting on first base greater than making a defensive play and missing it.

Part of Beane's success comes from his identification of discrepancies be-



Baseball's Billy Beane

AP/Wide World Photos

Moneyball
The Art of Winning an Unfair Game
by Michael Lewis
W.W. Norton, 288 pp., \$24.95

tween how conventional wisdom regards statistics and how he, through careful mathematical analysis, regards them. The other part comes from his invention of entirely new statistics that reveal previously unknown truths about the game. For instance, Beane and DePodesta ask how the term “double” can fairly describe both an unfieldable shot against the wall and a blooper to left that a less forgiving scorekeeper might have considered an error on the outfielder. According to Beane and DePodesta, it can’t. They consider instead the alleged double as a hit at a certain velocity and trajectory to a particular point on the field. They then examine ten years of balls hit at the same velocity to the same point, which yields a much better idea of the “expected run value” of the hit than the lazy classification of “double” allows.

Beane and DePodesta learned about valuing hits from former derivative traders, and they learned about evaluating pitchers from Voros McCracken, an unemployed paralegal living with his parents at age twenty-eight. McCracken, a fantasy-baseball player who was active in sabermetrics websites, was intrigued when someone in an Internet discussion group said that it was impossible to distinguish pitching from defense. After all, a pitcher’s earned run average—the conventional statistic for evaluating pitchers—doesn’t (aside from errors) account for the fielding that can allow or prevent runs. So the world needed a new number, and McCracken provided it in an essay on *baseballprospectus.com*. He flushed out the fielding from pitching statistics by dividing hits and earned runs (for which fielders are partially responsible) by walks, strikeouts, and home runs (for which fielders are not responsible). Examining the numbers for 1999, McCracken determined that the five best pitchers were Randy Johnson, Kevin Brown, Pedro Martinez, Greg Maddux, and Mike Mussina—which, as the obviously right result, suggested the theory worked. And the practice worked for Billy Beane. On its basis, he snagged the pitcher Chad Bradford, who, because of his unconventional delivery and his

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slow fastball, was not highly valued by any other team.

Why would Billy Beane give Michael Lewis such access and thus allow his secrets to be shared with his competitors? Lewis doesn't say, but there are a couple of possible answers. The first is that other teams are already beginning to get it. Boston Red Sox owner John Henry, who made a fortune off inefficiencies in the commodities market, tried to hire Billy Beane away from the A's and did hire Voros McCracken as a pitching analyst and Theo Epstein, a twenty-eight-year-old Yale graduate, as his general manager.

Still, baseball's conventional wisdom is so deeply embedded that it is unlikely to be swayed merely by the truths in *Moneyball* that challenge it. The sports section in the *New York Times* retains the ultimately meaningless batting average as its first and most prominently displayed statistic—and doesn't list the leaders in slugging percentage or on-base percentage.

At the end of the 2002 season, several players on the A's questioned the strategy that brought them to the playoffs against all conventional wisdom. Joe Morgan, arguably the greatest second baseman ever to play, said that it was not surprising the A's lost to the Twins in the playoffs, because Beane's team didn't manufacture runs and insisted on depending on walks and home runs. In answer, DePodesta showed how the A's scored an average of 0.6 runs *more* per game in that play-off than they did during the regular season. The problem was that the A's ace Tim Hudson had two terrible outings. As a dejected Beane reflected, "My sh—t doesn't work in the play-offs. My job is to get us to the play-offs. What happens after that is the f—ing luck." Beane's strategy succeeded in its intention: to generate the 800-820 runs and give up 650-670 runs for a total of 95 wins, so as to make the playoffs. It is a long-term strategy, with no solution to the playoffs' short-term vicissitudes. Luck, as Branch Rickey said, may be the residue of design—but it's still luck, and it persists.

I bought copies of *Moneyball* for around twenty of my company's

employees. Anyone in business who sees how Beane has won so many games with so little money will be either inspired or frightened. If the market for baseball players is not efficient, then no industry can be safely considered efficient. And inefficient markets create opportunities for people who think in new ways. Billy Beane is a baseball genius, but it doesn't take a genius to follow his example and start asking the right questions. Is the employee who made a good first impression genuinely performing bet-

ter than his peers? How much is that product line that gets such good press actually contributing? Is that popular "brand-building" campaign really generating a lot of cash? How and why does our company actually make money? Do our compensation and promotion policies correspond precisely with that answer? What is the return on the cost of the baseball season tickets our company has?

Perhaps that last question explains why Bud Selig is not a Billy Beane devotee. ♦



Tough Guys

Athens gets all the press, but Sparta won the war.

BY VICTOR DAVIS HANSON

The importance of Sparta to Greek history was nothing less than pivotal. It was the Spartan king Leonidas and his royal guard "The Three Hundred" who perished holding the pass at Thermopylae, spearheading a last stand that gave the Greeks to the south a few precious days to regroup at Salamis. A year later the Spartans' "Dorian spear" won the battle of Plataea and sent the Persians fleeing Greece for good. Without the bravery of such grim, oily-haired stalwarts in their bizarre red cloaks, Darth Vader-like helmets, and polished breastplates, the Athens of Themistocles might well have been stillborn.

As Paul Cartledge shows in his valuable new introductory survey of Spartan culture, for much of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., Sparta's social rig-

or and the checks and balances of its tripartite constitution were the envy of Athenian utopian philosophers. Hypocrites like Plato and Aristotle thrived in the liberality of a tumultuous Athens even as they praised at a safe distance the order and stability produced by the life of the barracks one hundred and fifty miles to the south.

It seems natural to equate a society's cultural worth and influence with its military prowess, but as in the Peloponnesian War, the connection can be misleading. After twenty-seven years of fighting, the Spartans brought to an end the much-cele-

brated Athenian fifth century—and with it the majesty and brutality of Pericles' empire. The defeat of Athens had a powerful effect on observers from Plato and Xenophon to the German philosophers Hegel and Spengler. They and others wrongly concluded that material wealth and equality inevitably lead to personal license and civic ennui, undermining martial virtue and civic patriotism.

The Spartans
The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece from Utopia to Crisis and Collapse
by Paul Cartledge
Overlook, 304 pp., \$27.95

The Peloponnesian War
by Donald Kagan
Viking, 498 pp., \$29.95

Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. His Ripples of Battle will appear from Doubleday in September.

Sparta, after all, did no better with its own hegemony in the next forty years. The enlightened empire of Athens was replaced by gruff *harmosts* (“fixers”) who had nothing to offer allies, subjects, and neutrals—other than the fact of their past opposition to Athens. Under the inept leadership of a series of blinkered Spartan kings, the city-states stayed mired in internecine wars for decades. The result was an exhausted culture ripe for harvest by Philip II at Chaeronea (338 B.C.). Sparta ended its days as a curiosity for Roman sightseers (what Cartledge calls “sado-tourists”), who detoured to Laconia to see “real” Spartans of fame and legend, then little more than reservation warriors being whipped to the delight of a bored elite.

What are we to make of its rise and fall? The Spartan saga itself is inexplicable without careful study of its bizarre class system and especially the serfs around whom so much of the structure was built. It is to the plight of

these strange helots (“those taken”) that the classicist Cartledge has chosen to devote most of his life in a series of landmark scholarly studies that finally have given us full appreciation of how Sparta really worked. The fruits of that complex research—illuminating the reality behind the legend—are now presented in a short, well-illustrated review of some seven centuries of Spartan history and the fascination its mystique has held on two millennia of subsequent Western culture.

As Cartledge demonstrated in a long series of demographic, topographical, and social investigations of the Lacedaemonians, something strange, even awful, transpired in the eighth century B.C. A relatively tiny city-state in the southern Peloponnese saw its population rise beyond its resources. Traditionally, city-states sent excess people as colonists throughout the Aegean and Italy or turned to freeholding, intensive farming, and the homesteading of once marginal land to get more food. Instead, through acci-


dent, a trick of fate, or the mythical “Lycurgus,” this city-state chose a different and improbable outlet. Less than ten thousand of its hoplites annexed over one thousand square miles of land surrounding Laconia and then audaciously marched over Mt. Taygetus and swallowed the even-larger state of Messenia in southwest Peloponnese.

Beware of wishes granted. The need to occupy and police as many as a quarter-million Laconian and Messenian helots led to an unsolvable paradox of great state power achieved at a price of abject vulnerability. Constant surveillance and control of the helot population left Spartan citizens (the “Similar”) little time for anything but military preparation. Spartan boys underwent years of a brutal military regimen, beginning at age seven, while their fathers declared war annually on an entire subjugated people.


The helots—“the single most important human fact about ancient Sparta,” as Cartledge notes—tilled Messenia and Laconia for their outnumbered

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Leonidas leads the fight at the Battle of Thermopylae.

overlords, who in turn needed to be freed from farm work simply to patrol them. A police state, underpopulation, and an endemic paranoia followed—as well as a magnificent hoplite army that finally discovered in the early fifth century that its shock troops, like the similarly frightening Waffen SS, fought outsiders every bit as well as internal enemies. We all marvel at the glorious last stand at Thermopylae but sometimes forget that Leonidas' lads were basically a SWAT team whose prime directive and training were to hunt down and assassinate rebellious helots. We know little now about Epaminondas the Theban—Plutarch's life of the great liberator is lost—except that he was the most hated man at Sparta, and elsewhere the “first man of Greece,” precisely because in 369 B.C. he freed the helots and put an end to this odious subjugation of other Greeks.

Cartledge aims his latest survey at the general reader—no footnotes, chapters arranged around famous Spartans from Lycurgus to Agesilaus, none of them requiring mastery of the literary, epigraphical, and archaeological sources. He reveals his own ambivalence about Spartan society, which has lent his earlier books a tragic rather than strident tone. True, other Greeks held chattel slaves; indeed Athenians may have owned one hundred thousand of them in Attica. Monarchy was

not uncommon in Thessaly. Oligarchy was a Peloponnesian, and not just a Spartan, phenomenon. But what are we to make of it all when the calculus of serfdom, kings, and privilege somehow computed to personal courage, asceticism, political stability, and hyper-patriotism never quite reached anywhere else in Greece?

These contradictions lead us, as Cartledge notes, to the unsettling conclusion that Sparta's plethora of unfree and unequal residents may have made her own small cadre of full citizens themselves the most free, equal, and civic-minded of all Greeks. It is no surprise, then, that after chronicling the brutality of this apartheid state, the first in the West, Cartledge succumbs to the allure of these strange and cruel patriots—and so ends his book with the exclamatory “Leonidas lives! With him Sparta does too.”

Much of what we think about Sparta also derives from its mirror image of Athens and the great war that Spartans fought to destroy Athenian interference in the lives of hundreds of autonomous city-states. No ancient conflict—not Xerxes' massive invasion of Greece, the destruction of the Persian empire by Alexander the Great, or the madcap invasions of Italy by Pyrrhus and Hannibal—is more Manichean than the three decades of intramural fighting between Athens and Sparta. Think of

the collision: a land versus a maritime power; the rigor of the Dorians contrasted with Ionian elegance; the rule of the few pitted against democracy; inculcated dearth set against pride in surfeit; a rural hamlet without walls marching against the great stones of Pericles; and a garrison state championing the cause of Greek autonomy even as a liberal democracy sought to force the unwilling to join its noble experiment in democracy.

Athens did not lose, it self-destructed. Only by simultaneously taking on Sparta, the Peloponnesians, Thebes, Sicily, and Persia

did it forfeit its empire. Some hard-bitten realists still refuse to absorb this lesson of the Peloponnesian War, thus equating consensual government and freedom with spiritual and moral decline. Yet Hitler, Tojo, Saddam Hussein, and Osama bin Laden could have all learned from a careful reading of Thucydides that democracies such as Athens, when aroused, make war like no other societies.

Despite the success of his most recent books on strategy and military preparedness, Donald Kagan is still best known for his monumental four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War. Thirty-four years after the initial volume—*The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*—appeared, Kagan has now written a compendium, about a fourth in size of the original work, replete with maps and titled subsections, but without the scholarly notes or discussions of specialized controversies of the earlier books. As in the case of Cartledge's *The Spartans*, the present volume is designed for a different sort of general reader who enjoys a riveting story and seeks a coherent guide to the general chaos of the present in some abstract and timeless wisdom of the past—however uncomfortable it may be in our present therapeutic age.

Reading Kagan's account of near endless fighting over three decades

reminds us that aggressive states are just as likely to go to war for reasons of honor and pride as they are to fight over economic exploitation, lost homelands, or past social injustices. Osama bin Laden's pan-Islamic jihad had about as legitimate a gripe against us as Athens did against Sicily. In either case, the aggressors could not be reasoned with, understood, or bought off—but only defeated.

Kagan presents a seamless chronological narrative of the war drawing on Thucydides, Xenophon, Diodorus, and Plutarch, punctuated by his own life-long interest in the primacy of politics and these very human emotions like envy, fear, honor, and self-interest that really drive statesmen even as they profess ideals of a higher sort. His contribution is not merely to piece together a coherent story from sources that are incomplete and often at odds, but in addition to explain rationally why Athens did so many supposedly stupid things like trying to annex Boeotia,


conquer Sicily, or expand its overseas empire while it was engaged in a war to the death with the greatest army in Greece.

In his retelling of the war, the how and why of military practice is often not guided by reason, but rather is captive to emotion, pure and simple. It makes no sense for Athenians to recall Alcibiades after turning over 20,000 men to his command—unless one remembers how obnoxious, electrifying, and downright successful he could be, and the inevitable wages of envy that followed him. Nicias ruins the Athenian armada not because he is all that tactically stupid or strategically ill-informed, but rather because his own instincts for political survival back home and superstitions about a lunar eclipse lead to paralysis of action.

While much of the complexity of the original scholarship is by needs lost in this condensed version—especially missed are discussions of the views of the great German historians Busolt,

Beloch, and Meyer—Kagan's main theses remain unchanged and wear well: Men, not inanimate forces, caused the war. Athens could have won had it adopted better strategies and sought to fight Sparta rather than the entire Aegean world at once. The deleterious effects of the war are not to be counted in wasted lives and treasure alone, but rather in the end of the very idea of an ascendant democracy as the transforming experience in the lives of thousands outside Athens.

Kagan is reverential, but not unquestioning of his chief source, the complex warrior-historian Thucydides. For all his brilliance, Thucydides was after all human, and his history often reveals his prejudices as both a conservative and an aristocrat who was unfairly exiled by the mercurial Athenian assembly. While Thucydides often comes across as a determinist—he thought the Peloponnesian War was unavoidable because of the Spartan “fear” of the inevitable growth of



ISBN: 1-893554-73-2, \$24.95, 180 pages

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The problems Hanson addresses may have reached critical mass in California but they affect all Americans and this brave and searching book might just as easily be called “Mexachusetts” or “Mexiyork.” Victor Davis Hanson pulls no punches about the immigration dilemma we face, but he also believes our traditions of assimilation and integration, and intermarriage may yet remedy a situation that the politicians and ideologues have allowed to get out of hand.



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Athenian power—Kagan reminds us that the evidence of his own history suggests otherwise. It is again the ignorance and timidity of real people who are responsible for breakdowns in the peace—a condition attainable if farsighted statesmen maintain deterrence and are ready to use military force to thwart aggression in its infancy.

For a purported conservative, Kagan is more than fair to the most radical figures on both sides of the conflict—the odious Cleon and Alcibiades of Athens and the brilliant pair of mavericks at Sparta, Brasidas and Lysander. As he demonstrates, for all their character flaws and occasional brutality, they alone understood that the old way of doing business—the Athenian navy patrolling an Aegean empty of Spartan ships, while the Spartan army tramped around Attica looking for an enemy army who would not come out—was a recipe for attrition, stalemate, and quagmire.

Indeed, an Archidamian War (431-421 B.C.) led to a failed “Peace” of Nicias (421-418) that was followed by a disastrous Sicilian Campaign (415-13), leading on to a final murderous Ionian War fought at sea (413-404). The war ended only when the Athenian fleet was sunk, the empire dismantled, Lysander’s Spartan triremes were in the Piraeus and his hoplites on the acropolis. Thus there was no longer a question of Athens determining the affairs of Greece outside Attica. After reading Kagan’s account, readers might naturally think of the six Mideast “wars” between 1947 and the present intifada that were punctuated by typically faux-peaces. If these well-recorded fights of the classical Greeks are any guide, we should be reminded that conflict ultimately ends only when one side wins and the other loses—and thus the conditions that brought the two sides to fighting are resolved for good or evil.

Both these condensed and abridged studies of Cartledge and Kagan are the dividends of decades of patient classical scholarship, characteristic of a nineteenth-century tradition of academic rigor coupled with a desire to use such erudition to educate a new generation of English readers. Judicious reading of Greek texts leads to certain “facts” whose reliability can be checked—and argued about—through common sense and comparison with inscriptions,



Foto Marburg / Art Resource, NY

archaeological evidence, and coins, all leading to a coherent idea of what likely happened in the past. Still, while these two are perhaps the best known ancient Greek historians now at work, they could not be less alike in outlook and method—differences that transcend Cartledge’s Oxbridge orientation and Kagan’s long sojourn at Yale.

Kagan is an unapologetic military and political historian who seeks to remind us that hardball politics and self-interest are not modern democratic

traits, but were at the root of the city-states’ often unfathomable foreign policies. In contrast, Cartledge is a social chronicler who tries to illuminate the more nebulous world of class and status—an almost impossible task given the fragmentary nature of our sources and the predilections and biases of ancient observers.

Although Cartledge began his career as one sympathetic to the overriding role of class struggle (his Oxford adviser was the brilliant though erratic Marxist ancient historian Geoffrey de Ste. Croix), and Kagan has written a number of broader books that apply a Thucydidean conservatism to contemporary strategic thinking, they are, in fact, birds of a feather. This is particularly so in their deep reverence for philology in an age when post-modernism and deductive theory have undermined much of what is published about the ancient world.

In addition, they also share a kindred public spiritedness in believing that there is still a didactic role for Classics in the modern world—if the message gets out in a manner that is both professional and presented with verve. There surely is a large readership eager for accessible books about Greece and Rome and the insights they offer into contemporary problems. I have a suspicion that many in Washington who have led us so well in these last two perilous years were more acquainted with Thucydides, ancient Greece, and the Peloponnesian War than with Marx, Freud, and Foucault.

Despite their obvious political differences, Paul Cartledge would appreciate having the public reading Donald Kagan’s story of his favorite Spartans at war; and by the same token Kagan could only applaud the imagination and erudition of Cartledge’s *Spartans*—men who ended the achievement of his much admired Pericles. ♦



"I'm erasing you from my Palm Pilot!"

Books in Brief



***Raising America: Experts, Parents and a Century of Advice About Children* by Ann Hulbert (Knopf, 450 pp., \$27.50).**

Faced with the wall of parenting manuals in bookstores these days, a parent can understand why Dr. Spock said the most common problem is hesitancy. Ann Hulbert's *Raising America* surveys four generations of those who have fostered that: the "parenting professionals."

She focuses on a pair who offer opposing advice in each era. Around 1900, there was G. Stanley Hall, who wrote that discipline shouldn't begin until age eight, and L. Emmett Holt, who thought toilet-training should be accomplished at three months. Then, in the 1920s, John Broadus Watson advised parents to greet their children with handshakes, never kisses; a decade or so later, Arnold Gesell, the country's first school psychologist, wrote child-centered books in which the parents were all but invisible. Then Benjamin Spock came to prominence, urging parents to trust themselves. He was followed by Austrian émigré Bruno Bettelheim, who ruthlessly blamed parents for their children's autism.

In the final section of *Raising America*, Hulbert passes the warm, fuzzy Spock mantle to T. Berry Brazelton and Penelope Leach. There are surely other contenders, given that five times as many parenting books were published in 1997 as in 1975. The book contains some puzzling slights. While James Dobson, John Rosemond, and even Gary Ezzo each have over a dozen citations, attachment-parenting pioneers William and Martha Sears, a doctor-and-nurse team who have sold millions of books (and baby slings), have a scant two pages between them.

Still, *Raising America* is meticulously researched, with a sixty-four-page bibliography. The reader will come away at least with the knowledge that if their home lives are any indication, the experts didn't know much more than the people buying their books.

—Susie Currie



***A Heart, A Cross, and a Flag* by Peggy Noonan (Free Press, 256 pp., \$25).**

Peggy Noonan's book comes at an important time. A collection of her *Wall Street Journal* columns throughout the year after September 11, *A Heart, A Cross, and a Flag* is a living record. It begins with her column on September 13, 2001—

and she leaves in place the factual and spelling uncertainties the column contained at that confused and terrible time. Noonan's gifted narrations of her experiences draws us into remembering what we ourselves were doing when the dreadful news came; indeed, a major theme of the book is the call for all Americans to record their memories before they fade.

Other columns record her reactions to other news, from the year's corporate scandals to the Academy Awards. *A Heart, A Cross, and a Flag* contains much practical advice, as well, from recommendations for memorials to what citizens should do to stay on the lookout for potential terrorists. Noonan uses her own perspectives—as a conservative, a mother, a Catholic, a New Yorker—not to limit her scope but to say something new about what are now very old topics. The result is poignancy without sentimentality, and is well worth a read.

—Erin Sheley



***What Every Person Should Know About War* by Chris Hedges (Free Press, 175 pp., \$11).**

Longtime *New York Times* war reporter Chris Hedges caused a stir this spring with his commencement speech at Rockford College. Reciting every anti-war cliché ever known, Hedges warned that war in Iraq would soon cause fascism to descend on America. His new book claims to be an objective question-and-answer discussion of war, but the melodramatic editorial packaging and the slant of the questions and answers make it clear that this is an extension of the Rockford address. When it isn't focusing on military minutiae such as promotions, benefits, and paternity leave, the book relentlessly drives home an old refrain: War is hell. This may come as a surprise to Hedges, but most of us, including the students who nearly booed him off the stage, knew that already.

—Jeremy Lott

"The New Republic just cancelled its debut cruise in the Caribbean." —Washington CityPaper, June 20-26, 2003

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