the weekly Standard

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By Charles Krauthammer

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The Surprisingly Good Guys List (cont.)

Our winner this week of membership on THE SCRAPBOOK's Surprisingly Good Guys List™ is the German Navy. Obviously, as they are NATO members in good standing, we expect a lot of the *Deutsche Marine*. But in their actions described in the e-mail below and depicted in the photo, they went above and beyond the call of duty.

The e-mail, which is now in wide circulation, was written by a young ensign on the USS *Winston Churchill*.

Dear Dad,

We are still at sea. The remainder of our port visits have all been canceled.

We have spent every day since the attacks going back and forth within imaginary boxes drawn in the ocean, standing high-security watches, and trying to make the best of it. We have seen the articles and the photographs, and they are sickening. Being isolated, I don't think we appreciate the full scope of what is happening back home, but we are definitely feeling the effects.

About two hours ago, we were hailed by the German Navy destroyer *Lutjens*, requesting permission to pass close by our port side. Strange, since we're in the middle of an empty ocean, but the captain acquiesced and we prepared to render them honors from our bridgewing. As they were making their approach, our conning officer used binoculars and announced that *Lutjens* was flying not the German, but the American flag. As she came alongside us, we saw the American flag flying half-mast and her entire crew topside standing at silent, rigid attention in their dress uniforms. They had made a sign that was displayed on her side that read "We Stand By You."

There was not a dry eye on the bridge as they stayed alongside us for a few minutes and saluted.

It was the most powerful thing I have seen in my life. The German Navy did an incredible thing for this crew, and it has truly been the highest point in the days since the attacks. It's amazing to think that only a half-century ago things were quite different. After *Lutjens* pulled away, the Officer of the Deck, who had been planning to get out of the Navy later this year, turned to me and said, "I'm staying Navy." I'll write you when I know more about when I'll be home, but this is it for now. ♦

The German destroyer Lutjens*, flying the American flag.*

ABCNews.com and Anthrax

On the critical issue of who sent the anthrax, it's time to give credit to the ABC website, *ABCNews.com*, for reporting rings around most other news organizations. Here's a bit from a comprehensive story filed late last week by Gary Matsumoto, lending further credence to the commonsensical theory (resisted by the White House) that al Qaeda or Iraq—and not some domestic Ted Kaczynski type—is behind the germ warfare.

"The government's top labs have run the Daschle anthrax sample through a series of tests. An electron microscope study found the Daschle spores looked 'virtually identical' to those found in Iraq by U.N. weapons inspectors in 1994. But after subjecting it to a sophisticated X-ray test last week, the Army concluded it contained no bentonite [which the Iraqis are known to use], a clay comprised of several minerals, including aluminum.

"For the Army, no aluminum equaled no bentonite. 'One of its principal ingredients is aluminum,' said Maj. Gen. John Parker, overall commander of the military laboratories doing the

analyses. 'And I will say to you that we see no aluminum presence in the sample.'

"That assessment may prove correct, but not based solely on the absence of aluminum. ABC News has learned that at least two European chemical companies make a processed, aluminum-free bentonite. Mineralogist William Moll, who has mainly worked in private industry, says these synthetic bentonites are used as 'free-flow agents' that give dry powders a 'fluid' or 'slippery' quality as the particles float through the air. The existence of such bentonite means further tests are needed to rule out the presence of the troubling additive.

"One of America's leading experts on mineral clays, Hayden Murray, a professor emeritus of geology at Indiana University, says a company based in Munich, Germany, removes aluminum from bentonite to create a finer, more refined additive than one could make from the bentonite deposits found in Iraq.

"Murray says at least two American companies mine such high-quality bentonite, but the German company has a much larger customer base in the Middle East."

This was more than we were able to learn from any of the large daily newspapers. And surprisingly little of this reporting, perhaps because of its technical nature, actually ends up on the air. That's what we call civic journalism.

Full disclosure: THE SCRAPBOOK has no business relationship with and doesn't even personally know the *ABCNews.com* reporters. But the zero recognition they're receiving for their enterprise is a professional travesty. ♦

What Afghan Civilians?

Something to bear in mind whenever you hear the Taliban and its sympathizers discussing civilian casualties: "Each Afghan has a rifle in his home, and each Afghan's home is his bunker."

—Amir Khan Muttaqi, chief Taliban spokesman, to the Associated Press, November 1, 2001

No Flags for the Capitol Police?

Several of the Capitol Police's finest tell us that, a little over a week after the first terrorist attacks, orders came from on high they were not to wear "adornments" to their uniforms. Presumably, this meant the flag pins and patriotic ribbons that festoon nearly everyone in Washington these days. Police spokesman Lt. Dan Nichols wouldn't provide us with a rationale for this restriction, maybe because it's hard to imagine one. Wearing a flag as a cape might be one thing, but lapel pins?

We've been generally siding against the civil libertarians in their disputes with central authority, but not this time. If the officers working round the clock to protect the seat of the republic want to wear a lapel pin, we say let a thousand flags bloom. ♦

Casual

Emergency Exit

The domestic-front press coverage of our war on terrorism has featured at least a half dozen stories of knuckle-dragging American provincial lugnuts who have bolted from commercial flights upon finding a couple of *kaffiyeh*-wearing gentlemen aboard. These stories generally end the same way. The offending Arabs, it always turns out, were doctors heading to a neurological research conference, say, or a banker and his brother on their way to a niece's wedding in Scottsdale. The general reaction from politicians and the press has been: Shame on us. The proper way for red-blooded Americans to react to such incidents, it is strongly implied, is with embarrassment verging on revulsion—at our compatriots' ignorance, intolerance, and cowardice.

I disagree, but then again I would. I'm one of the lugnuts. Two weeks ago, I walked off an overnight flight from San Francisco because it had too many Arabs on it.

At least that was part of the reason. I've flown a lot since September 11, but, even given wartime conditions, security seemed high that night. With only two flights remaining to leave from my terminal before the airport closed, the metal detector was manned by a dozen soldiers with machine guns. Army, by the way—not National Guard. After we'd handed over our tickets, there was a *second* checkpoint. A table had been set up *in* the walkway to the flight. There, more soldiers were taking everyone's carry-on luggage to pieces, almost literally: unscrewing lipsticks, disassembling pens, removing batteries from cell phones and computers. One soldier peered into a plastic box of tic tacs as he rattled it.

It was one of those planes with three seats on either side of the narrow aisle, and all six seats in the front row were occupied by Arab men in their early 20s, dressed in a kind of shabby-casual way, in either blazers or those car-upholstery leather jackets. They were nice-enough looking guys, I must say, but that thought didn't help. I recalled an excerpt from the terrorist manual seized from one of the September 11 hijackers' cars: "If a Muslim is in a combat or godless area, he is not obligated to have a different appearance from those around him. . . . Resembling the polytheist in religious appearance is a kind of 'necessity-permits-the-forbidden.'" They were all looking rather blankly in front of them towards the cockpit door—a rather flimsy one, I now noticed.

Darren Gygi

What's the likelihood that all six passengers in the front row of a plane will be Middle Easterners? Assuming the country is 2 percent Arab, and that plane seating is wholly random (an improbable assumption, I grant), you just raise .02 to the sixth power and you have your answer: about 1 in 16 billion. I then started totting up ethnicities with the zeal of a college-admissions officer. Five of the twelve passengers in the second and third rows were young Arab men as well.

I buzzed the stewardess. She turned out to be a perky Midwestern young lady. "So . . . ," I said, not knowing quite how to put it. "Is this some kind of . . . em . . . *group tour*?" She hadn't a clue what I was getting at. So I asked her to walk back to the exit with me, and told her why I was getting off the plane.

My friends have all reacted identically. First they commiserate with me for my embarrassingly uncosmopolitan behavior. That is, when they don't overtly accuse me of being uncouth. "And how did you know they were Arabs?" a fellow editor scolded me. "They could have been Persians . . . or even Israelis." (For one thing, they weren't. For another, do I need to get a graduate degree in anthropology to have the right to protect myself?)

The second thing my friends say is that they would have wanted to get off that plane, too, but would never have had the "guts." ("Aw, shucks," I reply. "It was nothin'.") Frightened as Americans are of terrorism, they're more frightened still of political correctness. This is an attitude they share with our politicians, from President Bush on down. Do you believe the president when he insists that America's radical Islamic leaders "love this country just as much as I do"? Or how about Richard Gephardt, who a week after September 11 was still fantasizing that "we don't know who did all of this. We don't know what ethnic group they may be part of. We don't know what religious background they may have." And that is the nub of why I walked off that plane. I worry that, when push comes to shove, my government will be too *polite* to protect me.

This is, of course, the first war in which literally any American—not just soldiers—can die in an attack. That doesn't scare me in the slightest. It's in God's hands whether I die of terrorism. But it's in my hands whether I die of political correctness. I don't plan to.

Christopher Caldwell

"The illegal drug trade is the financial engine that fuels many terrorist organizations around the world, including Osama Bin Laden."

House Speaker Dennis Hastert[1]

- The United Nations reports an illegal drug trade worth $400 Billion a year[2] — $100 Billion more than our Department of Defense budget.
- Drug trade is big business: Illegal Drugs are 8% of all international trade while Textiles are 7.5% and Motor Vehicles are 5.3%.[3]

We do not purport a direct link with the tragedies of 9/11. But as part of the battle to defeat terrorism and strengthen our society, ask yourself:

- Is the funding of terrorism another unintended consequence of drug prohibition?
- Could a regulated and controlled model for soft drugs similar to our approach with alcohol and for hard drugs similar to prescription drugs stop the flow of illegal drug profits?
- In so many ways, does the War on Drugs cause far more harm than good, both here and abroad?

Kevin B. Zeese, President, Common Sense for Drug Policy
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Main Phone: 202 299-9780 * fax 202 518-4028

Sources:

1: Associated Press, "Hastert Forms Task Force on Drugs," September 21, 2001.
2: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, "Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking" (New York, NY: UN Drug Control Program, 1998), p. 3.
3: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, "Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking" (New York, NY: UN Drug Control Program, 1998), p. 3.

Correspondence

Our Surprising Times

One thing is for sure: We live in surprising times. The "Surprisingly Good Guys List" in the Oct. 22 Scrapbook moved me to submit a bit entitled "A Good Surprise, A Bad Surprise, and No Surprise."

Coming home from London after living there for a good part of 1943 and 1944 as a war correspondent, I was firmly convinced that the Londoner who lived through the blitz, shaking his fist at the Luftwaffe overhead and ducking the V-1 and the V-2 pilotless bombers that all but decimated his city, was a breed of man the world would never see again. But since Sept. 11, I have seen him over and over again in New York City. That's the good surprise.

The bad surprise is that the children and grandchildren of those wartime Londoners paraded through London's streets protesting America's bombing of the Taliban. Watching them with their dopey signs, all I could think of was that, if it weren't for the American B-17s that did to Hitler what we now want to do to Osama bin Laden, there might well have been no streets of London for them to parade through. At the very least, parading through those streets today could have been storm troopers, not protesters.

What is no surprise is that British prime minister Tony Blair closed ranks with us just as we closed ranks with Winston Churchill.

As a postscript, a surprise that maybe no one should have been shocked at: Rev. Jerry Falwell's contention that God sent Osama bin Laden to cleanse our souls.

Don Hewitt
Executive Producer, 60 Minutes
New York, NY

Let's Get Serious

Christopher Caldwell's piece "Be Afraid" (Oct. 29) is full of great insights. As a scientist, I continue to be appalled at the ignorance of politicians who deal with scientific matters.

Does no one teach them the basics? Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson's telling us early on that the first case of anthrax was from a man's drinking water out of a stream in North Carolina is a sad example.

Most Americans do not know the difference between a virus and a bacterium, so doctors write useless antibiotic prescriptions for viral illnesses. The times we live in are too perilous for scientific ignoramuses to be controlling our future, not that the scientifically cognizant would be good politicians, sad to say.

Jon Laan
Atlanta, GA

As Christopher Caldwell hints, in the aftermath of Sept. 11 we need to develop a mature, serious politics. When the federal government either conceals or refuses to fully disclose the scope and magnitude of the threats we face, it fosters the growth of all manner of fantastical notions, including the conceit that peace is the normal condition of mankind or, worse yet, the temporal fallacy that our society has banished war and hate. That attitude leads to politics that are not serious and allows our enemies to find comfort and gather strength.

Even if it complicates the daily work of the State Department, we need to be constantly reminded that there are real and substantial forces in the world that actively work for our harm and even destruction. But when people cavil and scoff at this idea, Sept. 11 will answer. The question is whether we have retained the intellectual and moral fiber necessary to rebuild our politics. When the government conceals the nature of the threats before us, hope diminishes.

Nathaniel Trelease
Cheyenne, WY

Getting More Serious

To continue in the spirit of David Tell's "All About Anthrax" (Oct. 29), I believe we can expect future bioterror attacks will employ multi-drug-resistant *bacillus anthracis* strains. In the absence of widespread vaccination against anthrax, the results of even crude dispersal of such strains would be devastating.

A penicillin-resistant, tetracycline-resistant derivative of the *b. anthracis* Ames strain could be constructed from the Ames strain in one week, using materials available in many molecular biology laboratories and procedures taught in many upper-level molecular biology undergraduate programs and in most first-year molecular biology graduate programs. A penicillin-resistant, tetracycline-resistant, ciprofloxacin-resistant derivative of the *b. anthracis* Ames strain could be constructed with somewhat more difficulty.

In short, any person or organization able to prepare and distribute *b. anthracis* as a terror weapon (and, alas, at least one such person or organization exists) could be able to prepare and distribute a multi-drug-resistant, effectively untreatable, version of this bacteria. I believe the only effective way to avoid continued disruption and terror—and perhaps future mass destruction—is widespread vaccination.

I would recommend that the U.S. government: (a) award additional contracts for production of the approved human anthrax vaccine (voiding the sole-source contract to BioPort), (b) clear existing civilian stocks of human anthrax vaccine for distribution (bypassing FDA approval processes and restrictions that have prevented release of the vaccine produced by BioPort), (c) evaluate possible use of the non-encapsulated live culture anthrax vaccine (Sterne/veterinary or STI/human), and (d) initiate voluntary vaccination of civilians.

Richard H. Ebright
Waksman Institute of Microbiology
Rutgers University
Piscataway, NJ

"What the Brothers Wright Hath Wrought"

Trying to fly his kite in vain, the boy ran back and forth along the Kitty Hawk beach. Tears of frustration trickled down his cheeks. Suddenly, turning into the wind, his kite flew. Exhausted now, the warm breeze dried his weeping. He tied the kite's long string around his wrist. He lay back against a sand dune. He fell asleep.

Sitting on one side of him, Wilbur Wright gently asked, "Why are you crying little boy?"

While on the lad's other side, Wilbur's brother Orville wondered out loud, "Can we be of help?"

"I'm so tired," the little fellow sighed. "I couldn't get my kite to fly. I was thinking of my Dad."

"Why?" asked one brother. "And what's your name?"

Sadly, the boy replied. "I'm Ted. My Dad got killed last September eleventh. His plane crashed into the Tower. We live right here near Kitty Hawk. A voice told me."

"Told you what, Ted?" Orville asked.

The voice said. "Son, just go fly your kite. Stop worrying about me. It sounded like my Dad. That's why I'm here."

Pointing straight ahead, a short distance away, Wilbur said, "Well, Ted, see that contraption over there, they call it an airplane today. It was the very first machine to ever fly. Long, long ago my brother and I were the first ones in all the world to do it. Come with us. We'll show you."

"O.K." said Ted, smiling now, letting his kite fly free.

Up close to the contraption, much later called an airplane, Ted listened to the miniature engine sputtering uncertainly. Wilbur climbed aboard. Orville stood alongside. Two others held on to the wingtips on either side. All three ran along in unison. Wilbur steered. The contraption took flight. "And the thing can really fly," shouted Ted in amazement.

"See for yourself! It is!" Wilbur shouted back.

Trailing them, Ted yelled even louder over the tiny coughing engine. "I'd be scared to death. My Mom says she'll never fly again, after Dad. My aunt and uncle swear they never will. Even my big sister says she'll never fly again. It's the same with all my friends."

"Just you watch, Ted." Orville cried out. The first plane to ever fly was now airborne, if for only a short distance, but still a few feet above the sandy beach. Softly, the Wright brothers' first plane to ever fly slowly glided to a safe landing, just short of the looming ocean.

The tiny engine stopped. Out of breath now, Ted gasped, "Who were those two holding onto the wingtips on either side? Just who were they?"

"Oh, them," replied Wilbur, disembarking from the plane. "We wanted you to see for yourself what happened years ago when my brother and I first flew. Those two were heaven's angels. God sent them down to help us fly even if only a few feet above planet earth but still a little closer up to heaven."

"So, that's who. That's why." Ted now understood.

"God's will be done," Wilbur said to the boy. "Now, as for your Dad."

"What?" replied Ted.

"Seconds before your Dad's plane crashed into the Tower, two angels took him by both his hands. They flew him safely up to heaven. It's like what the two angels did for us with our plane. Every single person killed in all those awful crashes on September eleventh had the same happy thing happen to them."

"I see, I see." Ted rejoiced.

"Call it a miracle come true, Ted." Wilbur added, "as heaven only knows. You see, when our plane flew, it met, for the first time, the blue sky. They fell in love. The two got married. Together, they've lived happily ever since. Never forget, the Good Lord gave those evil terrorists fair warning. He said, "Whom God has joined together, let no man put asunder."

"God said that?" Ted wanted to make sure.

As if speaking in one voice, the Wright brothers continued. "Yes, He did. It's why so many, afraid to fly right now, should put aside their fear of flying. Above the earth is heaven. Everyone who perished last September eleventh, accompanied by two angels, is certain to have made a safe and happy landing at an airport the whole world calls Paradise. We know that to be so. We two were there to bid them welcome."



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Fighting to Win

A couple of weeks after the September 11 attacks—before the military campaign in Afghanistan had begun, and when Secretary of State Colin Powell's coalitionism seemed to be driving American policy—a concerned observer privately asked Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld what in the world was going on. According to one account of the meeting, Rumsfeld responded, "Don't worry. When the war starts, the Pentagon will be calling the shots."

Rumsfeld was off by three weeks. Only in the past few days has the Pentagon begun to wrest control of the war in Afghanistan from the hands of Powell and his top policy adviser, Richard Haass. Better late than never. But the price of State Department control of strategy for the first weeks of the war has been high.

The State Department's strategy, if one can call it that, was to slow down the pace of the war and delay victory over the Taliban. In particular, State Department officials wanted to prevent a rapid advance of the Northern Alliance on Kabul until Haass could put together a broader coalition of Afghan political forces that could in turn agree on the shape of a post-Taliban government. Meanwhile, the Pakistan government, a longtime supporter of the Taliban, was insisting that some members of the Taliban must be included in the "post-Taliban" government. And so eager were Powell and his team to keep the Pakistanis happy that the secretary of state even seemed willing to go along with the idea of preserving "moderate" Taliban influence in Afghanistan.

The results of all this? The political efforts to build an anti-Taliban coalition have gone nowhere. This is hardly surprising. It may be impossible to pull together hostile Afghan factions under any circumstances. But it is certainly impossible to achieve a consensus on what a post-Taliban government is going to look like before we actually begin defeating the Taliban.

And thanks to the go-slow strategy, the Taliban until last week had suffered no serious military setbacks. On the contrary, the Taliban was scoring victories against the Northern Alliance and managed an enormous coup in the south when it killed a potentially key opposition leader, Abdul Haq. Happy talk from military officials about the Taliban being "eviscerated" turned to grudging admiration for the Taliban's tenacity. The military boasted of achieving air superiority over Afghanistan, but on the ground, the Taliban was actually growing in numbers, swelled by new recruits from abroad.

What's more, the go-slow strategy was beginning to undermine the State Department's prized achievement, "the coalition." Instead of scoring some quick early successes, which might have bolstered confidence that the United States knew what it was doing and was on the road to victory, the limited bombing campaign of the first few weeks succeeded in making our few, fragile Muslim allies nervous. The State Department behaved as if we had all the time in the world to make military progress in this war. But we didn't. The United States needs rapid, impressive, and convincing victories in Afghanistan, both to attract opposition elements to the anti-Taliban fight and to maintain support abroad.

Here, then, were the results of the State Department's conduct of this war in the first few weeks: No military progress against the Taliban on the front lines where it counts. No political progress in forming an anti-Taliban coalition in Afghanistan. No diplomatic progress in strengthening the coalition in support of the war elsewhere in the Muslim world.

The good news is that the administration appears now to be pivoting away from the State Department's flawed approach toward Rumsfeld's more aggressive military strategy. As the *Washington Post* reported last week, senior administration officials admit, on background, that they made a mistake and are now "giving wider latitude to the Defense Department to accelerate the U.S. battle plans." The strategy now, according to one official is, "Let's do what we need to do. Let's get on with it and get it over with."

The shift in strategy is good news. It signals an understanding of the importance of winning the Afghanistan stage of the war on terrorism as quickly and as decisively as possible. There has been at times an eerie lack of urgency in Washington about the Afghan war. This suggests a failure to understand the damage that would be done elsewhere—especially in Pakistan and in the Muslim world—if it seemed we were halfhearted. A chance to show awe-inspiring, sudden force and joltingly mighty resolution has probably already been lost. But moving now, with the utmost energy, to win the war in Afghanistan, rather than

treating it as an occasion for a never-ending exercise in round-robin negotiation, is the next best thing.

There's another reason we're glad to see the president is willing to change course in fighting this war. Tactical and strategic flexibility is an enormously important virtue in a war leader. In this as in all wars, if one strategy isn't working, you've got to recognize it quickly and try another. There is no dishonor in changing strategies. The United States brought itself to failure in Vietnam in part because of a rigidity that made it difficult to adapt to new and unexpected realities on the ground. President Bush's willingness to shift course suggests he may well be a successful commander in chief.

It would help the president in his mission if administration and military officials stopped pretending all the time that "everything is going according to plan." Everything never goes according to plan, and pretending that it does can only create a credibility gap. The Bush administration needn't worry about looking omniscient. The American people know this is a tough war, and a complex one. They expect some course changes along the way. Explaining what we're doing now, why changes are needed, and how they contribute to our war aims will suffice.

It's likely the president will have to show continued flexibility in the coming weeks and months, because there's no guarantee that the current intensified bombing will do the job. Perhaps bombing the Taliban's front lines will open the path for the Northern Alliance to march through to Kabul. And perhaps the Northern Alliance has the wherewithal to exploit the opportunity. But it is also possible that the heavier bombing of the Taliban forces won't be enough.

That means the president must be prepared to move to the next step: not just sending in advisers and commando units, but deploying ground troops in Afghanistan. This may be a limited deployment at first, to create a base of operations for further attacks. But we suspect a major deployment of American ground troops will be needed to finally oust the Taliban, capture Osama and his gang, and make Afghanistan a terrorist-free zone.

A decision to deploy a substantial number of American ground troops would not be an easy one. No one is under any illusion that it will be without cost. But time is of the essence. This has nothing to do with the patience of the American people, which we trust will never flag in this fight. But given the dynamics in the Muslim world, there is a huge benefit to winning quickly, or at least to being visibly on course to an overwhelming victory in Afghanistan in the near future. Then we can move on to winning the overall war on terrorism, a war in which anything short of full victory is unthinkable.

—Robert Kagan and William Kristol

Good for Bush, Bad for the GOP

Why a popular war president doesn't benefit his party. BY FRED BARNES



AP / Wide World Photos

Bush and Daschle

REPUBLICANS ARE REVELING in the sky-high poll numbers of President Bush, but there's a downside. As a popular war president, Bush is mostly unable to help his party. Worse for Republicans, Bush is subject to constraints that may actually harm his party. A top priority for Bush is to keep the nation, and particularly Democrats and Republicans in Congress, behind the war effort. To achieve that, Bush has accepted limitations on his political role. He's declined to campaign this year for GOP candidates. He's no longer the public champion of a Republican agenda. Even on war-related issues, he rarely promotes his own proposals or those of congressional Republicans. He doesn't criticize Democrats.

Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Bush has become Mr. Bipartisan. This is all but required of a war president. The attacks caused Bush's approval rating to reach 90 percent, but it's his performance post-September 11 that's kept it there. He's forged a congenial working relationship with Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle and House Democratic Leader Dick Gephardt. They've had only one sharp disagreement (when Daschle said he wouldn't bring up more judicial nominations this year). On the conduct of the war, there's been no serious Democratic dissent. The result is Bush has the luxury of speaking for a united America on the war.

But he's sacrificed the luxury of speaking as the leader of the GOP. In fact, he's leaned so far toward the middle he's occasionally tilted in favor of Democrats. He made concessions to Democrats on an economic stimulus package without insisting on Republican-backed elements. This upset conservatives in Congress, who felt abandoned. They pressured the White House into enunciating four "principles" for inclusion in a stimulus package: expensing, repeal of the alternate minimum tax for business, acceleration of income tax rate reductions, a rebate for non-income taxpayers. "He had to be pushed into going that far," says a Republican lobbyist. "But you have to please your own party to be truly bipartisan. Otherwise, it's not bipartisan, it's Democratic. The White House missed this initially."

To the pleasant surprise of House Republican leaders, Bush actively pressed for the version of an aviation security bill preferred by conservatives. He made phone calls and met in the Oval Office with waverers. His lobbyists, including chief congressional liaison Nick Calio, showed up for strategy sessions at whip Tom DeLay's office. The Republican measure won in the House. But Bush also undercut the effort by disclosing that he'd happily sign the Democratic bill (it would make airport screeners federal employees and create a new federal agency). That bill, which cleared the Senate, may yet emerge from a House-Senate conference.

The signal that Bush would no longer stump for Republican candidates or raise money came on October 25 when he cancelled a speaking engagement for the Republican Governors Association. Vice President Dick Cheney spoke instead. Noting this, a strategist for Virginia gubernatorial candidate Mark Earley ceased daily pleas to the White House for a day of campaigning by Bush in Virginia. The president also skipped a private fund-raiser for Earley in Washington. All the Earley campaign got was a tepid letter of endorsement.

Fred Barnes is executive editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

In New Jersey, Bret Schundler, the GOP candidate for governor, got one too. Bush also taped get-out-the-vote radio messages for the two campaigns. Michael Bloomberg, the Republican nominee for mayor of New York City, didn't get a letter or a tape.

What's aggravating for Republicans about Bush's decision to politically disarm is they can't grouse publicly. "The president's not partisan enough, he's too nice to Democrats"—complaints like that would sound petty, perhaps unpatriotic. But even if Bush did campaign furiously for Republican office-seekers, it might only make things worse. President Franklin Roosevelt did that in 1942 and was seen as too political for a war president. Despite FDR's popularity, Democrats lost 55 House and 9 Senate seats that year.

In other years, the war president's party has fared better, but still poorly. With Harry Truman as president and the Korean war unresolved, Democrats lost 5 Senate and 29 House seats in 1950. In 1966 as the Vietnam buildup was accelerating under Lyndon Johnson, Democrats lost 4 Senate and 47 House seats. In 1986, America was winning the Cold War under Ronald Reagan. Republicans dropped 8 Senate and 5 House seats.

Here's the worst part for Republicans: Not only has the war on terrorism brought out the best in Bush—partly at the GOP's expense—it's also brought out the best in Democrats. They've quit whining about a stolen presidency. They wear American flag pins in their lapels. They're pro-defense, pro-intervention, and pro-bombing. Some members of the former party of doves—Sen. Joe Biden, Sen. Joe Lieberman—sound more hawkish than Bush. I asked Sen. Edward Kennedy for his assessment of Bush as a war president. "He's been an inspiring figure," Kennedy said, "and he's been able to get a good deal of respect and support around the world and here at home." He didn't have a single critical word. Oddly enough, that's bad news for Republicans. ♦

Washington Goes To War

The case for an energetic—and limited—national government. BY MICHAEL S. GREVE

When Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center, President George W. Bush was sitting in on a second-grade class at Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida. Later that day, he found himself preparing the nation for war. In a matter of hours, Bush had traversed a divide, from the photo-op distractions that had come to preoccupy our chief executives to the serious business for which we have a national government, and a president.

As we put aside the trivial pursuits of the focus-grouped presidency to meet exigent national concerns, conservatives and liberals both need to reacquaint themselves with the core constitutional principle that the federal government—in order to be energetic and effective in its proper sphere—must be limited. More precisely, the energetic national government that we now desperately need presupposes and requires limits. A serious war against terrorism demands a credible campaign against the nanny state.

The administration has not so far been willing to recognize those limits. To do so would require drawing a distinction between the war on terrorism and the poll-tested baubles that comprised its pre-9/11 agenda—targeted tax cuts, charitable "incentives," and federally funded and supervised school "accountability." Indeed, the wartime president is again visiting grade school classrooms, now pitching penpalships with Kuwaiti kids, and the White House has yet to declare any of its old domestic initiatives officially dead.

Small-government conservatives and libertarians have likewise failed to draw crucial political distinctions and to forsake their reflexive anti-government rhetoric for a sober consideration of the ways in which government must grow more powerful to defeat our enemies. There has been on the right a rather indiscriminate bellyaching over an impending expansion of big government. Complaints have ranged from a general, dire prediction that September 11 will produce another "ratchet" of war-induced government growth to very specific objections to the airline bailout, federal reinsurance guarantees, and provisions of the just-enacted anti-terrorism legislation.

Liberal pundits, meanwhile, have had a hard time containing their enthusiasm for what they take to be the restoration of the era of big government. "After decades of self-loathing," Jacob Weisberg enthuses in the *New York Times Magazine*, "Washington is proud once again to be the place with the answers."

Both the gloating and the lamenting over "big government" are grossly exaggerated. September 11 has not expanded the national government's presumed authority, which was already boundless. While the war against terrorism will bring some new programs and a higher level of spending, an incremental enlargement of the federal pork barrel is not a quantum leap. It is the old politics, fought over a slightly larger pot of money.

Rather, September 11 has reintroduced us to the difference between national interests and the self-absorbed issue-mongering that Wash-

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ington defaults to in times of peace and prosperity. The terrorist threat to the nation, and indeed the world, is real, serious, and immediate—unlike, say, computer models showing one half-degree Celsius of global warming over the next century. The threat is national in scale—unlike such recent national "crises" as suburban sprawl and trace levels of arsenic in a few rural water systems. And terrorism and the war against it are truly national in the sense that neither can be reduced to constituency politics and interest-group demands. It is the country that is at stake.

This distinction—between a real national interest and special-interest causes dressed up as crises—is lost on the liberal establishment, because those trumped-up crises *are* their national agenda. That is why Washington-is-back pundits believe the public's renewed trust in Washington and its support for the war against terrorism will translate into support for Hillary Clinton's wish list—from improved mental health care to more efficient internal combustion engines, child care benefits, and Amtrak service from Bismarck to Biloxi. That, too, is why the congressional Democrats promptly mistook an airline security bill for a union jobs measure.

Vigilance against liberal attempts to use September 11 for the greater growth and glory of the nanny state is altogether commendable. Still, to construe our new politics as nothing more than a struggle between partisans of big government and small is to miss the real reason for pursuing a limited-government agenda—namely, that there is a war to be won.

Two major new federal initiatives that conservatives would otherwise have been unable to stop are now indefinitely on hold: an education "reform" of, by, and for the teachers' unions; and a patients' bill of rights that was mostly about the trial lawyers' inalienable right to sue health care providers in a forum of their choosing. Those enactments would have brought vastly more centralized government—and vastly greater gains for unions and plaintiffs' attorneys—than the most ambitious anti-terrorism and relief programs contemplated since September 11.

AP / Wide World Photos

The World Trade Center: In peacetime, it would be a Superfund site.

Beyond such crowding-out effects, the perceived, constituency-driven "priorities" of the nanny state will tend to give way when they conflict, as they often do, with the real priority of fighting—and winning—the war against terrorism. As the *Wall Street Journal*'s Daniel Henninger observed in a trenchant column, the trial lawyers' vow to abstain from lawsuits over the fallen World Trade Center was an ironic concession that September 11 compels a break with the normal operation of our legal system (in this case, legalized bounty-hunting). Similar ironies and contradictions abound.

Environmental Protection Agency monitors at ground zero in New York have found violations of federal trace-level standards for asbestos, PCBs, and dioxin. Comparable violations have in the past prompted EPA-ordered evacuations, including the closure of an entire town (Times Beach, Missouri); yet the clean-up effort in Manhattan goes forward. Tom Daschle's anthrax-polluted offices are being fumigated with chlorine, a chemical that the environmental movement has for years sought to ban. We cannot ensure a robust, resilient energy market if we continue to obsess over the hurt feelings of polar bears and calving caribou on Alaska's North Slope. We would be constrained in flying B-2 bombers from Missouri to Central Asia under the Kyoto global warming accords, which threaten to count war-related air emissions (except for U.N.-approved missions) towards a U.S. carbon dioxide budget. We cannot ensure an adequate supply of smallpox vaccine, let alone administer it in

an emergency, unless we also immunize producers against punitive product-liability suits. The FBI cannot track down international terrorists if it must devote manpower and resources to the pursuit of such federal "interstate" crimes as carjacking, gender-based domestic violence, and the failure to pay child support.

Even before September 11, the obsessions and distractions that now compete and conflict with a serious war effort were, for the most part, just that—irksome, inane, and occasionally expensive distractions. Conservative resistance to those schemes, however, rarely gained traction. So long as the nanny state's "priorities" lacked a contrast, let alone a conflict, with an actual national priority, the voters were too bored to pay attention, too nice to say "no" to the next group of miserable claimants, and at any rate persuaded that a resilient economy could surely afford another public program.

There is no point in decrying the voters' apathy—which, in times of peace and prosperity, is rational and in fact a protection against even greater political mischief. (Think what Washington would promise a mobilized electorate.) The lesson, rather, is that the principal threat to limited government does not arise from a national government that pursues the nation's interests with energy and resolve. The threat, rather, arises from a government that cannot tell the difference between a national crisis and a constituency demand, between a war and an interest-group favor.

In the wake of September 11, voters easily comprehend those distinctions, and they will be receptive to political initiatives that translate them into practice. Conservatives should therefore resist the tendency to characterize serious wartime measures as just another big-government charade. Our national government must be limited not because it should be enfeebled, but rather and precisely because it must not be distracted from the life-and-death work it has to do. ♦

More Like Nazis Than Commies

The proper analogy for our terrorist enemies.

BY ADAM WOLFSON

IT IS SAID THAT GENERALS are always fighting the last war, and this is no less true of politicians and policymakers. As the first war of the new century begins, America's leaders have been reaching back to the two great struggles of the 20th century, against communism and fascism, to understand this one. Some, like Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, think that the appropriate comparison is to the Cold War. Rumsfeld has said that today's war will be waged more as we fought the Communists than the Axis. On October 4, in Cairo, he declared:

> For it undoubtedly will prove to be a lot more like a cold war than a hot war. In the cold war it took 50 years, plus or minus. It did not involve major battles. It involved continuous pressure. It involved cooperation by a host of nations. And when it ended, it ended not with a bang, but through internal collapse. . . . It strikes me that might be a more appropriate way to think about what we are up against here, than would be any [other] major conflict.

In contrast, Rumsfeld's commander in chief seems to have uppermost in his mind the struggle against Nazism. In his address to the joint session of Congress on September 20, President Bush declared: "By abandoning every value except the will to power, [the terrorists] follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism."

Which should be our guide (if either)—the fight against communism or against fascism? This is more than an academic question. Nazism and communism were dissimilar regimes, of different historical and philosophic lineages, and exhibiting distinct political profiles and contrasting international conduct. The response of the United States to each threat was also quite different. Thus whether our reference point is to Nazism or communism will have enormous policy implications.

U.S. foreign policy towards communism was mapped out in George F. Kennan's (or Mr. X's) famous article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947. Kennan argued that to counter Soviet conduct, one must first come to grips with "the political personality" of Soviet power, which he diagnosed as a product of Communist ideology and historical circumstance. The interplay of these two factors, in his view, caused the Soviet Union to be highly flexible and responsive to outside pressures in pursuit of its goals. The Soviet Union was, in a sense, a rational actor, which, in Kennan's memorable words, "can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy."

It was a brilliant piece of political and psychological analysis, which accurately forecast nearly the entire future course of the Cold War. For almost 50 years, we fought a series of wars along the periphery to check Soviet expansion, aided and funded anti-Soviet proxies, and engaged the Soviets in intricate arms-control negotiations and propaganda one-upmanship. Never did we directly

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engage them on their own soil, nor they on ours. This containment strategy fit the Soviet Union's political personality—malevolent but rational, ill-intentioned but cautious—like a glove.

But such a policy, as Kennan implied in his article, would never have succeeded against a power like Nazi Germany. Kennan contrasted the leaders of the Soviet Union with Napoleon and Hitler, who were deaf to anything but their own megalomaniacal dreams of world conquest. Nazism was irrationalist and anti-Enlightenment to its core, while, as an outgrowth of the Enlightenment—an extreme outgrowth, to be sure—Soviet communism was amenable to the persuasion of the carrot and the stick.

And indeed, our foreign policy during World War II was very different from what it was during the Cold War. In his war address of December 8, 1941, Franklin Roosevelt flatly declared, "We will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again." And several years later, in a speech before Congress, FDR declared our war aims to be "unconditional surrender," meaning "the end of Nazism and the Nazi party—and all of its barbaric laws and institutions." In the Soviet case, we applied a policy of calibrated counterforce; in the Nazi case, we sought the total destruction of fascism as a political entity and ideology. It was a war fought not over decades and by proxy, but swiftly and furiously, by our own arms and men, and ultimately with atomic bombs.

If we are to respond effectively to September 11, it will be necessary to investigate, as Kennan once did, the "political personality" of our foes. Certainly, the president's analogy to Nazism is imperfect—most obviously, Nazism had no roots in religion, whereas the terrorists consider themselves to be acting in the name of one of the world's great monotheistic religions. Nonetheless, as a political phenomenon, the terrorists do have more in common with fascism than with communism. They are at war with the Enlightenment and modernity. In particular, they reject the liberal principles of separation of church and state, toleration, and the rights of the individual. They view the United States and other liberal democracies as weak and corrupt, and have nothing but contempt for a way of life dedicated to commerce and the pursuit of happiness. The terrorists instead take a nihilistic delight in

Hulton / Archive

FDR, December 8, 1941

blood and destruction. We "look forward to death, like the Americans look forward to living," said one al Qaeda leader. And finally, the terrorists harbor an insane, all-encompassing hatred of Jews (indeed, much of their anti-Jewish propaganda is borrowed directly from the Nazis).

The political character of the terrorists is also revealed in their September 11 assault on the United States. Had they flown planes only into the Pentagon and other military targets, a peace party probably would have emerged in the United States. Liberal Democrats (and some Republicans as well) would have argued that the terrorists only meant to send a message about our Middle East policy and that we can reason with them, perhaps appease them with a more "neutral" policy. But the terrorists' savage attack on civilians in the liberal state of New York, wantonly killing people as they sat at their desks in the World Trade Center, made any such argument absurd on its face and turned even Senator Hillary Clinton into a war hawk. "There is America, full of fear from its north to its south, from its west to its east. Thank God for that," said bin Laden after the assault. Not our policies but our very existence enrages the terrorists.

The failure of the Cold War analogy to capture today's threat can be grasped most simply from how our enemies characterize us. It's one thing to be called "bourgeois," quite another to be called an "infidel."

Perhaps President Bush had none of this in mind when he likened the terrorists to Nazis. Some pundits have suggested that he compared them to fascists rather than to Communists only to avoid alienating China. Or he may have meant nothing more concrete by the comparison than did the first President Bush in his fight against Saddam Hussein. That President Bush boldly declared that the war against Iraq was akin to the war against Nazism, and then, after a brief military campaign, implemented a policy of containment instead. Similarly, George W. Bush has invoked a fascist-like threat to national security, and yet his policies, like those of his father, seem closer to how the United States fought the Cold War than World War II. George W. Bush's carefully calibrated use of force in Afghanistan, his emphasis on coalitions, and his proposal to create a "moderate" Taliban regime, all suggest a policy of containment, not unconditional surrender. The decision to attack Afghanistan rather than Iraq is representative of Cold War thinking: Concentrate on the periphery, not the source. The prob-

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lem is that such a containment-oriented policy does not match the Nazi-like threat that the president has repeatedly warned the American people they now face. FDR never spoke of "moderate Nazis."

In all likelihood the analogy to either Nazism or Soviet communism will prove inaccurate, and thus neither a policy of unconditional surrender nor one of containment will alone be adequate. Rather, we will need to think broadly and deeply about the political personality of this new enemy. And in so doing, everything should be placed on the table, from religion's role in this war, to the influence of fascist and nihilistic modes of thought, to the fifth-column question, to the Iraqi menace.

We must also reconsider whether so-called moderate states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt are any less inimical to our national security than rogue states such as Iraq. The carnage of September 11 was the work not of an Iraqi missile but of 19 hijackers, 15 of whom were Saudi nationals, and it was masterminded by the Saudi bin Laden and the Egyptian Mohamed Atta. U.S. foreign policy will have to confront both sorts of regime—those that are openly at war with us, and those that claim to be our allies but export suicide bombers to our shores.

The souls of men, Plato taught, are reflections of the regimes that raise them. In the Islamic world, where liberal democracies are scarce, so too are liberal democrats. In contrast, anti-American sentiment is rife, and while mass murderers like bin Laden and Atta remain a minority, they are cheered by the thousands in the street, lauded by the government press, incited by imams, and winked at (when not openly encouraged) by their rulers. If the terrorists are to be defeated in their war against the United States, the regimes that nurture them will have to be held strictly accountable, not merely "contained." In some instances, the only solution will be ending, as FDR did, "barbaric laws and institutions." Only then will we regain our peace and security. ♦

Remembering Abdul Haq

The Taliban executes an Afghan patriot.

BY LISA SCHIFFREN

ABDUL HAQ, the legendary Afghan resistance commander, was captured and hanged on October 25 by the Taliban while on a mission inside Afghanistan to contact local Taliban leaders who wished to defect. In the war against the Soviets, Abdul Haq had led large-scale operations in and around Kabul. In the past decade, he had been a tireless, if sometimes despairing, advocate of the return of King Zahir Shah and the installation of a democratic political system in Afghanistan.

Intelligent and articulate, Abdul Haq was a genuine political moderate. At 44, he was one of a tiny number of Afghans with the stature and ability to lead an effective opposition coalition against the Taliban and eventually to help constitute a successor government. With his death, a satisfactory resolution to the U.S. action in Afghanistan becomes even harder to imagine than it was before.

Abdul Haq was born Humayoun Arsala in 1957, one of six sons of a prominent member of the rural aristocracy in Eastern Afghanistan. His family were historic leaders of a major Pashtun tribe. His father was a senior engineer on the massive, U.S.-funded Helmand River irrigation project in the 1960s, a large American contribution to Afghan development in the Cold War years. These influences—the traditional conservatism, independence, and noblesse oblige of the rural khanate, along with a scientific and Western orientation—ran deep.

In 1973, the long-reigning, do-nothing King Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin Mohammed Daoud, with Soviet backing. Shortly thereafter, Abdul Haq left school to join the resistance forming in the villages, as the new regime attempted to enlarge the powers of the state by curtailing the powers of family and tribe. After a few brushes with the police, he landed in Kabul's Pul-i-Charki prison, where he was tortured and condemned to death. When the Afghan Communists took power in 1978, a bribe secured his release, and he left home for good, fleeing to Peshawar, Pakistan, where refugees were massing and the Pakistani military had begun training promising young men in insurgency and guerrilla-warfare tactics. It was then that he took the nom de guerre Abdul Haq, Servant of Justice.

When the Soviet army marched into Afghanistan in 1979, Haq went to war. He joined his brothers in the Hisb-i-Islami party, a centrist Islamic party affiliated with the moderate nationalists. His guerrilla operations, near Kabul, were known for their bravado and a level of organization unusual among the rather haphazard mujahedeen. His exploits included blowing up the largest Soviet munitions dump in the country, at Karga, with a handful of small rockets, and disabling the Sarobi Dam and power station for many months, depriving Kabul of electricity. Haq's intelligence network in Kabul circulated "Night Letters," to instruct and bolster the city's captive population.

In those years, Abdul Haq was feted as a freedom fighter by Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and others in the West. Back then, the Afghans seemed noble for their swashbuckling resistance, at great

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personal cost, to the Soviet colossus.

In 1987, when he was 29, Haq lost his right foot to a landmine. In a war conducted largely on foot and horseback in some of the world's least negotiable terrain, this crippled his ability to lead guerrilla operations, though he initially resisted that conclusion. Eventually, he understood that his future lay in politics.

The U.S. government had never given much in the way of money or arms to Abdul Haq's party, and in the late '80s it stopped most of his funding. He was not, to be sure, the ideal agent of the CIA. He would not be bought, and the agency trusts only men who are on the payroll. He believed he was fighting for the interests of the Afghan people, and the CIA had contracted the war out to the Pakistani government, which wanted to support only commanders who could be controlled by Pakistani military intelligence, the ISI.

Haq, though a member of an Islamic party and personally conservative, was no fundamentalist. The CIA, with its blind reliance on the ISI, which is famously staffed by rabid Islamists, convinced itself and some at the State Department that only mujahedeen espousing the most virulent and repressive Islamic fundamentalism would successfully fight the Soviets, so that is where the agency directed arms, money, and training. And that is how Afghanistan came to be so congenial to Osama bin Laden.

Members of the CIA station in Pakistan took to disparaging Abdul Haq as "all talk, no action," "Hollywood Haq," and "the BBC commander," appellations disparaging the ability to persuade through speech, a hallmark of democratic politics—as opposed to, say, the willingness to assassinate any potential rival, a quality possessed by Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, the Islamist mujahedeen leader they backed with U.S. dollars.

Because he held the United States and its ideals in high regard, however shortsighted and stupid he deemed its actions, Haq in the late 1980s wrote a series of detailed letters to the American and British governments and the United Nations explaining how CIA money, filtered through the ISI, was being used to build terrorist training camps in Afghanistan that would destabilize Middle Eastern governments and ultimately threaten the United States. This would be an excellent time to dig those letters out of the files at Langley and read them.

In 1989, as the Soviets prepared to leave Afghanistan and the mujahedeen had high hopes of taking Kabul, Haq drew up plans to keep the city he loved supplied with food, water, and electricity, even in battle conditions, though its population was largely not supportive of the mujahedeen. He saw that the mujahedeen would never be able to govern if they couldn't win the confidence of the Kabulis. He saw, too, that building an Afghan future required reconciliation, not vengeance—a statesmanlike view not universal among resistance leaders.

What must be considered one of Abdul Haq's most significant accomplishments, given the fractiousness of Afghan politics, came in 1989-91, when he organized a gathering of commanders, warlords, and tribal leaders and brokered an agreement to prevent looting and rampaging when Kabul finally fell. This agreement fell through only when the celebrated Ahmed Shah Massoud sent his men in for a spree of pillaging and raping that would make the Taliban a welcome relief.

When the mujahedeen took power, Haq was offered the job of minister of police. He turned it down three times because the new regime refused to allow him to disarm local militias. Instead, he became a businessman in Dubai, though he kept a hand in politics. He visited the United States from time to time in the mid '90s; he found it unbelievable that the Clinton administration had discarded the Afghans, now that they were of no immediate use, and that it paid no heed to the terrorists overrunning the country.

After the Taliban takeover, Haq turned down a position in that government, too. In 1999, Taliban agents murdered his wife, Karima, and an 11-year-old son in their home in Peshawar.

In the last year, Haq was working with the exiled king to arrange a Loya Jurga, a traditional national assembly of tribal and religious leaders, to form a government that could succeed the Taliban. He was disappointed that the United States chose to begin bombing before laying the political groundwork. He was convinced that many Taliban commanders were ready to defect—but the ornery Afghan temperament would prevent their doing so once they were under attack. The bombing, meanwhile, failed to destroy the main Taliban base in Kabul, which was in fine condition when Abdul Haq was executed there. Of his five surviving children, the oldest lives in the United States.

The day Haq was killed, news anchors in New York pulled long faces and announced that the elimination of this resistance leader was a grave setback to the war effort. Oddly, the American government acknowledged no such thing.

In the late 1980s, when I was a reporter in Afghanistan, I had the privilege of knowing Abdul Haq as a friend. Early in my first trip to Pakistan, after the Soviets had butchered yet another village full of civilians, I asked Haq why the mujahedeen didn't take the war to the Soviets. Why not knock off a Soviet envoy or two in Europe? He gave me a sharp look to see if I was serious, then said coolly, "We are not the Palestinians. We are not terrorists."

One reason so many journalists admired him was that he was straightforward, sardonic, and often irreverent. If the CIA held it against him that he got good press—well, he understood that the fate of his people depended on the world's willingness to help. Sure, he exaggerated the magnitude of his operations, but that wasn't the most important thing about him.

A senior State Department official with whom I spoke last week pointed out that "Haq was not our guy." He



Abdul Haq

Thomas Fluharty

said indignantly, "We don't have a guy," then added, "Every nation in the world is grooming and paying someone to be their guy." Well, yes. You can't beat a horse with no horse. A policy, while desirable, is no substitute for a leader. Without a legitimate leader to take over from the Taliban, the United States will find itself mired in Afghanistan.

Should Abdul Haq have been our guy? We could have done worse. Actually, we did worse.

Back in the 1980s, when Ambassador Robert Oakley and Station Chief Milt Bearden were justifying U.S. support for brutal and fanatical leaders such as Gulbaddin Hekmatyar—who came out of the Muslim Brotherhood and helped bring Arab fighters to Afghanistan—their favorite line was, "It takes a tough guy to defeat the Soviets."

They mistook a willingness to brutalize Afghans and force on them an inhumane Islam foreign to Afghanistan for the staunchness that real leadership requires. They could not conceive of a leader willing to do what it took to bring to fruition a moderate philosophy—one that stressed education and elections, instead of burquas and beatings, one that might have had sufficient legitimacy to preclude the advent of the Taliban.

Even now, the CIA continues its sniping. Anonymous officials have rushed to make the case that Abdul Haq, a man who could be cocky but was always meticulous in assessing risks, threw his life away in a pathetic attempt to recapture the limelight. Though the details are unclear, the CIA was probably involved. All eyewitness reports place two or three Americans in the party traveling with Haq. Indeed, any serious attempt to win or buy the allegiance of local commanders would have required visible assurance of future American support. But because the CIA, with its unforgivable lack of Pashto speakers, remains to this day dependent on Pakistan's ISI, its operations are riddled with spies, and one may suppose that ISI, and therefore the Taliban, know the CIA's every move. With the Taliban already boasting that it has bested the CIA in this round of the Great Game, one should not bet on too many defections.

The United States government knows that the Northern Alliance is made up of disgruntled ethnic minorities that cannot govern Afghanistan because the largest ethnic group won't let them. They know that there are no hidden reserves of leadership among Afghan technocrats in exile or among the commanders inside Afghanistan with whom we have no contact. They know that the king is a useful symbol, but not the person of vigor and vision who will be needed to govern.

As week three of the U.S. war on terrorism ended, then, we had dropped a lot of bombs, but the other side had scored the big victory. If I were commander in chief, I'd want to know who lost Abdul Haq. ♦

In Search of a Moderate Sheikh

A pro-American Muslim cleric is hard to find.

BY STEPHEN SCHWARTZ

On September 27, a group of Islamic scholars in the Middle East issued a fatwa on the duties of Muslims serving in the U.S. armed forces. The story of this fatwa —a religious pronouncement with legal force among Muslims— illustrates both the confused state of relations between American society and Islam and the nature of Muslim fundamentalism.

It all began when the first-ever Muslim chaplain to American military personnel, U.S. Army Captain Abdul-Rashid Muhammad, sought an authoritative opinion as to whether Muslims could serve in a war against a Muslim enemy. Captain Muhammad turned to the head of the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences in Leesburg, Virginia, one Taha Jabir Alwani. As if that weren't unusual enough, Alwani conveyed the request to a "moderate" cleric of the Wahhabi sect living in Qatar and subsidized by Saudi Arabia named Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who drafted the resulting document.

The content of the fatwa was inoffensive. Sheikh Qaradawi and his cosignatories (three Egyptians, a Syrian, and Alwani) held that, in the face of the recent attacks, American Muslims were obliged to support the United States, since Islamic law prohibits "terrorizing the innocent, killing noncombatants, and the destruction of property." Further, the fatwa declared that American Muslims must fulfill the duties of citizenship, including conscientious service in the armed forces, lest their loyalty be doubted.

Some American media seized on the fatwa to prove that Muslims abhor terrorism. Sam Jaffe, for instance, writing in *Business Week Online*, characterized Qaradawi as one of those "Islamic thinkers . . . that will defeat bin Laden." But the honeymoon was brief. Sheikh Qaradawi has a record of public statements inciting terrorism; just last April, he defined suicide bombings as "martyrdom, not suicide," suicide being forbidden by Islam. The September 27 fatwa set off a firestorm in the Arab world, and Qaradawi changed course.

On October 11, the sheikh held a press conference in Qatar where he condemned American military action against Afghanistan. His wording was anything but mild: "We support the Afghans who stand firm against the American invasion," he proclaimed, likening the U.S. campaign to the Russian occupation. He blamed the United States for September 11 because of American support for Israel and threatened that a thousand bin Ladens will rise up unless U.S. policy changes. He incited the Pakistanis against their government and concluded with the claim that bin Laden's videotaped self-justifications could not be considered a confession of wrongdoing. He praised the terrorist chieftain as "a symbol of the world uprising against American hegemony."

Some Islamic websites reported that the original fatwa had been "misattributed," others that it had been superseded. Qaradawi's outburst of hatred, and his manifest self-contradiction, prompted inquiries from the press, but he declined to elaborate. On October 30 he brushed off the Associated Press, saying, "I wrote an explanation. I can't tell you anything more."

By official count, there are some 4,100 Muslims in the U.S. armed forces (although Captain Muhammad has been quoted claiming 12,000) out of a total force of a million and a half. But any questions concerning Muslim soldiers' duties and loyalties are less urgent than the questions this episode raises about the proper relationship between American authorities and the ostensible Islamic establishment in the United States and abroad.

Many Muslim functionaries in the United States maintain an attitude of truculence toward American society, even after September 11. Some of them appear rattled; thus, the notorious Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) expressed condolences after the massacre of 16 Christians during a worship service in Pakistan on October 28, although the organization has never expressed regret over killings by suicide bombers in Israel. At the same time, CAIR and partner groups like the Islamic Society of North America and the American Muslim Council loudly complain of purported hate crimes and civil liberties violations to keep American society on the defensive.

As for Sheikh Qaradawi, he embodies the fantasy that there are "moderate" Muslim fundamentalists who can be our allies in the anti-terror fight. Qaradawi, to be sure, has expounded a "liberal" approach to music, which Wahhabis typically abhor. But he also defended the Taliban's demolition of ancient Buddhist statues in Afghanistan.

The lesson: In reality, there is no "moderate" Wahhabism, for it is an amoral power ideology that cannot accept the coexistence of Muslim and non-Muslim civilizations. No wonder it can't explain itself forthrightly to Americans. American Muslims who wish to dissociate themselves from these extremists have their work cut out for them. ♦

Stephen Schwartz is working on a book to be titled The Two Faces of Islam.

1001 Taliban Nights

There are no "moderates" in the Afghan regime.

BY MATT LABASH

Of all the puzzling things that have been said since the United States started bombing Afghanistan back to the Stone Age—or, as pedants would have it, up to the Bronze Age—none outranks the idea offered during the October 16 press conference with Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf and Secretary of State Colin Powell that there are "moderate Taliban leaders."

It was a distinction that one might think could be drawn only by the president of a militantly Islamic country on the cusp of violent overthrow. But Powell echoed the notion (minus the "leaders"), saying that even with the Taliban vanquished, there would be those who "find the teachings and the beliefs of that movement still very important," who might be included in a new Afghan government. Besides, Powell added, "You can't send them to another country."

But you can send them to their just reward—which would be a deserving fate for a regime where "moderates" have historically differentiated themselves from hardliners by, say, throwing homosexuals off roofs instead of crushing them under stone walls.

Powell must have thought he was doing the polite thing by agreeing with his host. In the interest of knowing thine enemy, I have spent the last two weeks surveying stacks of human rights reports, first-hand dissident accounts, and books such as Ahmed Rashid's indispensable *Taliban*, in search of the elusive "moderate Taliban." They don't appear to exist. What you find in these sources, instead, is a nearly inexhaustible accretion of Taliban atrocities and absurdities that end up taking on a black comic hue—assuming you don't live in Afghanistan.

From the moment, in 1996, when militant madrassa-trained *talibs* (or religious students) seized power from nihilistic mujahedeen fighters, they immediately gained the world's attention. Their housewarming party in Kabul included kidnapping former President Najibullah from the U.N. compound where he was staying. The Taliban beat him, castrated him, dragged his body behind a jeep, then hung him from a traffic light in front of the presidential palace. But first impressions can be deceiving. Despite the blinding efficiency with which the Taliban terrorized Afghanistan's war-weary population, they proved woefully inept at governing.

The Taliban's first act was to declare Afghanistan a "pure Islamic state." This was bad news for church/state separatists, Hindus (who must wear yellow identification stickers), and Christian Afghans (Christian converts from Islam under the Taliban are executed). But it seemed like good news for the eleven parties that jousted for power at the time of the Taliban's ascendancy, ten of which had the word "Islamic" in their monikers. (The Taliban then broke the bad news to its rivals by banning all political parties—since Islam "forbids divisions.")

Instead of elected officials or the self-appointed strongmen that usually commandeer third-world countries, Afghanistan was now being run by the village mullah, described by Michael Griffin, author of *Reaping the Whirlwind*, as a "cross between a country parson and a Shakespearean clown."

What the mullahs lacked in erudition, they made up for with perfect mosque attendance. In Afghanistan, five-times-a-day prayer is enforced religiously. Sports such as soccer are not allowed to be played at prayer times, as clapping might prove a distraction (as an extra caution, the Taliban banned clapping altogether, though sports fans are permitted brief pro-Allah chants when the home team scores).

Men who do not wish to pray in mosques may do so at home—if they want to be shot, or beaten by a variety of instruments (staves, iron-fortified leather straps, electric cables). Women are expected to pray in the privacy of their burqua, behind the blacked-out windows of their homes, assuming they can afford homes, since one out of every eight women in Kabul is a widow, and they are, for the most part, forbidden to work. Women do have a prayer loophole, however. Since the Taliban do not permit women who have had their periods to pray until they've had a ritual bath, and since many women no longer have running water and the Taliban shut down public bathhouses, many women have not been permitted to pray in roughly four years.

All this compulsory mosquing doesn't leave much time for governance, which may be just as well. Government offices are open only from 8 A.M. to noon each day. Civil servants were laid off in droves, often for the crimes of being female, having too short a beard, or being educated abroad.

What's left, then, is a rogue's gallery of Taliban ministers who are in a perpetual race to see if their cruelty can outpace their stupidity. The minister of higher education has no formal education. The culture minister has overseen the looting of museums and the destruction of priceless ancient artifacts. And the health min-

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Peter Steiner

ister has been spotted cleaving off hands at public amputations. This, in a country where one out of every four babies dies before the age of five, where a child is blown up by a landmine every three hours, and where 268,000 children die every year from easily treatable conditions like diarrhea.

Overseeing all this is the one-eyed commander of the faithful, Mullah Mohammed Omar. Not much is known about the 43-year-old recluse, whose harem reportedly includes Osama bin Laden's daughter. But thanks to the *Sunday Telegraph*'s Christina Lamb, who interviewed one of Omar's doctors, a widely held suspicion has been confirmed: Omar is nuttier than a Stuckey's log. Alternating between childlike behavior and serious depression, Omar likes to sit in the driver's seat of his parked car, turning the wheel while making engine noises. According to his physician, the "visions" Omar claims to have had when locking himself away for days on end are probably seizures caused by the shrapnel that lodged itself in his brain during a 1989 Soviet rocket attack.

This may explain a host of Taliban edicts, which range from mildly eccentric to criminally sadistic. Bus drivers are not permitted to tell jokes, and must have a boy younger than 15 collect fares from female passengers. If a dog bites someone, the dog's owner must pay the victim 20 million Afghanis and give him "a girl for marriage." According to Taliban law, a woman cannot leave her house without being accompanied by a male relative, which causes considerable problems for the unemployed legions of widows, many of whom have been driven to prostitution. To avoid Taliban beatings, they must lug along their children, who are then present for the act, and who are sometimes forced by violent pederasts to become part of the act themselves.

This is not to say the Taliban fail to provide bread and circuses. Well, actually, not much bread (Afghans have been spotted eating everything from boiled bones to grass). But there are plenty of circuses. For fun, Afghans have been known to get in rock fights, pray for death, or visit the Kabul zoo, where the blighted animals cower from years of getting poked with sticks by Taliban militia seeking entertainment. Then there are the public stonings. On one recent afternoon, an adulterous mother was stoned, while her crying child was forced to periodically check under her burqua to see if she had died. At the soccer stadium, where thieves' limbs are severed, and where enemies of the state are hanged from the goalposts, soccer games do occasionally break out. But often, they have unhappy endings. Last year in Kandahar, when a visiting Pakistani soccer team dared wear shorts, baton-wielding police broke up the game, arrested the team, and took them to prison, where they had their heads shaved.

Then, of course, there are the massacres, which usually involve non-Pashtun minorities like the Hazaras. From Mazar-e-Sharif to Bamiyan, the Taliban have been good for at least one civilian massacre per year, in which people have variously been shot, raped, suffocated in metal transport containers, had their hands broken with stones, their eyes gouged out with bayonets, and the skin peeled off their heads. On occasion, their families have been ordered to leave their loved ones' bodies in the street—so they can be eaten by dogs.

But despite all this terror, the Taliban haven't been entirely bad for business. Though Afghan currency has been completely devalued, you can pick up prosthetic limbs or children, which many families have been forced to sell since they can no longer support them, for a song ("song,"

here, is figurative—actual singing has been banned). Likewise, Afghanistan has become a large exporter of refugees and opium.

The Taliban have no problem with selling drugs but do frown on using them. The head of the Taliban's anti-drug control force told Ahmed Rashid, for instance, that when they catch hashish users, they're entered into the Taliban treatment program: After beating them, he said, "We put them in cold water for many hours, two or three times a day. It's a very good cure."

What Americans should take from this is that even if bin Laden packed up his cave and moved to Buenos Aires tomorrow, rooting out the Taliban with extreme prejudice would still be the humanitarian equivalent of a Superfund cleanup. The only problem with wresting the country away from the bad guys to give it to the good guys is that as of yet, we haven't identified many. The same human rights groups that monitor Taliban atrocities have produced long rap sheets showing many of the venerated Northern Alliance's commanders are also guilty of raping, pillaging, and generally acting like the Mongol hordes from which some are descended.

I asked an old Afghan hand in the intelligence community, how, then, can a postwar Afghanistan achieve some level of civility and stability? He laughed at such a naive notion, saying, "It's way too late for that." But Afghans, among the world's most resilient people, still hold out hope for normalcy—though after two decades of war, no one can quite remember what normal looks like.

Perhaps someday, when its cities regain certain luxuries—like electricity—Afghanistan can open a Ministry of Tourism and crank out zippy little slogans, the Afghan equivalent of "Virginia Is For Lovers." Until then, it is damned by the words of a U.N. mediator, who told Rashid, "We are dealing with a failed state which looks like an infected wound. You don't even know where to start cleaning it." ♦

An Endangered Species?

Among the California Republicans.

BY WLADYSLAW PLESZCZYNSKI

Los Angeles

"OSAMA BIN LADEN is very unhappy that we Republicans are gathering here today," Rep. David Dreier told some 800 delegates attending the California Republican party convention on October 27, six weeks later than scheduled. Dreier attacked House Democrats, who again are showing that "the old partisanship is still alive and well in Washington," and he blasted Joe Biden for showing "his true colors" in criticizing the president's Afghanistan policies. Who says September 11 has toned down American politics?

Dreier was at his most rousing at a small reception for $100 donors, where he defended his old friend Richard Riordan, who was under fire from Republicans unhappy that the former two-term L.A. mayor is back to his old trick of surrounding himself with Democrats. After greeting each other with a loud hand-slap, the two men stood arm in arm as Dreier began: "Dick Riordan offers the best hope for Republicans in California." By the time he was through, this had become, "Dick Riordan offers the best hope for the future of this state."

California Republicans definitely want to have a future. The present is not kind. Three consecutive election disasters have left them holding only one statewide office and a weak minority in the state legislature. This year they underwent a controversial White House-backed restructuring, based on the premise that "professionalization" of the party would free them to do better things. More indicative of their current plight was the cheering at the convention for the "great job" GOP state legislative leaders had done in the recent redistricting to protect the 20 California congressional seats still held by Republicans (Democrats hold 32). Next year's gubernatorial race thus looms as the state GOP's path out of the political wilderness. Even conservatives who would otherwise eagerly support likable political rookie Bill Simon Jr. are saying they'll be more than happy to back Riordan, who presumably has a better shot at winning.

Consequently, the villain of the

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moment was California secretary of state and fellow Republican gubernatorial hopeful Bill Jones, whose campaign had distributed anti-Riordan materials throughout the convention area. The most inflammatory item was headlined "Dick's Team." It picked up on recent reports that key GOP consultants Dan Schnur and Bill Whelan left Riordan's campaign after it signed on such Democratic operatives as Clint Reilly, Pat Caddell, and Susan Estrich. Under a photo of each, as well as one of Nancy Daly Riordan, identified as "Riordan's Wife," the item enumerated their various sins. Reilly, for example, "has an arrest record, a history of domestic violence and sexual harassment charges." Caddell advised Coca-Cola during its effort to market "new Coke." Estrich said in September that Republicans "stole Florida," and now she was expected to participate in a "Democrats for Riordan" effort. Mrs. Riordan, a Democrat, has contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to people like Willie Brown, Bill Clinton, and Barbara Boxer. Another Jones flier predicted the Democratic makeup of a Riordan administration. It included past recipients of Riordan's support, like Bill Press as appointments secretary and Maxine Waters as secretary of health and welfare.

There was more, lots more, but Riordan's people came armed with a single flier as deadly as all the Jones material combined. It was a reprint of a February 16, 2000, *Los Angeles Times* story, which reported that Bill Jones was switching his support from George W. Bush to John McCain in the GOP presidential race. Why? Jones explained he could no longer remain silent while yet another Republican doomed his campaign by refusing to reach out to Democrats and independents.

During his duet with Riordan, Dreier noted that "it's no secret that President Bush encouraged Dick Riordan to run for governor." Just who sought out whom remains in dispute, but in late June Riordan met at the White House with Karl Rove and others to discuss a gubernatorial run. Earlier that month, he was endorsed by 16 of California's 20 Republican members of Congress, including Dreier, Chris Cox, Bill Thomas, and Dana Rohrabacher. Riordan has the air of an anointed nominee of a party desperate for a win. His prospects weren't hurt by a pre-September 11 Field poll that had him running ahead of mildly unpopular Democratic incumbent Gov. Gray Davis.

It's only natural that California's Republicans want to tie themselves to Bush's now-surging numbers. Southern California investment banker Gerald Parsky has become the party's de facto head, because he is widely considered to be President Bush's man in the state. On October 17, Parsky introduced Bush at an appearance in Sacramento during the president's refueling stop en route to Shanghai.

No thanks to Parsky, Bush today would carry a state he lost by 1.3 million votes last year—a defeat that Parsky's critics contend he's never really answered for. He was chairman of a Bush California campaign that squandered millions that might have been better spent in battleground states Bush lost. But since Bush won the election anyway, there was nothing left for Parsky but to fail upward.

Among numerous tasks he's undertaken for the Bush operation, earlier this year Parsky became chairman of the state party's Reform and Restructuring Committee, which was formed to professionalize the party's structure and expand its base by reaching out to new voter groups. On paper, the first aim was unremarkable, and the second consistent with a major Bush theme of 2000. But Bush's talent was to moderate his party's image without throwing conservatives overboard or otherwise humiliating them. In California, Parsky has proved less adept at working the same trick.

Most of the state's dwindling corps of elected conservatives went along with Parsky's scheme, but the party's conservative volunteers were another matter. When *Human Events* reported in late July that Parsky's first proposed bylaws would have seriously curtailed conservative influence in party operations, a mini-tempest broke out. A major showdown seemed likely at the scheduled mid-September convention, but in a brokered meeting in late August, current state party chairman Shawn Steel and Parsky reached an agreement, and at the rescheduled convention all the reforms passed on a voice vote.

At the convention, Parsky was not particularly conciliatory. "We're not an 'anti-' party," he declared, as if without him the GOP would be "anti-education, anti-immigration, and anti-minority." Unlike Riordan, Parsky couldn't let criticism slide. "In our society, there's no room for personal attacks," he announced. Yet in an unguarded moment, he dismissed opposition to his reforms as the work only of a "very extreme wing." That's a sure way to guarantee that what's left of the "anti-" party will remain anti-Parsky.

In a stronger moment, Parsky introduced Leonard Rodriguez, an aide to Karl Rove who gave a detailed presentation on the critical importance of the fast-growing Hispanic vote. For once, Parsky's emphasis on changing the face of the state's GOP began to seem more than just a settling of scores with old-line conservatives. Everyone even enjoyed a laugh when Rodriguez predicted that a successor to Parsky would carry the name Gerry Parsky Perez. Caught up in the excitement, Parsky talked openly of wanting to match the 49 percent of the Hispanic vote that helped reelect Bush in Texas in 1998.

Rodriguez's remarks could easily have been construed as an endorsement of Richard Riordan, who won Hispanic votes before it became fashionable to do so. But when asked if that's what Rodriguez had done, Parsky said no, "we're only interested in getting the strongest candidate who can beat Gray Davis." How long before Parsky declares the California GOP to be Riordan country? And will California as a whole follow? ♦

The Real New World Order

The American empire and the Islamic challenge

By Charles Krauthammer

I. The Anti-Hegemonic Alliance

On September 11, our holiday from history came to an abrupt end. Not just in the trivial sense that the United States finally learned the meaning of physical vulnerability. And not just in the sense that our illusions about the permanence of the post-Cold War peace were shattered.

We were living an even greater anomaly. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and the emergence of the United States as the undisputed world hegemon, the inevitable did not happen. Throughout the three and a half centuries of the modern state system, whenever a hegemonic power has emerged, a coalition of weaker powers has inevitably arisen to counter it. When Napoleonic France reached for European hegemony, an opposing coalition of Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria emerged to stop it. Similarly during Germany's two great reaches for empire in the 20th century. It is an iron law: History abhors hegemony. Yet for a decade, the decade of the unipolar moment, there was no challenge to the United States anywhere.

The expected anti-American Great Power coalition never materialized. Russia and China flirted with the idea repeatedly, but never consummated the deal. Their summits would issue communiqués denouncing hegemony, unipolarity, and other euphemisms for American dominance. But they were unlikely allies from the start. Each had more to gain from its relations with America than from the other. It was particularly hard to see why Russia would risk building up a more populous and prosperous next-door neighbor with regional ambitions that would ultimately threaten Russia itself.

The other candidate for anti-hegemonic opposition was a truncated Russia picking up pieces of the far-flung former Soviet empire. There were occasional feints in that direction, with trips by Russian leaders to former allies like Cuba, Iraq, even North Korea. But for the Russians this was even more a losing proposition than during their first go-round in the Cold War when both the Soviet Union and the satellites had more to offer each other than they do today.

With no countervailing coalition emerging, American hegemony had no serious challenge. That moment lasted precisely ten years, beginning with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. It is now over. The challenge, long-awaited, finally declared itself on September 11 when the radical Islamic movement opened its worldwide war with a, literally, spectacular attack on the American homeland. Amazingly, however, this anti-hegemonic alliance includes not a single Great Power. It includes hardly any states at all, other than hostage-accomplice Afghanistan.

That is the good news. The bad news is that because it is a sub-state infiltrative entity, the al Qaeda network and its related terrorists around the world lack an address. And a fixed address—the locus of any retaliation—is necessary for effective deterrence. Moreover, with the covert support of some rogue regimes, this terrorist network commands unconventional weapons and unconventional tactics, and is fueled by a radicalism and a suicidal fanaticism that one does not normally associate with adversary states.

This radicalism and fanaticism anchored in religious ideology only increased our shocked surprise. We had given ourselves to believe that after the success of our classic encounters with fascism and Nazism, then communism, the great ideological struggles were finished. This was the meaning of Francis Fukuyama's End of History. There would, of course, be the usual depredations, invasions, aggressions, and simple land grabs of time immemorial. But the truly world-historical struggles were over. The

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West had won. Modernization was the way. No great idea would arise to challenge it.

Radical Islam is not yet a great idea, but it is a dangerous one. And on September 11, it arose.

II. The American Mind

It took only a few hours for elite thinking about U.S. foreign policy to totally reorient itself, waking with a jolt from a decade-long slumber. During the 1990s, American foreign policy became more utopian and divorced from reality than at any time since our last postwar holiday from history in the 1920s. The liberal internationalists of the Clinton era could not quite match the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact abolishing war forever for sheer cosmic stupidity. But they tried hard. And they came close.

Guided by the vision of an autonomous, active, and norm-driven "international community" that would relieve a unilateralist America from keeping order in the world, the Clinton administration spent eight years signing one treaty, convention, and international protocol after another. From this web of mutual obligations, a new and vital "international community" would ultimately regulate international relations and keep the peace. This would, of course, come at the expense of American power. But for those brought up to distrust, and at times detest, American power, this diminution of dominance was a bonus.

To understand the utter bankruptcy of this approach, one needs but a single word: anthrax. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention sits, with the ABM treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, in the pantheon of arms control. We now know that its signing marks the *acceleration* of the Soviet bioweapons program, of which the 1979 anthrax accident at a secret laboratory at Sverdlovsk was massive evidence, largely ignored. It was not until the fall of the Soviet Union that the vast extent of that bioweapons program was acknowledged. But that—and the post-Gulf War evidence that Iraq, another treaty signatory in good standing, had been building huge stores of bioweapons—made little impression on the liberal-internationalist faithful. Just before September 11, a serious debate was actually about to break out in Congress about the Bush administration's decision to reject the biological weapons treaty's new, and particularly useless, "enforcement" protocol that the Clinton administration had embraced.

After the apocalypse, there are no believers. The Democrats who yesterday were touting international law as the tool to fight bioterrorism are today dodging anthrax spores in their own offices. The very idea of safety-in-parchment is risible. When war breaks out, even treaty advocates take to the foxholes. (The Bush administration is trying to get like-minded countries to sign onto an agreement to prevent individuals from getting easy access to the substrates of bioweapons. That is perfectly reasonable. And it is totally different from having some kind of universal enforcement bureaucracy going around the world checking biolabs, which would have zero effect on the bad guys. They hide everything.)

This decade-long folly—a foreign policy of norms rather than of national interest—is over. The exclamation mark came with our urgent post-September 11 scurrying to Pakistan and India to shore up relations for the fight with Afghanistan. Those relations needed shoring up because of U.S. treatment of India and Pakistan after their 1998 nuclear tests. Because they had violated the universal nonproliferation "norm," the United States automatically imposed sanctions, blocking international lending and aid, and banning military sales. The potential warming of relations with India after the death of its Cold War Soviet alliance was put on hold. And traditionally strong U.S.-Pakistani relations were cooled as a show of displeasure. After September 11, reality once again set in, and such refined nonsense was instantly put aside.

This foreign policy of norms turned out to be not just useless but profoundly damaging. During those eight Clinton years, while the United States was engaged in (literally) paperwork, the enemy was planning and arming, burrowing deep into America, preparing for war. When war broke out, eyes opened. You no longer hear that the real issue for American foreign policy is global warming, the internal combustion engine, drug traffic, AIDS, or any of the other transnational trendies



A U.S. Navy plane captain prepares to secure his aircraft on the flight deck of the carrier USS Carl Vinson*, October 23, 2001.*

Photo by Martin S. Fuentes / U.S. Navy / Getty Images

of the '90s. On September 11, American foreign policy acquired seriousness. It also acquired a new organizing principle: We have an enemy, radical Islam; it is a global opponent of worldwide reach, armed with an idea, and with the tactics, weapons, and ruthlessness necessary to take on the world's hegemon; and its defeat is our supreme national objective, as overriding a necessity as were the defeats of fascism and Soviet communism.

That organizing principle was enunciated by President Bush in his historic address to Congress. From that day forth, American foreign policy would define itself—and define friend and foe—according to who was with us or against us in the war on terrorism. This is the self-proclaimed Bush doctrine—the Truman doctrine with radical Islam replacing Soviet communism. The Bush doctrine marks the restoration of the intellectual and conceptual simplicity that many, including our last president, wistfully (and hypocritically) said they missed about the Cold War. Henry Kissinger's latest book, brilliant though it is, published shortly before September 11, is unfortunately titled *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* Not only do we know that it does. We know what it is.

III. The New World Order

The post-September 11 realignments in the international system have been swift and tectonic. Within days, two Great Powers that had confusedly fumbled their way through the period of unchallenged American hegemony in the 1990s began to move dramatically. A third, while not altering its commitments, mollified its militancy. The movement was all in one direction: toward alignment with the United States. The three powers in question—India, Russia, and China—have one thing in common: They all border Islam, and all face their own radical Islamic challenges.

First to embrace the United States was India, a rising superpower, nuclear-armed, economically vibrant, democratic, and soon to be the world's most populous state. For half a century since Nehru's declaration of nonalignment, India had defined itself internationally in opposition to the United States. As one of the founders in 1955 of the nonaligned movement at Bandung, India helped define nonalignment as anti-American. Indeed, for reasons of regional politics (Pakistan's relations with China and with the United States) as well as ideology, India aligned itself firmly with the Soviet Union.

That began to fade with the end of the Cold War, and over time relations with the United States might have come to full flower. Nonetheless, September 11 made the transition instantaneous. India, facing its own Taliban-related terrorism in Kashmir, immediately invited the United States to use not just its airspace but its military bases for the campaign in Afghanistan. The Nehru era had ended in a flash. Nonalignment was dead. India had openly declared itself ready to join Pax Americana.

The transformation of Russian foreign policy has been more subtle but, in the long run, perhaps even more far-reaching. It was symbolized by the announcement on October 17 that after 37 years Russia was closing its massive listening post at Lourdes, Cuba. Lourdes was one of the last remaining symbols both of Soviet global ambitions and of reflexive anti-Americanism.

Now, leaving Lourdes is no miracle. It would likely have happened anyway. It is a $200 million a year luxury at a time when the Russian military is starving. But taken together with the simultaneously reported Russian decision to leave Cam Ranh Bay (the former U.S. Naval base in South Vietnam, leased rent-free in 1979 for 25 years), it signaled a new orientation of Russian policy. On his trip to European Union headquarters in early October, President Vladimir Putin made clear that he sees Russia's future with the West—and that he wants the West to see its future including Russia.

This shift is tactical for now. America needs help in the Afghan war. Russia can provide it. It retains great influence over the "-stans," the former Soviet Central Asian republics. From their side, the Russians need hands off their own Islamic problem in Chechnya. Putin came to deal. In Brussels, he not only relaxed his opposition to NATO's expansion to the borders of Russia, not only signaled his willingness to compromise with the United States on missile defense, but broadly hinted that Russia should in essence become part of NATO.

Were this movement to develop and deepen, to become strategic and permanent, it could become one of the great revolutions in world affairs. For 300 years since Peter the Great, Russia has been unable to decide whether it belongs east or west. But in a world realigned to face the challenge of radical Islam, it is hard to see why Russia could not, in principle, be part of the West. With the Soviet ideology abandoned, Russia's grievances against the West are reduced to the standard clash of geopolitical ambitions. But just as France and Germany and Britain have learned to harmonize their old geopolitical rivalries within a Western structure, there is no reason Russia could not.

Cam Ranh Bay and Lourdes signal Russia's renunciation of global ambitions. What remain are Russia's regional ambitions—to protect the integrity of the Russian state itself, and to command a sphere of influence including its heavily Islamic "near abroad." For the first decade of the post-Cold War era, we showed little sympathy for the first of these goals and none for the second. We looked with suspicion on Russia's reassertion of hegemony over once-Soviet space. The great fight over Caspian oil, for example,

was intended to ensure that no pipeline went through Russia (or Iran), lest Russia end up wielding too much regional power.

That day may be over. Today we welcome Russia as a regional power, particularly in Islamic Central Asia. With the United States and Russia facing a similar enemy—the radical Islamic threat is more virulent towards America but more proximate to Russia—Russia finds us far more accommodating to its aspirations in the region. The United States would not mind if Moscow once again gained hegemony in Central Asia. Indeed, we would be delighted to give it back Afghanistan—except that Russia (and Afghanistan) would decline the honor. But American recognition of the legitimacy of Russian Great Power status in Central Asia is clearly part of the tacit bargain in the U.S.-Russian realignment. Russian accommodation to NATO expansion is the other part. The Afghan campaign marks the first stage of a new, and quite possibly historic, rapprochement between Russia and the West.

The third and most reluctant player in the realignment game is China. China is the least directly threatened by radical Islam. It has no Chechnya or Kashmir. But it does have simmering Islamic discontent in its western provinces. It is sympathetic to any attempt to tame radical Islam because of the long-term threat it poses to Chinese unity. At the just completed Shanghai Summit, China was noticeably more accommodating than usual to the United States. It is still no ally, and still sees us, correctly, as standing in the way of its aspirations to hegemony in the western Pacific. Nonetheless, the notion of China's becoming the nidus for a new anti-American coalition is dead. At least for now. There is no Russian junior partner to play. Pakistan, which has thrown in with the United States, will not play either. And there is no real point. For the foreseeable future, the energies of the West will be directed against a common enemy. China's posture of sympathetic neutrality is thus a passive plus: It means that not a single Great Power on the planet lies on the wrong side of the new divide. This is historically unprecedented. Call it hyper-unipolarity. And for the United States, it is potentially a great gain.

With Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa on the sidelines, the one region still in play—indeed the prize in the new Great Game—is the Islamic world. It is obviously divided on the question of jihad against the infidel. Bin Laden still speaks for a minority. The religious parties in Pakistan, for example, in the past decade never got more than 5 percent of the vote *combined*. But bin Ladenism clearly has support in the Islamic "street." True, the street has long been overrated. During the Gulf War, it was utterly silent and utterly passive. Nonetheless, after five years of ceaseless agitation through Al Jazeera, and after yet another decade of failed repressive governance, the street is more radicalized and more potentially mobilizable. For now, the corrupt ruling Arab elites have largely lined up with the United States, at least on paper. But their holding power against the radical Islamic challenge is not absolute. The war on terrorism, and in particular the Afghan war, will be decisive in determining in whose camp the Islamic world will end up: ours—that of the United States, the West, Russia, India—or Osama bin Laden's.

IV. The War

The asymmetry is almost comical. The whole world against one man. If in the end the United States, backed by every Great Power, cannot succeed in defeating some cave dwellers in the most backward country on earth, then the entire structure of world stability, which rests ultimately on the pacifying deterrent effect of American power, will be fatally threatened.

Which is why so much hinges on the success of the war on terrorism. Initially, success need not be defined globally. No one expects a quick victory over an entrenched and shadowy worldwide network. Success does, however, mean demonstrating that the United States has the will and power to enforce the Bush doctrine that governments will be held accountable for the terrorists they harbor. Success therefore requires making an example of the Taliban. Getting Osama is not the immediate goal. Everyone understands that it is hard, even for a superpower, to go on a cave-to-cave manhunt. Toppling regimes is another matter. For the Taliban to hold off the United States is an astounding triumph. Every day that they remain in place is a rebuke to American power. Indeed, as the war drags on, their renown, particularly in the Islamic world, will only grow.

After September 11, the world awaited the show of American might. If that show fails, then the list of countries lining up on the other side of the new divide will grow. This is particularly true of the Arab world with its small, fragile states. Weaker states invariably seek to join coalitions of the strong. For obvious reasons of safety, they go with those who appear to be the winners. (Great Powers, on the other hand, tend to support coalitions of the weak as a way to create equilibrium. Thus Britain was forever balancing power on the Continent by supporting coalitions of the weak against a succession of would-be hegemons.) Jordan is the classic example. Whenever there is a conflict, it tries to decide who is going to win, and joins that side. In the Gulf War, it first decided wrong, then switched to rejoin the American side. That was not out of affection for Washington. It was cold realpolitik. The improbable pro-American Gulf War coalition managed to include such traditional American adversaries as

Syria because of an accurate Syrian calculation of who could overawe the region.

The Arab states played both sides against the middle during the Cold War, often abruptly changing sides (e.g., Egypt during the '60s and '70s). They lined up with the United States against Iraq at the peak of American unipolarity at the beginning of the 1990s. But with subsequent American weakness and irresolution, in the face both of post-Gulf War Iraqi defiance and of repeated terrorist attacks that garnered the most feckless American military responses, respect for American power declined. Inevitably, the pro-American coalition fell apart.

The current pro-American coalition will fall apart even more quickly if the Taliban prove a match for the United States. Contrary to the current delusion that the Islamic states will respond to American demonstrations of solicitousness and sensitivity (such as a halt in the fighting during Ramadan), they are waiting to see the success of American power before irrevocably committing themselves. The future of Islamic and Arab allegiance will depend on whether the Taliban are brought to grief.

The assumption after September 11 was that an aroused America will win. If we demonstrate that we cannot win, no coalition with moderate Arabs will long survive. But much more depends on our success than just the allegiance of that last piece of the geopolitical puzzle, the Islamic world. The entire new world alignment is at stake.

States line up with more powerful states not out of love but out of fear. And respect. The fear of radical Islam has created a new, almost unprecedented coalition of interests among the Great Powers. But that coalition of fear is held together also by respect for American power and its ability to provide safety under the American umbrella. Should we succeed in the war on terrorism, first in Afghanistan, we will be cementing the New World Order—the expansion of the American sphere of peace to include Russia and India (with a more neutral China)—just now beginning to take shape. Should we fail, it will be *sauve qui peut*. Other countries—and not just our new allies but even our old allies in Europe—will seek their separate peace. If the guarantor of world peace for the last half century cannot succeed in a war of self-defense against Afghanistan(!), then the whole post-World War II structure—open borders, open trade, open seas, open societies—will begin to unravel.

The first President Bush sought to establish a New World Order. He failed, in part because he allowed himself to lose a war he had just won. The second President Bush never sought a New World Order. It was handed to him on Sept. 11. To maintain it, however, he has a war to win. ♦

Michael Ramirez

Syria Yes, Israel No?

Our anti-terror coalition doesn't distinguish friend from foe.

By Norman Podhoretz

During Desert Shield, the run-up to the Gulf War of 1991, President George Bush told a visitor that Israel would join in the fight "over my dead body." His reason was that the coalition of Arab states he was building to eject Iraq from Kuwait would break up if Israel were involved.

Everyone knows this, but there is something else that few know now and fewer chose to know then: When Saddam Hussein started firing Scud missiles at Israel, several Arab members of the coalition—including even Syria, whose hostility to the Jewish state was easily a match for Saddam's—announced that they would "understand" (that is, tolerate) a military response by Israel. Nevertheless, the first George Bush turned a blind eye to this green light, so persuaded was he that Israeli entry into the war would break up the coalition. Refusing to give the Israelis the codes their planes would need to assure they would not be shot down by ours, he stopped them from taking to the air.

Yet the elder Bush must have been aware that special Israeli pilots had been training for years to fly low enough to find the Scud launchers in their hiding places (with the help of target-spotting commandos who had also been preparing for this very mission). Our own pilots were not allowed to descend to such perilously low altitudes. And so, as a direct consequence of the exclusion of Israel, Saddam emerged from his defeat with his Scuds intact, and only the dummies destroyed

Now a different George Bush is sitting in the White House, confronted by a different threat emanating from the Middle East. Even so, the younger Bush has gone about meeting this new threat of terrorism in much the same way his father did in preparing to throw Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait and preventing him from invading Saudi Arabia. Now, as then, the building of a coalition in which, it is deemed, Arab and other Muslim states must be included, has become so obsessive that it has almost turned into an end in itself rather than a means of fighting a war. And now as then, this overriding imperative has dictated the exclusion of Israel.

Yet today, George W. Bush is under no compulsion to put together a semblance of the coalition his father rightly calculated he needed. In 1991, half the country—and practically all the Democrats in Congress—opposed the idea of going to war against Iraq. Hence it was to provide himself with political cover (and a sharing of the financial burden) that the elder Bush assembled his coalition. In 2001, by contrast, some 90 percent of the American people are solidly behind the war on terrorism, and the Democrats are all on board. (Tom Daschle, the majority leader of the Democratic-controlled Senate, seconded the president's magnificent speech before Congress on September 20 with unprecedented fervor: Not even Pearl Harbor elicited words from the repentant isolationists that came close to Daschle's in bipartisan solidarity.)

Why then has George W. Bush been following in the footsteps of his father? Specifically, why has Secretary of State Colin Powell been pitching woo at some of the very states against which the president himself declared we were going to war?

After all, the president vowed that we would make no distinction between terrorists like Osama bin Laden and the states that had financed and trained and provided safe haven and diplomatic protection for them over the years. These states, the president and leading members of his administration kept repeating, were no less guilty of the aggression against us on September 11 than the terrorists who depended upon them.

To make matters even more bizarre, a few of the countries courted by Powell—Syria and Iran, for example—were on his own department's list of such sponsors of terrorism. Along the same lines, several groups officially recognized by the State Department as terrorists, including Hamas and Hezbollah, were omitted from a new list of organizations whose assets were to be frozen as part of the war we had declared against them.

But not even all this exhausts the bizarre aspects of the situation, which extend not only to our self-declared enemies but to our "friends" and "allies" in the Arab world—the two most prominent being Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These "moderates" have sympathetically clucked their

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

Henry Payne

tongues over the bombing of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and have made all—or anyway some—of the right noises about the evils of terrorism. And why not, since the despotic rulers of those countries are all potential targets in their own right? Indeed, Hosni Mubarak came to power in Egypt only after Anwar Sadat had been assassinated by Islamic militants.

This, however, is not the whole story of how Saudi Arabia and Egypt relate to the war against the terrorists in their midst.

Mubarak and the monarchy in Saudi Arabia may wish for various reasons to play ball with us, and we are constantly being assured that they are doing so. Thus, to start with the latter, in the early days of our struggle to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban regime under whose protection Osama bin Laden had long been operating, Phil Reeker, a spokesman for the State Department, announced that the Saudis "have agreed to everything we have asked of them in our campaign against terrorism."

If this were true, all it would have meant was that we had not asked them to do much of anything, especially not to allow us to launch bombers from Saudi bases. But Reeker's statement was a bald-faced lie.

As of late October, 94 countries had complied with our request that airlines entering this country provide U.S. Customs with advance lists of passengers, so that they could be checked for possible terrorists; the Saudis are among a handful (along with other great friends of the U.S. like Egypt, Kuwait, and Jordan) that have said no. The Saudis have also balked at investigating the 15 hijackers of September 11 who identified themselves as citizens of Saudi Arabia and obtained their visas there. And the Saudis have not exactly been enthusiastic about joining the more than 80 countries that are freezing the assets of terrorist cells. (A Treasury official last week praised the Saudis for their "cooperation," while acknowledging that the accounts in question may simply be under surveillance, not frozen.) To be sure, Saudi apologists whisper that, behind the scenes, they are providing us with valuable intelligence. But if so, it has not been valuable enough to help us find bin Laden in the caves of Afghanistan.

Nor has the intelligence we have been getting from that other much-touted bastion of "moderation," Egypt, led us to bin Laden's hideout. Admittedly, unlike the Saudi rulers, Mubarak has granted overflight rights to American warplanes. Perhaps that is why the United States is preparing to supply him with new weapons. Whatever else Mubarak plans to do with these weapons, however, he has repeatedly expressed his determination to refrain from using them—or the rest of the huge arsenal with which we have supplied him—against Afghanistan or any other Muslim country. He has in addition particularly cautioned us not to risk offending Islamic "public opinion" either by "widening the battlefield" to Iraq (with which he has been working to improve his relations), or by bomb-

ing Afghanistan during the holy Islamic month of Ramadan (even though it was precisely during Ramadan that Egypt itself attacked Israel in 1973).

In interviews with Western journalists like Lally Weymouth of *Newsweek*, Mubarak attacks bin Laden, deplores suicide bombing, and voices sympathy for America. Yet in his own officially controlled press, not even the relentless assaults on Israel (and Jews in general) are more disgusting than the vitriol directed at America.

Here are only two of many dozens of examples. First, shortly after September 11, in *Al Akhbar*, a daily newspaper sponsored by the Egyptian government, a columnist wrote: "The Statue of Liberty, in New York Harbor, must be destroyed because of . . . the idiotic American policy that goes from disgrace to disgrace in the swamp of bias and blind fanaticism. . . . [T]he age of the American collapse has begun." Then, after the bombing of Afghanistan had started, the editor of *Al Ahram*, an even more important government daily, reported that the food we were dropping into Afghanistan "may have been genetically treated. . . . If this is true, the U.S. is committing a crime against humanity by giving the Afghani people hazardous humanitarian products."

This kind of filth could not be published without Mubarak's acquiescence. But very likely he thinks it serves as a safety valve, deflecting opposition to him on the part of a population that shares in such views. Evidently, giving a new twist to an old cliché, Colin Powell, and presumably his boss, too, believe that *even* with friends like these we *still* need enemies whom we can also cajole and bribe and flatter and whitewash. Which brings me back to the question of why.

The answer usually given is that Powell and Bush are convinced that even lip-service support from some Islamic countries will keep the war against terrorism from being interpreted as a war against Islam, which is how bin Laden and his allies have been trying to portray it.

Never mind that there is an irrefutable argument against this charge in the fact that we have in recent years aligned ourselves both militarily and politically with Muslims: first in the Gulf, and then in Bosnia and Kosovo (where we sided with Muslims against Christians). Scarcely mentioning this fact, we have instead bought into the notion that the price of securing even such minimal support as we receive from Saudi Arabia and Egypt is to exclude Israel, a natural ally in any war against terrorism. It is a price Colin Powell is willing to pay. As he has made abundantly clear over the past month, the only way the Israelis can help us in *our* war against terrorism is not (shades of Desert Storm!) by participating in it with all the expertise they have gained in this area through much bloody experience, but rather by exercising "restraint" whenever terrorist aggressions are committed against *them*.

Nor is this all. The administration has no compunction about pressuring Israel to try yet again for a deal with the godfather of contemporary terrorism, Yasser Arafat. This holder of the Nobel Peace Prize is even now continuing to harbor terrorist organizations (at least one of which, Hezbollah, has participated in actions against the United States) in the areas over which he rules as head of the Palestinian Authority. If the PA were a nation, this would qualify it as a target of our war against state sponsors of terrorism. Yet it is not to close that loophole that we are pressuring Israel to accede to a Palestinian state. We are doing so because we imagine that this will lessen Islamic hostility to us and undercut the popularity bin Laden enjoys among Muslims all over the world.

Assuming that Arafat would now accept what he refused when it was offered to him last year by Israel and the United States, it is yet another delusion to believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state at this, of all moments, would have the desired effects. On the contrary: it would be seen by the Islamic world, and correctly, as a capitulation to and a reward for terrorism. It would therefore add contempt to the hatred already felt for us as the embodiment of modernity and all that modernity entails.

Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon, undoubtedly committed a great diplomatic blunder in warning the West against trying to do unto Israel today what England and France did unto Czechoslovakia when they surrendered it to Hitler at Munich in 1938. But Sharon's mistake lay in talking so bluntly in public to his allies and benefactors, not in the substance of his speech.

The upshot is that the coalition of Muslim states put together by Colin Powell is proving to be of no value to us. I would go further: It is causing us harm, and not alone by making us look like appeasers in our constant rebukes of Israel. We have been pulling our punches in Afghanistan, and a major cause is fear that a greater deployment of our power would put a strain on the coalition. That same fear, I suspect, is also behind the record speeds achieved by some administration spokesmen in fleeing from any suggestion that Iraq ought to be our next target.

Finally, and most damaging of all, by allying ourselves in a war against terrorism with states that harbor terrorism, we create moral and intellectual confusion, and make it even harder to define an already shadowy enemy.

I realize that a similar complaint was lodged against our alliance with Stalin in the war against Hitler. But in forging a pact with the devil, as Winston Churchill put it, we derived a great military asset. An analogous, if lesser, military consideration justifies our current alliance with

Pakistan, from whose territory we have been able to stage raids into Afghanistan.

But no such military benefit has come from our courtship of Syria and Yemen and Iran, or even our "friendship" with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. And who can tell whether the "intelligence" they are all said to be sharing with us is reliable? If R.W. Apple of the *New York Times* is right, "the sole known commando raid into enemy territory" in Afghanistan provided "ample evidence that American intelligence about the Taliban is thin."

On September 11, we suffered the bloodiest aggression against us on our own soil in our history. War was declared on the United States, and the United States responded by going to war. But in no small measure because of the irrational compulsion to assemble a coalition that Arab and/or Islamic states would be willing to join, we have not been fighting this war with the all-out energy we summoned up after Pearl Harbor.

We, the American people, passionately want and need and demand that the enemy be defeated as decisively as Germany and Japan were by 1945. (Seventy-two percent of us are even in favor of restoring the draft!) It is not merely our physical security that has for the first time been called into question. A great blow has also been struck against our confidence in our strength and power, and we hunger for—yes—revenge.

Beyond revenge, we crave "a new birth" of the confidence we used to have in ourselves and in "America the Beautiful." But there is only one road to this lovely condition of the spirit, and it runs through what Roosevelt and Churchill called the "unconditional surrender" of the enemy. If we go on dithering, our lives will remain at permanent risk. So, too, will something deeper than the desire for physical security that has been stirred and agitated by the ferocious wound we received on September 11: a wound that is still suppurating and sore for lack of the healing balm that only a more coherent and wholehearted approach to the war will bring.

What I mean is that nothing less than the soul of this country is at stake, and that nothing less than an unambiguous victory will save us from yet another disappointment in ourselves and another despairing disillusion with our leaders. Only this time the disappointment and the despair might well possess enough force to topple us over just as surely as those hijacked planes did to the twin towers of the World Trade Center. ♦

You deserve a factual look at…

100+ Years of Zionism and 50+ Years of Israel
What Can the World Learn from It?

With Israel once again under attack, engaged for over one year in the Al-Aksa Intifada, it is time to reflect on the singular success of the Jewish state. Political Zionism was started in 1894 by Theodor Herzl, a journalist and thoroughly assimilated Austrian Jew, who was assigned by his Vienna paper to cover the notorious Dreyfus trial in France. The experience of seeing this Jewish officer being railroaded to a life sentence on Devil's Island led him to the recognition that life for Jews in Europe was untenable and that the solution of the "Jewish problem" lay in the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

What are the facts?

The Birth of a Dream. The return to Zion had for 2,000 years been the dream of Europe's dispersed Jews, the only hope in their miserable lives. "Next year in Jerusalem" had always been the watchword. But nothing was done to bring this dream to reality. Theodor Herzl organized the first Zionist Congress in Basel (Switzerland) in 1897 and political Zionism was born.

The concept of creating a new nation in what was then a sparsely settled country was something totally new, never before attempted in the history of mankind. But Herzl's vision fired up world Jewry and especially the Jews of eastern Europe, who were despairing under the yoke of Russian oppression and recurring pogroms. Energized by Zionist aspirations, British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour issued his famous Declaration in 1917, by which Palestine was established as a national home for the Jewish people. In 1922, the League of Nations entrusted Britain with the Mandate for Palestine. Regrettably, and contrary to the Balfour Declaration and the requirement of the Mandate, Britain decided that the provisions for setting up a Jewish national home would not apply east of the Jordan River. That area constituted three-fourths of the territory of the Mandate and eventually became the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan. Only one-quarter of Palestine remained to fulfill the Jewish dream.

> "One would think that the world, especially the emerging nations, would wish to learn from Israel's example, so as to emulate its achievement. Unfortunately, almost the exact opposite is the case."

A Nation is Born and Succeeds. The modern state of Israel was founded in May 1948, just over 53 years ago—fifty years after Herzl formulated the concept. Immediately upon its creation, the country was invaded by the armies of five Arab countries. With a total Jewish population of only about 650,000, and with limited armaments and resources, the ragtag army of Israel defeated the combined might of the aggressors and established itself firmly within its boundaries. Transjordan (now renamed Jordan) stayed in possession of Judea/Samaria (now known as the "West Bank") and the eastern part of Jerusalem. Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip. The price was very high. In this bloodiest of wars imposed on Israel, over 6,000 citizen-soldiers died – over 1% of the population. It is as if the United States were to suffer a loss of close to 3 million people! It was not the only war that its neighbors visited on Israel. In the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel once again prevailed; it repossessed Judea/Samaria (the "West Bank"), the eastern part of Jerusalem, and conquered the vast Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. And once more, in 1973, the Arabs tried to destroy Israel in the Yom Kippur War. Once more, they suffered defeat.

Despite being under constant attack and siege and having suffered over 20,000 dead in those defensive wars, Israel created social and political systems and an economy that continues to amaze experts worldwide. Israel is the only truly democratic country in the entire Middle East, with governmental structure and institutions comparable to those of the United States. Its economy—despite the enormous defense expenditures mandated by the aggressiveness of its neighbors and despite the effort and expense of having absorbed more than 2.5 million immigrants (four times the population at the creation of the state)—can only be described as a miracle of human accomplishment. Virtually everything—infrastructure such as roads, railroads, ports, airports, water carriers, electricity stations and distribution networks—had to be built from a minimal base. Today, Israel's economy is booming. It is a leader in high-tech technology; it has created one of the most advanced agricultural systems in the world; it is one of world leaders in economic growth rate; it has one of the highest per-capita incomes in the world; and it is the world leader in exports per capita.

We have in this century seen the demise of many "isms", the most prominent failures being those of Communism and Nazism. But Zionism, the national movement of the Jewish people, has flourished despite incredible obstacles—to an extent that the visionary Theodor Herzl could not have possibly imagined 100 years ago. One would think that the world, especially the emerging nations, would wish to learn from Israel's example, so as to emulate its achievements. Unfortunately, almost the exact opposite is the case. Goaded by the Arab nations, inalterably hostile to Israel and single-mindedly dedicated to its destruction, the United Nations has offered more than 100 resolutions censuring and condemning Israel's actions.

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

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O, Cleopatra!

Globalization in antiquity

By Paul A. Cantor

The issue of globalization is very much on our minds at the moment—and the experience of the ancient world proves an aid to understanding what we think of as a uniquely modern problem.

It was Jean-Marie Guéhenno who argued in his brilliant 1995 book *The End of the Nation-State* that during the age of empire—beginning with the conquests of Alexander the Great—the ancient world embarked on a vast experiment in cosmopolitanism that eerily foreshadows what we are experiencing today. What we refer to as Hellenization or Romanization in the ancient world may well be the first examples of the phenomenon we now call globalization. As alien civilizations clashed in the all-embracing grasp of the Roman empire, the results proved unpredictable. Sometimes Rome managed to impose its cultural will on its subject peoples, sometimes these foreign cultures had a profound effect in reshaping the Roman way of life, and sometimes the clash produced hybrid forms never seen before. With the cultural fate of the ancient world hanging in the balance, Hellenization and Romanization generated the same peculiar mixture of hopes and fears that globalization produces around the world today.

Anyone interested in what we can learn from ancient experiments in globalization should make every effort to see the exhibition "Cleopatra of Egypt: From History to Myth," which runs from October 20 to March 3 at the Field Museum in Chicago. This is the only opportunity in the Western hemisphere to see an exhibition that has already fascinated audiences at the Palazzo Ruspoli in Rome and the British Museum in London (where I saw it in August). This is not a blockbuster exhibition in the King Tut tradition; do not expect to see anything on the order of the Rosetta Stone or the Venus de Milo, or even anything with a curse on it.

But what this exhibition does have is extraordinary historical and educational value. It is one of the most thoughtfully assembled and thought-provoking shows I have ever seen. And it is not just about one Egyptian queen. It also deals with the great Romans she encountered: Julius Caesar, Mark Antony, and Augustus Caesar. "Cleopatra of Egypt" gives a comprehensive view of the Mediterranean world at one of the great turning points of history, when the Roman Republic changed into the Roman Empire—a moment of exceptional cultural complexity, ferment, and anxiety.

The woman we know simply as Cleopatra was really Cleopatra VII (69-30 B.C.), descended from a line of Macedonian Greeks who had ruled Egypt since 305 B.C., when Ptolemy, one of Alexander's generals, had himself proclaimed pharaoh. The Ptolemies were foreigners in Egypt and ruled the North African and Middle Eastern portion of Alexander's empire, a portion much diminished by the time of Cleopatra VII. Being foreigners, the Ptolemies had a problem in establishing and maintaining their political authority. One of the most fascinating

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aspects of the Cleopatra exhibition is the dual way the Ptolemies represented themselves. In some sculpture, they had themselves pictured in traditional Egyptian style, looking for all the world like pharaohs, with the customary headdress and other insignia of Egyptian power. But other busts and statues of the Ptolemies show a distinctively classical look, typical of what we expect from Greek and Roman sculpture of the period. Showing one face to their Egyptian subjects and another to the larger Mediterranean world, the Ptolemies presented themselves as assimilated to Egypt's native culture even as they tried to demonstrate that they were true to their Hellenistic heritage.

The political complexity of negotiating between two cultures is nowhere more evident than with Cleopatra herself. She is credited with being the first of the Ptolemies to learn the Egyptian language (more than two centuries into their dynasty!), and yet in moments of crisis she repeatedly turned to Roman leaders for help and ended up bringing Egypt firmly within the orbit of Rome. In some of the exhibition's pieces, she is pictured as an Egyptian goddess, Isis or Hathor. But in others, her features look Greek, and she seems modeled on an Olympian goddess like Aphrodite. Indeed, as the exhibition catalogue explains in detail, the identification of a given statue as Cleopatra VII can be extremely difficult. A statue long displayed in the Vatican as an image of Cleopatra's suicide is now identified as a figure out of Greek mythology, the sleeping Ariadne.

But by including numerous representations of Cleopatra on jewelry and coins, the exhibition helps the viewer arrive eventually at a reasonably consistent image of the great queen—more handsome than beautiful, one is tempted to say, but one can also get a sense of how this woman succeeded in captivating one Roman ruler after another.

Julius Caesar was so smitten that he brought her to live with him in Rome from 46 to 44 B.C., and he created something of a scandal by having a gold statue of Cleopatra placed in the Temple of Venus on the Via Sacra. Roman merchants and other travelers had already brought the cult of Isis to Rome before Cleopatra's arrival, but her presence helped ignite a kind of Egyptomania in the city, culminating in the bizarre Egyptian pyramid a Roman named Cestius built for himself as a tomb in 12 B.C. (still standing today, adjacent to the Protestant Cemetery and the graves of Keats and Shelley). The Vatican and Capitoline museums in Rome are filled with "Egyptian" artifacts manufactured by Roman craftsmen to meet a seemingly limitless demand for this kind of exotica. The Cleopatra exhibition features several such items, including both a terra cotta relief and a painted plaster panel featuring scenes of the Nile. The great strength of the exhibition is that it documents the Egyptianizing of Rome as well as the Romanizing of Egypt. We see sculpture in Egypt being reshaped on classical models, but at the same time we see how the Romans came to worship Egyptian deities and even adopt Egyptian funerary practices.

Thus the Cleopatra exhibition can teach us an important lesson—that globalization moves in both directions. The military victor is not always the cultural winner, and, as several essays in the exhibition catalogue point out, many writers in Rome, including Virgil, worried about the corrupting effects of Egyptian and other foreign influences. The *Aeneid* pictures Rome threatened by inhuman deities arising out of the East and associated with Cleopatra. As Virgil tells the story, the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C. was the triumph of the good old gods of Rome over Cleopatra, Mark Antony, and the animal gods of Egypt. But Rome was eventually conquered by a religion arising out of its Eastern provinces, namely Christianity. No better example could be cited of the unpredictable effects of globalization. Rome's imperial penetration into the East eventually enabled an Eastern religion to penetrate the very heart of the empire and remake it into a Christian community under the rule of the Emperor Constantine.

In the wide variety of objects on display, the Cleopatra exhibition is very entertaining. If you like coin collections or jewelry, this is certainly the exhibition for you. And although there are no world-class treasures, there are some extraordinarily beautiful works, beginning with the image of a dog from a mosaic floor excavated in 1993 in Alexandria. Looking uncannily like Nipper—the RCA trademark in the famous "His Master's Voice" advertisement for the gramophone—the dog is among the most realistic representations in ancient art, especially in its mournful eyes.

The exhibition also includes many examples of the kind of luxury items that would have adorned a court like Cleopatra's and made her daily life fit for a queen. I was especially struck by three agate vessels on loan from the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. In another reminder of the potential for globalization in the ancient world, the catalogue points out that similar agate vessels have been found as far away as China, but whether they were made in China and shipped to Egypt or vice versa is hard to tell. The exhibition also contains several quirky, one-of-a-kind

items. In the most oddball example of cultural hybridity, a stele found near the temple of the Egyptian dog-god Anubis in Memphis bears an inscription in Greek advertising the talents of a dream prophet: "I interpret dreams having a commission from god. With good fortune! A Cretan is he who interprets these things." As early as the third century B.C., Egyptian and Greek religious traditions were already being fused.

Perhaps the rarest item in the exhibition is the only known surviving example of a royal order issued by Cleopatra, recorded on a papyrus in 33 B.C. and preserved, like many ancient writings, only because it was later used to wrap a mummy. The papyrus is a grant of tax privileges to Publius Canidius, a close political associate of Mark Antony. As the catalogue reports, "Canidius was permitted to export 10,000 sacks of wheat from Egypt and to import 5,000 amphoras of wine from Cos each year, and enjoyed exemptions from duty on these items, and, moreover, in perpetuity from all taxes on his land in Egypt." This was presumably some kind of payoff for services to Cleopatra's lover, Antony, and I for one am relieved to learn that even while the ancient world was globalizing, it managed to carry on the age-old tradition of political corruption at the local level.

No self-respecting museum installation would be complete these days without a few items of prurient interest, especially one that deals with a famous lover. The British Museum dug deep into its vaults and came up with two examples of ancient pornography. In one, a Roman terra cotta lamp from about 40-80 A.D., a plump woman is taking full advantage of a rather remarkable Nile crocodile. (In the true spirit of scholarship, the catalogue soberly reports: "Although made many decades later than her death, this may be an obscene caricature of Cleopatra VII.")

Even more interesting is a marble relief of unknown provenance picturing a Nile scene with a couple—how shall I put this delicately?—doing it Anubis-style in the middle of a boat. (The catalogue asks: "Could the relief even be a savage caricature of the relationship between Cleopatra and Mark Antony?")

Above: A third-century B.C. Egyptian advertisement for a dream interpreter, written in Greek. Opposite page: A second-century B.C. mosaic of a dog, from Alexandria.

A museum show subtitled "From History to Myth" has to be careful about its claims, and to its credit this exhibition never sensationalizes its material and always makes it clear what is purely conjectural in its ascriptions. Still, it is good to see that the curators have a sense of humor and chose to give us a glimpse of the seamier side of ancient artistic representation.

And if these objects really were making fun of Cleopatra and Mark Antony, they do provide a footnote to history, illustrating the relentless character of the propaganda campaign Augustus launched against his enemies in Egypt. The *Aeneid* was in some sense the highest flower of this campaign, but evidently Augustus' propagandists were not above an obscene cartoon here and there.

In the end "Cleopatra in Egypt" succeeds in its task. By an artful juxtaposition of objects and images, it manages to make some of the most interesting and complex figures of antiquity come to life. The catalogue that accompanies the exhibition is sumptuous in the way catalogues tend to be these days; you may have a hard time hauling it home, but you will not regret it. The photographs of the objects on display do an excellent job of reproducing them. In particular, three-dimensional objects such as busts, statues, and reliefs are dramatically lit in a way that helps bring out their character on the printed page. The catalogue essays and entries supply all sorts of useful background information; my one complaint is that with the assignments divided up among ten different authors and not well coordinated, there is a great deal of repetition in the text.

In any event, as good as the catalogue may be, this is an exhibition that begs to be viewed in person and not just read about in a book. I would hate to have missed the chance to sort out the multiple images of Cleopatra—and the eyes of that Egyptian Nipper have to be seen to be believed. ♦

Japanese-American internees, 1942. Hulton / Archive.

Second-Guessing FDR

The internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. BY KEN MASUGI

Among those worried that the United States may react to the slaughter of September 11 by turning against Arab Americans, frequent reference is made to the relocation of 110,000 ethnic Japanese (among them my parents and other relatives) from the West Coast a few months following Pearl Harbor.

A pair of recent books unwittingly aid in understanding that widely condemned action: Greg Robinson's *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans* and Eric L. Muller's *Free to Die for Their Country: The Story of the Japanese American Draft Resisters in World War II*. Muller, a law professor at the University of North Carolina, interviewed Japanese Americans who turned against their country in time of war and resisted the draft (an uncle of mine was among these). Robinson, a historian at the University of Quebec, notes the translation of Roosevelt's suspicions of Japan into virtual dismissal of Japanese-American loyalty.

These are scholarly contributions in a field where publication is dominated by popularizers and ambulance chasers, but they aim merely to confirm what has become conventional wisdom: Few actions of the Supreme Court have occasioned so much criticism as the 1944 *Korematsu* v. *United States* decision, which legitimized the relocation.

By Order of the President
FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans
by Greg Robinson
Harvard University Press, 336 pp., $27.95

Free to Die for Their Country
The Story of the Japanese American Draft Resisters in World War II
by Eric L. Muller
University of Chicago Press, 256 pp., $27.50

In the years since, popular novels and films, such as *Snow Falling on Cedars*, have trumpeted the injustice of the drastic action. Racism, economic opportunism, and wild charges all befell the hapless minority. In 1988, following the recommendations of a commission appointed by his predecessor, President Reagan signed a bill apologizing to those relocated and giving $20,000 to each of those still living.

But, in fact, the case for relocation was a much closer call at the time than hindsight has allowed it to be. Both Robinson's *By Order of the President* and Muller's *Free to Die for Their Country* are forced to ignore important parts of the historical record in order to assert their conclusion that "ethnic profiling" is reprehensible even in time of war, with all the undermining of national security that might follow. As Robinson puts it, Roosevelt "refused on racial grounds to accept them on equal terms as Americans. . . . This refusal blinded him to the invidious and undemocratic character of the repressive actions he and the government undertook."

To advance his case, Robinson sifts through the disputes within the government and among Roosevelt's special advisers over the loyalty of ethnic Japanese. Some advocated total relocation, while others maintained that loyalty interviews should suffice for isolating the potential subversives. Hadn't the most dangerous ethnic Japanese already been picked up immediately following Pearl Harbor? Robinson argues that "Roosevelt's failure was a lack of compassion, or, more precisely, of empathy"—an odd charge to make of a president at war.

Of course, one must take seriously Robinson's arguments about Roosevelt's political opportunism in 1944, when he delayed the closing of the camps. This may have been nothing more than an example of the political calculations Roosevelt was forced to make, as was Lincoln in the Civil War. But, for Robinson, what lies at the bottom is Roosevelt's prejudices about race and nationality. "During the prewar years the president consistently regarded Japanese Americans as adjuncts of Japan and therefore as potential enemies despite their American birth or decades-long residence in the United States. . . . Roosevelt automatically extended . . . hostility and suspicion to the entire Japanese American community."

What Robinson is finally incapable of appreciating is Roosevelt's strategic vision. After all, if Imperial Japan

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thought in racial terms, must Roosevelt ignore this? Though he cites the distinguished historian John J. Stephan's *Hawaii Under the Rising Sun*, Robinson ignores the evidence Stephan presents about Imperial Japan's war plans for using America's Japanese in the occupation of Hawaii. The primary flaw in Robinson's argument is his failure to consider the relocation in the light of foreign policy exigencies.

Thus, Robinson completely omits the "Niihau episode." Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, a Japanese fighter pilot landed his crippled Zero fighter-bomber on the tiny island of Niihau, at the western end of the Hawaiian archipelago. He was able to persuade an American of Japanese ancestry to assist him in taking over the island, with its small number of inhabitants, who knew nothing of the attack.

Eventually, loyalists (including other Japanese Americans) were able to kill their confused neighbor, and the pilot committed suicide. But to claim, as Robinson and virtually all of the critics of the relocation do, that there was a "complete absence of any documented case of espionage or sabotage by Japanese Americans" is clearly wrong.

What Niihau revealed to those responsible for the national security of the United States is that a completely ordinary Japanese American was capable of subversive behavior. What temptations would other Japanese Americans have in case of hostilities on the mainland? After all, the *issei* (immigrants from Japan) were not citizens, and many of the *nisei* (Americans of Japanese descent) were dual citizens who had experienced vicious discrimination. Why should they be loyal?

The lives of ethnic Japanese during the war reflected the split in Americans' attitudes toward them. Those living outside the west coast (about 10 percent of all ethnic Japanese) were not relocated. Besides leave policies for those working or attending school outside the camps, the ethnic Japanese attempted to live normal lives, with schools, work, team sports, and entertainments. The extent of normalcy (at least for wartime) was such that the draft was extended to Japanese Americans. It seems incongruous that almost heroic virtue should be legally required for people in this position. Like the freedmen who fought for the Union in the Civil War, Japanese-American volunteers helped affirm an American identity to counter the suspicions of their fellow Americans.

In *Free to Die for Their Country*, Muller sees the celebration of these volunteers as "sad, even tragic." What fascinates him is the personal and legal story of those who refused to serve. Muller believes that the story of these "patriots" can contribute to the "construction of a truly American identity." In recounting the trials of these draft resisters, he makes some useful contributions about jurisprudence during time of war, including one judge's anticipation of Justice Felix Frankfurter's substantive due process argument, as he dismissed charges against the draft resisters.

Muller's disgust with *any* military service is encapsulated in his candid declaration, "to me, everything about going to war sounded terrifying, from basic training to the trenches. I could not imagine myself surviving such experiences."

But, as an author, he should not permit his squeamishness to distort his judgment about citizenship and patriotism. What if the draft resisters and those who supported them, including the pro-Japan rioters, who beat and intimidated their pro-American fellow evacuees, had become the face of Japanese Americans? This identity would have meant a far different place for Japanese Americans following World War II.

One cannot say that the relocation of Japanese Americans aided the victory over tyranny. Surely the overwhelming majority of those relocated were loyal. Nonetheless, carefully read, these recent works prevent us from condemning those who made the decision to relocate. ♦

The Imperial Left

Why American academics love Hardt and Negri's Empire.

BY FRED SIEGEL AND JIM CHAPIN

Since last spring, the publishing sensation on the American academic left has been Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Empire*. Its many critics—in magazines from the *New Republic* to the *New Criterion*—have consistently denounced the book as morally loathsome and intellectually shallow.

Empire
by Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri
Harvard University Press,
478 pp., $18.95 paper

But, somehow, *Empire* managed to keep rolling on: Touted this summer by the *New York Times* as "The Next Big Idea," it recently reached its tenth printing, and it is still being read and praised on campuses across America.

That's a very curious thing, for every year brings dozens of new books written in dense academese that take for granted the evils of the present world system, and most of them vanish without a trace. What *Empire*'s critics have missed, in general, is the function that the book is performing for its readers—the frisson that it brings in its wake—which has allowed it to succeed where so many of its predecessors have failed.

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We might put it this way. The great question driving Muslim rage is why Islam, which is to its adherents self-evidently superior, is so manifestly inferior to the infidels in economic and military power. So, too, the great question for a large swath of modern leftism, which sees its mix of Marxsant and postmodernist ideas as self-evidently superior to bourgeois America, is why it has similarly been cuckolded by history.

Empire—which, as it happens, actually takes up the cudgels for Islamic fundamentalists, along with rioters in Los Angeles, peasants in Chiapas, and everyone else who, whether by happenstance or on principle, seems to stand outside the mainstream of modern life—is a guide for the perplexed, a path, the authors hope, back into relevance for the marginalized academic left. And the beauty of it, from the point of view of its many admiring readers, is that the book offers them a way both to lead the good life as tenured radicals and to bring about the revolution. Like the Muslim militants who struck at the World Trade Center, the authors of *Empire* see America's openness and adherence to the rule of law as something that can be used against the United States.

The authors of *Empire* are Michael Hardt, a run-of-the-mill Duke academic, and Antonio Negri, a theorist of anarchist violence in Italy who is in prison for his connection to the murder of the Italian prime minister Aldo Moro. Although Hardt is listed first, this is clearly Negri's book; much of it reads like notes on every book Negri has read in jail. Foucault, Fichte, Fanon, and the Frankfurt School—as well as St. Francis of Assisi, in a crucial cameo role—make their way into *Empire*. Spinoza and Schmitt; Kant, Keynes, Kautsky, and Kelsen; Herder, Heidegger, Hilfinger, and Hobbes; Debord and Deleuze: The book is a montage of authors' names used as placeholders for ideas. About the only person who doesn't seem to have had a hand in *Empire* is an editor. In a book filled with such words as aporia, aleatory, alterity, rhizomatic, hybridity, disciplinarity, and materiality, one of the clearer sentences insists that postmodernists "tell us a regime of transversal linguistic relations of production has entered into the unified and abstract universe of value."

This parade of pretentiousness serves a function, of course: confirming for readers, with a wink and a nod, that they are among the knowing ones. But it isn't the style that forces *Empire*'s authors to assert such absurdities as, for example, the claim that Stalinism was not totalitarian. The Soviet Union, the authors tell us, was a "society criss-crossed by extremely strong instances of creativity and freedom"—while Nazism was just a phase of capitalism.

Perhaps we should not be surprised that a man like Negri, who has never had second thoughts about his role in the murderous Red Brigades, would take this line. Negri wants to present himself as a quasi-religious prophet who reveals how to make the world anew. But that still leaves the question of why so much of American academia would take him seriously when he tries to do it. Surely, in 2001, there are very few people left who won't abandon an author when his defense of Stalin comes along?

The answer lies in the seeming ability of *Empire* to both affirm and deny at the same time, to eat its cake and have it, too—together with its pie, its cookie, its crumpet, and its fruitcake. The book is an unstable mix of insight and incoherence, combining a blandly assumed communism with an anarchist anti-communism in a work stuffed with every standard anti-American cliché and yet filled with admiration for American republicanism. It is postmodern in form (the authors insist the book need not be read in any particular order), while its message is curiously *anti*-postmodern.

Indeed, the book's greatest significance may be its proof that authors and readers with impeccable postmodernist credentials are beginning at last to write off postmodernism as passé. "We suspect," Hardt and Negri write, "that postmodernist and postcolonial theories may end up in a dead end because they . . . [are] so intent on combating the remnants of a past form of domination that they fail to recognize the new form that is looming over them in the present."

This new situation, which the book presents as both a danger and an opportunity, is what the authors call "Empire." They argue that leftists are wrong to see this new form of global domination as merely an extension of American power. Referring to the growth of non-governmental organizations and international courts, as well as the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, they see the new empire as being "formed not on the basis of force itself but on the capacity to present force as being the service of right and peace." The analogy that drives the argument is the resemblance they see between today's world order and the Roman empire, which spread the rule of a "universal law" through "just wars." "The contemporary idea of empire," they explain, "is born through the global expansion of the internal U.S. constitutional project."

The explanation for how this new empire works is based on Michel Foucault's argument that modern liberal societies are all the more totalitarian for reducing the use of force. The capitalists rule through what Foucault calls "capillary power," by infiltrating the individual spirit so that people willingly conform to coercive social norms. Modern man, they insist, lives in a "state of autonomous alienation from the sense of life and the desire for creativity." Empire is Foucault's soft but smothering conformity applied globally.

It is a genuine insight on the part of Hardt and Negri—one of only two in the nearly five-hundred-page book—that postmodernism with its "emphasis on concepts such as difference and multiplicity, . . . its continual fascination with the new and with fashion," is not only helpless to confront this new situation but unintentionally aids and abets global capitalism. They mock postmodern slogans such as "Long live difference. Down with essentialist binaries." Capitalism, they correctly

Reuters / CORBIS

World Trade Organization protesters in Seattle, December 1999.

note, loves difference because it creates new markets. And as for the postmodern love of subjectivity, what could be better suited to advertisers than an appeal to personal desire? "The new enemy is not only resistant to the old weapons but actually thrives on them."

So how, then, can the monster be slain? *Empire* has no single answer, but several contradictory ones. Negri sees the revolt of the Christian poor against Rome as one of the models for the new revolution. Marxists, he notes, have always hated the poor, precisely for being "free as birds." In a section illegibly printed entirely in italics, Negri (who had a Catholic education and has written almost meditatively on St. Francis of Assisi) explains that "only the poor has the ability to renew being. The divinity of multitude of the poor does not point to any transcendence. . . . On the contrary . . . the poor is god on earth, . . . the poor itself is power."

And how will the poor help bring about god's reign on earth? In part by refusing to work. Negri first made his name as the theorist of the violently anarchist *autonomista* movement, for which all forms of resistance to capitalism—from squatting, sabotage, and wildcat strikes to assassinations, kidnappings, and refusing to work altogether—were equally noble, equally important to the class struggle. Negri turned to anarcho-violence because he felt that the Italian Communist party was merely another version of statism. Sounding almost like free-market techies, Negri and Hardt insist that the growth of network communications means that command-and-control government is no longer possible. At one point they shout in capitals, "it's our turn now to cry that 'BIG GOVERNMENT IS OVER!' Why should that slogan be the exclusive property of conservatives?"

Here, in a nutshell, is the affirm-and-deny feature, the have-it-both-ways function, that has made *Empire* so attractive for certain readers. In a millenarian call to arms, Hardt and Negri tell their dejected academic readers that the rise of empire is, in fact, good news—because it carries with it the seeds of its own defeat. Capitalism is not a success, "it just hasn't failed yet." The postmodern, global empire of capitalism "creates a greater potential for revolution . . . because it presents, along with the machinery of command, an alternative: the set of all the exploited and subjugated, a multitude that is directly opposed to empire, with no mediation between them."

So, for example, one benefit of globalization is that it makes a worldwide anti-globalization movement possible. Asked about the violence during the World Trade Organization meetings in Genoa this past summer, Hardt responded, in an echo of Mussolini, that "all politics is violence."

Or, for an even better example, modern globalizing capitalism's attempt to penetrate the Islamic countries is precisely what allows Islamic radicalism to turn around and strike at the rest of the world in a welcome part of the coming revolution. In their second genuine insight, Hardt and Negri note that Islamism is not traditional Islam but a new ideology—not a premodern religion but a postmodern desire, like that of America's academic irrationalists, to escape modernity in all its forms. "Insofar as the Iranian revolution was a powerful rejection of the world market, we might think of it as the first postmodern revolution."

The closing paragraph of *Empire*—printed again entirely in italics—begins with a paean to St. Francis of Assisi as a man whose devotion to poverty "illustrates the future life of Communist militancy, . . . a joyous life, including all of being and nature, the animals, sister moon, brother sun, the birds of the field, the poor and exploited humans." Perhaps it is appropriate that the book closes as incoherently and as pretentiously as it began, with Negri, the unrepentant theorist of terror, explaining that the coming revolution will bring together "love, simplicity, and also innocence. This is the irrepressible lightness and joy of being Communist."

The original appeal of *Empire* was that it used a grab bag of Marxist, fascist, democratic, and even Christian ideas both to justify the academic left and to connect it to an anti-globalist movement which seemed to be the major assault on the triumphant liberal capitalism of the last decade. Unfortunately, the book now exists in a world—after September 11—in which the greatest blows against that system have been struck by people who would cheerfully kill not only ordinary, bourgeois Americans, but the authors, anti-global demonstrators, and St. Francis of Assisi as well. What seemed, to many academic leftists this spring, a route out of the swamp of political futility has proved, this fall, to lead back into the same mire—and it has left them dirtier in the process. ♦

The Standard Reader

"I believe in a former life I was a biographer."

Prizing Anti-Americanism

If you ran an American foundation with a whole lot of money—so much money that you give out each year what are, after the Nobel prize, the biggest monetary awards for literature in the world—on whom would you bestow your largesse for 2001?

Well, as it turns out, the answer is easy, at least for the flush Lannan Foundation of Sante Fe, New Mexico. On Oct. 28, the foundation announced that it was granting a $200,000 "lifetime-achievement" prize to Edward Said, the Columbia University literary critic turned pro-Palestinian activist, and another $350,000 to Mahmoud Darwish, a Palestinian poet.

Said was an early exponent of the race-class-gender school of literary interpretation, famous once upon a time for such things as his denunciation of Jane Austen as a supporter of slavery and for *Orientalism*, his 1978 book raging against Western literature's presentation of the East. In more recent days, he has been quoted saying silly, anti-American things about the attacks on Sept. 11 and, earlier, photographed in Lebanon throwing rocks across the border at an Israeli guardhouse. (Said insisted the rock was merely a "symbolic gesture of joy," while Columbia declared Said's actions were protected by "principles of academic freedom.")

If the name of Mahmoud Darwish is less familiar, you needn't feel bad. He is a minor Palestinian poet, although he does command some genuine popularity. He is a sort of politicized Rod McKuen for the PLO, best known for his ability to gather good-sized crowds to hear his rhythmic paeans to Palestine and denunciations of Israel.

This would all be boringly familiar—if it weren't for the date. These prizes weren't given back in the days when it was still fun for the politically correct rich to tweak the noses of the bourgeoisie by toying with anti-Americanism. The Lannan Foundation announced the prizes on October 28, six weeks after the murders at the Pentagon and World Trade Center. "We wanted," a spokesman explained about Said, "to honor the integrity of his work, the rigor of his scholarship, the elegance of his prose, and his commitment to justice and freedom."

Indeed, the Lannan foundation—whose mission statement declares that globalization "threatens all cultures and ecosystems"—had to go very far out of its way to honor these anti-American authors. Not only is Said the first nonfiction writer to win the award, but the poet Robert Creeley had already been presented with the 2001 prize earlier this month. Since the award began in 1989, only one prize has been given each year. So what makes it so important, all of a sudden, to present a second prize—to a nonfiction writer?

Patrick Lannan, speaking for his family's foundation, insisted that the winners were chosen well before the attacks. "What happened on Sept. 11," he mourned, "has politicized everything." Said and Darwish "just happened to be Palestinian and I guess that today that becomes an issue."

But the truth is exactly the reverse: The events of Sept. 11 have *de*-politicized things. Said and Darwish were chosen for reasons of politics—politics as it was perceived by the intellectual, literary, and prize-giving classes before Sept. 11. What makes the Lannan awards offensive is exactly what now makes those politics offensive. The world has changed for the rest of us; it has been transformed into a more dangerous and far more serious place. Not only is there less patience today for poseurs and would-be firebrands like Edward Said. There is also less patience for wealthy children who want to play with fire. ♦

Books in Brief

***Communism: A History* by Richard Pipes (Modern Library, 175 pp., $19.95).** Richard Pipes calls this little volume both an introduction to communism and its obituary. Marxism-Leninism was first a theory, then a revolutionary program, then the brand name of certain political regimes in the twentieth century. Like earlier manifestations of the age-old quest for perfect equality, it ran its course, and now the whole story can be told.

It is our gain that so authoritative a historian as Pipes—a professor at Harvard for the last half century—has accomplished this feat of compression. He is particularly good on the shades of difference among Marxist regimes. Thus, while the Soviet Union demanded outward conformity to the state, Mao's China pressed for *inward* confor-

mity, while Ethiopia's military dictatorship merely "aped Soviet and Chinese practices for its own political ends."

Pipes's assessment is that of a cold warrior: In the name of great good, communism brought great evil. It failed because it was based on the false idea that man could be remade. If you've wondered how your children and grandchildren are going to grasp this large and alien reality, a good move is to make sure they own this book.

—Claudia Winkler

***Life at the Bottom: The Worldview that Makes the Underclass* by Theodore Dalrymple (Ivan R. Dee, 256 pp., $27.50).** Theodore Dalrymple has written what may be the most depressing book ever: *Life at the Bottom*, a collection of his *City Journal* essays on the British poor. Dalrymple, a physician in a London hospital and prison, does not possess a soothing bedside manner. In this book, women are hanged out windows by violent boyfriends, assaulted as they lie in hospital beds recovering from earlier assaults, and beaten by brutes.

What makes all this possible is the British welfare state, which gives housing and money for nothing, discourages marriage, and affects a studied neutrality on the whole range of "lifestyle choices." And what makes the welfare state possible—and here Dalrymple is at his most bracing—are the intellectuals who have overturned all the old wisdom about culture, sex, and criminality, creating a Hell that they do not have to live in. His conclusion is straightforward: "The poor reap what the intellectual sows."

But Dalrymple equally condemns the underclass for its refusal to accept common sense. Dalrymple quotes a teenaged girl who has taken up with a known abuser:

> "I can look after myself," said the seventeen-year-old.
>
> "But men are stronger than women," I said. "When it comes to violence, they are at an advantage."
>
> "That's a sexist thing to say," she replied.
>
> A girl who had absorbed nothing at school had nevertheless absorbed the shibboleths of political correctness in general and of feminism in particular.

Dalrymple doesn't advance much in the way of solutions. But *Life at the Bottom* is a valuable—and frightening—reminder of the destruction the welfare system wrought.

—Justin Torres

Book of the Week

Too Funny for Words

A year in the life of P.J. O'Rourke BY J. BOTTUM

The CEO of the Sofa by P.J. O'Rourke (Atlantic Monthly Press, 265 pp., $25).

There ought to be a law against people like THE WEEKLY STANDARD's contributing editor P.J. O'Rourke, or at least serious investigation by the FDA, the FCC, the TVA, or whatever federal agency it is that regulates prose these days. Everything else has warning labels—my four-year-old daughter's nightgown had three of them, I noticed yesterday when she put it on backwards over her swimsuit and came downstairs to say she was leaving home to find nicer parents who would buy her a real mermaid. So why don't certain authors come with warnings? "Do not read me when you have to write yourself" would work, or even, "Put me down, you idiot, you have a deadline in two hours."

G.K. Chesterton is this kind of writer. You can't read lines like "The Bible tells us to love our neighbors and also to love our enemies, probably because they are generally the same people" without having your own sentences break down into bad attempts at Chestertonian parallels and paradoxes. P.G. Wodehouse is another. When he says of Madeline Bassett, "She holds the view that the stars are God's daisy-chain . . . and that every time a fairy blows its wee nose a baby is born, which, as we know, is not the case," you can't stop yourself from trying—and failing—to recreate the perfect diction of that "as we know."

Maybe it's the double initials, but P.J. O'Rourke similarly creates the unfulfillable desire to write the way he does. His latest, *The CEO of the Sofa*, missed, in the wake of Sept. 11, the attention it deserved. It's a hilarious walk through a year in the life of an author, loosely modeled on *The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table*. ("Oliver Wendell Holmes has been agreeing with the CEO's opinions for nearly 150 years. The CEO's wife does so less frequently.")

The problem is not just that O'Rourke is funnier than the rest of us. It's the way he's funny. It begins with perfect timing for punchlines. When he asks why he's the one who has to teach his best friend's son how to drive, his patient wife reminds him, "Nick's father tried to teach Nick's sister Ophelia to drive." "Yes," he finally remembers, "that made the Metro section of the *New York Times*."

But what really makes P.J. O'Rourke untouchable is the pacing of his prose. There's this indescribable *speed* that drags you from a description of his neighbors through an unbearably funny 6-page intermezzo about the presidential election, only to shoot you out into the deceptions that parents have to practice in order to convince their neighbors with bad political opinions to send their daughters over to babysit.

Please, go buy *The CEO of the Sofa*. Read it. Laugh with it. God knows, we need the laughter—as long as you don't have anything to write yourself. ♦

Media Leadership in Our Time

In an Oct. 23 appearance at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, later broadcast on C-SPAN, ABC News President David Westin was asked, "Do you believe the Pentagon was a legitimate military target, even if the missile [i.e., the civilian airliner] was not?" Here is how the president of ABC News instructed America's future media elite (transcript, courtesy of the Media Research Center):

"The Pentagon as a legitimate target? I actually don't have an opinion on that and it's important I not have an opinion on that as I sit here in my capacity right now. The way I conceive my job running a news organization, and the way I would like all the journalists at ABC News to perceive it, is there is a big difference between a normative position and a positive position. Our job is to determine what is, not what ought to be and when we get into the job of what ought to be I think we're not doing a service to the American people. I can say the Pentagon got hit, I can say this is what their position is, this is what our position is, but for me to take a position this was right or wrong? I mean, that's perhaps for me in my private life, perhaps it's for me dealing with my loved ones, perhaps it's for my minister at church. But as a journalist I feel strongly that's something that I should not be taking a position on. I'm supposed to figure out what is and what is not, not what ought to be."

After the Media Research Center and others drew attention to Westin's declared position as a neutral in the war on his country, ABC News e-mailed a new Westin statement:

"Like all Americans, I was horrified at the loss of life at the Pentagon, as well as in New York and Pennsylvania on September 11. When asked at an interview session at the Columbia Journalism School whether I believed that the Pentagon was a legitimate target for terrorists I responded that, as a journalist, I did not have an opinion. I was wrong. I gave an answer to journalism students to illustrate the broad, academic principle that all journalists should draw a firm line between what they know and what their personal opinion might be. Upon reflection, I realized that my answer did not address the specifics of September 11. Under any interpretation, the attack on the Pentagon was criminal and entirely without justification. I apologize for any harm that my misstatement may have caused."

"No Truer Friend"

Gerald A. Dorfman is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

British prime minister Tony Blair has been the dominant foreign leader at President Bush's side throughout the present crisis. He has been a constant presence: at the president's congressional address, taking the lead in laying out the evidence against Osama bin Laden, pressing other foreign leaders on behalf of coalition building, making key policy pronouncements, and contributing British forces to the war effort. In sum, **Blair on behalf of Britain has been vigorously carrying on the long tradition of an Anglo-American special relationship.**

Why is Britain so important to the United States? To begin with, Britain is an exceptional friend. The United States and Britain have collaborated in every major military and diplomatic action of the twentieth century, suffering only the briefest disagreements. Even when the United States has faced significant opposition to its policies from traditional allies, as in the bombing of Libya, the British have stood with us, offering their bases, their intelligence, and most important their prestigious support.

Even though militarily less powerful, Britain still boasts invaluable strength in strategic situations. For example, 20,000 British forces and two dozen British warships were available in the gulf region immediately after September 11. Indeed, Britain continues to be an important force in both the gulf and South Asian areas and is still collaborating with the United States in the bombing missions over Iraq. Britain also makes a base on the strategically important island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean available to the United States.

On the diplomatic side Blair has demonstrated again how valuable Britain can be in reaching out both to allies and to uncertain or wavering states. **Britain often has access to and influence in places where the United States does not or is unwelcome.** Britain, for example, retains important contacts in the Middle East, such as in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which exceed U.S. influence. And British contacts in Africa are much more influential than American contacts. There are often situations where the British can approach an estranged power where we cannot, such as British foreign secretary Jack Straw's recent trip to Iran to enlist its support. London also continues as the economic and financial capital for a great number of developing nations, giving Britain complex economic and financial relationships with a wide variety of countries. This is why the British were able to immediately freeze much more of Osama bin Ladan's financial resources than did a similar presidential action in the United States. Finally,
British leaders are often valuable in putting out policy "trial balloons" to test reactions that could engender considerable political damage if they had come directly from the United States. Blair's predecessor John Major provided this valuable help during the gulf war, and Blair is again helping out in this direction.

Looking at the sum of the Anglo-American relationship during this crisis tells us that President Bush was indeed sincere when he told Congress that we have "no truer friend" than Britain.

— Gerald A. Dorfman

A world of ideas on public policy.

Are Innovative Medicines Worth the Higher Price?

by Frank R. Lichtenberg

The cost of prescription drugs has helped to lift healthcare reform to the top of the policy agenda in the U.S. Congress and state governments. Higher spending on innovative medicines has led some legislators to advocate restrictive Medicaid formularies, reimportation of low-priced drugs from abroad, and even explicit price controls on pharmaceuticals. But policymakers don't always consider whether the benefits of new medicines outweigh their higher prices. Fortunately, sound quantitative analysis exists to help answer this important question.

It's true that spending in the United States on prescription drugs has grown dramatically in recent years. Previous studies have shown that the replacement of older drugs by newer, more expensive ones is the single most important reason for this increase. However, those studies did not examine the extent to which price differences between new and old drugs reflect changes in quality. Newer medicines tend to be more effective than older ones in treating the same medical condition.

In a recent study, I analyzed prescribed-medicine data from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to examine the effect of drug age – i.e., the number of years since the drug's active ingredient was first approved by the Food and Drug Administration – on mortality, morbidity, and total medical expenditure. The MEPS is a nationally representative survey of healthcare use, expenditures, sources of payment, and insurance coverage for the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population.

The MEPS data allow us to control for many important attributes of the individual patient, his or her medical condition, and the prescription. These attributes include sex, age, education, race, income, insurance status, the payer for the drug, the medical condition for which the drug was prescribed, the duration of the condition, and the number of conditions reported by the patient. Indeed, the fact that many individuals in the sample had multiple medical conditions and multiple prescriptions means that we can control for all individual characteristics, both observed and unobserved.

> ***Newer drugs offer not only health benefits to patients, but also long-run fiscal benefits to public health service***

The results of the analysis strongly support the hypothesis that the use of newer rather than older drugs reduces mortality (i.e., death of the patient), morbidity (i.e., loss of work-days), and total medical expenditure. Although the mortality rate in the MEPS sample is quite low, I found that people consuming new drugs were significantly less likely to die by the end of the survey than were people consuming older drugs. This result is consistent with previous studies showing a highly significant positive relationship across diseases between mortality reduction and the use of new pharmaceuticals. As to morbidity, I found that people consuming new drugs were significantly less likely to miss work or school days than people consuming old drugs, although the estimated effect was not very large.

The study also demonstrates that the use of newer drugs tends to reduce all types of non-drug medical expenditure, with inpatient hospital spending (the most costly type) showing by far the largest reduction. The data indicate that use of newer drugs is associated with shorter (and therefore less expensive), as well as fewer, hospital stays. The total estimated reduction in non-drug expenditure from using newer rather than older drugs is almost four times as large as the increase in drug expenditure. Consequently, using newer drugs results in a substantial net reduction in the total cost of treating the condition.

It's not surprising that policymakers focus their efforts to control public healthcare expenditure on drug spending. The costs of pharmaceuticals (and changes in those costs) are visible to the naked eye, while those in other segments of the healthcare system are hidden. As the MEPS analysis shows, innovative medicines are more cost-effective than older alternatives. Newer drugs offer not only health benefits to patients, but also long-run fiscal benefits to public health services. Identification of those benefits requires careful analysis of good data. It's vital that public officials making drug policy decisions consider the full range of benefits, not just the costs, of newer drugs.

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