the weekly Standard

OCTOBER 1, 2001 $3.95

# WANTED

Osama bin Laden

Saddam Hussein

WILLIAM KRISTOL & ROBERT KAGAN • The Right War
FRED BARNES • Bush's Moment
PETER D. FEAVER • Cold War II
REUEL MARC GERECHT • The Coalition Delusion
STEPHEN F. HAYES • Target Iraq?
FREDERICK W. KAGAN • How to Fight in Afghanistan
JEREMY RABKIN • Sovereignty Amidst Terror

Because our sisters have heart disease, too.



At Pfizer, we're determined to find the cures of the future. A cure for your father's Alzheimer's, your sister's heart disease, your best friend's diabetes. A cure for the ailments that touch all our families. To help create this better world, we decided to create an even better company. At the newly expanded Pfizer, we have the largest pharmaceutical research team in the world, with a scientific staff of 12,000 dedicated people looking for solutions to age-old problems. This year we're spending approximately $4.5 billion searching for new cures, and in the coming years we'll invest even more. We're now poised to do more for human health than any other pharmaceutical company in history. At Pfizer, our company has changed, but our mission hasn't.

Pfizer

*Life is our life's work.*

www.pfizer.com

TOMORROW'S CURES

# Contents

October 1, 2001 • Volume 7, Number 3



## Articles



Cover photos: Right: Corbis, Left: AP / Wide World Photos

## Features



## Books & Arts





the weekly Standard

THE WEEKLY STANDARD (ISSN 1083-3013) is published weekly (except the last week in April, the second week in July, the first week in September, and the second week in January) by News America Incorporated, 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036. Periodicals postage paid at New York, NY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. For subscription customer service in the United States, call 1-800-274-7293. For new subscription orders, please call 1-800-283-2014. Subscribers: Please send new subscription orders to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96153, Washington, DC 20090-6153; changes of address to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. Please include your latest magazine mailing label. Allow 3 to 5 weeks for arrival of first copy and address changes. Yearly subscriptions, $78.00. Canadian/foreign orders require additional postage and must be paid in full prior to commencement of service. Canadian/foreign subscribers may call 1-850-682-7653 for subscription inquiries. Visa/MasterCard payment accepted. Cover price, $3.95. Back issues, $3.95 (includes postage and handling). Send manuscripts and letters to the editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Suite 505, Washington, DC 20036-4617. Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. For a copy of THE WEEKLY STANDARD Privacy Policy, visit www.weeklystandard.com or write to Customer Service, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th St., NW, Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20036. THE WEEKLY STANDARD Advertising Sales Office in Washington, DC, is 1-202-293-4900. Advertising Production: Call Ian Slatter 1-202-496-3354. 

BPA INTERNATIONAL

www.weeklystandard.com

# The Chattering Asses

Four-fifths of the British public support a war against global terrorism. Three-quarters approve of George W. Bush's leadership. But don't tell the chattering classes. The *Guardian*, Britain's leading liberal paper and house organ of the intellectual class, has become a hotbed of rabid anti-Americanism. So here's a little multiple choice test. Three of the following quotations are from the *Guardian* over the past week. One is from Osama bin Laden. Can you spot the bin Laden comment?

A. "During my lifetime, America has been constantly waging war against much of humanity: impoverished people mostly, in stricken places. Moreover, far from being the main perpetrators of terrorism, Islamic peoples have been its victims—more often than not of an American fundamentalism and its proxies."

B. "It is this record of unabashed national egotism and arrogance that drives anti-Americanism among swaths of the world's population, for whom there is little democracy in the current distribution of global wealth and power. If it turns out that Tuesday's attacks were the work of Osama bin Laden's supporters, the sense that the Americans are once again reaping a dragons' teeth harvest they themselves sowed will be overwhelming."

C. "A bully with a bloody nose is still a bully."

D. "It is men who perpetrated this violence and men who organise the response. The power structure is exposed at such times, as the token women slide into the background, leaving war to men. Condoleezza Rice seems to be the one exception. Virtually the only female faces in the media at the moment are the victims; women are cast as passive."

ANSWER: Sorry. It's a trick question. They're all from the *Guardian*. ♦

## Chattering Asses, II

Some senior editor at the *New Yorker* really, really doesn't like Susan Sontag. For in an act of wince-making sadism, said editor has included three paragraphs from Sontag in the middle of an otherwise elegiac and elegant series of short essays on the World Trade Center attack. Sontag long ago mastered that most annoying of all prose poses: unusual stupidity that imagines itself to be unusual intelligence. But here, for sheer tastelessness and moral vacuity, she has outdone herself 50 times over:

"We have a robotic president who assures us that America still stands tall. . . .The unanimously applauded, self-congratulatory bromides of a Soviet Party Congress seemed contemptible. The unanimity of the sanctimonious, reality-concealing rhetoric spouted by American officials and media commentators in recent days seems, well, unworthy of a mature democracy. . . .

"'Our country is strong,' we are told again and again. I for one don't find this entirely consoling."

Sign this woman up to write for the *Guardian*. ♦

## Chattering Asses, III

In certain circles, you're supposed to know who Robin Morgan is. She is—an e-mail she circulated to her "sisters and friends" last week reminds us—an NEA-award winning poet, the founder of the Sisterhood is Powerful Institute, the 1990 Feminist Majority Foundation "Woman of the Year," and the former editor-in-chief of *Ms.* magazine.

She is also, like Susan Sontag, considerably less well endowed in the cerebellum department than she appears to believe.

In the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center attack, our Woman of the Year—who lives in Greenwich Village—received concerned inquiries, her e-mail explains, from "women in 18 different countries." Which is understandable, of course, given that the entire event revolved completely around Robin Morgan.

"First, thank you from my heart for all your thoughts. . . . So many, many of you have astonishingly cited my book *The Demon Lover* as the essential expression/analysis of what has just happened (as well as the background and underlying conflicts) that even in the midst of deep sorrow and grief you have renewed my belief that art, an attempted clarity of thought, and a stubborn politics of transformation do make a contribution. . . .

"This morning the National Guard arrived—and on my dawn walk I could just as well have been walking through a military state: police, state troopers, and emergency personnel on every corner below 14th Street, with trucks filled with Guardsmen, rifles bayoneted and at ready, beginning to roll through the streets. . . .

"Already, mosques are being defaced and Internet chat rooms are spewing hate against 'all Arabs.' We (feminists, progressives, etc.) are doing everything we can to avoid this kind of escalating nightmare—and a network of safe houses is already being set up to shelter and help innocent Arab or Muslim civilians who might be persecuted in


the wake of this tragedy. . . . This morning I was touched to learn that the Pagan and Wiccan community is doing the same thing, in the name of religious freedom from persecution. . . .

"I trust with all my heart that you will each do all you possibly can in your own countries, cities, and situations to educate people as to WHY this kind of tragedy happens—that it is NOT just 'madmen' or 'monsters' or 'subhuman maniacs' who commit dramatic violence, but that such acts occur in a daily climate of patriarchal violence so epidemic as to be invisible in its normality—and that such tactics as this come from a complex set of circumstances, including despair over not being heard." Um, we hear you loud and clear, Robin. ♦

## Wake Up and Smell the Kofi

Immediately after the September 11 attacks, United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan stated, "We do not know yet who is behind these acts, or what objective they hope to achieve. What we do know is that no just cause can be advanced by terror."

What an affectless bit of blather that was. It means, THE SCRAPBOOK gathers, that since the "objective" was not yet known, Kofi Annan wanted to keep his powder dry; after all, the objective might turn out to be admirable, even though the terrorists' means were not. The idea that the terrorists' primary, if not only, objective was to kill thousands of Americans and humiliate this country seems not to have penetrated the mind of the secretary general.

Now, U.S.-U.N. relations have generally improved under this secretary general, but that's only because they couldn't get much worse. Annan's anti-American stands are generally characteristic of—if no worse than—the lamentable norm for the United Nations. But his promotion of that institution as the world's only legitimate arbiter of the use of force looks about to become a historical curiosity. Who now cares about his assertion two years ago that "only the [U.N] Charter provides a universally legal basis for the use of force"?

So perhaps personal pique has played a role in the secretary general's post-September 11 performance. In the *New York Times* last Friday, Annan went so far as to argue that retribution for the terrorist attacks should belong to the United Nations since its "conventions already provide a legal framework for many of the steps that must be taken to eradicate terrorism."

Yes, the United Nations has many conventions. In another historical curiosity, it turns out that September 11 was a U.N.-declared "International Day of Peace" for world citizens to "imagine a world free of conflict and violence," not to mention "picture hatred turning into respect, bigotry into understanding, and ignorance into knowledge." Alas, something came up. ♦

## Campus Comedy

Since September 11, any conservative with an e-mail account has been on the receiving end of countless dispatches of political lunacy from American campuses—pro-Iraqi teach-ins here; blame-America-first chaplains there.

There was the tasteless punning of Georgetown's "Grave New World" conference. There was a memorable con-

# Scrapbook

clave of defeatists at Yale, denounced by Donald Kagan: "No one seems to have challenged the primacy of concerns expressed by history professor Paul Kennedy and Strobe Talbott, director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, that focused on the reasons that caused the perpetrators to act and our need to understand and sympathize with them.

"Kennedy suggested that the great power of the United States, its extraordinary influence in the world on international organizations, the attractive power of its political and social ideas—seen as 'offensive cultural messages'—understandably provoke hatred, as they would in us if the roles were reversed. . . . Many people and nations in the world resent and dislike the United States—its political system, its culture, its way of life and power—but they do not kill innocent civilians and make war for that reason. Those people who do may be pitied for their derangement—but first, they must be stopped."

The American Political Science Association urged its members "to undertake appropriate professional responses to these horrific events in their classes and departments, reflecting upon implications for the well-being of the United States, civil rights and liberties, international order, and democracy." Yes, their thoughts turned to civil liberties, but not to terrorism or war.

We could go on—at great length. Instead, we'll give the last word to Alexandra Wolfe, a senior at Duke, who wrote a fine column for that school's *The Chronicle* on the "Lack of Outrage."

Wolfe writes of the "fatuousness" of what she "heard all around me for the past week here on the Duke campus. A class begins and the voice from the front of the room says, 'We only got what we deserved. We've been bombing and invading other countries at will.' In a seminar a student says, 'The level of patriotism in America is scary.' As two students enter a classroom, I hear one say to the other, 'The most horrible part of this whole thing is all the racial profiling.' I hear others saying, 'You have to separate the political from the personal' and 'I'm getting sick of all the sob stories.' . . .

"A minister at the prayer service at the University last Wednesday told the audience to pray that the government remains peaceful and doesn't attack anyone else. Although we've all been brought up wanting world peace, I will not pray for pacifism. I'll pray against it. . . . I will wear my red, white and blue, I will revere our flag flowing in the wind and hold in contempt the terrorists who attacked the wrong country.

"Believe whatever you want, cower at our patriotism, but unless you have a close friend with a father who drove her to school every morning and tucked her in at night and whose day was interrupted by a 757 smashing into his office, driving temperatures up to 1,500 degrees and hurling him and his co-workers out through the walls, just don't tell me about your political correctness. I won't be listening." ♦

## Message, I CAIR

Alarmed and disappointed—as is The Scrapbook—by reports that some Muslims around the country have been subjected to harassment in recent days, President Bush last Tuesday visited the Islamic Center of Washington, D.C., for "wide ranging discussions" with representatives of leading Muslim organizations in the United States. When his private talks at the mosque were through, Bush spoke a few public—and moving—words. "Islam is peace," the president said. Our Muslim "fellow Americans" must be "treated with respect." And "Muslims make an incredibly valuable contribution to our country."

That last part is no doubt true as a general matter. But it appears to be questionable as specifically applied to some of the president's hosts, the people Bush called "the good folks standing with me" at the Islamic Center.

The enterprising Ira Stoll, who runs the invaluable *smartertimes.com*, has looked into the background of "the good folks" in question. They don't look too good. Citing research by Daniel Pipes, Stoll reports that the Council on American-Islamic Relations, one of the groups in attendance at the mosque last week, is . . . um, kind of radical.

CAIR has in the past criticized—as "ethnic and religious stereotyping"—the criminal prosecution of two men arrested in Cleveland for the "honor killing" of their female cousin. CAIR also, in May 1998, co-sponsored an all-day rally at Brooklyn College, the highlight of which was an anti-Semitic screed by Wagdi Ghuniem, a militant cleric from Egypt. When he was done, Ghuniem led his audience of 500 in a song with the memorable refrain: "No to the Jews, descendants of the apes." And so on.

Then there's the Muslim Public Affairs Council, also represented at the Bush meeting. Its leader is a man named Salam Al-Marayati—who called U.S. missile strikes on Osama bin Laden's training camps in 1998 "illegal" and "immoral," and who has likened Arab terror bombers to American minutemen during the Revolutionary War.

And then there's the American Muslim Alliance, another co-sponsor of Brooklyn College's "no to the Jews" festival in 1998, and a group that has, for example, distributed Holocaust denial literature at its annual convention.

"Good folks?" Doesn't look like it. Looks, instead, as though President Bush was very poorly served by whatever White House staffer arranged this visit. Looks like the myriad news organizations that covered the event were asleep at the switch, too. ♦

# Casual

## Looking for King Kong

The picture I couldn't get out of my mind from that dread-filled Tuesday morning—and still can't get out of my mind more than a week later—is the image of the second plane, turning round and flying directly into the 110-story building, setting it instantly aflame. So insane, so like a comic book, did the picture of the plane crashing into the building seem, that I quite expected to see King Kong atop the tower. I rather wished I had, so that I would know I was watching a piece of crude science fiction. No such luck.

I was stunned but not shocked, depressed but not demoralized by the events of that long day. The reason is that, completely unworked out though my personal theology is, it has always included a prominent place for evil. I happen to believe that any group of people who can talk others into giving up their lives to murder innocents comes as close to qualifying as evil as anything I know.

Still, as I watched the proceedings on Tuesday, September 11, the overwhelming fact was the innocence of those killed. That is what I couldn't shake from my mind. For years I have read in the *New York Times* about vast numbers of people being wiped out in a flood in Bangladesh, or a drought in Ethiopia, or an earthquake in Central America, and not allowed myself to dwell on the ghastliness of such events. I turned away from them as quickly as possible, not, I prefer to think, from a failure of imagination but from the possession of all too vivid—and slightly squeamish—an imagination. The killings of September 11 constituted another such event, with two exceptional facts added: that these deaths resulted from acts not of God but of men, and that in this instance it wasn't possible to turn away.

Death in its various forms—slow, quick, painful, merciful, even accidental—is not usually difficult to imagine. These deaths, though, are. Solipsistically, I see myself, a cup of coffee at my desk, my computer just booted up, ready to make an attack on the day, when I hear a shattering boom, see flame, and darkness—oblivion. I shy away from thinking about death of the kind visited upon those in the four hijacked planes, who had time for the terror to sink in.


Darren Gygi

One reads the lists of the dead and feels the defeat of so many plans and dreams. A young couple with its 2-year-old child crash in Pennsylvania, two firemen brothers are crushed in lower Manhattan, a former model who had nursed a now dead moviestar husband through AIDS is used as fodder to destroy a building. All victims of a vicious political game in which they had no knowledge they were enrolled as players.

After the first day, I rationed my television watching. Among people not personally affected, depression, I noted, hit hardest those who couldn't pull themselves away from their television sets. Ceaseless contemplation of the gray rubble, empty reports from journalists ("Back to you, Tom, Peter, Dan"), clarified nothing, but only deepened despair. I wanted hard news: numbers of survivors, numbers of dead, firm facts leading to knowledge of who brought about this sorrow. I found myself taking solace from the memorial service at the National Cathedral, its dignity and beautiful music and measured speech, and was pleased to see the president come through so admirably by speaking so well.

What I especially wanted to avoid was television interviews with people who were waiting to discover if they had lost family. I wanted them left alone. One evening I watched the man who owned the restaurant at the World Trade Center called Windows on the World and who had lost 55 members of his staff break down and weep before the already dampened microphone of Barbara Walters. Why did the man agree to be interviewed? Why does anyone who lost family and friends? The obscenity of modern television journalism was therein once more revealed, but its mysterious attraction even to the victimized remains unsolved. I clicked off the television.

"We don't have a precedent for anything like this," noted a psychiatrist at the post-traumatic stress program at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York. Nor do we have language for it. We long ago used up *carnage* and *atrocity* and *catastrophe*. The day of the crashes, television commentators gave *horrific* a good workout, and by afternoon the juju had departed that word, too. Thomas Friedman, in his column in the *New York Times*, reported that a secretary in Jordan, not having much English, had called the events of September 11 "the Big Terrible."

I don't myself have the language to put what happened into any sort of useful order or perspective, and language is my game, just about all I have and am. All I come away with is a heightened realization of the easy violability of life when it is held so cheap by enemies and my own selfish good fortune in having thus far been spared a death devoid of natural cause or rational meaning.

**Joseph Epstein**

the weekly Standard

# The Right War

President Bush's speech before Congress Thursday night conveyed both the determination and the reassurance the American people needed. But what gave the president's address historic significance was the courageous and visionary mission he set for his administration and for the nation. For Bush pledged not only to find and destroy Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan, and not only to attack and vanquish the brutal Taliban regime that has given bin Laden aid and sanctuary. The president declared that while America's "war on terror" begins with Al Qaeda, "it does not end there." The war, he insisted, will require that "every terrorist group of global reach" be "found, stopped, and defeated," and our enemies, he declared, will include not just those groups but also "every government that supports them."

We trust these words will reverberate far beyond Kabul, in Tehran, Damascus, Khartoum, and above all, in Baghdad, where sits the man whom Secretary of State Colin Powell recently called "one of the leading terrorists on the face of the Earth." Evidence that Iraq may have aided in the horrific attacks of September 11 is beginning to accumulate. American intelligence officials have learned that one of the men who carried out the attacks on the World Trade Center, Mohammed Atta, met with an Iraqi intelligence official in Germany several months ago. Other bits of evidence of Iraqi complicity may emerge in the future. If Attorney General John Ashcroft's investigation does begin to piece together a puzzle that includes Iraq, the American public will demand that the kind of forceful response now being assembled against the Taliban be turned with even greater fury against Saddam and his regime. And they will be right.

But Bush's Thursday speech was significant because the president made clear that taking decisive action against Saddam does not require absolute proof linking Iraq to last week's attack. A few days before, Secretary Powell was even more explicit in saying that the United States should target those "groups out there that mean us no good" and "that have conducted attacks previously against U.S. personnel, U.S. interests, and our allies." That means the war on anti-American terrorism must target Hezbollah, the terrorist group backed by Iran and Syria, as well as the Taliban. And it must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power, by supporting the Iraqi opposition and, if necessary, by using American military force to complete the tragically unfinished task begun in Operation Desert Storm a decade ago.

The president revealed in his speech a deep understanding of an important point: that the "war on terrorism" is not merely a war on terrorists. It is also, and perhaps even more significantly, a war against the kinds of regimes that support and employ terrorism as a deadly weapon in their war against us. Saddam Hussein, because of his strategic position in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, surely represents a more potent challenge to the United States and its interests and principles than the weak, isolated, and we trust, soon-to-be crushed Taliban. And unlike the Taliban, Saddam Hussein may soon have at his disposal not only terrorist networks, but biological, chemical, and even nuclear weapons. Is it conceivable that the United States would destroy the Taliban but leave the Iraqi regime untouched? Could the war the president so eloquently rallied us to Thursday night be considered won if Saddam were still in power three years from now, aiding our enemies and developing weapons of mass destruction?

As both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* reported this past week, there has been an argument within the Bush administration over how centrally to target Iraq. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and others in the Pentagon and in Vice President Cheney's office have argued that no war on terrorism can possibly succeed if there is not a change of regime in Iraq—which is what Wolfowitz meant when he said a week ago that it was necessary to "end states that support terrorism." The president made clear in his speech that the war on terrorism must bring about a change of regime in Afghanistan. He surely knows that a change of regime in Iraq may take longer, but is every bit as important.

Indeed, we find it hard to believe that anyone in this administration, whether in the State Department or in the White House or in the CIA, can seriously be arguing that the Iraqi regime should be left alone. In 1998 a group of prominent figures sent a letter to President Clinton urging him to take strong action against Saddam Hussein. They warned that if Saddam were to "acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world's supply of oil will all be put at hazard." They pressed President Clinton to make it the aim of American foreign policy to "remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power."

The signatories of that 1998 letter are today a Who's Who of senior ranking officials in this administration: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of State John Bolton, Under Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky, Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman, and National Security Council senior officials Elliott Abrams and Zalmay Khalilzad. If these Bush administration officials believed it was essential to bring about a change of regime in Iraq three years ago, they must

believe it is even more essential today. Last week we lost more than 6,000 Americans to terrorism. How many more could we lose in a world where Saddam Hussein continues to thrive and continues his quest for weapons of mass destruction? Do we really want to find out?

Below we reprint another letter, sent to the president this week. The signatories support the president's war on terror. They point out that such a war must include a policy designed to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power in Iraq. They call for measures against Hezbollah, and against Iran and Syria if they do not cease their support for that powerful terrorist organization. These recommendations are consistent with the principles the president laid out Thursday night, and with the vital interests of our nation.

We are at war. It will not be easy. But the sacrifices we will make will be fully justified, and redeemed, if we fight the right war, and fight it to victory.

*—Robert Kagan and William Kristol*

# An Open Letter to the President

September 20, 2001

Dear Mr. President,

We write to endorse your admirable commitment to "lead the world to victory" in the war against terrorism. We fully support your call for "a broad and sustained campaign" against the "terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them." We agree with Secretary of State Powell that the United States must find and punish the perpetrators of the horrific attack of September 11, and we must, as he said, "go after terrorism wherever we find it in the world" and "get it by its branch and root." We agree with the Secretary of State that U.S. policy must aim not only at finding the people responsible for this incident, but must also target those "other groups out there that mean us no good" and "that have conducted attacks previously against U.S. personnel, U.S. interests and our allies."

In order to carry out this "first war of the 21st century" successfully, and in order, as you have said, to do future "generations a favor by coming together and whipping terrorism," we believe the following steps are necessary parts of a comprehensive strategy.

Osama bin Laden: We agree that a key goal, but by no means the only goal, of the current war on terrorism should be to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, and to destroy his network of associates. To this end, we support the necessary military action in Afghanistan and the provision of substantial financial and military assistance to the anti-Taliban forces in that country.

Iraq: We agree with Secretary of State Powell's recent statement that Saddam Hussein "is one of the leading terrorists on the face of the Earth…." It may be that the Iraqi government provided assistance in some form to the recent attack on the United States. But even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism. The United States must therefore provide full military and financial support to the Iraqi opposition. American military force should be used to provide a "safe zone" in Iraq from which the opposition can operate. And American forces must be prepared to back up our commitment to the Iraqi opposition by all necessary means.

Hezbollah: Hezbollah is one of the leading terrorist organizations in the world. It is suspected of having been involved in the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Africa, and implicated in the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. Hezbollah clearly falls in the category cited by Secretary Powell of groups "that mean us no good" and "that have conducted attacks previously against U.S. personnel, U.S. interests and our allies." Therefore, any war against terrorism must target Hezbollah. We believe the administration should demand that Iran and Syria immediately cease all military, financial, and political support for Hezbollah and its operations. Should Iran and Syria refuse to comply, the administration should consider appropriate measures of retaliation against these known state sponsors of terrorism.

Israel and the Palestinian Authority: Israel has been and remains America's staunchest ally against international terrorism, especially in the Middle East. The United States should fully support our fellow democracy in its fight against terrorism. We should insist that the Palestinian Authority put a stop to terrorism emanating from territories under its control and imprison those planning terrorist attacks against Israel. Until the Palestinian Authority moves against terror, the United States should provide it no further assistance.

U.S. Defense Budget: A serious and victorious war on terrorism will require a large increase in defense spending. Fighting this war may well require the United States to engage a well-armed foe, and will also require that we remain capable of defending our interests elsewhere in the world. We urge that there be no hesitation in requesting whatever funds for defense are needed to allow us to win this war. There is, of course, much more that will have to be done. Diplomatic efforts will be required to enlist other nations' aid in this war on terrorism. Economic and financial tools at our disposal will have to be used. There are other actions of a military nature that may well be needed. However, in our judgement the steps outlined above constitute the minimum necessary if this war is to be fought effectively and brought to a successful conclusion. Our purpose in writing is to assure you of our support as you do what must be done to lead the nation to victory in this fight.

*William Kristol, Richard V. Allen, Gary Bauer, Jeffrey Bell, William J. Bennett, Jeffrey Bergner, Rudy Boshwitz, Eliot Cohen, Seth Cropsey, Midge Decter, Thomas Donnelly, Nicholas Eberstadt, Hillel Fradkin, Aaron Friedberg, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Jeffrey Gedmin, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Charles Hill, Bruce P. Jackson, Eli S. Jacobs, Michael Joyce, Donald Kagan, Robert Kagan, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Charles Krauthammer, John Lehman, Clifford May, Martin Peretz, Richard Perle, Norman Podhoretz, Stephen P. Rosen, Randy Scheunemann, Gary Schmitt, William Schneider, Jr., Richard H. Shultz, Henry Sokolski, Stephen J. Solarz, Vin Weber, Leon Wieseltier, Marshall Wittmann*

# Sovereignty Amidst Terror

## Every terrorist lives in a nation-state, which is accountable for him. BY JEREMY RABKIN

NOW THAT EVERYONE AGREES we are at "war," it is time to think seriously about what that means.

The usual voices—from the European Union and its various agents of influence in America—warn us about the importance of "international cooperation." Americans who are eager to fight back may be tempted, on the other hand, to dismiss all talk about the rights of sovereign states. But now, more than ever, clear thinking about sovereignty is vital.

The first point to grasp is that, if we take words seriously, there is no such thing as "war" against abstractions like "terror"—or "drugs" or "poverty." War is a relation between sovereign states. The rest is merely policing—or empty rhetoric.

When armed men are shooting back, of course, "policing" may have little to do with lawyerly notions of due process. It can involve any force required to abate the violence.

Can we police outside our borders? In the classical conceptions of international law, sovereign states can deny outside powers the right to interfere in their own territory: That's what sovereignty means. But this privilege comes with a price. A sovereign state is obligated to ensure that its territory is not used as a launching pad for attacks on the territory of other states. If the host state won't take action, the victim state is entitled to do so.

This is not a doctrine invented in recent times by a starry-eyed U.N. conference. It follows from the basic idea of sovereignty. One state can only be expected to respect the territorial integrity of another when it is safe for it to do so.

So, for example, in 1842, British forces entered American territory from Canada to seize and destroy a ship loaded with arms for anti-British rebels in Canada. One American was killed in the resulting scuffle. Secretary of State Daniel Webster protested that the British action was precipitate. But he did not deny the principle that a state is authorized to protect itself when a neighboring state fails to repress such threats from across the border. Shortly after our Civil War, Irish nationalists tried to strike at the British Empire by launching a raid into Canada from American territory. The United States promptly apologized, cooperated in rounding up Fenians in New York, and offered compensation to Britain.

The principle remains very sound. When a state fails to suppress international terrorist networks, operating on its own territory, it is answerable to the countries targeted by the terrorists. A victim state is then justified when it acts in self-defense against the host state, even if the host state has indulged terror networks by negligence or fear rather than deliberate malice. There can be reasonable dispute about the timing and degree of defensive action, but not about the principle.

In planning our responses, we should not expect a great deal of military assistance from Europe or perhaps from many other countries. But we should certainly strive to get as much cooperation from other countries as we can. At minimum, we will need a lot of cooperation in gathering intelligence and closing escape routes for terrorist networks. That means it is much in our interest to keep the focus on terrorism—that is, on basic security—and not let ourselves get distracted by pompous rhetoric about democracy, liberty, or human rights.

China and Pakistan, for example, may prove valuable partners in some of our efforts. They have reasons of their own to be fearful of Islamist extremism and international terror networks. They cannot be expected to join a campaign for democracy, however, and it is no credit to democracy to enlist China and Pakistan under its banner. Right now it is our business to fight international terrorism, not any and all things of which we may disapprove. In the campaign against terrorism, pledging respect for the national sovereignty of our partners can be an asset and should not be seen as a reluctant concession.

When we do take military action, however, we must judge for ourselves the appropriateness of our measures. One thing we must therefore ask of our "allies" in Europe is that they at least put aside their fantasies of an international criminal court which would judge the legality of American actions.

This sort of thing is more than a distraction. It is a challenge to our own national rights. No international court can protect us against outside attack. No international court has any means to seize terrorists or to force harboring states to surrender them. Now that we have been attacked, no international court should presume to judge how we react in defending ourselves. If Europeans want to be neutral in the coming war, they should at least be told to respect the classic duty of neutrals—which is to refrain from judging the belligerents.

To those who regard all this as anachronistic, we should be more forthright. The terror menace has

*Jeremy Rabkin teaches international law at Cornell University.*

reached the scale it now has because too many countries—including our own—have been too willing to replace the historic claims of sovereign states with ineffectual and hypocritical international "understandings."

So the Palestinian Authority, which is not recognized as a sovereign state (and does not even claim to be one), is allowed to send delegates to international forums as if it were. Israel is told that it cannot interfere in "Palestinian territory," but the Palestinian Authority is not responsible for terrorist actions launched from that territory.

What is true for "Palestine" is true, in greater or lesser degree, for Syria, Libya, Iraq, and other sponsors of terror. We do not hold them to the standard of sovereign states. We have allowed them to connive with international terror, so long as they keep it below a certain acceptable level—and target it away from Europe or North America. Now it may be that states that have sponsored terror at a deniable distance have lost control of the most fanatic terrorist cells.

But the principle remains: If states do not suppress international terrorist operations on their own territory, they are failing in their most basic obligations. The victims of this failure are entitled to take up necessary policing duties on their own. Or they are entitled to regard host state failings as justification for war—against the sponsoring or negligent states. The United States now stands in the front rank of the victim states. And in war, toppling the other side's government is a time-honored tactic. Let this be clear.

We may not replace the dictatorships of Saddam Hussein or Bashar al-Assad with a western-style democracy. But we can hope to see them replaced with regimes that know the price of their independence is reliable cooperation in suppressing terror attacks on outsiders. That is the duty of sovereign states. That's what we should be fighting for. It is more than enough. ♦

# AWOL Christian Soldiers?

## These days, America's religious leaders are far from bellicose. BY J. BOTTUM

TWO DAYS AFTER the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson opened themselves to national condemnation by declaring that the terrorists' success was a direct judgment of God, visited upon the United States for the sins of abortionists, feminists, homosexuals, pagans, and the ACLU.

Meanwhile, *World* magazine, the evangelical weekly, fell over the edge in an editorial by Joel Belz that quoted, approvingly, the words of an Egyptian chauffeur as he praised the terrorists: "The Americans have forgotten that God exists." "High on our own Western shelf of false deities have been the gods of nominalism, materialism, secularism, and pluralism," Belz explained. "And it's hard to think of more apt symbols of all those 'isms' than the twin towers of the World Trade Center. . . . Babel needed just one such tower; New York built two."

Such views are contemptible, but they raise a significant issue. With George W. Bush, we have a seriously evangelical president in the White House for the first time since Jimmy Carter. We have an attorney general of more muscular Christianity than any since the nineteenth century. We have, as the last election showed on both sides, an astonishingly open return to the public square of religious rhetoric and concerns. All of which makes the question of the proper Christian understanding of the attack—and what we should do about it—of profound importance.

*J. Bottum is Books & Arts editor of* THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

News reports claimed that more Americans were in church on the Sunday after the attacks than on any ordinary Sunday in recent memory. But if the reports are accurate, they didn't hear many sermons that echoed Falwell, Robertson, and Belz. What they heard, interspersed with prayers for the victims and rescuers, were instead admonitions not to indulge racist feelings against Arabs or give in to the angry lust for revenge—neither of which the churchgoing portion of the American public seemed to feel much temptation to do.

In fact, American Christians are far more likely to feel the opposite temptation these days. There were very few churches in which "Onward, Christian Soldiers" got sung last week—much less "The Son of Man Goes Forth to War." Among Protestants, the entire theological tradition of using martial metaphors to describe God's glory has fallen into massive disrepute. Among Catholics, concerns about the injustices that must necessarily happen *during* war (the concerns scholastics called *jus in bello*) have damaged the ability to hold almost any good reason for *going to* war (what the scholastics called *jus ad bellum*). Righteousness has come to seem the equivalent of *self*-righteousness, and hardly anyone believes in genuinely righteous anger any more. If the United States goes wobbly in its war on terrorism—if the campaign peters out in self-doubt and confusion after a few months of bombings—Christian feeling in America will have had something to do with it.

There exists, of course, a morally serious and intellectually rigorous tra-

dition of Christian pacifism. Its threads run through every Christian community, from the Quakers in the radical reformation to the founders of Catholic monasticism. That pacifism is always stern and hard edged. It declares that Christian life in the world is defined by the perpetual possibility of martyrdom, and that to be a Christian is to stand as a sheep among the wolves.

The Christian believer who does not feel the tug of this pacifism has missed a constant theme of the gospels. But there are other themes as well, beginning with the righteous anger with which Christ drove the money-changers out of the Temple. In a famous passage in Romans 13—one of the central passages from which theologians as diverse as St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Martin Luther built their theories of government—St. Paul declares that the proper ruler of the state "beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil."

In a fascinating 1932 exchange in *Christian Century*, prompted by the question of whether the United States should intervene against the Japanese in Manchuria, the well-known Christian ethicist H. Richard Niebuhr wrote of what he called "the grace of doing nothing"—to which his brother, the even better-known Reinhold Niebuhr, replied in the next issue of the magazine, "I realize quite well that my brother's position both in its ethical perfectionism and its apocalyptic note is closer to the gospel than my own. In confessing that, I am forced to admit that I am unable to construct an adequate social ethic out of a pure-love ethic." But, he added, "I find it impossible to envisage a society of pure love as long as man remains man. . . . The hope of attaining an ethical goal . . . without coercion . . . is an illusion which was spread chiefly among the comfortable classes of the past century."

In point of fact, the United States did not intervene in Manchuria, and it was only after the attack on Pearl Harbor that most Americans came to see Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism as a better solution than his brother's Christian quietism. But even H. Richard Niebuhr's pacifistic position—which he would modify during World War II in a brilliant *Christian Century* essay called "War as the Judgment of God"—had much harder edges than the sermons that most Americans have been hearing since the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. We have, in the years since the Niebuhrs represented the mainstream of American Christianity, fallen back into a soft pacifism—the illusion of the comfortable classes—which lacks both the stern Christian pacifist's willingness to accept martyrdom and the hard Christian realist's willingness to use coercive force.

*A combat chapel, during the Korean war.*

Needless to say, soft pacifism is dangerous to a nation facing enemies without any softness or tradition of pacifism. It is as well a threat to American Christians, who can fulfill their religious duty either by accepting the suffering that H. Richard Niebuhr called "war as crucifixion" or by taking up the sword in righteous anger to guard the sheep against the wolves—but not by dithering between the two.

As for God's judgments, they are always difficult to discern. He has His own purposes, and if we are called to national repentance by the terrorists' attack upon the nation, it may be our own softness—our frivolity and unseriousness—that we are being asked to repent of and abandon. Abraham Lincoln understood all this when he said, in the enormous sadness of his second inaugural address, "Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue, . . . as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said 'the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.'" ♦

# Bush's Moment

## The son learns from his father's mistakes.

**BY FRED BARNES**

ALL BUT HIDDEN in the middle of President Bush's nationally televised speech last Thursday was a significant distinction about America's war against terrorism. "This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with its decisive liberation of territory and its swift conclusion," Bush said. He might have added that he won't repeat the mistakes made by the president in Desert Storm. Out of family loyalty Bush couldn't say this because that president was his father, George H.W. Bush. But Bush junior has thought about those mistakes and already gone out of his way to avoid two of them. More important, he's put himself in a position to avert a third, which turned out to be the most harmful of his father's mistakes. That was the failure to finish the job in the Gulf War by deposing Saddam Hussein.

In the days since terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon, Bush has become a wholly different president. Before he wasn't a rhetorical president able to stir the nation; now he is exactly that. Republicans in Congress used to beg White House aides to get the president to speak out more, to be more like President Reagan. Sorry, they were told, Bush believes that's not his strength, and he has no intention of trying to be what he isn't. Bush was wrong about himself. Now, he's not only adept at delivering a set piece speech, he's hard to shut up when asked questions by reporters at photo opportunities.

His outspokenness has consequences. In Desert Storm, his father never gave a speech to the nation on the reasons for deploying 500,000 troops to the Middle East to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. "Jobs, jobs, jobs"—the crude reason offered by then Secretary of State James Baker—wasn't satisfactory. One result of Bush senior's reticence was the collapse of his popular support after the war. He didn't keep the American people involved. Instead, he led by action—the initial deployment of troops, the buildup, the air war, the land war—and the public responded favorably each time. But most Americans never understood how important it was to achieve at least partial victory. Once the Gulf War was over, they quickly forgot about it and focused on new problems, like the economy.

In contrast, President George W. Bush delivers a message to the country every day. He meets in the morning with senior counselor Karl Rove and communications director Karen Hughes to fashion soundbites for public consumption. He's used colloquialisms to grab attention, phrases like "wanted dead or alive" or his intention to "smoke out" Osama bin Laden. And he's delivered two major speeches almost flawlessly, the prayer service address and the speech to Congress. Suddenly and surprisingly, Bush has mastered a few of the speechmaker's tricks. Maybe this has come naturally, a response to challenge. In any case, he was angry at times last Thursday, near tears at others, amused at the cheers for New York mayor Rudy Giuliani and governor George Pataki, and always passionate. My guess is that while his popularity will decline, it will plateau at a fairly high level—that is, assuming the war goes reasonably well.

The second mistake Bush avoided was to ignore everything but the war. That's what his father did, and it produced devastating political repercussions. At the White House now, there's a "domestic consequences group" headed by Josh Bolten, the deputy chief of staff. Rove plays a major role. The group, guided by economic coordinator Larry Lindsey, developed a package of tax cuts to juice up the economy: advancing the individual rate reductions enacted earlier this year, accelerating depreciation for business, providing tax relief for families of victims and a tax credit to offset payroll taxes. Initially, a capital gains rate reduction was not included, but a White House official indicated it could be added if Democratic congressional leaders agree. With the stock market in free fall, they might. The rule of thumb adopted by Bush is that any stimulus must be approved by both leaders of both parties in both houses. Something will pass, and Bush is likely to escape the tag he's solely a foreign policy president out of touch with domestic troubles of average Americans.

A representative day for Bush was Wednesday, September 19. He held repeated discussions with his national security team. He met with three foreign leaders and held a short session with the media in connection with each meeting. He had phone conversations with several more foreigners. He conferred briefly with his communications advisers. He talked with his speechwriters. He invited congressional leaders for a chat about a fresh tax cut. He discussed an emergency bailout for the airline industry with his advisers. The point here: Unlike his father, Bush is not oblivious to domestic concerns, whether or not they are chiefly a byproduct of the terrorist attacks.

As for mistake number three—not finishing the job—Bush senior had an excuse. He was encumbered by a United Nations resolution that authorized the United States and its allies to oust Iraq from Kuwait but not to drive on to Baghdad and wipe out Saddam Hussein's regime. Bush needed the U.N. cover because he didn't have overwhelming public support at home for war, especially in the Senate. Bush junior doesn't have this problem. Americans, except for college faculties and leftist intellectuals, are enthusiastically pro-war. Bush has wisely

*Fred Barnes is executive editor of* THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

# "Going Up, Please"

The vast crowd gathered in The Battery Park Plaza. Great people and articulate orators opened their hearts to the multitude, recalling the awful tragedy. It had consumed both World Trade Centers Buildings nearby. It had done the same to thousands of innocents trapped inside.

In the front row, sat an old lady in a wheelchair. A young man stood by her side.

On the stage, the master of ceremonies seemed about to close the memorable occasion with final and appropriate words. Just then, a little boy, not more than ten years old, gently tapped the back of the man in charge. Whereupon, he turned around and asked, slightly agitated, "Yes, young man, what is it?"

"May I please say a few words Sir?" he politely asked. The master of ceremonies hesitated. Then he thought, on this sad occasion, it might well be fitting to hear what one so young had to say.

"O.K.," said he.

The little boy waited while others brought along a stool on which the lad could stand. This elevated him high enough to talk comfortably into the loud speaker.

The boy wore a small round hat upon his head, tilted jauntily to one side. He was dressed all in blue. Down the front of his jacket sparkled a row of shiny brass buttons. A red stripe ran down the length of both his trouser legs. A tiny US flag stood out, clipped into his buttonhole.

"I'm an elevator boy," he announced in a boyish voice not yet changed. "Here I am because the 'Starter', boss of all us elevator boys, sent me."

A tentative, ripple of clapping greeted him. "Now, there are two brand new World Trade Center Buildings. First, I must tell you, we elevator boys know very well all your loved ones who worked in the two old buildings no longer standing."

Cheers erupted. The boy continued. "So, in the brand new World Trade Center Buildings, we presently welcome each and everyone of your loved ones every morning. They board our elevators. We say 'Going Up, Please." That's to make sure they're in the right elevator. Something else there is that should please and comfort you."

Again, the crowd interrupted, shouting, "Tell us! We want to hear!"

"Weekends," the boy informed them, "Your loved ones like to have us elevator boys take them to the very top. From there, they can look down upon where the two old World Trade Center Buildings once stood. But that's the place where your loved ones departed an old but good life. They begin a far happier new one in a brighter just completed complex bearing the same, never to be forgotten, famous name,"

More applause. More cheering. The little boy waited for quiet. "Over there," he pointed out. "See the Statue of Liberty on Bedloe's Island. Whenever your loved ones look in her direction from their vantage point atop the new buildings, Lady Liberty switches her torch from one hand to the other. That leaves a hand free to blow a kiss to each of your dear and happy loved ones."

Then, the crippled old lady turned to the young man standing by her side. Plaintively, she asked "Do you think my son, your father who was killed gets to enjoy all this too?"

"Oh, certainly, Grandma!" the grandson assured his Grandmother.

"There's a little more to say," the elevator boy wanted to make sure everyone knew. "Our 'Starter', our boss told me to be sure and tell you your loved ones were never lost. We elevator boys take them up each morning and down again at the end of every day. They know our names. We know theirs. We laugh. They laugh. Our 'Starter' said to be sure to say "Let not your heart be troubled nor let it be dismayed. You believe in God. Believe also in Me."

A hush muffled the slightest sound so that you could hear a feather drop. The young man whispered in his Grandmothers ear, "Who is the little elevator boy, anyway, Grandma?"

"Don't you know, dear lad?" she replied. "I'm sure he's the little elevator boy who, one day, says to each one of us, "Going Up, Please,"

And so, the little elevator boy climbed down again. Quietly, silently he left the stage. He simply vanished. No one saw him leave. It didn't really matter. For now, the great crowd was in each others arms. Were you to look closely, you'd have seen a smile on every face.

steered clear of bringing the war on terrorism under U.N. auspices. So he's free to do the whole job of attacking terrorism and not limit himself to taking out Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network.

Inside the administration, there's a debate over how extensive the war on terrorism should be. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell have recruited a broad coalition against bin Laden. But many members of the coalition will surely balk at targeting Iraq or Syria or Iran. And the Powell side in the internal debate is reluctant for the United States to go beyond where the coalition is willing to go, especially if the United States might be seen as waging a crusade against Islam. The contrary view, championed by Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, favors a wider war, whether members of the coalition like it or not.

Bush hasn't decided which he prefers and doesn't need to while concentrating on bin Laden. But he gives every indication he's ready to fight a wider war against all terrorism aimed at America. In his Oval Office remarks to the press during his meeting with President Megawati of Indonesia, Bush said bringing bin Laden and his gang to justice is merely "the first objective of a very long campaign." And he noted that nations in the coalition "will contribute in a variety of ways," not all of them in "overt ways." So every ally doesn't have to be publicly involved in every action or even in any of them. The coalition, he implied, is not an end in itself, as Powell seems to believe.

In his speech to Congress, Bush described the terrorist enemy in the broadest possible terms: "From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." The war "begins" with nailing bin Laden, he said, but doesn't end there. These were the right words. If Bush follows them up with action, he'll have a chance to achieve the right result—and avert the incomplete success of his father. ♦

# The Grudge Report

## The *New York Times* can't stop sneering at Bush.

**BY NOEMIE EMERY**

GEORGE W. BUSH finally became the president of Blue America around four in the afternoon on Friday, September 14, standing on rubble in downtown New York, clutching a bullhorn, telling the assembled hordes and heroes around him that the world will shortly be hearing from all of us. But by then, Blue America no longer existed. Neither did Red America, for that peculiar map of our past divisions that had transfixed us since last November no longer mattered. The Red and the Blue are now Red, White, and Blue—except for a few holdouts. Prominent among them is the *New York Times*.

Anyone who believes the *New York Times* is still a great paper should look closely at the coverage by its metropolitan bureau of George W. Bush's trip to Manhattan, in the edition of Saturday, September 15. You will find two rather startling stories. The first, by Clyde Haberman, is titled "Heartened by a Visit from Bush"—a headline written by someone who either hadn't read the text or couldn't believe it.

"Now we know what it takes to get Mr. Bush back, nothing less than the most devastating terrorist attack in American history," Haberman tells us. "More than a few said they thought that Mr. Bush's timing was off. . . . 'It's good that he's come, but it should have been automatic,' said . . . a bus driver. . . . 'He shouldn't look like he was told or asked to come. Now, it seems like it's just part of his job.'" And this was just the beginning. "I could care less," Haberman quotes another citizen. "I don't feel that he's the man that should have been there from the start. On TV he looked like a scared mouse. Now he's four days too late showing up."

Across the page from these graceless notes one finds more, this time under the headline, "Frontline Workers Are Happy to See the Commander in Chief." Again, the headline writer seems to have ignored the story, which claims the workers are not all *that* happy. As the lede put it, "For some New Yorkers, the hurt was so deep that no one . . . could make it feel better. . . . For others, the three days since Tuesday might as well have been an eternity; they were unwilling to make allowances for a commander-in-chief only now assuming his post on what they regarded as the front line. Yet across much of New York City, the visit . . . was welcomed as a much-needed civic lift, no matter how conflicted many residents said they were about the man himself." And the story's first quote from an affected citizen? "He is our leader, and even if some people don't respect the person, you have to respect the position."

The thing to know about such man-in-the-street stories is that they are often the most revealing of a paper's intention. If a reporter talks to enough people, he can get them to say just about anything, and then string together the voices he wants to achieve the proper tone. The tone of these stories, then, comes not from the streets of New York but out of the *New York Times* newsroom. More Haberman: "You may recall that George W. Bush was barely six months into his presidency before he decided that New York City was worth an hour of his time. He arrived

*Noemie Emery is a contributing editor to* THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

in July, not sounding too thrilled. . . . No one would have been surprised if that was the last time we saw this president. Who could really blame him? When you lose the state by about 25 percentage points in the last election, and the city by even more, you are not likely to beg your travel office to book you a return trip."

This spirit afflicts other sections of the *Times*, unwilling to let minor matters—like World War III or 6,000 dead people—stand in the way of a grudge. Economist Paul Krugman ended his September 14 column with a rant against Republicans as partisan and unpatriotic: "The administration developed its request for emergency funding in consultation with Congressional Republicans—full stop. A Democratic contact says that his party received 'no consultation, no collaboration, virtually no information.' I didn't want to mention this, but now is the time to draw the line. . . . Politicians who wrap themselves in the flag while relentlessly pursuing their usual partisan agenda are not true patriots, and history will not forgive them." Krugman shouldn't have mentioned this, since what his "Democratic contact" told him was a lie, as any competent editor was in a position to know by then.

For Maureen Dowd, nothing had changed that Tuesday. "The president will have to forgive the mayor for having warm words for John McCain during the New York primary, but desperate times require desperate measures," she wrote for last Sunday's paper, hitting the wrong note exactly. She then critiqued Bush's tax and energy policies. "Can he . . . Rummy and Condi move past their cold war attitude and Star Wars obsession?" She doubted it: "The young president . . . often seems trapped in the past."

Trapped in the past? There they are, the best minds of their generation, hunkered down like the Japanese in caves on the Pacific Islands, waiting for news of the Florida recount. Someone should tell them that this show has closed.

Of course, not everything in the *Times* was the work of a moral idiot. There have been many lucid, perceptive, and inspiring stories. Fairer accounts of Bush's visit were included in Saturday's edition, two of which ran the same quotes from Charles Schumer: "I would bet this is the first time [the president has] bonded with New York," said the senator. "That's going to be good for him, and it's going to be good for us." And it will be even better when Texas is finally accepted by the *Times*.

But even as late as Monday, when the editorial page gave in and gave Bush a victory, its words were hedged with what can be described only as geo-suspicion: "His recent attempt to bill his vacation in Texas as a return to the real American values of the heartland seemed a repudiation not only of Washington, D.C., but urbanity in general," said the paper, adding that "in the past, he reflected the country's more Manhattan-phobic side."

It is true enough that there has sometimes been an ugly edge to some conservative rhetoric—i.e., the disgraceful remarks of Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson. But it is also true that Manhattan itself has often been phobic about the many different forms of life outside itself. In recent years, there has been an insularity, a prejudice, an intolerance, a suspicion, a palpable snottiness about the *Times*. A lot of the tangible loathing for Bush among East Coast trendies has had less to do with concrete views and discrete policies than with a whole cluster of social and regional attitudes: a *Texan*, for crissakes, who likes the outdoors and didn't care much for their books or their chatter—what use could he be to them? Well, as it turns out, a hell of a lot.

What in the name of God was the *Times* Metro desk thinking, when it let those stories run? Especially when the paper would soon explain in detail exactly what George Bush was doing in those two days before he was able to come to Manhattan: securing the homeland, mapping out the response, synchronizing the agencies, talking to other leaders around the world. All the things that are the responsibility of an American president, and things that mayors and governors, however valiant and stalwart, don't do.

In times of great pressure, some always sink well below the occasion. This time it was the journalists, not the leaders, who failed. ♦

# Cold War II

## America can win another protracted, high-stakes global struggle. BY PETER D. FEAVER

Getty Images

IN HIS FINE ADDRESS to Congress, President Bush committed America to "our war on terror." But what should we call this war and how should we think of it? Already the Pentagon's initial name for the war, "Operation Infinite Justice," has been discarded. That unfortunate moniker called to mind a never-ending war, and was too easily twisted to substantiate the terrorists' view that this is a holy war between religions. The president has likewise advised us not to think of it merely as Desert Storm II. That war was too short and too easy. Nor is it really World War III, despite the obvious analogies drawn by the president to a second day of infamy and an enemy motivated by a murderous "will to power."

The truth is that this new war will be most like yet another war we won, although the president made only the slightest reference to it. As in our present conflict, victory came only after a sustained and often uncertain contest with a foe determined not just to seize foreign territory but to destroy America itself. In that war, there were some bloody pitched battles in far-flung places on the Asian rim and elsewhere, but much of the fighting was done in the shadows. In the end, that war was won, as this new one can be, only because the American public quickly understood the gravity of the situation and successive administrations kept up the fight.

This is the start of Cold War II. And because Americans do not really remember Cold War I, or at least do not remember it correctly, it is worth considering the analogy more closely. There are numerous parallels at the international level: evidence of a tectonic with-us-or-against-us realignment in the international community; the consequent need for adroit alliance management and the likelihood of uncomfortable marriages of convenience with unsavory allies; the seamless integration of combat, threats, and propaganda. There is even, as countless observers have pointed out, a painful connection between the two conflicts: Our enemy in the Second Cold War was nurtured by us as an ally in the First. We would do well to keep this uncomfortable fact before us as we recruit allies for the new Cold War.

The international ramifications are important, but the substance of President Bush's address to Congress shows he understands that three parallels at the domestic level will prove most telling.

First and foremost, Americans will have to pay a heavy price to win this war. Americans paid in treasure, blood, and fear to win the First Cold War, and the Second Cold War may carry an even higher price. Not so much in treasure; even the most hawkish fiscal estimates pale beside 50 years of Cold War budgets. The United States can easily afford to pay what this new war will cost in dollars.

It is the terrible price in blood and fear that we must quickly come to terms with, and the point of vulnerability is not the arena currently receiving the most attention in the press: the public's willingness to tolerate military casualties. Tens of thousands of American military personnel died in the various battles of the First Cold War. Since it ended, however, it has become fashionable to argue that Americans will no longer tolerate military casualties. Casualty phobia has been real, but it is largely limited to the decision-making and policy-implementing elites, not to the American public on whom it is blamed. Even before this attack, Americans gave every indication that they would support military operations that involved American casualties, provided the operations were successful. Polls since the attack confirm that the public understands American soldiers will be at risk in this war.

*Peter D. Feaver is director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies and associate professor of political science at Duke University. He is currently on sabbatical at Cambridge University.*

But do we understand that American civilians will also be at risk? During the First Cold War, Americans came to terms with American vulnerability for the first time. Because American soil emerged more or less unscathed when the First Cold War ended, we tend to forget that most people—including most experts—thought it more than likely that the United States would suffer a nuclear attack at some point. This new Cold War already has seen American citizens killed in large numbers, and there is every indication the enemy will strike again. President Bush explicitly invoked that dread: "I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat." Americans did not capitulate to fear during the First Cold War. Will they do so now?

Second, domestic political support is crucial and cannot be assumed. Partisan politics will return, and the Bush administration will have to fight this war without the unanimous support we have seen temporarily on display. To be sure, during the immediate aftermath of extreme crisis, we can count on politicians and the public to rally to the flag. The Democrats did not offer the customary rebuttal speech to a presidential address to Congress. But if Cold War I taught us anything, it is that politics does not stop at the water's edge, at least not in a campaign that lasts more than a few weeks. While there was a bipartisan consensus on the general need to stand up to communism, there was never a bipartisan consensus on how to stand up to communism. In the same way, there will be deep and probably bitter debates over how to conduct the Second Cold War.

This truth may be particularly hard to swallow, because in the last decade we have bought into a myth about the "good old days" when Americans—Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and leftists—were of one mind on foreign policy. On the contrary, successive administrations sustained political support for the First Cold War only with exceptional difficulty, and even then in fits and starts. Anyone with an e-mail connection to the American left can attest that the Second Cold War will be like the First in this regard, with loud clamoring from the blame-America-first crowd. Many of these debates will be specious, but not all will be. Indeed, the Second Cold War may be harder to fight than the last one, leaving ample room for responsible disagreements among reasonable people. We will have to nurture those debates, learn from them, and forge the best possible policy in an extraordinarily difficult political climate.

Third, like the First Cold War, this Cold War will test the uneasy balance between national security and individual liberty—in the president's words, whether we can "fight for our principles" as well as "live by them." Harold Lasswell, the distinguished social scientist, warned that the dictates of national security in an age of total war could turn the United States into a "garrison state"—a militarized state where basic individual liberties were systematically sacrificed and an all-powerful central government tyrannized the population. Some considered his prophecies fulfilled in McCarthyism and the rise of the military-industrial complex.

*The Second Cold War will be like the First in this regard—there will be loud clamoring from the blame-America-first crowd.*

But in fact, America did not become a garrison state during the Cold War. Rights and liberties actually expanded—remember the civil rights movement—and large defense expenditures precluded neither a vast expansion of the social safety net, nor a vigorous independent entrepreneurial base. But here the Second Cold War will pose more serious challenges. The Soviet espionage threat inside the United States was real, but it never came to the blowing up of skyscrapers and the wanton killing of thousands of American citizens. The fifth columnists of the First Cold War were largely misguided intellectuals, hoping to undermine American foreign policy with bombast in between gulps of wine and brie. The "sleepers" of the Second Cold War are of an entirely different nature, and the balance between security and liberty far more precarious.

The Second Cold War will require changes in the way we do business and organize ourselves for national security, all relics of the First Cold War. Already, the Bush administration has announced the most obvious change, a new cabinet-level Office of Homeland Security. Other measures will be debated soon, such as expansions in international economic espionage and law enforcement capabilities, and possibly a dramatic reorientation of NATO. But this Cold War will be won or lost in the hearts and minds of the American people, not in the fine print of policies and programs.

One of the most hopeful signs so far has been the clarity with which the Bush administration has understood that this war will be long and difficult, involving a careful, measured, but sustained application of American power. Only the most blinkered critics of America think the president is planning a quickie retaliation of blind vengeance, in which some innocent Afghans die and nothing else is accomplished. On the contrary, the administration has repeatedly drawn attention to the costs and the long-term focus.

Therein lies the worry. Will we sustain the fight? As President Bush reminded us, "Even grief recedes with time and grace. But our resolve must not pass." Bush shows every indication of understanding that he is the first president of the Second Cold War. He recognizes the demands this war will place on the home front. Do the rest of us? ♦

# A SCIENTIFIC DISSENT FROM DARWINISM

Public TV programs, educational policy statements, and science textbooks have asserted that Darwin's theory of evolution fully explains the complexity of living things. The public has been assured, most recently by spokespersons for PBS's *Evolution* series, that "all known scientific evidence supports [Darwinian] evolution" as does "virtually every reputable scientist in the world."

The following scientists dispute the first claim and stand as living testimony in contradiction to the second. There is scientific dissent to Darwinism. It deserves to be heard.

"WE ARE SKEPTICAL OF CLAIMS FOR THE ABILITY OF RANDOM MUTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION TO ACCOUNT FOR THE COMPLEXITY OF LIFE. CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE FOR DARWINIAN THEORY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED."

Henry F. Schaefer, Nobel Nominee, Director of Center for Computational Quantum Chemistry, U. of Georgia • Fred Sigworth, Prof. of Cellular & Molecular Physiology Yale Grad. School • Philip S. Skell, Emeritus Prof. Of Chemistry, NAS member • Frank Tipler, Prof. of Mathematical Physics, Tulane U. • Robert Kaita, Plasma Physics Lab, Princeton • Michael Behe, Prof. of Biological Science, Lehigh U. • Walter Hearn, Ph.D. Biochemistry-U. of Illinois • Tony Mega, Assoc. Prof. of Chemistry, Whitworth College • Dean Kenyon, Prof. Emeritus of Biology, San Francisco State • Marko Horb, Researcher, Dept. of Biology & Biochemistry, U. of Bath • Daniel Kubler, Asst. Prof. of Biology, Franciscan U. of Steubenville • David Keller, Assoc. Prof. of Chemistry, U. of New Mexico • James Keesling, Prof. of Mathematics, U. of Florida • Roland E. Hirsch, Ph.D. Analytical Chemistry-U. of Michigan • Robert Newman, Ph.D. Astrophysics-Cornell U. • Carl Koval, Prof., Chemistry & Biochemistry, U. of Colorado • Tony Jelsma, Prof. of Biology, Dordt College • William A. Dembski, Ph.D. Mathematics-U. of Chicago • George Lebo, Assoc. Prof. of Astronomy, U. of Florida • Timothy G. Standish, Ph.D. Environmental Biology-George Mason U. • James Keener, Prof. of Mathematics & Adjunct of Bioengineering, U. of Utah • Robert J. Marks, Prof. of Signal & Image Processing, U. of Washington • Carl Poppe, Senior Fellow, Lawrence Livermore Laboratories • Siegfried Scherer, Prof. of Microbial Ecology, Technische Universitat Munchen • Gregory Shearer, Postdoc. Researcher, Internal Medicine, U.C. Davis • Joseph Atkinson, Ph.D. Organic Chemistry-M.I.T., American Chemical Society member • Lawrence H. Johnston, Emeritus Prof. of Physics, U. of Idaho • Scott Minnich, Prof., Dept. of Microbiology, Molecular Biology & Biochemistry, U. of Idaho • David A. DeWitt, Ph.D. Neuroscience-Case Western U. • Theodor Litt, Ph.D. Chemistry-M.I.T. • Braxton Alfred, Emeritus Prof. of Anthropology, U. of British Columbia • Walter Bradley, Prof. Emeritus of Mechanical Engineering, Texas A & M • Paul D. Brown, Asst. Prof. of Environmental Studies, Trinity Western (Canada) • Marvin Tanzer, Prof. of Biochemistry & Molecular Biology, U. of Calgary Medical School • Theodore Saito, Project Manager, Lawrence Livermore Laboratories • Muzaffar Iqbal, Ph.D. Chemistry-U. of Saskatchewan, Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences • William S. Reiter, Emeritus Distinguished Prof. of Chemistry, U. of Georgia • Keith Delaplane, Prof. of entomology, U. of Georgia • Ken Smith, Prof. of Mathematics, Central Michigan U. • Clarence Loudre, Prof. of Biology, Virginia Intermont College • Thomas Milner, Asst. Prof. of Biomedical Engineering, U. of Texas, Austin • Brian J. Miller, Ph.D. Physics-Duke U. • Paul Nesselroade, Assoc. Prof. of Psychology, Simpson College • Donald L. Calbreath, Prof. of Chemistry, Whitworth College • William P. Purcell, Ph.D. Physical Chemistry-Princeton • Wesley Allen, Prof. of Computational Quantum Chemistry, U. of Georgia • Joanne Driske, Asst. Prof., Kansas Medical Center, U. of Kansas • Chris Graca, Assoc. Prof. of Psychology, Biola U. • Wolfgang Smith, Prof. Emeritus of Mathematics-Oregon State • Rosanne Heard, Assoc. Prof. Computer Science, M.I.T. • Garrick Little, Senior Scientist, L-Corr • John L. Omdahl, Prof. of Biochemistry & Molecular Biology, U. of New Mexico • Martin Poenie, Assoc. Prof. of Molecular Cell & Developmental Biology, U. of Texas, Austin • Russell W. Carlson, Prof. of Biochemistry & Molecular Biology, U. of Georgia • Hugh Nutley, Prof. Emeritus of Physics & Engineering, Seattle Pacific U. • David Berlinski, Ph.D. Philosophy-Princeton, Mathematician, Author • Neil Broom, Assoc. Prof., Chemical & Materials Engineering, U. of Auckland • John Bloom, Assoc. Prof., Physics, Biola U. • James Gretham, Professional Geologist, Sr. Program Manager, National Environmental Consulting Firm • John Baumgardner, Technical Staff, Theoretical Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory • Fred Skiff, Prof. of Physics, U. of Iowa • Paul Gold, Assoc. Prof., Biological Science, Biola U. • Yongsoon Park, Senior Research Scientist, St. Luke's Hospital, Kansas City • Manoug Alexanian, Prof. of Physics, U. of North Carolina, Wilmington • Donald Ewert, Director of Research Administration, Wilson Institute • Joseph W. Francis, Assoc. Prof. of Biology, Cedarville U. • Thomas Schoska, Prof. of Biology, Concordia U. • Ralph W. Seelke, Prof. & Chairman, Dept. of Biology & Earth Sciences, U. of Wisconsin, Superior • James G. Harman, Assoc. Chair, Dept. of Chemistry & Biochemistry, Texas Tech U. • Lennart Moller, Prof. of Environmental Medicine, Karolinska Inst., U. of Stockholm • Raymond G. Bohlin, Ph.D. Molecular & Cell Biology, U. of Texas • Fazale R. Rana, Ph.D. Chemistry, Ohio U. • Michael Atchison, Prof. of Biochemistry, U. of Pennsylvania, Vet School • William S. Harris, Prof. of Basic Medical Sciences, U. of Missouri • Rebecca Wickler, Research Prof., Dept. of Chemistry, U. of New Mexico • Terry Morrison, Ph.D. Chemistry, Syracuse U. • Robert E. DeHaan, Ph.D. Human Development, U. of Chicago • Matti Leisola, Prof., Laboratory of Bioprocess Engineering, Helsinki U. of Technology • Bruce Evans, Assoc. Prof. of Biology, Huntington College • Jim Gibson, Ph.D. Biology, Loma Linda U. • David Keys, Ph.D. Anthropology, Temple U. • Scott Niemann, Senior Engineer, Jet Propulsion Lab (NASA) • Edward T. Peltzer, Senior Research Specialist, Monterey Bay Research Institute • Sam Edmonds, Clinical Assoc. Prof. of Surgery, U. of Washington • Rob Payne, Prof. & Chair, Dept. of Biological Sciences, Biola U. • Phillip Savage, Prof. of Chemical Engineering, U. of Michigan • Paddy Fan, Prof. of Biology, Wheaton College • Jed Macosko, Postdoc. Researcher, Molecular Biology, U.C. Berkeley • Daniel Dix, Assoc. Prof. of Mathematics, U. of South Carolina • Ed Curlow, Chair, Dept. of Physics, La Sierra U. • James Hannoush, Clinical Assoc. Prof., U. of Kansas Medical Center • Roger W. Smith, Prof. of Chemistry, U. of Nebraska • Robert DiSilvestro, Ph.D. Biochemistry-Texas A & M • David Prentice, Prof., Dept. of Life Sciences, Indiana State U. • Walt Stangl, Assoc. Prof. of Mathematics, Biola U. • Jonathan Wells, Ph.D. Molecular & Cell Biology-U.C. Berkeley • James Tour, Chao Prof. of Chemistry, Rice U. • Todd Watson, Asst. Prof. of Urban & Community Forestry, Texas A & M • Robert Waltzer, Assoc. Prof. of Biology, Belhaven College • Vincente Vila, Prof. of Biology, Southwestern U. • James Tumlin, Assoc. Prof. of Medicine, Emory U. • Charles Thaxton, Ph.D. Physical Chemistry-Iowa State U. • Stephen C. Meyer, Ph.D. Philosophy of Science-Cambridge • Paul Nelson, Ph.D. Philosophy of Biology-U. of Chicago • Richard Sternberg, Invertebrate Zoology, National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institute

(scientists listed by doctoral degree or current position)

DISCOVERY INSTITUTE

www.discovery.org

# They Also Serve Who Buy and Sell

## Avoiding financial panic wasn't as easy as it looked. BY KAREN SHAW PETROU


REUTERS

MUCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN—and all the praise has been more than deserved—about the selfless emergency rescue workers who sought to save lives after the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11. Much less has been said—and almost none of it outside the financial press—of the heroics performed at the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the nation's financial companies to save the American way of life.

Despite an off-the-charts threat, our financial markets didn't crumble along with the buildings that housed them. Saving our financial infrastructure may not seem like much in the scope of the current human tragedy, but a functioning, free economy is essential if each of us is to have a job to come back to and the same home to house us and the same hopes for our children that we had the day before the planes struck.

Americans may take for granted the fact that cash came out of their ATMs without halt seconds after the planes hit the World Trade Center, but no one with market experience would have been as sanguine. The incredible interconnectedness of financial markets—combined with the fact that many of these connections met under the Twin Towers—makes the banking system and financial markets vulnerable to panics when the unexpected occurs. Indeed, just the suggestion that one large hedge fund might not pay its bills on time led the Federal Reserve in 1998 to orchestrate a bailout. If weakness in a single firm could create so much systemic risk, it's not hard to imagine the market carnage that could have occurred on September 11.

Of course, it didn't. Equity values went down and government bond prices went up, but record volumes were handled without a glitch. Even more important, in the days before the public financial markets reopened, the Federal Reserve and Treasury manned their battle stations and kept foreign and institutional investors from panicking.

One small example: The day before the attack, the Federal Reserve had about $200 million out in what are called discount window advances—the emergency funds available to banks that need extra liquidity. In the three days after the attack, discount window advances increased to a historic $80 billion, with the Fed improvising new financial instruments as it went along. Some of the world's largest financial firms were literally blown to bits with billions of outstanding obligations to other institutions, but no one panicked and the financial system held.

The stability of financial markets is all the more astonishing when one considers their rapid evolution over the last decade. In 1987, the last time Alan Greenspan's mettle was tested, financial institutions were on one side or the other of conventional stock, bond, or deposit positions. Today, that's no longer the case. Financial markets now depend as much on instruments called derivatives as they do on direct financial obligations. Derivatives are contracts in which the risks created by potential market moves (such as changes in interest rates) are traded. This may sound arcane, but the daily trading volume of derivatives today is about $140 trillion. Not all of that huge sum is at risk in ordinary times, but extraordinary circum-

*Karen Shaw Petrou is a managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics, Inc.*

stances create unprecedented risks. Further, the ability of derivatives and other financial contracts to trade in an orderly fashion depends as much on confidence as it does on actual market activity. Despite this, these potentially high-risk markets went about their business—not as normal, of course, but in a way that staved off the financial cataclysm for which the terrorists had hoped.

In the next days and weeks, considerable thought will be given not only to how well the financial system did, but also to where its weaknesses lay. Most companies showed that they came dressed with both belts and suspenders, and it would be unfortunate if regulators tried to add duct tape or staples to their ensembles. Proposals to impose special capital requirements for operational risk, for example, would only add cost to the banking system as it struggles to meet the credit needs of a rebuilding nation. Self-congratulation should always be tempered by introspection, but there is a danger that the financial system will be overregulated to avoid so much reliance in the future on ingenuity and steadfastness.

Not all our financial firefighters manned the barricades at the Fed or Treasury. Within each of the nation's big banks and securities firms, back-up systems fired up in an almost flawless fashion when the front offices were knocked out. Many of the back-ups had been built to withstand the Y2K catastrophe that never came. All of them had been built at a cost of billions of shareholder dollars spent to ensure operational certainty, not to earn an extra dollar. These rainy-day investments withstood a torrent, and their designers and the companies that invested in them also deserve thanks.

Are the markets out of the woods now? No one can really say, since these woods are the darkest of Black Forests. It's good to know, though, that those who keep the lights on in the financial markets did a far better job than any of them might have expected until called to the test. ♦

Illustration by Thomas Fluharty

# Target Iraq?

## We will, if Paul Wolfowitz has his way.

**BY STEPHEN F. HAYES**

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Paul Wolfowitz spent much of the last decade as a foreign-policy intellectual and dean of Johns Hopkins graduate school of international affairs doing two things: studying war and agitating for the ouster of Saddam Hussein. Now Wolfowitz has a prominent seat at The Table—at the right hand, literally, of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at the September 15 Camp David photo op. And since September 11, he has emerged as a principal proponent of the view that America's war on terrorism must include the toppling of Saddam Hussein.

Paul Wolfowitz

Wolfowitz, who had the number three position in the Defense Department in the first Bush administration, has in recent years been making his views plain. In 1997, in a monograph entitled "The Future of Iraq" published by the Middle East Institute, he labeled a "failure" the first Bush administration's underestimation of "the importance of removing Saddam from power." The conclusion of the Gulf War, he wrote, "reflected a failure to appreciate the damage that would be done by Saddam's continuation in power."

The following year, Wolfowitz cosigned a letter to President Clinton calling for a Middle East strategy that "should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power." Saddam, of course, had plotted to assassinate former president George Bush in 1993. The longer he remained atop the Iraqi regime, Wolfowitz argued, the more powerful and dangerous he became—and the more the Iraqi people suffered.

In the early days after September 11, the Wolfowitz line met with considerable resistance, notably from Secretary of State Colin Powell. The dispute came to the fore after Wolfowitz at a September 13 briefing called for "removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism."

Powell, asked a few days later about these comments, seemed not only to repudiate the words, but to rebuff the man who'd spoken them. "We're after ending terrorism," he said. "And if there are states and regimes, nations, that support terrorism, we hope to persuade them that it is in their interest to stop doing that. But I think 'ending terrorism' is where I would leave it and let Mr. Wolfowitz speak for himself."

Other voices in the administration, however, echoed the president's early insistence that the United States will "make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." On September 16, Vice President Richard Cheney (Wolfowitz's boss at the

*Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at* THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

Defense Department in Bush I) warned, "If you provide sanctuary to terrorists, you face the full wrath of the United States of America."

The Iraqis, meanwhile, true to form, were applauding the terrorists. Leaders around the world—including thugs such as Libya's Muammar Qaddafi—might rush to condemn the attacks, but state-run Iraqi television opined: "The American cowboy is reaping the fruits of his crimes against humanity. It is a black day in the history of America, which is tasting the bitter defeat of its crimes and disregard for people's will to lead a free, decent life." One week after that broadcast, Saddam blamed rescue workers at the World Trade Center site for additional deaths.

In recent days, news organizations have cited intelligence sources confirming that suspected hijacker Mohammed Atta had met with a top Iraqi intelligence officer this spring. On September 20, when the president addressed Congress, he announced a campaign against all terrorist groups and "every government that supports them." While the speech contained no explicit vow to overthrow Saddam, its emphasis reflected a partial victory for the Wolfowitz view.

Indeed, Wolfowitz is one of a handful of advisers Bush has consulted on virtually every move the administration has made in its response to the September 11 attacks. And though there have been some rumblings of tension between Wolfowitz and his boss, Donald Rumsfeld, one Pentagon official says the two remain close and work together to shape policy. "It's a circle of two," he says.

Current and former colleagues describe Wolfowitz as clear-minded and levelheaded. "He combines practical executive branch experience with intellectual training"—his Ph.D. in political science is from the University of Chicago—"in a way that makes him one of the more formidable foreign policy thinkers today," says former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, who has been informally advising the Pentagon. "He's a little bit like Kissinger without all the flamboyance."

As for his influence on current policy, Gingrich comments, "If we change Afghanistan first, and then change Iraq, I'd feel very comfortable about that. Bush's speech probably made Paul feel very good, with six different mentions of the Taliban and his emphasis on states."

Longtime Wolfowitz colleague Richard Perle agrees. "I don't think it was idle rhetoric," he says. "It would be a mistake to assume that the first actions [the United States takes] will somehow indicate the war to come."

If Bush perseveres beyond first actions to a wider war against terrorism and especially against Iraq, a heretofore unknown subcabinet official, Paul Wolfowitz, will be as responsible as anyone. ♦




"IT'S OUR WORST NIGHTMARE, OSAMA—NEW YORK FIREFIGHTERS IN F-16s!" Henry Payne

# How to Fight in Afghanistan

*Winning won't be easy, but it's doable.*

**By Frederick W. Kagan**

America is at war, says President Bush, and that is just as well, for only major military undertakings offer any hope of curtailing the threats posed to the United States by global disorder, including terrorism. In the first wave of anger after September 11 there was enthusiasm for a counterstrike, but as people now consider the magnitude of the task, many are daunted. There is an increasing sense that we are helpless and that taking significant action is beyond our power. Not so. This war will be long, it will be difficult to fight, and it will be painful, but that is no reason not to wage it or to imagine that the United States cannot win it.

The prospect of war with Afghanistan is unsettling to many people. Americans remember vividly the decade the Soviet Union spent trying to subdue the Afghan *mujahedin*, whom the United States supported with weapons and training. Americans also remember the frustration the Soviets experienced and their ignominious withdrawal as a beaten force, soon a shattered country. This awareness highlights the difficulty of a significant campaign in South Asia, but it should not deter us from action. If Americans stop thinking of Somalia and Bosnia as major operations and recall the vast conflicts this country has fought and won when challenged, if they reflect on the important differences between the conditions under which the Soviets lost and those under which the United States would enter the conflict, then the prospect, although sobering, is far from hopeless.



Osama bin Laden

Illustration by Drew Friedman

President Bush has made the killing or capture of Osama bin Laden a primary objective of any operation against Afghanistan. Whether or not bin Laden was the prime mover behind the events of September 11, he is a powerful agent for preparing and conducting attacks on the United States, and his destruction is essential to any counterterrorism campaign. The reports that bin Laden has gone to ground are surely right. He knows better than anyone how eager the United States should be to eliminate him. He will be a hard target to hit, but not an impossible one. Missile strikes intended to kill him are almost certain to fail, since we are almost certain not to have perfect real-time intelligence about his movements. The United States will have to send in special-forces hunter-killer teams, then, to root him out.

Such teams will have to begin with what intelligence we have and can obtain about his location and

---

*Frederick W. Kagan teaches military history at West Point. The views expressed here are his alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Military Academy, the Army, or the Defense Department.*

work to develop more information from positions in and around Afghanistan. They will require aerial, primarily helicopter, support from regional bases to infiltrate them, to supply them, and to evacuate them. It is possible that such groups by themselves will find and kill bin Laden and his supporters, or they may make possible the targeting and destruction of critical individuals either by helicopter attack or by longer-range weapons. Such operations may take time—bin Laden has years of practice at concealing himself and many friends in Afghanistan—but if they are pursued with sufficient determination and vigor, they will probably achieve their goal. In the meantime, they will force bin Laden constantly to look to his own safety, thereby diverting his focus from attacking us.

It is critical to remember, however, that killing Osama bin Laden will not solve the problem we face. The Taliban regime itself is an extremely destabilizing force in the entire South Asian region, where destabilization has just become infinitely more disturbing with the acquisition by Pakistan and India of usable nuclear weapons. The existence of a radical fundamentalist Sunni—not Shi'ite—theocracy strikes at the foundations of the moderate secular Sunni states on which stability in the Middle East depends. It is hard to imagine a peaceful and stable Muslim world in which radical groups hold power in large states.

*As the Soviets discovered, the seizure of Afghanistan's major cities is not difficult. Moving into the countryside is a different matter.*

There are a number of important differences between the Soviets' efforts in Afghanistan and operations the United States is likely to undertake that offer grounds for optimism. The Soviets were supporting a totally illegitimate regime that was attempting to overturn all of the most fundamental tenets of traditional village life in the country. The Soviets sent an ill-trained and unfit conscript army to the battle. America and other nations supported the *mujahedin* with weapons, supplies, and sanctuary. The Soviet Union itself rapidly entered into the period of its final crisis, with corresponding confusion, lack of full commitment, and frustration as the war dragged on ineffectively. Last, the Soviets undertook a massive and brutal campaign aimed at driving the Afghan peasants out of the countryside into the cities—a campaign that created 5 million refugees in a country of 15 million people.

None of these conditions applies to prospective American involvement in the region. America's goal would be to establish a government that promises stability and peace with neighbors—a goal that need not be at odds with traditional Afghan values. The U.S. armed forces are highly trained and physically fit—they will be a match for the *mujahedin* fighters they encounter. The Taliban is a pariah regime—even Iran is working to seal its border, and Pakistan may be willing to shut down its limited cooperation with Kabul as well. America is strong now and made stronger by the attack of September 11. If Americans continue to understand the importance of the fight, there is no reason for their will to flag. Last, America will conduct the campaign with humanity and intelligence.

A sensible campaign against Afghanistan will avoid cruise missile diplomacy and reliance on firepower. Nothing we can do to the Afghan people with such weapons will be a thousandth part as painful for them as the war the Soviets fought and lost. The only prospect for success lies in getting troops rapidly on the ground, seizing and holding the major cities, and working to offer the Afghans a positive reason to abandon the Taliban and cooperate with us. As we secure cities and sanctuaries, we must work to feed the Afghan people and rebuild the infrastructure destroyed by decades of war.

As the Soviets discovered, the seizure of Afghanistan's major cities is not difficult. Most are in relatively accessible terrain, and the *mujahedin* then and now lack the resources to oppose a mechanized force operating there. The logistics will be daunting, to be sure, since American mechanized forces have a voracious appetite for fuel and ammunition. In the worst case, forces and supplies will have to be airlifted into the theater, which will slow the deployment and stretch our limited lift resources to the breaking point. There is reason to hope, however, that the neighboring regimes in Pakistan and even perhaps Uzbekistan will agree to cooperate with us at least to the extent of allowing us to establish logistics bases and supply routes through their territory—after all, both of those secular Sunni states are seriously threatened both by bin Laden and by the Taliban. It is also true, of course, that bin Laden's supporters in Pakistan are strong, so the United States will have to work hard to persuade the Pakistani leadership that America is serious about destroying bin Laden and that their own best interests run with ours.

The cities once seized and relief efforts put in train, it will probably be necessary to move into the countryside to control the guerrilla warfare that the Taliban will no doubt unleash in the face of our assault. This sort of warfare is extremely challenging, and rapid victory is not to be

AP / Wide World Photos

*Soldiers led by the late Ahmed Shah Massoud stand guard at Takhar in the Northern Provinces.*

expected. Even here, however, there is considerable room for hope that we could improve over the Soviet performance. First, as noted above, the United States will not suffer from any of the most significant failings that handicapped the Soviet effort. Second, the United States should aggressively support the internal opposition to the Taliban. Unfortunately, the most effective leader of anti-Taliban forces—Ahmed Shah Massoud, the "Lion of the Panjshir," a former *mujahedin* commander against the Soviets—is now dead, assassinated earlier this month by bin Laden. But the northern coalition that includes his supporters and others opposed to the Taliban remains. Afghanistan is by no means united under the Taliban. Even under the impact of the horrific attacks the Soviets launched on the countryside, the Afghan resistance was riven with factional jealousies that occasionally blew up into open conflict. Our much less inhumane approach and the benefits we can offer to the Afghan people are likely to reignite latent resistance that has been beaten down by the Taliban's apparent ascendancy, especially if we provide effective aid to the internal opposition forces already in the field.

None of which is to say that the war will be easy or short. What is more, America's resources will be stretched to their limits just in this theater. Afghanistan is a country that must be won by units like the 101st Air Assault Division that rely on helicopter transports for movement and helicopter gunships for fire support. We have only one such division, although the 82nd Airborne Division, the 25th Light Infantry Division, and the 10th Mountain Division come close in capabilities. To fight and win this war while maintaining our deterrent capabilities in other theaters, not to mention other campaigns that may need to be fought against terrorists and the countries who harbor them, will require a substantial increase in the active duty armed forces. Nor will the United States be able to avoid or delay the fundamental reequipment and reorganization of the armed forces necessary to bring us fully into the information age. A substantial increase in the defense budget will, without doubt, be essential.

It is a price well worth paying. The preparations we make will indicate to would-be aggressors and terrorists our determination to oppose and destroy them, and the actions that we take will not only strike the targets at which they are aimed, but will deter other threats of which we are not even aware. We have become accustomed over the past decade to thinking on a very small scale about military operations and defense budgets, and that constrains our view. It was hard to fight World War II, it was hard to fight Korea. If you had asked a strategist in 1939 about American prospects in a war against Germany, the response would have been "awful." Many people in the late 1940s doubted that America could summon the resolve to oppose the Soviet Union for as long as it would take to win. Those who have doubted America's ability to stay the course and fight the hard fights have almost always been wrong. It is up to the current generation to show itself worthy. ♦

# The Coalition Delusion

*Friends aren't necessary to gain respect in the Middle East. Power is.*

**By Reuel Marc Gerecht**

Of all the forbidding challenges that now confront the United States in its war against Islamic terrorism, easily the most dangerous is navigating the Muslim emotions surrounding Osama bin Laden and his call to holy war. If we read those passions wrong—if we see others as we see ourselves—we will surely watch the Middle East become even more violently anti-American. In this regard, Secretary of State Colin Powell's plan to build a "Muslim coalition" of powers behind Washington's campaign against terrorism will likely do far more harm to us and our Muslim allies than to bin Laden and his Taliban "hosts." The Bush administration understandably wants to avoid being seen as waging a war against Islam, so that Muslims who are publicly on our side, at least in theory, can deflect the "Crusader" charge. The Gulf War coalition, which defines the Middle Eastern experience of so many of the Bush administration's senior officials, must, they think, be reborn to enhance the legitimacy of America's war in Arab and Muslim eyes.

Such reasoning is, of course, blind and deaf to both Islamic history and the arguments that bin Laden and other militants are hurling at us. It is one thing to treat the governments of Middle Eastern countries as legitimate in normal, daily diplomacy; it is quite another to view them, or to believe that their citizens view them, as morally legitimate in the much larger sense to which Secretary Powell aspires.

Let us step back in history. The Crusaders survived two centuries (1099-1291) in the Middle East precisely because they often had Muslim allies, in commerce and in war. Saladin, the conqueror of Jerusalem whom the West likes to pair off against Richard the Lionhearted, has become a legend in the region precisely because he overcame the Muslim-state tendency to ally with or ignore the Christian enemy. The Taliban chieftan Mollah Omar, bin Laden, and Secretary Powell are now forcing the Middle East's dictators and kings, none of whom enjoys the ironclad legitimacy and peace of mind that come only from the ballot box, into an extremely unpleasant historical paradigm.

Bin Laden and his fans will relentlessly put pressure on the fault lines in the Muslim mind. On the offensive, they will continue to underscore the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which they construe as a matter of "Jewish Crusaders" occupying Muslim land—Muslim land being, for bin Laden and in the hearts of most Muslims, all of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. They will challenge Muslim leaders to compete for the passions of their citizenry, who for the most part live in unjust, disillusioned societies. They will contrast today's weak, Westernized Arab rulers, who solicit money, weapons, and political support from the West, with the Saladins of the past, who made Christendom tremble. Islamic militants will throw down the gauntlet to Islam's religious scholars and neighborhood clerics, daring them to denounce anti-Western violence during Friday prayers, where Muslims have always powerfully expressed their collective identity.

It is very unlikely that those Muslims who hate bin Laden and support the United States will become any more pro-American because Hosni Mubarak and King Abdullah, Egypt and Jordan's rulers, are siding with us. It is, however, quite likely that those Muslims who admire bin Laden's anti-Western resolve, if not necessarily his tactics, will despise the Saudis even more when Washington and its Muslim allies march in lockstep. The "high" Islam of Cairo's ancient Al-Azhar University and the state-salaried *ulama* throughout the Middle East will also play right into the militants' hands if they now fire

*Reuel Marc Gerecht, director of the Middle East Initiative of the Project for the New American Century, is a former case officer in the CIA's clandestine service.*

off, as if on cue from their political overlords, denunciations of bin Laden.

Which is why they probably won't do so, at least not in a clear-cut fashion. At best, they will treat America as Pakistan's ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, recently did in a national address, as the "lesser of two evils." At worst—and General Musharraf's poignant, religiously allusive speech shows how little distance separates "best" and "worst"—the *ulama* will bury us in provocative anti-infidel allusions from the Koran, the Muslim holy book, and from 1,400 years of Muslim-Christian confrontation.

"Terrorism" in Arabic—as in other great Muslim languages that have absorbed so much of the ideological baggage of Islam's mother tongue—has a politically and morally ambiguous resonance. In recent history, the term overwhelmingly connotes justified resistance to Israel and other Western powers. When Arab leaders publicly condemn bin Laden's terrorism, it isn't a particularly damning reproach. Secretary Powell's determination to build a coalition of Muslim states to fight terrorism is for bin Laden and his supporters neither unexpected nor unwelcome. For them, and many others in the Muslim world, it confirms the corruptness of dictators and kings who for years have been waging brutal struggles against their own faithful Muslims.

Our war against Saddam Hussein was unfortunately a likely forerunner to our campaign against radical Islamic terrorism. The United States and its European allies achieved a military victory on the battlefield, followed fairly quickly by a propaganda defeat throughout the Arab world. Very few Arab intellectuals, religious scholars, and politicians were willing to state forcefully the simple truth that Saddam was the most savage totalitarian in Middle Eastern history. Especially after it became apparent that American and British bombing runs over Iraq were going to continue for years, Arab pride, always reinforced by the Muslim identity, turned the United States from noble victor to villain even though Saddam's depravity was visible to all.

Muslim Middle Eastern rulers are either going to help us or they're not based on a realpolitik assessment of whether America's war on terrorism strengthens, or weakens, their power. Neither they nor we need a coalition to advance the nuts-and-bolts counterterrorism intelligence and police work that has long been a staple of the private relations between us. And beyond intelligence, the "Muslim coalition" has very little of practical value to offer the United States in its campaign against bin Laden and radical Islamic terrorism. We didn't need a coalition to obtain overflight rights from Pakistan. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Afghanistan's anti-Taliban neighbors to the north, which have already signaled their willingness to help, couldn't care less about a Muslim coalition.

All that the key states of Secretary Powell's envisioned alliance—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan—really do offer us is the certainty that they will rescind the legitimacy that Secretary Powell so desires. If the participation of these countries helps us deflect Arab-Muslim criticism of America's war, it stands to reason that these same countries, when they tire of the campaign against terrorism, will hoist the Bush administration by its own petard. And their support will certainly fray as CNN broadcasts inevitably ugly images of America's war, no doubt juxtaposed with ugly images from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (The shooting hasn't even begun, and it's clear the Saudis have no stomach for a war against the Taliban, whom they have so faithfully supported.) One would think that General Powell, who has watched his triumph in Iraq become in just ten years a public-relations disaster, would be loath to give again moral stature to the very countries whose official presses, TV stations, intellectuals, diplomats, and leaders have done so much to maul us in the court of Muslim opinion.

We need always to remember that power first and foremost is the basis of a ruler's legitimacy in the Muslim world. We need to understand that our Muslim allies are primarily concerned with only one thing in the exercise of American power: Will we be victorious? Forty-five years ago, a few months after the British, French, and Israelis fell into political disarray following their Suez invasion, a senior officer of the Pakistani Army remarked to a visiting English scholar that he was, of course, outraged by the attack on a Muslim nation. "We are strongly against military aggression," he averred, "especially when left unfinished." With typical Pakistani mirth, the general revealed the key to political survival from Casablanca to Kabul.

In the power politics of the Middle East, there is no such thing as "soft power," multiculturalism, or liberal guilt. Muslims, who have fought each other far more than they have fought Westerners, do not spend much time worrying about hurt feelings. They are very much grown-ups about the exercise of power. When dealing with bin Laden and others in the region, like Iraq or the Lebanese Hezbollah, who intend us grievous harm, we should similarly school ourselves. If we can demonstrate militarily that we understand *siyasa*, the Darwinian game of Middle Eastern politics, our friends will stay our friends, regardless of how CNN portrays the clash of civilizations. ♦

# AMERICA'S FOREMOST POLITICAL WEEKLY JUST GOT 5 TIMES BETTER !

**Starting in October, you'll be able to see for yourself by going to weeklystandard.com and reading (free of charge!)**

## The Daily Standard.

**Yes, The Daily Standard — articles written every weekday by the same staff that brings you THE WEEKLY STANDARD.**

**Even Fred Barnes will be joining the 21st Century!**

**This isn't all you'll find on our new, reinvented site. (No, we didn't consult Al Gore.)**

**For subscribers to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, we're putting it online in an easily legible magazine format, available the minute it's published.**


**Subscribers also will be able to download past issues. That's because we're putting every print issue of THE WEEKLY STANDARD in a virtual library.**

Eventually every issue going back to our very first one — September 17, 1995 — will be in this library.
Which means that with a few keystrokes subscribers will be able to read not only every new issue, but also whatever they want from any back issue.

**All of this and more is coming soon in October @ weeklystandard.com.**

A whole new way to look at politics

# Reagan Rising

## *and liberalism falling*

By Robert G. Kaufman

Reagan on the campaign trail in 1980. Hulton / Archive.

Ronald Reagan is unquestionably the most important political figure in American politics since World War II. His successful quest for the presidency transformed the Republican party, invigorated the conservative movement, and worked the demise of "Great Society" liberalism. His strong stands during the Cold War helped defeat Soviet totalitarianism. His "Reaganomics" not only ended stagflation but launched two decades of unprecedented prosperity.

So Steven F. Hayward has chosen an apt title for *The Age of Reagan*, his important new study of the man and his times. The newly published first volume is subtitled *The Fall of the Old Liberal Order*; the promised second volume will examine Reagan's presidency. Hayward appreciates the felicitous combination of character, conviction, and ability to articulate them that lay at the heart of Reagan's greatness, without slighting reasonable criticisms of Reagan weaknesses. He avoids the mistake of both Reagan's admirers and Reagan's detractors who see the root of the president's conservatism in the old Republican right. What happened to Reagan ideologically during the 1950s presaged what would happen to many Truman liberals during the 1970s—it simply happened to him earlier. He saw "all by himself . . . liberalism's 'lack of a limiting principle' that would prove its undoing."

**The Age of Reagan**
*1964-1980: The Fall of the Old Liberal Order*
by Steven F. Hayward
Prima, 848 pp., $35

And yet, Hayward points out, "Reagan's rise depended more on circumstances than most other presidents," for it required the ripening and deepening of the consequences of liberalism's collapse. Thus, Hayward extends his analysis far beyond Reagan to cover the whole sweep of American politics between 1964 and 1980. Indeed, in some of the best parts of *The Age of Reagan*, Hayward captures the combination of hubris, naive idealism, and liberal guilt that animated and later ruined Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. The Kennedy administration marked the beginning of what Hayward calls "the third wave of the progressive administrative state." By the time that wave reached Johnson, it had become an absolute cult of expertise, producing the disaster of Vietnam, the failure of the War on Poverty, and the rise of broad government regulation aimed at massively changing American society.

Hayward excels in analyzing the paradox of Richard Nixon's astonishingly liberal administration. While employing conservative rhetoric, Nixon allowed spending and federal regulation to explode during his administration. Declaring that "we are all Keynesians now," he imposed mandatory wage and price controls, anathema to conservatives and a huge economic mistake, as even Nixon himself later admitted. His favorite cabinet officer, Treasury secretary John Connally, brought more state direction to economic policy than even the most liberal peacetime Democratic administrations. "Any other president who compiled Nixon's domestic and foreign record," Hayward notes, "would be regarded as standing firmly within the progressive tradition."

*Robert G. Kaufman is an associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont and author of* Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics.

Although not up to the standard of his chapters on Johnson and Nixon, Hayward's treatment of Jimmy Carter reliably conveys the peculiar amalgam of liberalism, sanctimoniousness, ostentatious guilt, inexperience, and naiveté that made Carter such an ineffective and unappealing president. By exaggerating Carter's fiscal conservatism, however, Hayward underestimates how much "new" liberalism dominated the Carter administration. Similarly, he does not address sufficiently the role of the courts in promoting and sustaining liberalism. The Carter administration succeeded more than any other, including Reagan's, in imposing an ideological litmus test—the embrace of liberal judicial activism—in its selection of federal judges.

When he comes to treat foreign policy, Hayward is justifiably scathing about Robert McNamara, whose managerial, technocratic theory of graduated response he rightly identifies as a prime cause of the Vietnam disaster. Yet *The Age of Reagan* sometimes becomes so engrossed in the details of the Vietnam War, especially the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the Tet Offensive, that it neglects significant issues such as the Kennedy administration's capitulation in Laos. The book also overstates its case against Lyndon Johnson's handling of the war. Johnson had many shortcomings, but failure to explain the rationale of American intervention in Vietnam was not one of them. When Johnson took office, he inherited certain commitments and policy premises that generated powerful pressure to intensify American involvement in South Vietnam. Johnson's reasoning flowed logically from the domino theory that not only he but also his predecessors since Truman largely and correctly accepted.

By the time Nixon came to power, the "New Left" was firmly in place, and its critique of American foreign policy underlay the arguments of the vast majority of liberals after 1968, who urged a more conciliatory approach to America's Communist adversaries than even Nixon and Kissinger would countenance as they undertook that peculiar project called "détente" that dominated American foreign policy through the 1970s. Hayward's understandable admiration for Daniel Patrick Moynihan leads him astray in his analysis of the opposition to détente. Reagan's views on the subject most closely paralleled not those of Moynihan but those of Senator Henry


M. Jackson. (As Kissinger himself put it, "criticism of détente might have remained inchoate sniping but for the emergence of a formidable leader able to unite the two strands of opposition and direct them to concrete issues that lent themselves to legislative intervention in American foreign policy: Senator Henry M. Jackson.")

Thus the debate over détente began in earnest not in the late 1970s, but in 1972, when Jackson succeeded in attaching the Jackson Amendment to the SALT I Treaty and introduced the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in 1974, linking the Soviet Union's most-favored-nation status to permitting freedom of emigration. Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin lamented that "no single question did more to sour détente than the question of Jewish emigration that the Jackson-Vanik Amendment raised." Constrained by his loyalty to Nixon and his focus on state issues while governor of California, Ronald Reagan did not emerge as a forceful and important critic of détente until 1975, although he had long opposed it privately.

Still, Hayward is right in his larger point about Reagan's opposition to détente and the political consequences of it. Reagan correctly considered the Soviet Union a totalitarian state, a malevolent Leninist entity with unlimited ambitions—and not the traditional imperial power that Nixon and Kissinger considered it or a peace-loving country driven to aggression by American belligerence that the liberals considered it. In contrast to deep pessimism about America's prospects held by Nixon and Kissinger, Reagan exuded robust confidence in the ability of the United States to prevail in the struggle with Soviet totalitarianism.

This first volume of *The Age of Reagan* concludes with an excellent account of the seminal presidential campaign of 1980. Hayward sees Reagan's unsuccessful run for the presidency in 1976 as paving the way for his success in 1980. The experience made Reagan a better and more disciplined candidate. By 1980, the decline of American power seemed ominous, contrasting starkly with the spectacular growth of Soviet military capabilities and the steady expansion of Soviet global power. Double-digit inflation, interest rates in excess of 20 percent, gas lines, and slow growth menaced the prosperity Americans had come to take for granted. The hostage crisis and President Carter's famous "malaise speech" chiding Americans for their "crisis of confidence" increased the widespread assumption that the United States had become impotent to

resist brazen provocations abroad and solve its serious problems at home.

Although the American people did not want Carter, they still had serious doubts about Reagan until a few days before the election. Hayward brings to life several of the noteworthy events of the 1980 campaign season: Reagan's dramatic recovery in the New Hampshire primary after a stumble in the Iowa caucuses, the disaster averted at the Republican convention when proposals for a Reagan-Ford co-presidency nearly led to Ford's choice as vice president, the gaffes that dogged Reagan during the first weeks of the general election, Carter's mean-spirited and counterproductive efforts to depict Reagan as a bigot and a fanatic, the struggle within the Reagan camp to develop a credible economic plan, Reagan's marvelous and Carter's dismal performance in the October 28 debate that clinched the election. As Hayward argues compellingly, Reagan ran for president as his own man, not as a creature of his advisers. And he won because of who he was, what he stood for, and what he said.

Hayward's *The Age of Reagan* is an invaluable contribution to the small but growing body of serious work that finally gives Reagan his due. Readers not only will profit immensely from reading this first volume, but will long for the publication of the next. ♦

# All in the Family

## *William J. Bennett and Jennifer Roback Morse defend a fundamental institution.* BY BRIAN ROBERTSON

The phrase "family values" has always seemed an empty one on the lips of American politicians. That's because those who use it are very reluctant to say what it means. For a politician—whose constituency is bound to include a vast assortment of divorced couples, single moms, cohabiting young professionals, and baby boomers with family histories that are models of instability—it's just too risky to explain in any detail the origins and consequences of the family breakdown that afflicts American society.

**The Broken Hearth**
*Reversing the Moral Collapse of the American Family*
by William J. Bennett
Doubleday, 320 pp., $22.95

**Love and Economics**
*Why the Laissez-Faire Family Doesn't Work*
by Jennifer Roback Morse
Spence, 300 pp., $27.95

William J. Bennett has always been something of an exception to this rule. Throughout his time in public life, he has not been timid about using the bully pulpit of his public positions to instruct his fellow citizens about the moral principles that underlie the institutions of a free society. His bestselling *The Book of Virtues*, following his term as the secretary of education, and *The Death of Outrage* established him as one of the nation's most popular defenders of the traditional moral order. And now, with *The Broken Hearth: Reversing the Moral Collapse of the American Family*, Bennett looks at family breakdown in the United States.

*The Broken Hearth* is a wake-up call to all who imagine that "family issues" are only something to be exploited for the votes of social conservatives on Election Day. Unless the breakdown of the American family is addressed directly, any attempt to ameliorate our social problems is doomed. "There are few matters of more profound public consequences than the condition of marriage and families," Bennett writes. "Most of our social pathologies (crime, imprisonment rates, welfare, educational underachievement, alcohol and drug abuse, suicide, depression, sexually transmitted diseases) are manifestations, direct and indirect, of the crack-up of the modern American family."

One major barrier to grappling with this truth, Bennett notes, is the increasingly influential school of thought which holds that "the family" is, in fact, a constantly evolving, highly artificial social construct with no necessary and set form. Measures of "family decline" are, according to this way of thinking, only indications that families are taking on new and different forms; the fact that the nuclear family of late-twentieth-century Western society is in eclipse should cause no more concern than did the demise of other seemingly "permanent" family forms throughout history.

Bennett neatly demolishes this facile relativism with a section on "The Family in History" in which he conclusively shows that the solid core of mother-and-father-with-children has, despite all the incidental changes, remained constant. It was the universal orientation of married couples towards the education, upbringing, and civilizing of their children that constituted the key to the relative stability of marriage and family in past eras of dramatic socio-economic change; it is the collapse of that orientation that accounts for the unprecedented levels of divorce, illegitimacy, cohabitation, and fatherlessness that we witness today. These phenomena don't indicate the "evolution" of the institution of the family, according to Bennett, but its collapse.

The effort to downplay the importance of this decline, Bennett observes, is not restricted to the fever swamps of the academic left. The conservative editors at the highly respected *Economist*, for example, have argued that the "unprecedented burst of agonizing in Western society about the collapse of the family" merely betrays an unseemly historical and cultural parochialism: "Maybe today's Western family, in all of its many jumbled

*Brian Robertson, an editor at Regnery Publishing in Washington, D.C., is the author of* There's No Place Like Work.

forms—one-parent-headed, second-time-around-headed, grandparent-headed, peopled with half siblings of stepsiblings, or combinations thereof—is simply returning to the complex, diverse state in which in fact [the family] spent most of the last millennium." The "new conventional wisdom," says Bennett, is that there is no such thing as the family, and it has become so commonplace a view that even a publication like the *Economist* can assert it as a simple—and morally neutral—reality of modern life.

But the truth is, there is also a considerable ideological element to the reluctance of those on the right in addressing the family issues that Bennett raises. As Jennifer Roback Morse points out in her recent book *Love and Economics: Why the Laissez-Faire Family Doesn't Work*, the strong strain of individualism in modern conservatism makes it difficult to examine the family with anything other than a purely utilitarian analysis. Morse, a free market economist at the Hoover Institution, argues that those family relationships ought not to be subjected to the sort of cost-benefit analysis that characterizes the usual laissez-faire understanding of human activity. A self-identified libertarian, Morse contends that such a relentlessly materialistic way of looking at human behavior is wholly insufficient to explain the dynamics of families.

Morse starts with the fact that babies are not freely choosing, rationally calculating beings who make considered judgments of their best interests. While that may seem obvious, it is not, as Morse points out, accounted for in the free market worldview; babies and their needs are not truly factors in the ideological universe of laissez-faire. Nor, she argues, is the mother's investment of time, effort, and love into the task of caring for her child. If we view that investment of the mother solely in terms of her direct or indirect benefit, our analytical tools fall short of accounting for the reality of mother-love. A mother, or father for that matter, is not continually calculating all the ways in which care for a child is a rational investment. Laissez-faire analysis, while useful in explaining economic dynamics of the market, does not suffice to explain the dynamics within the family.

Those dynamics, Morse contends, go beyond the realm of materialistic and rational consideration of self-interest, which is one of the reasons that domestic life has traditionally been conceived of as something separated from the commercial forces of the market. Like the parent-child bond, the relation of spouses in a marriage is not analogous to other human contracts. In fact, the contractual mentality, which looks solely for one's optimum personal benefit, has been one of the primary forces undermining marriage as an institution in this society.

*To see the battle for the American family as worth fighting, we need to understand the social and economic costs of abandoning it.*

Morse's efforts to reconsider the ways in which we typically think about families is most striking in her chapter entitled "The Mother of All Myths," about the myth of the "single parent." Morse points out that, in truth, there is "literally no such thing as a 'single parent,'" since "some third party is always in the background, helping the mother who is unconnected to the father of her child. . . . The person who appears to be raising a child all by herself has substituted for the other parent some combination of market-provided child care, employment income, and government assistance."

In all the debates about child care and family structure, it's essential never to lose track of this vital insight. Many on the libertarian right, wary of seeming to endorse one particular freely-chosen "family structure" over another, blanch at tax policies that support the traditional family or acknowledge the essential social and economic role of parents.

But there is no such thing as neutrality in the matter of family policy. Government policies that acknowledge parents' contribution to society and to the economy are the only political alternative to costly proposals to further subsidization of dual-income families and commercial day care as a way of addressing the growing difficulties working parents have in fulfilling their obligations to both employer and children.

All surveys show that parents wish to invest more time in caring for their own children. In the absence of determined and thoughtful policy proposals to help parents, the day-care establishment—made up of media, academia, and lobbyists—will carry the day and co-opt the child-friendly banner in the public debate. That can only accelerate the family decline at the root of our most pressing—and expensive—social problems.

Our difficulty is finally that the relativistic view of family as merely one more matter of individual preference in a consumerist democratic culture undermines any attempt to make a moral, legal, or policy distinction between traditional marriage oriented towards the welfare of children and other possible domestic arrangements. In particular, it makes it impossible to argue against same-sex marriage, cohabitation, and illegitimacy, all of which were once easily seen as inherently destructive of family welfare.

It is on this point that William Bennett is at his best, keenly aware that such behaviors are mortal enemies of family stability. He persuasively argues in *The Broken Hearth* that the already-complete revolution in divorce law and the imminent normalization of same-sex marriage are both directly destructive of the institution of the family: the former because it has annihilated the legal, economic, and even psychological security that the marriage bond provides to spouses; the latter because it

denies the procreative and sexually complimentary nature of marriage. Along the way, Bennett points to the copious evidence that the divorce culture and the legitimization of homosexual behavior have had devastating effects on children and adults alike, despite their promises of liberation.

While he acknowledges that reversing these trends is, first and foremost, a matter of convincing individuals of the old wisdom that true happiness, contentment, and security are only to be found within the haven of the traditional family, Bennett does not shy away from the fact that reversing the collapse of that institution necessarily entails making the political case against both the no-fault divorce regime and the gay-rights agenda.

Although he grants that refuting the "liberationists"—those who see the traditional family as an antiquated, repressive institution that should be deconstructed out of existence—is a priority, Bennett contends that this challenge is, in some ways, easier than dealing with "the apathy and surrender" of those who know better but are unwilling to give battle. "Bad as is the situation of the American family," he writes, "we still have within us the power to change our ways and reclaim our legacy."

But in order to see the battles to shore up the institution of the American family as a public fight worth fighting, we need—as Jennifer Roback Morse demonstrates in *Love and Economics*—to think our way through the social and economic costs of abandoning the traditional family. As family breakdown progresses, the expectation increases that government should step into the breech to provide the social and economic stability naturally found in families.

One of the more interesting insights into current voting patterns is that the much discussed "gender gap" is largely a function of marital status. When you set aside single moms, divorced wives, and unmarried women, the gender gap tends to vanish: Married women vote Republican. A more pragmatic reason for conservatives to focus on family stability as a public policy issue cannot be imagined. ♦



A scene from the *Hamza-Nama*. Philadelphia Museum of Art / CORBIS.

# Pale Fury

## *Why Salman Rushdie never lives up to his promise.*

BY JUSTIN TORRES

The only interesting question left to ask about Salman Rushdie is: How can a writer so good be so bad? There are passages in Rushdie's novels that are among the best of the past quarter century: funny and moving and written with real verve. He is a prodigiously talented prose stylist with a remarkable ear and broad knowledge. But his novels can also be simply awful. Even in his best books, whole passages are pretentious, slow, confusing, and overwrought. His worst books are close to unreadable.

**Fury**
by Salman Rushdie
Random House, 272 pp., $24.95

Why is this so? His latest novel, *Fury*—the story of an Indian professor who walks out of his marriage and leaves London for New York—points to an explanation: Rushdie's fascination with the techniques and tropes of postmodernism.

When he gets into trouble, it's not because words have failed him, but because his ideas have overpowered his words. Rushdie's natural lyricism and comedic touch get lost in all the reworking of history, double vision, and imperfect narration that marks literary postmodernism. It is as though his determination to check down the list of postmodern techniques distracts him from what he does best: telling good stories well. All of his books suffer from this fault to some degree, but his recent novels are seriously flawed by it. Rushdie has become, in a sense, a victim of his own success.

What was striking twenty years ago is merely conventional now that all the new Indian writers—especially Anita Desai, Vikram Seth, and Arundhati Roy—have caught what critic Pankaj Mishra calls "Rushdieitis." Indeed, in an acerbic commentary, Mishra claims that Rushdie has caught his own disease, becoming in his most recent novels a parody of himself.

*Midnight's Children* (1981), Rushdie's break-out novel, remains a gem of a book—a beautifully written, darkly comic allegory of Indian history that explores the "double parentage" of postcolonial writing.

The novel is a retelling of Indian history through the life of Saleem Sinai, who was born on August 15,

*Justin Torres is the managing editor of* Philanthropy Magazine.

1947, as India declared its independence from Britain:

> On the stroke of midnight, as a matter of fact. Clock-hands joined palms in respectful greeting as I came. . . . I had been mysteriously handcuffed to history, my destinies indissolubly chained to those of my country. For the next three decades, there was to be no escape. Soothsayers had prophesied me, newspapers celebrated my arrival, politicos ratified my authenticity. . . . And I couldn't even wipe my own nose at the time.

Saleem can communicate through his thoughts with the precisely one thousand other children born at that moment, and they become a kind of prophetic class within India. But during a political crisis, they are targeted by a sterilization campaign led by Indira Gandhi and her son, Sanjay, and driven to ruin.

*Rushdie in 1983*

AP / Wide World Photos

Despite its contemporary setting, *Midnight's Children* didn't pretend to be realistic; its fable-like qualities spring naturally from the largely Eastern sources it draws upon. But it is nonetheless a classic postcolonial tale. The thousand and one children, like the postcolonial societies of which India is one example, exist uneasily among their contemporaries because they are caught between the past and the future. Critics hailed the book as the beginning of a new era in third-world literature. In a much-quoted review in the *New York Times*, Clark Blaise announced that reading Rushdie was like hearing "a continent finding its voice," and no one was surprised when *Midnight's Children* received the 1981 Booker Prize and later the "Booker of Bookers" for the best novel to receive the award in twenty-five years.

But already there were critics, mostly Indian, who suggested that Rushdie had taken unacceptable liberties with the history, culture, and traditions of his native land. Editorialists railed that *Midnight's Children* misrepresented Indian history and played fast and loose with Indian religious myths. Most irritating to some was the book's habit of rendering the peculiarities of subcontinental English in a sing-song patois that called to mind Western stereotypes of Indian speech patterns. (The book's fiercest critic, of course, was Indira Gandhi, who sued in British courts for libel and won; only her assassination in 1984 saved Rushdie from paying significant money damages.) But the saving grace of *Midnight's Children* was its comedy. Only those with no humor—or not like Indira Gandhi, on the receiving end of Rushdie's barbs—could read it as an attempt at literary realism.

With much more deadly results, the same charges of novelistic plunder of cultural riches would be lodged against *The Satanic Verses* (1988) by Muslim fundamentalists, who objected to Rushdie's reimagining of the birth of a religion that sounds a great deal like Islam.

In the offending section of the book, the prophet "Mahound" (a name for Mohammed used in medieval Christian morality plays) is a weak and bumbling fool, surrounded by a ragtag group of thieves and prostitutes (whom Rushdie, in a nice inflammatory touch, gives the names of Mohammed's wives). Mohammed's flight from Medina is reworked as the hasty retreat of a con artist staying one step ahead of his debts.

The controversy over *The Satanic Verses* points to the difficulties engendered by the postmodern tendency to "play" with traditional myths, stories, and beliefs—specifically, that it only really works if no one cares enough to be offended. Allusion is one of Rushdie's favorite literary techniques; his books contain literally thousands of references to myths and traditions from cultures around the world. But critics have long noted that in Rushdie's novels allusion is merely *allusive*. In a few pages, he will mix and match images or stories from Greek myth, Christian hagiography, and rock 'n' roll. But they are empty references—none of them referring to real belief. And as Rushdie discovered with Indian criticism of *Midnight's Children* and the Muslim furor over *The Satanic Verses*, not everyone appreciates their beliefs' being "reimagined" for novelistic purposes.

Rushdie faced real danger from the *fatwa* issued against him. But in their rush to defend him, critics largely overlooked serious flaws in the novel—especially the Mahound section, which was congested and stagnant, and added very little to an otherwise fascinating novel about two Indians who survive a mid-flight terrorist bombing on board a jetliner. Afterwards, the pair is transformed into the two Biblical enemies, Satan and the Archangel Gabriel, and begin a strange battle for control of greater London.

Outside of the Mahound section, the book put all of Rushdie's talent on show. Consider this scene, where Gibreel, an Indian actor who is transformed into Gabriel, confesses his secret to his lover:

> He told her: he fell from the sky and lived. She took a deep breath and believed him. . . . "Okay," she said, exhaling. "I'll buy it. Just don't tell my mother, all right?" The universe was a place of wonders, and only habituation, the anaesthesia of the everyday, dulled our sight. She had read, a couple of days back, that as part of their natural processes of combustion, the stars in the skies crushed carbon into diamonds. The idea of the stars raining diamonds into the void: that sounded like a miracle, too. If that could happen, so could this.

The Mahound section had none of this level of wit and linguistic power. It was plodding and heavy-handed, written in that faux-literary voice many bad contemporary authors use to signal their "seriousness" to the reader. It's notable that Rushdie's most perfectly executed novel remains *Haroun and the Sea of Stories* (1991), a collection of Eastern fables he refashioned for his son. Critics have generally ignored *Haroun* since it is not considered "serious," but the book is the best example of Rushdie's soaring talent as writer, full of twists and turns and wry comedy. It has no self-consciousness; the beautiful prose simply *is*.

The burden of postmodernism grew stronger in Rushdie's grotesque 1995 novel, *The Moor's Last Sigh*, and became overwhelming in 1999 with *The Ground Beneath Her Feet*. A tale of rock 'n' roll, *The Ground Beneath Her Feet* did not involve play with deeply held religious beliefs. Without that distraction, critics focused on the novel and discovered that it was terrible. Even careful readers lost track of what was going on amidst the six or seven different plots that creakily contended for predominance in this sprawling, multi-charactered affair of nearly six hundred pages—with one vital character not even introduced until the last sixty pages.

The novel is the story of Indian rock star Ormus Cama, his female vocalist Vina Apsara, and a photographer, Rai Merchant, who grew up with them. Throughout, history is inverted and reimagined in ways that are confusing and not especially illuminating. So Nixon's scandals become a political novel called *The Watergate Affair*; John F. Kennedy isn't shot but wins a second term; British youths protest that country's escalating war in Vietnam and escape to America to avoid the draft; the singer Lou Reed is a woman; Madonna is a rock groupie who nabs a succession of musician husbands; John Lennon survives to mourn the death of an Indian singer shot by a crazed fan outside his apartment in New York City. This world is visited by a procession of figures—one of them Ormus's dead twin brother—from "alternative universes." These ghostly figures come to have sex with rock stars and drive Ormus, who can see them through a "tear" in the fabric of his universe, increasingly crazy. In the end, Vina Apsara, after letting loose a ferocious roar in her incomparable singing voice, is swallowed by an earthquake in Mexico. (Or maybe she was taken up to heaven? It's never quite clear.) Her death inspires millions around the world to join fertility cults that burn candles and chant in her memory.

After more than thirty years of literary postmodernism, all this twinning, alternative history, reimagining, reconstructed myth, and faulty narrative has grown very tired. It has, in fact, become an orthodoxy, and Rushdie's strengths as a writer shine through best when he is being unorthodox—which is perhaps why Rushdie has now attempted in *Fury* to jettison some of the postmodern techniques and elements that have weighed down his recent works.

*Fury* is a much better book than *The Ground Beneath Her Feet* or even *The Satanic Verses*: smaller, more compact—at 272 pages, a mere scribble for Rushdie—and more accessible. The story of Malik Solanka, an Indian professor who leaves academia in mid-career to write for a BBC series he created, *Little Brain* (about a doll who converses with philosophers), *Fury* is set in New York in the year 2000. Rushdie has described it as "ultra-contemporary, smack up against the daily headlines," and Elián González, Tony Soprano, Monica Lewinsky, George W. Bush, and Al Gore all make appearances.

*Rushdie in 1998*

Random House

The book starts out strong, the first two-hundred pages among the best of Rushdie's career. "Professor Malik Solanka," the opening paragraph begins, "retired historian of ideas, irascible dollmaker, and since his recent fifty-fifth birthday celibate and solitary by his own (much criticized) choice, in his silvered years found himself living in a golden age." This is Rushdie at his finest: richly detailed, archly comic, and keenly attentive to sound and language.

*Fury*—at least the first two-thirds of it—is more clearly autobiographical than anything Rushdie has written before. Like the author, the hero Malik Solanka has just left a third wife with whom he has a four-year-old child. Much of the novel is classic interior monologue. "I have come to America to be devoured," Solanka thinks after an unspeakable incident involving his wife Eleanor and son Asmaan. But he is plagued by bouts of overwhelming anger that make him question his sanity and his actions during the long nights he spends roaming the streets of New York.

This fury is assuaged by the love of a Central European émigrée, Mila, who runs a web-design shop, and then is finally healed by Neela, a stunningly beautiful television producer from a fictional island off India's coast. In all his previous books, Rushdie's protagonists have been misshapen by supernatural forces beyond their control. Yet the cause of Solanka's mental torment—the cause of his fury—is not supernatural but psychological, childhood abuse that is revealed in strikingly subdued, un-Rushdian tones.

The success of the first two-thirds of the book is a triumph for Rushdie. *Fury* shows that he *can* write realistic psy-

chological novels. The pulsing, fractured city perfectly mirrors the dislocation in Solanka's mind, and Rushdie proves himself remarkably adept at capturing a particular moment in the tech-driven frenzy of late capitalist society.

But this early success only makes the failure of the last part of the novel more apparent. Rushdie suddenly shifts tone at the end and reverts to the strained postmodernism of his previous novels. After 220-odd pages, Rushdie brings Neela together with Mila and her fiancé—and also Eleanor and her present lover Morgen—in a strange scene in the professor's bedroom. After each of them lambastes Solanka, and Morgen lands a right hook that knocks him out, the book rushes into a description of a failed military coup on Neela's home island, called "Lilliput-Blefuscu." The island has been taken over by a band of "Indo-Lilly" patriots who have declared an independent republic of "Filbistan." These bumbling guerrillas wear masks sporting the faces of characters from Solanka's web project. (The leader of the coup wears the mask of a character who was based on Solanka—there's that old twinning again.)

This leader has decided that what's needed on the island is "no more nambying and pambying." He demands of Neela, who's come to make a documentary about the island, "If we say the moon is made of cheese, then of what, sister, is it made?" She answers, "Cheese," and goes on to agree that the sun revolves around a flat Earth and never sets on an independent Filbistan. In four quick pages the coup is resolved and Solanka is flying home. The closing is forced, hurried, and altogether unsatisfying, and the tone shifts in exactly the same jarring manner as in the Mahound section of *The Satanic Verses*.

So why did Rushdie feel the need to revert to a style that has failed him in the past to end a largely successful book that is quite unlike his others? *Fury*'s final fifty pages have the feel of a musty dogma whose time has passed, as though Rushdie had suddenly remembered he's a postmodern writer and had better throw something along those lines into the plot. It is possible to read *Fury* as a promising book, a transition to more realistic and serious work. But it is now twenty years after *Midnight's Children*, and Salman Rushdie is getting a little long in the tooth to be described as promising. The time has come to admit that the man has never quite lived up to his talent. ♦

# Picturing Egypt

*Modern times looks at the ancient world.* **BY LAURANCE WIEDER**

On September 10, the day before we were attacked, I attended a press preview for two small photography exhibitions devoted to Egypt at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. *Along the Nile*, a show mounted by the photography department, features photographs of Egypt made in the 1850s and 1860s. The other, *The Pharaoh's Photographer*, presents stills and silent-movie footage by the Met's own archaeological photo-documentarian, Harry Burton. Once the museum reopens, both shows are set to run through the end of December.

Every photograph takes the past as its subject—and turns that subject into an object. And like a photograph, the past is two-dimensional. In one way, ancient Egypt exists in the same place, the same uniform and intelligible past, as the Declaration of Independence, or Omaha Beach, or the day before yesterday. But in another way, ancient Egypt exists in an entirely other place—broken off from us, unintelligible: Its gods had animal heads, its magicians were the most powerful, its writing was pictures. Countless slaves toiled to raise monuments to their incestuous masters in the Valley of the Kings.

Maxime Du Camp was a nineteenth-century French journalist and photographer. The son-in-law of Jean-François Champollion, the discoverer of the Rosetta Stone, Du Camp made this first photo-documentary tour of the ruins of ancient Egypt in the company of his young friend, the novelist Gustave Flaubert. While the novelist sampled Oriental sensation, the journalist recorded images of the temple at Abu Simbel (at a site now submerged by the waters behind the Aswan dam), the Sphinx (half-buried, its nose defaced possibly by a Napoleonic cannonball), the Pyramids, Amenhotep's Colossus, and the Tomb of Ozymandias (he of Shelley's poem: *Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair*).

The photographic prints themselves possess the uncanny patina of old objects. These pictures also look eerie because they are empty, no people at all save for the lone figure of Du Camp's assistant posed beside a column, or at the base of a statue, to establish scale. It may be that pre-tourist Egypt didn't have much in the way of everyday activity around its monuments. Or perhaps the photographer chose a quiet time to shoot. Or the vacancy may be a side effect of technology: Anything that moves would not appear at all, or would leave only the ghost of an image on the paper negative's necessarily long exposure. The one picture Du Camp did take of a camera-shy Flaubert in a Cairo back street wearing native dress relies on its caption to declare its meaning. It could be a picture of anyone.

Those European and American photographers who followed Du Camp into Egypt—George Wilson Bridges, Félix Teynard, John Beasley Greene, Ernest Benecke, Théodule Devéria, Gustave Le Gray—either found new

*Laurance Wieder is writing a history of New York, as seen from the west end of Canal Street.*

subjects or new takes on now standard motifs. The German Benecke's portraits of Egyptian musicians, of two dancing girls, of a master and two slaves in Cairo, and his photograph of an autopsy of a crocodile, have that posed frozen quality and grainy focus that makes old prints look more like art objects than like documentation. An early example of society photography, Le Gray's 1867 photograph of the shipboard fête for His Highness Ismail Pasha makes the occasion look even duller than it must have been.

When photographers migrated from paper to glass negatives in the 1850s, they were able to produce sharper pictures with shorter exposures. Félix Bonfils and Francis Frith worked with the newer technology. Their photographs have a clarity that immediately distinguishes them from their predecessors. An example of contemporary state-of-the-art imaging, Frith's stereo view of the Chapel of Rameses II, displayed in a stereopticon rather than on the wall as a print, is every bit as arresting in the context of this two-room gallery exhibit as it must have been when it was first published around 1860. On the documentary side, Bonfils's picture of the Temple of Dendur clearly shows the actual condition and site of a monumental structure that now resides inside its own glass pyramid pavilion at the Metropolitan Museum, just down the hall from the department of Egyptian Art where *The Pharaoh's Photographer* is hung.

From 1918 until his death in 1940, Harry Burton documented the epic excavations conducted by the Met Egyptologist Howard Carter and his British patron Lord Carnarvon in the Nile valley. Part of Burton's job was to catalogue all the finds of the expedition, both in the place of their discovery, and again after being removed to the collection. Additionally, Burton recorded the events of the dig, most famously the unearthing and opening of Tutankhamen's Tomb.

Burton's are archives with a difference. His subjects have historic, dramatic, and scholarly interest. His photography, straightforward and transparent, lets the people, events, and things speak through it. Exposed on glass negatives, using some artificial but primarily reflected available light, his photographs of tomb interiors show the storerooms to be more like high-end attics or curiosity shops than awe-inspiring displays.

The Metropolitan Museum of Art

*Harry Burton's photograph of the Tomb of Nefertari, 1923.*

In some pictures, the objects have been tagged with identification numbers before being moved. In a time-lapse study, four images made in 1936 record the complete unwrapping of a mummy, a long-standing mystery revealed.

Burton also took pictures of people, of native bearers in the procession of objects taken from the tomb, of Howard Carter looking through the open doors of Tut's second shrine, of tourists and curiosity seekers at a site that has inspired countless romances and scary movies.

The Hollywood connection is more than speculative. Met Museum trustee Edward S. Harkness purchased a hand-cranked movie camera for the Egyptian expedition in 1921. The new equipment made it to Luxor in 1922, and Burton taught himself how to work the machine. The expedition acquired a second camera the following year, and in 1924 the museum photographer went to Hollywood to study film lighting. It's plain that someone in Hollywood, when it came to shooting Boris Karloff in that early talkie *The Mummy* or Abbott and Costello in *Meet the Mummy*, must have been aware of the footage Burton shot of the excavations and of daily life in modern Egypt.

Eight minutes of silent movie abstracted from thirteen hours of documentary reels shot by Burton along with Albert M. Lythgoe, the curator of the Met's Department of Egyptian Art, is the real reason to visit the show. Scenes of labor and dust in the Nile Valley, of exhumations from sealed tombs, of mummy coffins placed in crates that are actually a second funeral, complete with a woodie station wagon for a hearse, make explicit the nature of Egyptian toil. All this in a haze of desert light and billowing dust that lets the decay of the ruins appear present and ongoing.

The moving-picture views of daily life in Egypt are of a different order. They show Giza and the Sphinx, of course, but also bustling, random Cairo street scenes chaotic with people and animals and feluccas on the Nile. There is a stretch of travelogue, riding along the Nile on Harkness's private steamer. Watching a 1930s Hollywood movie, we would know exactly who these white-suited men are: They are the professors and plutocrats in pith helmets whose curiosity or ambition or acquisitive nature excites wrath and envy and draws down upon them the mummy's curse. ♦



The staff of
THE WEEKLY STANDARD
mourns the loss of those
killed in the September 11
attack on our nation.
We extend our deepest
sympathy to the relatives
and friends of all
those who died.