the weekly Standard

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

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the weekly Standard

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BPA INTERNATIONAL

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Stephen Ambrose, Copycat (continued)

As Fred Barnes reported in our cover story last week, bestselling historian Stephen Ambrose lifted the words of historian Thomas Childers and published them as his own. Ambrose subsequently apologized to Childers for the unacknowledged debt that *The Wild Blue* owes to *Wings of Morning* (both are histories of B-24 crews in World War II). But—as is almost always the case with sticky-fingered writers—this turns out not to have been an isolated incident. Ambrose is a repeat offender.

THE WEEKLY STANDARD has been besieged in the past week with e-mails, phone calls, and letters pointing to a number of books in which Ambrose recycles other authors' prose without benefit of quotation marks. Some of these instances were reported this week by Mark Lewis of *Forbes.com* and by the *New York Times*. One turns out to have been the subject of a review in the autumn 1997 issue of the *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*. There, reviewer Turk McCleskey of the Virginia Military Institute commented on Ambrose's 1996 history of the Lewis and Clark expedition, *Undaunted Courage*:

> [Ambrose's book] represents itself as a deeply researched and carefully documented narrative, but on closer scrutiny, *Undaunted Courage* only repackages other people's work. Adding nothing substantially new, Ambrose uncritically skates across the preceding literature. . . . Most of Ambrose's citations do point to more reputable scholarly sources, but not always precisely. Indeed, Ambrose's debt to his predecessors leaves him open to charges of sloppy paraphrasing, as with this wanly cited echo of Dumas Malone: "In a country of vast estates, without cities or public transportation of any kind, with plantation seats far apart, riding was not a matter of sport or diversion but of necessity. . . . Good horsemanship was taken for granted among the gentry" (Ambrose, p. 30). Malone wrote: "In a country without large settlements and where plantation seats were far apart, riding was not a matter of occasional diversion but of daily necessity, and good horsemanship was taken for granted among the gentry" (Dumas Malone, *Jefferson and His Time*, vol. 1: *Jefferson the Virginian*, p. 46).

In addition, as reported by *Forbes*:

* Ambrose's 1975 *Crazy Horse and Custer* lifted passages from Jay Monaghan's 1959 *Custer: The Life of General George Armstrong Custer.*

* Ambrose's 1997 *Citizen Soldiers* borrowed from Joseph Balkoski's 1989 *Beyond the Beachhead*.

* Ambrose's 1991 *Ruin and Recovery* borrowed from Robert Sam Anson's 1984 *Exile: The Unquiet Oblivion of Richard M. Nixon*. Both these books were edited by Simon & Schuster's Alice Mayhew.

Finally, according to the *New York Times*, in *The Wild Blue* Ambrose "acknowledged using sentences verbatim and in at least five cases closely echoed the language and structure of longer passages from both the Army's official seven-volume study, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (University of Chicago, 1949) and *The Rise of American Air Power*, by Michael S. Sherry (Yale University Press, 1987)."

Not all of Ambrose's problems involve copying other authors' work. In his 1966 book *Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point*, he wrote of a Capt. John Lillie "who upon hearing Lt. Robert W. Osborn accuse him of stealing public property had died of an apoplectic fit." Lillie's descendants disputed the matter, first demanding Ambrose's source, then, when neither he nor military record-keepers could come up with one, seeking a retraction. Ambrose grudgingly apologized in 1978. His publisher, Johns Hopkins University Press, agreed in 1979 to delete the passage in subsequent printings of the book.

Ambrose's defenders, including his publisher, intimate that leaving out quotation marks might be a kind of streamlining of the production process, a side effect of high productivity. Are they sorry about that? Hardly. "We welcome the fact that he is prolific," David Rosenthal, executive vice president and publisher of Simon & Schuster, told the *New York Times*. "He works at a schedule that he sets, and we encourage the amount of his output because there is a readership that wants it." ♦

Urban Renewal in Mecca

Wahhabism—the quasi-fascist ideology that serves as a sort of genetic code for the Saudi Arabian state and the Islamic extremism it funds around the world—has always been committed to iconoclasm and vandalism. Wahhabis twice, in the 19th and 20th centuries, devastated the sacred mosques, tombs, and other buildings in the Two Holy Places, Mecca and Medina. Indeed, the Wahhabis would have leveled the Ka'bah, the temple in Mecca that is the object of pilgrimages by pious Muslims, had they thought they could get away with it.

Wahhabis believe that impressive

Recess Time

Otto Reich, President Bush's nominee to be assistant secretary of state for western hemispheric affairs, will never get the chance to publicly defend himself from the vicious charges leveled against him in a public smear campaign by Senator Christopher Dodd. That's unfortunate. Dodd attacked Reich in the media, but refused to give him a Senate hearing at which he could reply.

This distasteful process notwithstanding, Reich is nonetheless assuming the position for which the president selected him. As is Eugene Scalia, now solicitor at the Department of Labor. President Bush recess-appointed both nominees late last week. Scalia's nomination had made it out of committee before Tom Daschle single-handedly brought it to a screeching halt.

Both men probably would have been approved by the Senate. Too bad Bush had to get his men in in such a roundabout fashion. Still, his willingness to stand with "controversial" nominees is encouraging, especially with major fights ahead on judicial nominations. ♦

buildings are like idols, and that treating them with respect constitutes a denial of monotheistic religion. Americans found out about this attitude up close on September 11. The destruction in March 2001 by the pro-Wahhabi Afghan Taliban of the ancient Buddhist statues of Bamiyan falls into the same category of sacred architecture criticism.

Wahhabism doesn't change, and the Saudis, proud of having destroyed the Islamic architectural heritage in the Arabian peninsula, are still at it. Turkey has assailed the Saudis for a new "cultural massacre"—the demolition at the beginning of this year of the historic Ottoman castle of al-Ajyad, overlooking Mecca. Officials in Ankara say they will protest to the United Nations. Saudi minister of Islamic Affairs Saleh Al-Sheikh replied in the manner typical of the kingdom's representatives: "No one has the right to interfere in what comes under the [Saudi] state's authority."

The castle was built more than two centuries ago on a hill overlooking Mecca, with the aim of protecting the holy site. It will be replaced by eleven high rise residential towers, comprising 942 apartments, and a twin-tower five-star hotel including 1,200 rooms. ♦

From the People Who Won't Say "Terrorist"

Reuters, the Brit news agency that thinks it would be unfair to label Osama bin Laden a terrorist, sent this remarkable phrase across the wires last Wednesday (emphasis added): "The United States, *which gives Israel about $2 billion a year in weaponry used to kill Palestinians*, objected to the $100 million [Iranian arms] shipment to the Palestinians."

Wonder how they really feel about the Jewish state. ♦

Casual

Taken to the Cleaners

My mother-in-law is just this side of 90, and has the ailments that are normally associated with her advanced years. She is, in fact, more or less housebound, leaving only to visit her stable of doctors or for emergencies—such as last week's trial in a Baltimore city court, in which she found herself "The Defendant," a pretty scary designation for anyone, much less an old woman. More about that in a minute.

Her immobility has one advantage: It permits her to indulge her passion for television news. Either because her late husband was a print journalist, or in spite of that fact, she prefers television to newspapers. Well, not all television. The major networks she regards as useless because of their liberal bias—except when George Will appears on Sundays. CNN she considers to be a hopeless example of leftish prejudice. Only Fox tells it like it is, in her judgment, although she finds unsettling the appearance of Bill Kristol when he criticizes the administration. I'm not sure what she thinks of Geraldo and Greta, the CNN fugitives wooed away by Fox, but suspect she is suspending judgment until she sees whether they have shed the effects of their prior unsavory association.

My mother-in-law has been able to indulge her passion for news-watching in relative comfort because her father willed her an income-producing building in the heart of downtown Baltimore. It contains one store, has never been vacant, and along with Social Security and some savings wrung from her journalist-husband's modest salary, allows her the independence she values.

Or did. The city decided that the area in which the store was located should be redeveloped, and took the property under the constitutional provision that permits such "taking" for a public purpose. But there has to be just compensation.

A bright and mentally alert lady, my mother-in-law has what seems to this economist a reasonable notion of what she should have gotten—enough money so that, invested, it would yield the income she was getting before the city took her building, adjusting for any difference that might exist in the riskiness of the old and new investments. The city disagreed and, the way things worked, mailed her a check for about a third of that amount. The city's appraiser picked a number that was well below what the city had determined for tax purposes. In short, when it set the value for tax purposes, the city said this property is valuable; when it decided to use its power to snatch it, it decided the value was far less. And, of course, it proceeded to knock down the building. So much for any right to appeal the taking of her building, now reduced to rubble.



Darren Gygi

Because she wanted more than the city offered, she went to law, as sophisticates say. This meant hiring a lawyer and an independent appraiser in order to contest the city's valuation. Since my mother-in-law is no passive litigant, it also meant getting to court in a wheelchair to tell the jury just what she thought she was entitled to have. The jury considered the bewildering computations of the competing appraisers, and did what juries tend to do—it split the difference.

"Property is theft," claimed Proudhon some 160 years ago. Which I suppose summarizes the belief of the city bureaucrats who seem determined to let nothing like fairness stand between them and their plans for urban redevelopment, in this case a project that involved the eviction from their little stores of numerous struggling minority entrepreneurs.

Were my father-in-law, a Virginian to his core, still alive he would probably encourage his wife to remind whatever appellate forum is available that the Virginia Bill of Rights, drafted at almost the same time as Proudhon made his announcement, proclaims that when men "enter into a state of society" they are guaranteed "the means of acquiring and possessing property." Indeed, his widow is still toying with the idea that somewhere there is a court that will right the wrong done her. The names of two of her heroes, Scalia and Thomas, leap to her mind. But the chance of prevailing in her lifetime is too slim to make it worthwhile to carry the fight upward through the court system. Not to mention the expense.

If there is a difference between taking property from an unwilling owner at a price that is far less than either its market value or any semblance of just compensation, and theft, or at best Frédéric Bastiat's "lawful plunder," it eludes all save the savviest condemnation lawyer and the most fervent believer in urban development schemes. It certainly eludes a 90-year-old Baltimore woman who thought a lifetime of careful planning and scrimping had assured an independent old age.

Irwin M. Stelzer

Greenpeace



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Correspondence

Ambrose Exposed

Fred Barnes deserves praise for exposing Stephen Ambrose's plagiarism ("Stephen Ambrose, Copycat," Jan. 14). I find Thomas Childers's attitude surprising considering that a student of his caught committing the same offense would likely face expulsion.

The lesson seems to be that once acquired, literary fame provides ample shelter from otherwise life-altering mistakes. Pity the poor undergraduates who follow this example thinking that they, like Ambrose, will have a chance to simply rewrite their papers.

Adam Sherman
Chicago, IL

Kudos to Fred Barnes for his exposé of Stephen Ambrose. I wrote to Fox News when Ambrose was interviewed about his latest book, *The Wild Blue*. I flew 35 missions over Germany in World War II and was struck by the many inaccuracies in Ambrose's account—casualty figures, etc. I never heard anymore about it, so Barnes's story was vindication of sorts.

From the Eighth Air Force, 26,000 were killed, 18,000 wounded, and 20,000 were taken prisoner of war, and it is upsetting to me to see someone making money out of it, particularly if he doesn't know what he is talking about.

Douglas Spencer
Dunedin, FL

Fred Barnes's article on Stephen Ambrose was not very damning. While some of the sentences in the books are similar, the aim of Ambrose's and Thomas Childers's narratives is different, and Ambrose does credit Childers in four footnotes.

Childers himself may have lifted "Up, up, and away" from *Superman*, and readers should note that "glittering like mica" is not that rare a simile. I found it used 1,300 times in a quick Google search.

It would be better if we accepted the use of phrases and fragments of ideas that circulate like language.

Marcos Martinez
Cambridge, MA

About a year ago, I chaired a committee of historians that wrote a 25-page document which set down some 50 major errors in Stephen Ambrose's *Nothing Like It in the World*, a novel written as a history of the building of the Pacific Railroad.

Our work ended up on the front page of the *Sacramento Bee* on January 1, 2001. From there the World War II experts went to work, and now Fred Barnes has taken up the cudgels against the sloppy work of Stephen Ambrose.

G.J. Graves
Newcastle, CA

In Fred Barnes's detailed account of the apparent plagiarism by author Stephen Ambrose, he reports that Thomas Childers hasn't written

Ambrose. Childers says he "doesn't want to go after Stephen Ambrose. The man has done an awful lot of good work."

Childers is apparently not only a better writer, but also far too kindhearted. To Childers I say this: When weak crediting occurs on this scale with students, we automatically question their body of previous work. So when I read Barnes's article, and particularly Childers's comment, I think, "good work?" Perhaps that too contains the work of others that has simply gone unnoticed.

Michael Zeugin
Vernon, NJ

I am an avid Stephen Ambrose fan, but I admit that Fred Barnes's comments on Ambrose and *The Wild Blue* are right on.

I was disappointed when I read *The Wild Blue*. It seemed rushed and in need of some good editing. It did not have the usual Ambrose flow.

What concerns me more is that I felt the same way about *Nothing Like It in the World*. I have read every book on the building of the transcontinental railroad, and some of my good friends on the Union Pacific spent considerable time with Ambrose. They, like me, looked forward to the book. But it too needed much more research and extensive editing.

Ambrose's *Band of Brothers* and *Undaunted Courage* are outstanding, as are his other books on World War II, so it pains me to see less than his usual skill.

Jon Lee
Perrysburg, OH

Seizing the Moment

I was struck by David Brooks's first priority for the new era: developing character in an age of affluence ("A Moment to Be Seized," Jan. 14). I worry about that, too.

It seems to me the only way to do so is to cultivate wisdom and virtue. But that requires belief in the soul, because the soul is the seat of wisdom and virtue. Thus, to cultivate wisdom and virtue requires that we nourish the soul. And what does the soul feed on? Truth, goodness, and beauty. But who today believes in these three graces?

This is the core of any serious education reform and the mission of my service. May more people hear Brooks's voice, reminding us of what matters most.

Andrew Kern
CIRCE Ministries
Charlotte, NC

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Dan Burton, Wrong Again

Next Wednesday, January 23, Rep. Dan Burton's House Committee on Government Reform will hold a hearing on the "history of congressional access to deliberative Justice Department documents," Burton having served a subpoena for certain such documents on Attorney General Ashcroft in early September, and President Bush having subsequently directed Ashcroft to ignore the demand on grounds of "executive privilege." Rep. Burton has cast himself the hero in this controversy—a government-in-the-sunshine crusader against recalcitrant executive branch officers eager to conceal official malfeasance and corruption. And Burton's is the construction of events that most people outside the Bush administration now seem eager to accept.

The *New York Times*, for example, claims alarm over the "expansion of executive authority" implicit in a "blanket presidential order denying access to records that were routinely made available in the past." The House Republican leaders have given Burton leave to pursue precisely this argument by formal means—against their own party's White House. Senate Republicans haven't made a peep in the president's defense. And congressional Democrats proclaim themselves goose-pimply with respect for, even awed by, Burton's courage and consistency here. Henry Waxman, ranking minority member of the Government Reform committee, says, "I agree with Chairman Burton." Rep. Barney Frank, who for some reason fancies himself qualified to judge such stuff, marvels at Burton's "genuine intellectual integrity."

It is true that Burton is consistent. He is consistent in his view that any confidential executive branch information he is curious to peek at is confidential executive branch information that Congress has a right to obtain and make public. Burton is consistent in his view that invocations of executive privilege that frustrate his curiosity are *ipso facto* improper and invalid. And he is consistent in his willingness to employ the full powers of his committee's "oversight" authority in order to affect, to his liking, real-time government decision-making traditionally reserved to the president and his appointees. Since assuming the Government Reform committee chairmanship in 1995, Dan Burton has fired somewhere in the neighborhood of *seven hundred* subpoenas down Pennsylvania Avenue, a great many of them, as in the present case, seeking disclosure of deliberative memoranda prepared by Justice Department prosecutors in connection with criminal investigations still underway.

This is not exactly what James Madison had in mind when he explained the separation of powers necessary to constitutional government in *Federalist* 51. Nor is it the sort of thing one would expect the *New York Times* and Henry Waxman to admire—or Burton's Hill Republican colleagues to acquiesce in. After all: During his first six years at the helm of Government Reform, when Burton was tirelessly tilting against various Clinton administration scandals, real and imagined, the *Times* regularly and repeatedly derided his subpoenas as the work of a malevolent kook. And Henry Waxman fought him every step of the way. And Burton's fellow Republicans in the House eventually grew so embarrassed over his excesses that they forced him, at a notable closed-door caucus meeting in May 1998, to apologize. News of which apology, so as to reinforce the humiliation, allies of then-Speaker Newt Gingrich promptly leaked to the *Washington Post*.

How is it, then, that all of a sudden Dan Burton gets to be the good guy? Has something changed—other than the fact that the president today asserting executive privilege isn't a Democrat? Are the documents Burton now insists he be provided of such a nature as to distinguish his latest "appropriate" subpoena from all those previous "abusive" ones?

No, as a matter of fact, they're not. "You are hereby commanded," the Government Reform Committee's September 6 subpoena informs Attorney General Ashcroft, to deliver unto Dan Burton, in unredacted form, every extant document relevant to internal Justice Department deliberations, past or present, over whether to prosecute 14 specifically named individuals—and whether to refer a fifteenth, unnamed individual, who happens to be former Vice President Gore, to an outside special counsel. Henry

Waxman is okay with all this. Burton, he says, is "clearly entitled to receive" the material in question, and the Bush administration's refusal to turn it over "conflicts with the fundamental democratic principles of our nation." For reasons Waxman does not explain, the Clinton administration's refusal to turn over the very same records concerning Gore—which Burton originally subpoenaed in August 2000, over vehement Democratic objections—did not conflict with the fundamental democratic principles of our nation. Go figure.

And go figure, too, Dan Burton's contention that Congress's unlimited prerogative to review decision-making memoranda prepared by executive branch prosecutors "cannot be seriously disputed." The *New York Times*'s potted account of history notwithstanding, Burton has it exactly backwards: The truth is that no American president has ever *failed* to dispute such a subpoena as his. Various presidents dating back to Thomas Jefferson have reluctantly complied with subpoenas issued by federal courts in connection with ongoing criminal trials. Various presidents dating back to George Washington have reluctantly provided Congress with confidential executive branch documents concerning ongoing civil investigations. And various presidents have released confidential but purely factual information, purged of prosecutorial deliberation, from the case files of criminal investigations that have already been closed. But faced with a congressional oversight committee's subpoena for "live" and otherwise non-public criminal case records—or for memoranda justifying even ancient decisions about whether or not to indict a criminal suspect—no chief executive has ever surrendered.


Dan Burton

AP / Wide World Photos

No chief executive, that is, except Bill Clinton, who in this respect, as in so many others, badly betrayed the presidency as an institution. As a matter of constitutional and common law, Clinton's infamously promiscuous and almost invariably unsuccessful litigation of frivolous executive privilege claims left the confidentiality of White House and cabinet department decision-making vulnerable as never before to invasion by officers of the federal courts. And while it is not clear that any of the relevant judicial rulings rendered *congressional* subpoenas like Dan Burton's legally enforceable, here too, in practice, Clinton managed to mortgage a necessary authority of his office. The president has a responsibility, flowing from the Constitution's due process clause, to ensure that the federal government's administration of criminal justice is never compromised by exposure to the pressure of popularly elected legislators. Specifically, the president has a responsibility to ensure that Justice Department prosecutors are allowed to make up their minds whether to indict someone without worrying that Dan Burton's Government Reform Committee will shortly put them on the griddle for it.

Rep. Burton regularly sought access to prosecutorial decision memoranda prepared by Janet Reno's Justice Department. These inquiries President Clinton *should* properly have doggedly resisted on grounds of executive privilege. Instead, he all too often capitulated.

President Bush should not make the same mistake. The bulk of Burton's latest subpoena seeks evidence now before a federal grand jury investigating a grotesque scandal involving the FBI. For more than 20 years beginning in the 1960s, it seems, the Bureau's Boston office, in order to preserve access to a group of prized Mafia informants, actively concealed evidence of its favored mobsters' serious crimes, including murder, and kept mum while at least one clearly innocent man went to prison in their stead. Dan Burton is rather vague about what role the House Government Reform Committee might play in rectifying this miscarriage of justice. But he is certain he will find it once John Ashcroft forks over a series of years-old "declination memos"—formal legal analyses explaining why federal prosecutors long ago decided not to indict certain people allegedly belonging to the New England mob.

Disclosure of these documents cannot be harmful, Burton argues; all the case files in question are "closed." But that's the whole point, of course: Why those files were closed—whether decisions not to prosecute FBI mob informants in Boston were illegal and corrupt—is the very question now directly before the grand jury. No consideration of constitutional law or basic prudence suggests that a House committee chairman may appropriately review and publicize otherwise secret federal grand jury evidence even as it is being presented and considered. And any man who cannot see why it might not be a good idea for this particular House committee chairman to get his mitts on such stuff is a fool. Or worse.

George W. Bush was correct to assert executive privilege against Dan Burton's subpoena. And he should stick to his guns no matter what—not to effect an "expansion" of presidential authority, but merely to restore a healthier pre-Burton, pre-Clinton status quo.

—David Tell, for the Editors

Reparations and 9/11



Two months after the World Trade Center attack, Atlanta mayor Bill Campbell welcomed 700 attendees to the "State of the Black World Conference" with this applause line: "While the rest of the world waves the flag of Americana, we understand we are not part of that." Al Sharpton then told the throng: "We don't owe America anything; America owes us."

These outbursts expose a racial fissure in the body politic as deep as the ambivalence felt by some black citizens about their identity as Americans. The idea that blacks owe nothing to their country while America owes everything to them is the core theme of a movement seeking reparations for the crime of slavery, committed more than a century ago.

Last year, in a campaign met by censorship and angry protests at colleges across the nation, David Horowitz challenged the reparations claim with these self-evident truths: America gave birth to the idea that all men are created equal, paid a heavy price to end slavery, and has made generous payment on its debt to African Americans alive today. America deserves the gratitude of all its citizens--including blacks--for rights and privileges the sacrifices of their countrymen have made possible.

Now comes **UNCIVIL WARS,** Horowitz's book about these events. This remarkable work is the most searching look yet at the intellectual and moral bankruptcy of the reparations idea. It is also a searing report on the imperiled status of free speech at American universities, describing the extraordinary effort it took one man to get a simple hearing for ideas vital to our national debate. As Black History Month approaches, **UNCIVIL WARS** demands a place on the calendar.

David Horowitz has written a *J'Accuse* about the reign of terror by racial demogogues on American college campuses, and a patriotic hymn to one nation indivisible--blacks and whites together--with liberty and justice for all.

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Enron's Clinton Connection

The Clintonites seem to have been more accommodating than the Bushies. **BY DAVID BROOKS**

AP/Wide World Photos / Sherwin Crasto

Enron's Indian power plant: Guess who paved the way?

On July 5, 1995, Enron Corporation donated $100,000 to the Democratic National Committee. Six days later, Enron executives were on a trade mission with Commerce Secretary Mickey Kantor to Bosnia and Croatia. With Kantor's support, Enron signed a $100 million contract to build a 150-megawatt power plant.

Enron, then a growing giant in energy trading, practically had a reserved seat on Clinton administration trade junkets. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, who egregiously linked political donations to government assistance, accompanied Enron chairman Ken Lay on a mission to India. Enron president Joseph Sutton was on the trip to Bosnia during which Brown lost his life in a plane crash (Sutton was not on Brown's plane at the time). After Brown's death, Enron's Terence Thorn, a $1,000 donor to the Clinton-Gore campaign, traveled with Commerce Secretary William Daley to South Africa. Ken Lay also traveled with Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary on her trade trips.

There were other contacts between Enron and the Clinton administration. Ken Lay was a close friend of Mack McLarty, Clinton's first chief of staff. In his 1993 disclosure statement, Robert Rubin listed Enron as one of the firms with which he had had "significant contact" while at Goldman Sachs. Enron was represented by the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, the firm where Clinton advisers Robert Strauss and Vernon Jordan worked.

And Enron benefited from its government contacts during the Clinton years. After Lay's trip to India with Ron Brown, Enron received nearly $400 million in U.S. government assistance so that it could build a power plant south of Bombay. According to reports in the *Houston Chronicle* at the time, the Export-Import Bank kicked in $298 million, while another federal agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, put up $100 million.

In February 1995, David Sanger of the *New York Times* wrote a fascinating insider account of how the deal had been consummated. Enron had been the lead bidder to build the new power plant. Jeff Garten, then undersecretary of commerce for international trade, created what he called "our economic war room" to push the American firm's interests. The State and Energy departments were enlisted to press Enron's case. According to Sanger, the U.S. ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, "constantly cajoled Indian officials." The CIA performed some risk analysis and investigated rival British companies.

Clinton himself was involved in starting the India effort for Enron. According to Michael Weisskopf of *Time*, Clinton scrawled a note to McLarty telling him to help with the project.

Support for the Bombay power plant was just a small part of the help Enron received from the Clinton administration. All told, Enron received over $4 billion from OPIC and the Export-Import Bank for projects in Turkey, Bolivia, China, the Philippines, and elsewhere.

Under Clinton, the Commerce Department was proud that it was finally using the might of the U.S. government to assist favored firms. But the enterprise was plagued by constant criticism that somehow it always seemed to be big political

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donors that got most of the help. According to the *Boston Globe*, all but three of the recipients of OPIC aid during Brown's tenure were substantial Democratic donors. According to a study by the Center for Public Integrity, Enron, U.S. West, GTE, McDonnell Douglas, and Fluor donated a combined $563,000 to the Democratic party during 1993 and 1994 and received $2.6 billion in foreign contracts secured with government help. The *Globe* found that during the first Clinton term, 27 firms had donated $2.3 million to the Democrats and received nearly $5.5 billion in federal support.

All of this is not to deny that Enron was primarily a Republican donor. Nor is it to minimize the connections between Enron and the Bush administration. Rather, the connections between the Clintonites and Enron remind us that the scandal is not the donations. The scandal is what gets done by federal officials in return for the donations. And while the Clintonites received less money from Enron than the Republicans, the evidence thus far suggests that Democrats extended more favors to Enron than Republicans. That suggests that the nascent Enron scandal may not end up helping Democrats as much as they now think.

Make no mistake: The press corps is in full frenzy over what the Bush administration may or may not have done to help Enron as it was going down the tubes—though there is no evidence the Bush administration did anything beyond take phone calls from desperate Enron executives. But the real story here is not about lawbreaking or extraordinary behavior. It is about what has become standard practice in Washington every day.

When corporations make political donations, the money is generally not used to lobby for free market reforms—although Enron did some of that. Rather, the money is used to encourage French-style *dirigisme*. It is used to lure government into bed with private commercial interests. That's not an effect conservatives should cheer. ♦

Arafat's Naval Adventure

It's time for him to go.

BY TOM ROSE

Jerusalem

IF NEW PROOF were needed that reforming Yasser Arafat is a lost cause, the Israeli navy's pre-dawn seizure last week of a cargo vessel destined for Gaza City and packed with 50 tons of weapons supplied by Iran should have provided it. The ship was registered to Arafat's Palestinian Authority, paid for with PA funds, and skippered by a lieutenant colonel in the PA Navy who told investigators his assignment was to deliver his secret cache directly to the PA. At least 7 of the 13 crew members belonged to Arafat's private militias.

The Israeli government called it the largest and most dangerous illegal arms shipment ever attempted. Had it reached its destination, every inch of Israel would have been in range of its cargo, which consisted of long- and short-range Katyusha rockets, LAW and Sagger anti-tank missiles, long-range mortars, sophisticated mines, nearly two tons of hi-tech semtex plastic explosive many times more deadly than what the suicide bombers currently use, hundreds of high-powered sniper rifles, thousands of rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank grenades, and, most dangerous of all, an undisclosed number of SA-7 (Strella) anti-aircraft missiles capable of imperiling commercial air service into and out of Tel Aviv.

On the other hand, Arafat has been leading one terrorist organization or another for four decades. Why should a little Katyusha-running change anything? As it turns out, it won't. Israel seems to view the episode as just another public relations opportunity to be milked; the United States as a public relations challenge to be managed. Neither regards it as reason to begin the process of replacing Arafat's regime with one less malign.

Not only did the State Department refuse even to discuss breaking with Arafat, but Washington's special Middle East envoy issued no rebuke to Arafat. Quite the contrary. Retired Marine general Anthony Zinni concluded a visit to Israel two days after the boat was seized by telling reporters that he saw "a real opportunity for progress." A State Department official traveling with Zinni said bluntly, "Our mission will go on, ship or no ship."

That passing comment explains why recent American and Israeli efforts at Middle East peacemaking have so miserably failed. Excusing Arafat's criminality only insures more. If it takes the United States five days to so much as criticize the most brazen attempted violation of the Oslo Accords, what crime could ever justify Arafat's ouster?

The obstacle to peace between Israel and the Palestinians is not the inability to resolve particular issues, but the violent, oppressive, and unstable nature of the Arafat regime. Until U.S. and Israeli policymakers realize that peace depends far more on the nature of a future Palestinian state than on its borders, Israelis will not know peace and Palestinians will not know freedom.

If a future Palestine were free, nonviolent, and committed to bettering the lives of its people and to living in peace with Israel, it wouldn't threaten Israel. But a Palestine that resembled the corrupt and dictatorial Palestinian

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Authority would be a mortal danger.

Dictators make bad neighbors, and before he is an Arab, or a Palestinian, or even a Muslim, Yasser Arafat is a dictator. When he founded the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964, there was not a single "Jewish settlement" to oppose nor an "Israeli occupation" to resist, because the West Bank was ruled by Jordan and Gaza was ruled by Egypt. Arafat created the PLO to destroy Israel. He learned that first he had to consolidate his power over a fractious and scattered people. He chose to do that by killing those who challenged him and oppressing the rest.

It took an inarticulate Israeli general turned prime minister to lay bare the fatal mindset from which Oslo was born. The PLO leader, said the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, was the ideal partner precisely *because he was a dictator*. Arafat could crack down on terrorists, Rabin said, because, "unlike us, he doesn't have to worry about elections or human rights groups." Thus, Israel itself was midwife to the terrorist-supporting tyranny now in its midst. Rather than requiring that the Palestinian Authority have an open political system, Oslo gave Arafat both the time and the resources to consolidate his rule.

Like other dictators, Arafat has to worry not about losing an election, but about losing his life, and those most likely to take it are the extremists he has armed, funded, and trained. The notion that Arafat could ever crack down on the very organizations he needs to survive is preposterous. For Arafat, upsetting Colin Powell carries little risk. Upsetting Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or even his own private militias carries the ultimate risk.

But there's another, more important reason why Arafat isn't going to crack down on terrorists—namely, that they help him. In fact, these groups provide his regime with the best insurance stolen American aid money can buy: They keep the national focus on fighting the external enemy rather than on the failings of their leader. If Palestinians could vote, things might be different. Arafat might have to defend his record. And quite a record it is.

Many people think Arafat's refusal to rein in the terrorists



Drew Friedman

Yasser Arafat

demonstrates his weakness. But Arafat is far from weak when it comes to dealing with those Palestinians who clamor for an end to corruption, a freer press, religious liberty, or even elections. With these opponents, his retribution is swift and merciless. While the number cannot be known for sure, Arafat's PA is almost certainly responsible for the murders of dozens of political opponents, none of them Islamic extremists.

Since its creation in 1994, his Palestinian Authority has presided over the collapse of the Palestinian economy. He was given billions in aid, and squandered what he and his cronies didn't steal. With GDP down nearly 70 percent, Palestinians have seen their collective national net worth reduced by more than two thirds. Virtually nothing remains of a once reasonably vibrant private sector.

Corruption exists on a scale that even the normally approving Europeans cannot abide. Public infrastructure has disintegrated. Public health standards, just seven years ago the highest in the Arab world, are among the lowest. And the disastrously self-destructive terrorist war against Israel that Arafat started last year has reduced Palestinians to the most desperate conditions they have seen since the creation of Israel in 1948.

Arafat denies responsibility for the actions of extremists he cannot stop. Yet he alone controls the state media, whose endless torrent of incitement to murder creates the climate in which young men embrace the vocation of terrorist. A central character on Palestinian television's leading children's show is a 7-year-old boy who aspires to become a suicide bomber. The people's cry for blood, which Arafat purposely foments, Hamas and Jihad can answer, creating in the process new martyrs to fuel the cycle. Arafat and Hamas aren't enemies or rivals, they are co-dependents. Arafat needs Hamas and Jihad to divert the people's hatred, while Hamas and Jihad need Arafat to provide "moderate" cover for their murderous acts. Arafat needs terror much more than he needs Colin Powell.

It seems worth asking why neither Jerusalem nor Washington ever sought to democratize the Palestini-

ans. Particularly in the early stages of Oslo, when Arafat was dependent on American and Israeli support, the Palestinians would have had an excellent chance to build the first democracy in the Arab world. A democratic Palestine would have been a landmark achievement. If only someone had bothered to insist on it.

But it wasn't without reason that no Israeli, American, or European government ever made such a demand. It's just that the reason is a dirty little secret. The truth is that virtually no one in either government believes Arabs to be capable of—or even worthy of—democracy. In Israel, it is the supposedly enlightened left that most passionately rejects the notion that Palestinians could govern themselves democratically. The only reason the right hasn't rejected the idea is that it has never considered it. With the exception of Natan Sharansky, the deputy prime minister who spent nine years as a prisoner of Zion in the Soviet Gulag, not a single political figure has made the case for Palestinian democracy.

How else can one explain that when Secretary of State Colin Powell finally set out his much anticipated "vision" for reaching peace between Israel and the Palestinians, he never mentioned "freedom" or "democracy"? Secretary Powell used a November 19 speech at the University of Louisville to endorse an independent Palestinian state more emphatically than any U.S. official ever had before. But he devoted not even one sentence of his 43-minute address to what kind of state he thought Palestine should be.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is less about land, borders, or even refugees than it is about the inherent inability of dictators to be peaceful. It is dangerously premature to focus on where the borders of a future Palestinian state will be drawn before determining how it will be governed. For until someone gives them a chance to develop a more open political culture, the Palestinians will never taste the fruits of freedom, and peace will never come to the Middle East. ♦

Bush's Big Budget Conservatism

The era of GOP big government begins.

BY FRED BARNES

Is President Bush a big government conservative? Yes, a point that will be affirmed when the White House's new federal budget (for fiscal 2003) is unveiled early next month. "The president didn't say, 'I want it to be a big government conservative budget,'" says a White House aide. What he ordered up, according to budget director Mitch Daniels, is "a budget of big projects."

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And these are projects the government is to carry out: winning the war on terrorism, building up the military, creating a system of homeland security, and reviving the economy. For Bush, achieving these is more important than balancing the budget. By definition, that makes him a big government conservative—that is, a conservative willing to embrace deficit spending for the sake of large, critical government programs.

That's not the only mark of big government conservatives. As a type,

they tend to be realistic and programmatic. They take a relatively benign view of government and aggressively seek to expand the programs they believe in. A sense of realism means big government conservatives, Bush included, recognize Americans like big government. And this sense also keeps them from tilting at windmills. This is reflected in Bush's downgrading of Social Security reform, a cherished priority but one whose time is not expected to come soon. Programmatic? That involves staying on offense politically by proposing new programs, often of small size and limited reach, for whatever national problems crop up. For big problems, however, there are big solutions. Thus Bush will propose billions in his new budget for what Daniels calls "a comprehensive network for homeland security" that includes new infrastructure, especially at airports.

It's no secret that Bush has a more positive view of government than do most conservatives. He made that clear in the 2000 campaign and again last week when he and Democratic senator Teddy Kennedy celebrated the signing of a new education bill that enhances the federal role in education and allocates billions in new federal spending. And of course he's neither a libertarian nor a "leave us alone" conservative. His self-identification as a "compassionate conservative" is based implicitly, as Michael Barone has pointed out, on the duty of government to aid the poor and less fortunate. Conservatives eager to reduce government have been assuaged by Bush's tax cuts, but Daniels expects they'll find fault with the new budget. So-called "national greatness" conservatives will probably be pleased, since the top priority is the same as theirs, supporting a vast national project, the war on terrorism.

Big government conservatives such as former education secretary Bill Bennett relish what they dub "programs that work." Bush and Daniels have taken up this notion with something called "performance-based budgeting." The idea is to use empirical evidence to assess the effectiveness of domestic programs, then jack up spending for those that work and reduce or eliminate it for those that don't. This is easier said than done. The problem, says Daniels, is that there is "very little" data one way or the other. Bureaucrats, wary of accountability, like it that way. "The burden of proof in most of life is on the spender" to justify spending, the budget chief says. "In government, it works the other way around. We've got to turn that around."

Daniels found enough data on three programs to propose significantly higher spending, one of which may shock conservatives. He signaled this by bringing the heads of these three programs with him in November when he spoke to the National Press Club. The surprising one is the Women, Infants, and Children program (WIC) for poor women who are pregnant. In the early 1980s, President Reagan and his budget director, David Stockman, fought to kill this program and came close to succeeding. Now, Daniels says, WIC has provable results: lower health care costs, reduced anemia rates, lower infant mortality, increased immunizations, and "other hard, tangible measures." WIC, Daniels told the press club, "is a sound investment of the public's and the taxpayer's dollar."


Drew Friedman

The two other programs that work are the National Weather Service and the National Science Foundation. The weather bureau "has staked itself to specific goals and met them and surpassed them" according to Daniels. "Tornado warning times, flash flood lead times have more than doubled." As for the science foundation, it has low overhead and more than 95 percent of its funds go out on a competitive basis. "It has supported 8 of the 12 most recent Nobel Prize awards earned by Americans at some point in their careers."

Extolling federal programs is not a common practice of budget directors. But no doubt Bush will repeat some of Daniels's kind assessments in his State of the Union address on January 29, along with praise for the military. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has asked for a jump in Pentagon spending for fiscal 2003 from the $302 billion envisioned in President Clinton's last budget to $350 billion, and he'll probably get a good chunk of the proposed hike. Given the war on terrorism, Bush and Rumsfeld have abandoned their desire to cut spending for troops, planes, helicopters, and artillery—a decision that falls under the big-government-conservative category of realism.

Daniels insists a balanced budget "should be a fundamental goal of government," but "there are things that come ahead of it." They are war, recession, and a national emergency. "We have all three," he says. Taking them into account, a senior Bush adviser says, "there was no way to avoid a deficit." A tax increase was never considered—quite the contrary. The deficit shouldn't be a big political problem, the senior aide says. Rather, the American people have a "mature view" of the budget and the economy and understand that "sacrifices need to be made" in wartime. As a big government conservative, Bush is ready for America to make them. ♦

Sex, Lies, Videotape, and CNN

William Butler Yeats predicts Paula Zahn.

BY JOHN PODHORETZ

WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS believed in ESP, so I'd like to think he may have caught a mystical glimpse of future CNN newsbabe Paula Zahn in his tea leaves when he wrote these wise and cynical words in 1933: "Only God, my dear, could love you for yourself alone and not your yellow hair."

There was a big dust-up last week when CNN briefly aired an advertisement for Zahn's new morning show that described her as "provocative, super-smart, oh yeah, and just a little sexy." The ad lied, because Paula Zahn is not just a little sexy. Paula Zahn is a lot sexy. And anybody who actually believes that Paula Zahn's looks are incidental to the success she's had in her career should be hospitalized immediately.

Only God, my dear, could love Paula Zahn for her provocative super-smarts alone and not her yellow hair.

CNN pulled the ad, claiming no one in senior management had approved it. Network head Walter Isaacson proclaimed himself embarrassed. Not because the ad was wrong about Zahn's sexiness, but because it was in such poor taste.

It *was* in poor taste. It was in poor taste to dub the intensely amiable Zahn "provocative," because she's about as provocative as Velveeta. And it's in poor taste—in super-poor taste, actually—to use the term "super-smart" about anybody, because horrific neologisms are the very definition of bad taste.

But neither the use of the word "provocative" nor the use of the execrable "super-smart" is what kicked up all the ruckus. No, it was the use of the word "sexy." You can almost hear Walter Isaacson chewing out the CNN promotions department: "Hey, this is 2002, people! We don't describe beautiful women on television as sexy!"

Ismael Roldan

Wait. That can't be it. After all, CNN is part of AOL Time Warner, which produces many hours of prime-time television featuring many sexy women.

The problem was that Paula Zahn works for a news channel, and news channels are serious. Serious issues are being discussed, like Afghanistan. CNN has a fellow named Bill Hemmer hosting its show *Live from Afghanistan*. I can't really judge Bill Hemmer's sexiness, but it seems to me that Bill Hemmer is kind of a male version of Paula Zahn. Before CNN, he won a local Emmy for a program in which he interviewed Mother Teresa and then went bungee-jumping in New Zealand.

Also in Afghanistan, late last year, was Ashleigh Banfield, a young blonde woman with very chic glasses. Did I say blonde? When MSNBC decided to send her into the belly of the mid-Asian beast, Banfield had her hair darkened—presumably so that people would take her more seriously. Perhaps Miss Banfield had read Yeats's second verse, in which the woman figures she has a solution to being appreciated for her body and not her mind: "But I can get a hair-dye, and set such color there—brown, or black, or carrot." Yet still, as Yeats predicted, she was loved by viewers for her hair.

Television news is like Anne Gregory, the original subject of Yeats's poem. Television news wants to be loved for itself. It wants to win Peabodys, to be invited to join the Council on Foreign Relations. It wants respect. And for a few brief shining moments this fall, television news was elevated in importance just as the entire nation seemed elevated by its response to September 11.

But it's still mostly flash and dazzle, emanations from a cathode-ray tube, intended to fit on a two foot by two foot screen in your living room. Sexy people—beautiful women, handsome men, and supremely self-confident folk of both sexes—dominate in news as they do in entertainment because they're pleasing company and easy on the eyes.

Television news is more television than news. This is a fact of pop-culture life that becomes annoying only when television pretends otherwise.

Yeats once wrote of a country in which "an aged man is but a paltry thing, a tattered coat upon a stick." In television country, not just an aged man, but every personality that's not "a little bit sexy," is a paltry thing.

And that's the way it is. ♦

John Podhoretz is a contributing editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD *and columnist for the* New York Post.

Daschle's Folly

The Senate majority leader alienates fellow Democrats. **BY STEPHEN F. HAYES**

IT'S ADVICE a Republican consultant might deviously give to a Senate Democrat: Open the New Year with a harshly partisan attack on a Republican president with approval ratings in the mid-80s. Suggest that his tax cuts—mostly not yet in effect—are responsible for the return of budget deficits. And say this despite the fact that 12 Democratic senators, including six who are up for reelection in 2002, voted for those tax cuts. Be shameless about the fact that you earlier claimed credit for last year's tax rebates, the only front-loaded piece of Bush's tax plan. Finally, in the midst of a recession, warn against further tax cuts and hint that you might even be open to repealing the tax cuts—as if wartime budget deficits were more important than the long-term health of the national economy.

That scenario, of course, is not hypothetical. It's what Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle did January 4, in a speech at the Center for National Policy. "September 11 and the war aren't the only reasons the surplus is nearly gone," he declared. "They're not even the biggest reasons. The biggest reason is the tax cut."

The tone of the remarks (and Daschle's new coiffure) ignited immediate speculation that the talk was meant to be a stature-enhancer, the kind of speech a prominent senator might give as he seriously considered a presidential bid. Last week, after the speech was widely panned—with moderate Democrats offering some of the harshest reactions—Daschle supporters muted their criticism of the tax cut and unconvincingly played down the presidential speculation. Some Republicans, however, believe Daschle has shown himself vulnerable. These Republicans want to raise the political stakes by revisiting the tax cut—not to discuss repealing it, as liberals have suggested, but to propose making it permanent.



Tom Daschle

Ismael Roldan

What Daschle's speech accomplished wasn't what he intended. It demonstrated the immense challenge the majority leader faces in running the Senate and running for president at the same time. Daschle, now the de facto leader of the Democratic party, must retain or enlarge his majority in the Senate. To do that will require reelecting several moderates, some of whom work comfortably with the Bush administration. But to seriously undertake a presidential run, he must remain in the good graces of liberal constituencies—labor, minorities, enviros—crucial to winning the Democratic nomination. Critics say those groups were his intended audience on January 4.

Moderate Democrats weren't happy. California's Dianne Feinstein, who voted for the tax cut but is open to some tinkering with it, strongly rebuked Daschle in an appearance on *Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer*. "The impact of the tax cut has not yet been felt. I think that's a very important point to make. So I don't think it worsens the recession at all."

Zell Miller of Georgia was characteristically candid in his assessment last week. "How do you have as one of your highest priorities to reelect the moderate Democrats from South Dakota, Montana, and Missouri on one hand, then on the other blame them for voting for a tax cut that he maintains has created this recession? Hello?"

Miller sponsored a bill last fall with Texas Republican Phil Gramm that would make the tax cut permanent, and would cut capital gains tax rates from 20 percent to 15 percent. Both ideas were discussed when the tax cuts were initially proposed and then again during debate over the economic stimulus package. Daschle's speech may have given them new life.

"The strategy of a good opposition party is to make life difficult for the majority, and in this case divide Democrats," says Scott Reed, who ran Bob Dole's

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1996 campaign and knows the hazards of seeking a presidential nomination while running the Senate. "And taxes obviously work. That's what everybody learned after his speech."

"Daschle's position is that the tax cut is the source of all evil on this planet," says Gramm. "So, should we cut out this cancer and repeal the tax cut? He says no. That's a nonsensical kind of position."

Miller, naturally, would like a vote on his bill. "How can anyone make any long-range plans for a business or for a family with a here-today, maybe-gone-tomorrow tax cut—a tax policy that has a perishable date on it, like a quart of milk? The fastest way to show taxpayers that we're serious about tax relief is to make the tax cut permanent."

Politically, forcing a second vote on tax cuts has its advantages for Senate Republicans. The six Democrats who voted for the tax cut and are up for reelection in 2002 would have essentially two choices. Either vote again for the tax cut, this time making it permanent; or explain to voters why it made sense to vote for a temporary tax cut before we knew the country was in a recession, and why it's wise to reject a permanent tax cut in the middle of one.

"It would clearly become a major issue in 2002," says Gramm. "I think people would like to know in Missouri, for example, whether Senator Carnahan intended it to be a permanent tax cut or just a short-term deal. To say, 'I voted for the tax cut but I wanted it to be temporary,' is the worst political position to be in."

Republicans say they will continue to push issues like taxes, energy, and health care that will highlight the differences between Daschle and his more moderate colleagues. If Daschle's presidential ambitions drive him to the left, it will be an interesting year in Congress's upper chamber.

Says one GOP aide: "The Senate will be a circus. If you're a Democratic Senate candidate, especially a moderate, you've got to be terrified." ♦

The Dog Days of Summers

Harvard's new president finds out who's really in charge. BY NOAH D. OPPENHEIM

As president of Harvard University, Larry Summers holds perhaps the most prominent office in American academia and, you might think, one of the most powerful. But after just six months on the job, he now better understands who really holds the power.

In late December, three members of Harvard's Afro-American Studies department—Henry Louis Gates Jr., Cornel West, and Anthony Appiah—threatened to leave for Princeton, dissatisfied with Summers's leadership. Through surrogates, the trio complained to the *Boston Globe* that Summers was not clear in his support of affirmative action and did not place adequate emphasis on diversity. What's more, they claimed, he had personally insulted West.

According to the *Globe*, during a private October meeting, Summers had "rebuked West for recording a rap CD, for leading a political committee for the Reverend Al Sharpton's possible presidential campaign, and for writing books more likely to be reviewed in the *New York Times* than in academic journals." Summers also reportedly questioned West's easy grading policies.

In an interview with National Public Radio, West confirmed the *Globe*'s account of that meeting, adding that he was "attacked and insulted." And, he grumbled, "The one thing I do not tolerate is disrespect, being dishonored and being devalued."

The potential defection of Harvard's best-known black scholars elicited an immediate response from the university, which characterized the conflict between Summers and West as a "huge misunderstanding." But West and his allies were not to be easily mollified. Within a week, Jesse Jackson was headed to Cambridge, demanding a meeting with Summers, and Al Sharpton was threatening a lawsuit.

Then began a more intense effort to quiet the storm. Declining a face-to-face with Jackson, Summers released a statement explaining, "I take pride in Harvard's longstanding commitment to diversity. I believe it is essential for us to maintain that commitment, working to create an ever more open and inclusive environment that draws on the widest possible range of talents." He also held private meetings with Gates and West, during which Summers again said he was "sorry for any misunderstanding."

The university claims those meetings "cleared the air," but West's spokesman, Harvard law professor Charles Ogletree, was less sanguine. He says West may still leave for Princeton, declaring, "This is not over. We're still waiting for finality. There's still a ways to go." Having promised in a public statement to "compete vigorously" to keep West, it seems Summers may yet have to do further penance.

But if Cornel West is still dissatisfied with Summers, far more disappointed are those who would have been delighted to see West, and perhaps one or two more of the Af-Am stars, pack their bags. Senior members of the Harvard faculty say Sum-

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Photographer Showcase

Cornel West

mers's criticism of West was well-founded and long overdue.

The quality of West's scholarship has long been suspect. In a 1995 review of West's books, the *New Republic*'s Leon Wieseltier concluded that "West's work is noisy, tedious, slippery . . . sectarian, humorless, pedantic and self-endeared." That judgment is confirmed by West's more recent offerings such as *The Future of American Progressivism*, co-authored with Roberto Unger, a stale, platitudinous call for the "reenergizing of democratic politics and the democratizing of the market economy."

Making matters worse, West is one of only 14 University Professors at Harvard, a distinction shared by Nobel laureates and super-luminaries like Samuel Huntington. But when students looked for wisdom in the wake of the September 11 attacks, West offered this pearl: "America has been 'niggerized' by the terrorist attacks." He questioned the government's eagerness to provide aid to the victims, chiding a campus audience, "Sounds an awful lot like reparations to me. I didn't think America was into reparations."

West's new CD, to which Summers reportedly objected, is described on its promotional website as "a watershed moment in musical history." West says the album is an effort to be "intellectual without being cerebral." He cut the album during a one-year leave from Harvard, and while it has posted meager sales, he appears to revel in his cross-over status as an academic cum hip-hop impresario. On a promotional tour this past summer, West bragged to the *New Yorker*: "We're going to hook up with Shaq tomorrow. Call the Trump International. We're just gonna go kick it with him, talk about life, talk about struggle."

To be fair, West's classes, when he is teaching them, are popular among students. He can be a colorful speaker. He is also not especially demanding. According to the university's most recent annual review of undergraduate courses, students rate West's Introduction to Afro-American Studies a 2.5 out of 5 on the scale of difficulty. They give the workload a 1.8. Both ratings are below the average among social science courses in general, a category of instruction not known in general for its rigor.

Of course, in the context of the modern academy, it seems the substance of Summers's complaint with West hardly matters. Harvard history professor Stephan Thernstrom explains, "The Fellows of Harvard College, the members of the Corporation, don't like Harvard to be on the front page of the *New York Times* impugned as racially insensitive." Writing in the *Wall Street Journal* last week, Shelby Steele went further: "Institutions today lose their mainstream legitimacy unless white guilt defines their approach to racial matters."

Still, most of the pro-Summers faculty are hoping the president's conciliatory gestures were not a complete capitulation. One question now is whether his tangle with West will derail Summers's commitment to address the plague of grade inflation. Summers gets full marks for taking up this issue, which as recently as six months ago was the quixotic crusade of a happy few, led by political science professor Harvey Mansfield. Yet any serious campaign to restore standards cannot bode well for scholars of specious disciplines. This most recent spat with the Af-Am department may be just round one of a larger fight.

Perhaps more important, while Summers has expressed support for the principle of "diversity," nowhere has he been directly quoted on the more substantive matter of racial preferences in hiring and admissions. As one Harvard insider puts it, referring to the ongoing litigation over racial preferences in University of Michigan admissions, "the ultimate litmus test will be the Michigan case, if it gets to the Supreme Court. Will Harvard file an amicus brief defending racial preferences in admissions?"

In the meantime, Summers faces a more immediate concern—growing agitation for a Latino studies center. So far, indications have been that he will resist the project. On the other hand, it hasn't made the front page yet. ♦

Voice of Iran

Look what terrorist state is helping Afghanistan now. BY A. WILLIAM SAMII

Kabul

OUTSIDE his small workshop on a dusty street here the other day, Mohammad Nasim lined up a colorful display of satellite dishes. Shouting to be heard over the racket made by his ten workmen's hammers and drills, he said he's selling 25 to 30 satellite dishes a week. In Taliban times, sales were clandestine, and demand was much lower, he said, about one a week. I passed four more satellite dish makers in the following few days. Abdul Samad, whose crowded shop sells satellite receivers and televisions, said he moves about 200 units a week, whereas under the Taliban he was lucky to sell even one.

Back then, television was forbidden, and radio—called Voice of Sharia—broadcast only religious messages, official decrees, and anti-Western propaganda. After coalition airstrikes in October destroyed Kabul's main radio tower, several new stations appeared. One of these, known as Commando Solo, was broadcast from a Pennsylvania Air National Guard EC-130. It carried music and information for 10 hours a day on one shortwave and two AM frequencies. The programs advised listeners to stay away from possible targets, informed the Taliban of their imminent demise, and offered instructions on how to surrender. Another new station was the Northern Alliance's Voice of Peace, which used equipment donated by a French agency called Droit de Parole.

American and British broadcasters, furthermore, increased their programs in Pashto, Dari, and Farsi, Afghanistan's main languages. Even Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) increased its Dari-language programming from the usual 6 hours a day to 11 hours a day. It includes news, religious shows, and songs in Dari, Pashto, and Uzbek.

At Radio Kabul, the director of technical services, Zabiullah Hafizi, told me that during the conflict the most popular radio stations in Afghanistan were the ones from Iran (especially in the western provinces), the Persian and Tajik Services of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Voice of America, and the BBC. People appreciated the Commando Solo broadcasts, he said, but they were afraid to listen because of possible Taliban retaliation and because the signal often was weak.

Now Radio Kabul is back on the air, and the interim administration's radio and television chief, Abdul Hafiz Mansour, says he hopes to make it appeal to the entire Afghan population. He means to hire people from different ethnic groups (Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Aimaks, Turkmen, Baluch, and Uzbek), languages (Pashto, Dari, Uzbek, Baluchi, and Turkmen), regions, and religions. From the beginning, maintains Mansour, his organization has promoted mass participation and equal rights. "On our first radio and television program after the Taliban's flight," he says, "we made use of female broadcasters and female staff, who make up 40 percent of our staff."

The United States, Italy, and Japan have promised to help Radio Kabul, Mansour said, but they've done nothing yet—while Iran has stepped into the breach. A delegation from Iranian state broadcasting accompanied Iran-

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ian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi when he visited Kabul to attend the inauguration of the interim administration December 22. In addition, Tehran has already donated a 50-kilowatt radio transmitter, a 200-watt television transmitter, satellite equipment, and movies, and has offered to repair or replace transmitters in cities outside the capital. And Tehran has offered to set up training courses in journalism, technical skills, and set design, and has sent four technicians to work with Afghan broadcasting.

Two days after speaking with Afghan broadcasting officials, I visited Kohe Asmaii, the hill where the radio and television towers used to sit. A rocky, wind-swept site with a commanding view of Kabul, it was guarded by a handful of antiaircraft guns. Obviously, they weren't up to the task. All that was left were some scraps of twisted metal, a blown-out building with a large hole in its roof, and a heavily fortified bunker.

Fearing booby traps and unexploded ordnance, I passed on visiting the bunker. But I did encounter two engineers from Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and a crew of Afghan laborers. They had already installed a temporary transmitter next to Kabul's main hotel and now were installing a television transmitter they said would be ready in ten days and should last for about three years. It would be temporary, one engineer explained, but other needs were more pressing. All the equipment they were installing was made in Iran, he said. The main cause of delay in activating it was the absence of electricity on the hilltop.

The broadcast media are especially important in Afghanistan, where the literacy rate is an estimated 40 percent overall and less than 4 percent for women. Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar acknowledged as much when he told the BBC back on November 15, "You and American puppet radios have created a sense of concern." Iran's leaders clearly appreciate the power of radio. By taking the lead in reviving Afghan state broadcasting, they have cast Iran as the selfless big brother—and secured for themselves a strong position from which to shape public opinion about Afghanistan's future leaders and relations with other countries. While the United States openly presses its military campaign, Iran is quietly conducting its own campaign for Afghan hearts and minds. ♦

Staying Alive

A very modest proposal for a pro-life president.

BY HADLEY ARKES

The Born-Alive Infants Protection Act is an attempted "modest first step" on abortion, a measure that would simply protect a child who *survives* an abortion. The bill passed in the House by a vote of 380-15 in September 2000. Last June, it was approved 98-0 in the Senate, when it was introduced by Pennsylvania Republican Rick Santorum as a rider to the patients' bill of rights. Like much else that happened before September 11, it has been sidelined ever since.

Such a gentle move to protect innocent life might seem to be a natural issue for promotion by a pro-life White House, especially when the bill seems to enjoy a consensus among the parties in Congress. And yet, any effort to move this bill is likely to be branded by the Democrats as "divisive." For in their heart of hearts, many Democrats hate the Born-Alive act. Michigan's Debbie Stabenow threatened last year to oppose it in the Senate before cooler heads prevailed. After a huddle, the Democrats decided to follow the plan counseled by Rep. Jerrold Nadler in the House: Play rope-a-dope, go along with the bill—don't court the embarrassment of voting against it, and don't give its sponsors the satisfaction of an argument. For an argument would only draw attention to an uncomfortable truth about abortion law: namely, that the right to end a pregnancy has been transformed into a right to a dead child.

The Nadler tactic held. True, the National Abortion Rights Action League denounced the bill as an "anti-choice assault," a subtle first step in rolling back *Roe* v. *Wade*. But only 13 true believers among the Democrats voted with NARAL. The same reflexes were suppressed among Democrats in the Senate, and the word was that they hoped to knock the born-alive part out of the patients' bill of rights in a conference between the chambers.

The discomfort among Democrats with a bill that essentially restates society's opposition to infanticide is a confirmation of the fact that the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act, as modest as it is, runs to the root of things, and that root is unsettling. The most practical effect of the bill would be to stop the hideous practice of so-called "live birth abortions," practiced at places like Christ Hospital in Oak Lawn, Illinois. There, babies with Down Syndrome and other defects are delivered and then simply put aside, barely covered, and allowed to die. The House Judiciary Committee heard vivid testimony on this procedure from Jill Stanek and Allison Baker, two brave nurses who had worked at the hospital and came forward despite the risk to their careers.

But apart from stopping such horrors, the importance of the bill lies in the premises that it would plant in the law—notably, that a child marked for an abortion nevertheless retains a

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claim to the protections of the law; that if the courts can pronounce on abortion, the Congress can legislate on the same subject; and that abortion, like any other right, must have its limits.

The sponsors of the bill made those premises explicit in an elegant set of findings, and they could earnestly say that, if these propositions did not explain the reasons for voting for the bill, it was hard to see why the Democrats were voting for it. The most notable of the findings were these: The right to end a pregnancy ends when the pregnancy itself ends; and so the "right to an abortion" cannot mean the right to a dead child. The child born alive has a claim to the protection of the law, a claim that cannot pivot on the question of whether anyone "wants" her. The child, said the committee, has an "intrinsic dignity as a human being," and her claim to protection cannot be "dependent upon the desires, interests, or convenience of any other person." If these reasons did not hold, would we protect a child only when it "pleased" us to protect her—and would we cease to protect her when it ceased to please us?

It is hard to see how anyone could object to these findings while he was professing to vote for the bill, and yet the Democrats regarded the findings as provocative and inflammatory. And to the astonishment of the Republican sponsors, those findings were deleted from the bill, not by the opposition of the Democrats, but by the Republican chairman of the Judiciary Committee, James Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin. Sensenbrenner knew that the findings would encounter resistance among Democrats, and apparently he did not wish to look like a less effective chairman than his predecessor, Henry Hyde, by losing votes for the bill. With 380 votes in favor, there were plenty of votes to spare, and there was no need for a preemptive surrender. But the result was one of the strangest plays in our recent politics: The Democrats were trapped in a bind with no good choices, and the Republican chairman ran interference in helping them escape.

In one stroke, Sensenbrenner disrupted years of work in putting together a coalition for the bill, for without the findings the bill might indeed lose its point. Yet even without the findings, as Rick Santorum remarked, the bill would still make a difference if it were to become law: It would establish a firmer ground for the Congress to pass again a bill on partial-birth abortion. For it would establish that even a child marked for abortion is a real entity, who comes under the protection of the law.

NEWSMAKERS

The 2001 March for Life

Nonetheless, the Born-Alive measure languishes.

In the meantime, Christ Hospital in Oak Lawn, perhaps reading the political moment, has fired nurse Jill Stanek. And so, in the haze of bipartisanship that has followed September 11, a measure to protect living, newborn children has been put to the side, and the main casualty, apart from the bill itself, is the woman who risked her career in exposing this killing of the innocent. It is hardly an advertisement for a political party that it does nothing to protect the people who have run risks on its behalf. An administration that is pro-life would also have a stake in showing that its adherents do not become hostages: If the administration cannot protect a Jill Stanek, it could at least honor her and try to redeem the sacrifice she made. It could do that by making a move to pass the bill in behalf of which she testified and risked her career. This would not seem to require herculean amounts of political courage, with the Democrats afraid to vote against the bill.

The president's performance the past few months has been, on all counts, admirable. His administration has been marked by a commendable moral fervor and indignation over the killing of innocent Americans in New York and Washington. But even as domestic politics begins to command the president's attention once more, the administration has yet to call for passing this simplest of all bills, which could forestall the killing of innocent beings marked for death. There are not a lot of live-birth abortions, but each one is unforgivable. These lives are within the power of the administration to protect, and, in protecting them, to teach a notable lesson.

We have, coming up on January 22, the annual March for Life, timed to the anniversary of *Roe* v. *Wade*. The president would not appear to be going out of his way to be provocative if he took the occasion to remind the country of the importance of protecting innocent life. If we really think the human person bears an intrinsic dignity, which we are therefore obliged to respect, then that dignity does not rise in proportion to height or weight or age. A one-hour old, prematurely born infant with Down Syndrome possesses the same dignity as any of us. Surely, she cannot be destroyed or used as a means to our projects low and high, or thrown away when she fails to serve our interests.

To enact the Born-Alive act would require only the slightest effort: The hearings have already been held, twice, in the House, and the bill containing the Born-Alive act has already been passed unanimously in the Senate. The passing of the bill in the House, in September 2000, took only 45 minutes. The president might simply pose the question: Would Senate Democrats be willing to take 45 minutes to enact, finally, a bill to protect children born alive; a bill that commands wide support among both parties in Congress? Why, after all, should there be a problem—unless most Democrats really are opposed to the bill? If they are, let's find out.

This can be a win-win situation for the president, with little political cost. For he could take the Democrats at their word, and suggest, in the spirit of bipartisanship, that both parties could agree on this: that whatever else a right to abortion means, there cannot be a right to kill a child already born merely because she had once been marked for termination. Like every other right under the sun, even the right to abortion must have its limits.

In coming to this agreement, the parties would make it possible for Congress to pass the first legislation since *Roe* v. *Wade* that actually recognizes a limit on abortion. In that way, even this most modest of all bills would establish something momentous. But if the Democrats cannot brook that kind of step, they would have to proclaim in public that abortion, for them, finds no limits; that they will not accept a single restriction on the 1.3 million abortions performed every year in this country.

Of course, many of us believe that this, precisely, is the policy of the Democratic party. But it is not a policy that Democrats care to make explicit in public and claim as their own. The president, in short, may be free to take the high ground, and to articulate the fuller, principled reach of the concerns he has been representing in the country since September. And for a change, it's the Democrats who would be off balance. They could hardly breathe a word of complaint in public. But there are few things that would unsettle them more. ♦

What to Do About Iraq

For the war on terrorism to succeed, Saddam Hussein must be removed.

By Robert Kagan & William Kristol

What next in the war on terrorism? We hear from many corners that it is still too early to ask this question. If you mention the word Iraq, respectable folks at the State Department and on the *New York Times* op-ed page get red-faced. After all, the mission in Afghanistan is not over. The destruction of Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network is not finished. And even when these goals are accomplished, they say, we won't even begin to think about Iraq until we've taken care of Somalia, the Philippines, Yemen, Indonesia—and Antarctica, and the moon.

All this strikes us as an elaborate stratagem for avoiding the hard decision to confront Saddam Hussein. Yes, it is essential to capture bin Laden and destroy al Qaeda. It is necessary to stabilize Afghanistan and back a functioning government there. And, yes, we have to roll up the al Qaeda operations in other troublesome parts of the world.

But none of this precludes dealing with Iraq, or makes the obligation of dealing with Iraq less urgent. The United States can, after all, walk and chew gum at the same time. The Iraqi threat is enormous. It gets bigger with every day that passes. And it can't wait until we finish tying up all the "loose ends." For one thing, those loose ends are not just minor details. If bin Laden has left Central Asia, he'll be hard to find. Who knows how long it may take? Meanwhile, history moves on, and the clock is ticking in Iraq. If too many months go by without a decision to move against Saddam, the risks to the United States may increase exponentially. And after September 11, those risks are no longer abstract. Ultimately, what we do or do not do in the coming months about Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq will decisively affect our future security.

And it will determine more than that. Whether or not we remove Saddam Hussein from power will shape the contours of the emerging world order, perhaps for decades to come. Either it will be a world order conducive to our liberal democratic principles and our safety, or it will be one where brutal, well-armed tyrants are allowed to hold democracy and international security hostage. Not to take on Saddam would ensure that regimes implicated in terror and developing weapons of mass destruction will be a constant—and growing—feature of our world. Destroying Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda is, obviously, very important. Dealing with other sponsors of terrorism—Iran in particular—is crucial. But,



Illustrations by Thomas Fluharty

Robert Kagan is a contributing editor and William Kristol is editor of The Weekly Standard.

in the near-future, Iraq is *the* threat and *the* supreme test of whether we as a nation have learned the lesson of September 11.

The amazing thing about the current "debate" over Iraq is that no one disputes the nature of the threat. Everyone agrees that, as Al Gore's former national security adviser Leon Fuerth puts it, "Saddam Hussein is dangerous and likely to become more so," that he "is a permanent menace to his region and to the vital interests of the United States."

No one questions, furthermore, the basic facts about Saddam Hussein's weapons programs:

• According to U.N. weapons inspectors and western intelligence agencies, Iraq possesses the necessary components and technical knowledge to build nuclear bombs in the near future. A report prepared by the German intelligence services in December 2000, based on defectors' reports, satellite imagery, and aerial surveillance, predicted that Iraq will have three nuclear bombs by 2005. But that may be too optimistic. Before the Gulf War no one had a clue how far advanced Saddam's nuclear weapons program was. According to the Federation of American Scientists, even with an intrusive inspections regime, "Iraq might be able to construct a nuclear explosive before it was detected." Today, no one knows how close Saddam is to having a nuclear device. What we do know is that every month that passes brings him closer to the prize.



• The chemical weapon VX is the most toxic poison known to man. Ten milligrams—one drop—can kill a human being. In the mid-1990s, Iraq admitted producing VX in large quantities. When U.N. inspectors left Iraq at the end of 1998, they believed Iraq maintained 41 different sites capable of producing VX in a matter of weeks. They also believed Iraq possessed enough precursor materials to produce over 200 tons of the poison, enough to kill hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. A year ago, U.S. officials told the *New York Times* that Iraq had rebuilt "a series of factories that the United States has long suspected of producing chemical and biological weapons." A year later, who knows how many of those factories are operational?

• The Federation of American Scientists reports that Iraq possesses the equipment, the know-how, and the materials to produce "350 liters of weapons-grade anthrax" a week. In the five years before Desert Storm, Iraq produced 8,500 liters of anthrax and managed to place 6,500 liters in various munitions. We can only imagine how much anthrax Saddam Hussein may have at his disposal today.

Nor is there any doubt that, after September 11, Saddam's weapons of mass destruction pose a *kind* of danger to us that we hadn't fully grasped before. In the 1990s, much of the complacency about Saddam, both in Washington and in Europe, rested on the assumption that he could be deterred. Saddam was not a madman, the theory went, and would not commit suicide by actually using the weapons he was so desperately trying to obtain. Some of us, it's true, had our doubts about this logic. The issue seemed to us not so much whether we could deter Saddam, but whether he could deter us: If Saddam had had nuclear weapons in 1991, would we have gone to war to drive him from Kuwait?

But after September 11, we have all been forced to consider another scenario. What if Saddam provides some of his anthrax, or his VX, or a nuclear device to a terrorist group like al Qaeda? Saddam could help a terrorist inflict a horrific attack on the United States or its allies, while hoping to shroud his role in the secrecy of cutouts and middlemen. How in the world do we deter that? To this day we don't know who provided the anthrax for the post-September 11 attacks. We may never know for sure.

What we do know is that Saddam is an ally to the world's terrorists and always has been. He has provided safe haven to the infamous Abu Nidal. Reliable reports from defectors and former U.N. weapons inspectors have confirmed the existence of a terrorist training camp in Iraq, complete with a Boeing 707 for practicing hijack-

ings, and filled with non-Iraqi radical Muslims. We know, too, that Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of September 11, went out of his way to meet with an Iraqi intelligence official a few months before he flew a plane into the World Trade Center. As Leon Fuerth understates, "There may well have been interaction between Mr. Hussein's intelligence apparatus and various terrorist networks, including that of Osama bin Laden."

So there is no debate about the facts. No one doubts the nature of the threat Saddam poses. Most even agree that, as former national security adviser Samuel R. Berger says, "the goal . . . should be getting rid of Saddam Hussein." Leon Fuerth recently wrote that Saddam "and his government must be ripped out of Iraq if we are ever to be secure and if the sufferings of the Iraqi people are ever to abate."

Tough talk from a Clintonista. But when it comes to actually doing something about Saddam, suddenly it's a different story. Fuerth, Berger, Madeleine Albright, and Tom Daschle and a host of other Democrats (with the increasingly notable and honorable exception of Joseph Lieberman) insist over and over again that no matter how much of a threat Saddam may pose, no matter how necessary it may be to "rip" him out of Iraq—nevertheless we should not do it.

Here is Daschle, in late December: "A strike against Iraq would be a mistake. It would complicate Middle Eastern diplomacy. . . . I think we have to keep the pressure on Iraq in a collective way, with our Arab allies. Unilateralism is a very dangerous concept. I don't think we should ever act unilaterally." What's more, the Iraq doves claim, removing Saddam would be a diversion from the war against al Qaeda, and the cure would be worse than the disease.

This is nonsense. It is almost impossible to imagine any outcome for the world both plausible and worse than the disease of Saddam with weapons of mass destruction. A fractured Iraq? An unsettled Kurdish situation? A difficult transition in Baghdad? These may be problems, but they are far preferable to leaving Saddam in power with his nukes, VX, and anthrax. As for the other arguments, the effort to remove Saddam from power would no more be a "diversion" from the war on al Qaeda than the fight against Hitler was a "diversion" from the fight against Japan. Can it really be that this great American superpower, much more powerful than in 1941, cannot fight on two fronts at the same time against dangerous but second-rate enemies?

And as for the issue of unilateral versus multilateral action, we would prefer that the United States act together with friends and allies in any attack on Iraq. We believe others will indeed join us if we demonstrate our serious intention to oust Saddam—the British and some other Europeans, as well as Turkey and other states in the Middle East. But whether they join us or not, there is too much at stake for us to be deterred by the pro forma objections of, say, Saudi Arabia or France.

On one point, we agree with some of the critics. We doubt that the so-called "Afghanistan model" of airstrikes combined with very limited U.S. ground troops, and dependence on a proxy force, can be counted on as sufficient for Iraq. The United States should support Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress—they are essential parts of any solution in Iraq. But we cannot count on the Iraqi opposition to win this war. Nor can we count on precision bombing and U.S. Special Forces alone to do the job. American ground forces in significant number are likely to be required for success in Iraq. At the least, we need to be prepared to use such forces, and for a number of reasons.

First, there is the special problem posed by Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Any attack on Iraq must succeed quickly. There is no time to repeat the pattern in Afghanistan of trying a little of this and a little of that and seeing what works. In the Afghan war, it was a change of strategy after three weeks that eventually turned the tide against the Taliban. We don't have the luxury of early mistakes in Iraq. As soon as any attack begins, Saddam will be sorely tempted to launch a chemical or biological attack on one of his neighbors, probably Israel. Any U.S. attack will have to move with lightning speed to destroy or secure sites from which such an Iraqi strike could be launched.

But even then, as the Gulf War demonstrated, it is almost impossible to locate every Scud missile in the Iraqi desert before it is fired. A key element of American strategy must therefore aim at affecting the decision-making process of Saddam's top commanders in the field. Whether or not they carry out an order from Saddam to launch a chemical or biological weapon at Israel may depend on their perception of whether Saddam and his regime are likely to survive. If the size and speed of an American invasion make it clear, in the first hours, that Saddam is finished, an Iraqi commander may think twice before making himself an accomplice to Saddam's genocidal plans. We believe it is essential that the effort to remove Saddam not be a drawn-out affair.

American troops on the ground will be important for another reason. The best way to avoid chaos and anarchy in Iraq after Saddam is removed is to have a powerful

American occupying force in place, with the clear intention of sticking around for a while. We have already begun to see the price of not having such a force in Afghanistan. In Iraq, even more than in Afghanistan, the task of nation-building will be crucial. We don't want a vacuum of power in Iraq. We don't want Iran playing games in Iraq. We don't want Turkey worried that it will be left alone to deal with the Kurdish question. The United States will have to make a long-term commitment to rebuilding Iraq, and that commitment cannot be fulfilled without U.S. troops on the ground.

Although we hear only about the risks of such action, the benefits could be very substantial. A devastating knockout blow against Saddam Hussein, followed by an American-sponsored effort to rebuild Iraq and put it on a path toward democratic governance, would have a seismic impact on the Arab world—for the better. The Arab world may take a long time coming to terms with the West, but that process will be hastened by the defeat of the leading anti-western Arab tyrant. Once Iraq and Turkey—two of the three most important Middle Eastern powers—are both in the pro-western camp, there is a reasonable chance that smaller powers might decide to jump on the bandwagon.



We are aware that many will find all this too much to stomach. Ground forces? Occupation? Nation-building? Democratization and westernization in the Arab world? Can't we just continue to "contain" Saddam? Or can't we just drop some bombs, let the Iraqis fight it out, and then beat it home? The answer is, we can't. And if we haven't learned this much from September 11, then all that we lost on that day will have been lost in vain.

It is past time for the United States to step up and accept the real responsibilities and requirements of global leadership. We've already tried the alternative. During the 1990s, those who argued for limiting American involvement overseas, for avoiding the use of ground troops, for using force in a limited way and only as a last resort, for steering clear of nation-building, for exit strategies and burden-sharing—those who prided themselves on their prudence and realism—won the day. When the World Trade Center was attacked in 1993, when former President Bush was almost assassinated by Saddam Hussein in Kuwait, when bin Laden and al Qaeda bombed U.S. embassies and the USS *Cole*, the Clinton administration took the cautious approach. A few missile strikes here and there, a few sting operations. But when confronted with the choice of using serious force against al Qaeda, or really helping the Iraqi opposition and moving to drive Saddam Hussein from power, President Clinton and his top advisers flinched. And most Republicans put little sustained pressure on the Clinton administration to act otherwise. The necessary actions were all deemed too risky. The administration, supported by most of the foreign policy establishment, took the "prudent" course. Only now we know that it was an imprudent course. The failure of the United States to take risks, and to take responsibility, in the 1990s paved the way to September 11.

It is a tough and dangerous decision to send American soldiers to fight and possibly die in Iraq. But it is more horrible to watch men and women leap to their deaths from flaming skyscrapers. If we fail to address the grave threats we *know* exist, what will we tell the families of future victims? That we were "prudent"?

The problem today is not just that failure to remove Saddam could someday come back to haunt us. At a more fundamental level, the failure to remove Saddam would mean that, despite all that happened on September 11, we as a nation are still unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities of global leadership, even to protect ourselves. If we turn away from the Iraq challenge—because we fear the use of ground troops, because we don't want the job of putting Iraq back together afterwards, because we would prefer not to be deeply involved in a messy part of the world—then we will have made a momentous and fateful decision. We do not expect President Bush to make that choice. We expect the president will courageously decide to destroy Saddam's regime. No step would contribute more toward shaping a world order in which our people and our liberal civilization can survive and flourish. ♦

How to Deal with Tyrants

Kill them if you can; deter them if you must.

By Stephen Peter Rosen

How should we deal with tyrants who threaten the security of the United States and its friends? Tyranny is not a word with which modern political scientists and government officials are comfortable; they prefer more neutral formulations, such as "unitary rational actor" or "state of concern." Ancient political philosophers, however, would have no problem recognizing a man like Saddam Hussein as a tyrant, one who rules in accord with his own will, and against the laws. Such men are not crazy, but they do not behave the way, say, Tony Blair would, if Blair ruled their countries.

No one strategy will always be appropriate for dealing with tyrannies. Under some circumstances, as with Joseph Stalin, we have been content to deter tyrants from hostile action. At other times we have been compelled to destroy their regimes. In either case, an effective strategy for dealing with tyrants has to take into account their special nature. This is more than an idle question as the government of the United States turns its attention to Saddam Hussein. For now, we must deter him. In time, we should destroy him. What, then, are the special problems of tyrannicide under modern conditions, when tyrants seek and, increasingly, obtain, weapons of mass destruction?



The special character of tyrannies springs from their oppression of their own people. Tyrants who rule in accord with their personal will are not legitimate in the eyes of their own people. They take what they want, and so they are hated. Xenophon in his dialogue on tyranny has the tyrant say, "I believe myself that to take from an unwilling enemy is the most pleasant of all things." Tyrants rule by means of fear, and are at war with their own people, as was explicitly the case in the wars waged by Stalin and Mao against the peasantry of their countries, and as is implicitly the case of the contemporary tyrannies that are starving the people of North Korea and Iraq.

The consequence is that tyrants live in constant fear of being killed. Even Hitler, who was undoubtedly loved by many Germans, was the object of several assassination attempts.

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Illustrations by Thomas Fluharty

Xenophon, again, captured the essence of the tyrant's condition when he had the tyrant say, "To fear the crowd, yet to fear solitude; to fear being without a guard, and to fear the very men who are guarding; to be unwilling to have unarmed men about me, yet not gladly to see them armed—how could this fail to be a painful condition?" All tyrants have spies and secret police forces to protect themselves from their enemies, but, more important, to protect them from their own generals and family.

How does this affect a strategy of deterrence? Deterrence involves communicating a threat that pain will be inflicted on someone else in the future, if certain actions are carried out. The business of deterrence, therefore, involves making people think in certain ways about the future. Do all people look at the future in the same way? In ordinary conversations, we often ask ourselves why people act foolishly. Do they not see that eventually their actions will catch up with them? Some people seem to be very shortsighted, lacking the ability or willingness to think more than a few hours or days into the future. People who study common criminals are often struck by the fact that criminals are not crazy or irrational—they act purposefully, and their actions have a logic to them—but they often seem to pay no attention to the long-term consequences of their actions. By contrast, they do not commit crimes if a policeman is standing next to them or just around the corner. Such criminals are affected by punishments and rewards meted out in the short term, and are said to have a short-term view of the future.

What about tyrants? They are usually more intelligent than criminals, though not always. They do, however, invariably live in conditions that require them to be suspicious of everyone around them. When a ruler must think every day about how to avoid a coup or assassination, he is likely to have a very short-term view of the future. He may have very stable long-term goals. Every day Hitler woke up, he wanted to kill the Jews.

But such a ruler will choose courses of actions that give rewards and avoid punishment in the short term. He will not be willing to think a great deal about courses of action that may be good or bad for him months or years into the future. He will concentrate on what will be good or bad for him today, and for the next few days, because if he does not survive in the short term, nothing else will matter. Democratic politicians usually think at least as far into the future as the next election. A tyrant is like a politician who faces reelection every day and will be executed if he loses. Tyrants have chosen domestic strategies that promised results quickly, such as Mao's Great Leap Forward, whatever their other problems might have been.

This has major implications for deterrence. A ruler who is concentrating on the near term will not be much affected by threats that take months or years to execute. It takes months to obtain agreement in the international community to a set of economic sanctions. Economic sanctions, once in place, take years to affect the country against which they are directed. Military action that is slow to execute has the same drawbacks. It may take months to assemble an international coalition before military preparations and deployments can begin. It may then take additional months for men and supplies to be sent to the area in which they will fight. Deterrence will fail against tyrants when retaliation is slow. On the other hand, if the military capability to inflict pain is visibly in place and can be used rapidly in response to a hostile act, this will affect the calculations of even a very shortsighted tyrant. The presence of U.S. forces in South Korea and the Persian Gulf today serves that purpose. During the early Cold War, the United States emphasized "instant" as well as massive retaliation.

Deterring tyrants requires more than the ability to threaten prompt retaliation, however. In order to affect the decisions of tyrants, it is necessary to consider what information they have about the world. What information do they receive, believe, and use? Tyrants do not necessarily know everything that we assume well-informed people know. A tyrant is one who rules by means of fear. What kind of information will he receive from his subordinates? Is it likely that the servants of a tyrant will present him with information that shows that he has made a mistake, or has chosen a bad policy? In a state where everyone lives in fear of the ruler, and where the bearers of bad news are not kindly received, there will be much information that is slow reaching the ears of the tyrant. We now have documents, for example, revealing that Hitler's foreign minister did not pass on to the *Führer* crucial intelligence about the French before the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, because he feared he might be punished if the intelligence proved to be wrong. We now know that Stalin was not told during his 1948 blockade of Berlin that the American airlift was successfully resupplying that city, and he continued the blockade in the belief that it was working. Mao was not told of the defeat of his armies in Korea, or about the failures of the Great Leap Forward.

Those who would deter tyrants, therefore, must not assume that threatening messages passed to his subordinates will get through to the leader in the intended form.

Care must be taken to present information and threats directly to the tyrant, either by delivering them in person, or by making the military threat to the tyrant immediately visible to the tyrant, by demonstrating it, for example, in an area where he will be sure to see it himself.

How should deterrent threats be made when they are communicated in person? It is striking that the tyrants we know about were all good at reading the body language of the people with whom they came into contact, and were sensitive to their tone of voice. In general, tyrants are able to rise to power and stay in power because they have extraordinary ability to sense the nonverbal signals that people send in face-to-face settings, and to detect when they are lying. Hitler's ability to "read" people and then to act and talk in ways that appealed to them was legendary.

In the studies of the 1991 Gulf War done by the U.S. government, it was noted that Saddam Hussein went to a great deal of trouble to arrange face-to-face meetings with his military commanders, rather than dealing with them on paper or on the telephone. Such men have great confidence in their ability to sense whether a person talking to them is telling the truth or bluffing. When sending deterrent threats, therefore, we must take care not only to deliver the correct words, but also to send a messenger who communicates by his non-verbal bearing and attitude that the threat of hostile action is very real. One has the feeling that when selecting diplomats to send to tyrannies, the State Department may not always be sensitive to this issue.



Beyond deterrence, the United States has waged wars to depose tyrants such as Hitler and Mullah Omar. What does a strategy of tyrannicide call for? If a tyrant has access to weapons of mass destruction, and fears that foreign military action may bring him down, what, if anything, can prevent him from launching his weapons in the belief that he has nothing to lose and might as well kill as many of his adversaries as possible?

It is worth noting that German chemical weapons were not used against the Allied armies marching into Germany, even while Berlin was under siege; also, that Hitler's order to destroy Paris was disobeyed. If it is obvious even to the tyrant that he is facing defeat, it will be equally apparent to his subordinates. In fact, they are likely to know it long before the tyrant accepts the reality of his situation. In such situations, then, those seeking to depose the tyrant should shift the focus of their attention from the tyrant to his subordinates, and work on deterring them. The tyrant has nothing more to lose, but they do.

They must be made aware, publicly, that after the defeat and death of the tyrant, they will be captured and punished if they carry out certain orders issued by the tyrant. Normally, they would fear him more than they would fear an outside power, but not when the tyranny is crumbling. The tyrant will, of course, increase his efforts to purge traitors, real or imagined. Public efforts to suborn his servants will feed that frenzy. This will increase the rate at which the tyranny crumbles. As more lieutenants are killed, many more will defect out of fear for their personal safety. An outside power seeking the tyrant's demise must be willing to offer defectors some form of safe haven, as well as to promise punishment for die-hards. Deterrence always requires that threats be carried out if hostile action is taken and, by the same token, that punishment not be inflicted if hostile action is not taken.

And what of Saddam? The United States is the military hegemon of the world, but even the United States has finite resources. The successful completion of the campaign in Afghanistan, and perhaps in other lawless countries that offer sanctuary to al Qaeda, may require that we bide our time, militarily, with Iraq. Meanwhile, Saddam must be deterred from overt hostile action. But it is idle to hope that the problem of his regime and his weapons of mass destruction will fade away. Action to remove his government is a prerequisite to the emergence of an acceptable order in the region from Turkey to Pakistan. The existence of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons is a real problem in executing such a strategy, but the problem can be managed if the United States takes into account the special character of tyrannies. ♦

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Rebuilding Ground Zero

Memorializing September 11

By Catesby Leigh


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In the aftermath of September 11, Senator Charles Schumer recommended the World Trade Center be replaced with "something grand." It's a curious word. Who speaks of grandeur any more? Certainly not many of the fashionable architects, designers, and pundits suggesting what to do with the site.

There have been, of course, any number of suggestions that something big be erected where the World Trade Center stood, if only as a gesture of defiance. Minoru Yamasaki's 1970s twin towers—stark, steel-sheathed, 110-story buildings severely geometrical and devoid of human scale—were very big indeed. But *big* isn't the same as *grand*. And nowhere does the difference matter more than on the ground of the buildings obliterated on September 11. This place demands a monumental architectural setting.

A preliminary plan for reconstruction at the sixteen-acre site, which extends over what were once twelve city blocks, should emerge in the next few months. Cleanup at the site has gone much faster than anyone imagined and is expected to be finished in June. Which raises the question: When it comes to rebuilding, will New York learn from the seemingly endless stream of errors it has made in its architectural patronage over the last half century?

Fortunately, the likelihood of a clone of Yamasaki's Corbusian towers-in-a-desolate-plaza is practically nil. The new buildings will probably rise about fifty stories: hardly pygmies, but short enough to allow the Empire State Building to assert its primacy on Gotham's skyline once again. Larry A. Silverstein—the developer who only last July took out a $3.2 billion, ninety-nine-year lease on the towers, two adjacent buildings in the complex, and the retail mall—has retained Alexander Cooper to work on a new scheme. You can see an example of Cooper's work in Battery Park City, which he and his former partner Stanton Eckstut laid out two decades ago, eschewing the Corbusian blueprint for more traditional, finer-grained planning. But Silverstein's design architect is David Childs of Skidmore Owings and Merrill—and Childs's specialty is, alas, slick, uninspired postmodernism.

Whatever buildings are erected at the site, there remains the question of a memorial. Given the ideas floating around New York these days, it's not hard to imagine a park at the site with walls inscribed with names or mechanically etched with computerized images of the dead. An unadorned fountain might offer the minimalistic spectacle of water shooting up in jets from a pavement or cascading over slabs of granite. We might even anticipate a landscape strewn with the remnants of the twin towers' steel sheathing—if they're not displayed in an on-site museum—along with twisted girders, or even flattened police cars and fire trucks. Thus might the postmodern preoccupation with "authenticity" and "metaphor," "memory," and "meaning" be satisfied.

The players in the decision-making include the new Lower Manhattan Redevelopment Corporation headed by former deputy secretary of state and Goldman Sachs co-chairman John C. Whitehead. This entity, a subsidiary of

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New York State's economic development corporation, will produce the preliminary reconstruction scheme, and it has received a stunningly bountiful $2 billion appropriation from Congress as part of an emergency aid package for New York City. Then there's the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which built the World Trade Center and owns the land. Silverstein, for his part, is expecting to collect a huge sum from his insurers that will allow him to build his new skyscrapers. Finally, the federal government may demand a say in return for billions of dollars for cleanup and infrastructure repair at the site.

Not surprisingly, the memorial has become the lightning-rod issue. Shortly before leaving office, Mayor Giuliani declared that a "soaring, monumental, beautiful memorial" should be the first priority. He suggested that such a memorial would be a major international attraction, and that Silverstein could build in another part of Manhattan. But comments by Whitehead—and by Giuliani's successor as mayor, Michael Bloomberg—indicate that there will almost certainly be a very considerable amount of office, retail, and possibly residential construction at the site.

In fact, the space allotted the memorial will be determined in tandem with other planning questions bearing on this most valuable chunk of real estate. Will the rebuilt precinct serve as a more important transit nexus, serving not only as the terminus of a PATH railway from New Jersey, as before, but also of the Long Island Railroad and Metro-North commuter lines which now terminate in Brooklyn and at Grand Central Station? Will this nexus include just the two old IRT subway lines that served the old trade center, or will it extend to the dozen other lines running through the Cortlandt Street station and the tangled Broadway-Nassau-Fulton Street complex to the east?

Another decision crucial in determining the character of the new precinct and its memorial will be the degree to which the old street grid—the two north-south and three east-west streets which Yamasaki's superblock interrupted—will be restored. And there remains the question of what to do with West Street, a ground-level extension of the West Side Highway that isolates Battery Park City and its World Financial Center from the trade-center site and the rest of Lower Manhattan.

Sparks are going to fly. The bereaved will be pushing for a generous memorial program. They can draw on deep reserves of public sympathy, and politicians will be hearing them loud and clear. But many influential New Yorkers are deeply concerned about the economic vitality of Lower Manhattan and see the loss of fifteen million square feet of commercial real estate as a dire threat to the district's global primacy as a financial venue. Only the widespread sense that rebuilding must proceed quickly is likely to keep turf battles from degenerating into a morass of prolonged litigation.

Given contemporary architecture's pathological inability to engage the public interest, however, the danger is that no unifying or compelling artistic outlook will guide construction of the new buildings and the memorial, leading to an aesthetically fragmented or simply sterile environment. Our designers talk a great deal about vision, but seldom has it been in shorter supply. From the Hellenistic age in the ancient world all the way down to the Progressive era and the City Beautiful Movement in this country, Western urbanism integrated art and science. Ever since the eclipse of the classical tradition during the 1930s, art has been the loser.

To do justice to the trade-center site we need visionaries like Daniel H. Burnham, whose inspiring plan of Chicago in 1909 incorporated the technical aspects of city planning into a classical vision of the modern city—transforming and vastly improving the city's Lake Michigan shoreline, the Chicago River, and major thoroughfares such as Michigan Avenue. We need the kind of vision that, during the same period, endowed Manhattan with Grand Central Station, with its superb sculptural embellishment on the exterior and breathtaking celestial vault within, and the elegance of a Park Avenue rebuilt on top of the newly subterranean tracks.

Anti-classicism has ruled for sixty or seventy years, and its failure to enhance the quality of our built environment has been catastrophic. Classical visionaries, meanwhile, may not be chic, but they are by no means extinct. An impressive World Trade Center reconstruction scheme appeared in the Fall 2001 issue of *City Journal*. The work of Franck Lohsen McCrery Architects and the Scottish sculptor Alexander Stoddart, the scheme embraces planning as well as architectural and memorial design, and is imbued with the sense of urban drama that animated Burnham's work. It restores civic art to its rightful place in American urbanism and recognizes the classical tradition as the most promising source of a truly meaningful artistic response to September 11. More, it offers the kind of vision that, sooner or later, will once again assert itself in our great cities, despite the best efforts of a deeply entrenched postmodern regime propped up by the

establishment press, the academy, fashionable artists and architects, curatorial staffs at leading museums, and official design review boards.

The Franck Lohsen McCrery scheme reestablishes the old grid in the trade-center precinct. It reconnects Battery Park City by configuring West Street as a boulevard with a landscaped median and by extending the now-truncated Little West Street northward. The West Side Highway is sunk underground. The plan also includes a major commuter rail and subway station.

These sound urban planning ideas, which emphasize the complexity of circulation patterns and the amenity of streets with orderly building frontages—as opposed to the haphazard configuration of the old trade center—are enriched by a grand architectural scheme focused on a Liberty Square extending over two blocks. (The plaza would interrupt Dey Street.) Lying on a north-south axis, the square would be surrounded by skyscrapers, the tallest of which would be situated at the north end. At the opposite end a Liberty Station for trains and subways would stand about as tall as Grand Central, but with a much smaller footprint. A fraction of the height of the lofty skyscraper facing it, the domed railway station would create a dramatic contrast in scale and allow more sunlight into the square.

The tall buildings surrounding the square would not be the usual functionalist steel-and-glass slabs (with or without the tiresome neo-Deco trappings that have appeared in recent years), let alone abstract sculptural curiosities, but pleasingly massed classical buildings whose decoration would allow them to impart a sense of human scale.

At the square's north end would stand two great statues of female figures, their contours inspired by Bartholdi's Statue of Liberty, standing on a stepped base and a pair of high pedestals. One would represent History, pointing to a tablet, while the other would represent Memory, holding a torch aloft. A draped catafalque would be situated between them as a symbol of the dead. At the other end of the square, in front of the train station, would stand statues of a policeman and a fireman. In between would lie a long patch of turf, approached by three downward steps. On each side, moreover, the plaza would be flanked by arches doubling as pedestrian bridges and extending between tall façades fronting on Dey Street.

This page: Elliott Banfield. Opposite Page: Franck Lohsen McCrery.

Banfield and Reed's proposed memorial column.

There are problems with the Franck Lohsen McCrery plaza. First of all, the dispersion of Stoddart's statues prevents the memorial from reading as a unified design. And the plaza's plot of grass is bewildering. Is it a slightly sunken symbolic cemetery? Will people want to bring their lunch to such a space? And will they be willing to go to the trouble of crossing a traffic-clogged street to get there?

An alternative is proposed by the artist Elliott Banfield and the architectural historian Henry Hope Reed. They suggest a great column in a pedestrian plaza, flanked not by automobile traffic but by arcades of monumental scale that could lead into tall buildings set back from the plaza. The column would provide Dey Street with a far more dramatic vista than the glazed vault of the World Financial Center's Wintergarden presently offers. Were this column incorporated into the Franck Lohsen McCrery scheme, it might commemorate the fallen heroes of September 11, complementing Stoddart's two female figures and catafalque. In that case, the angel crowning the column could bear wreaths as tokens of valor, with reliefs on the base portraying firemen and policemen, and eagles perched above. Statues of particular heroes, such as Father Mychal Judge, the venerated Fire Department chaplain who was



Left: Franck Lohsen McCrery. Right: Alexander Stoddart.

Left: The Franck Lohsen McCrery plan for the central plaza. Right: Alexander Stoddart's proposed History and Memory statues.

killed by falling debris while administering the last rites to a fireman, might then be set in front of the train station.

Banfield and Reed's plaza differs in two other respects. It extends over just one block, opens onto West Street and is aligned with Dey Street (whereas Franck Lohsen McCrery's Liberty Square is situated a block to the east and runs perpendicular to Dey). The arcaded façades proposed by Banfield and Reed are splayed to create a forced perspective, or illusion of spatial depth, when viewed from the east. Their plaza would be intimate and grand at the same time, with their memorial column providing a powerful artistic focus.

The great significance of both Franck Lohsen McCrery's design and the Banfield-Reed proposal is that they are grounded in the idea of cultural continuity—the persistence of time-tested forms and conventions—as a source of enduring meaning and aesthetic resonance in architecture and fine art, and in the idea that the horizons of human life reach beyond death, loss, and grief. These ideas, and all they assume about the supreme legitimacy of a humanist art that rejects the assertion of personal creativity as an end in itself, are positively anathema to the postmodern regime.

Perhaps that's why we find a ballyhooed authority on memorial design, Edward Linenthal of the University of Wisconsin at Oshkosh, telling the *Daily News*, "The process of deciding what to do—to rebuild, to memorialize, to make a park, or put up lights—and deciding what it means in the culture, means people need to agonize. In the end, the process of conversation is as important, if not more important, than the result." The postmodern memorial, in other words, just doesn't matter that much.

The "lights" Linenthal mentions, by the way, are the twin "towers of light" proposed as a temporary art installation at the World Trade Center site. The *New York Times* Sunday magazine put a variant of this scheme on its cover, and pronounced it "haunting." The proposal, surely more noteworthy as a technological concept than an artistic one, is under review at City Hall. Impermanence, at least, is an explicit part of the package in this case. But the main point here is that "process"—rather than, say, artistic norms—is what really matters to Linenthal and the arts establishment. "The visioning process is just getting underway," an official of the influential Municipal Arts Society says of the memorial. In a draft report posted on the Internet shortly after New Year's Day, an ad-hoc confederation of 350 architects, engineers, planners, graphic designers, and academics called "New York New Visions" advocates "an expanded concept of the memorial as both commemoration and continuing process."

New York New Visions, which came together after the terrorist attack to provide ideas for reconstruction, includes—you guessed it—a "Memorial Process Team" with over fifty members who are preparing a briefing book on precedents for New York's Governor Pataki, Whitehead's redevelopment corporation, groups of the bereaved, and other concerned parties. The memorial team's co-coordinator Ray Gastil (who graciously shared draft portions of the briefing book with me) is, I believe, fully sincere when he says the book is intended to be objective, wide-ranging, and non-prescriptive. But the fact remains that the team's interest lies mainly in memorials erected only quite recently—and such memorials tend to be deeply flawed.

We're talking about projects like the Kobe Port Earthquake Memorial Park, whose centerpiece is a generous portion of a pier ravaged by the 1995 earthquake that took 6,400 lives in the Japanese city and its surrounding region. Then there's the Irish Hunger

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Memorial, now under construction in Battery Park City. This memorial will consist of a quarter-acre grassy landscape including the ruin of an old two-room stone house imported from County Mayo, overgrown potato furrows, and stones donated by all thirty-two counties of Ireland—tilted on an irregularly shaped platform. Under the platform's cantilevered upper end, the base will carry numerous quotations, some documentary and others poetic, inscribed in bands of glass that alternate with bands of stone.

In one of the draft articles from the memorial team's briefing book, the memorial landscape of the Gettysburg battlefield is treated as a matter of ideological controversy, without the slightest suggestion of the transcendent aesthetic power of this essentially classical landscape. The AIDS Memorial Quilt, for its part, warrants consideration because "it is as much a process as it is an artifact." All these memorials—like Oklahoma City's stark portals, pool, and empty chairs—reflect an ephemeral sensibility utterly at odds with design's higher possibilities. More than likely, a memorial that takes its cues from these precedents, rather than the classical tradition, will lose much of its resonance once those affected by the cycles of grief, loss, and healing are gone. What's more, the documentary ethos and minimalist aesthetics will likewise drift into oblivion.

New York New Visions unwittingly lends support to such an outcome when it cites as a compelling precedent the 350-member task force that produced the mission statement for the Oklahoma City National Memorial. Regarding input for the World Trade Center site, the draft report suggests that, apart from those who lost their loved ones, "there should be wide representation by many groups at all income levels, including private and public property holders, small business owners, and downtown civic and business leaders; neighborhood residents, workers, artists, cultural producers, religious leaders, schoolchildren, representatives of small arts groups and landmarks; city, state, and federal agency representatives; and concerned citizens from the community, city, five boroughs, state, other states, and the world."

This is a formula for confusion, not vision. And for all the talk of "inclusiveness," it is entirely possible that traditional proposals like Franck Lohsen McCrery's and Banfield-Reed's will be excluded from serious consideration. This can only be prevented by political means. Influential New Yorkers who understand the aesthetic and symbolic power of true civic art will have to prevail upon Whitehead and his colleagues to brave the ire of New York's "cultural producers" and make sure that classical architects and artists are heard in the councils of debate that will shape the future of the World Trade Center site.

To be sure, the firemen and policemen of New York, along with the survivors of the heroes who gave their lives on September 11, will keep a close eye on the "process." It seems reasonable to assume that where design is concerned, these are the people most likely to understand that the memorial and its architectural setting should incarnate the heroic dimension of the human spirit, drawing on the same emotional wellsprings that inspired so much valor on that terrible day.

After James McCrery of Franck Lohsen McCrery and Alexander Stoddart presented their scheme in a November press conference, they received a tour of Ground Zero and visited the famous "war room," the operations center at 1 Police Plaza. They encountered about forty policemen, as well as FBI, Coast Guard, and Secret Service officers, and distributed copies of their proposal to those present. "They loved it, they just loved it," says McCrery. "It's legible. A police officer can pick it up and tell us, 'Hey, this is great,' and point out what's going on with the statues and the buildings. These guys want soaring, in-your-face buildings. American skyscrapers."

They want something *grand*, in other words. ♦

P&A

From Jefferson to Jeffords

The decline of the American Politician.

BY MATT LABASH

Any serious student of the Bible has, at one point or another, had to grapple with the Moses Paradox. The Moses Paradox is the proposition that Moses was the humblest man in all the earth, information that would go down easier had it not come to us by way of Numbers, a book written by Moses.

A similar puzzlement sets in when reading *My Declaration of Independence*, the self-aggrandizing manifesto from Vermont's newly Independent senator, Jim Jeffords. Like its author, it manages to be preachy, charmless, and slight. Even with the frontispiece, double-spacing, pocket format, and full reprint of the May 2001 speech in which Jeffords untethered himself from the Republican party, it weighs in at a skeletal 136 pages (though it feels much longer).

Jeffords's publisher, Simon & Schuster, threatens a full-length autobiography next year. But why bother? In *My Declaration of Independence*, Jeffords has already accomplished his mission:

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showcasing his wholesome goodness on every page, casting himself in a morality pageant that plays like every Jimmy Stewart movie and Quaker Oats commercial rolled into one. "A contemporary *Profiles in Courage*," boasts his jacket copy. "A soft-spoken, modest, true American hero," announces the book's press release. "There seems to be a hunger in our country for heroes, especially of the political variety," writes Jeffords of himself. It's worth noting that Jeffords's publication date was bumped because of the World Trade Center attacks. Now that Americans have a pretty fair snapshot of what actual heroes look like, his claims read more like blasphemy than hyperbole.

Then there's the title. Jeffords has no compunction about pinching the name of our founding document for his modest little memoir. By doing so, he might single-handedly settle one of the perennial debates of historians: Which has grown smaller, the times or the men who inhabit them?

Our forefathers, when crafting the prequel to Jeffords's book, were combating "death, desolation and tyranny . . . cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous age." Jeffords was fighting to downsize the Bush tax cut and to boost special-education funding—that is, before he got all upset when Republicans retaliated by threatening to end Vermont's price-supported dairy cartel and the White House didn't invite him to a teacher-of-the-year reception. Thomas Jefferson fought for life and liberty. Jim Jeffords fought to drink punch in the Rose Garden and to sell overpriced milk.

But if there is a yawning chasm between Jeffords's reality and reality's reality, most seem not to have noticed. The truest thing Jeffords writes is that before he decided to end Republican rule of the Senate by becoming an Independent and caucusing with the Democrats, which effectively made him one, he "ranked about ninety-ninth on the U.S. Senate celebrity scale." A Nexis search of Jeffords's name shows that he has garnered almost as many mentions since last May's melodrama as he had in his prior twenty-five-year career (this, despite being a member of the Singing Senators).

From the moment he first whinnied over George W. Bush's $1.6 trillion tax cut—one that couldn't have come as a surprise to Jeffords, since Bush campaigned on it—the media lavished praise on Jeezum Jim (Jeffords's nickname, and one Vermonters insist is a farmer's swear word). He was extolled by the *New York Times* and *Newsweek*'s Jonathan Alter. The man who had never been on a Sunday talk show was suddenly the subject of fawning profiles in *People* magazine. For a while, "aw-shucks" and "plainspoken" became the two most overworked modifiers in the English language.

Simon & Schuster

My Declaration of Independence
by James M. Jeffords
Simon & Schuster, 136 pp., $14.95

Not that Jeffords was influenced by the media attention that had eluded him his entire career. "Those who don't know me may have thought I . . . enjoyed the limelight. Nothing could be further from the truth," he says in *My Declaration of Independence*. Nor was he influenced by Nevada Democrat Harry Reid, who, among others, offered him the chairmanship of the Environment and Public Works committee if Jeffords defected (at the same time Jeffords's chairmanship of the Health, Education, Labor, Pensions Committee was set to lapse).

No, for Jeezum, the entire episode was a great big Texas death match with his conscience. It brooked no honest political dissent between men of good conscience, since Jeffords, in his telling, is the only person who had one. It was a conscience newly pricked by the awareness that the Republicans surrounding it were all voting as if they were, well, Republicans. It was the conscience of a moderate who had slept soundly through what most would consider more conservative chapters in our history, the Reagan and Gingrich revolutions. And it was a conscience that had permitted its owner to write in *Roll Call*, just three months before he bolted, "In my quarter century in Washington, I have never seen a president invest as much personal interest and political capital in education"—the very issue that Jeffords now claims he fled over, since Bush wouldn't give Jeffords a $180 billion increase for special education before it was reformed.

The bulk of *My Declaration of Independence* is a near pornographic recounting of the lead-up to Jeffords's defection. There are the come-to-Jesus meetings with the Republican leadership in which he rebuffed every compromise they offered; and entreaties to stay Republican from his staff and his wife, herself so liberal she supported a Jesse Jackson presidency. Jeffords records every rhetorical hiccup, most of which would put a discriminating audience straight to sleep with wind-ups such as: "As I put it in the text of a speech to the Burlington Rotary Club in October 1999 . . ."

But above all else, Jeffords's intent is making sure you feel his sacrifice. He fancies himself a damn-the-torpedoes kind of guy, writing, "In the end, I had to be true to what I thought was right, and leave the consequences to sort themselves out." Those consequences have sorted themselves out just fine for Jeffords. Sure, there were the petty snubs from his old cronies in the Singing Senators. Trent Lott, for exam-

ple, claimed Jeffords was such a poor singer that they frequently turned off his mike (having to sing "Elvira" with Lott would be enough to make any man reconsider his affiliations).

And of late, several media organs, from the *New Republic* to the *Boston Globe*, have rudely noticed that the two biggest issues that purportedly set Jeffords and his conscience a'walking—Republican failure to fully fund the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, and failure to renew the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact—have flamed out, with hardly a moo from Jeffords's new friends across the aisle (when Jeffords voted against Bush's education reform bill, only six Democrats joined him).

Other than that, however, it's been a gentle ride. As Larry King told the formerly media-shy Jeffords, "I salute you, Jim." Though Jeffords had to admit to Katie Couric that "in a way" his education stand was for naught, he bounced back by the time he was on *60 Minutes*, telling Mike Wallace, "I've never felt better about myself."

And why shouldn't he? After all, as he told Katie, "I'm chair of an important committee." The Associated Press calls his book a "vitally important document." Sixty-five percent of the Green Mountaineers and civil unionists back home support his decision, so much so that they named a beer after him. He is represented by the chairman of the William Morris Agency. He has a two-book deal with Simon & Schuster. And Sharon Stone said she would love to shake his hand. (After they met, Jeffords wouldn't disclose to the *Washington Post* whether Stone was blubbering, though he did allow, "I was moved to hear her praise for me.")

Of all this adulation, Jeffords writes, "This will soon pass." Not soon enough. But Jeffords does have one thing right. The American people are starved for evidence that politics is "not so corrupt as they believe," that there is such a thing as a politician who "will act on principle," even if such a stand puts him in peril. If Senator Jeffords meets someone who fits that description, he ought to write a book about him. ♦

The Closing of the Muslim Mind

Bernard Lewis on how Islam got where it is.

BY CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL

Bernard Lewis has called his latest book *What Went Wrong?* And the implied askers of that question are not—as one could be forgiven for assuming after September 11—Westerners desperately curious about what has put elements of the Muslim world at murderous odds with Europe and America. Lewis's askers are Muslims themselves, desperately curious to know why, after the medieval centuries in which Europe was "a pupil and in a sense a dependent of the Islamic world," the roles were reversed. This is not an academic question. Since roughly the time of the Reformation, Islam has never recovered from the European challenge. Today, this region, so steeped in civilizational self-regard, finds itself, in relative terms, "poor, weak, and ignorant."

What Went Wrong?
Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response
by Bernard Lewis
Oxford University Press, 180 pp., $23

A professor at Princeton University, Lewis has over six decades established the greatest and most varied career in Middle Eastern scholarship of our day, and he has long been fascinated by the subject of how a fading Islamic empire confronted a Europe on the rise. His latest book will not replace his masterwork on the subject, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (1982), but *What Went Wrong?* provides an accessible and gorgeously written introduction for those on whom it has recently dawned that Islam's troubled relations with modernity now threaten a lot more than the Islamic world.

Christopher Caldwell is a senior editor at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

Muslims always viewed Christianity as a rival ideology, but not one to be taken too seriously. "The remoter lands of Europe," Lewis writes, "were seen in much the same light as the remoter lands of Africa—as an outer darkness of barbarism and unbelief from which there was nothing to learn and little even to be imported, except slaves and raw materials." And when Europe began to turn the tables, Muslims were slow to notice. The Christian reconquest of Spain, finalized in 1492, was seen by Muslims as merely a matter on the periphery of their empire—as was the less obvious but no less crucial encirclement of Islam by trading vessels and navies from Portugal and then Holland, which were coming to dominate the Indian Ocean and even the Red Sea. The rout of Islam's armada at Lepanto in 1571 was a minor setback in military terms.

And Muslims could console themselves that they were winning victories in the center, most spectacularly at Constantinople in 1453. And yet something was missing, even at the height of Islamic conquest. As Kemal Ataturk noted in 1925, "That same might and power which, in defiance of a whole world, made Istanbul forever the property of the Turkish people was too weak to overcome the ill-omened resistance of the men of law and to receive in Turkey the printing press, which had been invented at about the same time." As for the Europeans' demonstrably superior weapons, Muslims thought they could simply imitate them. "For a long time," Lewis remarks, "they did

not ask why it was always the infidels who introduced the new devices."

This fading world was admirable in many ways. Lewis has always been impressed by Islam's relative tolerance. He illustrates it by invoking the oft-cited parallel between medieval Christendom's bipolar struggle against Islam and the Cold War. Since the more tolerant of the two poles in such a struggle is likely to be the one that is attracting the political refugees, Lewis considers it worth noting that "in the twentieth century this movement was, overwhelmingly, from East to West; in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and even the seventeenth centuries, it was primarily from West to East." He returns to this theme again and again, adding that "There is nothing in Islamic history to compare with the emancipation, acceptance, and integration of other-believers and non-believers in the West; but equally, there is nothing in Islamic history to compare with the Spanish expulsion of Jews and Muslims, the Inquisition, the *Auto da fé*'s, the wars of religion, not to speak of more recent crimes of commission and acquiescence."

What's more, until recent times, the egalitarianism that Muslims like to brag about was no myth. "It is probably true," Lewis writes, "that even at the beginning of the nineteenth century a poor man of humble origin had a better chance of attaining to wealth, power, and dignity in the Islamic lands than in any of the states of Christian Europe, including post-Revolutionary France."

It was, in a way, Islam's misfortune that it constituted such a viable system. It was not used to failure. Christianity spent its first few centuries as a persecuted faith. Islam spent its first few centuries as custodian of one of the greatest conquering military movements in history. To quote an old proverb, the Muslim world is like a standing tent: "The tent is Islam, the pole is the ruler, the ropes and pegs are the people. None can thrive without the other." It's not just that Islam didn't need foreign cultures; it's that it couldn't tolerate their introduction without endangering the whole civilization.

While Lewis never puts it so bluntly, it's clear that a certain cultural chauvinism—more complete in Islam than in any other civilization—not only contributed to the region's loss of preeminence, but also made the reality of it so hard to face. European universities had chairs of Arabic by the sixteenth century, but Muslims considered it demeaning to learn Western languages, and even in the nineteenth century, "literally nothing of European literature was available in Arabic, Persian, or Turkish: not Shakespeare, not Dante, nor any other European writer apart . . . from some historical works—and even



Bernard Lewis

Princeton University

those were few and limited." Books in Persian were printed in Leiden in 1639, but Iran didn't get its first printing press until the nineteenth century.

Something similar happened with science. Muslims not only brought from India the numerals we call "Arabic," but invented experimentation, and the scientific method. They have contributed practical inventions as well, even in recent centuries: the incubator in Egypt, the smallpox vaccination in Turkey. But their contribution to science "compares poorly with that of other non-Western regions." Their problem was that they tended to use and build from European science only where it served a clear practical purpose: the seventeenth-century treatment of syphilis, for instance.

This piecemeal approach has obtained in other fields as well. "They looked for the secret of Western success," Lewis writes, "in those features of the West that were most distinctive, most different from anything in their own experience—and not tainted with Christianity." It was in politics that this selective approach had its worst outcome. The French Revolution was a major influence, but also, eventually, nationalism, socialism, and National Socialism, whose baleful influence Lewis still sees at work in the Baathist governments of Iraq and Syria. The move to political modernization in Islam did not enhance freedom and autonomy, but strengthened states through modern approaches to enforcement, surveillance, propaganda, and the consequent depredations against civil society.

The results are today readily apparent. Apart from fossil fuels, the exports from the Arab world amount to less than those from Finland. And Lewis considers that oil is "doomed, sooner or later, to be exhausted or superseded—probably superseded, as the international community grows weary of a fuel that pollutes the land, the sea, and the air wherever it is used or transported, and puts the world economy at the mercy of a clique of capricious autocrats."

Whether the Islamic world can get out of this mess depends on how it decides to engage the problem. Contemporary anti-Americanism is a successor ideology to attempts to blame the decline of Islam on the Mongol hordes who took it over in the thirteenth century, then on the Turks who ruled it for most of the modern age, then on the European colonial powers who ruled it for only a few decades and have been gone for half a century now. Unfortunately, Lewis thinks, the useful question, "What did we do wrong?" has been replaced by the self-destructive question, "Who did this to us?" Lewis is enough of a believer in the civilization Islam built to hold out hope. As soon as the Muslim world is able to ask the former question, he thinks, it stands a good chance of being able to make the Middle East, "in modern times as it was in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, a major center of civilization." But not until then. ♦

Weather

Today: *Rain early, some sun later. High 50. Low 32.*
Saturday: *Partly sunny. High 46. Low 34.*

Details, Page **B10**

The Wa

Thursday, January 17,

Apocalypse for Republicans! Enron Scandal Spells Doom

By MIKE ALLEN
Washington Post Staff Writer

California congressman Henry Waxman announced today that he has decided not to let the absence of any Bush administration wrongdoing stop him from going into a foaming at the mouth rage over the Enron scandal. "This scandal is too important and too much fun to call off simply because the Bush administration behaved correctly," he added.

At Waxman's signal the entire Washington scandal network, which lies dormant while waiting for such moments, was placed on full Defcon 5 status. Congressional investigations were announced. David Boies and Robert Bennett were called into action. *New York Times* reporter Jeff Gerth was unleashed. Talk show hosts Greta, Chris, Wolf and The Factor were ordered to double their caffeine intake. Political reporters, cast into the shadows by the war, were put in a state of full arousal—exuding enough musk-odored body fumes to kill germs within a 25-mile radius. "What did he know and when did he know it?" one asked. "This is bigger than Whitewater!" another declared. "Bigger than Watergate . . . the French Revolution . . . Noah's flood!"

The scandal centers around a series of phone calls that Enron CEO Ken Lay placed to cabinet secretaries Paul O'Neill and Don Evans, during which he may have implied that he could use a little help in forestalling bankruptcy. O'Neill and Evans, astonishingly, refused to give special treatment to a donor. This fueled media suspicions and led key congressional Democrats to call for a special counsel. Since everyone knows that Republicans are scumbags, any evidence to the contrary is subterfuge. "They wouldn't look this innocent unless they were really guilty," Bob Herbert devastatingly noted.

"I am outraged that Republicans exist!" Waxman added.

In the Senate, Tom Daschle announced the creation of 437 committees that will investigate the Enron situation. "We will not be going off on a witch hunt," Daschle calmly assured reporters, "We will be going off on a super-de-dooper-mega-mondo witch roast extraordinaire! Attack! Attack! Attack!!!"

President Bush was unavailable for comment.

Special Education Charters

Herbert J. Walberg is a distinguished visiting fellow, Hoover Institution; member Hoover's Koret Task Force on K–12 Education; and University Scholar, University of Illinois at Chicago.

Special programs for disabled students partly account for the poor achievement and the high and rising costs of American schools. Of course, programs for blind, deaf, and other children with scientifically evidenced disabilities are clearly justified. But most of the roughly 6.1 million U.S. children in special programs are in such psychological categories as "learning disabled" and "mildly mentally retarded." In the last twenty-five years, they have accounted for the approximately 65 percent increase in special education enrollments and huge increases in costs without better learning.

Money, conflicts of interests, and disingenuous accountability often motivate the growth of such programs. The more children whom educators classify as psychologically disabled, the more money comes into their states, districts, and schools. School, district, state, and federal administrative jobs multiply accordingly, and the ensuing expanding bureaucracy distracts educators from learning; Michigan, for example, has some six thousand detailed program regulations. When children are psychologically classified, they can be neglected since they are excused from accountability examinations, thus making their schools appear to be doing better than they actually are. Kentucky, Louisiana, and South Carolina made leaps in reading scores alongside big increases in excused special students.

In 1982, the National Academy of Sciences contended that psychological classifications are unreliable and that special programs often do little good and sometimes do harm. Subsequent research has shown that the **present classification systems misleadingly suggest that as many as 80 percent of all school students require special programs, which cost about 2.3 times more than regular programs.**

Yet studies show that mildly disabled students do no better in regular classrooms because what they need is better—not special or differentiated—teaching. Moreover, spurious diagnoses stigmatize children, give them a debilitating excuse not to learn, and lead to their segregation from other children.

Special programs also lead to discrimination and unfairness. Special educators more often litigiously classify big-city children as mildly retarded and expect less of them. But middle-class students are less demeaningly labeled (for example, "special learning disabled"). In affluent Greenwich, Connecticut, educators classify about one in three high school students as disabled. Such students may be get tutors, note takers, laptop computers, and extra time on tests, including those for college admission.

The rapidly growing numbers of charter schools suggest a solution: Charter schools are privately governed and largely deregulated, but they receive public funds. They must admit all applicants (or use lotteries when oversubscribed). To begin, they must attract students; to continue, they must retain them and report achievement gains.

Analogous special education charters would work in a similar way. Any charter school or regular school could apply for a waiver of special federal and state regulations. Waivered schools would continue to receive extra money for special children but be held responsible for their retention and learning. They could, for example, declassify special children, remove them from segregated programs, and provide all children with more learning time and effective teaching, which are proven policies for promoting achievement for regular and special students. The resulting deregulation, competition for special student applicants, and increased accountability to parents, citizens, and legislators would help even more.

— Herbert J. Walberg



PETA

"It would be great if all the fast-food outlets, slaughter-houses, these laboratories and the banks who fund them exploded tomorrow."

— Bruce Friedrich, PETA Spokesperson July 3, 2001

PETA: Not as warm and cuddly as you thought.

ConsumerFreedom.com

Find out more about the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals and other extremists.