COURTING TROUBLE
CLAUDIA WINKLER

the weekly Standard

FEBRUARY 14, 2000

$3.95

Whoa!

Hold on there, Dubyah.



WILLIAM KRISTOL & DAVID BROOKS
FRED BARNES • TUCKER CARLSON

Contents

February 14, 2000 • Volume 5, Number 21

Articles

Cover illustration by Alan Dingman

Features

Books & Arts

the weekly Standard

THE WEEKLY STANDARD (ISSN 1083-3013) is published weekly (except the second week in April, the second week in July, the last week in August, and the first week in January) by News America Incorporated, 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036. Periodicals postage paid at New York, NY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. For subscription customer service in the United States, call 1-800-274-7293. For new subscription orders, please call 1-800-283-2014. Subscribers: Please send new subscription orders to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96153, Washington, DC 20090-6153; changes of address to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. Please include your latest magazine mailing label. Allow 3 to 5 weeks for arrival of first copy and address changes. Yearly subscriptions, $78.00. Canadian/foreign orders require additional postage and must be paid in full prior to commencement of service. Canadian/foreign subscribers may call 1-303-776-3605 for subscription inquiries. Visa/MasterCard payment accepted. Cover price, $3.95. Back issues, $3.95 (includes postage and handling). Send manuscripts and letters to the editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Suite 505, Washington, DC 20036-4617. Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. THE WEEKLY STANDARD Advertising Sales Office in Washington, DC, is 1-202-293-4900. Advertising Production: Call Ian Slatter 1-202-496-3354.

BPA INTERNATIONAL

www.weeklystandard.com

5,000 Sociologists, Sittin' Around Talkin'

Once upon a time, there was a "scholarly journal" called—would THE SCRAPBOOK make this up?—*The Insurgent Sociologist*. If you were an *engagé* assistant professor convinced that mainstream sociology wasn't woolheadedly "relevant" enough, this is what you read. Then, in 1988, the whole intra-disciplinary revolution thing went belly up and *The Insurgent Sociologist* got a brand-new, more soothing name: *Critical Sociology*. Had sociology's 1960s finally ended?

Nope. There couldn't be an *Insurgent Sociologist* anymore simply because there were too few "reactionary" sociologists left to insurge against. And now, 12 years later, there appear to be even fewer of them.

Invitations have just gone out to the 95th annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, sociology's Elks Club. This August in Washington, announces association president Joe R. Feagin, more than 5,000 sociologists will gather to discuss the "vital issues that animate our society and sociology as a field." Those issues would be "Oppression, Domination & Liberation: Challenges for the 21st Century." With "special plenary sessions" on "Sexism and Feminism" and "Racism and Anti-Racism Struggles."

Washington is a perfect place for such discussions, Feagin observes, since "racial and class inequality [is] etched in the physical face of the city" and "full citizenship and democratic representation are still denied to its residents." In fact, the convention's feature event will be a "Town Meeting on the status of Washington, DC within the U.S. political system," featuring such of "the nation's leaders" as Eleanor Holmes Norton, Joyce Ladner, and Constance King.

Norton is Washington's nonvoting delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives. THE SCRAPBOOK can't remember who Ladner and King are. But that doesn't matter. Nor does it matter that Washington will achieve statehood—ASA's apparent goal, here—when hell freezes over. What matters, as Joe R. Feagin points out, is how "sociology begins a new and challenging century of social inquiry." Quantitative ethnographers of the world, unite! ♦

The FCC Retreats on Religious Censorship

Good news. The Federal Communications Commission has reversed itself and withdrawn a Dec. 29 censorship edict directed against religious broadcasters.

In the Jan. 24 WEEKLY STANDARD, Justin Torres reported on an "additional guidance" buried in FCC Order 99-393. That guidance made educational broadcast licenses contingent on the willingness of stations to purge from most of their programming any "religious exhortation, proselytizing, or statements of personally-held religious views or beliefs." Ninety-five religious broadcasters around the country were affected; the guidance would have gutted their programming schedules—and threatened their continued existence.

On Jan. 28, in response to an unexpected outpouring of protest, the FCC's governing commissioners, by a four-to-one vote, decided to "vacate our additional guidance" in this area. "It has become clear," the majority of commissioners wrote, "that our actions have created less certainty rather than more, contrary to our intent." Weasel words, but welcome just the same. Dissenting, pro-censorship commissioner Gloria Tristani was rather more candid in defeat: "This is a sad and shameful day for the FCC. . . . [T]his supposedly independent agency"—independent of the First Amendment?—"has capitulated to an organized campaign of distortion and demagoguery."

On behalf of our contributor Justin Torres, THE SCRAPBOOK thanks Ms. Tristani for the acknowledgment. ♦

Press Release of the Week

Over THE SCRAPBOOK's fax machine last Tuesday came the latest press release from the Republican National Committee. No, check that—it was a press release the RNC hoped THE SCRAPBOOK would soon receive from any number of interchangeable "Republican activists" around the country. It was a "sample press release," you see, designed to be filled out by all those sheep in the GOP flock who can't be expected to come up with such stuff on their own. And it started like this:

> (YOUR NAME HERE) today joined Republican activists nationwide marking the 107th straight month of economic growth, the longest economic expansion in American history, which (YOUR NAME HERE) noted "began under a Republican President, George Bush, and continued under the low-tax, balanced budget, free-trade policies of the Republican Congress."

If the RNC gets its way, YOUR NAME HERE will soon prove himself a very clever and witty fellow, indeed. For YOUR NAME HERE's forthcoming press release also contains a whole

bunch of facts YOUR NAME HERE will have "noted" and "recalled"; news stories and documents he will have "cited"; eloquent words he will have "said"; and even a joke he will have dreamed up about Hillary Clinton and the Chicago Cubs.

The news organizations that receive YOUR NAME HERE's very, very personal statement on the economy will no doubt be deeply impressed. Either that, or those news organizations, having already received last Tuesday's tip from the RNC that YOUR NAME HERE can't so much as tie his shoes without a script from Washington, will write off YOUR NAME HERE as an idiot.

Maybe that's the plan: "the new honesty," or something. The Scrapbook can't decide. ♦

Your PTA Dues at Work

The public-schools lobby loves to prattle on about how students must learn to "respect differences" in our multicultural society. But when it comes to really important things—like money—tolerance, it seems, is the first thing to fly right out the window.

For example. Two parent-teacher associations in Fairfax County, Virginia, recently sent letters home with students warning parents about a state legislative effort to establish tax credits for private school tuition. The letters encouraged parents to attend an anti-tax-credit rally being held in Richmond. People for the American Way, whose local contact information was listed on these fliers, offered rides to the rally—a blatant violation of Virginia lobbying regulations, according to the state's attorney general.

And when the scam was reported in the local papers? The president of one of the two PTAs involved distanced her group from the effort, claiming it represented the views of just a single member, not the whole organization. But it's not clear which is worse: the PTA turning students into political pawns, or one member abusing her access to students and parents to promote a personal agenda.

What is clear, in either case, is that these PTA types were clueless about why they were on the defensive in the first place. Because when a few members of the Fairfax County school board publicly objected to their letters—board member Mychele Brickner correctly observed that students should never be turned into political "carrier pigeons"—the president of the county's umbrella Council of PTAs reacted with bewildering hostility. "Our school board members are supposed to be out there working for public education," Rosemary Lynch told the *Washington Post*. "I would hope that Mrs. Brickner's actions do not mean she is in favor of vouchers or tax credits; if she is, she should not be on the Fairfax School Board."

That's the spirit. Isn't tolerance beautiful? ♦

Casual

Endless Somerville

Senior year in college, I lived on a run-down street in Somerville, Massachusetts. One Sunday night, my roommate called me to the front window and said, *Look!* There was some kind of riot going on in front of Studley's bar. We drank there a lot, since it was really cheap: 75¢ for a bottle of beer the size of a fire extinguisher. From the look and smell of it, Studley's economized on sanitation and passed the savings along to the customer.

But on Sunday nights, they outdid themselves, running some kind of loss-leading deal that drew every unemployed badass within a ten-block radius. I forget what the signs outside said. Something like *Spell Your Name and Drink Free All Night*. Or *Buy a Double Shot and We'll Pay You to Drink Till Saint Patrick's Day*. Wretched, wretched guitar music filled the street until two in the morning, going *Dunna nunna nunt! / Dunna nunna nunt!*—all of it probably collected today on some K-TEL record called Proletarian Dance Tunes of the Reagan Era. We stayed away.

Sunday was Drink-Till-You-Get-In-a-Fight Night under the best of circumstances, but what was going on downstairs that night looked grave. There were dozens of men in the middle of the street, divided into two milling circles. Two guys were raging at each other with their whole arsenal of invective (an arsenal that consisted of two words, one of which was "you"). The assembled mob was apparently trying to restrain them—but only *apparently*, because once we opened the window, we could tell that the crowd was as eager to watch a fight as the two drunks were to have one. They were practicing the eternal art of preaching peace and stoking war. "Cooler heads" were "calming tensions" by saying things like, on the one side: *C'mon, Kevin, Mark thought you wouldn't mind if he stole your girlfriend, 'cause he assumed you were gay!* And on the other: *Hey, Mark, if Kevin was such a bad guy, why would your sister be sleeping with him? Oops!*

Just as the thing was about to blow, another man emerged slowly from the line of women assembled on the sidewalk. He had one leg and was hopping along on a crutch. Clearly he'd been deputized by the women to talk sense into Kevin. The sight of him seemed to calm the pugilist down immediately. The two of them walked together to the other side of the street, where the one-legged guy sat on the hood of a car and began to counsel Kevin in a calm voice. Kevin kept nodding. But his one-legged interlocutor obviously made a misjudgment, because Kevin suddenly began shouting again, and before anyone knew what happened, he caught the poor guy with an uppercut that knocked him across the hood and onto the windshield. At that point the police came.

Darren Gygi

"Did you see that?" I said to my roommate.

He smiled, and with the tenderness that would be a hallmark of the investment-banking career he launched six months later, said: "Yeah. I'd hate to be in his shoe."

Before going back to reading (respectively) Keynes and Saintsbury, my roommate and I indulged the first instinct of undergraduates in such circumstances: to discuss the various ways in which one is superior to what one has just witnessed. This we did with about as much self-knowledge as the boobs who had been trying to "stop" the fight outside.

What was striking when we shut the window, we decided, was that after the animal *Dunna-nunna-nunt* music the barbarians had been listening to outside, the cynical, ironic "alternative" rock we'd been playing was strangely comforting. "One of the nice things about Talking Heads, as opposed to the pap those kids listen to," I said, "is that I don't imagine you or I will be weeping over lost youth when we hear 'Houses in Motion' on the radio twenty years from now."

In the last few weeks, I've had a chance to put my proposition to the test. The music of my undergraduate years is becoming a mainstay of Oldies stations—although in deference to my generation's many-splendored capacity for self-delusion, the deejays on the station I tune in to use the "O" word sparingly, preferring to describe theirs as the "jammin'" station.

The station lumps together the "cutting-edge" music I favored with the two-chord rock the thugs from Studley's liked, and with the dance music that led so many of my contemporaries to don "Disco Sucks" T-shirts. It's as if the deejays can't discriminate between them. What's humiliating, though, is that I can't any longer, either. Yes, a Eurythmics song, for instance, calls back pleasant states of mind. But so does *Dunna-nunna-nunt*. At a "seventies party" last week, I found myself wondering whether the old disco tunes playing were, as they used to say, "available in stores." I don't know if I could listen to any of this stuff day after day. But we'll find out once Proletarian Dance Tunes of the Reagan Era arrives in the mail.

Christopher Caldwell

The Martian Chronicles

Charles Krauthammer's essay on the American space program says something that has long needed to be said (Jan. 31). "On To Mars" isn't so much about going to Mars, as it is about the loss of national ambition and national will in a time of unprecedented success and prosperity.

In special-interest, me-first America, vision and dreams amount to contemptible wastes of money. The common question is: What's in it for X, Y, or Z? Certainly not a stirring sentiment able to touch one's soul in the same way as words such as, "We choose to do these things because they are hard." Krauthammer's point that President Kennedy's words motivated a nation with courage instead of greed cannot be emphasized too much or made too often.

As a supporter of the space program, I join Krauthammer in calling for a renewed sense of purpose, vision, and yes, romance on the part of the American people and their government. Perhaps the problem is that Americans these days want nothing more than to be entertained, and that the media, educators, and politicians have capitulated to that desire. Then again, perhaps the problem lies in American leadership, after all. Without leaders to hold up visions for citizens to follow and believe in, there will be no visions.

And perhaps the problem goes back yet one more step. Without a test of will which challenges the entire nation—a depression, a world war, a space race—leaders with vision may have no voice. It may be that America is the victim of its own success. A heavy price was paid for our present peace and prosperity, but who would have guessed we would keep on paying it after peace and prosperity had been achieved?

John Barton
Manchester, CT

Charles Krauthammer's advocacy of manned space exploration strikes me as somewhat naive. He seems to believe that all we're lacking is collective will and desire to visit the moon and Mars. In fact, we're missing something much more important: military or economic incentives. People investing in big-budget science projects want more in return than the limited (though admittedly fascinating) scientific data and warm-fuzzy feelings manned planetary exploration provides.

Krauthammer's two prime examples of big 20th-century American science—the Manhattan Project and the moon landings—were both of extreme military importance. Similarly, the great European explorations of the 16th and 17th centuries were not undertaken out of the goodness of people's hearts; rather, fortunes were to be had from the spice trade, mining, trapping, plundering of natives, slavery, and other unsavory enterprises.

While many find enough motivation in knowledge and discovery for scientific research, society at large, for good or bad, has never been willing to finance research for its own sake at the massive levels needed for planetary exploration. NASA focuses on near-orbit missions because it can perform many more commercially useful experiments there, but more importantly because almost every shuttle launch is heavily financed by commercial satellite payloads.

It's great that people like Krauthammer dream of manned planetary exploration, but unless economic realities change I don't see any of it happening in our lifetimes.

Edward Elliott
San Diego, CA

According to Charles Krauthammer, we should immediately begin spending tens of billions of dollars to send men to other worlds in the solar system—even if they are ugly, boring deserts—simply "because they are there," rather than spending it on such silliness as helping the poor (apparently government assistance can't do anything to help them at all, which presumably means private charity can't either), or carrying out scientific and technical research that actually has some bearing on improving the human condition.

There may, perhaps, be adequate justification for an unmanned solar system exploration program—which would cost only 1 percent or 2 percent of the cost of a manned program—but until such a program discovers something a lot more interesting in the solar system than anything that has been found so far, it is the height of both idiocy and moral irresponsibility to start spending tens of billions on it.

Bruce Moomaw
Cameron Park, CA

Charles Krauthammer's "On To Mars" misses the mark. There is not a new disinterest in space exploration, as expressed in the current unwillingness to expend scarce resources to achieve interplanetary space travel. Rather, there has always been an unwillingness to pursue this objective based on rational cost/benefit analysis. The only reason the trip to the moon was accomplished during the 1960s was the need to develop a reliable ICBM capability, with the space program as political cover to popularize Cold War missile development. Many scientists, including Hawking and Crick, believe that the limits placed on technology by the laws of physics disallow the possibility of significant extraterrestrial space excursions. "Because it's there" is a platitude, not a justification.

Harry S. Hill
Jackson, MI

I agree with Charles Krauthammer that America has been without a bold vision in space far too long. But why Mars? Especially when a serious return to the moon could easily restore America's sense of pioneering purpose. After all, we did get there first, and in every lunar picture I see, there are lots of flags, all of one design.

But Krauthammer missed a very big legal point concerning the bureaucratic gang at the United Nations. As far as Mars or the moon is concerned, America might as well hang it up. Just prior to Neil Armstrong's first steps on the moon, we gave away our single most precious advantage in space exploration: the right to declare national sovereignty. In an utter Cold War sop to the Soviets, the Johnson administration signed and then had the Senate ratify the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Article 2 of this treaty forbids any form of national sovereignty whatsoever—the absolute precursor to property rights. Five years later, after

we'd landed on the moon in 1969, the same U.N. gang that undermined our space efforts in '67 came back with an even more prohibitive encyclical, the Moon Treaty of 1972. Fortunately, this one died a quiet death in the Senate.

If it's a bold vision for America in space Krauthammer truly seeks, we must return to the immutable laws of risk and reward. Article 16 of the original Outer Space Treaty of 1967 allows for unilateral treaty withdrawal, which the next U.S. president should do immediately. Then, via executive order, he could declare American sovereignty on the moon, by right of first manned exploration. From this starting point, firmly grounded in the legal principles of capitalist property ownership, a successful plan can be developed.

In fact, we have a profoundly successful public-private sector model by way of the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862. America gave incentives to private capital, vis-à-vis the powers of national sovereignty, to guarantee reward for risks taken. It opened the most abundant physical and spiritual frontier in human history to date: the American West. Numerous historians maintain we owe much of our character, wealth, and what we became in the 20th century to this one piece of legislation.

Cannot America do the same on the moon and invite the rest of the world to invest? They certainly came to invest in our railroads. With the weight of planet earth's most powerful and transparent legal system guaranteeing property rights (and the rewards for the risk of getting there), our 30-plus-year wait for serious action in space would be quickly over.

WILLIAM T. SELLERS
Overland Park, KS

MY THANKS TO Charles Krauthammer for giving us some compelling reasons to continue and expand our exploration and settling of space. However, for all the practical and philosophical reasons he mentions, he neglected perhaps the most important one.

Given our new scientific understanding of the dangers of earth-crossing asteroids and comets, and remembering the awesome destructive power we witnessed when one of these objects struck Jupiter not so long ago, and realizing that sooner or later one will come our way, all of us should be keenly aware that the age-old saying "don't put all your eggs in one basket" applies to the entire human race.

So let us visit and settle on the moon, Mars, and beyond—for all the reasons Krauthammer gives, and for our very survival.

JIM BURTON
Helena, MT

SHAYS'S REBELLION

SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL'S critique of Robert Novak's article on campaign finance reform unfortunately misses its most important point (Correspondence, Feb. 7). He rails against "gross factual errors" and "glaring inaccuracies," but ignores Novak's most basic premise: Republicans risk more than they gain by opposing efforts to protect our political system from corruption.

Senator McConnell has been a staunch and passionate opponent of reforming campaign finance laws. But he offers no alternative proposal; instead, his passions are unleashed in defense of the broken and corrupt status quo.

If the Republican party decides to address this issue constructively, we can debate the other party with confidence in our ideals. But if the GOP continues to cast itself as the defender of corruption, we provide Democrats with a powerful issue for the upcoming elections.

The Supreme Court ruled last week that limits on campaign donations are constitutional because unlimited gifts invite corruption into the political process. Yet there will still be those who defend the loopholes that allow unlimited, unregulated contributions from corporations and labor unions to the political parties. If our party stands for expediency and not principle, we *will* suffer at the polls come Election Day.

REP. CHRISTOPHER SHAYS
(R-CT)
Washington, DC

CRIMINAL THEORY

ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS laments the fact that the crime issue has left the "national stage" ("Completing the War on Crime," Jan. 24), and urges the Republican presidential candidate to set a "new national goal" of reducing the crime rates down to where they were in the 1950s.

Thomas's tactical "statecraft" is terribly misguided because it undermines the strategic objective of reducing the size and scope of the federal government. The Rehnquist Court is in the process of setting some landmark precedents in the area of federalism. In 1995, the Court blew the dust off the Tenth Amendment by invalidating the federal "Gun-Free School Zones Act." This year, the Court is expected to invalidate the "Violence Against Women Act." Instead of helping to restore the idea that the Constitution created a federal government of limited and enumerated powers, Thomas would have conservative politicians undermine that principle.

Liberals look silly when they can't bring themselves to acknowledge that some social problems might actually fall outside the purview of the federal government. Conservatives should be mocking that stance—not embracing it.

TIMOTHY LYNCH
Director, Project on Criminal Justice
Cato Institute
Washington, DC

the weekly Standard

Gore's Nose Grows

I think that the way a candidate for president communicates with the voters is directly relevant to the way a president communicates with the American people after the election.

—Al Gore, *New York Times*, January 23, 2000

There has never been a time in this campaign when I have said something that I know to be untrue.

—Al Gore, Democratic debate, January 26, 2000

In the 12 years since he brashly jumped into America's presidential politics, Al Gore has shown many different sides of himself: loyal understudy, passionate environmentalist, fierce partisan, image-conscious mid-life male. He's also shown he can be a world-class fibber—though not as skilled a one as his current boss.

During the 1988 presidential campaign, Gore boasted that while he was working for a Nashville newspaper in the 1970s, his reporting "got a bunch of people indicted and sent to jail." He's also said that during his five months of military service in Vietnam he was "shot at" and "fired upon." And just last December, he told the *Washington Post* that as a 21-year-old he'd provided themes for Hubert Humphrey's speech at the 1968 Democratic convention. All of these claims, it turns out, are figments of Gore's imagination and deserve to be memorialized alongside his better-known whoppers about "creating" the Internet and serving as the model for Oliver Barrett in Erich Segal's *Love Story*.

But, to be fair, these were fibs that Gore seems to have uttered in moments of spontaneity. Leaving aside whether or not he ever believed them to be true, once he was called on them he didn't repeat them.

But Gore does repeat his more consequential untruths; he goes to great lengths to rewrite history when confronted with uncomfortable facts. Indeed, Gore makes statements he knows to be false, and then adopts a King Canute attitude: If I repeat these lies over and over and over, they will become true.

Gore's habitual behavior raises a fundamental question, which Bill Bradley (finally) put to the vice president in their January 26 debate: "Why should we believe that you will tell the truth as president if you don't tell the truth as a candidate?" (His integrity challenged, the artful dodger instinctively hid behind campaign tactics: "That's not a negative attack?")

There was a seemingly minor incident last week that provides a nice snapshot of how Gore's mind works. On January 30, Democratic senator Bob Kerrey, a Bradley supporter, appeared at a New Hampshire campaign event for Gore to provide the media horde with some counterspin. All innocent enough, and standard practice these days. But some Gore goons didn't appreciate Kerrey's appearing on their turf, and so they ran over and began splashing mud on him and ridiculing him as a "cripple" (Kerrey lost part of a leg in Vietnam). A number of reporters witnessed the incident and promptly wrote it up, for the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Boston Herald*, and the *New York Post*.

The simple, and natural, response for any politician in this situation would be to publicly apologize to Kerrey and repudiate the actions of his supporters. But not Gore. Instead, he trotted out his spokesman, Chris Lehane, who said even protesters have a right to free expression(!). Then Gore himself called in to an MSNBC talk show to say reports of the incident were "not true. It did not happen." Yes, it did happen. Why not just apologize and put the matter to rest?

Because by Gore's twisted logic, that would concede something to Bill Bradley, and that can't be done. This mindset also seems to be what's driving Gore to misrepresent recklessly Bradley's ambitious health care proposal. Regardless of one's opinion of the proposal, it is contemptible race-baiting for Gore to tar it as insensitive to the needs of blacks and Hispanics. What's more, Gore huffs that Bradley's proposal "wipes out" and "dismantles" Medicaid, while only occasionally mentioning that Bradley wants to provide the poor with refundable tax credits to pay for their health care.

Gore's most egregious distortions have come in his characterizations of his own voting record on abortion. He consistently voted against federal funding of abortions while a House member from 1977 to 1985. As late as 1987, while he was in the Senate, he wrote, "It is my deep personal conviction that abortion is wrong," and characterized abortion as "arguably the taking of a human life." Of course, he never used such language after he began running for president later that year. Indeed, after he'd been selected as Bill Clinton's running mate, he said, "I've had the same position from the very first days in Congress."

Gore has repeated this fiction over and over during the past seven years. Only in the past few weeks, as reporters, and Bill Bradley, began to question him did he modify his

lies. Thus, in the January 26 debate, after the obligatory declaration that he had "always supported a woman's right to choose," he conceded that early in his career he'd "wrestled" with the funding question. Note, however, that he never actually admitted he'd changed his position.

Consider, too, what Gore has said about campaign finance reform. He consistently holds himself out as a Common Cause type who, in his words, has "fought for [campaign reform] for 20 years." The evidence? While a senator, he claims, he cosponsored the McCain/Feingold bill. Just one problem: McCain/Feingold didn't exist when Gore was in the Senate (Russ Feingold hadn't been elected yet). There's also the small matter that Gore didn't find space in his speeches at the 1992 and 1996 Democratic conventions, or his campaign-kickoff speech last June, to so much as mention campaign finance reform.

And then there are all the statements Gore makes that rest in that gray area between true and false. Gore touts his father's civil rights record when speaking before black audiences, but ignores that Senator Gore voted against the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. He says he's "always" supported the death penalty, even though he voted against it 10 times as a senator. And let's not even bother rehashing his deceit in answering questions on how much he knew about the Buddhist temple fund-raiser in 1996 and how much marijuana he smoked in his twenties.

The conventional view of Gore's lies is that they're a function of his having spent the past seven years alongside the master of mendacity. But that's not quite fair to Saturday Night Bill. Indeed, as the *Boston Globe* revealed recently, Gore lore was so prevalent in his first presidential campaign that it elicited warnings from his aides. In September 1987, the campaign's press secretary, Mike Kopp, addressed a memo to Gore warning him that his image "may continue to suffer if you continue to go out on a limb with remarks that may be impossible to back up." Gore didn't seem to get the message, so his communications director, Arlie Schardt, delivered the same warning six months later: "Your main pitfall is exaggeration."

There is, in fact, a fundamental difference between the prevarications of Clinton and Gore. Clinton has lied his way through life to impress people, often women, and to boost his own fragile self-esteem (oh yes, and to protect himself). Gore, by contrast, doesn't need people to tell him what a noble, wonderful guy he is—he already knows that. No, his lies have a single purpose: political power. One can argue over which kind of lie is worse, but one thing is clear: As long as Al Gore has an election to win—and even beyond—the duplicity will continue unabated.

—Matthew Rees, for the Editors

P.O.W.—Right in the Kisser!

Up against a surging war hero, the Bush campaign suffers self-inflicted wounds. BY FRED BARNES

A TALKING POINT dispatched to allies of George W. Bush after his defeat in the New Hampshire primary touches directly on what's ailing the Bush campaign. To counter John McCain's suggestion that he alone is ready to be commander in chief, Bush backers were urged to cite the endorsement of their man by 35 senators. They supposedly know who's best qualified to step into the presidency. Bush himself, among others, actually said this. The advice was a double-barreled mistake. It awarded McCain the mantle of outsiderdom—exactly what he's been claiming anyway and what's been spurring his campaign. And it tied Bush to Washington and the Beltway status quo, which is the connection he most needs to shed.

Not to take anything away from the McCain campaign and its extraordinary surge, but a good part of Bush's problem is self-inflicted. As Texas governor, he *is* an outsider. But he's allowed himself to become, in the words of a disgruntled Bush adviser, "the moneyed, establishment, endorsement-driven candidate."

Up to the first post-New Hampshire weekend, little had changed. Bush continued to stress that, unlike McCain, he's running in all 50 states. This made his campaign sound like a remote corporation instead of a scrappy startup like McCain's. Aides were still dwelling on Bush's fund-raising advantage over McCain. And what was Bush's first act after being trounced in New Hampshire? He accepted the endorsement of former vice president Dan Quayle.

Fred Barnes is executive editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

There is a lesson to be learned from New Hampshire. For Bush, it's simply that the model he's adopted for his presidential run is the wrong one for 2000. Yes, it worked marvelously in 1994 when he ousted Democratic governor Ann Richards. Then, his campaign was tightly controlled. Don Sipple, Bush's media consultant against Richards, says Bush was the most disciplined candidate he's ever worked for. He was always on message, robotically listing the four things he wanted to do as governor. It drove reporters crazy. Bush prided himself on never going harshly negative on Richards.

Now, if Bush is going to recover, he must turn to the Walter Mondale model. No, I'm not kidding. After losing the New Hampshire primary to Gary Hart in 1984, Mondale recognized that he must redefine not only Hart ("Where's the beef?") but also himself. He declared himself no longer the front-runner, said the Democratic presidential nomination was up for grabs, and vowed to fight furiously, state by state, to win. Mondale was appropriately humble, conceding he'd made mistakes and hadn't approached the campaign the right way. He then created a new, no longer arrogant, and far more appealing Mondale and wound up winning the nomination before losing the general election to the incumbent, Ronald Reagan.

What Mondale changed was the style of his campaign. On substance, he remained an unswerving liberal. Bush is fine on substance, too, and probably closer to the thinking of average Republicans than McCain is. But ideology doesn't matter as much in this race. Personal traits, chiefly character, and how a candidate presents himself to voters have trumped substance. With McCain, it's not just his Vietnam POW record that's important. He appears alone on an austere stage with a handheld mike, portraying himself as a reformer out to thwart special interests in Washington. He produces an air of spontaneity and truth-telling by responding to any and all questions. At Bush events, the candidate stands behind a podium, with an array of GOP bigwigs behind him, and gives a canned speech. Nor does Bush spend hours schmoozing (and flattering) reporters, as McCain does.

The 1994 model initially worked for Bush, as he built up a huge lead in the polls last year, but public sentiment has shifted. It's not that voters are suddenly anti-Bush, says Frank Luntz, the pollster and focus group specialist. Rather, they've gotten a glimpse of McCain, and that's changed the political mood. "It's pro-McCain," Luntz says. "Voters were fine with Bush until they saw McCain. Then they perceived a difference." Luntz's focus groups during GOP presidential debates found Bush too issue-focused. "Nobody cares [about issues]," Luntz says. "They want to know, is the person straightforward? Is he honest? Does he listen? It's one legacy Bill Clinton has left that's actually positive. The character of the candidate does matter. They don't want another Bill Clinton."

Bush may help himself marginally in the South Carolina primary on February 19 by challenging McCain's conservative credentials. But my guess is that Republican voters won't reassess McCain until Bush does to McCain what Bill Bradley has done to Al Gore in the Democratic race. Rather than point up tiny ideological differences, Bradley took on Gore's fundamental flaw, his untrustworthiness. What Bush has to do is undermine McCain's claim to being a cru-

sading outsider bent on transforming Washington. Which shouldn't be too hard to do. In 17 years in Congress, McCain has been a conventional politician, an influential Senate committee chairman, and a Washington insider—anything but a committed maverick. True, he's bucked GOP leaders, but he's rarely gone against public sentiment.

Bush may be too finicky to attack McCain as a hypocrite or a phony. It took weeks of cajoling to get Bush to put a single sentence zinging McCain on taxes in a 30-second TV ad. At the least, though, Bush will have to recognize, as Bradley did, that the press will not do his job for him. Bradley expected reporters, on their own, to play up Gore's distortions, exaggerations, and untruths. They did, but only in late January once Bradley himself made the vice president's statements the focus of his campaign. If Bush waits for the media to pummel McCain with questions about whether his pose as an outsider is legitimate, he'll still be waiting when McCain accepts the GOP nomination in Philadelphia in August.

McCain has run a brilliant campaign, especially in captivating reporters. For the press, access is everything, and McCain has provided plenty of it. Bush hasn't. Why not? Maybe there are just too many control freaks in the Bush entourage. Perhaps Bush is one of them. But he's perfectly capable of conversing amiably for hours with reporters, as McCain has.

The night before the New Hampshire primary, I chatted with Bush for 15 minutes as he waited to be interviewed by Brit Hume on the Fox News Channel. We talked about taxes, John Rocker, the economics of professional baseball, foreign trips he might take if he wins the nomination, and a few other subjects. He didn't stammer. He was self-effacing. He joked about his campaign. He was still yapping when he went into the studio for the interview, and I suspect he could have chatted for hours. Indeed, he should have, and with every reporter in sight. ♦

Sleepless in South Carolina

Bleary-eyed and buoyant, the McCain campaign heads to Dixie. BY TUCKER CARLSON

Greenville, South Carolina

IT'S THREE IN THE MORNING and hundreds of people are dancing inside a hangar at the Greenville-Spartanburg airport. Thundering techno-pop-disco-soul music blasts from enormous speakers in the corners. Spotlights cut through a haze of smoke to project purple and blue psychedelic designs onto a back wall. There's a small hot-air balloon tethered near the door, a Greyhound-sized tour bus festooned with bunting parked across the concrete floor. The air smells like beer and cigarettes and sweat. No one in the room seems to be over 22. A lot of them are jumping up and down drunkenly in place and shouting: "John McCain! John McCain!"

For the reporters wandering in, bleary-eyed from hours on a charter flight from Manchester, it's like stumbling upon some weird, secret Southern ritual. John McCain has just won the New Hampshire primary, and this is supposed to be his first post-victory political rally. Instead it feels like an after-hours rave. Or intermission at a Dead show. It feels subversive.

And, in a way, it is. John McCain has been running for president for about a year. Scores of reporters have written hundreds of stories about his campaign, most of them positive, many of them fawning. Yet in that time virtually nobody who covered McCain—or even who worked for him—seemed to believe that McCain had a chance of beating George W. Bush for the Republican nomination, much less of becoming president. The perception began to change shortly after lunch on primary day. The first exit polls came in around 1:00, and immediately caused mild panic at McCain headquarters. The data seemed to show McCain with as much as a 20-point lead over Bush. McCain strategists assumed that the numbers must be ridiculous, and worried that a subsequent 5-point victory (widely considered optimistic the day before) would look like failure by comparison.

As it turned out, McCain won the primary by 19 points. CNN declared him the winner at 7:00 P.M. Minutes later, Bush guru Karl Rove called McCain's hotel room to concede. John Weaver, McCain's political director, scoffed when he heard Rove was on the line. Weaver detests Rove, and was irritated by what he considered the arrogance of the call. "Tell him that consultants don't concede to candidates," Weaver said to an aide. "Have Bush call himself." Bush soon did.

Twelve hours later, members of McCain's communications staff held their daily conference call. Today's topic: What do we do now? The conversation continued until someone asked, "Has anybody here ever been on a campaign that won New Hampshire?" For a moment there was silence, then laughter.

For McCain himself, there isn't much question what the next move is. A little before 9:00 A.M., the candidate is back on the bus and rolling through South Carolina. McCain made it to bed in Greenville at 5:00 in the morning, 24 hours after his day began in Nashua. An hour and a half after turning off the light, the phone rang. McCain couldn't immediately locate the source of the ringing and fumbled around his hotel room in the dark for

Tucker Carlson is a staff writer at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

a while until he found it. The phone turned out to be covered with buttons and immensely complicated to operate. By the time McCain finally pushed the right button, whoever it was had hung up.

McCain never went back to sleep. Exhaustion has made his eyes sensitive, and once on the bus he puts on his fabled sunglasses. In speeches, particularly when he talks about The Special Interests, McCain can come off as self-righteous. Catch him in his sunglasses and you realize he couldn't be. No one who took himself seriously would ever wear anything so dorky. Mike Murphy, McCain's message chief, has tried to prevent cameras from filming McCain when he has them on, and for the most part the effort has been successful. Unfortunately there's nothing Murphy can do about the food.

While traveling, McCain eats constantly, donuts mostly (Krispy Kremes, now that the campaign has arrived in the South), but also hamburgers and barbecue and whatever else aides pick up at events. This morning someone has shown up with a dozen sausage biscuits. The sides of the white cardboard container are dark and moist with grease. McCain balances the box on his knee, opens it and fishes out a biscuit. As he does, a crew from a local television station begins to set up for an interview. McCain takes off his sunglasses, but keeps the biscuit. While the reporter asks him questions about Social Security and tax cuts, McCain munches away, pausing only to wipe his mouth with a paper napkin.

The bus pulls into the parking lot of the Beacon Drive-in Restaurant in Spartanburg where McCain will hold his first rally of the day. The conventional understanding is that, in order to win South Carolina, McCain will have to run much farther to the right than he did in New Hampshire. (On primary night, one aide joked that McCain planned to become a John Bircher on the flight to Greenville.) That may be the plan, but there's no evidence of it in McCain's speech. He says the things he always says, except perhaps with a bit more emphasis on his concern for veterans. (South Carolina has more veterans per capita than any other state.) The striking thing about McCain this morning is how hyper he is. He shouts, jabs his finger into the air, and otherwise does a fair imitation of a street-corner orator. On less than two hours sleep he seems more energetic than he ever has.

Back on the bus after the rally, the New Hampshire blowout is still sinking in. Mike Murphy has his laptop computer out and is reading aloud from newspaper stories about the primary. He calls out the headlines in his best WrestleMania announcer's voice: "'McCain Romps,' says the *New York Times*." McCain chuckles. Murphy reads a few more then comes up with his own, which he'll repeat to reporters throughout the day: "Heard From the Bush Pilothouse: Iceberg!"

McCain is still chuckling, but it seems more in bewilderment than anything. McCain never really expected to get this far, and it's obvious he's not quite sure how it happened. At the moment he is, technically, the front-runner, having racked up one primary to Bush's zero. But for McCain the next several contests will be conducted in sudden-death overtime: one loss and he's out. McCain seems to find the precariousness of it all amusing. "It's the Amazing Wallendas," he says. "Quick, hand me a chair." Murphy looks up from his computer. "I'll get my unicycle," he says.

The comedy routine continues, entertaining as always. But something else about the campaign has changed for good. When McCain gets to his next event and announces, as he has begun to do lately, "I am going to beat Al Gore like a drum," it sounds different. It doesn't sound as much like a joke. ♦

Smart Guns, More Lawsuits

A new technology may trigger legal trouble for gun manufacturers. BY EDMUND WALSH

CROWING ABOUT his record on crime at a community center in Boston the other day, President Clinton unveiled a proposal to spend $10 million on research into "smart gun" technology. This high-tech approach to gun safety is the newest weapon in the fight to bring down gun manufacturers.

Smart guns are designed to allow only their specified users to fire them. A number of models are on the drawing boards, including combination locks, fingerprint-recognition technology, and radio-controlled locks requiring the user to wear a transmitter ring to fire the gun. Each design has its drawbacks. If the user forgets the ring or the combination or isn't recognized by the gun because he's wearing gloves, he may be endangered. But supporters say the benefits outweigh the risks. Smart guns, they claim, will prevent police officers from being shot with their own weapons, desperate teens from committing suicide, and children from accidentally shooting themselves.

The new technology has other implications, as well. Once smart guns reach the market, they will set the standard for gun safety, and older technology will be by definition unsafe. This will create an opening for gun opponents to sue the manufacturers of "unsafe" products, and possibly drive them out of business, without coming up against the Second Amendment.

City governments, emboldened by the states' landmark settlement with the major tobacco companies, are primed to hammer the gun makers in court. Even without the safety issue, 30 cities have already filed lawsuits against gun manufacturers to recover the costs of emergency services linked to gun violence. Meanwhile in Washington, the president has said his Department of Housing and Urban Development may initiate a federal lawsuit against gun makers to recoup the cost of gun crimes in public housing.

In nearby Maryland, attorney general Joseph Curran, too, is speaking the language of litigation. "In addition to death and injury, we also pay [for gun violence] in economic terms," Curran wrote in a report entitled "A Farewell to Arms: The Solution to Gun Violence in America." "As this tragedy has unfolded, how has the gun industry responded?" Curran asked. "By creating new products with greater killing power." According to one "scholar" he cites, "Lethality is the nicotine of the gun industry."

Maryland governor Parris Glendening (who last year distanced himself from Curran's goal of banning handguns for non-law-enforcement uses) has made smart guns a priority for the General Assembly. Like President Clinton, Glendening requested funds—$3 million over three years—to finance research into personalization technology and develop a smart-gun model.

But Glendening has upped the ante by asking the legislature to mandate smart-gun features in all guns sold in Maryland by 2003 if the technology is commercially available. According to the governor's spokesperson, "The state has to mandate the technology to drive the technology."

So far Maryland's Democratically controlled legislature is unenthusiastic. Critics and some proponents argue that the technology won't be ready anytime soon. Even the special commission Glendening established to craft a strategy for reducing gun violence couldn't agree on a smart-gun timeline. While the commission's final report recommended imposing the mandate in 2003, its technology subcommittee said reliable smart guns wouldn't be available until 2005.

In pushing for the earlier date, the full commission noted that Colt Man-



Illustration by Neil Shigley

Edmund Walsh is a staff assistant at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

ufacturing has created a research division devoted to developing a smart gun. But Colt's program is funded by the National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the Justice Department, and "is directed solely at the law enforcement market." The $500,000 grant has produced one prototype smart gun and a request for more funding. The NIJ insists that it could be up to five years before a smart gun is available for law-enforcement use.

Oxford Micro Devices, a computer-chip maker, has sought NIJ funding to apply fingerprint-recognition technology to guns. CEO Steven Morton believes smart-gun technology could come to the market in as little as two years, despite the attitudes of gun manufacturers. They are fostering suspicion about the reliability and feasibility of the technology, Morton says, out of fear of lawsuits and government interference. And they don't want to take a financial risk. Oxford made smart-gun proposals to several manufacturers but found no takers. According to Morton, the typical response was, "We'll wait until the government funds it."

An unsigned position paper from Colt expresses similar concern that manufacturers will be dissuaded from marketing a smart gun by the potential liability associated with a new gun technology. Although the company has recently downsized and is happy to take federal money, the paper reiterates that "there must also be liability protection for 'smart gun' pioneers if they are going to be required to bring smart gun technology to the market before it is fully developed and adequately tested."

Attorney General Curran is dead set against such protection. He testified to Governor Glendening's gun commission that citizens "should be permitted to persuade the courts that any gun without a child-proof design or personalization technology is unreasonably dangerous." With rhetoric like that in high places, gun makers can hardly be blamed for their hesitation about developing new products. ♦

Castro's American Friends

The National Council of Churches does a dictator's bidding. **BY MARK TOOLEY**

WHAT IF THE Christian Coalition were fighting to return a little refugee boy to the right-wing military dictatorship from which he and his mother had fled—she having lost her life in the process? Imagine the howls of protest. How odd, then, that the National Council of Churches (NCC) has received so little criticism for campaigning to return Elián González to Fidel Castro's Communist dictatorship in Cuba.

Mark Tooley is the director of the United Methodist Committee at the Institute on Religion and Democracy.

Legitimate arguments might be made that Elián *should* be reunited with his father in Havana, of course. But the famously left-leaning NCC, with its rich history of fawning over Castro, is hardly the organization to make such arguments effectively, much less serve as a "neutral" mediator in the dispute. Yet there they are: NCC officials busily shuttling back and forth between Havana, Miami, New York, and Washington—all the while huffily insisting that no legitimate arguments exist *not* to return the

boy to the totalitarian society his mother gave her life to escape. Is the council's biased presence in the middle of this "negotiation" at all problematic? The question has been entirely overlooked by the nation's media.

Not once since they involved themselves in the Elián controversy have NCC representatives publicly acknowledged why it is that Cubans routinely risk their lives to escape the Castro regime in the first place. Nor has the NCC admitted that the boy's relatives in Cuba aren't free to tell us what they really think—what with Castro having made them pawns in an anti-U.S. propaganda campaign. Instead, the NCC has actively participated in that campaign, chartering a plane to fly Elián's grandmothers from Cuba for a publicity and lobbying tour through New York, Washington, and Miami.

The council has been behaving like this for three decades. Ostensibly the voice of 35 denominations that include 50 million American church members, the NCC long ago abandoned formal interest in traditional Christian pursuits like evangelism and spiritual growth. Beginning in the 1960s, politics—the more radical the better—became the organization's focus. And radical politics has remained the council's bread and butter to this day. Most of the Latin American "liberation" movements of the 1970s and 1980s have expired and most American "progressives" no longer take Marxism seriously. But the NCC has proved singularly unable to abandon bad habits.

Council officials regularly meet with Fidel Castro, both in Cuba and in New York. A show is usually made that this cozy relationship has something to do with religion. Four years ago in New York, for example, NCC general secretary Joan Brown Campbell celebrated Castro's pastoral concern for "the poor" and announced that religious intolerance was a thing of the past in Cuba: "The churches now are able to carry out all the work of the church—that is, the training of pastors, Sunday School teaching, evangelism, and service to the society." Castro was pleased to agree, and thanked Campbell for her discerning observations. "We see in you and your actions the expression of the best values and intentions of the American people," the dictator burbled. "We love you very specially, and always welcome you to our country. You are teaching us to be Christians."

Needless to say, that "teaching" is actually going rather badly. Religious persecution by Cuba's Communist government is less severe than ten years ago. But the island's Christians are still routinely denied permits for church repairs and new construction. Church properties are commonly subject to government seizure. Public proselytizing remains illegal. Church leaders are still monitored by the Cuban domestic security service, interrogated and threatened with arrest. House churches and parochial schools are forbidden. Bible distribution is strictly limited.

No serious American church organization could possibly judge this situation praiseworthy. And, sure enough, on close inspection, church work turns out not to be the NCC's priority where Cuba is concerned. The council's entente with Castro is an overwhelmingly political affair.

Last year the NCC sent a "fact-finding" mission to Cuba. Poverty on the island, the council's field workers "discovered," is the result of American trade sanctions, not Castro's state-managed economy.

Human rights remain a problem in U.S.-Cuba bilateral relations, the NCC's delegation concluded: American "political prisoners" continue to serve "very long" sentences, after all. The U.S. nuclear arsenal also hampers the development of friendship between Washington and Havana. And Castro's total censorship of Cuban media and ban on non-Communist political parties? Nary a word on those subjects from the NCC.

One day last summer, before an "ecumenical rally" of 10,000 in Havana's Plaza of the Revolution, NCC's Campbell apologized for the American trade embargo of Cuba. While Castro beamed appreciatively from the front row, Campbell went on to ask her audience for forgiveness.

This is the context in which the NCC's "assistance" to Elián González and his family must be understood. The council is Castro's faithful servant in every appeal he makes to American public opinion. And the NCC is prepared to be quite nasty about it from time to time, as the denouement of the grandmother gambit made clear last week.

Sister Jeanne O'Laughlin, president of Barry University, is the Dominican nun who hosted the meeting between Elián and his grandmothers in Miami. She had originally favored the boy's return to Cuba. The meeting changed her mind. As she explained in a subsequent *New York Times* op-ed, O'Laughlin was alarmed by the two elderly women's "trembling, furtive looks, [and] ice-cold hands" when in the company of their Cuban escort, who spent much of the encounter on a cell phone to Havana, reporting back to his superiors. Shocked by the atmosphere of fear, O'Laughlin now thinks Elián should stay in the United States.

And Joan Brown Campbell—who chaperoned the grandmothers throughout their weeklong propaganda tour of the United States, oblivious to what was really going on—is mightily displeased over Sister Jeanne's apostasy. The NCC has issued a press release condemning O'Laughlin for daring to express her opinion publicly. Having "fueled the fire of controversy," the council thundered, Sister Jeanne has "eliminated herself as a neutral facilitator in any future discussions on this matter."

It is the National Council of Churches, of course, that should not be taken seriously as a "neutral" participant in the Elián González debate—or in any debate about Castro's Cuba. The council speaks only for a tiny group of quasi-religious political activists in the United States, not for the millions of church members it claims to represent. Its strenuous effort to return Elián to Castro should, if anything, argue for keeping the little boy with his Florida relatives at least a little while longer. ♦

Greed is Chic at Last

Luxury sales are up, charitable contributions down. Where are the scolds? BY KENNETH LEE

A CLASSMATE OF MINE at Harvard Law School recently spurned a job offer from the prestigious New York law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell despite the $120,000 starting salary. Instead, he'll head to the greener pastures of investment banking, where first-year associates can earn upwards of $160,000. Within five years, investment bankers barely 30 years old can make over half a million dollars a year—while corporate lawyers with five years' experience are bringing in a mere $200,000. "A hundred thousand dollars is chump change," grouses my 23-year-old friend. "You can't live in New York City on that. Corporate lawyers are basically only middle class."

Nowadays, it isn't just a handful of techno-nerds with their risky Internet ventures who are getting rich. Thousands of workers at secure jobs with law firms and banks command mind-numbingly high salaries. These young, white-collar employees may not receive as much money or media attention as the dot-com millionaires, but there are a lot more of them. And they earn salaries unheard of even in the heyday of Ronald Reagan. Indeed, by most measures, the 1990s, not the 1980s, was the "decade of greed."

At least in the '80s, it was the 30- and 40-year-olds who made a killing on Wall Street. Now, sprightly twentysomething graduates genuflect before the almighty dollar. In 1988, law students thrilled at the news that the blue-chip firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore had upped its first-year salary to $71,000. Back then, only the seniormost associate took home a six-figure salary. Times have changed. Recently another classmate of mine, with no work experience, received a $30,000 signing bonus from a consulting firm. That's more than the U.S. per capita income.

While lawyers covet the wealth of Wall Street, investment bankers envy the surreal stock options of Silicon Valley. "[Young bankers] say, 'I want to be a multimillionaire by the time I'm 30, but if I stay at Morgan Stanley, it may take me until I'm 50,'" Morgan's head of investment banking, Joseph Perella, told the *New York Times* last year. They want "instant gratification," he added. So do some bigwigs. For example, Thomas Casey, 47, left his $5-million-a-year job at Merrill Lynch to reap higher rewards at an Internet start-up. This exodus to dot-com companies partly explains why investment banks are forced to recruit lawyers and law students.

After hours, their bank accounts flush, these Americans are splurging on luxuries. Last year, Porsche produced over 45,000 of its pricey (starting around $50,000) sports cars, near the all-time high. And New York City restaurants have noted a dramatic increase in sales of wines costing over $1,000. Government statistics confirm that Americans are living beyond their means. At the end of the 1990s, the private savings rate was actually negative (-1.4 percent), meaning that people were spending more than they earned. Compare that with the 1980s savings rate of 5 percent, which the media bemoaned as a sign of America's decline. Consumer and corporate debt also hit record highs during this past decade. Credit card debt alone stands today at a staggering $600 billion. Moreover, American investors have less patience and self-restraint. In the 1980s, investors had a comparatively long-term view, holding stocks for an average of two years. In the 1990s, they sold within an average of eight months.

Amidst all this wealth, meanwhile, charitable contributions are declining. The Independent Sector, an umbrella group of charitable organizations, reports that in 1998 households donated on average only 2.1 percent of their income, down from 2.5 percent in 1989. Furthermore, the percentage of people making charitable contributions at all decreased from 75.1 percent in 1989 to 70.1 percent last year.

Tellingly, the media, which excoriated the gilded 1980s, have mostly ignored the rapacity of the 1990s. In 1987, a *Time* magazine cover story grumped, "What's Wrong: Hypocrisy, Betrayal and Greed Unsettle the Nation's Soul." The piece solemnly

Illustration by Darren Gygi

Kenneth Lee is the author of Huddled Masses, Muddled Laws *(Praeger, 1998).*

rued "the 'My decade,' a time when by one's possessions thou shall be known and judged." Now, *Time* says nary a word about the 1990s—except to celebrate it, as when it named Jeff Bezos, the multi-billionaire CEO of Amazon.com (a company that has yet to make one cent in profit) Person of the Year for 1999. Imagine *Time* 15 years ago bestowing that honor on Henry Kravis or Donald Trump.

What accounts for the disparate treatment of the '80s and the '90s? One explanation is the media's liberal political bent. During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan led the country, while Bill Clinton was at the helm in the 1990s. *Time* magazine was openly contemptuous of Reagan in that 1987 article. "[T]he problem starts at the top," it preached. "No better symbol exists of the public philosophy of the Reagan era than the Adam Smith neckties worn proudly by presidential confidants. The result is an Administration whose clarion call is 'Enrich thyself.' For Reagan, money is the measure of achievement, and he has left no doubt that he prefers the company of the wealthy." President Clinton, of course, hobnobs with rich friends who offer million-dollar loans to finance the purchase of a glitzy New York home. For that matter, he may even become one of the new rich himself: *Washingtonian* magazine reports in its January 2000 issue that he is contemplating a $10 million-a-year job at the investment bank Lazard Frères.

In Oliver Stone's 1987 movie *Wall Street*, Michael Douglas played the high-flying investment banker Gordon Gekko. In a memorable scene, Gekko ends his paean to American capitalism by proclaiming, "Greed . . . is good." Maybe, but it seems we only call it by its name when the Oval Office is occupied by a Republican. ♦

The McCain Insurrection

The Republican establishment and the conservative movement rallied to George W. Bush. The voters went for the insurgent.

By William Kristol and David Brooks

The two great Republican general-election victories of the recent past grew out of intra-party insurrections. In 1980, Ronald Reagan, fresh from challenging a sitting Republican president in 1976, ran against a party establishment represented in various ways by Howard Baker, George Bush, and John Connally. A decade later, Newt Gingrich led an insurrection, first against the Bush budget deal and then against Bob Michel and the Republican congressional establishment, which culminated in the Republican landslide of 1994. Now we are witnessing a third insurrection. John McCain is taking on the Republican establishment. In New Hampshire, he crushed it.

At first glance, the McCain insurgency seems nothing like the other two. Reagan and Gingrich led ideological crusades. They attacked the Republican establishment from the right, and the ground had been prepared by a conservative movement which first won the war of ideas. The McCain insurgency is not ideological. It does feature certain themes and principles, but they are not yet fully developed into a governing agenda.

But if one abandons the premise that insurrections have to be ideological, it becomes clear that in some ways the McCain insurgency does resemble its two predecessors. Like Reagan and Gingrich, McCain makes the corporate and lobbyist types nervous. The corporate elites have invested heavily in George W. Bush, and they must have been chugging Tums after New Hampshire.

Furthermore, like the other two insurgents, McCain is trying to bring new and unlikely blood into Republican ranks. Reagan appealed to the spirit of Franklin Roosevelt and brought in the Reagan Democrats, along with intellectuals like Jeane Kirkpatrick and Bill Bennett who had been Democrats all their lives. In Gingrich's Republican landslide of 1994, eight million Americans voted Republican in House elections for the first time. And for better or worse, Gingrich tried to import a whole raft of ideas and people that were not part of the conservative canon: thinkers ranging from Marvin Olasky on the right to Heidi and Alvin Toffler on the left, through Edwards Deming and all the rest of that Third Wave zoological futurology.

Rather than Reagan Democrats, this election season has produced the McCain Independents. Many of these new Republican primary voters seem ill-suited to the GOP. But that's what insurgencies do. They expand the base. They topple the old establishment by bringing in new people. They create new alliances within the party. That's why 1980 and 1994 were winning years for the GOP in the fall; that's why the orthodox Republican campaigns of 1992 and 1996 were unsuccessful.

Finally, like Reagan and Gingrich, McCain attacks a Republican establishment that has already rotted from within. John McCain could cruise to such a massive win in New Hampshire because the Republican establishment has ossified. It cannot save a faltering campaign no matter how well funded it might be, no matter how many firewalls it claims to erect. It is possible that a revitalized Bush could save himself—but the establishment's weakness has been exposed, and some other insurgency will eventually take advantage of it.

The current Republican establishment comprises two factions that were once rivals, the "pragmatic" corporate establishment and the "ideological" conservative movement. But both have suffered crushing defeats in the past decade. In their weakness, they now cling warily to each other. Last year when George W. Bush looked inevitable, they hoped to save themselves by riding his coattails to power. Now, as Bush has faltered, they hope that together they still have enough clout to propel him to the White House.

William Kristol is editor and publisher and David Brooks a senior editor at The Weekly Standard.

The corporate establishment suffered its crushing defeat back in 1990, with the tax-hiking budget deal. By breaking the "no new taxes pledge," President Bush and his senior advisers—Richard Darman, Nicholas Brady, and the rest of the Republican pragmatists—sloughed off the Reagan legacy and forfeited the trust of the American people. They went on to run a typical establishment campaign against Bill Clinton in 1992. Their failure opened the way for conservatives—led by Gingrich, who had dissented from the budget deal—to take over the party. They did, and seemed to achieve a historic triumph in 1994.

But that triumph was short lived. The catastrophic budget shutdown of late 1995 was the conservative movement's Waterloo. Bill Clinton seized the initiative. The Republicans were thrown back on their heels, saddled with a profoundly unpopular leader, and spent the next couple of years plagued by self-doubt and internal power struggles.



In the time since, neither the corporate honchos nor the movement types have been strong enough to dominate the party. Stumbling and grasping, the Republicans mounted the ineffectual Dole-Kemp campaign, suffered a setback in the 1998 midterm elections, and in general have fitfully surrendered policy ground to the Democrats (in their response to the State of the Union address, the Republicans boasted they were sending $500 million *more* to the Department of Education than Clinton asked for).

Reeling from these blows, both the corporate bigwigs and many movement conservatives seized upon George W. Bush as their savior. They saw Bush as a man with a magic political touch who could lead them back to victory.

And for much of 1999, George Bush did seem to possess that magic touch. More important, he seemed to understand that if it were to win, the Republican Party had to move beyond its two tired factions. Bush made several bold gestures to distinguish himself from the corporate establishment. He talked openly about his religious faith. He distanced himself from the Dick Darman types. He went on to propose a bold tax cut plan.

Bush also distinguished himself from the conservative movement. In a series of subtle and sophisticated speeches, he made it clear that he had a positive governing philosophy. Unlike the Gingrich-Armey-DeLay revolutionaries, he wasn't merely going to cut, devolve, and dismantle. He proposed new conservative programs. He said government should be limited but energetic. Compassionate conservatism offered the prospect of something new and compelling.

For a time it seemed that the Republican party would not need an insurgency. It seemed that the Republicans had found a candidate who could transform the party from the top, revitalizing its message and broadening its support. But in the heat of the election campaign—in the debates, up against real competition and increased media scrutiny—all that had seemed potentially transforming about the Bush campaign withered. By the end of New Hampshire, compassionate conservatism was a memory. George W. Bush sounded almost indistinguishable from the Robert Dole of 1996 or the George Herbert Walker Bush of 1992.

Indeed, this became almost comically evident the last week in New Hampshire when the Bush campaign rolled out Jack Kemp, John Sununu, and George Bush the elder to prop up a faltering candidate. And whom did the Bush team bring out the day after New Hampshire, when they presumably should have learned that voters were looking for new blood and new themes? Dan Quayle.

In short, after a year of innovative groundwork the Bush campaign reverted to tired formulas. It defaulted to the most familiar conservative rhetoric and the most ineffectual GOP establishment political tactics.

This left the field wide open for John McCain. He attracted independent voters by stressing a reform agenda not part of conservative orthodoxy. But he also beat Bush among voters who called themselves conservative. The conservative establishment turned out to be almost as out of touch with real conservatives as the GOP establishment was with the Republican rank and file. And so McCain won.

At once heterodox in tone and conventional on most issues, at once a rebel and an experienced senator, at once a fervent reformer and a reassuring commander in chief, John McCain now finds himself at the head of the third major insurgency of the past two decades. Right now his strong showing looks like a victory of character over platform, of personality over position papers.

But in the helter-skelter of the McCain campaign, two core themes are discernible, themes that could form the foundation of a new Republican approach to governing.

First, all of McCain's talk about campaign finance reform, special interests, and shaking up Washington—some of it hyperbolic and demagogic—can be understood as part of a more comprehensive ambition to reinvigorate citizenship. As McCain said not long ago, "Although the locus of the change we are calling for is our campaign finance system, this crusade is about much more than changing how we pay for our campaigns. It's about changing how we view our democracy."

In speech after speech McCain calls on his listeners, especially young people, to serve a cause greater than themselves. That's why Bush's decision to press the tax cut issue was so ineffective. Bush was saying, in effect, I'm going to give you more of your money back. But in these good economic times, McCain was able to trump the appeal to self-interest with a public-spirited message: We should think of ourselves as citizens, not merely as consumers; we should serve the public good, not merely private interest; we should be represented in Washington as Americans, not merely as members of interest groups or as taxpayers.



McCain's campaign reminds us that citizenship entails more than just voting, and the business of America is more than just business. His brand of conservatism rejects the notion that the highest end of government is to leave us alone. This may sound un-Republican. But just as Reagan reached across party lines to appropriate some of the rhetoric and spirit of Franklin Roosevelt, so McCain echoes some of the language and sentiments of John and Robert Kennedy.

This created a particularly effective contrast with Bill Clinton, who never sacrificed for the public good, who used the Lincoln Bedroom for partisan fund-raising and the Oval Office for private gratification, and whose vision of public policy consists of doling out favors to Americans divided into innumerable niche interests.

Against a Democratic party that is deferential to bureaucrats, judges, and professional activists, against a Republican party of corporate hierarchies and business lobbyists, against a conservative movement that loves the private sector so much it disdains the public one, McCain offers a vision of an engaged, active, self-governing citizenry.

He also offers a second vision, one that grows out of his own life story: a story of honorable behavior on behalf of a great nation. McCain launched his campaign with a book entitled *Faith of My Fathers*. McCain's faith-based institution is America. He sees patriotism as a more solid ground for public action than the softer, more private compassion of George Bush's faith-based charities. He offers a vision of a remoralized America, but his cultural renewal does not depend on a religious revival. It comes from a commitment to the idea of America and the public virtues, like courage, honor, integrity, and duty, required to keep America great.

It is clear that Vietnam plays an important role in McCain's appeal. Vietnam led many on the left to doubt the idea of America, and many other Americans to shy away from full-throated patriotism. McCain, the Vietnam hero, is the final renunciation of all that.

It is no accident that McCain has emerged after a decade dominated by two politicians, Clinton and Gingrich, clever but not self-sacrificing, who never served in the armed forces. For all his conventional political views, McCain embodies a set of virtues that today are unconventional. The issue that gave the McCain campaign its initial boost was Kosovo. He argued that America as a great champion of democracy and decency could not fail to act. And he supported his commander in chief despite grave doubts about the conduct of the war—while George W. Bush sat out the debate and Republicans on the Hill flailed at Clinton.

McCain closed his New Hampshire campaign with two ads. One emphasized his commitment to reform, the other his fitness as commander in chief. For McCain, the president is, above all, these two things: citizen reformer and commander in chief. These two fundamental elements—reform for the sake of citizenship and leadership in the service of American greatness—undergird a not yet fully developed program. What's striking is that both of these elements have been absent from most current political discourse. That's why the McCain insurgency is not just a fundamental challenge to the Republican party but a political phenomenon with potential appeal to the country as a whole. ♦

The Chinese, Too, Deserve to Be Free

A strategy for promoting democracy in China.

By John Derbyshire

Macao, Portugal's 400-year-old colony across the Pearl River estuary from Hong Kong, returned to Chinese sovereignty at midnight last December 19. Considering that the place is tiny (eight miles from end to end, with a population of 450,000), that it has no discernible economy beyond gambling and prostitution, and that the Portuguese have been trying unsuccessfully to give it back to China since they got out of the colonial business 20 years ago, you might suppose that this was a matter of minor importance. Wrong: For China, it was a very big deal indeed.

President Jiang Zemin, in a speech marking the occasion, got right to the point: "I am sure that our compatriots in Taiwan will share the joyful sentiments of the people in Macao. . . . To achieve a complete national reunification is the shared aspiration of all the Chinese people including the Taiwan compatriots, and an inevitable historical trend which no force on earth can ever resist." In short, it's about Taiwan. With Hong Kong and Macao safely back in the bosom of the Motherland, the "recovery" of Taiwan is now Project Number One for the rulers of China.

Well, I should like to suggest a counter-project for the West. Our project should be to bring constitutional government to China. Not for moralistic reasons, though there would be great moral satisfaction in accomplishing such a thing, but from simple prudence and the desire for peace.

I have just been reading historian Spencer Weart's 1998 book *Never at War*. Subtitled *Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another*, it is a long exploration of Kant's notion that free peoples are inherently peaceful. Much of it is devoted to developing good working definitions of "democracy" and "war." All the obvious counterexamples—Athens vs. Thebes, the Anglo-Dutch War of 1652, the War of 1812—are scrutinized in the light of these definitions. Weart's conclusion is the one implied in his subtitle, and it is perfectly convincing. Democracies—sufficiently inclusive, well-established democracies—do not go to war against each other.

This alone is sufficient cause for us to rack our brains for ways to help China democratize. A war with China would be a catastrophe, and if we can help make it unthinkable—as unthinkable, say, as war between the United States and Canada—we should surely do it. At present war is all too thinkable, for reasons that derive from the nature of the Chinese Communist regime. Spencer Weart points out what political scientists from Aristotle onward have noticed: that a nation's dealings with other nations tend to the same style as its internal practices. A regime that tolerates no internal dissent will be intolerant of other nations' concerns. A regime that considers disagreement with its policies to be treason will register even the mildest foreign criticism as belligerent hostility. A regime whose leaders have never experienced the give and take of democratic politics will be inept at, and temperamentally hostile to, the give and take of international diplomacy.

Weart describes a number of historical instances in which fatal misunderstandings arose between a democracy and an oligarchy. Oriented toward negotiation and compromise, the democracy makes a concession. Oriented toward coercion and deceit, the oligarchs take the compromise as weakness and assume that the democracy will never take a stand. Thus emboldened, they strike—and are astonished when the democracy strikes back. Reading these accounts, it seems that conflicts like the First World War arise not because one side has lost the diplomatic game, but because the two sides are not actually playing the same game.

Current U.S.-China relations conform uncomfortably to this pattern. Our administration speaks breezily of "strategic partnership with China," while China's govern-

John Derbyshire is a critic and novelist living in Huntington, New York.

AP / Wide World Photos

Chairman Mao waves at the Communist party's anniversary celebration in 1966.

ment-controlled press snarls that the United States is "aspiring to world hegemony."

These considerations dispose of one of the main objections to our project, the one posed by Kissingerian *realpolitik*: How is it any business of ours what sort of government China has? We should deal with the world as we find it, accommodating ourselves to China's interests when prudent, encouraging its leaders to do the same in respect of our interests. But if Weart's arguments are sound, the outlook and skills required to rise to the top in a Leninist oligarchy are inevitably threatening to international peace and order.

Another line of objection is the appeal to the Law of Unintended Consequences. According to this reasoning, a loud and persistent campaign to push China in any direction will generate resentment not only among the Chinese leadership but among their people, who have been indoctrinated for a hundred years to believe that all their problems arise from foreign countries' meddling. Action on our part will generate reaction, and the current odious system will only be strengthened.

This is a more potent argument. It is true that foreigners' prescriptions for China meet loud scorn from Chinese people. The notion that only the Chinese understand China is dear to their hearts. "Meddling in our internal affairs" is not just a useful slogan for the ruling gang to use when brushing off foreign criticism, it is also an appeal to a fundamental principle of Chineseness. Yet the argument misses the ambivalence of Chinese attitudes to the outside world ever since that world gatecrashed their consciousness 150 years ago. The twentieth century's most percipient observer of the Chinese soul, the writer Lu Xun, noted, "We Chinese are forever either looking down on foreigners as uncultured savages, or else gazing up admiringly at them as paragons of science and democracy. We can never look them in the eye as equals." Chinese officials who have to deal with foreigners are instructed that the proper attitude is *bu kang bu bei*—neither arrogant nor servile. The notion that foreign suggestions will always be rebuffed, and its often-heard corollary that nothing foreigners do makes any difference in China, both miss this tension in Chinese thinking. While the Chinese and their leaders may scoff at foreign prescriptions for their country, in the back of each Chinese head is a little voice whispering that the foreigners might be onto something after all.

Certainly there is a widespread understanding among Chinese people—at any rate those with some education—that the current political system of the mainland will not do. Another fundamental principle of Chineseness in the present age is the aching desire to be up-to-date, to be *modern*. On this score, the Chinese Communist party is at a terrible disadvantage with its own people: They perceive it to be old-fashioned. Forty years ago, when it was still possible to believe that state socialism was the way of the future, the CCP could tap into this desire for modernity. Socialism was sleek, shiny, and efficient; it was scientific. After the calamities of the Mao period, nobody now believes that. In recent years a number of memoirs and exposés of the early

AP / Wide World Photos

Premier Zhu Rongji and President Jiang Zemin at the 1999 anniversary celebration.

decades of Communist rule have been available to those Chinese who cared to seek them—perhaps most famously the 1994 book by Mao's doctor, Zhisui Li, which every Chinese seems to be familiar with. When reading these accounts, Chinese people who know their nation's history cannot but be reminded of the intrigues of the Imperial court and the follies of that older autocracy. Their reaction is not pride at the continuity of their nation's political culture, but shame that they are stuck with methods of statecraft long since abandoned elsewhere.

There is therefore, I believe, a widespread hunger among educated Chinese people for a more modern form of government—"to be a normal country like the others," as one expressed it to me. A Western campaign for democracy in China, if conducted with some tact and good sense, could harness this yearning.

Supposing the West could be convinced of the desirability of this project, what steps could we actually take to help China towards democracy? I propose the following.

¶ *Shame them.* China, like Japan, has a "shame" culture rather than a "guilt" culture. Doing wrong and getting away with it disturbs a Chinese person's peace of mind much less than it does an Anglo-Saxon's; being laughed at for an honest mistake is more distressing. This is a lever which, if skillfully pulled, can serve the end I am proposing. Loud foreign complaints about human rights abuses are answered with blustering defensiveness from Chinese officials; but down among the people themselves, such complaints, if properly pitched, can generate shame. "A bunch of middle-aged people want to practice a meditation cult, and you think this is a *threat to your nation*? What a primitive attitude! A confident modern nation can tolerate any number of peaceful cults!" Behind the show of indignation with which Beijing spokesmen greet such remarks, there is much blushing and squirming among ordinary Chinese. Westerners, therefore, both through our news media and private contacts and through our government representatives, should complain loud and long about human rights abuses in China. Never mind the self-righteous bluster we get in return. Never mind warnings from the State Department's China desk that such complaints are "unhelpful." Never mind Chinese accusations of "interfering in our internal affairs" and the clumsy *tu quoque* rebuttals. (As part of their training, Chinese officials are equipped with prefabricated arguments rather like those that used to be supplied to pupils in Catholic schools for confounding Protestants and atheists. They are, for example, trained to riposte with remarks about segregation in the Old South any time an American raises issues of human rights in China. Most recently they have been countering queries about the suppression of Falun Gong with references to the Branch Davidians.) Never mind: Some of what we say will sink in, inducing shame—a potent force for changing Chinese behavior.

¶ *Expose their lies.* The diplomatic arsenal of the current Chinese regime—as of any authoritarian regime—is stocked mainly with lies, threats, and insults. The insults should be ignored and the threats met with calm, clear declarations of firmness. The lies, however, should be exposed. If the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations declares that "Tibet has always been a part of China," the U.S. ambassador should stand up at the first opportunity and point out that this is untrue, citing historical chapter and verse. When Jiang Zemin says that the people of Taiwan long to be reunited with the Motherland, someone of authority in the Free World should be heard to say that this is not so—that the people of Taiwan have no desire to

Newsmakers

The Chinese army entering Macao on December 20, 1999.

surrender their freedoms to a clique of Leninists with Swiss bank accounts. One of the depressing things you discover if you live in a dictatorship is that after decades of indoctrination, most people—including even dissidents—end up believing at least some of the official lies. In a completely closed society, they hear nothing else. Today's China, however, is not so hermetically closed, and challenges to the CCP's lies can filter through to at least some Chinese citizens. Since the party rests its legitimacy on lies and on long-exploded pseudoscientific theories about "inevitable historical trends," simple repetition of the truth undermines it.

¶ *Recognize governments-in-exile for Tibet and Eastern Turkestan.* Twentieth-century history—in Spain, Turkey, Austria, Portugal, and Russia—suggests that for a despotic imperial power to democratize fully, it must first shed its colonial possessions. The current territory of the People's Republic includes three vast regions whose base populations are not Chinese: Tibet, Eastern Turkestan, and Inner Mongolia. The last of these is probably a lost cause, as Manchuria has been for a hundred years. Being too close to the Chinese heartland, it has been swamped with Chinese immigrants, and the Mongolians are now a minority. Tibet and Eastern Turkestan, however, are outlying Imperial possessions held by brute force. Their cultures have nothing in common with China's—not even an alphabet. In Tibet, one person in 12 is a Chinese soldier—a much higher proportion than the *Wehrmacht* required to hold occupied France in World War II. Continued Chinese occupation of these nations is an international scandal. Their people have suffered horribly under Chinese rule. Most to the point, no democratization of China will be possible until they are freed; for democratization of China within its current borders would lead to secession by these regions, as the Communists surely know. We must extend official recognition to governments-in-exile for the Tibetans and Eastern Turkestanis, with ambassadorial residences in our capital and proper accreditation of diplomats. True, there will be a rather melancholy comic-opera aspect to these missions for a few years. So there was to the missions of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia as recently as the 1980s; but those Baltic states are now free, their missions issuing visas and organizing cultural exchanges. So it must be with Tibet and Eastern Turkestan one day, if we are ever to have democracy in China. Unlike the Baltic states, which had a higher standard of living than Soviet Russia, Tibet and Eastern Turkestan are poorer than metropolitan China. Their Chinese settler populations would have little incentive to stay on after independence and most would drift back to China proper.

¶ *Recognize Taiwan.* From the point of view of the project I am proposing, the case of Taiwan presents some

ambiguity. It may be that if China were a democratic nation, the people of Taiwan would wish to join it. Having recognized Taiwan, therefore, we might, a few years on, if our project were successful, find ourselves withdrawing recognition. I believe it is an embarrassment we should be willing to endure with equanimity. The case for recognizing Taiwan was put very ably by John Bolton in the August 9, 1999 issue of this magazine. I would add only that a major jolt of this sort would, after an initial firestorm of indignant bluster, contribute to the delegitimization of the Chinese Communist party among the Chinese people.

The project I have sketched is not risk-free. The state ideology of the Beijing regime is partly irrational, indeed *anti*-rational. The regime might react in irrational ways to some of the steps I have proposed. Those steps must therefore be complemented with clear, consistent declarations of intent and with as much support as we can gather from our democratic allies in Asia. Whatever the risks, the indefinite perpetuation of the current system is much, much riskier. As Spencer Weart has shown—and as Demosthenes noted 23 centuries ago—relations between democracies and oligarchies are always unstable; and the different styles, rooted in different responses to internal challenges, that democracies and oligarchies bring to the diplomatic arena offer endless possibilities for misunderstanding and miscalculation.

We are not helpless. The West is at the apogee of its wealth, power, and influence. We do not have to sit by, passive, in the vague hope that once China's living standards reach a certain point the Maoists will simply step aside. The world is a much smaller place than it was even 20 years ago, and what is said at one end of it can be heard at the other. Let us say loud and clear what we stand for.

Let us make plain to the Chinese that while we respect them and their civilization, with its glittering achievements in art, literature, and technology, we deplore their current political arrangements and think them a danger to ourselves and to the world. Let us let them know that we long for a free and democratic China, a "normal country," with which we can compete in friendship to our mutual benefit.

They will be listening, enough of them. Their leaders, too: Take a look at the gifts that came into your house over the recent holiday season and count those marked "Made in China." They need us far more than we need them. By being firm and principled, we can accomplish a great and wonderful thing: We can help a mighty nation find a path to constitutional government and ensure peace for ourselves and our children.

We can help bring to an end the long night of imperial despotism in China and watch with joy and satisfaction as freedom's morning breaks at last over that proud, beautiful, long-suffering land. ♦

Courting Trouble

Why Courtship Matters

By Claudia Winkler

Details from Francesco del Cossa's fresco *Month of April*, c. 1470. Scala / Art Resource.

Just in time for Valentine's Day, Amy and Leon Kass of the University of Chicago have produced an anthology of classic readings on courtship and marriage. Ranging from Homer and the Song of Songs to Allan Bloom and Miss Manners, *Wing to Wing, Oar to Oar* is their constructive response to what they have observed over fifteen years of their students' romantic perplexity and jadedness.

In their important introductory essay about the human necessity of marriage, the Kasses recount the episode that planted the seed for their book. On the first day of a course they were co-teaching on men and women in literature, they asked their students what they thought the most important decision in their lives would be. Most of the answers had to do with career. Only one young man replied, "Deciding who should be the mother of my children." "For his eccentric opinion," write his teachers, "and especially for this quaint way of putting it, he was promptly attacked by nearly every other member of the class."

Claudia Winkler is a managing editor at The Weekly Standard.

The Kasses, by contrast, marveled at his maturity. Equally, they were pained by what seemed to be the amorous aimlessness of a generation of students for whom "the way to the altar is uncharted territory." And so they started collecting literary passages concerning marriage and courtship. They quickly saw that if the marital ideal is weak among the young, the reason is that the old—often disappointed and confused themselves—have failed to pass on any culturally prescribed pattern for channeling sexual attraction into lifelong marriage. And the reasons for that, in turn, are not far to seek.

Wing to Wing, Oar to Oar
Readings on Courting and Marrying
edited by Amy A. and Leon R. Kass
University of Notre Dame Press, 636 pp., $25

The changes that have weakened the cultural inheritance are large and obvious and, for the Kasses, can be summed up as the decline of biblical morality. They cite, in particular, the sexual revolution, feminism, and the destigmatizing of illegitimacy, divorce, adultery, and abortion, together with the erosion of shame and awe in sexual matters, morally neutral sex education, the loosening of ties to place and extended family, the celebration of

youth and independence, and an ethos lacking transcendent aspirations. These, they argue, are natural products of liberal democracy's emphasis on liberty and equality and modern philosophy's exalting of the individual: "The courtship and marriage of people who see themselves as self-sufficient rights-bearing individuals will be decisively different from the courtship and marriage of people who understand themselves as, say, unavoidably incomplete and dependent children of the Lord who have been enjoined to be fruitful and multiply."

Undeterred by this profoundly pessimistic conclusion about our present situation, the Kasses affirm a view of marriage they contend is not socially constructed, but rooted in the truth about men, women, and sexuality. Their many-layered discussion of what it means that the species is divided into male and female—and thus of the meaning of shame, the connection between sex and beauty, the interrelation of sex and death, and the desire for self-transcendence—should be required reading for young people used to a starvation diet of rock-culture lewdness and "safe sex." Marriage begins with eros, but it disciplines eros, making way for the renewal of the species and the shared work of rearing children. This central mission enhances "the singular friendship and love of husband and wife. Precisely because . . . children are yours for a lifetime," they write, "this is a friendship that cannot be had with any other person. Uniquely, it is a friendship that does not fly from, but rather embraces wholeheartedly, the finitude of its members, affirming without resentment the truth of our human condition. Not by mistake did God create a woman—rather than a dialectic partner—to cure Adam's aloneness."

This exalted partnership, encompassing both the spiritual and the mundane, is what is captured in the title the editors have given their volume. It comes from Robert Frost's poem on his daughter's wedding, which ends: *Two such as you . . . / Cannot be parted nor be swept away / From one another once you are agreed / That life is only life forevermore / Together wing to wing and oar to oar*. Because marriage allows men and women to develop these higher possibilities, the young should be guided towards it. Courtship, unlike directionless dating and mating, is mutual inspection with a view to marriage. There is no resurrecting its vanished forms, but what can be done—what this volume helps to do—is cultivate insight, and thus inform behavior, rather than trusting solely to spontaneity in decisions so grave as whether and whom to marry.

It is possible to argue with the Kasses' emphasis on our present romantic chaos as a necessary consequence of modernity. High ideals, after all, are besmirched in every age; there is no escaping the waywardness of man. Certainly one could fill as fat an anthology as this one with the chronicles of conjugal catastrophe, going back, as this collection does, to the Hebrews and the Greeks. The Kasses themselves, moreover, do not despair. They are a happily married, modern, two-career couple. And far from giving up on the young, they have responded to the longings they detect in their students for "wholeness, for a life that is serious and deep," by searching the stores of civilization to assemble this wonderful anthology.

Leon and Amy Kass

Univ. of Notre Dame Press

As befits a book whose purpose is Socratic, they have organized their selections under interrogative headings: Where Are We Now? Why Marry? What About Sex? Is This Love? How Can I Find and Win the Right One? Why a Wedding? and What Can Married Life Be Like? Though enthusiastically pro-marriage, the volume is provocative, rather than prescriptive. For all their own high philosophical predilections—signaled by passages from Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Rousseau, Kant, and Kierkegaard—the editors have not excluded from their pages, for example, Benjamin Franklin's down-to-earth plea for "a Union of Minds, and a Sympathy of Affections; in a mutual Esteem and Friendship for each other in the highest Degree possible"; or anthropologist J.A. Pitt-Rivers's empirical account of family formation in a mountain community in contemporary Spain; or Charles Darwin's touching list of the pros and cons of marrying, written just two years before he mastered his fear that, once wed, he "should never know French,—or see the Continent,—or go to America, or go up in a Balloon, or take [a] solitary trip in Wales," and cast his happy lot with Emma Wedgwood.

Many of the entries, moreover, are not theoretical at all, but narrative. The process of self-discovery through courtship springs to life in the excruciatingly roundabout progress of Elizabeth Bennet and Darcy from first impressions to mutual love in Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*. The blessedness of domesticity (invisible or even repellent to the young) is conjured up by no less a master than Tolstoy, in the transformation of the lithe Natasha into Pierre's wife and a nursing mother in *War and Peace*. Loyalty cruelly tested finds its dazzling reward in the reunion of Penelope and her not exactly hearth-loving Odysseus after twenty years apart. I can't resist quoting from the Robert Fagles translation the Kasses use:

But the royal couple, once they'd reveled in all
the longed-for joys of love, reveled in each
other's stories,
the radiant woman telling of all she'd borne at
home. . . .
And great Odysseus told his wife of all the pains

he had dealt out to other men and all the hardships
he'd endured himself—his story first to last—
and she listened on, enchanted. . . .
Sleep never sealed her eyes till all was told.

Another strength of the anthology is that it has much to offer readers both secular and religious. *Wing to Wing, Oar to Oar* sets William Tucker's argument for monogamy based on sociobiology beside C.S. Lewis's Christian praise for erotic play as manifesting "our human participation in . . . the natural forces of life and fertility." It juxtaposes the Book of Genesis' account of Adam and Eve awakening to shame in their nakedness after the Fall with social theorist Kurt Riezler's "Comment on the Social Psychology of Shame," arguing that "Nature herself seems to connect sex with shame. . . . All peoples exclude the observer." But "mutual love banishes shame. . . . Without love, the companion becomes the observer. Shame decreases with increasing love."

In all this, the Kasses do not attempt to propound any new dating code. Instead, their selections indirectly illuminate the chasm that separates wooing aimed at marriage—interested as it is not just in sexual attractiveness but also in "attentiveness, dependability, care, exclusiveness, and fidelity"—from, say, flirting, seducing, trysting, hooking up, and indeterminate being "in a relationship." By breaking the cultural silence, as they put it, and exposing us to the wealth of our own cultural past, they enlarge our thinking on this literally vital theme.

In that, their book is an admirable first volume in the "Ethics of Everyday Life" series published through the University of Notre Dame Press under the auspices of the Institute of Religion and Public Life. *Wing to Wing, Oar to Oar* will soon be joined by anthologies on dying, edited by Richard John Neuhaus, on teaching and learning, edited by Mark Schwehn, on leading, edited by Timothy Fuller, and on working, edited by Gilbert C. Meilaender, each intended to spur the search for ordinary wisdom by which to live.

The great virtue of the Kasses' book—but also, it must be said, its limitation—is that it challenges the sophisticated reader with a sampling of the finest fruits of Western thought and literary art. In so doing, it points to the need for a companion volume, a less philosophical anthology on courting and marrying intended for readers not quite up to Kierkegaard; a shorter book that nevertheless raises the same essential questions, from texts accessible to high-school students, their mothers' book clubs, *Oprah* viewers, and the local adult Sunday School. Many of the Kasses' selections are well suited to this purpose (Sullivan Ballou's letter to Sarah, for example), and these could be supplemented from other sources. Precisely because the "Ethics of Everyday Life" project addresses a genuine and widespread need, its benefits should be extended beyond literary intellectuals. It should aspire to stimulate reflection wherever there are people who read—all of whom have a stake in the recovery of marriage. ♦

Clash Consciousness

Getting past the cliché that conflict is all that counts in American history. **BY GREGORY L. SCHNEIDER**

There's a consensus these days among the historians who ponder America's past and the pundits who ponder America's present. The trouble, claims Robert Booth Fowler in *Enduring Liberalism*, is that it's the wrong consensus—for what our intellectual classes agree upon is that there is no agreement in America. Our history and our current situation alike, it now seems universally held, are best interpreted not as examples of Americans' ability to forge a consensus, but as examples of Americans' inability to avoid conflict.

Enduring Liberalism
American Political Thought Since the 1960s
by Robert Booth Fowler
Univ. Press of Kansas, 336 pp., $35

Gone are the days when the prominent historian Daniel Boorstin could claim that "the genius of American politics" rests in the ability of the people to reject ideology. Intellectuals have given up on the ideal of consensus, held in high esteem by such 1950s critics as Lionel Trilling and Louis Hartz. Conflict rather than consensus, Fowler argues, is now routinely declared the great determining factor.

To a certain degree, American historiography has always cycled between interpreting history as consensus and interpreting it as conflict. The early progressive historians Vernon Parrington, Charles Beard, and Frederick Jackson Turner saw conflict emanating from the new industrial order in their own time, and they read that conflict back on the past—viewing the American Revolution, the Civil War, and western expansion as teeming with class conflicts that replicated their own progressive concerns.

By the 1920s, however, much of this conflict was muted politically, and even during the Great Depression radicals had a difficult time promoting their views of conflict. As the historian Richard Pells argued, the Depression signified a time of surprising consensus on cultural and social questions—and the way historians in the 1930s interpreted America's past tended to find in history further examples of American consensus. This was the cultural and intellectual hegemony that governed—with growing shakiness—

Gregory L. Schneider is an assistant professor of history at Emporia State University and author of Cadres for Conservatism: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of the Contemporary Right.

American thought from the 1940s through the 1950s. By the 1960s, however, racial issues, the Vietnam War, the conservative challenge, and identity politics ripped asunder the liberal consensus. The American story was reinterpreted as a tale of never-ending conflict.

But, Fowler goes on to suggest, even while American intellectuals have continued since the 1960s to reject the ideal of consensus, the American people have continued to embody that ideal. The general public remains committed to the pragmatic values of the liberal tradition of the 1950s and has adapted, perhaps too well, to the cultural changes of the 1960s. The task Fowler sets himself in *Enduring Liberalism* is thus to examine the gap between the beliefs of the intellectuals and the beliefs of the populace by focusing on the efforts of public intellectuals to find some new consensus.

Fowler argues that the hunt for this new consensus—a new formulation that will both capture the interest of the intellectual classes and explain the enduring features of American history—is being undertaken by such figures as Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel, Robert Bellah, Jean Bethke Elshtain, and William Bennett, to name just a few of those who appear in his pages. Diverse as they may seem, they actually form only three distinct camps or "redirections," Fowler claims: communitarianism, environmentalism, and the attempt to restore a civil society.

In the course of constructing this argument in *Enduring Liberalism*, Fowler, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, proves himself well read and well able to delineate the major intellectual forces at work in American political thought. In the end, however, his work leaves the reader with no good understanding of why so many intellectuals are confused—and that's because, in the end, Fowler himself remains confused.

The very idea of there being multiple candidates for consensus seems to imply the inescapable fact of conflict, and though no historical interpretation has ever persuasively eliminated the power of American consensus, no interpretation has ever eliminated the reality of American conflict, either. When Fowler labels himself "part Enlightenment liberal, part Burkean conservative, part Emersonian anarchist, and part religious existentialist," he has claimed a uniquely American mantle for himself. But coherent it's not, and it leaves the reader little hope that he can recommend some path out of our intellectual and cultural impasse.


Robert Booth Fowler

Univ. Press of Kansas

Fowler's personal beliefs lie with the communitarian "redirection," as he showed in his 1991 *The Dance With Community*. Unfortunately, as he explores communitarianism in *Enduring Liberalism*, it is the Hillary Clinton definition of community-through-the-state to which he falls prey. The American promise has been lost, Fowler argues, partly because of the identification of individualism with the free-market tradition that Alexis de Tocqueville saw as a weakness even in the early nineteenth century, and partly because of the liberationist ethos of the 1960s. But though he develops his attack on economic individualism, Fowler is far less critical than he should be of the 1960s liberationist ethos—which produced the identity politics that have gone a long way towards destroying the shared values for which he longs. It was exactly those identity politics that destroyed the Democrats' New Deal political coalition, which made the pluralist consensus of Boorstin and others possible.

And even that old consensus was never quite as absolute as *Enduring Liberalism* makes it seem. Fowler understands the major divisions among conservatives well enough, but he claims that conservative thought "provides scant ground for arguing against the existence of a broad ideological consensus" of liberalism in America. Noticeably absent from Fowler's discussion is the strongly anti-modern line of conservatism that was present even back in the 1920s with the "New Humanism" of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More—to say nothing of Richard Weaver's seminal *Ideas Have Consequences* or the Southern Agrarian line of communitarianism based on regionalism, advanced by the likes of Donald Davidson.

What Fowler really means by his conservatism-as-a-minor-form-of-liberalism is libertarianism, which, admittedly, has been a dominant political and economic thread among liberals and conservatives alike since the 1960s. Culturally, however, this libertarianism has had dire social costs—not the least of which is its weakening of the American consensus Fowler wants to rediscover. Whether the issue is abortion, separation of church and state, gender, or race, the atomization of the individual continues, and the lack of response among political leaders and intellectuals—their continuing effort to widen the gaps between us, best shown in identity politics, and the cynical triangulation of Bill Clinton—brings despair to a people who may share the same basic values but who lack the glue to hold together.

How wedded are the American people in fact to the consensus of liberal-individualism? Fowler argues that the mass of people accept most of what the intellectuals reject. But is liberal-individualism, cut off from community restraint, such a positive development? If not, how can individualism be restrained so it is virtuous, as the Founding Fathers desired, and not radically libertine?

Enduring Liberalism leaves us with few answers. But the author's desire to restore a community of "shared spiritual values" is not completely empty, and it may actually be a hopeful sign. Fowler, at least, is one intellectual who sees that spiritual values, not continued promulgation of an uncontainable liberal individualism, offer the best chance of addressing the problems confronting us—and turning our intellectuals from their current consensus about American conflict to a new consensus about American consensus. ♦

The Death of Us

How bioethics aims to undo ethics.

BY WESLEY J. SMITH

In just thirty years, bioethics has grown from a group of ruminating philosophers and theologians into one of the country's most fiercely secularized and influential intellectual forces. Bioethicists sit on presidential advisory commissions, teach in the most prestigious medical schools, lead hospital ethics committees, design treatment protocols, testify as expert witnesses, and engage in a myriad of other activities that are transforming American medicine.

The Definition of Death
Contemporary Controversies
edited by Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. Arnold, and Renie Schapiro.
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 346 pp., $54

Practitioners of bioethics are ever about the task of forging professional consensus on the major medical issues of the day. Toward that end, they like nothing better than a good intellectual squabble as they carefully sort through arcane philosophical points and policy minutiae. Indeed, they are contemporary equivalents of those proverbial medieval philosophers who argued bitterly over how many angels could dance on the head of a pin but who, despite their differences, shared an overarching worldview. Bioethics has similarly evolved into a relatively cohesive and robust movement—perhaps even an ideology.

Wesley J. Smith is a frequent contributor to The Weekly Standard. *His next book* The Culture of Death: The Destruction of Medical Ethics in America, *is forthcoming from Encounter Books.*

The major stream in bioethics explicitly rejects many of the core values of traditional Western medical ethics. The Hippocratic oath, for example, is dismissed as "paternalistic" and is now rarely administered to new doctors. The sanctity of human life is denigrated as "irrational." Religious values are tolerated and even embraced by some bioethicists, but are excluded from policy making as "divisive in a pluralistic society." As for objective concepts of right and wrong, bioethics is the epitome of relativism.

While constructing their "new medicine," bioethicists make much of the commitment to personal autonomy that led to the movement's most positive contribution: the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. But beneath their paeans to "choice" lie the foundational philosophical beliefs of the ideology: the utilitarian moral calculus and a relativistic "quality of life" approach to determining moral worth that, taken in tandem, create an explicit hierarchy of human life.

In bioethics ideology, what matters is not the "human community" but the "moral community" of "persons." Of course, the term "person" is generally supposed to be synonymous with "human being." But bioethicists use the term to distinguish "beings" of significant moral worth (which, for a minority, includes animals) from mere humans, a classification that they view as strictly biological. The status of personhood is earned by such "relevant characteristics" as self-awareness over time and cognitive capacity. Accordingly, newborn infants and patients in a coma or with severe brain damage or dementia are not persons and are thus of diminished moral status. Many bioethicists believe that such "nonpersons" can be treated in ways that would be immoral if done to persons—including denying them wanted medical treatment, killing them, experimenting upon them, and taking their organs.

It is in this context that readers should view the appearance of the recently published volume, *The Definition of Death*. Edited and written by some of the most notable bioethicists in the country, the twenty essays in the book form a dialogue that, true to its title, debates whether and how to obtain a new legal definition of death. This is no empty intellectual exercise. By broadening and subjectivizing death, most of the authors hope to redefine as already dead several classes of living human beings, with the goals of increasing organ procurement and increasing doctors' unilateral power to terminate wanted but expensive medical treatment.

Under current law, there are two sets of criteria that doctors may use to determine when a human being has died: irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions ("heart death") and irreversible destruction of neurological functions ("brain death"). Brain death occurs after every heart death, as the neural cells are deprived of oxygen. But brain death sometimes occurs *before* heart death, when medical technology artificially maintains circulation and respiration after a catastrophic brain injury. Without this medical intervention the loss of brain function would lead to an immediate cessation of breathing and swift cardiac arrest. But, through modern medical machinery, the lungs can be kept breathing and the blood circulating, keeping organs vital and better suited for transplantation. Indeed, organ pro-

curement was a primary reason for investigating whether brain death actually existed as an objective, biological reality.

Brain death has been relatively uncontroversial for twenty years and is recognized by law in all fifty states. But now, the concept is under increasing attack. Ironically the criticisms of brain death arise from two conflicting and paradoxical perspectives. One view, held primarily by right-to-life activists, is based on a strong belief in the sanctity of human life: Since the hearts of brain-dead people beat, other vital organs function, and wombs occasionally gestate, people who have been declared dead using neurological criteria are actually alive. The other less publicized—but far more dangerous criticism—rejects brain death as being ill defined and too narrowly drawn, thereby unduly limiting the supply of organs while people die waiting for transplants. It is this line that is presented in *The Definition of Death*.

Only one essay in the book vigorously supports the existence of brain death. Written by James Bernat, a neurology professor at Dartmouth University, the chapter makes the commonsense argument that "death is fundamentally a biological event" that "separates the process of dying from the process of bodily disintegration." Bernat defends brain death from criticisms that a non-functioning brain may have clusters of living neurons and may produce a hormone that prevents diabetes, asserting that these activities do not involve any critical functions of the brain. He contends that the primary problem with brain death isn't the condition but its proper diagnosis, noting that too many doctors fail to adhere "to quite specific protocols for determining [neurological] death."

Bernat's is a minority opinion. Most of the authors who write in *The Definition of Death* attack brain death in order to expand the categories of people who could be declared legally dead. Indeed, many of the authors explicitly reject death as an objective biological event and instead redefine it as a subjective social construct. The primary targets of an expanded definition of death are those who have been diagnosed as persistently unconscious—non-persons, in bioethics ideology—who possess organs ripe for the harvest. So Baruch A. Brody, the Leon Jaworski professor of biomedical ethics at Baylor College of Medicine, argues that death "is a process rather than an event":

> Consider the organism that suffers damage to its brain so that it is no longer conscious and can no longer engage in responsive voluntary movement. At some later stage, it loses the capacity to breathe on its own so that its respiration must be supported artificially. At a later stage, its capacity to regulate hormonal levels stops. Somewhere during this time period, its auditory pathways stop functioning. Finally its heart stops beating. Is it really meaningful to suppose that the organism died at some specific point in the process? . . . Isn't it more reasonable to say that the organism was fully alive before the chain of events began, is fully dead by the end of the chain of events, and is neither during the process?

You would never know it from his language, but Brody is speaking here of ill and dependent human beings, and he argues that life support for such people be "unilaterally withdrawn" and that "organs could be harvested at the stage in the process after the loss of cortical functioning when the organism can no longer breathe on its own." Society can be sold successfully on this new approach to dying, Brody believes, with arguments predicated upon our obligations to be good stewards of finite resources.

Robert M. Veatch, professor of medical ethics at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, who was one of the pioneers of the modern bioethics movement, views death as a "religious/philosophical/policy" issue rather than a "question of medical science." Creating a fixed definition of death is therefore oppressive because "the only way to have a single definition of death is for those in power to coerce others to use their preferred definition." Thus, "there may be no alternative but to tolerate multiple views" of when death occurs, meaning that people should be allowed to decide ahead of time when they are to be deemed dead, thereby transforming death into merely another issue of "choice."

On the surface, Veatch's approach seems mired in a hopeless notion of autonomy, but (as with the differing approaches of many of the authors in *The Definition of Death*) it is in fact premised upon a utilitarian calculus: If people were allowed to decide for themselves when they are dead, "organs could be procured that otherwise would not be available, . . . bodies could be used for research (assuming proper consent is obtained), and life insurance would pay off."

Norman Fost, director of the Program in Medical Ethics for the University of Wisconsin, goes further than most, questioning why we are worried about defining death at all. He writes, "My contention is that there is ample precedent in the law and good moral justification for removing organs from persons who are not legally dead."

Fost believes that requiring people to be dead before harvesting their organs (a current ethical requirement known as the "dead-donor rule") unduly limits the number procured. He asserts that organs should be harvested from people who are still alive. Among those Fost sees as appropriate to this procedure are ventilator-dependent patients diagnosed with permanent unconsciousness. Terminally ill but conscious people could also participate in having their organs harvested before they are actually dead "as part of their terminal care."

Before you dismiss these arguments as unthinkable and therefore of little real concern, you should remember that when bioethicists reach consensus on a biomedical ethics issue, it often becomes embedded into law and public policy. Fifteen years ago, bioethicists generally agreed that unconscious people should be allowed to have their feeding tubes removed in order that

they die. That procedure is now done to cognitively disabled people—conscious and unconscious—in every state. It was only about ten years ago that bioethicists and others began to talk seriously about legalizing physician-assisted suicide. Today, doctors legally prescribe poison to their terminally ill patients in Oregon, and serious legalization efforts are being mounted in Maine, California, and other states.

Arcane and dry, *The Definition of Death* will never make the bestseller lists. But the book is worth struggling through, for it illustrates the mindset and philosophical perspectives that underlie the modern bioethics movement.

In doing so, it provides an unintended service: warning us of the acute danger posed by bioethics to medical values and the essential morality of society. Indeed, for the most weak and vulnerable among us, preventing the new medicine envisioned by most of this book's authors is, quite literally, a matter of life and death. ♦

BCA

A Europe Whole and Free

Not politics, but ideas, drove the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe. **BY ARIEL DAVID ADESNIK**

When Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO on March 12, 1999, the proponents of expansion cheered loudly about the bright future of peace in Europe, while critics muttered darkly about a reckless provocation that would break down Russian democracy and incite bloody conflicts across the old Soviet bloc.

Ten months later, no one seems to care. Just weeks after enlisting in the alliance, the new states made America look good by backing the war effort in Kosovo. Now Americans look back on expansion as the most natural thing in the world. But in *Not Whether But When*, James Goldgeier insists that the 1999 NATO expansion was a major historical incident—in both external relations and internal politics. After all, "in the face of intense bureaucratic opposition, . . . how did the few supporters of NATO enlargement within the Clinton administration prevail? And why did a Republican-controlled Senate in a time of peace overwhelmingly consent to a Democratic president's initiative creating a new American defense commitment in Central Europe?"

Not Whether But When
The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO
by James M. Goldgeier
Brookings, 218 pp., $42.95

The answer, according to Goldgeier, is that National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke kept the issue alive long enough to push it over the top. They first won such influential converts as Strobe Talbott and President Clinton. And then, in a combined lobbying effort of the National Security Council and the State Department, they convinced the Republican Senate that NATO expansion would help deter any future Russian threat. When historians and columnists argued against expansion, the administration mobilized both the Polish-American community and the defense industry to make clear to the Senate the price of rejecting expansion.

Goldgeier's richly detailed account of insider politicking marvelously captures the ambivalence, conflict, and confusion behind any such decision. The one question left unanswered is "Why?" Why did Lake and Holbrooke support expansion? Why were State and Defense opposed? Why were the nation's leading historians and columnists dead set against it? Goldgeier rejects the idea that "where you sit is where you stand"—the notion that everything can be explained by bureaucratic jealousies. And he rejects the assertion that officials pushed through NATO expansion to win ethnic Polish, Hungarian, and Czech votes. Political considerations received little attention until after the administration decided on expansion.

In the end, Goldgeier argues, the views of senior officials derived mostly from what they thought about Russia. For those like Zbigniew Brzezinski who believed that Russia remained a threat, NATO expansion was a must. For those like Anthony Lake who believed that promoting democracy should be the guiding principle of our foreign policy, expansion was also a must. But for those like Secretary of Defense William Perry who believed that a strategic partnership with Russia was the foundation of European security, NATO expansion was misguided if not dangerous.

When it comes to the president, however, Goldgeier draws on psychological studies, as well as interviews with administration officials, to claim that Clinton deluded himself into believing that expansion would not preclude better relations with Russia. Is this right? In 1993, Yeltsin attacked his own parliament with tanks and artillery. To propose expansion at that moment might have provoked a backlash in Russia while discrediting the advocates of enlarging NATO. Yet after Yeltsin won reelection in 1996, Clinton announced that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic would join NATO before the end of the decade. Did the president come to his 1996 position as a result of the ideas of some members of his administration, or was he responding to events in Russia? By focusing on bureaucratic politics, *Not Whether But When* avoids answering this question.

In fact, the ideas and events we need to examine go back long before the col-

Ariel David Adesnik is a junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

lapse of eastern European communism in 1989. The twinning of strategic and ideological objectives has always been a hallmark of American foreign policy, and even though NATO came into being in response to the Soviet threat, its strategic mission was never distinct from its ideological mission. The driving force behind NATO expansion in the 1990s is not just Goldgeier's bureaucratic politicking, but the alliance's long-standing interest in sharing its commitment to democracy.

The first third of *Not Whether But When* traces the competition to determine the contents of Clinton's speech at the NATO summit in January 1994. With the exception of Lake and his few allies, all administration officials wanted Clinton to present the Partnership for Peace—a limited military cooperation between the United States and the old Soviet bloc—as the last word on European security. In the end, the president compromised, stating that the partnership was a precursor to expansion, but declining to set a timetable or name prospective members.

Things began to shift when Holbrooke became assistant secretary of state in August 1994. As Goldgeier puts it, Holbrooke was the "enforcer" who made the reluctant officials at State take concrete steps toward expansion. Ironically, the man responsible for recruiting Holbrooke was Strobe Talbott, whose fear of a backlash in Russia prevented Clinton from making a bold statement at the 1994 NATO summit. But if Talbott knew that Holbrooke favored expansion, why did he bring him in? Moreover, why did Talbott take over Holbrooke's role as "enforcer" in 1995 after Holbrooke departed for Bosnia to negotiate a peace accord?

Goldgeier argues that Talbott became more sympathetic to NATO expansion after being promoted from ambassador to the former Soviet Union to deputy secretary of state, a position that entailed responsibility for European as well as Russian affairs. This is only half an answer, for it ignores the effect on Talbott of changing conditions in Europe. After Yeltsin consolidated his power and led Russia into the Partnership for Peace in May 1995, concerns about a Russian backlash diminished. The signing of the Dayton Accords in late 1995 seemed to have answered the Yugoslavian question. And so, after Yeltsin's reelection in June 1996, America took the decisive step of providing a timetable for expansion and naming Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as candidates for membership.

One begins to wonder what Goldgeier meant by "intense bureaucratic opposition" to expansion, for the rapid progress made on expansion in 1995 and 1996 provoked no strong reactions from within the administration. Even when writers challenged expansion in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy*, its former opponents at State and Defense remained silent. If Warren Christopher, William Perry, and John Shalikashvili thought NATO expansion was a bad idea, why didn't they mount a passionate campaign to convince Clinton of that? As with Talbott, positive trends in Russia and Yugoslavia may have allayed their fears of an anti-NATO backlash. But, more, their silence suggests that they shared the fundamental premise of NATO expansion: that the United States' mission is to embrace and protect those nations that share its values. With Russia stabilized, there was no reason not to pursue this historic agenda.

America's ideology and image are intangible but nonetheless real strategic assets—no less real than advanced weaponry or a booming economy.

Expansion's opponents in the Senate mounted as lackluster a campaign as their counterparts in the administration. In 1997, North Carolina's Jesse Helms pressed Madeleine Albright, the new secretary of state, merely to assure him that Russia would have no influence over NATO's affairs. Missouri's John Ashcroft introduced an amendment to prevent an expanded NATO from taking actions other than defending its own territory, but ninety senators voted for a counter-amendment that approved intervention in ethnic conflicts. Some senators challenged the cost estimates the administration provided, but what no one suggested was that the United States should not, if possible, protect the new Polish, Hungarian, and Czech democracies. The Senate ratified expansion with an 80 to 19 vote.

The task ahead for historians and political scientists is to produce an account that illuminates the ideas behind NATO expansion as impressively as Goldgeier's work illuminates the bureaucratic politics—for it is an ideological belief in democracy, more than anything else, that made the United States initiate expansion at a time when its European allies remained lethargic. Of course, even while it was committed to a belief that the United States should pursue ideological ends, the administration was equally committed to the anti-ideological methods of *realpolitik*. And there are dangers precisely in the fact that our current commitment to democracy—for the likes of Lake, Holbrooke, and Talbott—is only partial.

When the United States pushes for democracy even without clear strategic interests at stake, it earns the respect of its allies, as well as that of reformers and dissidents across the globe. The United States' ideology and image are intangible but nonetheless real strategic assets no less important than advanced weaponry or a booming economy. The insistence of Lake, Holbrooke, Talbott, and others on preaching ideas but practicing *realpolitik* prevents them from recognizing this.

Yet for as long as Chinese students want to raise the Statue of Liberty on their shoulders in Beijing and for as long as Islamic radicals torch the American flag in Tehran, ideology and image will serve alongside armed and economic might as the strategic foundation of the lone superpower. ♦

AP / Wide World Photos

See Spock Run

Why Star Trek *lives long and prospers.*

BY JOHN PODHORETZ

Has there ever been an American subculture as benign as that shared by the fans of the 1960s television series *Star Trek*? Its members don't hurt anybody, they don't make a mess, and they pay their taxes. And yet for twenty-five years now, they have been the objects of merciless sport because they have a passion for an indifferently acted and cheesy old TV show. The teasing culminated in 1987 in a memorable *Saturday Night Live* skit in which *Star Trek*'s star, William Shatner, berated his fans, "Get a life, will you, people?"

But it turns out that the Trekkies have a sense of humor. They loved the sketch, and Shatner later published a book called *Get a Life!* in tribute to them. Now they and Shatner (as well as the other performers on the show who have simultaneously been immortalized and trapped by their roles) have become the subjects of two modest but delightfully inventive movies.

One is a big-budget adventure comedy called *Galaxy Quest* that was released to little fanfare six weeks ago as Hollywood was spewing an enormous number of Oscar-contending films into the marketplace. The other is an unexpectedly touching documentary called *Trekkies* that has just come out on video.

John Podhoretz is a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard *and a columnist for the* New York Post.

In *Galaxy Quest*, the funniest American movie in current release, the bickering cast of a long-canceled science-fiction show (led by Tim Allen, who does a hilarious riff on Shatner) are transported into space by aliens who don't know they're actors and need help against an intergalactic menace.

Roger Nygard's *Trekkies* is a nimble journey into inner space—the world of *Star Trek* fandom, which began in 1972 with a convention in New York whose organizers expected three hundred attendees but found themselves in a near-riot when more than three thousand showed up. *Star Trek* conventions, which now occur every weekend of every year, offer a social life and a reason to travel for such contented eccentrics as Dennis Bourguignon, a Florida dentist who has turned his office into a replica of the show's starship, the *Enterprise* (his patients like it because it takes their minds off the drilling). Perhaps *Star Trek*'s most notorious fan is Barbara Adams, the juror in one of the Whitewater trials who insisted on showing up every day in her *Star Trek* uniform because, as she explains in *Trekkies*, she considers herself an officer of the United Federation of Planets and thus has a responsibility to perform "community service" in dress blues (she was eventually booted off the jury).

The *Star Trek* conventions became such a phenomenon in the 1970s that they helped bring the moribund show back to life. Since 1979, Paramount has made nine *Star Trek* movies with a combined worldwide gross of more than $1 billion. The online bookseller Amazon.com lists more than a thousand *Star Trek* titles. There have been three spin-off TV series, each of which has produced many more episodes than its originator.

Obviously, Trekkies aren't the only ones doing the watching and the buying here. *Star Trek* has lived long and prospered because it has been saying something to Americans for thirty years now that they have desperately wanted to hear. The show promoted an idealistic vision of the United States as an exporter of democracy and freedom at a time when the idea was so derided that it could only be expressed in the context of a television program set four centuries in the future.

The *Star Trek* television programs of the 1980s and 1990s—*The Next Generation*, *Deep Space Nine*, and *Voyager*—were far more sophisticated in writing, acting, and presentation than the original series. But they had nothing like its cultural impact, because they were consumed by Hollywood's obsessive multiculturalism and pacifism.

On the original series, the captain and crew of the *Enterprise* were apostles of 1960s-style liberal internationalism, on a five-year mission to export American democratic principles to "new civilizations" that needed them. It's true that they were supposed to hew to a doctrine called the "prime directive," which prohibited interfering with the internal workings of those civilizations. But, of course, they couldn't help interfering, because our ideas were just so good. And when challenged, they fought—fought the Soviet-like Klingons and the Chinese-like Romulans when they sought to impose totalitarianism on the galaxy.

Star Trek offered Americans a vision of a robust and self-confident nation just when they needed it most, and that's why the people have such fond feelings for the show even now. And why the people who remain so dedicated to it for reasons that surpasseth all reason deserve a break. ♦

Town Meeting Transcript, Columbia, South Carolina, February 13, 2000

so I hope I can count on you on the 19th. (Applause.) Now I'd be honored to take your questions.

Audience Member A: Senator McCain, first I'd like to say it's a privilege to be able to talk with you this way. Your heroism during the Vietnam war was really...

McCain: Hey, it doesn't take any skill to get shot down. Heh, heh, heh. I don't like to talk about all that stuff. Just go on with your question and let's talk about the future of our country.

Audience Member A: Well, actually my question was about prescription drugs. The price of drugs is skyrocketing, and I'm not sure I've heard you articulate a detailed plan for taking care of this problem for needy seniors.

McCain: I'm glad you asked that, because as you were talking it occurred to me that we didn't have any drugs when I was sitting there at the Hanoi Hilton, prescription or otherwise. And if maybe some doctor had prescribed some pain killers I don't think we'd have gone whining about the cost when we had our shoulder blades sticking out into the air. So let me just say I understand the problems you're talking about and I'm always going to be straight with you. I'm always going to tell you the truth, whether you agree with it or not. Thanks for your question.

Audience Member B: Senator, I'm really concerned about urban sprawl and deforestation. And I have to say, Senator, your environmental record has me troubled. You don't seem to have shown any concern for our old growth forests.

McCain: Well ma'am, I don't like to talk about it, but let me just say that when you're sitting there in a bamboo cage in a North Vietnamese prison for a few years you get to be pretty intimate with forest products. And maybe the next time you have one of your Greenpeace Saturday afternoon outings chaining yourself to some Redwood somewhere maybe you ought to think about what it's like being chained to a tree for five and a half years. So my concern is there, and with your help I'm going to take on the special interests that lead to needless tree felling or whatever it is you call it. Lumberjacking. And another thing, on Chechnya. That's a dangerous situation there and we've got to have somebody in the White House who'll stand up to the Russians and tell them to cut it out. So I hope I've answered your question.

Audience Member C: Sir, South Carolina Republicans are divided about the use of the Confederate symbol that flies over our state capitol. Most politicians try to dodge this issue, but I was wondering if you, as the captain of the Straight Talk Express, could give us a straight answer on whether you support the current flag or not.

McCain: That's a great question and I'm going to give you a straight answer. Because I realize how important flags can be. Saw a lot of my buddies buried under 'em. I recall one year while I was in captivity—hate to bring it up, but there were so many who were greater heroes than me—and we in the cell carved American flags into our chests just to spite our North Vietnamese captors. That's the kind of president I hope to be. The kind who'll always be straight with the American people. Taking on the special interests. Ready to be president on day one. Conservative. Really conservative. So I hope I can count on your support. Thank you very much. (Exits.)