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**THE
GOOD
FIGHT**

**In Defense of the
House Republicans
DAVID FRUM • THE EDITORS**



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GRASSY KNOLL LIBERALS

THE SCRAPBOOK is now going to reveal for the first time esoteric knowledge that is shared by all American conservatives, imparted to us during adolescence by our elders.

Here's the secret: *There is no right-wing conspiracy in America.* Sometimes right-wingers, including THE SCRAPBOOK, wish that there were such a conspiracy, especially one with the power to topple presidents. But it doesn't exist. We just enjoy watching liberals try to find it. When E.J. Dionne Jr. writes, as he did in his *Washington Post* column last week, that "Hillary Clinton didn't invent that 'secret clique'"—that it really exists and is powerful—we snicker, because we know that, yes, she did invent it. It was a paranoid fantasy of hers and Sid "Grassy Knoll" Blumenthal's. The fact that her words are taken seriously, and

that liberal investigative reporters have devoted huge amounts of time to uncovering the non-existent conspiracy, only makes it more amusing. The voyeuristic thrill of watching liberal reporters claim to reveal the inner workings of American conservatism—THE SCRAPBOOK can now reveal—is one of the few guilty pleasures available to conservatives these days.

Dionne was taken in by a story that ran on the front page of the *New York Times* Sunday before last. And, to be fair, it was an impressive sounding story: The two reporters had uncovered "a small secret clique of lawyers" who "share a deep antipathy toward the President" and worked "quietly" on Paula Jones's sexual harassment lawsuit against the president, helping "push the case" into the office of the independent counsel.

But the narrative of the *Times* story is deeply confusing, as efforts to explain non-existent conspiracies tend to be. What the reporters actually seem to have uncovered, indirectly, is the sociological reality that elite American law firms have a suffocatingly liberal culture. The "cliquishness" and "secrecy" and "quietness" of the lawyers who helped Paula Jones's legal team reveal not a conspiracy but the facts that a) having anything to do with a lawsuit against Bill Clinton is a career killer at white-shoe law firms and b) there are so few top-drawer conservative lawyers in America, they all tend to know each other.

Meanwhile, THE SCRAPBOOK is still awaiting an explanation of how the Clinton-hating right-wingers managed to recruit Monica Lewinsky for her crucial role in the conspiracy.

NIGGLING OVER NIGGARDLY

After overseeing the 1,600 volunteers in Anthony Williams's victorious mayoral campaign, David Howard was appointed to be the District of Columbia's public advocate. On January 15, about two weeks into his new job, Howard, who happens to be white, told two members of his staff that, given the lack of funds, he was going to have to be "niggardly" (which means stingy, miserly). His staff, ignorant of the word's meaning or just sensing an opportunity to make trouble, mistook it for a racial slur and spread inflammatory rumors that Howard had used the other *n* word. Howard, in a caricature of self-abasing liberalism, resigned after apologizing to his spiteful subordinates. And the new black mayor, striking a pose of spineless racial posturing, accepted.

By quitting, Howard missed a chance to rebut this new version of the old but effective propaganda that

racism is born of ignorance: The victim of racism now apparently has no responsibility to distinguish between the ignorance of others and his own. If it feels racist, it is.

But the real lost opportunity was Williams's. Only three weeks in office, he had already been accused in an amazingly demagogic *Washington Post* op-ed of being insufficiently black. Faced with his first public controversy, he buckled. The "niggardly" flap was a pathetic parody of racial protest, but Williams's weakness in responding to it was the real thing. He will no doubt now be hounded throughout his term by opportunistic hectoring.

For D.C., one of the few cities in America where one comes across public property spraypainted with swastikas, the Howard story is only the most recent example of reaping what you sow. But that's not the whole story. David Howard, it was reported two days

Scrapbook



Rodney, the panelists issued a “call to understanding” to seek “the kind of catharsis that is the beginning of healing.” Alliance executive director C. Welton Gaddy went on to discourage “harmful diatribes attacking the integrity of opponents’ faiths.”

Unless of course, that opponent is the Christian Coalition, for which the Interfaith Alliance bills itself the antidote. While purporting to be a nonpartisan foundation of clergy (the membership ranges from the ultra-liberal Philip Wogaman, Clinton’s pastor, to the ultra-liberal minister Robert Meneilly, who likened the religious Right to Hitlerism), the Alliance rarely passes up a chance to beat the heck out of God’s children on the right in as uncivil a manner as possible. Of the 64 press releases that are on the Alliance’s Web site, a full 85 percent attack the religious Right in some fashion.

“Civility,” it turns out, is just liberal aggression in disguise.

WARDING OFF BUSH

Last week, as THE SCRAPBOOK reported, Governor Jeb Bush accused California civil rights leader Ward Connerly of wanting a “war.” Connerly had come to Florida to promote a ballot initiative ending racial preferences in the state, modeled on his successful effort in California. Bush, amazingly, maintained that Florida had no such preferences—despite a report by a Florida-based think tank demonstrating quotas in Florida’s law and medical schools.

This week, Connerly ably struck back in a respectful but firm letter to Bush. Some highlights: “I was disappointed to hear you characterize me as wanting a ‘war.’ Nothing can be further from the truth. I and millions of my fellow Americans want our leaders to responsibly guide us to a solution born out of good will and common values of equal treatment under the law.”

“Our educational foundation, the American Civil Rights Institute, is willing to hire a respected, independent consultant to review the laws and policies of Florida state government . . . [to] verify whether preferences based on race and gender exist. If evidence is presented that proves that Florida’s government or its subdivisions practice race or gender preferences, would you unequivocally and unqualifiedly denounce such state-sanctioned discrimination?” Good question.

into the flap, was the highest ranking openly gay member of the new government. D.C.’s gay rights groups, black and white, have rallied to his cause, arguing correctly that his resignation was wrongly accepted. No longer just a white guy with a big vocabulary, he is a representative of another special interest group, a trump card in the game of D.C. identity politics. Mayor Williams has now said that he is looking to rehire David Howard.

AGGRESSIVE CIVILITY

At last week’s “National Religious Leaders’ Summit on Civility,” an ecumenical panel of clergy addressed impeachment-era incivility at a forum sponsored by the Interfaith Alliance in one of the Senate office buildings. Groggy religion reporters were nerfed senseless with the sponge bats of “civil discourse.” Citing such great civility sages of our time as Stephen Carter, Mo Udall, and the Kings, Martin Luther and

Casual

ARMS AND THE MAN

Reading all the accounts of Joe DiMaggio's brave battle with illness has led me to recall the time when he and I corresponded, hitter to hitter. It was through my Uncle Irvin that we hooked up.

Although the war cost him his shot at the big leagues, Irvin was by many accounts the greatest baseball player in the history of Lynn, Mass. He had starred for the semiprofessional Lynn Frasers and played in the Cape Cod League alongside Birdie Tebbets and Yogi Berra, and even knew many Negro League stars. He could run, bunt, and hit for power, and got offered a contract by the Boston Braves. Irvin carried in his wallet a taped-up newspaper clipping in which National League umpire Artie Gore described him as "pound for pound, the greatest ballplayer I ever saw."

When I was 11, Irvin intervened to rescue me from a serious crisis. The crisis was: I couldn't hit for beans. Given that I was planning to spend the next three decades playing left field for the Boston Red Sox, this non-hitting jeopardized not just my standing with my friends but also my future livelihood. Irvin started coming to the house daily.

You could see where Artie Gore got that "pound-for-pound" trope. Irvin was only five-four or five-five. While he'd added a few pounds in

the years since he'd played, he was still quick as a cat. With his left hand holding an imaginary bat, Irvin would point his right index finger at me and start to twirl it frantically. He'd glare at me and intone, as if pronouncing a curse,

"You see the spin onnat ball." (The twirling finger was supposed to indicate a wicked overhand curve, though the pitching I was then failing to hit was only 2-3 m.p.h. this side of

underhand.) "You see the spin an' you see the stitches an' then . . ." Having pulled his right hand back, he now brought both hands around

in a lightning-fast pantomime swing and said, "Whoompf!" He cocked his head up and you could imagine a pantomime ball rocketing out of our backyard.

Then Irvin said, "Let's open up your stance." He got me to squat down and stick my foot out and wiggle the bat high above my head, as if it were a rope I was hanging from. "There!" he said. "You look like Vern Stephens." Vern Stephens was a power-hitting short stop who had played for the Red Sox decades before, but I didn't know that. The way Irvin had me standing, I assumed Vern Stephens was a local seamstress.

My next few games were tense. Opposing teams yelled, "Whassa

matta, batta batta batta?" My dad and my grandfather leaned intently on the chain link fence, smoking cigars. My Uncle Irvin sat in the bleachers yelling "Whoompf! . . . Whoompf! . . ."

And I stood at the plate, going: *Whiff . . . whiff*. When I made contact, I tapped anemic bloopers to the second baseman. But that was the point, Irvin said. Those bloopers would turn into triples to the right-field gap, as soon as I developed mammoth arms and wrists like his own.

"How do I do *that*?" I asked. At this point I weighed about 72 pounds.

"Let's see," Irvin said. "Why don't you ask . . . Joe DiMaggio?" Irvin dropped the name like it was a friend at City Hall. "Yeah, Joe DiMaggio. He has strong arms and wrists, very strong."

My faith in Irvin was unshakable. I sent off a letter addressed to "Joe DiMaggio, San Francisco, California." When I got home from school four days later (where have you gone, U.S. Postal Service?), a manila envelope was on the kitchen table. It had a "Swingin' A's" return-address and "DiMaggio" scribbled next to it. The note inside, accompanied by a real nice autographed picture, read:

Dear Chris,


I have no special exercise for strengthening the arms or wrists.

Joe

I keep it on my wall to this day. As a reminder of what might have been. If Joe had been a little more forthcoming in the arm-and-wrist department, things would have been different. I'd've been standing at the plate in Fenway with my foot in the bucket and my bat wagging ridiculously above my head. I'd've seen the spin on that ball and, with a sweep of my mighty arms and wrists . . .

Whoompf!

CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL



A NEW JUICE IS LOOSE

The editors correctly describe President Clinton's strategy of jury nullification by Senate Democrats ("Jury Nullification in the Senate?" Jan. 25). Yet Clinton's best interests lie elsewhere. It is not enough that the president escape conviction, that he be merely "not guilty." To govern, the president must be innocent.

Presidential authority is as much moral as it is constitutional. A non-defense by the president coupled with a refusal by Senate Democrats to convict under any circumstances leaves the remnants of Clinton's moral authority in tatters, taking with it that of the once-proud Democratic party.

If Clinton wishes to retain the presidency's power along with the title, he must testify in the Senate and demonstrate his innocence of the substantial—not to mention well-substantiated—charges against him. Otherwise, though he may retain office, Clinton will be left much as that other famous beneficiary of jury nullification, O.J. Simpson, was: innocent in no one's mind but his own.

ANDREW G. BIGGS
WASHINGTON, DC

ANSWER "THE QUESTION"

David Frum's piece on politicians dealing with the adultery question was a huge disappointment ("Answering 'The Question,'" Jan. 18). If a person is asked if he or she has ever committed adultery, saying "No" is the only proper response. Why is it unacceptable to simply tell the truth? It need not be trumpeted from the hills as an outstanding accomplishment; that would minimize, not amplify, the message. Quiet affirmations about living a respectable life are necessary and serve as compass points for our peers and our children.

JEAN-MARIE BOULANGER
WATERFORD, WI

Having long esteemed David Frum, I was surprised to find myself disagreeing with much of his article about public discussions of adultery.

Frankly, I was depressed by Frum's suggestion that this would be comparable to revealing that you scored 1600 on your SATs. Anybody who would put on airs because he had complied with this most minimal of moral requirements would be beyond pathetic. It would be like bragging about being literate or being able to tie your shoes. Being faithful to your spouse is, quite simply, the least you can do. Yet Frum speaks of it as though it were a species of heroic virtue—and Frum is one of the good guys. If even they have gotten used to thinking in such terms, I fear the cancer is indeed in our bones.

C.H. ROSS
NASHVILLE, TN



SECOND BEST

Jonathan V. Last's conclusion that Michael Jordan is "the greatest athlete, the most ruthless competitor—the best—the world has ever known" goes too far ("The Best," Jan. 25). Jordan's will to win is awe-inspiring, but his record as a winner is no more impressive than is that of Gretzky, DiMaggio, or Mantle. Jordan has even collected fewer basketball titles than Bill Russell.

And as an athlete, Jordan cannot hold a candle to Wilt Chamberlain, who was bigger, stronger, and nearly as agile. The record speaks for itself: Chamberlain scored more, rebounded more, and blocked more shots. And contrary to legend, Chamberlain's assist

totals show that he was at least as unselfish as Jordan.

Finally, Jordan did not win his rings alone—Scottie Pippen's presence was critical. In fact, the Bulls without Jordan, but with Pippen and Horace Grant, were more successful than the Bulls with Jordan, but without Pippen and Grant.

CRAIG D. HENRY
WAUNAKEE, WI

NO PILLAR OF VIRTUE

Richard J. Mouw identifies the theology he writes about as "Calvinist," but a bit more precision is in order ("The Protestant Theology of Abraham Kuyper," Jan. 4/Jan. 11). The national church is known as the Hervormde Kerk, "re-formed" after the French occupation ended in 1816; and the various dissident sects are called *gereformeerd*, "reformed." Kuyper started his political career by bringing together two of these sects, giving him some 600,000 super-Calvinists as a base. He then joined with Herman Schaepman, a priest-politician, in working for a Christian coalition.

As prime minister of a Christian government, Kuyper accomplished little, but in the words of a Dutch-language biography, he "initiated a completely new period, preparing the ground for future cabinets." Under Dutch democracy, perquisites reserved for the state church were not abolished but rather prorated among other churches and, eventually, humanist and socialist organizations.

The system that evolved is called *verzuiling*, from *zuil*, or "pillar." Radiating out from the churches, each pillar was built on a three-part base of school, political party, and newspaper, and each of these expanded virtually without limit. For example, education not only ranged from kindergarten through university, but included also trade schools, libraries, reading rooms, cultural and neighborhood clubs, and societies devoted to sports, gymnastics, movies, music, dancing, crafts, and travel. A Dutch professor, J.P. Kruijt, commented in a book on pillarization that one could more easily cite the few areas of life "not (yet) pillarized" than list all those that were.

When my wife and I lived in Ams-

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terdam in the 1950s, our landlady, a Catholic, mentioned that she had seen us coming out of a Protestant-owned department store. She understood that as Americans we did not know better, but she assumed that once warned we would adapt to the Dutch norm of avoiding *andersdenkenden*, persons in another pillar.

Whether during the decades that Kuyper's political maxims were followed or during the subsequent years when a general rebellion against Kuyperism set the tone, this is not a model I would advise we follow.

WILLIAM PETERSEN
CARMEL, CA

TECHNO RADICALS

James W. Ceaser's review of Virginia Postrel's *The Future and Its Enemies* makes clear that Postrel sees Pat Buchanan as an enemy of spontaneous growth because he opposes the new world order ("Forward to the Future," Jan. 18). But Buchanan's main complaint about what is sold as "free trade" is that it isn't free, but rather is part of an emerging globalized central economy. Sure, the average American is left to fend for himself, but trade between nations is regulated by treaties enforced by global agencies. And when Wall Street comes close to having to suffer the effects of a free economy, the government takes some more money from the taxpayer to cover its losses through IMF bailouts.

If Libertarians were really in favor of spontaneous growth, they would call for the removal of all government props of the economy. Let the people who run corporations into the ground suffer along with their employees and creditors so that the deadwood can be cleared away from the economy and true spontaneous growth may happen.

DON SHENK
ALLENTOWN, PA

USELESS ITEMS

David M. Smick apparently believes that a recession is imminent ("Recession Ahead?" Jan. 18). Perhaps it is, but his evidence of it appears to be shaky.

For instance, Smick notes that cur-

rently we are still in an expansion. Rather than denoting the international sector as being, perhaps, too weak to support our continued expansion, he focuses on America's manufacturing sector as being "close to recessionary conditions." Moreover, he points to "unused industrial capacity . . . growing at a time when employment and consumer demand remain strong."

These data, in earlier times, would indeed have indicated a buying frenzy, even as we blithely made our way into Recession-ville. However, another more likely interpretation can be found elsewhere. One can reconcile an increase in employment and consumer demand with rising unused industrial capacity by arguing that the United States is leaving its manufacturing sector and expanding into new information and technological areas—sectors whose productivity is not based on the manufacturing of "items." This is why employment is rising at the same time that unused industrial capacity is too. Our trade deficit widens, and consumer demand expands, because the manufacturing of consumer items is now taking place overseas.

BRYAN TAPLITS
CINCINNATI, OH

THE FATHER PROBLEM

John A. Barnes's otherwise fine article on child abuse in the homes of single mothers contains one questionable statement and one serious omission ("The Boyfriend Problem," Dec. 14). While "in absolute numbers, far more children are abused by their parents than by anyone else," this too takes place overwhelmingly in single-parent homes. The natural parents who abuse children are mostly single mothers. According to a major study recently released by the Department of Health and Human Services in 1996, women aged 20 to 49 were almost twice as likely as men to be perpetrators of child maltreatment. "It is estimated that . . . almost two-thirds [of child abusers] were females," the report states.

As Barnes rightly suggests, "male" perpetrators are not likely to be fathers but rather boyfriends and stepfathers. So fathers emerge as the least likely child abusers. Mothers accounted for 55 percent of child murders according

to a Heritage Foundation study two years ago (1,100 out of 2,000 child murders, with fathers committing 130). Maggie Gallagher summarizes the reality most accurately in her 1996 book *The Abolition of Marriage*: "The person most likely to abuse a child physically is a single mother. The person most likely to abuse a child sexually is the mother's boyfriend or second husband. . . . Divorce, though usually portrayed as a protection against domestic violence, is far more frequently a contributing cause." The hard, politically incorrect truth is that a child's natural protector is his or her father, and not only from "men who are not their fathers."

The serious question then emerges of where the father is throughout this horror. The all-too-easy assumption that he has skipped out on the family does not bear scrutiny. Throughout this country, many thousands, possibly millions, of fathers sit by helpless and anguished as their children are abused by Mom and her boyfriend, and they are under court orders to stay away on pain of incarceration. Insofar as family courts and other agents of the state are the creators of single-parent homes, they are also the leading causes of child abuse. From the standpoint of the father, it might appear that the abusers have thrown him out of the family so they can abuse his children with impunity. The bottom line is that this is an urgent civil-rights issue that might well be remedied not by elaborate social engineering, but by the old-fashioned formula of enforcing the constitutional right of fathers and children not to be ripped apart.

STEPHEN BASKERVILLE
WASHINGTON, DC

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THE HYDE REPUBLICANS

Will Republicans pay a price for impeaching the president in the House and carrying through with a trial in the Senate?

Who knows? It's certainly true that the Republican party, in its belief that Bill Clinton should be removed from office, is at odds with the majority of the American people. It's true as well that the Republican party's approval rating has dropped in recent months and trails that of the Democrats.

But it's also the case that in a recent Zogby poll Republicans ran even with the Democrats in a congressional ballot test. And the likely Republican standard bearer in 2000, George W. Bush, consistently leads Vice President Al Gore in presidential trial heats. Surely if the GOP were in as severe a meltdown as the *New York Times* insists, the prospective Republican presidential candidate—the party's most visible representative in the most important forthcoming election—would be paying a price in the polls.

Current polls, of course, probably tell us nothing about what is likely to happen 21 months from now. Once the threat of removal disappears, after all, Clinton's numbers may start to slide, as Americans who have rallied to him for don't-rock-the-boat reasons, or from hostility to his accusers, start to drift away. Even if impeachment is an issue in November 2000, it's hard to predict who will be better off, the pro-impeachment party or the pro-Clinton party.

But for now, Republicans are pro-impeachment and anti-Clinton. And what this means is that for now the leader of the Republican party is not the speaker of the House, nor the majority leader of the Senate, nor any of the prospective presidential candidates. It's Henry Hyde. And Republicans should be proud to stand with Henry Hyde against Bill Clinton.

The Democrats have stood with Clinton. That has meant minimizing the importance of perjury; appealing to public opinion to trump the law and Constitution; allying themselves with a politician of considerable gifts but of low character. To stand with Henry Hyde, by contrast, is to be allied with an honorable

politician and an impressive man.

Two of Hyde's comments—off-the-cuff remarks made during the senators' question period on Friday and Saturday, January 22-23—stand out. That first day, Hyde was arguing against the Senate's temptation to treat the articles of impeachment cavalierly: "I know, oh do I know," he said, "what an annoyance we are in the bosom of this great body. But we're a constitutional annoyance, and I remind you of that fact." In our time, when so many look to convenience rather than to the Constitution, when so many talk of exit strategies rather than of duties, it is refreshing, and important, for a political leader to defend the primacy of constitutional obligations—even, or especially, when they are "annoying."

Hyde's other striking comment came the next day: "There are issues of transcendent importance that you have to be willing to lose your office over. I would think of several that I am willing to lose my office over. Abortion is one. National defense is another. Strengthening, not emasculating the concept of equal justice under law . . ."

Leaving aside the rarity of a politician's being willing to lose office over anything, the irony is that Hyde here lays out, *en passant*, the core of a Republican agenda for 2000: defending the country, defending the Constitution, and defending the unborn. After all, the real problem afflicting the Republican party today is not impeachment. It's everything but impeachment. It's Republicans' failure to come to grips with the true issues of the day, their inability to figure out how to oppose a superficially alluring Clintonism. Hyde, in his offhand articulation of what really matters, does more to help in that task than a whole bevy of other Republican leaders have so far.

All honor, then, to Henry Hyde—the man who, in the concrete pressure of a bitter partisan struggle, has had the courage and capacity to defend the principles of constitutional government and to demonstrate the elements of honorable conduct, standing as an example to future generations.

—William Kristol

ACQUITTAL-PLUS?

by David Tell

CERTAIN THINGS WE CAN NOW FORECAST with as much certainty as politics ever allows. The president will be acquitted and will continue in office. For reasons this magazine has exhaustively detailed—all of which arguments, as the lawyers say, are incorporated here by reference—Clinton's acquittal will be an awful result. And if it remains the *only* official result of the Lewinsky scandal, it will leave a great many Americans dissatisfied.

Those convinced of the justice of his impeachment will feel cheated not to see some permanent brand of dishonor on the president's forehead. And even many of those unwilling to brook Clinton's expulsion from the White House will be unsettled by a stand-alone not-guilty verdict. That an ultimate declaration of the president's *technical* innocence not be interpreted as absolution of his behavior is a near-universal concern. No one, the Clinton impeachment doxology has it, wants to "defend the indefensible."

Indeed. Which is why, as the indefensible becomes inevitable, there is now—again—such a bipartisan fever in the Senate to place an asterisk on the whole affair. If Clinton is to remain president, some Republicans propose, he should nevertheless first be judged (more or less) guilty of his crimes as charged. If Clinton is to remain president, many Democrats counter, he should nevertheless also be condemned as personally disgraceful, quite apart from the question whether he broke the law.

This is not your father's Oldsmobile. This is the old-fashioned, black-and-white clarity of impeachment modernized to include a variety of day-glo colors and option packages. And unfortunately, it is no improvement. The hunt for a more palatable Clinton acquittal can only make "the process" more, not less, incoherent and unprincipled. Alas, the very best the Senate probably now can do—bad as it will be—is find the president not guilty. And then leave him entirely alone.

Did Clinton do what the House of Representatives says he did? Republican senator Susan Collins of Maine wants a rule-by-simple-majority roll call on the question, taken in advance of a final vote on conviction or acquittal. She got this idea from a 59-page treatise

on impeachment by law professor Joseph Isenbergh of the University of Chicago. Which is more than a tad ironic, since it turns out that Isenbergh is located at the farthest extreme of anti-anti-Clintonism.

Isenbergh believes that the president's current troubles are "grotesque," "perverse," and "idiotic." He says the scandal was "orchestrated by political opponents" from the start. Isenbergh thinks these "ghouls" asked Clinton questions about Monica Lewinsky that would be suitable only in a "theocratic state with an official religion and religious courts." He is pleased that the president responded with lies, because "a civilized person is not supposed to kiss and tell." And to the suggestion that some authoritative inquiry into those lies might be necessary to vindicate the rule of law, Isenbergh responds with the back of his hand. "Pablum," he sniffs. "Nonsense."

In fact, Joseph Isenbergh is so contemptuous of the president's critics that he is prepared to concede Clinton's crimes and invite the Senate to convict him. The professor feels free to make such mockery of the controversy because, by a highly eccentric reading of the founding documents and early precedents, he believes the Senate has authority to find a president guilty of an

impeachable offense—but still choose to retain that president in office.

Needless to say, this is not the basic Republican mood at the moment. Nor is it anything but an outlandish interpretation of the Constitution's impeachment provision. Just the same, Susan Collins and her colleagues are intrigued by the possibility that the Framers' design might have just a tiny bit of useful *give* in it. Surely, they believe, every GOP senator (and maybe even a few Democrats) would be prepared to approve a resolution endorsing the *factual basis* of the House impeachment, if not its practical implications. That way, in the "best case" scenario, a majority of the Senate could officially *imply* that Clinton is guilty—while, at almost exactly the same time, a super-majority of the Senate could officially *assert* that he is . . . well, innocent.

But what would that *mean*, and how would it help the nation "resolve" this "agonizing" crisis?

Much the same question could be asked of the preferred Democratic alternative, a resolution of censure against Bill Clinton, the language of which evades all judgment on the president's specific crimes. With the very vagueness of this censure—again, a rule-by-

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AND UNPRINCIPLED.

majority measure—Senator Daschle and his caucus hope to grease a closing deal: a maximum number of votes to repudiate the president in exchange for a maximum number of votes to preserve him. What would *that* mean?

The Constitution is quite careful to delineate what the three branches of our government may and may not do, by themselves and to one another. Outside its specified adjudicatory function in an impeachment trial—up or down, in or out, nothing more or less—may the Senate make a determination of (quasi) criminal guilt on anyone but its own members? No, it may not; such stuff is for the judiciary to take care of. Is there any constitutional provision for the Senate *effectively* to sanction a president by less than the two-thirds majority required in an impeachment proceeding? No, there is not. (And if the sanction *isn't* effective—as censure wouldn't be effective in the present circumstance—then really: Why bother?)

But “why bother” doesn't do the ugliness of these asterisked-impeachment proposals full justice. For even if the votes were unanimous in both houses, and public opinion were running 100-1 against him, the Framers would have been appalled at any such rebuke to a sitting president. And here we approach the nub of the problem that still confronts the nation.

There is a standard bromide attached to impeachment: “Not all impeachable offenses are felonies, and not all felonies are impeachable.” We have heard that so many times, from partisans of every conceivable stripe, that it no longer registers, and its truth is accepted on faith. As it happens, though, this phrase is not a truth at all, but a poison. Look at it carefully. Think about its second clause: “Not all felonies are impeachable.” And ask yourself: Which freebie felonies are these, precisely, that a president may commit without forfeiting his job? Or, put another way, outside the realm of criminal law: Just how bad a man can you be, and still remain a qualified chief executive?

This is a question the Constitution does not want our government—*ever*—to answer in an explicit, official voice. There must be “energy in the executive,” Hamilton wrote. But this energy must be harnessed in the interests of democracy, so the institution of the presidency must be widely respected. Impeachment is our life-insurance policy on the presidency's necessary reputation. In the test of a Senate trial, a chief executive judged dishonorable is removed from his office at once, lest he stain it. Acquittal, alternately, means this particular president can stay.

But that is all acquittal means *per se*, in isolation. There have been less than respectable presidents, of course. A few wretched presidents, even. Andrew Johnson was a drunkard who deliberately failed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. He was impeached. He was acquitted.

Did the outcome of the Johnson impeachment establish a precedent, in principle, that a drunkard who deliberately fails to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is a worthy president? No—because the Senate did not *say* that he was a drunken enemy of the Constitution. It said only that he was “not guilty,”

minimally worthy.

In 1999, the Senate will likewise acquit Bill Clinton and deem him minimally worthy. But the Senate may also, at the very same moment, through a “finding of fact” or “censure,” formally identify Clinton as a contemptible man or even an outright felon. A contemptible felon is a worthy president? By act of Congress? Are we to assault the standards of presidential integrity so directly and unequivocally? Please, *please*: no.

Better that the meaning of the Clinton impeachment trial be left some fig leaf of ambiguity. Better that he be acquitted and nothing more. Yes, Bill Clinton's acquittal will bother a lot of people. All to the good. It should bother every one of us.

David Tell is opinion editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.



Peter Steiner

MAXIMUM TRENT

by Fred Barnes

SENATE MAJORITY LEADER TRENT LOTT wanted witnesses. Given his druthers, he'd haul President Clinton up to the Senate to testify in the impeachment trial. That may be a stretch, but having any witnesses at all seemed unlikely only a few days before three—Monica, Vernon, and Sid—were actually subpoenaed.

Lott's witness problem was a dozen panicky Republican senators who'd grown more nervous as White House lawyers laid out their rebuttal of the case against Clinton. So, as a vote approached on witnesses last week, there weren't 51 votes to call them. And without witnesses, the trial would come to a premature end, humiliating to Republicans. It didn't, though, because of Lott. Through force of personality, he got all 55 Republicans on board, even Sen. Richard Shelby of Alabama, who had noisily declared his opposition to summoning witnesses.

This may sound like the routine work of a congressional leader. And it is. But Lott has done a lot more than simply foster GOP unity, and he's done it unobtrusively but brilliantly. Step by step, Lott has kept an unpopular trial alive and moving to a final vote on two articles of impeachment. His only slip-up was briefly considering a truncated, one-week trial. He's kept House managers reasonably satisfied. And he's given the trial an aura of bipartisanship. Don't sneer at this. It means the trial plays better with the public and the press. The White House and many Democrats would love for name-calling and partisan feuding to crowd out the serious business of the trial. Lott has kept this from happening. When Democrats wouldn't agree to procedures for the final days of the trial, Senate minority leader Tom Daschle still praised Lott for trying to accommodate Democrats. Three weeks into the trial, polls showed Senate Democrats were losing favor, Republicans gaining.

Lott's leadership has not always been obvious. He operates by building a consensus but never getting out in front of it. He's a facilitator, not a point man—the opposite of Newt Gingrich. Lott learned from his initial misstep a month ago. He discovered that Republican unity could be mustered for a full trial—but only a step at a time. Once the case was spelled out by House managers, that “laid the base” for witnesses, a Lott aide said. Now, Lott hopes videotaped depositions from three witnesses will stir support for calling them to testify on the Senate floor. That, in turn, might create the need for still more witnesses—Betty Currie, Clinton, others.

Lott's leadership rests heavily on his getting-along skills. He has a remarkable way with GOP senators. Many were dissatisfied with his unsteady leadership in 1998,

but he's well liked, so no one challenged him for majority leader. Now that seems the right decision. In the impeachment trial, Republican defections once seemed inevitable, and six or more of them could have shut down the proceedings if they sided with Democrats. Averting this was Lott's top priority. He's done everything except twist arms, which might backfire. He's put Republican squishes on leadership committees examining some aspect of impeachment. Mostly, he's schmoozed. “One of his great qualities is his patience and willingness to listen,” says Slade Gorton of Washington, one of Lott's closest advisers. “He creates an atmosphere where nobody wants to let him down.” Gorton is a good example. He doesn't think witnesses are needed, but he voted for calling them.

Of the three balls Lott is juggling—GOP unity, a smoothly moving trial, bipartisanship—the least critical is happy relations with Democrats. Yet that's important to Lott, and not only because of the bad PR that would flow from the trial's being seen as a partisan crusade by Republicans. While he moves the trial step by step, Lott plans several jumps ahead. Which is why a critical moment occurred when Democrat Robert Byrd of West Virginia moved to dismiss the case. Republicans were infuriated all the more when Byrd blabbed well past the 10-minute limit in the private Senate deliberations. But Lott kept them from launching an angry public attack on Byrd. Why? To preserve bipartisanship. Why also? In hopes that Byrd might be persuaded to vote later on so-called findings of fact that strongly condemn the president for lying under oath and trying to obstruct the Paula Jones trial.

For all his soft rhetoric, Lott is the moving force behind the findings of fact, which would affirm the House charges against Clinton. In effect, this would be the strongest possible censure, and it might attract the votes of Democrats who believe Clinton has committed offenses but not ones that “rise to the level” warranting removal from office. The beauty of the findings is that they match public opinion, condemning Clinton for breaking the law without ousting him. Lott first heard of the idea in December from his former aide, Rep. Chip Pickering of Mississippi. Around the same time, his top staffers discussed it with aides of Henry Hyde, who heads the House managers. Some of the managers like the idea. The White House loathes it. Lott hasn't formally endorsed the proposal, but he's formed a committee to look into it, thus keeping the idea afloat.

Here's the real secret about Lott: He's Maximum

Trent. He's for convicting the president for obstructing justice (Article II). If two-thirds of the Senate is not attainable for expulsion, he's for putting together a majority in favor of that article. The rallying cry: "51 votes for Article II." That would at least provide majority affirmation of the House's case for impeachment. He may also push quietly for findings of fact. In the meantime, he'd like to see Clinton interrogated in the well of the Senate. Short of that, he'd be delighted to force the president to answer the 10 questions Lott

submitted on January 25. Sample: "Is everything you testified to in the Jones deposition true?" Lott, in short, is for everything up to and including sending Bill and Hillary back to Little Rock. But he's figured out the only way to get near this goal is incrementally. He may look tentative, but in this case at least, that's what it takes to be an effective leader.

Fred Barnes is executive editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

GOING BALLISTIC

by Matthew Rees

HOW DO REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL candidates whip the crowds into a frenzy? They tear apart Clinton and Gore, demand tax cuts for hard-working Americans, and reminisce about the Gipper. Now add to this ballistic missile defense. As unlikely as it sounds, the issue—boosting America's defense against ballistic missiles by declaring the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union obsolete—has become the latest crowd pleaser. "It's a sign of how far we've fallen," Dan Quayle likes to say, "that more fidelity is shown to a piece of paper signed with a state that no longer exists than to our own Constitution." It's one of his biggest applause lines.

Missile defense may not seem like a natural issue Republicans would use to win the White House, or to supplement their congressional majorities. Other than the Republican faithful, few people really understand it, and it's so obscure that leading pollsters seldom ask about it. The issue has, nonetheless, quietly emerged as a Republican talking point. Nearly all the GOP presidential candidates have incorporated it into their speeches, party chairman Jim Nicholson has made a personal crusade out of the issue, and the congressional Republican leadership has indicated missile-defense bills will be among the first pieces of legislation considered by the House and Senate.

The GOP onslaught has had a predictable effect. On January 20, defense secretary William Cohen announced the Clinton administration would seek a \$6.6 billion increase in funding for missile defense. Cohen also echoed a GOP theme when he said the administration not only would be willing to modify the ABM treaty, which limits U.S. missile-defense capabilities, but it would be willing to withdraw from the treaty if Russia couldn't be persuaded to agree to the modifications.

As a policy matter, Cohen's announcement signaled a landmark victory for Republicans: They've been warning of the missile threat from rogue nations like North Korea for years, but the administration has always claimed the threat wasn't imminent enough to justify a spending increase on missile defense. Indeed, in September the administration vigorously opposed a missile-defense bill sponsored by senators Thad Cochran and Daniel Inouye, charging U.S. intelligence could provide necessary warning of missile threats. Now, the issue is no longer whether to develop a missile defense or whether to modify the ABM treaty. Instead, it's how.

The first agenda item will be the congressional missile-defense bills, which require the deployment of a national missile defense once the technology is ready. The House bill, sponsored by Republican Curt Weldon and Democrat John Spratt, won't have any trouble passing. The Senate version, sponsored again by Cochran and Inouye, was one vote short of overcoming a filibuster last year, but is expected to pass this year. Given the new Clinton administration position, a veto seems unlikely. But Cohen, asked in a private meeting recently whether the administration will support the congressional efforts, evaded the question.

The more contentious and more meaningful issue is the ABM treaty. As written, the treaty gives Moscow the right to approve any U.S. moves to build a national missile defense. Jesse Helms, writing recently in the *Wall Street Journal*, summed up what's wrong with this picture: "The Clinton administration wants to negotiate permission from Russia over whether the U.S. can protect itself from ballistic missile attack by North Korea."

Senate Republicans are united in agreeing the ABM treaty will have to be modified if a national missile-defense system is to be deployed. Indeed, some Republicans, such as Helms and Jon Kyl, argue the treaty is a dead letter since it was agreed to with the now extinct Soviet Union. As chairman of the Foreign

Relations Committee, Helms thinks he can drive a stake through the heart of the treaty by defeating a set of amendments that would make the treaty apply to Russia and other post-Soviet states. The Clinton administration's response has been to refuse to submit the amendments to the Senate for ratification, though Helms is still planning hearings this spring to bolster opposition to ratification. And last week, the committee issued a mischievous press release noting that while Clinton agreed in May 1997 to submit the amendments to the Senate for ratification, he had held them "hostage" for 622 days.

Regardless of how these disputes get resolved, what's clear is that missile defense looks to be part of the political debate between now and the 2000 presidential election. In fact, while Republicans are cautiously optimistic about Cohen's announcement, the administration has already provoked skepticism about its real intentions. The day after Cohen's press briefing, the White House had Bob Bell, a senior arms-control aide on the National Security Council staff, conduct his own press briefing on missile defense. He emphasized, in a way Cohen did not, that the missile defense system being considered was "limited," that a deployment decision wouldn't be taken until the year 2000 "or later," and that the ABM treaty remained "a cornerstone of strategic stability." This prompted Curt Weldon to say he sees "more politics than substance" in the administration's proposal.

There's another reason for skepticism. In his January 20 briefing, Cohen explained the administration's change of heart by citing two factors: a report issued last July by Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense in the Ford administration, spelling out the multiple missile threats facing the United States, and an August 31 launch of a missile by North Korea, which demonstrated capabilities that had until then been unknown. Yet even *after* the missile was launched, and the report was issued, the administration continued to vigorous-

ly oppose the modest Cochran-Inouye missile-defense bill. With the security climate no different today than it was in September, Republicans believe the real reason Cohen made his announcement is that the administration simply didn't like the appearance of opposing a national missile defense when North Korea has shown that its missiles can reach Alaska or Hawaii.

Motivation aside, the Clinton administration's very acknowledgment that a missile threat to the United States exists, and that more money is needed to develop a national missile defense, counts as a Republican policy victory. But it was also a clever way to muddy the differences between Democrats and Republicans on defense issues, undermining the efforts of Republican candidates like Dan Quayle to portray Al Gore as a dove. Perhaps focusing the debate on the ABM treaty, which the administration seems determined to perpetuate, can help Republicans call the administration's seriousness about defending the country into question. If not, Quayle and the rest of the GOP field could have a tough time using the missile-defense issue as they hope to in 2000.

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DISCRIMINATING COLLEGES

by Terence J. Pell

IT SEEMS THE EDUCATION ESTABLISHMENT is now prepared to concede that racial preferences in college admissions are really all about discrimination for its own sake. When preferences ended in California and Texas in 1997, educators predicted (mistakenly) that minority enrollment would drop dramatically. Some resorted to rhetoric not heard since the '60s—darkly forecasting a “resegregation” of higher education. Such reactions made clear what many had long suspected: Racial preferences are used in admissions not to ensure a heterogeneous student body but to increase minority enrollment. By revealing their true purpose educators have inadvertently strengthened the legal case against preferences.

It is unlawful to treat applicants differently by race in order to achieve a certain racial mix of students. It has been illegal for the last 20 years, since the Supreme Court's decision in *University of California Regents v. Bakke*. Justice Lewis Powell wrote that while it was permissible to use race as a factor to assemble an intellectually diverse student body, it was impermissible to use race to try to achieve any specific racial mix of students. This, Powell said, the Constitution “clearly forbids,” for it amounts to racial discrimination.

Defenders now claim that preferences are justified because, first, minority enrollment would plummet in their absence and, second, they serve a greater social good. Increasing the number of minority students helps increase the number of minorities in the professions, i.e., the upper class. This argument, that preferences promote a social good, concedes that affirmative action has wandered far from its constitutional domain. Furthermore, it turns out that educators' predictions about the resegregation that would follow the end of racial preferences in California and Texas were wildly overblown. Minority enrollment remained constant or even increased at all but a handful of elite schools. At the flagship law and medical schools, minority enrollment did drop in the first year following the end of preferences. But, as demonstrated in the Center for Individual Rights' recent report, *Racial Preferences in Higher Education*, minority enrollment has since rebounded, although not to pre-1997 levels.

Indeed, it turns out that at one school after another, in California, Texas, and elsewhere, racial preferences are not necessary to ensure the presence of minority students. And still, states use them anyway. Consider the state of Washington, which has a 12 percent minority population. If the University of Washington Law School didn't use preferences, it would

enjoy a 17 percent minority admissions rate. By using preferences, it doubles minority enrollment—far more than necessary for the intellectual diver-

sity Powell's *Bakke* opinion had in mind.

It matters why educators take race into account. Certain purposes are constitutional. Insisting that educators stick to narrowly drawn, permissible purposes ensures that race plays a determinate—and generally, minor—role in admissions. In admitting that it uses race for an unconstitutional purpose, the education establishment inadvertently has called attention to the large and unlawful role that race has come to play in deciding who gets admitted.

Powell's opinion imposes strict limits on the role that race can play in benefiting—or harming—any particular applicant. At most, he thought, race could be a “plus” factor that suggested a particular individual would make a distinctive contribution to the intellectual life of the school. But race could not be the predominant reason one applicant was preferred over another. Nor could race serve as the basis of a dual admissions system. Because of longstanding racial disparities in standardized test scores, many elite schools employ two admissions standards to avoid excluding minority applicants. Until recently, the University of Michigan used separate admission grids for minority and non-minority applicants. Now Michigan, and many other schools, simply add points to an index score—points that very often overwhelm other factors.

Lawsuits against the University of Washington and the University of Michigan, scheduled to go to trial this year, will show just how significant a factor race has become in admissions. Fortunately, students and their parents, trustees, and college alumni no longer need to wait for the outcome of high-profile lawsuits to begin reforming college admissions. A provision of federal civil rights law permits school officials who knowingly and clearly violate existing law to be held liable in their individual capacity for the damages resulting to applicants rejected illegally on the basis of skin color. Increasingly, this threat is more than academic. Last year, for example, a federal court in Ohio held college officials, including trustees, liable in their personal capacities for an illegal racial set-aside.

The prospect of personal liability for clear violations of constitutional law may give students, parents, and trustees a great deal of leverage in forcing worthwhile reforms at colleges and universities without the need for further litigation.

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THE GOOD FIGHT

In Defense of the House Republicans

By David Frum

Was it worth it? Was it worth losing five Republican congressmen in 1998 and risking more in 2000, consuming a year of the nation's time, dragging dozens of unwilling figures into the glare of publicity, and depressing the party's poll numbers, all in an attempt to punish the president for telling a few lies about his office hanky-panky?

That question, or some version of it, will take over the airwaves of the nation the moment President Clinton is acquitted by the Senate, as now seems both inevitable and imminent. Conservatives may complain that the question is tendentious—did anybody debate whether punishing Nixon for Watergate was worth delivering 17 million South Vietnamese to communism?—but that won't make it go away. Even within the Republican party—for all the remarkable solidarity on display now—acrimony may well erupt once the trial ends. And after all, the critics of the impeachment drive have something of a point. Pro-impeachment Republicans did choose to ignore the polls and did knowingly defy extreme political danger. They do owe their party and the country an accounting of what good they expected to achieve. Here's what such an accounting might sound like.

It would begin with a negative point: When people suggest that the scandal should somehow have been wrapped up earlier, when precisely do they have in mind? From the very first moment the story exploded last January, it was glaringly apparent that President Clinton had perjured himself and coordinated the perjury of others in the Paula Jones litigation. Nobody except the most extreme Clinton partisan could be—or in fact was—indifferent to that appalling fact. And even had Republicans somehow managed to feign indifference, the investigation of the

scandal would have proceeded anyway, because nobody except Kenneth Starr had the power to halt it. And the only way *he* could halt it was by violating the terms of the Independent Counsel law and his own appointment.

Indeed, though everyone now contrives to forget the fact, congressional Republicans did remain astonishingly reticent about Starr's investigation for most of 1998. It was not until September—the delivery of the independent counsel's report—that the scandal

unavoidably became Congress's responsibility. What should Congress have done then? Said, "Thank you very much Mr. Independent Counsel for your evidence, but we've looked at the polls and have decided that popular presidents can break the law if they want to?"

When an independent counsel—for the first time in the twenty year history of the statute—refers evidence to Congress that impeachable offenses have been

committed by the president, Congress cannot just wish its responsibility away. It must in turn refer the evidence to the only body with the power to act: the House Judiciary Committee. As it happened, virtually every member of the House of Representatives stood ready to do just that last fall.

Possibly, the Judiciary Committee could have devised some other penalty for the president's perjury and obstruction than impeachment. But what? The censure deal that the doughty editorialists of the *New York Times* kept touting was never more than a desperate expedient. Leave aside the question of censure's constitutionality. Ask only this: Would those House Democrats who took the bus over to the White House lawn to applaud the president on the day of his impeachment ever have voted for anything that explicitly named the president a criminal? Of course not. So a censure resolution would either have been hopelessly vague or, like impeachment, would have passed the House on a party-line vote.

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David Frum is a contributing editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

In either case, is there any doubt that President Clinton, who to this day insists that he is the victim of the most unjust prosecution since O.J. Simpson, would have brushed it off? Censure might have been an option had the president ever been willing to confess his perjury and witness-tampering and declare his willingness to submit to the judgment of the courts after his term was over. But so long as he scorned the law and denied the facts, censure only constituted an admission that Congress was afraid to punish a felonious president. Better, frankly, for Congress to pretend to believe in the president's innocence than to declare his guilt while behaving in ways that make it clear that so long as a chief executive rides high in the polls he may commit what crimes he pleases. That really is the way republics die.

So Henry Hyde and his Republican colleagues had no conscientious alternative. President Clinton's unapologetic defense of his crimes left them with no choice but to impeach or acquiesce. As the republic's only line of defense against a lawless president, they were duty-bound to impeach and accept the consequences.

To be sure, putting it that way makes impeachment sound like the futile gesture of the hero of an existential novel: "The site of the rendezvous had been betrayed to the Gestapo, but René put on his trench-coat, lit his cigarette, and went out into the rainy night . . ." In fact, while the Republicans did not undertake impeachment for party advantage—quite the contrary—it is mistaken to imagine they embarked on a suicide mission. Yes, the Republican determination to enforce the law against a popular president is perilous. But the Democrats' determination to let that president get away with breaking the law is at least as perilous, as they themselves seem to realize.

The peril is summed up in those polls by which Clinton lives: The mid-January Gallup poll found that 79 percent of Americans believe that Clinton perjured himself, and that 53 percent believe he obstructed justice. Pollster John Zogby asked some more specific questions from January 19-21 and learned that 63 percent agree that Clinton perjured himself before a federal grand jury. Henry Hyde and his House managers, in other words, have completely won the argument over the facts of this case. They have convinced the country that President Clinton has committed crimes—and serious crimes: 55 percent of Americans agree, Zogby reports, that grand jury perjury is an impeachable offense and 58 percent agree that obstruction of justice is impeachable. But the public has remained unwilling to connect the dots, and has

resisted removing the president from office.

But will the dots stay unconnected? That depends on which half of the public's split consciousness endures longer: the belief that Clinton is doing a fine job as president and should therefore stay in office? Or the knowledge that Clinton has committed crimes that merit impeachment? One of the Zogby polls' findings, and it echoes that of other pollsters, is that only 40 percent of Americans say they are "proud" that Bill Clinton is president; 42 percent say they are "ashamed." Isn't that odd? Three-quarters of Americans approve of the job Clinton is doing, but a plurality are ashamed of the man's presidency. If America were a patient on the couch, a psychiatrist would be quick to diagnose some very powerful feelings of ambivalence here—even a guilt complex. The Democrats sense that guilt, which is why they are anxious to craft a deal that will keep Clinton in office without seeming to condone his law-breaking.

The presence in office of a scofflaw president is a bone in the throat of American democracy. It won't go away, try as the senators might to ignore it. Years from now, in completely unpredictable ways, the country will still be gagging on it. Great misdeeds are like that—they linger, like the beating of Edgar Allan Poe's telltale heart. It was the Democrats' Cold War weakness that prevented Clinton from following through on his gays-in-the-military promise: He lacked the moral authority to bring the generals to heel. Similarly, but in entirely unpredictable ways, the Democrats' support for a president who defied the laws will haunt them and the country for years. It has, at least for the moment, deprived them of their usual trustworthy base in the media. The Monica Lewinsky story is the first Democratic scandal since the Alger Hiss trial to be covered by the press with anything like the zeal and outrage it brings to Republican scandals. The early Clinton administration enjoyed the same presumptive immunity that Kennedy and Johnson were able to count on. When caught with FBI files on their desks, Clintonites could smile and say innocently, "We may be sloppy but we're not crooked," and anticipate—correctly—that they would receive the benefit of the doubt. Not any more.

It may be over-optimistic to hope that the press will subject future Democratic administrations to the same skeptical scrutiny that Republicans expect as a matter of course. But the public will. In the long series of polls that show the Clinton-led Democrats have overtaken the Republicans as the party most trusted on Social Security, education, and other issues, and have pulled even with them on crime and taxes, the Republicans for the first time in memory

have taken a big and widening lead in one crucial domain: morality and ethics.

All too many people in Washington these days hear the phrase “morals and ethics” and think sex. But it’s not the president’s accusers who are obsessed with sex: It’s the president’s defenders. They feared that allowing Clinton to be punished for perjury would undermine the dogma that sex, so long as it’s consensual, ought never to be subject to moral or legal scrutiny.

Kenneth Starr never set out to win a putative culture war; it was Clinton’s defenders who feared that by letting their man be impeached, they would lose a culture war. “The president must not lose his job,” wrote Maureen Dowd, the *New York Times*’s bellwether columnist, in her remarkable September 1998 pivot in favor of the president. “Not over this.” Not because a “middle-aged married man has [an] affair with [a] frisky and adoring young office girl.” A failure to defend the president, she feared, would jeopardize everything won in the 1960s. Apparently, requiring presidents to tell the truth under oath is the first step on a slippery slope to the prosecution of fornication and the outlawing of abortion.

Poor Richard Nixon. If only he’d thought to say that he wanted to wiretap Larry O’Brien’s telephone at the Democratic National Committee because he had reason to believe O’Brien was using it to receive pro-life marching orders from the Vatican. Then Nixon, too, might have gotten a pass from the *Times* op-ed page!

Dowd had it really exactly backwards. One of the things that the Lewinsky affair illuminates is how very difficult it is to sustain any idea of public virtue in a society unable to agree on what constitutes private virtue. Clinton committed a public wrong. But he got away with it in very large part because it was connected to a private wrong, at a moment when Americans seem to find it uniquely difficult to express judgments about private wrongdoing. It was not conservatives who used perjury as a way to punish adultery; it was the Clintonites who saw they could use adultery to excuse perjury.

A cunning trick, but one likely to leave behind a certain odor. Nevertheless, for the moment it has been effective. Fearful Republican senators are now looking for some “exit strategy” that ends the trial rapidly. There is only one exit strategy that will work: Call the final vote and be prepared to lose. Impeachment was

unpopular primarily because voters interpreted it as a cynical partisan gambit. For once, this suspicion was entirely misplaced, and it would be an act of self-betrayal for Republicans now to do anything to justify it. Cutting short the trial of a felonious president because the polls oppose it may seem like smart politics. But ending the trial hastily for political reasons only lends credence to the charge that Republicans started the trial for political reasons.

And once over, Republicans must not disown the trial. When they permitted Jennifer Dunn and Steve Largent to appear on national television after the president’s State of the Union address and chirrup that the trial involves no big issues that justify disrupting the cozy comity of the capital, they raised the question: Well then, if the trial was so bogus, why did the Republicans start it? If Clinton feels no need to

apologize for breaking the law, why do the Republicans feel the need to apologize for enforcing it?

President Clinton deserves to be convicted and removed from office. His popularity has saved him. Very well: Let his party go on record, in the Senate as in the House (and on Lincoln’s birthday too!), that lying under oath and corrupting justice just do not seem to them to be impeachable offenses. Let them identify themselves as

Clinton’s apologists and defenders. And let Republicans retain enough of their old and deserved confidence in the American people—who are seldom deceived for very long—to believe that there will be a reckoning. Those same polls that show Clinton’s popularity as president also show how little Americans like or trust him personally. A man who might have gone down in history as the Democrats’ Eisenhower—a likable, cautious character who presided over an era of wonderful peace and prosperity—has instead been exposed as their Nixon.

Was it worthwhile to impeach Clinton? The impeachment proved to the American people that the charges against Clinton were in every particular true. It blackened the name of a law-breaking president. It destroyed the Democrats’ quarter-century moral upper-hand and exposed the party’s cynicism in pursuit of power. It gave American liberals one more opportunity to display their disdain for the law when it threatens to curb their appetites. It has ended in at least momentary defeat. Oh well. For a good cause, even defeat is worthwhile. But it’s funny about good causes: Somehow, the defeats rarely last for long. ♦

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THE REHABILITATION OF ELIA KAZAN

By Stephen Schwartz

On March 21, a long-standing and bitter injustice will be rectified: That evening, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences is scheduled to award a special Oscar to the 89-year-old director Elia Kazan. How the glittering audience at Oscar Night will greet this controversial presentation is hard to predict. The award is a direct rebuke to the American Film Institute and other movieland institutions that have snubbed Kazan repeatedly since the 1970s, although he was once among their brightest lights. Now, what amounts to Kazan's rehabilitation after decades of blackballing and smears marks a notable breach of the Iron Curtain that has long surrounded Hollywood's collective memory.

No figure in American popular culture this century is more deserving of honor for a lifetime of achievement than Kazan. The son of immigrants from the Ottoman Empire, he was successful as an actor, stage director, and novelist; and in the movies, he created masterpieces like *A Streetcar Named Desire* (1951), *Viva Zapata!* (1952), and *On the Waterfront* (1954). Yet Kazan saw his reputation savaged in a witch hunt—not the infamous hunt for Communists in Hollywood, but the later and far more destructive unofficial inquisition loosed against anti-Communists.

To understand Kazan's emblematic fate is an exercise in cultural archaeology. It requires sifting through

Stephen Schwartz's From West to East: California and the Making of the American Mind was published last year by the Free Press.

the ruins of the intellectual Left for clues to the bizarre anxieties attached to the figure of the anti-Communist "informer." For that is the term, drawn from the lingo of the gangster, that leftists and "liberals" attached to Elia Kazan. More than any other personal journey, his life shows how, in the aftermath of America's confrontation with Stalinism, history demonstrated its capacity for producing contradictory outcomes and claiming human sacrifices.



Elia Kazan in his Group Theater days.

Elia Kazanjoglous was born in 1909 to a Greek family in what was then Constantinople. Four years later, his father moved the family to New York and opened what became a prosperous carpet business. The young Kazan graduated from Williams College and studied drama at Yale. Along the way, he picked up the nickname "Gadget" or "Gadg."

In 1932, with the political and economic storms of the Depression raging, Gadg Kazan joined the Group Theater, in New York. The encounter would influence a generation of American performers. Those were days

when, even with the New Deal in full swing, the fear was widespread and real that the country could succumb to a red revolution. The Group Theater had been founded by the playwright Clifford Odets and other young leftists, along with such non-political figures as Lee Strasberg. In line with the excitements of the time, most left-wing theater consisted of agit-prop skits on the sidewalks of New York, in furtherance of Communist propaganda.

All that changed one night in 1935, when Odets's new play *Waiting for Lefty* opened. Unlike other left-

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wing dramatists, Odets was a born playwright, and his talent was fortified by his collaboration with Strasberg and Kazan. *Waiting for Lefty* was Art; not the greatest achievement in the history of the stage, but Art, nonetheless.

On the stage sat a group of men, the leaders of a taxi drivers' union. The action developed around the progress of a meeting called to consider a strike. In front of the stage, between the stage and the audience, actors conjured up the past, the inner lives and secret strivings of the drivers. All present waited for "Lefty," the charismatic rank-and-file leader without whom the strike could not begin.

At the play's unexpected conclusion, the young Elia Kazan, planted in the audience, burst to the front of the theater and shouted that Lefty's body had been found at the taxi barn with a bullet in his head. Other actors seated among the spectators leapt to their feet, shouting as one, "Strike! Strike! Strike!" In a crescendo of protest, filled with sympathetic fury at the death of the proletarian hero, the audience was swept into the chorus.

It was unforgettable. It was a revolution. The American theater had been changed forever.

Outside the theater, revolution failed to materialize in America, and Clifford Odets never fully realized his abilities. But in the late 1930s, performances of *Waiting for Lefty* were packed, and many young people who saw it started reading the Communist weekly *New Masses*, and some of them eventually joined the Communist ranks.

The ultimate failure of Odets's career was part and parcel of the withered hopes of the radical intellectuals of his time. Notwithstanding the stirring slogans of solidarity purveyed in performance and leaflet and song, as the grim decade wore on, Soviet communism perverted and betrayed the enthusiasm of its adherents. The young Elia Kazan, who had joined the Communist party in 1935, left it disillusioned within about a year and a half.

The horrors of Stalin's forced collectivization and the ensuing famines were covered up (by, among others, Walter Duranty of the *New York Times*). But in 1936, the Great Purges of old Bolsheviks began in Moscow, very publicly, with the trial of Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev. As a preliminary to their execution, these sometime companions of Lenin were forced to abase themselves with false confessions of counter-revolutionary activity.

The Spanish Civil War broke out the same year, and the international Left ardently embraced the

cause of the Spanish Republic. But Soviet intervention on the side of the Republic led to the murder of revolutionaries guilty of the fatal error of opposing Stalin. It led, too, to the Left's defeat. As veteran Spanish radical Joaquim Maurín put it, once Spaniards came to see the war as a struggle between Stalin and General Francisco Franco, the brutal incipient dictator, the Republic was doomed, for Franco at least was a Spaniard. The Republic collapsed in 1939.

Within six months, Stalin hatched an alliance with Hitler, and the two mass murderers began carving up Poland. These undeniable horrors—the purges, the betrayal of Spain, and the Hitler-Stalin pact—soured most of the young people who had been so stirred by Odets's play.

Elia Kazan, meanwhile, had become a journeyman actor and a rising director on Broadway. He soon started acting in movies and directing short films. After World War II, his movie-directing career took off in earnest, with *A Tree Grows In Brooklyn* (1945), and just two years later, he won his first Oscar—best director, for *Gentlemen's Agreement*.

A film starring Gregory Peck that attacked anti-Semitism, *Gentlemen's Agreement* was a landmark of early political correctness. It caused an uproar. Talky and dated though it seems now, it established Kazan as one of Hollywood's left-wing talents. Also in 1947, Kazan joined Lee Strasberg to found the Actors Studio, first in New York, then in Los Angeles. Actors Studio taught "Method" acting, developed by the Soviet stage director Konstantin Stanislavsky. Among the school's products were Marlon Brando and Marilyn Monroe.

In 1949, Kazan's production of Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman* won him plaudits as Broadway's finest director. But he and Brando were poised for much greater attainments—reached in 1951, with the film of *A Streetcar Named Desire*. Lyrical, corrosive, and heartbreaking, Tennessee Williams's creation explored the shadow side of American romantic illusions with a profundity that Miller never rivaled. *Streetcar's* frank sexuality—especially Brando's rendition of an incoherent yet charismatic masculinity—brusquely ended the era of prim Hollywood censorship.

It was then that Kazan, at the height of his fame, was drawn into the controversy over reds in Hollywood.

The U.S. government's investigations of Communist influence in Hollywood had begun in 1947, at a time when politically attentive Americans were caught up in the emerging Cold War. For patriotic citi-



AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

On the Waterfront took Oscars for best screenplay, best direction, best cinematography, and best art direction. Kazan is second from left.

zens, it was a frightening period. Stalin increasingly reminded them of Hitler. Since the war, Soviet armies had stayed on in Eastern and Central Europe, keeping an eye on the puppet regimes Moscow had installed. And around the world, Communists manipulated a fraudulent “peace” movement.

This last was central to the Communists’ strategy toward the United States. Back when Hitler and Stalin had been allied, from 1939 to 1941, American Communists, in tandem with Nazi agents, had deployed an array of pseudo-pacifist slogans—“The Yanks Are Not Coming!” “No Imperialist War!”—exploiting traditional American isolationism. After 1945, the Soviet dictatorship went beyond borrowing arguments and tactics from the Nazis and actually adopted the role and methods of the fascists in its confrontation with the democracies.

Young American “fellow-travelers,” hypnotized by the Communist peace offensive, seemed to know nothing of even this recent past. Kazan, by contrast, vividly recalled the Stalinist betrayals of the ’30s and the phony pacifism of the Hitler-Stalin pact. Regardless of his popularity among “liberals” and his own continuing leftist sympathies, he saw communism as the enemy of everything he valued.

In April 1952, Kazan took a public stand. The previous January, he had been subpoenaed to testify before a closed executive session of the House Un-American Activities Committee in Washington, holding hearings on Communists in Hollywood. He had

appeared but had refused to identify his former comrades—that is, he had refused to break the silence imposed on Communists by the party’s conspiratorial discipline and on ex-Communists by the manipulation of guilt.

But in the ensuing months, Kazan changed his mind. He came to believe that the secrecy imposed by the party was inappropriate in America and that the Communists’ demand for protection had been indulged too far. No previous radicals in this country had ever claimed the protection of the law for their clandestine activities; no other society in history had offered its citizens rights behind which to shield their political subversion. How could a revolutionary movement merit constitutional protection when its very purpose represented a repudiation of the U.S. Constitution?

On April 10, 1952, Kazan appeared before the committee a second time, at his own request, and “named names” in open session. Interestingly enough, while he knew the entire Hollywood Communist milieu in great detail, he concentrated on the Group Theater—the Communists he had known during the revolutionary period in the mid-’30s when he himself had been a party member.

He identified nine members of the cell to which he had belonged: Odets; the late actor J. Edward Bromberg; the actor Morris Carnovsky, who had appeared before the committee and pled the Fifth Amendment; actress Phoebe Brand, whom Kazan had

helped recruit; Paula Strasberg, wife of the anti-Communist Lee; actor Tony Kraber; party functionary Ted Wellman (alias Sid Benson), who with Kraber had recruited Kazan; Lewis Leverett, co-leader of the cell; and an actor named Art Smith.

Kazan recounted how party activities in the theater world had been directed by cultural commissar V.J. Jerome and Andrew Overgaard, a paid official of the Communist International. His prepared statement also mentioned three photographers, Paul Strand, Leo Hurwitz, and Ralph Steiner, as well as a playwright, Arnaud d'Usseau, the deceased actor Robert Caille, and four members of a Communist front, the League of Workers Theaters.

The Group Theater had been saved from Stalinist control, Kazan testified, by the firm stance of three anti-Communists: Lee Strasberg, critic Harold Clurman, and acting teacher Cheryl Crawford. Kazan had quit the party in 1936 because he had “had enough of regimentation, enough of being told what to think, say and do, enough of their habitual violation of the daily practices of democracy to which I was accustomed.”

A month later, Odets made a similar voluntary appearance before the committee and named Kazan, along with five of those Kazan had mentioned; the two had discussed their testimony before appearing. None of the names they mentioned offered any surprise; all but the trio of photographers had been prominent and unapologetic in their defense of Stalinism during the '30s, although Mrs. Strasberg, like Kazan, had subsequently become an anti-Communist.

Elia Kazan had decided where his loyalties lay, and he would never draw back. Interestingly, he suffered no immediate rejection by the Hollywood Left. In the broader scheme of things, the party and its supporters were clearly on the ropes. Stalin still ruled in Moscow, and war was raging in Korea, with Soviet pilots in action against U.S. and Allied forces.

In 1954, Kazan cast Brando in *On the Waterfront*, which took a bouquet of Oscars including best director. From the beginning, Kazan made clear that the film—about a union member who defies peer pressure and chooses to testify against labor racketeers—was inspired by his own decision to speak out. “A story about man’s duty to society” was the description he offered the press. The screenplay was written by

another ex- and anti-Communist, Budd Schulberg. In some respects, the story paralleled and completed the message presented in *Waiting for Lefty* almost twenty years before.

Yet even after the defiant *On the Waterfront*, Kazan was spared the full force of leftist hatred. He continued to produce great work—*East of Eden* (1955), with James Dean, another of his discoveries; *A Face in the Crowd* (1957), about the rise of a radio entertainer to political power; and *Baby Doll* (1956) and *Splendor in the Grass* (1961), two more demonstrations of his skill at handling complex, intimate subjects. With *America, America* (1963), he began a series of projects overtly concerned with his own life, including his marvelous memoirs (not published until 1988). He also continued to direct for the stage and wrote successful novels like *The Arrangement* (1969).

It was only during the 1970s, in the aftermath of the political convulsions of the '60s, that a revived leftist fundamentalism more virulent even than that of the '30s emerged and found a target in Elia Kazan.

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Two decades after the House Un-American Activities Committee probe of Hollywood, a new witch hunt developed in the land. It was led by “liberal” intellectuals holding that “stool-pigeons” are worse than Stalinists. Why this logic did not prompt them to vilify those Americans who had turned in supporters of the Nazis—or, for that matter, “informers” who testified in murder trials—was never explained. From this point on, Kazan was dogged by a drumbeat of insults and carping gossip.

The worst damage to his reputation was done in the late 1970s by a man dedicated to defending Communist spies, Victor Navasky, publisher of the *Nation*. In full moral-absolutist cry, convinced that the Vietnam tragedy had forever justified Communist pretensions, Navasky set out to write a kind of dual biography of Elia Kazan (bad) and Arthur Miller (good, for keeping silent before the House committee). But Kazan’s refusal to apologize for his actions or to assist Navasky with his project stirred Navasky’s rage. The result was a book called *Naming Names* that appeared in 1980.

Up until this time, Kazan’s creative work had carried more weight in most quarters than the Left’s contempt for him. But the young aspiring screenwriters

who read Navasky in the early '80s had no grasp of Kazan's extraordinary achievements. Their only concern was to punish him for straying from a rigid defense of the global Left. The handful of former Communists he had named to the committee—most of whom had left the film industry before he testified—were transformed in his critics' minds into hundreds of victims hounded out of the business.

From this point on, the contrasting trajectories of Kazan's reputation and those of the Stalinists he opposed say a great deal about the meaning of conscience in Hollywood. While Kazan was shunned, denied work, and otherwise humiliated, the Hollywood Ten—the cell of hard-core Stalinists who sought to turn the 1947 House committee hearings into something approximating a congressional riot, and paid for it with prison sentences—were lionized. Not only were their reputations restored, but institutions like the Hollywood talent guilds fawned over the Ten and repudiated their own supposed complicity with the establishment. While the Ten (who became Nine when the courageous Edward Dmytryk broke with the group) were acclaimed by “liberals” for what amounted to Soviet patriotism, Kazan's achievements were routinely dismissed in such venues as the American Film Institute, where his American patriotism was an embarrassment.

The thick varnish of sentimentality coating Hollywood's romance with Stalinism long remained intact, impervious even to extensive revelations about clandestine Soviet activities in the United States from the Russian and American archives. We now know from the Venona decrypts released by the National Security Agency, for example, that Mikhail Kalatozov, a Soviet director and cinema functionary prominent in Hollywood during World War II, was a high-ranking KGB agent. When Kalatozov's name was brought up in the House committee hearings, the Stalinists jeered, claiming that this Soviet operative had only come to the legendary city to buy prints of movies to show back in the motherland.

But we see from the Venona traffic that Kalatozov—who would later direct the famous 1957 Soviet war film *The Cranes Are Flying*—was a spy reporting directly to Grigory Kheifitz and Grigory Kasparov, the two NKVD station chiefs in San Francisco during World War II. (*The Cranes Are Flying* was shown to great fanfare in the Eisenhower White House.) Indeed, Venona

evidence establishes beyond doubt that Hollywood was a major target of KGB operations in the United States, fully justifying the congressional inquiry.

The latest landmark in Hollywood's shunning of Kazan came in 1996, when the Los Angeles Film Critics Association dropped him from consideration for its career achievement award. Instead of Kazan, the honor was presented to Roger Corman, producer of, among other films, *Attack of the Crab Monsters*.

Reviewing this dismal history, one marvels that the Motion Picture Academy has broken down at last and decided on the special Oscar to be given in March. Reportedly, the actor Karl Malden, a star of *On The Waterfront*, argued the case for Kazan before the academy's board, to no dissent whatever.

Industry sources point out that the crusade to exalt the Hollywood Ten has been mainly an enthusiasm of screenwriters, who tend to be leftists, while directors, producers, and actors always valued Kazan's art. Indeed, among the young generation in these fields, there is a surprising adulation of directors like Kazan, Samuel Fuller, and Robert Aldrich, despite their political incorrectness. Outside Hollywood,

too, it may be a sign of the times that Navasky himself, while intransigent on the cases of Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs (!), told the *New York Times* that Kazan's age, the passage of time, and the excellence of his work have softened Navasky's views. “It's a human thing,” he said. “He's not physically well, and he made this great cinematic contribution.”

By contrast, Abraham Polonsky, a Hollywood writer who would never have been heard of had he not received a House committee subpoena long ago, met a reporter with a snarl: “Has [Kazan] ever said, ‘Gee, I'm sorry. I shouldn't have done that. I was wrong?’”

Well, no. Kazan has refused, over the past decade, to elaborate on these matters beyond the dignified statement in his memoirs: “I did what I did because it was the more tolerable of two alternatives that were, either way, painful, even disastrous, and either way wrong for me. That's what a difficult decision means: Either way you go, you lose.” No explanation whatever, of course, comes from Polonsky and others so long devoted to Joseph Stalin. Has Polonsky ever said he regretted enthusiastically supporting the Soviet dictatorship that created Joe McCarthy?

In the late '40s and early '50s, many people, when

THE SOVIET
DIRECTOR MIKHAIL
KALATOZOV—WHOSE
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called upon to choose between the House committee and Stalin, chose the committee. Today, belatedly, others may be starting to see the wisdom of that judg-

ment. It may even be that the thaw begun in the Soviet Union when Khrushchev was premier is finally reaching the sunny precincts of Hollywood. ♦

Dictatorships and No Standards

By Lawrence F. Kaplan

When Vice President Gore uttered the word “*reformasi*” on a visit to Malaysia last year, American investors promptly charged him with rudeness. Their reaction was perhaps to be expected, as “*reformasi*,” or reform, is shorthand for dumping Malaysia’s investment-friendly prime minister. Less understandable were the complaints of Gore’s colleagues in the Clinton administration. The vice-president had “taken a bad situation and made it worse,” a White House official griped to the *New York Times*.

And, indeed, the vice-president’s stand marked something of a departure for the administration. The Clinton team—which entered office pledging to “enlarge” the community of democracies—has shown a curious reluctance to challenge the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. Instead, the president’s diplomatic counselors have sought to uphold the “stability” of governments whose demise Americans might be expected to cheer. The tendency is most apparent in U.S. relations with China, whose leadership the White House regards as mysteriously immutable and where the current wave of dissident arrests prompts barely a peep from American officials. Less noted is that this preference for order over liberty extends even to unsavory regimes that, unlike China’s, are coming apart at the seams.

Hence, even as American warships directed a fusillade of cruise missiles at Saddam Hussein last December, Defense Secretary William Cohen could protest, “We are not seeking to destabilize his regime.” Nor was the United States eager to see power slip away from Indonesian President Suharto, a ruler, Secretary

of State Madeleine Albright stressed last year, we need to “deal with . . . on the long run.” So, too, the Clinton State Department presumes Iran’s theocracy to be a “permanent” fixture on the international scene. Even North Korea has been advised to keep itself together.

A tendency to abide wobbling autocrats, of course, is hardly unique to the Clinton White House. In his widely ridiculed 1991 “Chicken Kiev” address, President George Bush advised the Ukrainian people to cling to Soviet rule, even then in the final stages of collapse. His national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, likewise recounted that he found it “painful to watch Yeltsin rip the Soviet Union brick by brick away from Gorbachev.” Indeed, so much did senior members of the Bush team value constancy that a few months before the Kiev speech, they averted their gaze as Saddam Hussein crushed an Iraqi rebellion within sight of an American armored unit.

Candidate Bill Clinton excoriated the Bush administration for its record of “coddling dictators,” most notably “the butchers of Beijing.” His running mate denounced the “moral blindness” of Bush’s Iraq policy. The brand of realpolitik practiced by the Bush White House was, a Clinton aide suggested to the *New York Times*, “stratocrap and globaloney.” The Clintonites promised to speed the demise of dictatorships and champion the American creed without apology. Who could predict, then, that in the name of stability, the Clinton team would largely abandon the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy aim?

Consider, to begin with, recent American policy toward Iraqi opponents of Saddam Hussein. When last year Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which authorized financial support for groups seeking to oust Saddam, the White House temporized,

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refusing to allocate the funds. (It still hasn't.) To underscore the putative weakness of the Iraqi opposition, the State Department peddled a list of 70 competing exile groups, while national security adviser Samuel Berger publicly discerned in plots to topple Saddam the likelihood of a second Bay of Pigs. Finally, Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, the commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, launched a public-relations offensive, advising in speeches and interviews that "a weak, fragmented, chaotic Iraq is more dangerous in the long run than a contained Saddam is now." Ample evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, there was, according to Zinni, no "viable opposition" to the Iraqi dictator.

The administration followed much the same script, though for entirely different reasons, when Indonesia's kleptocracy teetered on the brink of collapse last year. As student protests against the Suharto regime spilled into the streets of Jakarta, Madeleine Albright notified the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States intended to stand by the Indonesian autocrat. "If you start trying to pull the plug on Suharto now," a senior administration official cautioned reporters, "the question is, what could happen?" Even as it became clear that Indonesians were themselves about to pull the plug on Suharto, a parade of Treasury Department officials descended on Jakarta, counseling the doomed regime on how best to bolster its financial health. True, State Department representatives protested. The proposed economic reforms, they argued, would only undermine Suharto: Indonesia, too, had "no unified opposition movement," an administration official explained to the *Los Angeles Times*.

Which brings us to Slobodan Milosevic. When U.N. secretary general Kofi Annan declared that Saddam Hussein was a man he could "do business with," members of the Clinton foreign policy team rightly snickered. When it comes to the equally repugnant Serb leader, however, the administration adopts that very line. While it accuses Milosevic's lieutenants of committing war crimes in Bosnia, the White House has elevated to the status of peace partner the man who directed that criminal enterprise and whose forces are presently ransacking Kosovo. In contrast, the Clinton team has consistently spurned Serbia's democratic opposition. Thus, the administration responded with conspicuous silence when massive pro-democracy demonstrations in Belgrade threatened to unseat Milosevic in early 1997. Typically, Richard Holbrooke, during a round of interviews with independent Serbian journalists later that year, condemned as "stupid" the behavior of Belgrade's pro-democracy movement,

while praising Milosevic as a leader who "defends the interests of his country with great skill."

The tendency to confuse international stability with the good health of anti-American dictatorships finds its purest expression in recent American policy toward North Korea. Given the nature of the Pyongyang regime, its bellicose military posture, and its nuclear weapons program, one might expect the White House to yearn for North Korea's dissolution. To the contrary, the president hopes to "work with" its leaders "in restructuring their entire economy." In pursuit of that elusive aim, the United States has arranged for \$4 billion in multilateral financing for the construction of North Korean nuclear facilities, and the delivery of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea annually. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth explained the logic: "Who knows what actions North Korea might take if it were desperate."

How, finally, are we to account for this willingness to bolster failing dictatorships? Specifically, its defenders say the practice accomplishes either of two things: It promotes prosperity, or it advances national security. As to the first of these, the preference for the devil-we-know is fairly straightforward. States like Indonesia and Malaysia are, in the words of Madeleine Albright, "our customers. They are our competitors. If they are not doing well, they will cut the prices." Our affinity for the occasional autocracy is, according to this view, but one more consequence of the president's eagerness to place "our economic competitiveness at the heart of our foreign policy." Business first; democracy later.

But acquisitiveness hardly explains our preference for a stable Iraq, an enduring North Korea. In these instances, the justification is of the older political-military sort. In the case of Iraq, American policymakers fear civil war. Better to hold Iraq together than to confront instability, the argument goes, even if the only glue available is Saddam Hussein. In the case of North Korea, U.S. officials fret, somewhat more justifiably, that disintegration could lead to an invasion of South Korea by the North.

Even leaving aside the tenuous moral legitimacy of these arguments, their defects are numerous and irreparable. To begin with, the strategic rationale for propitiating collapsing adversaries is dubious. Its foundation, the theory that disintegrating authoritarian regimes are necessarily more prone to aggression than their stable counterparts, is no truer today than it was when promoted by those warning that implosion

of the Soviet Union would incite a major war or that a stable Nazi Germany would opt for peace. As for the country to which such logic is most commonly applied, it is not the prospect of North Korea's disappearance, but its very existence, that perpetuates global instability. From its 1968 seizure of the USS *Pueblo* and its periodic assassinations of foreign officials to its recent incursions in the South, North Korea has been remarkably consistent in its execrable conduct. (Characteristically, Pyongyang offered two weeks ago to "reduce" the United States "to ashes.") To contend that administering life support to such a regime enhances international stability is plainly inconsistent with the facts.


With respect to Iraq, it is true that failing states are prone to civil war. But surely at some point we pass a threshold where the possibility of, say, a "fragmented" Iraq becomes a lesser evil than the persistence of Saddam Hussein. By most accounts, we crossed that line some time ago. That things might be worse without Saddam—or, for that matter, without Slobodan Milosevic—is always possible. But given our current predicaments in Iraq and Kosovo, it is difficult to imagine how, particularly when the strongest opposition groups in these countries are friendlier to the United States than the regimes they seek to topple.

Equally fanciful is the economic rationale for embracing shaky autocracies: They are "our customers, our competitors," hence, we must bolster their rule. To the contrary, it has long been a truism of international politics that the best guarantor of market stability is democracy, the weakest a closed political system. Consider the financial havoc wrought on states that until recently preached the superiority of authoritarian "Asian values." It was precisely autocratic rule, and the corruption and capricious regulations that always accompany it, which led to the eventual unravelling of the Malaysian and Indonesian economies. The White

House, in its role as benefactor to besieged despots, confers legitimacy on just this brand of governance.

Politically, too, the administration has its priorities backwards. When an unfriendly junta teeters on the verge of collapse, it is disingenuous to argue—as proponents of indiscriminate engagement do—that the United States accelerates political change by sustaining the regime instead of giving it a final push. As Senator Richard Lugar wrote recently, "no lasting solution to the Balkan crises is possible without fundamental change in Serbia and in the leadership of Yugoslavia. It should be a U.S. policy priority to help bring about those changes." Much the same could be said of North Korea, Iraq, and other states whose status quo ensures regional instability. Indeed, when a hostile regime staggers toward certain ruin, the political wisdom of engagement becomes inscrutable.

Those who once charged the Bush team with cynicism now stand accused of exactly that—with one difference: The would-be Machiavellians at President Clinton's side can't even get cynicism right. In the name of global stability, they have, in fact, devised a formula for lasting turmoil. ♦



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NEW YORK, NEW YORK

The Life and Times of Gotham, the City by the Sea

By Fred Siegel

New York, the open city, the city created by its harbor, has always been both invigorated and imperiled by disorder.

As the offspring of the Dutch Republic, the most advanced economy of the seventeenth century, the great port drew commerce in eighteen languages—together with “servants, slaves, sailors, and soldiers” whose brawls made the burghers anxious and

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a police force an early necessity. Three and a half centuries before Mayor Rudy Giuliani preached civility to the unbelieving, Peter Stuyvesant described his city by the sea as “slovenly, drunken, disobedient.” Determined to establish discipline in New Amsterdam, Mayor Stuyvesant imposed fines on townsmen who allowed pigs, goats, and sheep to wander. He also—George Lankevich relates in his compact new study, *American Metropolis: A History of New York City*—ordered taverns to close at nine and forbade residents from throwing “rubbish, filth, ashes, oyster-shells, dead animals, or anything like it” into the street. New Amsterdam became the new “Gotham”: the legendary “goat town” of wise fools who, as one eighteenth-century observer noted, were

“infatuated with trade” and energized the economy even as they left the streets strewn with litter.

In 1664—when the Dutch, defeated by the English, passed the torch of economic leadership—New Amsterdam became New York, a prominent port in the British global economy. Its extraordinary harbor was and remains a “divine gift,” as the modern commentator Roger Starr once described it. Protected from the wind in all directions, it was free of fog, ice, and sharply shifting tides. The Long Island Sound funneled in commerce from the east, the Hudson River brought down traffic from the north, and New Jersey’s Raritan River carried in trade from the west.



NYC Museum / Monacelli. Opposite: Library of Congress; NY Historical Society / Monacelli

New Yorkers had the ingenuity to shape the port to their commercial advantage—and the port in turn shaped them. The city's adventurous eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century Whig entrepreneurs, well aware of competition from Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, operated with an energy and acumen unknown to the dynastic firms of their rivals. Even before the Erie Canal opened in 1825, they pioneered the auction system for selling arriving goods. "The truth," explained Abraham Thompson, one of the auctioneers, "was that in Boston and Philadelphia, the free and absolute sale of goods is not encouraged," in fact not even "understood." In 1817, New York established the first regularly scheduled packet-ship service to and from England, enhancing the city's position as the center of information for the financial markets that were, in turn, underwritten with the profits from trade. This virtuous circle, reinforced by the success of the Erie Canal in 1825, would carry the city to greatness.

This is the New York that Herman Melville knew when he composed his famous 1851 description of a city fasci-

nated by its port at the beginning of *Moby Dick*. But the city that once lived with its face toward the sea has now become a metropolis whose back is

Edwin G. Burrows and Mike Wallace
*Gotham: A History of
New York City to 1898*

Oxford University Press, 1383 pp., \$49.95

George J. Lankevich
*American Metropolis: A History of
New York City*

New York University Press, 282 pp., \$55

Selma Cantor Berrol
*The Empire City: New York and Its
People, 1624-1996*

Praeger, 183 pp., \$49.95

Kevin Bone, ed.,
*The New York Waterfront:
Evolution and Building Culture of
the Port and Harbor*

Monacelli, 280 pp., \$35

Laura Rosen
*Manhattan Shores: An Expedition
Around the Island's Edge*

Thames and Hudson, 160 pp., \$35

turned on its own harbor. The worlds of finance and trade, once intimately intertwined, have been severed. There is today—as Kevin Bone's brilliantly illus-

trated collection of essays on the architectural history of the harbor, *The New York Waterfront*, shows—no longer any Port of New York to speak of. It's all been transferred to the shallow waters of New Jersey while New York is now almost entirely an inner-borough white-collar community joined to outer boroughs nearly stripped of blue-collar work. Even in these boom times and under the leadership of a great mayor, New York is a city whose economy consists primarily of using Wall Street revenues to pay for social-service jobs in Brooklyn and the Bronx.

One new version of the great New York saga, and a significant publishing event, is *Gotham* by Edwin Burrows and Mike Wallace, an astonishingly readable 1,383-page account of the city from its origins to 1898, when the five boroughs were consolidated into "Greater New York." While the authors claim that they have no "overarching thesis," there is in fact an ongoing theme in their witty, well-written narrative. Drawing, as Burrows and Wallace readily acknowledge, on the last thirty years of scholarship in new labor and

social history, *Gotham* is at its core the story of the struggles of the working class and new immigrants against commercial capitalism.

Lankevich's *American Metropolis*, ideal for classroom use, is a political history that moves from one mayoral administration to the next. Burrows and Wallace's far more ambitious *Gotham* is a history in which the star actors are the conflicts and crises that shaped the social landscape. New York had contended with numerous riots well before 1789, when a Parisian mob's storming of the largely empty Bastille marked the beginning of working-class participation in the French Revolution. *Gotham* is particularly good at showing how the revolutionary example of the French cast a shadow over New York for a century, deepening class cleavages in the city's politics.

The backdrop to the arrival in New York of news of the French Revolution was a major lower-class riot all New York's own. In 1788, as Federalists and anti-Federalists were arguing over the new American Constitution, some boys, peering through a window at Columbia College (then located in lower Manhattan), discovered physicians holding up the arm of a dissected cadaver. The boys fled screaming, and a mob returned, outraged that graves had been violated. Rumors flew, and there were threats to kill every doctor in town. When the surgeons were taken to jail, a lynch mob five-thousand strong was dispersed only after the militia killed three of the rioters.

New York was nearly unanimous in supporting the onset of the French Revolution as a blow against monarchical tyranny. With the regicide of Louis XVI, well-to-do Federalists like Rufus King decided that the revolution was being "conducted with so much barbarity & ignorance" as to have become an enemy of liberty. But not even news from France of the 1793 Reign of Terror could turn most of the mechanics and small merchants of New York against the French Jacobins. The newly founded Tammany Society, soon to be a bulwark of the Democratic party, changed the "'Glorious Fourth' into a celebra-

Brooklyn Harbor, 1911



There now is your insular city of the Manhattoes, belted round by wharves as Indian isles by coral reefs. . . . Circumambulate the city of a dreamy Sabbath afternoon. Go from Corlears Hook to Coenties Slip, and from thence, by Whitehall, northward. What do you see?—Posted like silent sentinels all around the town, stand thousands upon thousands of mortal men fixed in ocean reveries. . . . But these are all landsmen; of week days pent up in lath and plaster—tied to counters, nailed to benches, clinched to desks. . . . Nothing will content them but the extremest limit of the land.

—Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*

Harlem River, 1903



tion of international revolution singing choruses of 'La Marseillaise.'" "The lower class of citizens," noted Peter Livingston approvingly, are "almost to a Man . . . Frenchmen."

It was a time in New York when one man in seven was jailed for debt in the course of a year but only one in ten had the property qualification to vote, and the toast at a mechanics' dinner struck a dangerous chord: "A cobweb pair of breeches, a porcupine saddle . . . to all the enemies of freedom." The divisions deepened when France declared war on the England still much hated in America, producing a wave of Francophilia in which French sympathizers adopted "the bloused shirts, linen cravats, and baggy pantaloons that were the uniform of the continental revolutionaries."

Mike Wallace, the principal author of *Gotham*'s chapters on the nineteenth century, is torn between his identification with the French revolutionary and socialist tradition and his considerable abilities as an historian. In describing the marked influence in New York of the Parisian revolts of 1789, 1848, and 1870, the reader can feel hope rising—only to be dashed by sobering sentences on why New York, the most European of American cities, never followed its French exemplar. The tension is part of what makes *Gotham* so intriguing, but it is also what leaves the book unable to answer the question of why New York, for all its violence, was never ripe for revolution.

When, in 1848, news reached the United States that France's "bourgeois monarch," Louis Phillipe, had been overthrown, there was again widespread support for the revolutionaries. The poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow spoke for most Americans when he said, "So long as a King is left upon his throne there will be no justice on earth." But when red republicans like Louis Blanc called upon the French government to establish a right to work in government-organized cooperative workshops, American attitudes changed. The citizens of a wide-open United States found it hard to identify with neo-Jacobin calls for a more governed society. The sometimes radical

New York Tribune (which would later employ Karl Marx as a correspondent) mocked the merchants' fear of socialism but ceased to support the Parisian revolutionaries. The *Tribune* would even come to endorse the ferocious suppression of the 1848 revolt, in which thousands of Parisian workers were injured or killed.

What made New York different was not the lack of intense, often violent, class conflict but rather the lack of the assumptions behind it. There was a fundamentally different character to American radicalism—primarily because many radicals shared the same free-market ideology as their class enemies. Consider William Leggett, leader of the “Locofocos,” the Jacksonian radicals who broke with the Tammany Hall regulars. “The sole reliance of the laboring classes,” Leggett argued, “is the great principle of Equal Rights . . . [and] a system of legislation which leaves all to the free exercise of their talents and industry.” The primary objects of Leggett’s ire were the government-granted monopolies in everything from meat and vegetables to fuel and ferries. It was the working people, he quite correctly argued, who paid for the privileges of the politically connected Whig elite with higher prices and reduced opportunities.

Writing in the *New York Morning Post*, Leggett made such a strong case for hard money, free trade, and limited government that some historians mistakenly see him as a precursor of such conservative free-market thinkers as Friedrich Hayek. “Governments,” Leggett insisted, “have no right to interfere with the pursuits of individuals . . . [or] to tamper with individual industry a hair’s breadth beyond what is essential to protect the right of person and property.”

Other New York radicals were more fully in the European mold. The German immigrant Wilhelm Weitling, who had fought on the Parisian barricades in 1848, was one of the early proponents of terror—“founding the kingdom of heaven by unleashing the furies of hell.” He wanted to mobilize “smart and courageous murderers and thieves,” but he found little success in America. His

proposals to establish workers’ cooperatives did resonate a little in New York’s German community (whose piano-makers’ union carried the flag that their fellow Parisian piano makers had planted “upon the barricades during the stormy days” of 1848). But at last Weitling’s ideas remained marginal.

New York in the nineteenth century—like New York in the twentieth century—was beset by an often bewildering set of cross-cutting antagonisms. In *Gotham*, Burrows and Wallace note that there were numerous clashes in which workers crossed ethnic lines. But most labor and fraternal organizations had a distinctly ethnic caste, as different groups operated in distinct niches of the economy. It is difficult, in fact almost impossible, to sort out ethnic and religious strands from class in radicalism. How can they be disentangled when, for instance, an unskilled Irish Catholic worker easily found himself in conflict with a native-born Protestant boss?

In fact, it often looked as though New York’s nineteenth-century con-

licts were entirely ethnic. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Irish immigrants—representing 20 percent of the population but 70 percent of the people on relief and more than half of the men in jail—were despised as “simian brutes” by Protestants of all stripes. The Irish alliance with radical Tammany politicians was already enough to anger Protestants, and the Catholic Church didn’t help matters when Bishop Hughes preached at St. Patrick’s Cathedral on “The Decline of Protestantism and Its Causes.”

Yet the 1849 Astor Place Riots demonstrated that Irish Catholics—given the right provocation—could unite with anti-Irish nativists to form the “dangerous classes.” It was Shakespeare who set off the Astor Place Riots, but what they revealed was a class conflict so intense it shook the city. The greatest Shakespearean actors of the day—and bitter rivals—were William Macready, a symbol of British aristocratic culture, and Edwin Forrest, the Philadelphia-born hero of the common man. In May 1849, Macready was set to perform for the white-gloved Whigs at the Astor





NYC Museum / Monacelli

Opera House, while Forrest was playing at a Broadway theater not far away. The penny press stoked the feud between the actors, and the Irish radicals hostile to Macready and the native-born Bowery B'hoys united for the occasion. When Macready came out for the third act of *Macbeth*, Isaiah Rynders, a knife-toting gambler, saloonkeeper, and Tammany politician, led his gang members to their feet shouting curses. Outside a mob of more than eight thousand—egged on by nativist Ned Buntline swinging a sword and screaming “Workingmen! Shall Americans or Englishman rule?”—were throwing stones at the theater windows. The crowd, shouting “burn the damned den of the aristocracy,” refused to be intimidated by the arrival of the militia, which eventually fired on the rioters and left twenty-two dead.

In the wake of the 1848 revolutions in Europe, it seemed as though class warfare had finally come to the New World. Some of the Whig grandees were delighted by the outcome. James Watson Webb saw the riots' casualties as “an excellent advertisement to the Capitalists of the old world that they might

send their property to New York and rely upon the certainty that it would be safe.” But, as the historian Peter Buckley notes, the class solidarity of late 1840s was soon replaced by the ethnic antagonism of the 1850s. Working-class nativists quickly came to see cheap Irish labor, rather than Anglophile bosses, as their primary foe.

The nativist riots of the 1850s were the last time that the Protestants dominated the streets of New York. In the 1860s, it took an entire regiment of Union soldiers to beat back the Irish rioters protesting the Civil War draft and the competition of black labor in what was the bloodiest disturbance in American history. By 1871, while wealthy New Yorkers looked with horror as the Commune ruled Paris, Catholics took control of New York's streets. With the police closely aligned to Tammany Hall, Irish Catholic rioters made that year's Protestant Orange-men's parade the city's last.

It's hard not to admire the encyclopedic breadth displayed by Burrows and Wallace in *Gotham*. On top of its coverage of political and economic topics, the book is filled with discussions of the arts, entertainment, popular recreation, and architecture.


It's also hard, however, to be satisfied with *Gotham's* implicit thesis of a world definitively divided between rich and poor. For what's striking about New York is that so many of its conflicts took place within a consensus about values. *Gotham* presents a city like a giant, wobbly bucket, always threatening to be tipped over by agitation. But for all its violence, nineteenth-century New York was more like an ocean that always settled back after a storm. The historian James Chapin argues that “if by chance the elite 10 percent of New York had been wiped out by a plague, the remaining population would have recreated something similar to what already existed.” What most New Yorkers, rich and poor, wanted was a chance to better themselves. It's true that sometimes they tried to achieve this by violent means, but the real fact of social mobility is the missing element in *Gotham*. There is no recognition, for example,

that the great-grandchildren of the nineteenth-century Irish Catholics would go on to create the New York Conservative party in the 1960s.

Selma Berrol's new *The Empire City: New York and its People, 1624-1996* lays out in its brief 183 pages the more compelling case of a city defined by upward mobility. Her thesis is that there was a “symbiosis” between the rise of new immigrants and New York City. As she notes, both the mid-nineteenth-century Croton water system (built by the Irish) and the turn-of-the-century subways (built by the Italians) provide examples of a city improving its infrastructure while its new immigrants improved their social position.

Berrol doesn't gloss over the desperate poverty of the immigrants, particularly during the down cycles of New York's boom-and-bust economy. But, as she observes, those who arrived in New York with skills—like the Germans, who were 15 percent of the population in 1855 but half the bakers, confectioners, cabinet makers, tobacconists, tailors, and woodworkers—were likely to do well even when times got hard. Berrol argues that “the basic reason” there was so much suffering in a city with a growing economy was simply that the population was expanding even more rapidly, “creating a gap that led to low wages and unemployment,” particularly in the winter “when the canals froze and commerce dwindled.”

Henry George, the most influential social critic of late-nineteenth-century New York, gave a different answer. George, an extraordinary mix of conservative and radical instincts, wanted to know why more wealth seemed to produce more poverty: “As liveried carriages, appear, so do barefoot children.” Seven years before Frederick Jackson Turner penned his famous thesis explaining why American democracy depended on the opportunities offered by the frontier, George anticipated his argument. The United States, George said, had been a land of promise because its vast expanses of territory meant that landlords couldn't extort monopoly rents from the workingman. But that



South Street Riverwall, c. 1910

Monacelli. Opposite: NYC Museum / Monacelli

day had ended, and the new world was about to become as class-bound as the old. The solution for George (an ardent free trader) was a single tax on land to replace all other taxes.

In 1886, Henry George was one of the three extraordinary candidates for mayor in a defining election fought out against a backdrop of rising unemployment, the Haymarket bombing in Chicago, and a wave of violent strikes. George's opponents were the twenty-eight-year-old Theodore Roosevelt (who finished last) and the victor, Abram Hewitt, the son-in-law of Peter Cooper, who had founded the Cooper Union for Arts and Sciences, where the bright children of mechanics could receive a free education.

Declaring himself the spokesman of "Honest Labor Against Thieving Landlords and Politicians," George drew the support of the city's newly aroused labor movement. His supporters, Irish laborers and German craftsmen alike, sought to restore the traditional virtues. Their placards read "No Charity: We Want Fair and Square Justice," and "The Spirit of '76 Still Lives." On the stage of Cooper's Great Hall, where Lincoln had denounced black slavery, George denounced "industrial slavery." Advertising to the city's densely packed slums, he told the crowd, "we are toiling per-

haps for Mrs. Astor" or "the heirs of some dead Dutchman."

Hewitt, by nature a reformer, reluctantly accepted the backing of Tammany Hall. His family ties gave him some credibility with the city's workers, and he insisted that he was not the upper class's candidate. "These rich Republicans and these rich millionaires—nay, have they not at the Union League Club endorsed Mr. Roosevelt?" Hewitt criticized the Astor family—who at one point were collecting 10 percent of the rents of Manhattan—for not devoting their "unearned increment" to the public good, and he agreed that the city should tax the wealthy to create more institutions like the tuition-free Cooper Union. But he also spoke to the fears of middle-class property owners, noting that the single-tax would hit them hard. And he insisted that the United Labor party that backed Henry George consisted of "anarchists, nihilists, communists, socialists" who were "enemies of civilization and order." The city should, he admitted, restore opportunity—but not at the risk of practices that would recall "the horrors of the French Revolution and the atrocities of the Commune."

Hewitt proposed to increase opportunity by rebuilding the city's crumbling docks, streets, and transit facilities. New Yorkers looked with envy at the way

Baron Haussmann used the authoritarian powers granted him by Napoleon III to modernize Paris. Haussmann tore down the jumble of working-class streets that had so often incubated revolution and replaced them with broad boulevards—transforming revolutionary Paris into a right-wing city by pushing the working class out into what became the "red belts" of the periphery.

This Haussmannian model was unavailable to New York with its manufacturing centered in the very heart of the city and its vibrant democratic politics. But New York had its own working-class jumble that worried the city's business class. It lay in the Tammany strongholds along the chaotic, densely packed, sometimes violent Manhattan docks.

The corporate lawyer and anti-Tammany reformer Andrew H. Green was the first to argue that the city and the port could modernize themselves if the five boroughs were consolidated. Mayor Hewitt (who was also an iron importer looking to reduce the cost of goods moving through New York harbor) agreed that only a unified city could dredge the harbor, upgrade the docks, and rebuild the warehouses. If a single authority controlled the waterfront, he argued it could control the abuses from those "who by encroachment, appropriation, and misuses, deplete the general system through niggard schemes of individual profit." He even suggested the construction of a rail bridge across the Hudson to connect manufacturers to the mainland.

Green and Hewitt cautioned that if New York did not consolidate its five counties in order to pay for the new infrastructure, it would inevitably fall behind its rival, Chicago. Echoing Leggett and George, Hewitt even warned that only a consolidated New York could carry on more than a "desultory and futile war against the organized forces of relentless and absentee capitalism, resident in Boston, San Francisco, New Orleans, London, Paris, or Frankfurt."

Green and Hewitt succeeded. New York surpassed Chicago in population and never looked back. With the 1898 consolidation, explains historian David

Hammack, New York became a regional government and “suburban development could in effect take place under the aegis of city.”

The upshot was extraordinary. New York turned into “the engineers city.” With a unified harbor, the city went on to build bridges across the Harlem and East Rivers, tunnels under the Hudson to New Jersey, and the subway’s circulatory system for labor. New York became not only the largest city in the United States, but its busiest port, a paradise for small manufacturers, and the headquarters city for national corporations. It was, as George Francis Train boasted, the “locomotive of these United States,” a city whose bank deposits were as great as all the rest of the country combined.

In *Gotham*, Burrows and Wallace mourn George’s defeat and thereby lose the larger picture in which Hewitt became the architect of the city’s twentieth-century success. Hewitt’s farsighted emphasis on infrastructure helped create the economy that gave the mass of newly arriving immigrants (as well as earlier arrivals) the opportunity to begin their now fabled journey up into the middle class.

Burrows and Wallace are not the only ones to lose sight of Hewitt’s vision. Much of the history of the city in our own time is the result of New York’s leaders forgetting what made their city great. Over the past half-century, New York has proved unable to erect major new projects—or even maintain what it once built. The city stopped building and ignored the harbor that had once sustained it. And in the bargain, it once again began to suffer from the disorder of its “dangerous classes.”

The New York of Hewitt—the New York that Herman Melville knew—seemed still very much alive when the city celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of consolidation in 1948. Unscathed by the war that had ravaged London, Paris, and Berlin, the city was alone at the top. The earlier warnings from the *Brooklyn Eagle* about the dangers of a “Manhattan pattern” imposed on the outer boroughs were forgotten. The expanded tax base had built the Manhattan and Williamsburg bridges, the subways, and


the sewage and water systems necessary for a rapidly growing city. The unified harbor that had a prime attraction for the merger was finished, and it brought in ever increasing tonnage.

And yet, even in 1948, consolidation had left an important piece of business unfinished. One of the primary reasons Brooklynites had voted for consolidation in 1898 was their desire for a cross-harbor rail connection linking Brooklyn’s deep-water port to the mainland. In the absence of a rail tunnel, goods were shipped across the harbor in barges or lighters (the “Manhattan Transfer” made famous by John Dos Passos). The river traffic, however, couldn’t sustain even the demands that the *First World War* had placed on the port—when, as Lankevich describes it in *American Metropolis*, trains arriving on the Jersey side “were backed up as far as Pittsburgh.”

When the war ended, New York and New Jersey collaborated to create a port authority modeled on the semi-autonomous agency already running the London docks. The new agency took on the job of building the rail tunnel, and therein lies perhaps the greatest “might have been” in New York history. In 1988, Rebecca Shanor published a fascinating volume entitled *The City that*

Never Was: Two Hundred Years of Fantastic and Fascinating Plans that Might Have Changed the Face of New York City. These included a dirigible port atop the Empire State Building and Robert Moses’s plans for a bridge from the Battery to Brooklyn. It is a wonderful book, but strangely it didn’t include William Wilgus’s proposals for modernizing freight connections. Wilgus, a master engineer best known for building Grand Central Station, showed how an inner rail line could update the port by joining the Brooklyn and Manhattan waterfronts and connecting Brooklyn to the mainland by way of a rail tunnel.

The Port Authority took up Wilgus’s proposal, but it was stymied when, as historian Robert Fishman explains, the twelve trunk-line railroads serving New York “achieved a rare level of agreement through their concerted refusal to cooperate.” This is the point at which everything started to go wrong for New York’s blue-collar economy. “In precisely those industrial and working class areas that would . . . become tragic loci of decay and deindustrialization,” writes Fishman, “the [Wilgus] plan called for massive investments in new rail and mass-transit lines, highways, and shipping piers.”



Chelsea Piers, c. 1920



Laura Rosen / Thames and Hudson. Opposite: NYC Museum / Monacelli; Stanley Greenberg / Monacelli

Instead, the city began to shed itself of the infrastructure that had been its glory. Saddled with the financial costs of the La Guardia years (when it had offered the widest range of social services available in the United States) and rising municipal labor costs, the city moved to divest itself of the very assets that had created its wealth. New York's two airports were turned over to the Port Authority, which went on to mismanage them. And then there came the final loss of the harbor.

Two years after a 1946 tugboat strike had shut down New York's port, Mayor O'Dwyer proposed that the Port Authority take over the city's

docks. The Tammany-connected longshoremen resisted furiously, but they were tainted by their mob connections. The docks of lower Manhattan were among the last remnants of the old New York described in *Gotham*. Cut off "from the rest of the city by a steel-ribbed highway and a wall of bulkhead sheds," wrote Daniel Bell in 1951, "is the New York waterfront, an atavistic world more redolent of the brawling money-grubbing of the nineteenth century than the smoother-mannered business transactions of the twentieth."

It was atavistic both in its mores and in its unmodernized facilities, and in the late 1950s, the harbor was turned over to the Port Authority—which had

by then only a secondary interest in maritime commerce.

The Port Authority was created to upgrade the harbor, but by the 1950s it had dedicated itself instead to building automobile bridges and tunnels and collecting tolls from them. The regional planners meanwhile turned to clearing Manhattan of "inappropriate uses"—by which they meant manufacturing. Without the Wilgus rail lines, most small factories were eventually pushed not only out of Manhattan but out of New York altogether.

Over time, the new bridges and tunnels managed both to open the city to suburban commuters and to congest the city to the point of making it almost impossible for New York businesses to ship out their goods. White-collar commuters came to Manhattan, and manufacturing jobs left.

This, to be sure, isn't the whole story. Over-taxation, over-regulation, the excess of Robert Moses, and John Lindsay's welfare programs played their part in the city's travails. But the decline of the harbor is a key and underappreciated part of the decline of New York. In the late 1950s, with the help of Governor Nelson Rockefeller, the Port Authority transferred most of what remained of New York's ship traffic across the river to Newark and Elizabeth, which were well connected by rail. New York City received instead that twin-towered white elephant, the World Trade Center, and higher downtown vacancy rates, while the Port Authority, which had devolved into the kind of monopoly William Leggett would have recognized as an enemy of opportunity, started an art collection.

It may be unfair to blame New York's leaders for not grasping at the time what seems so clear in retrospect. There was a moment when it looked as though New York could have the best of both worlds. Between 1947 and 1963, notes Berrol, the city added 58 million square feet of office space including the Time-Life, Equitable, and Seagram buildings, while still employing 927,000 people in manufacturing.

But today only a little more than a quarter of those manufacturing jobs

remain. Some of this transformation—documented in Laura Rosen’s well-photographed pictorial essay, *Manhattan Shores: An Expedition Around the Island’s Edge*—was inevitable as the United States shifted to a service economy. Land in Manhattan once devoted to docks and innumerable small factories has been converted to office towers for the far more remunerative financial sector. It came, however, at the cost of not just a decline but a near-catastrophic collapse of the city’s extraordinary ecology of the small specialty manufacturing companies that both competed and cooperated with each other.

With the post-1965 wave of immigration, well-educated and entrepreneurial Korean and Indian arrivals, like the nineteenth-century Germans, have generally moved up quickly. But New York is having a very hard time incorporating its largely unskilled arrivals. The loss of the harbor has meant the loss of the jobs traditionally filled by young immigrants.

A Puerto Rican man who had come to New York in the 1950s recently told the journalist Robert Suro:

I started after school hauling ice, and then as soon as I was sixteen, I dropped out of school and went down to the Fulton Street docks to become a stevedore. When there was no work on the docks, you could always go to the Garment District and just look for signs, . . . and I never spent a day on relief.

Since 1960, Puerto Ricans’ participation in the labor force has dropped from 85 percent to 50 percent, and the city’s 900,000 Puerto Ricans, as a whole, have become not only downwardly mobile but perhaps the poorest group in the country.

“The net effect of the repeal of New York’s harbor geography,” wrote Roger Starr, “has been to turn the primary asset of the city, the foundation of its greatness, into a liability.” The manufacturing intimately tied to the port has been marginalized and the city has been left, even in the booming 1990s, under the administration of a mayor as extraordinary as Rudy Giu-



Recreation Pier, c. 1920



Williamsburg Pier, 1993

liani, with an immigrant population but without an immigrant economy. In the hurly-burly immigrant city depicted in the pages of *Gotham*, disorder in the streets and opportunity in the shops were joined. The danger now is that the disorder of the downwardly mobile has few means of entrepreneurial expression.

Mayor Giuliani seems to have at last given up on the Port Authority, which has dabbled in fishports, airports, heli-

ports, and “resource-recovery centers” without ever carrying out the mission for which it was chartered. He has proposed that the city take back what it once ceded to the Port Authority and take on the task of building the cross-harbor tunnel itself. It’s an idea that might redeem Hewitt’s vision of New York as an “engineers city” and the harbor as an engine of opportunity.

New York City needs to turn its face to the sea, once again. ♦

U.S. Senate Private Session

Transcript of Closed-Door Deliberations of the Court of Impeachment
January 26, 1999

Not to Be Released upon Penalty of Imprisonment

**TOP
SECRET**

Sen. Collins: Has anybody seen my censure resolution? I have three weeks of grocery lists written on it.

Sen. Thompson: I may have used it for spitballs during the debate on witnesses. Check the back of Sen. Thurmond's neck.

Sen. Lott: Senators! Order please. We'll now vote on the motion. All those who think Cheryl Mills is more babelicious than Nicole Seligman, say aye.

Sen. Dodd: Wait a second. Was that Mills? This whole time I thought that was Betty Currie.

Sen. Domenici: No, no. Currie is the one the president kept calling in the middle of the night, except that she was on a plane to Amsterdam when one of the calls was placed so it couldn't have been her. I think that's it.

Sen. Roberts: Don't ask me. I've been asleep with my eyes open the whole time.

Sen. Specter: I could have sworn I heard one of the House managers, that really fat one, say that it was Monica Lewinsky who was on the plane.

Sen. Murray: The fat one? I thought the fat one worked for the president. Wait a second. Were the House managers the ones sitting at the table to our right, or were those the White House lawyers? Wasn't anyone paying attention?

Sen. Brownback: I was. I was.

Sen. Kennedy: You would, you weenie.

Sen. Snowe: Actually, I thought that guy with the two first names, Greg Greg, was the hottest one up there. Him and McCollum.

Sen. Hutchison: McCollum?! He's a bowser. What's with his upper lip? It's crying out for a moustache.

Sen. Hatch: Wait a second. If Lewinsky was the one on the plane, who was the one who returned the gifts from Sidney Blumenthal?

Sen. Leahy: Don't look at me. I'm a senator. I have staff to keep track of this kind of thing.

Sen. Schumer: I paid attention to Bumpers. He was funny.

Sen. Inouye: Oh yeah. Did you get a load of his war story? The one that ended with him not seeing combat? Pretty moving, right John?

Sen. McCain: I was quaking in my chair, man. Never been so scared.

Sen. Boxer: I won 4,000 games of tic-tac-toe during this trial. I hope it never ends.

Voices: Yeah, this is fun. . . . So relaxing. . . . Like a trip to Club Med. . . . Let's keep it going.