Why Lawrence Korb is Wrong on Iraq

The National Review's Rich Lowry writes:

Lawrence Korb and Peter Ogden of the Center for American Progress had an op-ed in the Washington Post Thursday responding to the piece I wrote with Bill Kristol the other day. They argue we simply don't have any additional troops to send to Iraq. The headline is, "Why We Can't Send More Troops." Note the "can't." Not "shouldn't," "can't." This is nonsense. As recently as December 2005, we had 160,000 troops in Iraq. Now, we have 147,000. Are we to believe that suddenly it is impossible to have another 14,000 or so - roughly four combat brigades - in Iraq to be back at 160,000? Those troops would nearly triple the number of troops we are currently surging into Baghdad. Let's say we are talking about another two or three divisions, in other words 30,000-45,000 troops. That is certainly doable as well, even though it would obviously be a strain. The way critics of the war argue that it is impossible to send more troops is to assume we need 250,000 troops in Iraq to make any difference. That would indeed be impossible. But increments short of that will make a difference in Iraq. The Marine intelligence officer whose downbeat report in Anbar recently got so much attention said another division, 15,000 troops, would make a difference there. 15,000 more troops would unquestionably make a difference in Baghdad, too. Much smaller increases in Ramadi and elsewhere would dramatically change the local equations as well. Remember: Only about 3,500 American soldiers were enough to clear Tall Afar. Let's roll through Korb and Ogden's argument. "In July an official report revealed that two-thirds of the active U.S. Army was classified as ‘not ready for combat.' When one combines this news with the fact that roughly one-third of the active Army is deployed (and thus presumably ready for combat), the math is simple but the answer alarming: The active Army has close to zero combat-ready brigades in reserve." This is all true, but is not quite as meaningful as Korb and Ogden suggest. The Army is clearly strained and the fall-off in readiness is alarming. The result is that most Army brigades are not rated "ready" - a complex metric that includes troop strength, equipment levels, and so on - until right before they deploy. In particular, units that have just rotated out of Iraq this summer are inevitably rated "not ready." But that is not to say that no brigades could be gotten ready fairly quickly to go to Iraq or elsewhere. "The second place to seek new troops and equipment is the Army National Guard and Reserve. But the news here is, if anything, worse." The National Guard is indeed a mess. But you're not going to pull National Guard brigades for sudden deployment anyway. "Already, the stress of Iraq and Afghanistan on our soldiers has been significant: Every available active-duty combat brigade has served at least one tour in Iraq or Afghanistan, and many have served two or three." This speaks to a strain, no doubt. But just because a combat brigade has served once in Iraq or Afghanistan, it doesn't mean that it can't go back. The same is true for brigades that have been there more than once. This is a hardship, but I'm guessing if you asked most soldiers if they'd rather avoid the strain, or win in Iraq, they'd take the strain and the victory. (Which is just one of the reasons why they are so amazing.) "Thus the simple fact is that the only way for Kristol and Lowry to put their new plan into action anytime soon without resorting to a draft … is by demanding even more from our soldiers by accelerating their training and rotation schedules." Yes, this is true. And it manifestly is not impossible, so why do Korb and Ogden pretend it is? "The equipment shortage that the U.S. Army faces at the moment is making it difficult to train troops even at current levels." Again, this speaks to a strain, and there might not be enough equipment for another 100,000 troops in Iraq, but increases in troop levels short of that can make a difference. "Increasing the number of deployed troops would compound this readiness problem and leave the Army with little spare capacity to respond to other conflicts around the globe that might demand immediate and urgent action." This is where Korb and Ogden give away the store. I thought there were no troops capable of responding at all. Now, suddenly, there are? Since they admit two-thirds of the way through their op-ed that we do have this spare capacity, the question comes down to whether the Battle for Baghdad "demand[s] immediate and urgent action"? I think it obviously does. The basic choice is whether it is better not to strain the army at the cost of potentially losing in Iraq, or better to strain the army while doing everything plausible to win the war in Iraq. The latter is clearly preferable. If there is ever a circumstance that calls for straining the Army, this is it. And we can be sure that if we lose in Iraq, there will be many more strains on the military to come. "While we disagree with Kristol and Lowry's contention that sending more troops to Iraq would bring peace and stability to the country…" This is a big disagreement. If they want to argue that the war is lost and we shouldn't send more troops there, fine, but they shouldn't pretend we "can't" send more troops there. "The solution is to do two things that the Bush administration has not: permanently increase the number of troops in the active Army and fully fund its equipment needs." I no longer have any doubts that this is true, and I look forward to the Center for American Progress vigorously making the case for a larger military and bringing lots of liberals along with them.