This brief post-election blurb, which I comment on here, has been updated with a longer commentary on why the GOP lost on Tuesday. It's McCain's fault, you see. Of course, the fact that you have to read several paragraphs in before Iraq is even mentioned, and then only in the context of the "Frist-Warner alternative," is a good sign of severe out-of-touchism. It's pretty clear that the deteriorating security situation in Iraq had a major impact on the election -- Ohio, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Montana, Missouri and Rhode Island included. Going back to the fall of 2003, McCain had warned again and again about the erosion of security and had called for a much greater commitment to win the war in terms of troop strength (we never had enough) and counterinsurgency strategy. In November of 2003, McCain argued for more ground troops to give "us the necessary manpower to conduct a focused counterinsurgency campaign across the Sunni Triangle that seals off enemy operating areas, conducts search and destroy missions, and holds territory." He continued:
Security is the precondition for everything else we want to accomplish in Iraq. We will not get good intelligence until we provide a level of public safety and a commitment to stay that encourages Iraqis to cast their lot with us, rather than wait to see whether we or the Baathists prevail. Local Iraqis need to have enough confidence in our strength and staying power to collaborate with us. Absent improved security, acts of sabotage will hold back economic progress. Without better security, political progress will be difficult because the Iraqi people will not trust an Iraqi political authority that cannot protect them. By all means increase the number of Iraqis involved in security…. But given the time it will take to train and deploy sufficient numbers of Iraqi forces and the competence required to root out a hardened foe, for the foreseeable future, Iraqi forces aren't a substitute for adequate levels of American troops.
Guess this tidbit wasn't fit to print. I don't recall Hewitt forcefully pressing Secretary Rumsfeld and the White House to dramatically ramp-up its prosecution of the war during the critical years of 2003 and 2004, when the insurgency formed and deepened, or in the subsequent months for that matter. Perhaps if Hewitt had joined McCain early on in pressing the administration from the right on Iraq, the U.S. may have been painted a bit less Blue on November 7. Oh, the road not taken.