The architects of the surge, Frederick Kagan and General Jack Keane, and the man whose judgment of it seems to carry the most weight with the media, Michael O'Hanlon, share a byline in today's Washington Post. The three start with the passage of the de-Baathification bill in the Iraqi Parliament:
Much remains to be done, but this is an important step toward political reconciliation -- and it further strengthens the case for America to remain committed to its crucial mission in Iraq in the months and years ahead.
And they address the role benchmarks should play in judging overall progress in Iraq, explaining of the benchmarks that were originally set out by the administration and Congress:
to the extent that benchmarks are employed, we would advocate using a longer list -- and include Baghdad's sharing of oil revenue with the provinces, the hiring of Sunni volunteers into the security forces and into the civilian arms of government, improvements in the legal and penal systems, and, over time, reform of the electoral system to weaken the role of the sectarian parties. In all but the last of these considerable progress has been made in the past year.
But on the most important matter, the timetable for drawing down U.S. troops, the three urge caution:
The strain on the U.S. military is great, and we are all concerned. But sustaining 15 brigades in Iraq for six more months or another year will not break the force. Reducing forces in Iraq too rapidly, however, even by one or two brigades, might seriously jeopardize the tenuous success we are seeing. We should not take that risk.
This is the key point. There can be little doubt that the Air Force and Navy could, and would as a matter of course, carry much of the load were a conflict to break out in the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula, or in the Persian Gulf. To the extent that ground forces would be needed, surely the Army and Marine Corps would be able to commit adequate resources. But to pull forces from Iraq in order to improve readiness and without regard for the impact on the security situation in that country just wouldn't make any sense. The point of maintaining readiness is to allow American forces every opportunity to secure victory in combat. To sacrifice victory in combat in order to improve readiness is a kind of backwards logic that obscures the real objective of its advocates.