Did the Osirak bombing in 1981 impede or accelerate Saddam's nuclear weapons program? Gerald Steinberg, director of the Program on Conflict Management at Bar-Ilan University, weighs in on this question and the relevance of the Begin Doctrine -- which asserts "the fundamental need to prevent any of Israel's enemies from obtaining nuclear weapons."
GIVEN THE complexities and unpredictability of international relations, the expectation that the consequences of strategic decisions can be mapped out in detail is illusory. History is not deterministic - the changes set off by one major act, such as the destruction of the Osirak reactor in 1981 - set off additional responses in all directions. The best any leader and government can do in such circumstances is to select the least bad option. Every situation requires a careful consideration of the available alternatives, and the consequences of both action and inaction. On this basis, if faced with a similar decision over Iran, Menachem Begin's precedent and the doctrine that he set out in dealing with Saddam's nuclear ambitions retain their importance.