IF THE UNITED STATES moves against Iraq, what attitude should it expect from neighboring Iran? Unfortunately, given improvements in Tehran-Baghdad relations, the considerable influence Tehran exerts over Iraqi opposition groups, and continuing poor relations between Tehran and Washington, the United States shouldn't count on Iran's adopting a helpful stance. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. action in Afghanistan, Washington could not ignore Iran, which had helped create and continued to back the opposition to the Taliban, notably the Northern Alliance. Tehran is closely involved, too, with the opposition to Saddam Hussein. Iran hosts the Shiite-dominated Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Shiite al-Dawa group. The Iraqi National Congress (INC), the democratic umbrella group, claims to have training facilities in Tehran. Tehran also is connected with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, and it maintains relations with the Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP) of Massoud Barzani. In fact, it was reported in January that the Iranian Foreign Ministry had organized, and cancelled at the last minute, a meeting in Tehran of the KDP, PUK, SCIRI, INC, and prominent Iraqi defector General Wafiq al-Samarrai. Baghdad returns the favor by supporting the Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq Organization (the MKO, recognized as a terrorist organization by the State Department). Nevertheless, relations between Iran and Iraq have improved since their bloody 1980-88 war. Two Iraqi cabinet members visited Tehran this winter, and in late February, Saddam Hussein cabled his congratulations to Iranian president Mohammad Khatami on the anniversary of the Iranian revolution. The two sides have made progress on outstanding war-related issues such as POWs and MIAs, too. And they have adopted similar positions regarding the current Palestinian uprising. Yet differences remain. In April, when Baghdad called for an oil embargo, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's top political and religious official, urged all Islamic countries to suspend their oil exports to the United States for one month and donate part of the month's oil revenues to the Palestinians. Baghdad actually suspended U.S. sales, and in two televised speeches, Saddam Hussein complained about Tehran's failure to follow suit. He used the opportunity to raise again a longstanding sore point: Iran's failure to return the 140 Iraqi warplanes and civilian planes flown to Iran during the 1991 Gulf War. Iran claims only 22 of the planes landed, and they will not be returned without the U.N.'s approval. More relevant to the issue of regime change in Iraq are some recent activities of the opposition to Saddam, notably meetings in Tehran between Kurdish and Shiite-dominated groups. Jalal Talabani of the PUK met with Ayatollah Mohammed Baqer al-Hakim of the SCIRI in Tehran in early February, and the following month al-Hakim said that the SCIRI and the Kurds together could change the Iraqi regime. Press reports from London in mid-March described frequent meetings between the SCIRI, the PUK, the KDP, and the Iraqi National Accord, as well as groups representing small minorities like the Turkmen and the Assyrians. The SCIRI leadership often has expressed misgivings about an American role in replacing Saddam. These may reflect bad memories from 1991, when the Shiite uprising in southern Iraq received no help from the United States, or they could simply be another manifestation of Iranian hostility towards the United States. The Tehran-backed opposition may also be wary of the increasingly prominent role played by Iraqi military defectors, some of whom fought in the Iran-Iraq War or were involved in poison gas attacks against Iranians and Kurds during that conflict and afterwards. But the main reason the United States shouldn't count on Iranian help if it overthrows Saddam is that Tehran is highly suspicious of U.S. intentions in the region. Iranian government officials oppose the presence of any foreign forces in the area and frequently complain about "U.S. encirclement." U.S. troops in Georgia are one cause for concern. Another is the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. As General Yahya Rahim Safavi, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, said on Iranian television in January, "America is attempting to loot energy resources, to export its products and facilities to the region, and to transform these regions into its consumer markets." Deputy Commander of the Guards Mohammad Zolqadr warned that one of America's objectives in Afghanistan is to "build bases . . . to spy on Iran and conduct their plots against the Islamic Republic." Tehran and Washington, of course, have had no diplomatic relations for some 20 years, and Iran's top leader recently dismissed the possibility of talks. Responding to Senator Joseph Biden's offer in March to meet with Iranian lawmakers at a place of their choosing, Ayatollah Khamenei said, "What kind of dialogue can be held with the side which does not even accept you at all, with the side which is against your existence as the Islamic Republic?" President Bush's naming Iran as part of the "axis of evil" had clearly registered with Khamenei. He saw Biden's message as: "If we do not wish to be attacked, we should become a dependent and a puppet regime, and that is impossible." The Iranian political elite is not united on the wisdom of the country's estrangement from the United States. Some members of parliament reacted to their country's inclusion in the axis of evil by demanding an investigation of Iran's role in the shipment of arms to the Palestinian Authority and of its sheltering of al Qaeda personnel. And although Ayatollah Khamenei rejected Biden's overture, a spokesman for President Khatami's government had said that it was up to members of parliament to decide whether they would meet with their American counterparts. Committees were formed to discuss this very idea. What seems to have closed off a possible Iranian opening to the United States in recent weeks is the Middle East crisis. Khamenei said in a sermon on April 5, "If America had not approved, if it had not given a green light, if it had not promised support, the Israelis would not have dared to do these things. . . . America is, therefore, a party to all the crimes being committed in Palestine today." President Khatami, furthermore, said on April 15, "The American administration's support for and satisfaction regarding Israel's unprecedented, inhuman crimes has removed the last shred of doubt, even in the most optimistic individuals and organizations, about America's neutrality." On April 9, the entire parliament attended a rally at the Palestinian embassy in Tehran. For all its tough talk and unacceptable behavior, the Iranian government is capable of being pragmatic. Iranian diplomats were involved in multilateral discussions of Afghanistan through the U.N.'s "six plus two" group, made up of Afghanistan's immediate neighbors plus the United States and Russia. And State Department officials credited Tehran with a constructive role in the discussions in Bonn in November 2001 that created the interim administration of Hamid Karzai. During the fighting, Tehran offered to rescue downed U.S. aviators, and Iranian and American special operations forces occasionally bumped into each other as they advised local combatants. Finally, Tehran facilitated the international community's provision of aid to Afghans displaced by the fighting, though it sealed its borders to new refugees. Supreme Leader Khamenei has the final say in all matters of state, and the lack of transparency in the decision-making process makes it hard to predict exactly what policy he will adopt if the United States seeks assistance in a conflict with Iraq. Moreover, the institutions with a role in Iranian foreign policy--the Foreign Ministry, the Intelligence Ministry, the Revolutionary Guards, and the armed forces--have conflicting agendas. Given the further variables of Tehran's bilateral relations with Baghdad and Washington, however, as well as the fractiousness of the Iraqi opposition, it seems unlikely that the same cooperation Iran offered during Operation Enduring Freedom will be forthcoming this time. A. William Samii is a regional analyst at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The views expressed here are his own.