Since Sen. Clinton is fond of her administration's 1994 deal with North Korea, I wonder if she feels the same about the deal the Clinton administration cut with the Russians a year later -- a deal that "emboldened Moscow to ignore other agreements, particularly on sales of missile and nuclear technology to Iran, according to Gordon C. Oehler, who directed the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency until he retired in 1998." The deal also led to the sale of "highly threatening military equipment such as modern submarines, fighter planes, and wake-homing torpedoes" to Iran, according to this October 2000 letter:
Statement by Former Secretaries of State, Defense, Directors of Central Intelligence and National Security Advisors on the Sale of Russian Weapons to Iran, October 24, 2000 The following individuals, who include supporters of both Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Gore, believe strongly that: The President's most important job is safeguarding our nation's security and our ability to protect our interests, our citizens and our allies and friends. The military balance in regions of vital interest to America and her allies--including the Persian Gulf, which is a critical source of the world's energy supplies--is the essential underpinning for a strong foreign policy. This is why we are deeply disturbed by the agreement made between Vice President Gore and then Russian Premier Chernomyrdin in which America acquiesced in the sale by Russia to Iran of highly threatening military equipment such as modern submarines, fighter planes, and wake-homing torpedoes. We also find incomprehensible that this agreement was not fully disclosed even to those committees of Congress charged with receiving highly classified briefings--apparently at the request of the Russian Premier. But agreement to this request is even more disturbing since the Russian sales could have brought about sanctions against Russia in accordance with a 1992 U.S. law sponsored by Senator John McCain and then Senator Al Gore.'' George P. Shultz, former Secretary of State. James A. Baker, III, former Secretary of State. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Frank C. Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense and former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, former Secretary of State. Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of State and former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Donald H. Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense. James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence. Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Caspar W. Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense. R. James Woolsey, Attorney and former Director of Central Intelligence.
By 2000, Iran's nuclear program appeared to be gathering steam: CIA Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1 January through 30 June 2000:
Russia also remained a key supplier for civilian nuclear programs in Iran, primarily focused on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project. With respect to Iran's nuclear infrastructure, Russian assistance enhances Iran's ability to support a nuclear weapons development effort. By its very nature, even the transfer of civilian technology may be of use in Iran's nuclear weapons program. We remain concerned that Tehran is seeking more than a buildup of its civilian infrastructure, and the Intelligence Community will be closely monitoring the relationship with Moscow for any direct assistance in support of a military program.
Testimony of John A. Lauder, Director of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 5, 2000:
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin with a few comments on Russian aid to Iran's nuclear power and nuclear weapons program. The Intelligence Community judges that Iran is actively pursuing the acquisition of fissile material and the expertise and technology necessary to form the material into nuclear weapons. As part of this process, Iran is attempting to develop the capability to produce both plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. As part of this effort, Iran is seeking nuclear-related equipment, material, and technical expertise from a variety of foreign sources, most notably in Russia. Tehran claims that it seeks foreign assistance to master nuclear technology for civilian research and nuclear energy programs. However, the expertise and technology gained-along with the contacts established-could be used to advance Iran's nuclear weapons effort.