Edwards Foreign Policy: Hope for the Best

John Edwards takes his turn in Foreign Affairs, explaining his foreign policy and showing how it differs from that of President Bush and his rivals for the Democratic nomination. On the critically important questions of how to deal with Iraq, and how to respond to international crises, Edwards is aimless--saying one thing, and proposing to do the opposite. He calls the approach 'smart power,' but it sounds more like 'hope for the best.' Edwards goes wrong early on:

This century's first test of our leadership arrived with terrible force on September 11, 2001. When the United States was attacked, the entire world stood with us. We could have pursued a broad policy of reengagement with the world, yet instead we squandered this broad support through a series of policies that drove away our friends and allies.

It's not that Edwards is wrong in valuing close relations with other nations; it is that this is entirely the wrong prism through which to view the September 11 attacks. The question was not whether we would use them to improve relations with allies and rivals; it was whether the nation would act to make sure that such an attack was not repeated. In just the 5th paragraph of this lengthy piece, Edwards makes us seriously question whether he has the judgment to fill the office he seeks. In the next paragraph, he recasts history--crediting Ronald Reagan with building international respect for the US, and bringing down the USSR:

For 50 years, presidents from Truman and Dwight Eisenhower to Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton built strong alliances and deepened the world's respect for us. We gained that respect by viewing our military strength not as an end in itself but as a means to protect a system of laws and institutions that gave hope to billions across the globe. In avoiding the temptation to rule as an empire, we hastened the fall of a corrupt and evil one in the Soviet Union.

Ronald Reagan was criticized bitterly by Democrats for provoking the USSR and dividing U.S. allies, allegedly leading to a diminished respect for the US abroad--echoing modern criticisms of George Bush. His pursuit of missile defense, the placement of Pershing missiles in Europe, the labeling of the USSR as an 'Evil Empire'--Democrats claimed that all these actions provoked the enemy, threatened relations with our allies, and would prolong the conflict with Communism. But if Edwards were running for president in 1984, he'd probably say the same thing of Reagan that he is saying of Bush today. Most of the rest of Edwards' piece amounts to a collection of unfounded assertions and election slogans: 'the war on terror is a bumper sticker,' we've 'walked into the terrorists' trap,' Bush is pushing 'a policy of fear'--all stuff that we've heard many times before. Interestingly, Edwards compliments local law enforcement for breaking up plots like the attack planned at New York's JFK, but he doesn't compliment you know who for the prevention of any terror attacks in the US since 9/11. This paragraph seems the best summary of Edwards' near-term plans:

We should begin our reengagement with the world by bringing an end to the Iraq war. Iraq's problems are deep and dangerous, but they cannot be solved by the U.S. military. For over a year, I have argued for an immediate withdrawal of 40,000 to 50,000 U.S. combat troops from Iraq, followed by an orderly and complete withdrawal of all combat troops. Once we are out of Iraq, the United States must retain sufficient forces in the region to prevent a genocide, a regional spillover of the civil war, or the establishment of an al Qaeda safe haven. We will most likely need to retain quick-reaction forces in Kuwait and a significant naval presence in the Persian Gulf. We will also need some security capabilities in Baghdad, inside the Green Zone, to protect the U.S. embassy and U.S. personnel. Finally, we will need a diplomatic offensive to engage the rest of the world--including Middle Eastern nations and our allies in Europe--in working to secure Iraq's future. All of these measures will finally allow us to close this terrible chapter and move on to the broader challenges of the new century.

So get out of Iraq, leave a 'quick-reaction force' in Kuwait, a military garrison at the Embassy in Baghdad, and enough troops in the region 'to prevent a genocide.' Then commence a 'diplomatic offensive' in Europe and the region. But if Edwards is concerned about a genocide, why does he advocate a withdrawal? Surely the U.S. risks fewer lives in Iraq by continuing the mission that exists today, as opposed to leaving ASAP and returning to prevent the genocide? Or does Edwards hope that the 'diplomatic offensive' will convince Iran or some other regional power to take charge of security? And in light of his plan for Iraq, can one really take this next paragraph seriously:

We also need to renew our commitment to engagement and diplomacy in order to solve problems before they occur, rather than scrambling to deal with crises after they have erupted. With engagement comes far greater knowledge and the potential for progress and even trust...

So in the case of Iraq, we should ignore military progress, leave the nation to fend for itself, and insert American troops in a full-blown civil war to prevent a genocide. But more broadly, we should practice 'engagement and diplomacy' to prevent crises before they develop. Taken together, this sounds like a 'hope for the best' approach. And indeed, when he describes his approach to Iran, it confirms it:

With a threat so serious, no U.S. president should take any option off the table -- diplomacy, sanctions, engagement, or even military force. When we say something is unacceptable, however, we must mean it, and that requires developing a strategy that delivers results, not just rhetoric. Instead of saber rattling about military action, we should employ an effective combination of carrots and sticks. For example, right now we must do everything we can to isolate Iran's leader from the moderate forces within the country. We need to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions through diplomatic measures that will, over time, force Iran to finally understand that the international community will not allow it to possess nuclear weapons. Every major U.S. ally agrees that the advent of a nuclear Iran would be a threat to global security. We should continue to work with other great powers to offer Tehran economic incentives for good behavior. At the same time, we must use much more serious economic sanctions to deter Ahmadinejad's government when it refuses to cooperate.

So military force is explicitly on the table, but we must not threaten it. In fact, we must never talk about it. Rather, we must make it clear that a nuclear-armed Iran is 'unacceptable,' and we must be prepared to talk as much as necessary--and even use bribes and sanctions--to make it clear. But if military action is 'on-the-table,' and a nuclear Iran is 'unacceptable,' then the necessary conclusion is that military force lies at the end of this chain of logic. Edwards however, indicates no willingness to initiate a strike; does he expect Israel to do the dirty work? If so, it's worth spelling out. And even in a new century, with new threats, Edwards even gets caught on a liberal trope from the 1970s:

In working toward the goal of a nuclear-free world, the United States must lead the effort to strengthen the international nonproliferation institutions, not cast them aside.

Now I don't own any nukes myself, but I have no problem with my own government having them. It would even be OK under a (God forbid) President Edwards. Similarly, I see no reason to worry about nukes in the hands of Canada, Israel, the UK... and probably a few other nations. They continue to provide a deterrent value, and they may have tactical applications as well. It's unfortunate that Edwards seems to be recycling rhetoric from the Mondale campaign. Edwards goes on at some length, but the piece as a whole doesn't offer much of an indication of what to expect under President Edwards. One point conflicts with the next, and the entire piece seems a string of slogans designed to appeal to one or another constituency--a plan for election as opposed to a plan for government. If Edwards ends up as the Democratic nominee, it should provide plenty of fodder for his GOP challenger.