"E specially as a Social Democrat," said German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier a few days after the U.S. elections, "I am glad that Barack Obama won. All night I sat in front of my TV and was enthusiastic and elated." The minister's merriment reflects the mood all over Old Europe: anticipation of the end of the Bush nightmare and hope for change under St Obama, the lightworker. It's a wonder there were no parades--yet.
While such views are not new among Europeans and the American left, it was astounding to witness the sheer number of conservatives jumping ship and bashing Bush. With even erstwhile staunch Bush supporters such as John Bolton attesting the Bush administration's "total intellectual collapse" (on occasion of the North Korea deal), the verdict is in: President Bush, especially because of his foreign policy, has been an utter failure.
Contesting this judgment is not a popular pastime these days, not even among Republicans. Given the glum political atmosphere in a year of dismal election results, this might be understandable. And true enough, many of the Bush administration's key foreign policy decisions have turned out more difficult than anticipated--most notably the prolonged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the long run, however, the Bush legacy will most certainly receive a fair treatment, emphasizing those achievements now buried under partisan politics and veiled by the inevitable problems that accompany the implementation of every groundbreaking policy. In fact, future U.S. administrations will be well-advised to build on the core ideas formulated and realized by the Bush administration. After all, there are at least three reasons to applaud the Bush foreign policy.
- The Bush administration developed the first coherent vision for an American role in the post-Cold War world.
Victory in the Cold War led to years of confusion in American politics. Bush senior, troubled by the "vision thing," was the steward of stability whose "New World Order" never had any meaning until Hulk Hogan introduced the concept to World Championship Wrestling in 1996. After the realist stasis, the liberal internationalist Bill Clinton embraced the buzz word of the decade, "globalization," and cast an ever-more intricate web of international treaties and institutions, designed to create an interdependent world of peace and prosperity--under the headline of "engagement and enlargement." Well, this tumescent globaloney was too much to take even for Clinton's own Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, who deemed the whole visionary strategy "a trade policy masquerading as foreign policy."
On 9/11, it became obvious that foreign policy needs to be about more than making money. The twin challenges of (mostly Islamist) anti-modern backlash and failing states breeding instability had been rising all throughout the 1990s, but it was due to the catalytic attacks of 9/11 and the Bush administration's leadership that the U.S. finally came up with a viable approach to post-Cold War foreign policy. The new doctrine identified the main threats to a liberal world order: terrorism, states sponsoring terrorism, and the nexus between weapons of mass destruction, irresponsible regimes, and terrorist organizations. It also outlined a strategy of forward deterrence to counter these threats: combat al-Qaeda militarily and destroy the structures which made its rise possible by stabilizing failed states and democratizing the Broader Middle East.
Granted, despite considerable progress in some areas, none of these ambitious goals has been fulfilled yet. Still, Bush has given the unfolding global conflict a name, identified the enemy, developed a doctrine to fight and win this struggle, and has begun to implement a strategy based on this doctrine. That is, in historic terms, not a small achievement.
What most contemporary critics fail to recognize is that at its most basic, this "Bush Doctrine," just as the war on terror, is less about preemption and regime change than about the understanding that the liberal international system is in peril and that the United States is the only capable custodian of this system. Even without a Cold War substitute, the free world depends on U.S. leadership and assertiveness--this is the lesson his successors should learn from Bush.
- The Bush administration fought the right wars and laid the groundwork for winning them.
There can be no doubt that the war in Afghanistan was a war of necessity. The regime of the Taliban provided safe havens and training camps for al-Qaeda. After 9/11, there was not a single serious politician in the civilized world who did not call for an eradication of this manifest threat. Moreover, the wounded superpower needed to demonstrate that such a violation of the rules of the international system as committed on 9/11 comes at a huge price. Add the moral obligation of the mighty to assist the brutalized people of Afghanistan and you have a powerful case for a lasting commitment to OEF and ISAF.
For the usual reasons--domestic inhibitions, strategies of free-riding etc.--not all NATO allies and partner countries put their full weight behind the effort in Afghanistan. Even the United States has not always directed the necessary attention at the complex task of simultaneously liberating, pacifying, and rebuilding the country. Considering the history of tribalism and the intrinsic opposition to outside interference, it is no surprise that progress in Afghanistan can only happen incrementally. The real story, however, is that there is any progress at all. The United States and its allies traveled an uneven learning curve, but with the comprehensive approach of combined security and state-building measures taking ever more hold there is much reason to be optimistic.
In 2003, Iraq was a war of necessity as well, and despite a disastrous post-war policy it remains exactly that. Although no WMD could be found in the country after the removal of Saddam Hussein, this does not alter the fact that Saddam had been prepared to build just such weapons within ten years had the United States not intervened. His record of acquiring and using WMD, of betraying and ridiculing the UN inspections and sanctions regimes as well as his many proven connections to Islamist terrorist organizations thus turned Iraq into a manifest and urgent threat to U.S., regional, and world security.
In addition, Iraq has always played a key role in the war on terror. The root cause of Islamist terrorism, according to the Bush analysis, is not poverty or Western policy but political disenfranchisement. The vast majority of the people in Islamic dictatorships have no access to education, no opportunity to pursue independent economic success, no say in the political process, and no investment in their individual future. Especially under conditions of demographic and economic pressure--as is the case virtually everywhere in the Middle East--they therefore fall easy prey to those who instrumentalize Islam to further their own personal or ideological goals. In order to achieve sustained success in fighting terrorism, Bush had to change the political dynamics in the Middle East, and Iraq was the most plausible point to start.
Again, as in Afghanistan, implementation proved tricky. But with the tangible success of the surge--less violence, uprooting of Al Qaeda in Iraq, spread of thriving, pacified areas of civil society etc.--there is plenty of reason to be optimistic. Iraq in, say, 2040 might quite possibly be the showcase for a modern, liberal, Islamic democracy in the Middle East Bush had envisioned. One thing is certain: This would not have happened without the forceful change of regime. Indeed, thanks to the initiative of President Bush, both the people of Afghanistan and the people of Iraq are better off already than they were in September 2001--and the same holds true for the world's liberal democracies.
3 . The Bush administration implemented a constructive, principled, and interest-oriented Pacific policy.
The focus on the Middle East and the war on terror leads many observers to overlook one of the crucial achievements of the Bush foreign policy: The American position in the Pacific area is stronger than it has been in decades. U.S. China policy, defined by a delicate balance of engagement and pressure, is the envy of realist and idealist policy-makers alike and led to the most constructive relationship both nations have enjoyed since the days of Nixon. American-Japanese relations since 2000, particularly under Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe, have never been better. This is underlined not just by the photogenic and good-natured celebrations of friendship during state visits but, more importantly, in Japan's significant and increasing contributions to global security as in the cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan. With India, the third major power in the region, Bush's courageous and far-sighted stance on the nuclear issue helped establish another strategic partnership. It is remarkable that the administration managed to escape the rivalries between all three of these states and shaped efficient bilateral relations with all of them. Especially with regard to the longstanding power competition between Beijing and New Delhi, Washington embarked on a course that will impress historians as a modern version of the British divide and rule method: embrace and govern.
Moreover, Bush strengthened ties with Australia which as a principal ally in the war on terror became a more important actor in the Pacific sphere. The U.S. also maintained strong commitments to traditional partners such as South Korea and Taiwan while also expanding its influence among the former Soviet Republics in Asia.
Taken together, these efforts signify a subtle preparation for an ongoing shift in international power from the Atlantic to the Pacific region. Bush made sure that despite this development the United States will not lose its strategic focus and will be well positioned to take on the power struggles of the future. Therefore, in the long run, Bush's foreign policy in the Pacific will be lauded as his coup de main.
Great modern presidents were hardly ever considered such at the end of their time in office. Harry Truman for instance could never quite shake the image of the bumbling simpleton, and in his final months as president his low approval ratings helped Republicans reclaim the White House for the first time in twenty years. It took more historical distance to appreciate Truman as the architect of an American foreign policy for a new age. Similarly, when Ronald Reagan left office shaken by the Iran Contra Affair, his public approval was at a low point, his derisive opponents numerous. Today, he is not only credited with restoring American strength and winning the Cold War but he is idolized by conservatives everywhere. On the other hand, achievements of presidents such as Bill Clinton who most probably would have been popular enough to win a third term often fade with time.
In that sense it is plausible to assume that history will be kind to the Bush presidency. Bush never flinched in the face of public disapproval or resistance in the international arena. He has protected the United States--and the free world--from the threats of global terror networks. He began to implement a strategy for winning the global war on terror and created a vision of a world worth fighting for. While George W. Bush certainly was not the greatest president in American history, he was a principled leader and more successful than most observers acknowledge. Once the heated debates of the day give way to the somber retrospective of historians, the administration of George W. Bush will finally receive a fair assessment--and it is going to be a good one.
Dr. Patrick Keller is the Coordinator of Foreign and Security Policy at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Berlin, Germany. Dustin Dehez is a historian and Lecturer in International Relations at the Freie Universität Berlin, Germany.