Joshua Muravchik has penned an incisive and authoritative essay in Commentary on the past, present, and future of neoconservatism, which can be found here. Here's the key graf:
As for the neoconservatives, they have taken their lumps over the war in Iraq. Nonetheless, the tenets of neoconservatism continue to offer the most cogent approach to the challenge that faces our country. To recapitulate those tenets one last time: (1) Our struggle is moral, against an evil enemy who revels in the destruction of innocents. Knowing this can help us assess our adversaries correctly and make appropriate strategic choices. Saying it convincingly will strengthen our side and weaken theirs. (2) The conflict is global, and outcomes in one theater will affect those in others. (3) While we should always prefer nonviolent methods, the use of force will continue to be part of the struggle. (4) The spread of democracy offers an important, peaceful way to weaken our foe and reduce the need for force.
Muravchik outlines four priorities for any future (foreign-policy) neoconservatism:
First, for all our failures in Iraq, we cannot afford to accept defeat there; nor do we have to. True, our more fanciful images of what Iraq would become after Saddam's removal have gone by the boards. But there is still a world of difference between a relatively stable if troubled country and a state of anarchy. And then there is Iran. Even if we turn a corner in Iraq, our relative success will be negated if we allow Iran to obtain a nuclear bomb. Once it does, not only will we be haunted by the specter of nuclear terrorism, but we may be constrained by nuclear blackmail from actions we would want to take in future chapters of the war against terror. Next, only by enlarging our military can we base strategic decisions on military need and not on the availability of forces. How is it that a nation of 300 million cannot indefinitely sustain a force level of 150,000 in a given theater, meaning one soldier for every 2,000 Americans? Finally, our efforts to foster democracy in the Middle East must not be curtailed but prosecuted vigorously and more effectively. True, the "Arab spring" of 2005 did not turn out to be as successful as the famous "Prague spring" of 1968. But then, it took two decades for that Prague spring to yield fruit. The modest liberalization in the Middle East and the democratic ferment that we have stirred there promise further advances if we persevere.
There's this widespread sense in Washington that neoconservatism is about to go into exile. Muravchik's essay demonstrates that no such thing is about to occur. It's well worth your time. And while you're at it, check out Robert Kagan's "End of Dreams, Return of History," a tour de force of contemporary geopolitical analysis that has not received the attention it deserves. These two pieces will fortify you for the future politics of foreign-policy. Also, I hear that Kagan may be expanding the "End of Dreams, Return of History" into a small book. This is great news for his fans--I'm one!--and an apt reminder to suggest you read the first part of his summa, Dangerous Nation.